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LLC - Presentation Materials Entitled ACRS Presentation: NuScale Instrumentation and Controls Design Overview, PM-0618-60212, Revision 0
	ML18235A315
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Issue date:	08/23/2018
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To:	; Office of New Reactors
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	LO-0818-61423 PM-0618-60212, Rev 0
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PM-0618-60212 Revision: 0 NuScale Nonproprietary ACRS Presentation:

NuScale Instrumentation and Controls Design Overview Brian Arnholt Supervisor, l&C Engineering Rufino Ayala l&C Engineer Paul lnfanger Licensing Project Manager August 23, 2018 Copyright 2018 by NuScale Power, LLC.

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Purpose

Provide an over-view of the NuScale Instrumentation and Control (l&C) systems and highlights of the l&C systems design described in NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Chapter 7 2

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Abbreviations APL - actuation and priority l_ogic ASAI - application specific action item CCF - common cause failure CFDS - containment flood and drain system CIS - containment isolation signal CNT - containment system eves - chemical and volume control system 03 - diversity and defense-in-depth Dl&C - digital instrumentation and control DHRS - decay heat removal system ECCS - emergency core cooling system EDSS - highly reliable DC power system EONS - normal DC power system EIM - equipment interface module ELVS - low AC voltage power system ESFAS - engineered safety features actuation system FPGA-field programmable gate array HIPS - highly integrated protection system HWM - hard-wired module l&C - instrumentation and controls ICIS - in-core instrumentation system IEEE - Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers ISM - input sub-module MCS - module control system MIB - monitoring and indication bus MIB-CM - MIB communication module MPS - module protection system NPM - NuScale Power Module NMS - neutron monitoring system PAM - post-accident monitoring PCS - plant control system PPS - plant protection system RMS - radiation monitoring system RTB - reactor trip breaker RTS - reactor trip system SBM - scheduling and bypass module SOB - safety data bus SDIS - safety display and indication system SFM - safety function module SVM - scheduling and voting module UTB - under the bioshield 3

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NuScale DCA Chapter 7 Structure

NuScale Chapter 7 Design Certification Application Follows Design Specific Review Standard Framework 4

PM-0618-60212 Revision: D Section 7.0: Instrumentation and Controls - Introduction and Overview

System Architecture and Overview

Key System Descriptions Section 7.1 Fundamental Design Principles

Independence

Redundancy

Predictability and Repeatability

Diversity and Defense-in-Depth

Simplicity

Hazards Analysis Section 7.2 System Features Design and system characteristics in accordance with IEEE 603-1991, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" and IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-2003, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Digital Computers and Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations" Copyright 2018 by NuScale Power, LLC.

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5 PM-0618-60212 Revision: 0 Section 7.0: Instrumentation and Controls -

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l&C System Design Basis main steam isolation valves main feedwater isolation valves control rod drives reactor vent valves steam header decay heat removal passive condenser control rods reactor recirculation -+-t---

valves 6

PM-0618-60212 Revision: 0 decay heat removal actuation valves

--r--r~-*--+--+-+- containment vessel reactor pool

safety relief valves

, +ff-+---+-+--

reactor pressure vessel

+---+--+-- pressurizer upper plenum steam generators hot leg riser

.+--4--+--+-

downcomer reactor core lower plenum NOT TO SCALE Safety l&C Platform

Digital l&C system

Use of FPGAs allows for diversification within the safety l&C platform

Passive safety features result in a simpler safety l&C platform

A simpler and more diversified design results in a more reliable safety l&C platform

No safety-related pumps or fans to control

Provide reactor trip breaker and pressurizer heater breaker trip signals

Provide trip signals to solenoid operated valves

On "loss of power" solenoids de-energize and associated valves fail in the "safe" position and reactor trip and pressurizer heater breakers open N ~!J.~"~-~-~r Template#: 0000-21727-F01 R4 Copyright 2018 by NuScale Power, LLC.

l&C Architecture Overview Safety Display and Indication Workstation (x12)

Safety Manual Safety Display&

Information Accident Monitoring Main Control Room Module Control System Workstation (x12)

Non safety Control Nonsafety Display Safety Sensors Modula Prolaclion System (x12)

Monitoring Nonsafety Manual*

Plant Control System Workstation Non safety Control Nonsafety Display Alternate Control Areas**

MCSand PCS Workstations Nonsafety Control Nonsafety Display ---

- Includes Remote Shutdown Station, Rad-Waste Building control room, and others Plant Control System Plant Protection System Module Control System (x12)

Priority Logic

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Equipment Nonsafety Manual*

Manually enabf ed Hard-wired signal for each component Plant Network

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Module-Specific l&C Systems 8

PM-061 8-6021 2 Revision: 0 Digital FPGA-based Protection System (MPS)

Analog Digital-distributed control system lncore Instrument System (ICIS)

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Plant-Level l&C Systems Digital FPGA-based Protection System (PPS)

Nonsafety-

related, nonrisk-significant Digital FPGA-based Digital distributed control system Analog and digital microprocessor 9

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Module Protection System

The NuScale safety-related MPS design is based on topical report TR-1015-18653-P-A, "Design of the Highly Integrated Protection System Platform" (HIPS TR).

The safety-related l&C systems design basis conforms to the following without deviation or exceptions:

IEEE 603-1991, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-2003, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Digital Computers and Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations" Staff Requirements Memorandum to SECY 93-087, '"'Policy, Technical and Licensing Issues Pertaining to Evolutionary and Advanced Light-water Reactor Designs"

Major components:

Four separation groups of sensor inputs, electronics and trip determination Class 1 E DC-DC power converters/isolation devices Reactor trip and pressurizer heater trip breakers Two divisions of RTS and ESFAS voting and actuation components Two divisions of hard-wired manual actuation switches Nonsafety-related 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months timers Nonsafety-related maintenance workstations

MCR isolation switches provided in Remote Shutdown Station.

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Loss of AC Power

NuScale l&C Architecture Low AC provides for nonsafety-related voltage sensors post-accident monitoring (PAM) functions.

Performed by MPS, PPS and SDIS and MCS for Type B, C and D, and other systems for Type E

MPS "PAM-only" mode supports long-term PAM variable monitoring MPS

Sensors that support long-term PAM functions remain energized for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

Battery Mission Times EDSS-MS Channel A & D - 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (ECCS Hold Mode)

EDSS-MS Channel B & C - 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months (PAM Support)

Time = 0 seconds EDSS-C Division I & II - 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Low ELVS bus (PAM Support) voltage detected 11 PM-0618-60212 Revision: 0 Copyright 2018 by NuScale Power, LLC.

ELVS bus voltage monitoriQ.g ___

l&C logic AC Power DC Power Time = 60 seconds Reactor trip Time = 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months DHRS actuation ECCS Actuation CNT isolation ECCS Hold Mode PAM Only Mode a! NUSCALE..

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HIPS TR Application Specific Action Items

FSAR addresses all 65 ASAls in HIPS TR.

FSAR Table 7.0-2 provides cross-references for all 65 ASAls from HIPS TR.

Table 7.0-2: Highly Integrated Protection System Topical Report (HIPS TR) Application Specific Information Cross References HIPS TR Section 7.0 -

Section 7.1 -Fundamental Design Principles Section 7.2 -System Characteristics Application Introduction and Specific Overview Action Item 7.0.1 7.0.2 7.0.3 7.0.4 7.1.1 7.1.2 7.1.3 7.1.4 7.1.S 7.1.6 7.1.7 7.1.8 7.2.1 7.2.2 7.2.3 7.2.4 7.2.S 7.2.6 7.2.7 7.2.8 7.2.9 7.2.10 7.2.11 7.2.12 7.2.13 Number 1

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31-X 7.2.14 7.2.15

~ I I I I I I I I I : I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Note 1: For ASAls 3 through 6, the overall conformance of the MPS to IEEE Std 603-1991, IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-2003, Digital l&C ISG-04 and SRM for SECY-93-087 is described in Section 7.1.1.

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MPS Top-Level Architecture Signal Conditioning A

Monitoring Trip Determination __ _. and A

Indication Signal Conditioning C

Monitoring Trip Determ1nation and C

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Indication I

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Reactor Trip Breakers LEGEND RTS Reactor Trip System ESFAS Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Hard-wired Signal One-way Serial Connection Redundant One-Way Serial Data Connection Copyright 2018 by NuScale Power, LLC.

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MPS Breaker Configuration

Four reactor trip

breakers, two per division

Four pressurizer heater trip

breakers, two per division Each breaker opens upon loss of power to the under voltage coil.

A shunt trip coil is provided as a nonsafety-related diverse means to open the breakers 14 PM-0618-60212 Revision: 0 Manual Trip From EONS Manual Actuation ELVS 480VAC ELVS 480VAC RTS Voting RTS Voting I

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Manual Actuation Pre~surlzer Heater Controllers Proportional A and Backup A PreS$urizer Heater Controllers Proportional Band Backup B N ~~g;*~-~.§ -

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Nonsafety System Segmentation

Segmentation is used as a defensive and preventative measure in the MCS architecture. Segmentation provides functional independence between major control functions preventing against a failure in one controller group from causing an undesirable condition in another controller group.

Preventive and limiting measures are determined by a susceptibility analysis that considered malfunctions and spurious actuations, as set forth in NRC Dl&C-ISG-04, Section 3.1, staff position 5.

Control groups were evaluated for effect on:

- reactivity addition to the reactor coolant system

- primary coolant pressure increase or decrease

- primary coolant temperature increase or decrease

- primary coolant level increase or decrease

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Fundamental Design Principles

Independence

Redundancy

Predictability and Repeatability

Diversity and Defense-in-Depth

Simplicity 17 PM-0618-60212 Revision: 0 Copyright 2018 by NuScale Power, LLC.

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Independence

The MPS and NMS are designed with physical, electrical, communication and functional independence.

One-way communication from safety to nonsafety systems through isolated data paths.

Separation of safety and non-safety communications on different communication busses.

MCS control of safety-related components via hard-wired isolated inputs from MCS (no digital signals) 1111 Safety Data Paths (1, 2, 3) llllsafety Data Path 1 1111 Safety Data Path 2 llllsafety Data Path 3 c=i Monitoring and Indication Path 18 PM-0618-6021 2 Revision: 0 4-20mA input flSMsl Isolation SFM#1 EIM#1 4-20mA Input flSMsl lso at,on SFM#2 EIM#2 Copyright 2018 by NuScale Power, LLC.

4-20mA Input flSMsl lso at1on SFM#n EIM#n Separation Group A Chassis MIB-CM MIB-CM

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Redundancy

FSAR Section 7.1.3

Four separation groups, two divisions of MPS

Four channels of safety-related NMS

- MPS and NMS meet single failure criterion

Post-accident monitoring channels

- No PAM Type A variables

- PAM Type B and C variables meet single failure criterion

Nonsafety l&C Systems incorporate redundancy principles for high reliability, asset protection 19 PM-0618-60212 Revision: 0 Copyright 2018 by NuScale Power, LLC.

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Predictability and Repeatability

FSAR Section 7.1.4

The MPS applies the deterministic features of the HIPS platform.

The MPS response time is accounted for in the plant safety analysis actuation delays.

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Diversity and Defense-in-Depth

FSAR Section 7.1.5

D3 strategy relies on platform/technology diversity for defense against common-cause failures r

- diversity for the platform technology is achieved through different FPGA chip technologies and their associated development tool sets

Approach simplifies the D3 Diversity Assessment and narrows scope of coping analysis required for digital-based sensors.

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Sensor Diversity

Coping Analysis performed (summarized in FSAR Table 7.1-18) to address potential digital-based CCF vulnerabilities associated with digital-based sensors for pressure, level and flow measurements.

Coping analysis included a full evaluation of all design basis events analyzed using best-estimate methods to analyze a postulated digital-based sensor CCF.

- In some cases, the event never progressed to a trip condition using best-estimate analytical methods.

- In other cases, diverse, non-digital sensors initiated the trip condition.

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24 Control of Access

MPS design conforms to IEEE 603-1991, Section 5.9, "Control of Access" and Secure Development and Operational Environment requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.152, "Criteria for Use of Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 3.

- Physical protection: locked cabinets/rooms.

- MPS design does not provide for remote access capability.

- Physical and logical controls prevent modification of MPS FPGA Logic while in service.

- Limited set of MPS tunable parameters (i.e., setpoints) can be modified when SFM is bypassed and special equipment is used.

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Automatic and Manual Controls

All MPS RTS/ESFAS functions occur automatically.

MPS provides for manual actuation via hard-wired switches in main control room as backup to automatic functions:

- reactor trip

- ECCS actuation

- decay heat removal actuation

- containment isolation

- demineralized water system isolation

- chemical and volume control system isolation

- pressurizer heater trip

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Actuation Priority Logic

APL circuit provides for prioritization of safety-related signals Automatic/Man u a I RTS/ESFAS actuation commands have highest priority.

Enable control of safety-related components from nonsafety-related MCS via Enable Nonsafety Control Switch MCS hard-wired interfaces Non-digital (no software) circuit -- comprised of discrete components 26 PM-0618-6021 2 Revision: 0 Copyright 201 8 by NuScale Power, LLC.

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Conclusion

NuScale FSAR follows the new Chapter 7 DSRS structure

- Overall resulted in more streamlined, efficient review.

The NuScale l&C design meets regulatory requirements contained in IEEE 603-1991, IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003 and SRM to SECY-93-087.

The l&C architecture and systems incorporate the fundamental design principles with an overall focus on simplicity.

NuScale passively safe design results in a simple l&C design solution - no complicated functions

- Simple RTS/ESFAS functions (simple comparators, simple functions)

- No closed/open loop control - all safety-related functions are "de-energize to actuate"

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28 P M-0618-60212 Revision : 0 Appendix:

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Portland Office 6650 SW Redwood Lane, Suite 210 Portland, OR 97224 971.371.1592 Corvallis Office 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvallis, OR 97330 541.360.0500 Rockville Office 11333 Woodglen Ave., Suite 205 Rockville, MO 20852 301. 770.0472 Charlotte Office 2815 Coliseum Centre Drive, Suite 230 Charlotte, NC 28217 980. 349. 4804 Richland Office 1933 Jadwin Ave., Suite 130 Richland, WA 99354 541. 360. 0500 Arlington Office 2300 Clarendon Blvd., Suite 1110 Arlington, VA 22201 London Office 1st Floor Portland House Bressenden Place London SW1 E 5BH United Kingdom

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