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LLC - Presentation Materials Entitled ACRS Presentation: NuScale Instrumentation and Controls Design Overview, PM-0618-60212, Revision 0
	ML18235A315
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Issue date:	08/23/2018
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NuScale Nonproprietary ACRS Presentation:

NuScale Instrumentation and Controls Design Overview Brian Arnholt Supervisor, l&C Engineering Rufino Ayala l&C Engineer Paul lnfanger Licensing Project Manager August 23, 2018 PM-0618-602 12 Revision : 0 Copyright 2018 by NuSca le Power, LLC .

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Purpose

Provide an over-view of the NuScale Instrumentation and Control (l&C) systems and highlights of the l&C systems design described in NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Chapter 7 2

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Abbreviations APL - actuation and priority l_ogic IEEE - Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers ASAI - application specific action item ISM - input sub-module CCF - common cause failure MCS - module control system CFDS - containment flood and drain system MIB - monitoring and indication bus CIS - containment isolation signal MIB-CM - MIB communication module CNT - containment system MPS - module protection system eves - chemical and volume control system NPM - NuScale Power Module 03 - diversity and defense-in-depth NMS - neutron monitoring system Dl&C - digital instrumentation and control PAM - post-accident monitoring DHRS - decay heat removal system PCS - plant control system ECCS - emergency core cooling system PPS - plant protection system EDSS - highly reliable DC power system RMS - radiation monitoring system EONS - normal DC power system RTB - reactor trip breaker EIM - equipment interface module RTS - reactor trip system ELVS - low AC voltage power system SBM - scheduling and bypass module ESFAS - engineered safety features actuation system SOB - safety data bus FPGA- field programmable gate array SDIS - safety display and indication system HIPS - highly integrated protection system SFM - safety function module HWM - hard-wired module SVM - scheduling and voting module l&C - instrumentation and controls UTB - under the bioshield ICIS - in-core instrumentation system 3

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NuScale DCA Chapter 7 Structure

NuScale Chapter 7 Design Certification Application Follows Design Specific Review Standard Framework Section 7.0: Instrumentation and Controls - Introduction and Overview

System Architecture and Overview

Key System Descriptions Section 7 .1 Fundamental Design Principles

Independence

Redundancy

Predictability and Repeatability

Diversity and Defense-in-Depth

Simplicity

Hazards Analysis Section 7.2 System Features

Design and system characteristics in accordance with IEEE 603-1991, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" and IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-2003, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Digital Computers and Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations" 4

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Section 7.0: Instrumentation and Controls -

Introduction and Overview 5

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l&C System Design Basis main steam isolation valves main feedwater isolation valves Safety l&C Platform

Digital l&C system

Use of FPGAs allows for diversification decay heat removal actuation valves within the safety l&C platform

--r--r~-*--+--+-+- containment vessel

Passive safety features result in a control rod drives reactor pool simpler safety l&C platform reactor vent valves - - - - safety relief valves

A simpler and more diversified design

, +ff- + - --+-+-- reactor pressure vessel

- - - --+---+--+-- pressurizer results in a more reliable safety l&C steam header upper plenum platform decay heat removal passive condenser

No safety-related pumps or fans to steam generators control

Provide reactor trip breaker and hot leg riser control rods pressurizer heater breaker trip signals reactor recirculation -+-t---

Provide trip signals to solenoid operated valves .+- - + - - + - downcomer reactor core valves lower plenum

On "loss of power" solenoids de-energize and associated valves fail in NOT TO SCALE the "safe" position and reactor trip and pressurizer heater breakers open 6

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l&C Architecture Overview

- Includes Remote Shutdown Station, Rad-Main Control Room Alte rnate Control Waste Building control Areas**

room, and others Safety Display and Module Control System Workstation (x12) Plant Control System MCSand PCS Indication Workstation Workstation Workstations (x12)

Safety Non safety Non safety Nonsafety Control Manual Control Control Nonsafety Nonsafety Nonsafety Plant Control System Safety Display Display Display Display&

Information Accident Monitoring Safety Modula Prolaclion System Plant Protection System Module Control System (x12) (x12)

Sensors Priority Monitoring Logic Nonsafety Manual*

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CRH/CRV Equipment Nonsafety Manual*

Manually enabfed Hard-wired signal Plant for each component Network

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Module-Specific l&C Systems Digital Protection FPGA-based System (MPS)

Analog Digital-distributed control system lncore Instrument System (ICIS)

A1 - Safety-related, risk-significant 82 - Nonsafety-related, not risk-significant 8

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Plant-Level l&C Systems Digital Protection FPGA-based System (PPS)

Digital FPGA-based Nonsafety-related, nonrisk-significant Digital distributed control system Analog and digital microprocessor 9

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Module Protection System

The NuScale safety-related MPS design is based on topical report TR-1015-18653-P-A, "Design of the Highly Integrated Protection System Platform" (HIPS TR).

The safety-related l&C systems design basis conforms to the following without deviation or exceptions:

- IEEE 603-1991, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"

- IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-2003 , "IEEE Standard Criteria for Digital Computers and Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations"

- Staff Requirements Memorandum to SECY 93-087 , '"'Policy, Technical and Licensing Issues Pertaining to Evolutionary and Advanced Light-water Reactor Designs"

Major components:

- Four separation groups of sensor inputs , electronics and trip determination

- Class 1E DC-DC power converters/isolation devices

- Reactor trip and pressurizer heater trip breakers

- Two divisions of RTS and ESFAS voting and actuation components

- Two divisions of hard-wired manual actuation switches

- Nonsafety-related 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months timers

- Nonsafety-related maintenance workstations

MCR isolation switches provided in Remote Shutdown Station.

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Loss of AC Power

NuScale l&C Architecture Low AC ELVS bus voltage monitoriQ.g ___

provides for nonsafety-related voltage se nsors l&C logic AC Power post-accident monitoring (PAM) DC Power functions.

Performed by MPS, PPS and SDIS and MCS for Type B, C and D, and other systems for Type E

MPS "PAM-only" mode supports long-term PAM variable monitoring MPS

Sensors that support long-term PAM functions remain energized for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

Battery Mission Times

- EDSS-MS Channel A & D - 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (ECCS Hold Mode)

- EDSS-MS Channel B & C - 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months (PAM Support)

Time = 60 seconds Time = 0 seconds Reactor trip Time = 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months

- EDSS-C Division I & II - 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Low ELVS bus DHRS actuation ECCS Actuation voltage detected (PAM Support) CNT isolation ECCS Hold Mode PAM Only Mode 11 PM-0618-60212 a!

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HIPS TR Application Specific Action Items

FSAR addresses all 65 ASAls in HIPS TR.

FSAR Table 7.0-2 provides cross-references for all 65 ASAls from HIPS TR.

Table 7.0-2: Highly Integrated Protection System Topical Report (HIPS TR) Application Specific Information Cross References HIPS TR Section 7.0 - Section 7.1 - Fundamental Design Principles Section 7.2 - System Characteristics Application Introduction and Specific Overview Action Item 7.0.1 7.0.2 7.0.3 7.0.4 7.1.1 7.1.2 7.1.3 7.1.4 7.1.S 7.1.6 7.1.7 7.1.8 7.2.1 7.2.2 7.2.3 7.2.4 7.2.S 7.2.6 7.2.7 7.2.8 7.2.9 7.2.10 7.2.11 7.2.12 7.2.13 7.2.14 7.2.15 Number 1 X X 2 X 31- X

~ I I I I I I I I I: I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Note 1: For ASAls 3 through 6, the overall conformance of the MPS to IEEE Std 603-1991, IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-2003, Digital l&C ISG-04 and SRM for SECY-93-087 is described in Section 7.1 .1.

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MPS Top-Level Architecture Signal Conditioning Signal Conditioning A C Monitoring Monitoring Trip Determination __ _. and

_ Trip Determ1nation and A

C ---+

Indication Indication I > *

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I lndication I Indication Manual - - - - Priority Logic I ----Manual Actuation Actuation

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Reactor Trip Breakers LEGEND RTS Reactor Trip System ESFAS Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Hard-wired Signal One-way Serial Connection Redundant One-Way Seria l Data Connection 13 PM-0618-602 12

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MPS Breaker Configuration

Four reactor trip RTS Voting RTS Voting breakers, I II two per division Manu a l Trip Priority Logic I Priority Logic II -

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Manual Trip L{ ,

~ Control Rod From EONS

I React or Trip Breakers Drive System

Four pressurizer ESFAS Voting ESFAS Voting I II heater trip breakers, Manual Actuation

~ Priority Logic I Priority Logic II 4-- Manual Actuation two per division ELVS ~

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/ \ Pre~surlze r Heater Co ntrollers 480VAC Pro portional A and Backup A Each breaker opens upon loss of power to the under voltage coil.

A shunt trip coil is provided as ELVS ',

a nonsafety-related diverse /"" /'s PreS$urize r Heate r Controllers Proportional Band Ba ckup B 480VAC means to open the breakers Pressurizer Heater Trip Breakers 14 PM-06 18-60212 Revision : 0 Copyright 2018 by NuScale Power, LLC .

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Nonsafety System Segmentation

Segmentation is used as a defensive and preventative measure in the MCS architecture. Segmentation provides functional independence between major control functions preventing against a failure in one controller group from causing an undesirable condition in another controller group.

Preventive and limiting measures are determined by a susceptibility analysis that considered malfunctions and spurious actuations, as set forth in NRC Dl&C-ISG-04, Section 3.1, staff position 5.

Control groups were evaluated for effect on:

- reactivity addition to the reactor coolant system

- primary coolant pressure increase or decrease

- primary coolant temperature increase or decrease

- primary coolant level increase or decrease

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Section 7 .1 Fundamental Design Principles 16 PM-0618-60212 Revision : 0 Copyrig ht 2018 by NuScale Power, LLC .

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Fundamental Design Principles

Independence

Redundancy

Predictability and Repeatability

Diversity and Defense-in-Depth

Simplicity 17 PM-0618-60212 a!

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Independence Separation Group A

The MPS and NMS are 4-20mA input 4-20mA Input 4-20mA Input Chassis flSMsl flSMsl flSMsl designed with physical, Isolation lso at,on lso at1on electrical, communication and SFM#1 SFM#2 SFM#n functional independence.

One-way communication from safety to nonsafety systems through isolated data paths. , ___,___Monitoring &

MIB -C M Indication

Separation of safety and non-safety communications on different communication busses.

MCS control of safety-related MIB-CM

, ___,___Monitoring &

Indication components via hard-wired isolated inputs from MCS (no digital signals) 1111 Safety Data Paths (1 , 2, 3) llllsafety Data Path 1 1111 Safety Data Path 2 EIM#1 EIM#2 EIM#n llllsafety Data Path 3 Reactor Trip System w

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Redundancy

FSAR Section 7 .1 .3

Four separation groups, two divisions of MPS

Four channels of safety-related NMS

- MPS and NMS meet single failure criterion

Post-accident monitoring channels

- No PAM Type A variables

- PAM Type B and C variables meet single failure criterion

Nonsafety l&C Systems incorporate redundancy principles for high reliability, asset protection 19 PM-0618-60212 Revision: 0 Copyright 2018 by NuScale Power, LLC.

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Predictability and Repeatability

FSAR Section 7 .1 .4

The MPS applies the deterministic features of the HIPS platform.

The MPS response time is accounted for in the plant safety analysis actuation delays.

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Diversity and Defense-in-Depth

FSAR Section 7.1.5

D3 strategy relies on platform/technology diversity for defense against common-cause failures r

- diversity for the platform technology is achieved through different FPGA chip technologies and their associated development tool sets

Approach simplifies the D3 Diversity Assessment and narrows scope of coping analysis required for digital-based sensors.

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Sensor Diversity

Coping Analysis performed (summarized in FSAR Table 7.1-18) to address potential digital-based CCF vulnerabilities associated with digital-based sensors for pressure, level and flow measurements.

Coping analysis included a full evaluation of all design basis events analyzed using best-estimate methods to analyze a postulated digital-based sensor CCF.

- In some cases, the event never progressed to a trip condition using best-estimate analytical methods.

- In other cases, diverse, non-digital sensors initiated the trip condition.

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Control of Access

MPS design conforms to IEEE 603-1991, Section 5.9, "Control of Access" and Secure Development and Operational Environment requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.152, "Criteria for Use of Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 3.

- Physical protection: locked cabinets/rooms.

- MPS design does not provide for remote access capability.

- Physical and logical controls prevent modification of MPS FPGA Logic while in service.

- Limited set of MPS tunable parameters (i.e., setpoints) can be modified when SFM is bypassed and special equipment is used.

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Automatic and Manual Controls

All MPS RTS/ESFAS functions occur automatically.

MPS provides for manual actuation via hard-wired switches in main control room as backup to automatic functions:

- reactor trip

- ECCS actuation

- decay heat removal actuation

- containment isolation

- demineralized water system isolation

- chemical and volume control system isolation

- pressurizer heater trip

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Actuation Priority Logic I- - - - - -, OMSION I

APL circuit provides for I I Offl< ja.os< 1 ILMCS

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related signals r---------------- ----- ---- --------

Automatic/Man ua I '

I RTS/ESFAS actuation I commands have high est ' """""""

priority.

Enable control of safety-related components from nonsafety-related MCS via Enable Nonsafety Control Switch MCS hard-wired interfaces

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ACTUA.TION....., PAtOAflY LOGIC (APl) __ - '----,---'-

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Conclusion

NuScale FSAR follows the new Chapter 7 DSRS structure

- Overall resulted in more streamlined, efficient review.

The NuScale l&C design meets regulatory requirements contained in IEEE 603-1991, IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003 and SRM to SECY-93-087.

The l&C architecture and systems incorporate the fundamental design principles with an overall focus on simplicity.

NuScale passively safe design results in a simple l&C design solution - no complicated functions

- Simple RTS/ESFAS functions (simple comparators, simple functions)

- No closed/open loop control - all safety-related functions are "de-energize to actuate"

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Appendix:

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NuScale l&C Architecture

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Portland Office Richland Office 6650 SW Redwood Lane, 1933 Jadwin Ave., Suite 130 Suite 210 Richland, WA 99354 Portland, OR 97224 541 .360. 0500 971.371 .1592 Arlington Office Corvallis Office 2300 Clarendon Blvd., Suite 1110 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Arlington, VA 22201 Corvallis, OR 97330 541.360.0500 London Office 1st Floor Portland House Rockville Office Bressenden Place 11333 Woodglen Ave. , Suite 205 London SW1 E 5BH Rockville, MO 20852 United Kingdom 301. 770.0472 +44 (OJ 2079 321700 Charlotte Office 2815 Coliseum Centre Drive, Suite 230 Charlotte, NC 28217 980. 349.4804 http://www. nuscalepower. com

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ML18235A315

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