ML18218A207
| ML18218A207 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200046 |
| Issue date: | 08/06/2018 |
| From: | Korea Electric Power Corp, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co, Ltd |
| To: | Office of New Reactors |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18218A206 | List: |
| References | |
| KAW-18-0102, MKD/NW-18-0102L | |
| Download: ML18218A207 (61) | |
Text
19-15_Rev.5 - 1 / 5 KEPCO/KHNP Non-Proprietary REVISED RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION APR1400 Design Certification Korea Electric Power Corporation / Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co., LTD Docket No.52-046 RAI No.:
271-8290 SRP Section:
SRP 19 Application Section: 19.1 Date of RAI Issued:
10/22/2015 Question No. 19-15 Regulation 10 CFR 52.47(a)(27) requires that a standard design certification applicant provide a description of the design specific PRA. SRP Chapter 19, Revision 3 (Draft),Section I. Areas of Review, Review Interfaces states that the staff should confirm that: All common-cause failure (CCF) mechanisms for digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) systems have been accounted for in the PRA. The staff reviewed APR1400 DCD Section 19.1, Probabilistic Risk Assessment, and did not find sufficient information describing the modeling of the DI&C system, including the hardware and software common-cause failures, to be able to make this conclusion.
Therefore, in order for the staff to reach a reasonable assurance finding that the description of the PRA is adequate, please provide the following details of DI&C modeling in the PRA and include it in the DCD:
System description (e.g., describe the functions, subsystem interfaces, operator actions, etc.)
Key assumptions (e.g., modeling, uncertainties)
CCF analysis of both the hardware and software, including the basis and/or justification of this information Failure effects, if modeled at the system/subsystem level Response - (Rev. 5)
The digital plant protection system (PPS) consists of the digital reactor trip system (RTS) and the digital engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS). The reactor trip system (RTS) analyses are documented in the Reactor Protection System Notebook (APR1400-K-P-NR-013218-P, Rev. 0), and the engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) analyses are documented in the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Notebook (APR1400-K-P-NR-
19-15_Rev.5 - 2 / 5 KEPCO/KHNP Non-Proprietary 013217-P, Rev. 0), which includes descriptions of the system functions, system interfaces, operator actions, hardware and software common cause failures and modeling uncertainties.
The failure modes and effects analysis of the reactor trip system (RTS) and the engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) are provided as Attachments 1 and 2.
The Digital I&C CCF coping analysis is described in APR1400-Z-A-NR-14019-NP. This Digital I&C CCF coping analysis assumed software CCF exists, but also credited the systems which are diverse from the safety I&C (Diversity and Defense-in-Depth Technical Report (APR1400-Z-J-NR-14002-P)). The Diversity and Defense-in-Depth Technical Report provides the design description of the diverse actuation system, and the diversity and defense-in-depth approach for I&C systems which are intended to be used for the application of the APR 1400 Design Certification.
The software reliability analysis specifically has not been evaluated in APR1400.
Also, SRP Appendix 7.1 -B Subsection 4.1 discusses protection system reliability, specifically in the second two paragraphs which state: Staff acceptance of system reliability is based on the deterministic criteria described in IEEE Std. 279-1971 rather than on quantitative reliability goals.
The NRC staff does not endorse the concept of quantitative reliability goals as the sole means of meeting the requirements for reliability of protection systems (see the response of RAI 356-7881, Q07-20, ML16154A870).
Also, in the response of RAI 261-8253, COL item (COL 7.1(1)) is added as The COL applicant is to provide and the software operation and maintenance plan for the safety I&C systems, as described in the Software Program Manual Technical Report. The Software Program Manual Technical Report (APR1400-Z-J-NR-14003-P) contains the software management plan, software quality assurance plan, software verification, validation plan, etc.
The Software Program Manual Technical Report describes the method to reduce safety risk caused by software failure to an acceptable level, and the need to assess hazards at each stage of the software life cycle.
Although the APR1400 is designed with diversity to cope with software failure, the COL applicant needs evaluate software reliability. COL 7.1(2) will be added in DCD Subsection 7.1.4 (Attachment 3).
Regarding the reliability of the APR1400 digital I&C system, International Standard IEC 61226 (Revision 3), Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation and control important to safety -
Classification of instrumentation and control functions, classifies and provides specific requirements for I&C systems. These requirements include reliability assessments, and states that the reliability assessment shall consider the effects of common cause failures, including hardware failures, software failures, and human errors during operation, maintenance, as well as modification and repair activities. In addition, IEC 61226 also states: The techniques used to assess these effects range from purely qualitative engineering judgement to detailed quantitative analyses, which may themselves depend on qualitative estimates. Finally, when evaluating the reliability IEC 61226 states:
For an individual system which is specified and designed in accordance with the highest quality criteria, a figure of the order of 10-4 failure/demand may be an appropriate overall limit to place on the reliability that may be claimed, when all of the potential sources of failure due to the
19-15_Rev.5 - 3 / 5 KEPCO/KHNP Non-Proprietary specification, design, manufacture, installation, operating environment, and maintenance practices, are taken into account. This figure includes the risk of common mode failure in the redundant channels of the system, and applies to the whole of the system, from sensors through processing to the outputs to the actuated equipment. Claims for better reliabilities than this are not precluded, but will need special justification, taking into account all of the factors mentioned. Alternatively, the design of independent I&C systems important to safety with an acceptable level of diversity may be applied.
Based on the above statements from IEC 61226, an assessment of the reliability of various RPS and ESF-CCS signals was made taking into account all of the potential sources of failure due to the specification, design, manufacture, installation, operating environment, and maintenance practices including the whole of the system, from sensors through processing to the outputs to the actuated equipment. Hardware reliability values (including common cause) were derived from various industry sources. Software reliability of [ ]TS/demand per application software common cause failure, and [ ]TS/demand for operating system common cause failure based on a proprietary Westinghouse assessment performed to support the APR1400 PRA.
Using these hardware and software reliability values, and including other failure modes such as test and maintenance unavailability and miscalibration errors, an assessment of the reliability of various RPS and ESF-CCS signals was performed. The resultant reliabilities for RPS signals ranged from 1.02x10-4/demand to 3.42x10-3/demand for the RPS signals modeled in the PRA (i.e., P1 - Hi Pressurizer Pressure, P2 - Lo Pressurizer Pressure, P3 - Lo SG1 Level, P4 - Lo SG2 Level, P9 - Hi Containment Pressure and P14 - Lo DNBR). The resultant reliabilities for ESF-CCS signals (SIAS and AFAS) were both about 1.13x10-4/demand.
Based on this reliability assessment, the hardware and software failure rates used within the APR1400 DC PRA are judged to be reasonable where no claims for better reliability are warranted to meet the requirements of IEC 61226.
Several sensitivity cases were performed to better understand the CDF sensitivity to the software reliability values used in the digital I&C system. These sensitivities were performed by cutset manipulation of the at-power internal events model. A total of 12 different cases were evaluated:
- 1.
The PPS and DPS operating system software CCFs were increased by a factor of 10 resulting in a CDF of increase of 3%.
- 2.
The PPS and DPS operating system and application software CCFs were increased by a factor of 10 resulting in a CDF increase of 43%.
- 3.
The PPS and DPS operating system and application software CCFs were increased by a factor of 100 resulting in a CDF increase of 468%.
- 4.
The DPS application software CCF was increased by a factor of 100 resulting in a CDF increase of 1%.
- 5.
The DPS operating system software CCF was increased by a factor of 100 resulting in a negligible increase in CDF.
19-15_Rev.5 - 4 / 5 KEPCO/KHNP Non-Proprietary
- 6.
The PPS bistable processor module application software CCF was increased by a factor of 100 resulting in a CDF increase of 12%.
- 7.
The PPS group controller application software CCF was increased by a factor of 100 resulting in a CDF increase of 94%.
- 8.
The PPS loop controller application software CCF was increased by a factor of 100 resulting in a CDF increase of 315%.
- 9.
The PPS LCL application software CCF was increased by a factor of 100 resulting in a CDF increase of 12%.
- 10. The PPS operating system software CCF was increased by a factor of 100 resulting in a CDF increase of 32%.
- 11. All DPS software was assumed to fail (i.e., failure probability =1) resulting in a CDF increase of 432%.
- 12. All PPS and DPS software was assumed to operate perfectly (i.e., failure probability = 0) resulting in a CDF decrease of about 5%.
These sensitivities reveal the following significant conclusions about the digital I&C system:
Cases 1 - 3 demonstrate the relative insensitivity to the exact software CCF values used in the model up until a very large increase (between a factor of 10 and 100) is postulated.
Although Case 11 demonstrates the importance of a diverse I&C system (DPS); Cases 4 and 5 demonstrate that even relatively large increases (e.g., factor of 100) in DPS software CCF has little impact on CDF.
Cases 6 - 9 demonstrate the importance of operator action to overcome software CCF.
The ability to manually trip the reactor from the MCR/RSR reduces the impact of bistable and LCL software CCF. Furthermore, the ability to start equipment remotely from the MCR/RSR minimizes the impact of software CCF in the group controllers.
However, since these remote signals are input into either the group controller or loop controller, and the loop controller produces the final ESF-CCS output signal to the CIMs, software CCF in the loop controllers fails all remote signals.
Case 12 reveals that limited benefit would be obtained from trying to justify lower software CCF values, since complete perfection (which is not credible) only results in about a 5% decrease in CDF.
In the above analyses, the software CCF accounted for approximately 20 percent of the RPS failures, and about 44 percent of the ESF-CCS failures. This is due to the fact that in addition to bistable and LCL software which are with both RPS and ESF-CCS, the ESF-CCS also include group controller and loop controller application software. In addition to the percent contribution described above (i.e., F-V importance), since software CCF fails the signal, the RAW value of the software CCF is simply the inverse of the signals system unavailability.
Therefore, the software CCF RAW for the RPS signals is between 292 (= 1 / 3.42x10-3) and
19-15_Rev.5 - 5 / 5 KEPCO/KHNP Non-Proprietary 9800 (= 1 / 1.02x10-4), and the software CCF RAW for the ESF signals is about 8850 (= 1 /
1.13x10-4). Note that in all cases, these F-V and RAW importance values demonstrate the risk significance of software. provides clarifications of RAW importance values for operating system software and application software.
Impact on DCD Table 1.8-2 and Section 7.1.4 of DCD Tier 2 will be revised as indicated on Attachment 3.
Chapter 19 will be revised as indicated in Attachment 4 to include discussion on the modeling of digital I&C and software CCF, and the software CCF sensitivity analysis.
Subsection 19.1.4.1.1.4 will be revised as indicated in Attachment 4 (10/12).
Impact on PRA The PRA will be updated to include software CCF in both the PPS and DPS. The Reactor Protection System Notebook (APR1400-K-P-NR-013218-P) and the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Notebook (APR1400-K-P-NR-013217-P) will be updated to include details of software CCF modeling.
Impact on Technical Specifications There is no impact on the Technical Specifications.
Impact on Technical/Topical/Environmental Reports There is no impact on any Technical, Topical, or Environmental Report.
Failure Mode Evaluation of Reactor Trip System (RP) (1/13)
No.
Component ID Component Description Normal Status Failure Mode Screening Function 1
1-752-J-PA14A-R01-S01 PPS cabinet, PA14A (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 2
1-752-J-PA14A-R01-S02 PPS cabinet, PA14A (CI631)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Communication Interface Module
- No impacts 3
1-752-J-PA14A-R01-S03 PPS cabinet, PA14A (PM646A) Operation Fails to operate No
- Bistable Logic Processor
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 4
1-752-J-PA14A-R01-S04 PPS cabinet, PA14A (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 5
1-752-J-PA14A-R01-S05 PPS cabinet, PA14A (AI688)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Analog Input Module
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 6
1-752-J-PA14A-R01-S06 PPS cabinet, PA14A (DI620)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Input Module
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 7
1-752-J-PA14A-R01-S07 PPS cabinet, PA14A (AI688)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Analog Input Module
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 8
1-752-J-PA14A-R01-S08 PPS cabinet, PA14A (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 9
1-752-J-PA14A-R01-S09 PPS cabinet, PA14A (DO620)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Output Module
- It is for SOE (Sequence Of Events).
- No impacts 10 1-752-J-PA14A-R01-S10 PPS cabinet, PA14A (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 11 1-752-J-PA14A-R02-S01 PPS cabinet, PA14A (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 12 1-752-J-PA14A-R02-S02 PPS cabinet, PA14A (CI631)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Communication Interface Module
- No impacts 13 1-752-J-PA14A-R02-S03 PPS cabinet, PA14A (PM646A) Operation Fails to operate No
- Bistable Logic Processor
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 14 1-752-J-PA14A-R02-S04 PPS cabinet, PA14A (PM646A) Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts Remove this column RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (1/13)
Non-Proprietary
Failure Mode Evaluation of Reactor Trip System (RP) (2/13)
No.
Component ID Component Description Normal Status Failure Mode Screening Function 15 1-752-J-PA14A-R02-S05 PPS cabinet, PA14A (PM646A) Operation Fails to operate No
- Analog Input Module
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 16 1-752-J-PA14A-R02-S06 PPS cabinet, PA14A (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Input Module
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 17 1-752-J-PA14A-R02-S07 PPS cabinet, PA14A (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Analog Input Module
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 18 1-752-J-PA14A-R02-S08 PPS cabinet, PA14A (DO620)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 19 1-752-J-PA14A-R02-S09 PPS cabinet, PA14A (DO630)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- It is for SOE (Sequence Of Events).
- No impacts 20 1-752-J-PA14A-R02-S10 PPS cabinet, PA14A (DO630)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 21 1-752-J-PA14A-R03-S01 PPS cabinet, PA14A (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 22 1-752-J-PA14A-R03-S02 PPS cabinet, PA14A (CI631)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Communication Interface Module
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 23 1-752-J-PA14A-R03-S03 PPS cabinet, PA14A (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Bistable Processor Logic
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 24 1-752-J-PA14A-R03-S04 PPS cabinet, PA14A (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 25 1-752-J-PA14A-R03-S05 PPS cabinet, PA14A (AI688)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Analog Input Module
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 26 1-752-J-PA14A-R03-S06 PPS cabinet, PA14A (DI620)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Input Module
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 27 1-752-J-PA14A-R03-S07 PPS cabinet, PA14A (AI688)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Analog Input Module
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 28 1-752-J-PA14A-R03-S08 PPS cabinet, PA14A (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts Remove this column RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (2/13)
Non-Proprietary
Failure Mode Evaluation of Reactor Trip System (RP) (3/13)
No.
Component ID Component Description Normal Status Failure Mode Screening Function 29 1-752-J-PA14A-R03-S09 PPS cabinet, PA14A (DO620)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Output Module
- This is for SOE (Sequence Of Events)
- Ni Impacts 30 1-752-J-PA14A-R03-S10 PPS cabinet, PA14A (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module No impacts 31 1-752-J-PA14A-R04-S01 PPS cabinet, PA14A (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module No impacts 32 1-752-J-PA14A-R04-S02 PPS cabinet, PA14A (CI631)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Communication Interface Module
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 33 1-752-J-PA14A-R04-S03 PPS cabinet, PA14A (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- ESF functions with HSL to group controller
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 34 1-752-J-PA14A-R04-S04 PPS cabinet, PA14A (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 35 1-752-J-PA14A-R04-S05 PPS cabinet, PA14A (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- COM HSL input only
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 36 1-752-J-PA14A-R04-S06 PPS cabinet, PA14A (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- RT digital output
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two ouf of three 37 1-752-J-PA14A-R04-S07 PPS cabinet, PA14A (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 38 1-752-J-PA14A-R04-S08 PPS cabinet, PA14A (DO620)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- No impacts
- This is for SOE (Sequence Of Events) 39 1-752-J-PA14A-R04-S09 PPS cabinet, PA14A (DO630)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 40 1-752-J-PA14A-R04-S10 PPS cabinet, PA14A (DO630)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 41 1-752-J-PA14B-R01-S01 PPS cabinet, PA14B (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts Remove this column RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (3/13)
Non-Proprietary
Failure Mode Evaluation of Reactor Trip System (RP) (4/13)
No.
Component ID Component Description Normal Status Failure Mode Screening Function 42 1-752-J-PA14B-R01-S02 PPS cabinet, PA14B (CI631)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Communication Interface Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 43 1-752-J-PA14B-R01-S03 PPS cabinet, PA14B (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Bistable Processor Logic
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 44 1-752-J-PA14B-R01-S04 PPS cabinet, PA14B (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 45 1-752-J-PA14B-R01-S05 PPS cabinet, PA14B (AI688)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Analog Input Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 46 1-752-J-PA14B-R01-S06 PPS cabinet, PA14B (DI620)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Input Module
- No impacts Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 47 1-752-J-PA14B-R01-S07 PPS cabinet, PA14B (AI688)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Analog Input Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 48 1-752-J-PA14B-R01-S08 PPS cabinet, PA14B (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 49 1-752-J-PA14B-R01-S09 PPS cabinet, PA14B (DO620)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- No impacts
- This is for SOE (Sequence Of Events) 50 1-752-J-PA14B-R01-S10 PPS cabinet, PA14B (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 51 1-752-J-PA14B-R02-S01 PPS cabinet, PA14B (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 52 1-752-J-PA14B-R02-S02 PPS cabinet, PA14B (CI631)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Communication Interface Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 53 1-752-J-PA14B-R02-S03 PPS cabinet, PA14B (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- RT digital output
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three Remove this column RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (4/13)
Non-Proprietary
Failure Mode Evaluation of Reactor Trip System (RP) (5/13)
No.
Component ID Component Description Normal Status Failure Mode Screening Function 54 1-752-J-PA14B-R02-S04 PPS cabinet, PA14B (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- ESF functions with HSL to group controller
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 55 1-752-J-PA14B-R02-S05 PPS cabinet, PA14B (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- RT digital output
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 56 1-752-J-PA14B-R02-S06 PPS cabinet, PA14B (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- COM HSL input only
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 57 1-752-J-PA14B-R02-S07 PPS cabinet, PA14B (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 58 1-752-J-PA14B-R02-S08 PPS cabinet, PA14B (DO620)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- No impacts
- This is for SOE (Sequence Of Events) 59 1-752-J-PA14B-R02-S09 PPS cabinet, PA14B (DO630)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 60 1-752-J-PA14B-R02-S10 PPS cabinet, PA14B (DO630)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 61 1-752-J-PA14B-R03-S01 PPS cabinet, PA14B (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 62 1-752-J-PA14B-R03-S02 PPS cabinet, PA14B (CI631)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Communication Interface Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 63 1-752-J-PA14B-R03-S03 PPS cabinet, PA14B (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Bistable Processor Logic
- No impacts Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 64 1-752-J-PA14B-R03-S04 PPS cabinet, PA14B (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 65 1-752-J-PA14B-R03-S05 PPS cabinet, PA14B (AI688)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Analog Input Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three Remove this column RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (5/13)
Non-Proprietary
Failure Mode Evaluation of Reactor Trip System (RP) (6/13)
No.
Component ID Component Description Normal Status Failure Mode Screening Function 66 1-752-J-PA14B-R03-S06 PPS cabinet, PA14B (DI620)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Input Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 67 1-752-J-PA14B-R03-S07 PPS cabinet, PA14B (AI688)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Analog Input Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 68 1-752-J-PA14B-R03-S08 PPS cabinet, PA14B (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 69 1-752-J-PA14B-R03-S09 PPS cabinet, PA14B (DO620)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- No impacts
- This is for SOE (Sequence Of Events) 70 1-752-J-PA14B-R03-S10 PPS cabinet, PA14B (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 71 1-752-J-PA14B-R04-S01 PPS cabinet, PA14B (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 72 1-752-J-PA14B-R04-S02 PPS cabinet, PA14B (CI631)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Communication Interface Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 73 1-752-J-PA14B-R04-S03 PPS cabinet, PA14B (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- ESF functions with HSL to group controller
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 74 1-752-J-PA14B-R04-S04 PPS cabinet, PA14B (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- RT digital output
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 75 1-752-J-PA14B-R04-S05 PPS cabinet, PA14B (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- COM HSL input only
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 76 1-752-J-PA14B-R04-S06 PPS cabinet, PA14B (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- RT digital output
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 77 1-752-J-PA14B-R04-S07 PPS cabinet, PA14B (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts Remove this column RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (6/13)
Non-Proprietary
Failure Mode Evaluation of Reactor Trip System (RP) (7/13)
No.
Component ID Component Description Normal Status Failure Mode Screening Function 78 1-752-J-PA14B-R04-S08 PPS cabinet, PA14B (DO620)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- No impacts
- This is for SOE (Sequence Of Events) 79 1-752-J-PA14B-R04-S09 PPS cabinet, PA14B (DO630)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 80 1-752-J-PA14B-R04-S10 PPS cabinet, PA14B (DO630)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 81 1-752-J-PA14C-R01-S01 PPS cabinet, PA14C (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 82 1-752-J-PA14C-R01-S02 PPS cabinet, PA14C (CI631)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Communication Interface Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 83 1-752-J-PA14C-R01-S03 PPS cabinet, PA14C (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Bistable Processor Logic
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 84 1-752-J-PA14C-R01-S04 PPS cabinet, PA14C (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 85 1-752-J-PA14C-R01-S05 PPS cabinet, PA14C (AI688)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Analog Input Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 86 1-752-J-PA14C-R01-S06 PPS cabinet, PA14C (DI620)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Input Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 87 1-752-J-PA14C-R01-S07 PPS cabinet, PA14C (AI688)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Analog Input Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 88 1-752-J-PA14C-R01-S08 PPS cabinet, PA14C (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 89 1-752-J-PA14C-R01-S09 PPS cabinet, PA14C (DO620)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- No impacts
- This is for SOE (Sequence Of Events)
Remove this column RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (7/13)
Non-Proprietary
Failure Mode Evaluation of Reactor Trip System (RP) (8/13)
No.
Component ID Component Description Normal Status Failure Mode Screening Function 90 1-752-J-PA14C-R01-S10 PPS cabinet, PA14C (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 91 1-752-J-PA14C-R02-S01 PPS cabinet, PA14C (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 92 1-752-J-PA14C-R02-S02 PPS cabinet, PA14C (CI631)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Communication Interface Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 93 1-752-J-PA14C-R02-S03 PPS cabinet, PA14C (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- RT digital output
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 94 1-752-J-PA14C-R02-S04 PPS cabinet, PA14C (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- ESF functions with HSL to group controller
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 95 1-752-J-PA14C-R02-S05 PPS cabinet, PA14C (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- RT digital output
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 96 1-752-J-PA14C-R02-S06 PPS cabinet, PA14C (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- COM HSL input only
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 97 1-752-J-PA14C-R02-S07 PPS cabinet, PA14C (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module No impacts 98 1-752-J-PA14C-R02-S08 PPS cabinet, PA14C (DO620)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- No impacts
- This is for SOE (Sequence Of Events) 99 1-752-J-PA14C-R02-S09 PPS cabinet, PA14C (DO630)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 100 1-752-J-PA14C-R02-S10 PPS cabinet, PA14C (DO630)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 101 1-752-J-PA14C-R03-S01 PPS cabinet, PA14C (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 102 1-752-J-PA14C-R03-S02 PPS cabinet, PA14C (CI631)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Communication Interface Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three Remove this column RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (8/13)
Non-Proprietary
Failure Mode Evaluation of Reactor Trip System (RP) (9/13)
No.
Component ID Component Description Normal Status Failure Mode Screening Function 103 1-752-J-PA14C-R03-S03 PPS cabinet, PA14C (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Bistable Processor Logic
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 104 1-752-J-PA14C-R03-S04 PPS cabinet, PA14C (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 105 1-752-J-PA14C-R03-S05 PPS cabinet, PA14C (AI688)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Analog Input Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 106 1-752-J-PA14C-R03-S06 PPS cabinet, PA14C (DI620)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Input Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 107 1-752-J-PA14C-R03-S07 PPS cabinet, PA14C (AI688)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Analog Input Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 108 1-752-J-PA14C-R03-S08 PPS cabinet, PA14C (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 109 1-752-J-PA14C-R03-S09 PPS cabinet, PA14C (DO620)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- No impacts
- This is for SOE (Sequence Of Events) 110 1-752-J-PA14C-R03-S10 PPS cabinet, PA14C (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 111 1-752-J-PA14C-R04-S01 PPS cabinet, PA14C (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 112 1-752-J-PA14C-R04-S02 PPS cabinet, PA14C (CI631)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Communication Interface Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 113 1-752-J-PA14C-R04-S03 PPS cabinet, PA14C (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- ESF functions with HSL to group controller
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 114 1-752-J-PA14C-R04-S04 PPS cabinet, PA14C (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- RT digital output
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 115 1-752-J-PA14C-R04-S05 PPS cabinet, PA14C (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- COM HSL input only
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three Remove this column RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (9/13)
Non-Proprietary
Failure Mode Evaluation of Reactor Trip System (RP) (10/13)
No.
Component ID Component Description Normal Status Failure Mode Screening Function 116 1-752-J-PA14C-R04-S06 PPS cabinet, PA14C (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- RT digital output
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 117 1-752-J-PA14C-R04-S07 PPS cabinet, PA14C (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 118 1-752-J-PA14C-R04-S08 PPS cabinet, PA14C (DO620)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- No impacts
- This is for SOE (Sequence Of Events) 119 1-752-J-PA14C-R04-S09 PPS cabinet, PA14C (DO630)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 120 1-752-J-PA14C-R04-S10 PPS cabinet, PA14C (DO630)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 121 1-752-J-PA14D-R01-S01 PPS cabinet, PA14D (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 122 1-752-J-PA14D-R01-S02 PPS cabinet, PA14D (CI631)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Communication Interface Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 123 1-752-J-PA14D-R01-S03 PPS cabinet, PA14D (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Bistable Processor Logic
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 124 1-752-J-PA14D-R01-S04 PPS cabinet, PA14D (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 125 1-752-J-PA14D-R01-S05 PPS cabinet, PA14D (AI688)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Analog Input Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 126 1-752-J-PA14D-R01-S06 PPS cabinet, PA14D (DI620)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Input Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 127 1-752-J-PA14D-R01-S07 PPS cabinet, PA14D (AI688)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Analog Input Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 128 1-752-J-PA14D-R01-S08 PPS cabinet, PA14D (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts Remove this column RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (10/13)
Non-Proprietary
Failure Mode Evaluation of Reactor Trip System (RP) (11/13)
No.
Component ID Component Description Normal Status Failure Mode Screening Function 129 1-752-J-PA14D-R01-S09 PPS cabinet, PA14D (DO620)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- No impacts
- This is for SOE (Sequence Of Events) 130 1-752-J-PA14D-R01-S10 PPS cabinet, PA14D (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 131 1-752-J-PA14D-R02-S01 PPS cabinet, PA14D (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 132 1-752-J-PA14D-R02-S02 PPS cabinet, PA14D (CI631)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Communication Interface Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 133 1-752-J-PA14D-R02-S03 PPS cabinet, PA14D (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- RT digital output
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 134 1-752-J-PA14D-R02-S04 PPS cabinet, PA14D (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- ESF functions with HSL to group controller
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 135 1-752-J-PA14D-R02-S05 PPS cabinet, PA14D (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- RT digital output
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 136 1-752-J-PA14D-R02-S06 PPS cabinet, PA14D (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- COM HSL input only
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 137 1-752-J-PA14D-R02-S07 PPS cabinet, PA14D (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 138 1-752-J-PA14D-R02-S08 PPS cabinet, PA14D (DO620)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- No impacts
- This is for SOE (Sequence Of Events) 139 1-752-J-PA14D-R02-S09 PPS cabinet, PA14D (DO630)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 140 1-752-J-PA14D-R02-S10 PPS cabinet, PA14D (DO630)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 141 1-752-J-PA14D-R03-S01 PPS cabinet, PA14D (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts Remove this column RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (11/13)
Non-Proprietary
Failure Mode Evaluation of Reactor Trip System (RP) (12/13)
No.
Component ID Component Description Normal Status Failure Mode Screening Function 142 1-752-J-PA14D-R03-S02 PPS cabinet, PA14D (CI631)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Communication Interface Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 143 1-752-J-PA14D-R03-S03 PPS cabinet, PA14D (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Bistable Processor Logic
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 144 1-752-J-PA14D-R03-S04 PPS cabinet, PA14D (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 145 1-752-J-PA14D-R03-S05 PPS cabinet, PA14D (AI688)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Analog Input Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 146 1-752-J-PA14D-R03-S06 PPS cabinet, PA14D (DI620)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Input Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 147 1-752-J-PA14D-R03-S07 PPS cabinet, PA14D (AI688)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Analog Input Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 148 1-752-J-PA14D-R03-S08 PPS cabinet, PA14D (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 149 1-752-J-PA14D-R03-S09 PPS cabinet, PA14D (DO620)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- No impacts
- This is for SOE (Sequence Of Events) 150 1-752-J-PA14D-R03-S10 PPS cabinet, PA14D (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 151 1-752-J-PA14D-R04-S01 PPS cabinet, PA14D (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 152 1-752-J-PA14D-R04-S02 PPS cabinet, PA14D (CI631)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Communication Interface Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 153 1-752-J-PA14D-R04-S03 PPS cabinet, PA14D (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- ESF functions with HSL to group controller
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 154 1-752-J-PA14D-R04-S04 PPS cabinet, PA14D (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- RT digital output
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three Remove this column RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (12/13)
Non-Proprietary
Failure Mode Evaluation of Reactor Trip System (RP) (13/13)
No.
Component ID Component Description Normal Status Failure Mode Screening Function 155 1-752-J-PA14D-R04-S05 PPS cabinet, PA14D (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- COM HSL input only
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 156 1-752-J-PA14D-R04-S06 PPS cabinet, PA14D (PM646A)
Operation Fails to operate No
- RT digital output
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 157 1-752-J-PA14D-R04-S07 PPS cabinet, PA14D (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 158 1-752-J-PA14D-R04-S08 PPS cabinet, PA14D (DO620)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- No impacts
- This is for SOE (Sequence Of Events) 159 1-752-J-PA14D-R04-S09 PPS cabinet, PA14D (DO630)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three 160 1-752-J-PA14D-R04-S10 PPS cabinet, PA14D (DO630)
Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- No impacts
- Coincidence logic changes to two out of three Remove this column RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (13/13)
Non-Proprietary
Failure Mode Evaluation of Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (EF)
No.
Component ID Component Type Component Description Normal Failure Mode Screening Remark Group Controller - A1 D
U M
M Y
C I
6 3
1 P
M 6
4 6
P M
6 4
6 P
M 6
4 6
P M
6 4
6 P
M 6
4 6
D I
6 2
1 D
O 6
2 0
D U
M M
Y 1
1-752-J-PA03A-R01-S01 N/A Dummy at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 2
1-752-J-PA03A-R01-S02 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Component Interface Module
- It causes the loss of ability to communication by AF1000 Internet network.
- It impacts on when the coincidence failure of GC-2 CI631.
- Redundant group controller has its own CI module which provides global memory and provides AF 100 access.
3 1-752-J-PA03A-R01-S03 Processor Module PM Processor Module 1 (PM646A) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 1 (GC-1 PM1).
- It causes the loss of the A and C ESF Initiation signals.
- It causes the loss of the (A or C) coincidence logic performed by PM1.
- Redundant component control signal is available in the redundant group controller.
4 1-752-J-PA03A-R01-S04 Processor Module PM Processor Module 2 (PM646A) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 2 (GC-1 PM2).
- It causes the loss of the B and D ESF Initiation signals.
- It causes the loss of the (B or D) coincidence logic performed by PM2.
- Redundant component control signal is available in the redundant group controller.
RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 Remove this column Note)
Add RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (1/28)
Non-Proprietary
No.
Component ID Component Type Component Description Normal Failure Mode Screening Remark 5
1-752-J-PA03A-R01-S05 Processor Module PM Processor Module 3 (PM646A) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 3 (GC-1 PM3).
- It causes the loss of the selective two out of four coincidence logic performed by PM 3.
- It causes the loss of MCR CPM signals.
- Redundant component control signal is available in the redundant group controller.
6 1-752-J-PA03A-R01-S06 Processor Module PM Processor Module 4 (PM646A) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 4 (GC-1 PM4).
- It causes the loss of RSR CPM signals.
- Redundant RSR CPM signal is available in the redundant group controller.
7 1-752-J-PA03A-R01-S07 Processor Module PM Processor Module 5 (PM646A) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 5 (GC-1 PM5).
- It causes the loss of component control signal propagation (ESCM signals and MI signals) from CCG to LC via PM5.
- Redundant RSR CPM signal is available in the redundant group controller.
8 1-752-J-PA03A-R01-S08 Digital Input Module Digital Input Module (DI621) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Input Module
- It is no impact on the safety function.
- It causes the loss of local manual actuation in one GC in that channel, but the redundant GC is still functional.
- Redundant group controller and redundant initiation signals are provided within the channel.
9 1-752-J-PA03A-R01-S09 Digital Output Module Digital Output Module (DO620) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Output Module
- It is no impact on the safety function.
- It causes the loss of transmission the Transfer Switch status to the PPS.
10 1-752-J-PA03A-R01-S10 N/A Dummy at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 Remove this column RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (2/28)
Non-Proprietary
No. Component ID Component Type Component Description Normal Failure Mode Screening Remark CCG - A1 D
U M
M Y
C I
6 3
1 P
M 6
4 6
D U
M M
Y D
U M
M Y
D I
6 2
1 D
O 6
2 0
D U
M M
Y D
U M
M Y
C I
6 3
1 11 1-752-J-PA03A-R02-S01 N/A Dummy at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 12 1-752-J-PA03A-R02-S02 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) at CCG 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Component Interface Module
- It impacts on when the coincidence failure of redundant CI631 module in CCG2
- It impacts on corresponding channel's ESCM control manual control 13 1-752-J-PA03A-R02-S03 Processor Module PM Processor Module 1 (PM646A) at CCG 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Control Channel Gateway 1 Processor Module (CCG-1 PM)
- It impact on when the coincidence failure of CCG-2 PM
- It impacts corresponding channel's ESCM control 14 1-752-J-PA03A-R02-S04 N/A Dummy at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 15 1-752-J-PA03A-R02-S05 N/A Dummy at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 16 1-752-J-PA03A-R02-S06 Digital Input Module Digital Input Module (DI621) at CCG 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Input Module
- No impact, because no safety function depends on DI contact input.
- It is for transfer switch status 17 1-752-J-PA03A-R02-S07 Digital Output Module Digital Output Module (DO620) at CCG 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Output Module
- No impact, because no safety function depends on DO contact input.
- It is for transfer switch status 18 1-752-J-PA03A-R02-S08 N/A Dummy at CCG 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 19 1-752-J-PA03A-R02-S09 N/A Dummy at CCG 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 Remove this column Note)
Add RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (3/28)
Non-Proprietary
No.
Component ID Component Type Component Description Normal Failure Mode Screening Remark 20 1-752-J-PA03A-R02-S10 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) at CCG 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Communication Interface Module
- It impacts on when the coincidence failure of redundant CI631 module in CCG2
- It impacts on corresponding channel's ESCM control manual control Group Controller - A2 D
U M
M Y
C I
6 3
1 P
M 6
4 6
P M
6 4
6 P
M 6
4 6
P M
6 4
6 P
M 6
4 6
D I
6 2
1 D
O 6
2 0
D U
M M
Y 21 1-752-J-PA03A-R03-S01 N/A Group Controller (RB601) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 22 1-752-J-PA03A-R03-S02 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Component Interface Module
- It causes the loss of ability to communication by AF1000 Internet network.
- It impacts on when the coincidence failure of GC-1 CI631.
- Redundant group controller has its own CI module which provides global memory and provides AF 100 access.
23 1-752-J-PA03A-R03-S03 Processor Module PM Processor Module 1 (PM646A) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 1 (GC-2 PM1).
- It causes the loss of the A and C ESF Initiation signals.
- It causes the loss of the (A or C) coincidence logic performed by PM1.
- Redundant component control signal is available in the redundant group controller.
24 1-752-J-PA03A-R03-S04 Processor Module PM Processor Module 2 (PM646A) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 2 (GC-2 PM2).
- It causes the loss of the B and D ESF Initiation signals.
- It causes the loss of the (B or D) coincidence logic performed by PM2.
- Redundant component control signal is available in the redundant group controller.
RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 Remove this column Note)
Add RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (4/28)
Non-Proprietary
No.
Component ID Component Type Component Description Normal Failure Mode Screening Remark 25 1-752-J-PA03A-R03-S05 Processor Module PM Processor Module 3 (PM646A) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 3 (GC-2 PM3).
- It causes the loss of the selective two out of four coincidence logic performed by PM 3.
- It causes the loss of MCR CPM signals.
- Redundant component control signal is available in the redundant group controller.
26 1-752-J-PA03A-R03-S06 Processor Module PM Processor Module 4 (PM646A) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 4 (GC-2 PM4).
- It causes the loss of RSR CPM signals.
- Redundant RSR CPM signal is available in the redundant group controller.
27 1-752-J-PA03A-R03-S07 Processor Module PM Processor Module 5 (PM646A) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 5 (GC-2 PM5).
- It causes the loss of component control signal propagation (ESCM signals and MI signals) from CCG to LC via PM5.
- Redundant RSR CPM signal is available in the redundant group controller.
28 1-752-J-PA03A-R03-S08 Digital Input Module Digital Input Module (DI621) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Input Module
- It is no impact on the safety function.
- It causes the loss of local manual actuation in one GC in that channel, but the redundant GC is still functional.
- Redundant group controller and redundant initiation signals are provided within the channel.
29 1-752-J-PA03A-R03-S09 Digital Output Module Digital Output Module (DO620) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Output Module
- It is no impact on the safety function.
- It causes the loss of transmission the Transfer Switch status to the PPS.
30 1-752-J-PA03A-R03-S10 N/A ESF-CCS group controller cabinet, PA03A (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 Remove this column RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (5/28)
Non-Proprietary
No.
Component ID Component Type Component Description Normal Failure Mode Screening Remark A2 D
U M
M Y
C I
6 3
1 P
M 6
4 6
D U
M M
Y D
U M
M Y
D I
6 2
1 D
O 6
2 0
D U
M M
Y D
U M
M Y
C I
6 3
1 31 1-752-J-PA03A-R04-S01 N/A Dummy at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 32 1-752-J-PA03A-R04-S02 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) at CCG 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Component Interface Module
- It impacts on when the coincidence failure of redundant CI631 module in CCG1.
- It impacts on corresponding channel's ESCM control manual control.
33 1-752-J-PA03A-R04-S03 Processor Module PM Processor Module 1 (PM646A) at CCG 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Control Channel Gateway 1 Processor Module (CCG-2 PM)
- It impact on when the coincidence failure of CCG-1 PM
- It impacts corresponding channel's ESCM control 34 1-752-J-PA03A-R04-S04 N/A ESF-CCS group controller cabinet, PA03A (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 35 1-752-J-PA03A-R04-S05 N/A ESF-CCS group controller cabinet, PA03A (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 36 1-752-J-PA03A-R04-S06 Digital Input Module Digital Input Module (DI621) at CCG 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Input Module
- No impact, because no safety function depends on DI contact input.
- It is for transfer switch status 37 1-752-J-PA03A-R04-S07 Digital Output Module Digital Output Module (DO620) at CCG 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Output Module
- No impact, because no safety function depends on DO contact input.
- It is for transfer switch status 38 1-752-J-PA03A-R04-S08 N/A ESF-CCS group controller cabinet, PA03A (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 39 1-752-J-PA03A-R04-S09 N/A ESF-CCS group controller cabinet, PA03A (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 40 1-752-J-PA03A-R04-S10 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) at CCG 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Communication Interface Module
- It impacts on when the coincidence failure of redundant CI631 module in CCG1.
- It impacts on corresponding channel's ESCM control manual control CCG -
RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 Remove this column Note)
Add RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (6/28)
Non-Proprietary
No.
Component ID Component Type Component Description Normal Failure Mode Screening Remark Group Controller - A3 C
I 6
3 1
C I
6 3
1 P
M 6
4 6
P M
6 4
6 D
I 6
2 1
D O
6 2
0 D
U M
M Y
D U
M M
Y D
U M
M Y
C I
6 3
1 41 1-752-J-PA03A-R05-S01 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) 1 at Group Controller 3 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Component Interface Module
- It causes the loss global memory.
- Redundant CI module provides redundant global memory for the chassis.
42 1-752-J-PA03A-R05-S02 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) 2 at Group Controller 3 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Component Interface Module
- It causes the loss global memory.
- Redundant CI module provides redundant global memory for the chassis.
43 1-752-J-PA03A-R05-S03 Processor Module PM Processor Module 1 (PM646A) at Group Controller 3 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate No
- Primary Processor Module
- It causes the loss of Actuation of BOP ESF or Load Sequencing.
- Redundant GC-3 secondary processor module provides the logic for actuation of BOP ESF and Load Sequencing.
- The redundant PM acquires the RMS and Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) input signals, performs the BOP ESF and Load Sequencing Logic and transmits the corresponding initiation signals.
44 1-752-J-PA03A-R05-S04 Processor Module PM Processor Module 1 (PM646A) at Group Controller 3 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate No
- Secondary Processor Module
- It causes the loss of Actuation of BOP ESF or Load Sequencing.
- Redundant GC-3 secondary processor module provides the logic for actuation of BOP ESF and Load Sequencing.
- The redundant PM acquires the RMS and Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) input signals, performs the BOP ESF and Load Sequencing Logic and transmits the corresponding initiation signals.
45 1-752-J-PA03A-R05-S05 Digital Input Module Digital Input Module (DI621) at Group Controller 3 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Input Module
- It causes the loss of internal cabinet status information, and it causes the loss of Actuation of BOP ESF or Load Sequencing.
- Redundant GC-3s are provided by ESF-CCS Channels A and B, thus the redundant GC-3 maintains the function.
RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 Remove this column Note)
Add RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (7/28)
Non-Proprietary
No.
Component ID Component Type Component Description Normal Failure Mode Screening Remark 46 1-752-J-PA03A-R05-S06 Digital Output Module Digital Output Module (DO620) at Group Controller 3 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- It causes the loss of internal cabinet status information, and it causes the loss of Actuation of BOP ESF or Load Sequencing.
- Redundant GC-3s are provided by ESF-CCS Channels A and B, thus the redundant GC-3 maintains the function.
47 1-752-J-PA03A-R05-S07 N/A ESF-CCS group controller cabinet, PA03A (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 48 1-752-J-PA03A-R05-S08 N/A ESF-CCS group controller cabinet, PA03A (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 49 1-752-J-PA03A-R05-S09 N/A ESF-CCS group controller cabinet, PA03A (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 50 1-752-J-PA03A-R05-S10 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) 3 at Group Controller 3 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03A Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Component Interface Module
- It causes the loss of ability to communication by AF1000 Internet network.
- It impacts on the actuation of BOP-ESF and load sequencing.
- Redundant GC-3s are provided by ESF-CCS channel A and B, thus the redundant GC-3 maintains the function.
Group Controller - A1 D
U M
M Y
C I
6 3
1 P
M 6
4 6
P M
6 4
6 P
M 6
4 6
P M
6 4
6 P
M 6
4 6
D I
6 2
1 D
O 6
2 0
D U
M M
Y 51 1-752-J-PA03B-R01-S01 N/A Dummy at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 52 1-752-J-PA03B-R01-S02 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Component Interface Module
- It causes the loss of ability to communication by AF1000 Internet network.
- It impacts on when the coincidence failure of GC-2 CI631.
Redundant group controller has its own CI module which provides global memory and provides AF 100 access.
RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 Remove this column Note)
Add RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (8/28)
Non-Proprietary
No.
Component ID Component Type Component Description Normal Failure Mode Screening
- Remark 53 1-752-J-PA03B-R01-S03 Processor Module PM Processor Module 1 (PM646A) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 1 (GC-1 PM1).
- It causes the loss of the A and C ESF Initiation signals.
- It causes the loss of the (A or C) coincidence logic performed by PM1.
- Redundant component control signal is available in the redundant group controller.
54 1-752-J-PA03B-R01-S04 Processor Module PM Processor Module 2 (PM646A) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 2 (GC-1 PM2).
- It causes the loss of the B and D ESF Initiation signals.
- It causes the loss of the (B or D) coincidence logic performed by PM2.
- Redundant component control signal is available in the redundant group controller.
55 1-752-J-PA03B-R01-S05 Processor Module PM Processor Module 3 (PM646A) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 3 (GC-1 PM3).
- It causes the loss of the selective two out of four coincidence logic performed by PM 3.
- It causes the loss of MCR CPM signals.
- Redundant component control signal is available in the redundant group controller.
56 1-752-J-PA03B-R01-S06 Processor Module PM Processor Module 4 (PM646A) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 4 (GC-1 PM4).
- It causes the loss of RSR CPM signals.
- Redundant RSR CPM signal is available in the redundant group controller.
57 1-752-J-PA03B-R01-S07 Processor Module PM Processor Module 5 (PM646A) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 5 (GC-1 PM5).
- It causes the loss of component control signal propagation (ESCM signals and MI signals) from CCG to LC via PM5.
- Redundant RSR CPM signal is available in the redundant group controller.
RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 Remove this column RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (9/28)
Non-Proprietary
No.
Component ID Component Type Component Description Normal Failure Mode Screening Remark 58 1-752-J-PA03B-R01-S08 Digital Input Module Digital Input Module (DI621) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Input Module
- It is no impact on the safety function.
- It causes the loss of local manual actuation in one GC in that channel, but the redundant GC is still functional.
- Redundant group controller and redundant initiation signals are provided within the channel.
59 1-752-J-PA03B-R01-S09 Digital Output Module Digital Output Module (DO620) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Output Module
- It is no impact on the safety function.
- It causes the loss of transmission the Transfer Switch status to the PPS.
60 1-752-J-PA03B-R01-S10 N/A Dummy at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts CCG - A1 D
U M
M Y
C I
6 3
1 P
M 6
4 6
D U
M M
Y D
U M
M Y
D I
6 2
1 D
O 6
2 0
D U
M M
Y D
U M
M Y
C I
6 3
1 61 1-752-J-PA03B-R02-S01 N/A Dummy at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 62 1-752-J-PA03B-R02-S02 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) at CCG 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Component Interface Module
- It impacts on when the coincidence failure of redundant CI631 module in CCG2
- It impacts on corresponding channel's ESCM control manual control 63 1-752-J-PA03B-R02-S03 Processor Module PM Processor Module 1 (PM646A) at CCG 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Control Channel Gateway 1 Processor Module (CCG-1 PM)
- It impact on when the coincidence failure of CCG-2 PM
- It impacts corresponding channel's ESCM control 64 1-752-J-PA03B-R02-S04 N/A Dummy at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 65 1-752-J-PA03B-R02-S05 N/A Dummy at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 Remove this column Note)
Add RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (10/28)
Non-Proprietary
No.
Component ID Component Type Component Description Normal Failure Mode Screening Remark 66 1-752-J-PA03B-R02-S06 Digital Input Module Digital Input Module (DI621) at CCG 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Input Module
- No impact, because no safety function depends on DI contact input.
- It is for transfer switch status 67 1-752-J-PA03B-R02-S07 Digital Output Module Digital Output Module (DO620) at CCG 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Output Module
- No impact, because no safety function depends on DO contact input.
- It is for transfer switch status 68 1-752-J-PA03B-R02-S08 N/A Dummy at CCG 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 69 1-752-J-PA03B-R02-S09 N/A Dummy at CCG 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 70 1-752-J-PA03B-R02-S10 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) at CCG 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Communication Interface Module
- It impacts on when the coincidence failure of redundant CI631 module in CCG2
- It impacts on corresponding channel's ESCM control manual control Group Controller - A2 D
U M
M Y
C I
6 3
1 P
M 6
4 6
P M
6 4
6 P
M 6
4 6
P M
6 4
6 P
M 6
4 6
D I
6 2
1 D
O 6
2 0
D U
M M
Y 71 1-752-J-PA03B-R03-S01 N/A Group Controller (RB601) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 72 1-752-J-PA03B-R03-S02 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Component Interface Module
- It causes the loss of ability to communication by AF1000 Internet network.
- It impacts on when the coincidence failure of GC-1 CI631.
- Redundant group controller has its own CI module which provides global memory and provides AF 100 access.
RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 Remove this column Note)
Add RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (11/28)
Non-Proprietary
No.
Component ID Component Type Component Description Normal Failure Mode Screening Remark 73 1-752-J-PA03B-R03-S03 Processor Module PM Processor Module 1 (PM646A) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 1 (GC-2 PM1).
- It causes the loss of the A and C ESF Initiation signals.
- It causes the loss of the (A or C) coincidence logic performed by PM1.
- Redundant component control signal is available in the redundant group controller.
74 1-752-J-PA03B-R03-S04 Processor Module PM Processor Module 2 (PM646A) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 2 (GC-2 PM2).
- It causes the loss of the B and D ESF Initiation signals.
- It causes the loss of the (B or D) coincidence logic performed by PM2.
- Redundant component control signal is available in the redundant group controller.
75 1-752-J-PA03B-R03-S05 Processor Module PM Processor Module 3 (PM646A) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 3 (GC-2 PM3).
- It causes the loss of the selective two out of four coincidence logic performed by PM 3.
- It causes the loss of MCR CPM signals.
- Redundant component control signal is available in the redundant group controller.
76 1-752-J-PA03B-R03-S06 Processor Module PM Processor Module 4 (PM646A) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 4 (GC-2 PM4).
- It causes the loss of RSR CPM signals.
- Redundant RSR CPM signal is available in the redundant group controller.
77 1-752-J-PA03B-R03-S07 Processor Module PM Processor Module 5 (PM646A) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 5 (GC-2 PM5).
- It causes the loss of component control signal propagation (ESCM signals and MI signals) from CCG to LC via PM5.
- Redundant RSR CPM signal is available in the redundant group controller.
78 1-752-J-PA03B-R03-S08 Digital Input Module Digital Input Module (DI621) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Input Module
- It is no impact on the safety function.
- It causes the loss of local manual actuation in one GC in that channel, but the redundant GC is still functional.
- Redundant group controller and redundant initiation signals are provided within the channel.
RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 Remove this column RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (12/28)
Non-Proprietary
No.
Component ID Component Type Component Description Normal Failure Mode Screening Remark 79 1-752-J-PA03B-R03-S09 Digital Output Module Digital Output Module (DO620) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Output Module
- It is no impact on the safety function.
- It causes the loss of transmission the Transfer Switch status to the PPS.
80 1-752-J-PA03B-R03-S10 N/A ESF-CCS group controller cabinet, PA03B (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts CCG - A2 D
U M
M Y
C I
6 3
1 P
M 6
4 6
D U
M M
Y D
U M
M Y
D I
6 2
1 D
O 6
2 0
D U
M M
Y D
U M
M Y
C I
6 3
1 81 1-752-J-PA03B-R04-S01 N/A Dummy at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 82 1-752-J-PA03B-R04-S02 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) at CCG 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Component Interface Module
- It impacts on when the coincidence failure of redundant CI631 module in CCG1.
- It impacts on corresponding channel's ESCM control manual control.
83 1-752-J-PA03B-R04-S03 Processor Module PM Processor Module 1 (PM646A) at CCG 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Control Channel Gateway 1 Processor Module (CCG-2 PM)
- It impact on when the coincidence failure of CCG-1 PM
- It impacts corresponding channel's ESCM control 84 1-752-J-PA03B-R04-S04 N/A ESF-CCS group controller cabinet, PA03B (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 85 1-752-J-PA03B-R04-S05 N/A ESF-CCS group controller cabinet, PA03B (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 86 1-752-J-PA03B-R04-S06 Digital Input Module Digital Input Module (DI621) at CCG 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Input Module
- No impact, because no safety function depends on DI contact input.
- It is for transfer switch status 87 1-752-J-PA03B-R04-S07 Digital Output Module Digital Output Module (DO620) at CCG 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Output Module
- No impact, because no safety function depends on DO contact input.
- It is for transfer switch status RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 Remove this column Note)
Add RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (13/28)
Non-Proprietary
No.
Component ID Component Type Component Description Normal Failure Mode Screening Remark 88 1-752-J-PA03B-R04-S08 N/A ESF-CCS group controller cabinet, PA03B (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 89 1-752-J-PA03B-R04-S09 N/A ESF-CCS group controller cabinet, PA03B (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 90 1-752-J-PA03B-R04-S10 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) at CCG 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Communication Interface Module
- It impacts on when the coincidence failure of redundant CI631 module in CCG1.
- It impacts on corresponding channel's ESCM control manual control Group Controller - A3 C
I 6
3 1
C I
6 3
1 P
M 6
4 6
P M
6 4
6 D
I 6
2 1
D O
6 2
0 D
U M
M Y
D U
M M
Y D
U M
M Y
C I
6 3
1 91 1-752-J-PA03B-R05-S01 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) 1 at Group Controller 3 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Component Interface Module
- It causes the loss global memory.
- Redundant CI module provides redundant global memory for the chassis.
92 1-752-J-PA03B-R05-S02 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) 2 at Group Controller 3 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Component Interface Module
- It causes the loss global memory.
- Redundant CI module provides redundant global memory for the chassis.
93 1-752-J-PA03B-R05-S03 Processor Module PM Processor Module 1 (PM646A) at Group Controller 3 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate No
- Primary Processor Module
- It causes the loss of Actuation of BOP ESF or Load Sequencing.
- Redundant GC-3 secondary processor module provides the logic for actuation of BOP ESF and Load Sequencing.
- The redundant PM acquires the RMS and Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) input signals, performs the BOP ESF and Load Sequencing Logic and transmits the corresponding initiation signals.
RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 Remove this column Note)
Add RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (14/28)
Non-Proprietary
No.
Component ID Component Type Component Description Normal Failure Mode Screening Remark 94 1-752-J-PA03B-R05-S04 Processor Module PM Processor Module 1 (PM646A) at Group Controller 3 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate No
- Secondary Processor Module
- It causes the loss of Actuation of BOP ESF or Load Sequencing.
- Redundant GC-3 secondary processor module provides the logic for actuation of BOP ESF and Load Sequencing.
- The redundant PM acquires the RMS and Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) input signals, performs the BOP ESF and Load Sequencing Logic and transmits the corresponding initiation signals.
95 1-752-J-PA03B-R05-S05 Digital Input Module Digital Input Module (DI621) at Group Controller 3 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Input Module
- It causes the loss of internal cabinet status information, and it causes the loss of Actuation of BOP ESF or Load Sequencing.
- Redundant GC-3s are provided by ESF-CCS Channels A and B, thus the redundant GC-3 maintains the function.
96 1-752-J-PA03B-R05-S06 Digital Output Module Digital Output Module (DO620) at Group Controller 3 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate No
- Digital Output Module
- It causes the loss of internal cabinet status information, and it causes the loss of Actuation of BOP ESF or Load Sequencing.
- Redundant GC-3s are provided by ESF-CCS Channels A and B, thus the redundant GC-3 maintains the function.
97 1-752-J-PA03B-R05-S07 N/A ESF-CCS group controller cabinet, PA03B (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 98 1-752-J-PA03B-R05-S08 N/A ESF-CCS group controller cabinet, PA03B (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 99 1-752-J-PA03B-R05-S09 N/A ESF-CCS group controller cabinet, PA03B (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 100 1-752-J-PA03B-R05-S10 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) 3 at Group Controller 3 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03B Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Component Interface Module
- It causes the loss of ability to communication by AF1000 Internet network.
- It impacts on the actuation of BOP-ESF and load sequencing.
- Redundant GC-3s are provided by ESF-CCS channel A and B, thus the redundant GC-3 maintains the function.
RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 Remove this column RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (15/28)
Non-Proprietary
No.
Component ID Component Type Component Description Normal Failure Mode Screening Remark Group Controller - A1 D
U M
M Y
C I
6 3
1 P
M 6
4 6
P M
6 4
6 P
M 6
4 6
P M
6 4
6 P
M 6
4 6
D I
6 2
1 D
O 6
2 0
D U
M M
Y 101 1-752-J-PA03C-R01-S01 N/A Dummy at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 102 1-752-J-PA03C-R01-S02 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Component Interface Module
- It causes the loss of ability to communication by AF1000 Internet network.
- It impacts on when the coincidence failure of GC-2 CI631.
- Redundant group controller has its own CI module which provides global memory and provides AF 100 access.
103 1-752-J-PA03C-R01-S03 Processor Module PM Processor Module 1 (PM646A) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 1 (GC-1 PM1).
- It causes the loss of the A and C ESF Initiation signals.
- It causes the loss of the (A or C) coincidence logic performed by PM1.
- Redundant component control signal is available in the redundant group controller.
104 1-752-J-PA03C-R01-S04 Processor Module PM Processor Module 2 (PM646A) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 2 (GC-1 PM2).
- It causes the loss of the B and D ESF Initiation signals.
- It causes the loss of the (B or D) coincidence logic performed by PM2.
- Redundant component control signal is available in the redundant group controller.
105 1-752-J-PA03C-R01-S05 Processor Module PM Processor Module 3 (PM646A) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 3 (GC-1 PM3).
- It causes the loss of the selective two out of four coincidence logic performed by PM 3.
- It causes the loss of MCR CPM signals.
- Redundant component control signal is available in the redundant group controller.
RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 Remove this column Note)
Add RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (16/28)
Non-Proprietary
No.
Component ID Component Type Component Description Normal Failure Mode Screening Remark 106 1-752-J-PA03C-R01-S06 Processor Module PM Processor Module 4 (PM646A) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 4 (GC-1 PM4).
- It causes the loss of RSR CPM signals.
- Redundant RSR CPM signal is available in the redundant group controller.
107 1-752-J-PA03C-R01-S07 Processor Module PM Processor Module 5 (PM646A) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 5 (GC-1 PM5).
- It causes the loss of component control signal propagation (ESCM signals and MI signals) from CCG to LC via PM5.
- Redundant RSR CPM signal is available in the redundant group controller.
108 1-752-J-PA03C-R01-S08 Digital Input Module Digital Input Module (DI621) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Input Module
- It is no impact on the safety function.
- It causes the loss of local manual actuation in one GC in that channel, but the redundant GC is still functional.
- Redundant group controller and redundant initiation signals are provided within the channel.
109 1-752-J-PA03C-R01-S09 Digital Output Module Digital Output Module (DO620) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Output Module
- It is no impact on the safety function.
- It causes the loss of transmission the Transfer Switch status to the PPS.
110 1-752-J-PA03C-R01-S10 N/A Dummy at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts CCG - A1 D
U M
M Y
C I
6 3
1 P
M 6
4 6
D U
M M
Y D
U M
M Y
D I
6 2
1 D
O 6
2 0
D U
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Y D
U M
M Y
C I
6 3
1 111 1-752-J-PA03C-R02-S01 N/A Dummy at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 112 1-752-J-PA03C-R02-S02 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) at CCG 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Component Interface Module
- It impacts on when the coincidence failure of redundant CI631 module in CCG2
- It impacts on corresponding channel's ESCM control manual control RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 Remove this column Note)
Add RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (17/28)
Non-Proprietary
No.
Component ID Component Type Component Description Normal Failure Mode Screening Remark 113 1-752-J-PA03C-R02-S03 Processor Module PM Processor Module 1 (PM646A) at CCG 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Control Channel Gateway 1 Processor Module (CCG-1 PM)
- It impact on when the coincidence failure of CCG-2 PM
- It impacts corresponding channel's ESCM control 114 1-752-J-PA03C-R02-S04 N/A Dummy at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 115 1-752-J-PA03C-R02-S05 N/A Dummy at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 116 1-752-J-PA03C-R02-S06 Digital Input Module Digital Input Module (DI621) at CCG 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Input Module
- No impact, because no safety function depends on DI contact input.
- It is for transfer switch status 117 1-752-J-PA03C-R02-S07 Digital Output Module Digital Output Module (DO620) at CCG 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Output Module
- No impact, because no safety function depends on DO contact input.
- It is for transfer switch status 118 1-752-J-PA03C-R02-S08 N/A Dummy at CCG 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 119 1-752-J-PA03C-R02-S09 N/A Dummy at CCG 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 120 1-752-J-PA03C-R02-S10 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) at CCG 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Communication Interface Module
- It impacts on when the coincidence failure of redundant CI631 module in CCG2
- It impacts on corresponding channel's ESCM control manual control Group Controller - A2 D
U M
M Y
C I
6 3
1 P
M 6
4 6
P M
6 4
6 P
M 6
4 6
P M
6 4
6 P
M 6
4 6
D I
6 2
1 D
O 6
2 0
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Y 121 1-752-J-PA03C-R03-S01 N/A Group Controller (RB601) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 Remove this column Note)
Add RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (18/28)
Non-Proprietary
No.
Component ID Component Type Component Description Normal Failure Mode Screening Remark 122 1-752-J-PA03C-R03-S02 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Component Interface Module
- It causes the loss of ability to communication by AF1000 Internet network.
- It impacts on when the coincidence failure of GC-1 CI631.
- Redundant group controller has its own CI module which provides global memory and provides AF 100 access.
123 1-752-J-PA03C-R03-S03 Processor Module PM Processor Module 1 (PM646A) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 1 (GC-2 PM1).
- It causes the loss of the A and C ESF Initiation signals.
- It causes the loss of the (A or C) coincidence logic performed by PM1.
- Redundant component control signal is available in the redundant group controller.
124 1-752-J-PA03C-R03-S04 Processor Module PM Processor Module 2 (PM646A) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 2 (GC-2 PM2).
- It causes the loss of the B and D ESF Initiation signals.
- It causes the loss of the (B or D) coincidence logic performed by PM2.
- Redundant component control signal is available in the redundant group controller.
125 1-752-J-PA03C-R03-S05 Processor Module PM Processor Module 3 (PM646A) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 3 (GC-2 PM3).
- It causes the loss of the selective two out of four coincidence logic performed by PM 3.
- It causes the loss of MCR CPM signals.
- Redundant component control signal is available in the redundant group controller.
126 1-752-J-PA03C-R03-S06 Processor Module PM Processor Module 4 (PM646A) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 4 (GC-2 PM4).
- It causes the loss of RSR CPM signals.
- Redundant RSR CPM signal is available in the redundant group controller.
RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 Remove this column RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (19/28)
Non-Proprietary
No.
Component ID Component Type Component Description Normal Failure Mode Screening Remark 127 1-752-J-PA03C-R03-S07 Processor Module PM Processor Module 5 (PM646A) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 5 (GC-2 PM5).
- It causes the loss of component control signal propagation (ESCM signals and MI signals) from CCG to LC via PM5.
- Redundant RSR CPM signal is available in the redundant group controller.
128 1-752-J-PA03C-R03-S08 Digital Input Module Digital Input Module (DI621) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Input Module
- It is no impact on the safety function.
- It causes the loss of local manual actuation in one GC in that channel, but the redundant GC is still functional.
- Redundant group controller and redundant initiation signals are provided within the channel.
129 1-752-J-PA03C-R03-S09 Digital Output Module Digital Output Module (DO620) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Output Module
- It is no impact on the safety function.
- It causes the loss of transmission the Transfer Switch status to the PPS.
130 1-752-J-PA03C-R03-S10 N/A ESF-CCS group controller cabinet, PA03C(RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts CCG - A2 D
U M
M Y
C I
6 3
1 P
M 6
4 6
D U
M M
Y D
U M
M Y
D I
6 2
1 D
O 6
2 0
D U
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Y D
U M
M Y
C I
6 3
1 131 1-752-J-PA03C-R04-S01 N/A Dummy at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 132 1-752-J-PA03C-R04-S02 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) at CCG 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Component Interface Module
- It impacts on when the coincidence failure of redundant CI631 module in CCG1.
- It impacts on corresponding channel's ESCM control manual control.
133 1-752-J-PA03C-R04-S03 Processor Module PM Processor Module 1 (PM646A) at CCG 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Control Channel Gateway 1 Processor Module (CCG-2 PM)
- It impact on when the coincidence failure of CCG-1 PM
- It impacts corresponding channel's ESCM control RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 Remove this column Note)
Add RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (20/28)
Non-Proprietary
No.
Component ID Component Type Component Description Normal Failure Mode Screening Remark 134 1-752-J-PA03C-R04-S04 N/A ESF-CCS group controller cabinet, PA03C (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 135 1-752-J-PA03C-R04-S05 N/A ESF-CCS group controller cabinet, PA03C (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 136 1-752-J-PA03C-R04-S06 Digital Input Module Digital Input Module (DI621) at CCG 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Input Module
- No impact, because no safety function depends on DI contact input.
- It is for transfer switch status 137 1-752-J-PA03C-R04-S07 Digital Output Module Digital Output Module (DO620) at CCG 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Output Module
- No impact, because no safety function depends on DO contact input.
- It is for transfer switch status 138 1-752-J-PA03C-R04-S08 N/A ESF-CCS group controller cabinet, PA03C (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 139 1-752-J-PA03C-R04-S09 N/A ESF-CCS group controller cabinet, PA03C (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 140 1-752-J-PA03C-R04-S10 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) at CCG 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03C Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Communication Interface Module
- It impacts on when the coincidence failure of redundant CI631 module in CCG1.
- It impacts on corresponding channel's ESCM control manual control Group Controller - A1 D
U M
M Y
C I
6 3
1 P
M 6
4 6
P M
6 4
6 P
M 6
4 6
P M
6 4
6 P
M 6
4 6
D I
6 2
1 D
O 6
2 0
D U
M M
Y 141 1-752-J-PA03D-R01-S01 N/A Dummy at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 142 1-752-J-PA03D-R01-S02 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Component Interface Module
- It causes the loss of ability to communication by AF1000 Internet network.
- It impacts on when the coincidence failure of GC-2 CI631.
- Redundant group controller has its own CI module which provides global memory and provides AF 100 access.
RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 Remove this column Note)
Add RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (21/28)
Non-Proprietary
No.
Component ID Component Type Component Description Normal Failure Mode Screening Remark 143 1-752-J-PA03D-R01-S03 Processor Module PM Processor Module 1 (PM646A) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 1 (GC-1 PM1).
- It causes the loss of the A and C ESF Initiation signals.
- It causes the loss of the (A or C) coincidence logic performed by PM1.
- Redundant component control signal is available in the redundant group controller.
144 1-752-J-PA03D-R01-S04 Processor Module PM Processor Module 2 (PM646A) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 2 (GC-1 PM2).
- It causes the loss of the B and D ESF Initiation signals.
- It causes the loss of the (B or D) coincidence logic performed by PM2.
- Redundant component control signal is available in the redundant group controller.
145 1-752-J-PA03D-R01-S05 Processor Module PM Processor Module 3 (PM646A) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 3 (GC-1 PM3).
- It causes the loss of the selective two out of four coincidence logic performed by PM 3.
- It causes the loss of MCR CPM signals.
- Redundant component control signal is available in the redundant group controller.
146 1-752-J-PA03D-R01-S06 Processor Module PM Processor Module 4 (PM646A) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 4 (GC-1 PM4).
- It causes the loss of RSR CPM signals.
- Redundant RSR CPM signal is available in the redundant group controller.
147 1-752-J-PA03D-R01-S07 Processor Module PM Processor Module 5 (PM646A) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 5 (GC-1 PM5).
- It causes the loss of component control signal propagation (ESCM signals and MI signals) from CCG to LC via PM5.
- Redundant RSR CPM signal is available in the redundant group controller.
148 1-752-J-PA03D-R01-S08 Digital Input Module Digital Input Module (DI621) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Input Module
- It is no impact on the safety function.
- It causes the loss of local manual actuation in one GC in that channel, but the redundant GC is still functional.
- Redundant group controller and redundant initiation signals are provided within the channel.
RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 Remove this column RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (22/28)
Non-Proprietary
No.
Component ID Component Type Component Description Normal Failure Mode Screening Remark 149 1-752-J-PA03D-R01-S09 Digital Output Module Digital Output Module (DO620) at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Output Module
- It is no impact on the safety function.
- It causes the loss of transmission the Transfer Switch status to the PPS.
150 1-752-J-PA03D-R01-S10 N/A Dummy at Group Controller 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts CCG - A1 D
U M
M Y
C I
6 3
1 P
M 6
4 6
D U
M M
Y D
U M
M Y
D I
6 2
1 D
O 6
2 0
D U
M M
Y D
U M
M Y
C I
6 3
1 151 1-752-J-PA03D-R02-S01 N/A Dummy at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 152 1-752-J-PA03D-R02-S02 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) at CCG 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Component Interface Module
- It impacts on when the coincidence failure of redundant CI631 module in CCG2
- It impacts on corresponding channel's ESCM control manual control 153 1-752-J-PA03D-R02-S03 Processor Module PM Processor Module 1 (PM646A) at CCG 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Control Channel Gateway 1 Processor Module (CCG-1 PM)
- It impact on when the coincidence failure of CCG-2 PM
- It impacts corresponding channel's ESCM control 154 1-752-J-PA03D-R02-S04 N/A Dummy at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 155 1-752-J-PA03D-R02-S05 N/A Dummy at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 156 1-752-J-PA03D-R02-S06 Digital Input Module Digital Input Module (DI621) at CCG 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Input Module
- No impact, because no safety function depends on DI contact input.
- It is for transfer switch status 157 1-752-J-PA03D-R02-S07 Digital Output Module Digital Output Module (DO620) at CCG 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Output Module
- No impact, because no safety function depends on DO contact input.
- It is for transfer switch status 158 1-752-J-PA03D-R02-N/A Dummy at CCG 1 in ESF-CCS Operation Fails to Yes
- Dummy Module RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 Remove this column Note)
Add RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (23/28)
Non-Proprietary
No.
Component ID Component Type Component Description Normal Failure Mode Screening Remark S08 Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D operate
- No impacts 159 1-752-J-PA03D-R02-S09 N/A Dummy at CCG 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 160 1-752-J-PA03D-R02-S10 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) at CCG 1 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Communication Interface Module
- It impacts on when the coincidence failure of redundant CI631 module in CCG2
- It impacts on corresponding channel's ESCM control manual control Group Controller - A2 D
U M
M Y
C I
6 3
1 P
M 6
4 6
P M
6 4
6 P
M 6
4 6
P M
6 4
6 P
M 6
4 6
D I
6 2
1 D
O 6
2 0
D U
M M
Y 161 1-752-J-PA03D-R03-S01 N/A Group Controller (RB601) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 162 1-752-J-PA03D-R03-S02 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Component Interface Module
- It causes the loss of ability to communication by AF1000 Internet network.
- It impacts on when the coincidence failure of GC-1 CI631.
- Redundant group controller has its own CI module which provides global memory and provides AF 100 access.
163 1-752-J-PA03D-R03-S03 Processor Module PM Processor Module 1 (PM646A) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 1 (GC-2 PM1).
- It causes the loss of the A and C ESF Initiation signals.
- It causes the loss of the (A or C) coincidence logic performed by PM1.
- Redundant component control signal is available in the redundant group controller.
RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 Remove this column Note)
Add RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (24/28)
Non-Proprietary
No.
Component ID Component Type Component Description Normal Failure Mode Screening Remark 164 1-752-J-PA03D-R03-S04 Processor Module PM Processor Module 2 (PM646A) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 2 (GC-2 PM2).
- It causes the loss of the B and D ESF Initiation signals.
- It causes the loss of the (B or D) coincidence logic performed by PM2.
- Redundant component control signal is available in the redundant group controller.
165 1-752-J-PA03D-R03-S05 Processor Module PM Processor Module 3 (PM646A) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 3 (GC-2 PM3).
- It causes the loss of the selective two out of four coincidence logic performed by PM 3.
- It causes the loss of MCR CPM signals.
- Redundant component control signal is available in the redundant group controller.
166 1-752-J-PA03D-R03-S06 Processor Module PM Processor Module 4 (PM646A) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate No
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 4 (GC-2 PM4).
- It causes the loss of RSR CPM signals.
- Redundant RSR CPM signal is available in the redundant group controller.
167 1-752-J-PA03D-R03-S07 Processor Module PM Processor Module 5 (PM646A) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Group Controller 1 Processor Module 5 (GC-2 PM5).
- It causes the loss of component control signal propagation (ESCM signals and MI signals) from CCG to LC via PM5.
- Redundant RSR CPM signal is available in the redundant group controller.
168 1-752-J-PA03D-R03-S08 Digital Input Module Digital Input Module (DI621) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Input Module
- It is no impact on the safety function.
- It causes the loss of local manual actuation in one GC in that channel, but the redundant GC is still functional.
- Redundant group controller and redundant initiation signals are provided within the channel.
169 1-752-J-PA03D-R03-S09 Digital Output Module Digital Output Module (DO620) at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Output Module
- It is no impact on the safety function.
- It causes the loss of transmission the Transfer Switch status to the PPS.
170 1-752-J-PA03D-R03-S10 N/A ESF-CCS group controller cabinet, PA03D(RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 Remove this column RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (25/28)
Non-Proprietary
No.
Component ID Component Type Component Description Normal Failure Mode Screening Remark CCG - A2 D
U M
M Y
C I
6 3
1 P
M 6
4 6
D U
M M
Y D
U M
M Y
D I
6 2
1 D
O 6
2 0
D U
M M
Y D
U M
M Y
C I
6 3
1 171 1-752-J-PA03D-R04-S01 N/A Dummy at Group Controller 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 172 1-752-J-PA03D-R04-S02 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) at CCG 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Component Interface Module
- It impacts on when the coincidence failure of redundant CI631 module in CCG1.
- It impacts on corresponding channel's ESCM control manual control.
173 1-752-J-PA03D-R04-S03 Processor Module PM Processor Module 1 (PM646A) at CCG 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Control Channel Gateway 1 Processor Module (CCG-2 PM)
- It impact on when the coincidence failure of CCG-1 PM
- It impacts corresponding channel's ESCM control 174 1-752-J-PA03D-R04-S04 N/A ESF-CCS group controller cabinet, PA03D (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 175 1-752-J-PA03D-R04-S05 N/A ESF-CCS group controller cabinet, PA03D (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 176 1-752-J-PA03D-R04-S06 Digital Input Module Digital Input Module (DI621) at CCG 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Input Module
- No impact, because no safety function depends on DI contact input.
- It is for transfer switch status 177 1-752-J-PA03D-R04-S07 Digital Output Module Digital Output Module (DO620) at CCG 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Digital Output Module
- No impact, because no safety function depends on DO contact input.
- It is for transfer switch status 178 1-752-J-PA03D-R04-S08 N/A ESF-CCS group controller cabinet, PA03D (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 179 1-752-J-PA03D-R04-S09 N/A ESF-CCS group controller cabinet, PA03D (RB601)
Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Dummy Module
- No impacts 180 1-752-J-PA03D-R04-S10 CI Interface Processor Component Interface Module (CI631) at CCG 2 in ESF-CCS Group Controller Cabinet, PA03D Operation Fails to operate Yes
- Communication Interface Module
- It impacts on when the coincidence failure of redundant CI631 module in CCG1.
- It impacts on corresponding channel's ESCM control manual control RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2 Remove this column Note)
Add RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (26/28)
Non-Proprietary
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Note)
The Group Controller Cabinets (GCCs) contain two Control Channel Gateways (CCGs) and two Group Controllers. For Channel A and B, they have also contain third GC. The CCG 1 and CCG 2 are on racks R02 and R04. The GC1, GC2 and GC3 are on rack R01, R03 and R05.
The table summarizes the rack configurations and component ID.
Slot R01 (GC1)
R02 (CCG1)
R03 (GC2)
R04 (CCG2)
R05 (GC3)
(Only Channel A and B)
Component ID Component ID Component ID Component ID Component ID 1
RB601 (Dummy)
R01-S01 RB601 (Dummy)
R02-S01 RB601 (Dummy)
R03-S01 CI631 R04-S01 C
RB601 (Dummy)
R04-S01 2
CI631 R01-S02 01-S02 R
CI631 R01-S0 3-S02 CI631 R
0 CI631 03-S02 CI 2
R03-S02 3
R01-S03 PM646 PM646 02-S0 R02-S03 R
M646 R
03-S03 P
3-S03 PM PM646 0
3 03-S03 PM646 4
R01-S04 PM646 R
RB601 (Dummy)
R02-S04 02-S04 P
PM646 R04-S04 P
RB601 (Dummy)
R04-S04 PM646 5
R01-S05 PM646 R02-S05 P
RB601 (Dummy)
R02-S05 04-S05 D
DI621 R
RB601 (Dummy)
R04-S05 6
M646 R01 PM646 P
DI621 PM646 R02-S06 0
03-S06 DI621 R04-S06 R
6 R05-S06 04-S0 7
PM646 R01-S07 DO620 R02-S07 PM646 PM646 R03 DO620 DO620 R04 RB601 (Dummy)
R05-S07 DI621 8
R01-S08 RB601 (Dummy)
R02-S08 02-S08 D
DI621 R
RB601 (Dummy)
R04-S08 RB601 (Dummy)
R05-S08 DO62 9
0 R01-S09 DO620 RB601 (Dummy)
R02-S09 R03-S09 RB601 (Dummy)
R04-S09 RB601 (Dummy)
R05-S09 10 CI631 RB601 (Dummy)
R01-S10 R02-S10 0
CI631 R
R04-S10 R
CI631 RB601 (Dummy)
R03-S10 03-S1 Add RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.3 RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (27/28)
Non-Proprietary
Note)
The Group Controller Cabinets (GCCs) contain two Control Channel Gateways (CCGs) and two Group Controllers. For Channel A and B, they have also contain third GC. The CCG 1 and CCG 2 are on racks R02 and R04. The GC1, GC2 and GC3 are on rack R01, R03 and R05.
The table summarizes the rack configurations and component ID.
Slot
R01 (GC1)
R02 (CCG1)
R03 (GC2)
R04 (CCG2)
R05 (GC3)
(Only Channel A and B)
Component
ID
Component ID Component ID
Component ID Component ID
1 RB601 (Dummy)
R01-S01 RB601 (Dummy)
R02-S01 RB601 (Dummy)
R03-S01 RB601 (Dummy)
R04-S01 CI631 R05-S01
2
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R01-S02
CI631 R02-S02 CI631 R03-S02
CI631 R04-S02 CI631 R05-S02
3
PM646
R01-S03
PM646 R02-S03 PM646 R03-S03
PM646 R04-S03 PM646 R05-S03
4
PM646
R01-S04 RB601 (Dummy)
R02-S04 PM646 R03-S04 RB601 (Dummy)
R04-S04 PM646 R05-S04
5
PM646
R01-S05 RB601 (Dummy)
R02-S05 PM646 R03-S05 RB601 (Dummy)
R04-S05 DI621 R05-S05
6
PM646
R01-S06
DI621 R02-S06 PM646 R03-S06
DI621 R04-S06 DO620 R05-S06
7
PM646
R01-S07
DO620 R02-S07 PM646 R03-S07
DO620 R04-S07 RB601 (Dummy)
R05-S07
8
DI621
R01-S08 RB601 (Dummy)
R02-S08 DI621 R03-S08 RB601 (Dummy)
R04-S08 RB601 (Dummy)
R05-S08
9
DO620
R01-S09 RB601 (Dummy)
R02-S09 DO620 R03-S09 RB601 (Dummy)
R04-S09 RB601 (Dummy)
R05-S09
10 RB601 (Dummy)
R01-S10
CI631 R02-S10 RB601 (Dummy)
R03-S10
CI631 R04-S10 CI631 R05-S10
Add RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.3 RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (28/28)
Non-Proprietary
1.8-13 Table 1.8-2 (9 of 29)
Item No.
Description COL 6.1(1)
The COL applicant is to identify the implementation milestones for the coatings program.
COL 6.2(1)
The COL applicant is to identify the implementation milestone for the CILRT program.
COL 6.3(1)
The COL applicant is to prepare operational procedures and maintenance programs as related to leak detection and contamination control.
COL 6.3(2)
The COL applicant is to maintain complete documentation of system design, construction, design modifications, field changes, and operations.
COL 6.4(1)
The COL applicant is to provide automatic and manual operating procedures for the control room HVAC system, which are required in the event of a postulated toxic gas release.
COL 6.4(2)
The COL applicant is to provide the details of specific toxic chemicals of mobile and stationary sources and evaluate the MCR habitability based on the recommendations in NRC RG 1.78 to meet the requirements of TMI Action Plan Item III.D.3.4 and GDC 19.
COL 6.4(3)
The COL applicant is to identify and develop toxic gas detection requirements to protect the operators and provide reasonable assurance of the MCR habitability. The number, locations, sensitivity, range, type, and design of the toxic gas detectors are to be developed by the COL applicant.
COL 6.5(1)
The COL applicant is to provide the operational procedures and maintenance program as related to leak detection and contamination control.
COL 6.5(2)
The COL applicant is to maintain the complete documentation of system design, construction, design modifications, field changes, and operations.
COL 6.6(1)
The COL applicant is to identify the implementation milestones for ASME Section Xl inservice inspection program for ASME Code Section III Class 2 and 3 components.
COL 6.6(2)
The COL applicant is to identify the implementation milestone for the augmented inservice inspection program.
COL 6.8(1)
The COL applicant is to provide the operational procedures and maintenance program for leak detection and contamination control.
COL 6.8(2)
The COL applicant is to provide the preparation of cleanliness, housekeeping, and foreign materials exclusion program.
COL 6.8(3)
The COL applicant is to maintain the complete documentation of system design, construction, design modifications, field changes, and operations.
COL 6.8(4)
The COL applicant is responsible for the establishment and implementation of the Maintenance Rule program in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65.
COL 7.5(1)
The COL applicant is to provide a description of the site-specific AMI variables such as wind speed, and atmosphere stability temperature difference.
COL 7.5(2)
The COL applicant is to provide a description of the site-specific EOF.
Rev. 0 APR1400 DCD TIER 2 Add The COL applicant is to provide the feasibility of software reliability.
COL 7.1(2)
The COL applicant is to provide justifiable software reliability data for software used in the digital I&C systems (i.e., PPS and DPS).
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APR1400 DCD TIER 2 7.1-29 Compliance with safety criteria for software is described in the Software Program Manual Technical Report.
The software design throughout the software life cycle is implemented in accordance with various software development plan documents described in the Software Program Manual Technical Report. The software development process is carried out throughout the software life cycle, which consists of the following:
a.
Concept phase b.
Requirements phase c.
Design phase d.
Implementation phase e.
Test phase f.
Installation and checkout phase g.
Operation and maintenance phase Software is classified based on the functionality and importance related to safety, as described in the Software Program Manual Technical Report. The software that is used within the APR1400 I&C systems is assigned to one of the following classes:
a.
SC (Protection) b.
ITS c.
Important-to-availability (ITA) d.
General purpose 7.1.4 Combined License Information No combined license (COL) information is required with regard to Section 7.1.
Rev. 0 COL 7.1(2) The COL applicant is to provide the feasibility of software reliability.
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The COL applicant is to provide justifiable software reliability data for software used in the digital I&C systems (i.e., PPS and DPS).
RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.5 (2/2)
Non-Proprietary
APR1400 DCD TIER 2 19.1-10 19.1.3 Special Design/Operational Features Design and operational characteristics of the APR1400 that result in improved plant safety as compared to currently operating nuclear power plants, include the following:
a.
An in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) b.
A four-train safety injection system (SIS) that injects borated water directly into the reactor vessel (RV) through direct vessel injection (DVI) nozzles c.
Four pumps for component cooling water and essential service water systems (CCWS and ESWS) d.
An emergency containment spray backup system (ECSBS) e.
A cavity flooding system (CFS) f.
A hydrogen control system (HG)
The PRA has influenced the selection of design changes such as:
a.
Four emergency diesel generators (EDGs) b.
The inclusion of an alternate ac source (AAC) gas turbine generator (GTG),
which can be used as an independent ac source to cope with station blackout (SBO) scenarios following loss of offsite power (LOOP)
Table 19.1-2 provides a summary of the APR1400 systems. The table includes the systems key structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and the key functional descriptions with respect to the design features for preventing core damage, mitigating the consequences of core damage and preventing releases from containment, and mitigating the consequences of releases from containment.
Design/Operational Features for Preventing Core Damage 19.1.3.1 Key preventive features that are intended to minimize initiation of plant transients, mitigate the progression of plant transients, and prevent severe accidents include the following safety systems:
a.
Safety Injection System (SIS)
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APR1400 DCD TIER 2 19.1-17 injection water when RCP seal injection is not available through the two centrifugal charging pumps. The ACP takes suction from the VCT or the BAST and supplies seal injection water to the RCPs through the normal CVCS seal injection flow path. The ACP is considered as a diverse capability from the two centrifugal pumps.
The charging pumps are powered by the safety-related buses which are normally supplied by Class 1E onsite or offsite power. Following a loss of offsite power (LOOP), the buses will be re-energized by the emergency diesel generators.
However, the charging pumps will not automatically restart. It needs to be manually re-started by the operators after bus voltage has been restored (COL 19.1(7)).
- g.
Reactor Protection System (RPS)
The RPS is a part of the plant protection system (PPS). Nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) parameters and containment conditions are monitored by the PPS continuously. If monitored conditions approach specific safety limits, the PPS through the RPS rapidly shuts down the reactor to protect the fuel design limits and prevent a breach of the RCS pressure boundary. The PPS also communicates with the engineered safety features - component control system (ESF-CCS), which actuates mitigating systems.
The PPS is based on a digital I&C that includes plant parameter bistable comparator functions, coincidence logic functions, and initiation logic functions to actuate a reactor trip and operation of engineered safety features.
The coincidence trip signals are used in the initiation of the reactor trip switchgear system (RTSS) and the ESF-CCS. A coincidence of two-out-of-four like trip signals is required to generate a reactor trip signal.
A trip is generated when a coincidence of two like trip signals of the monitored plant parameters or containment conditions reach a preset safety limit. The RPS initiates a reactor trip for the following conditions:
- 1) Variable overpower trip signal (VOPT)
- 2) High logarithmic power level trip signal Rev. 1 RAI 271-8290 - Question 19-15_Rev.2
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APR1400 DCD TIER 2 19.1-18
- 3) High local power density (LPD) trip signal
- 4) Low departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR) trip signal
- 5) High pressurizer pressure trip signal
- 6) Low pressurizer pressure trip signal
- 7) Low steam generator water level trip signal
- 8) High steam generator water level trip signal
- 9) Low steam generator pressure trip signal
- 10) High containment pressure trip signal
- 11) Low reactor coolant flow trip signal
- 12) Manual trip The APR1400 design includes the diverse actuation system (DAS). The DAS consists of the diverse protection system (DPS), the diverse manual ESF actuation (DMA) switches, and the diverse indication system (DIS). The DPS provides additional trip capability to the RPS.
- h.
Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)
The engineered safety features (ESF) I&C consists of sensors, auxiliary process cabinet - safety (APC-S), the ESFAS portion of the PPS, and ESF-CCS.
The ESFAS monitors selected parameters to initiate the operation of necessary ESF systems to prevent damage to the core and the RCS components. It also provides reasonable assurance of containment integrity and prevents unacceptable levels of radioactivity release to the environment as well as protecting the control room operators during fuel handling accidents. The system uses bistable trip functions and coincidence logic in the PPS and component control logic in the ESF-CCS to generate actuation signals. The following actuation signals are generated by the ESFAS:
- 1) Safety injection actuation signal (SIAS)
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APR1400 DCD TIER 2 19.1-19
- 2) Containment isolation actuation signal (CIAS)
- 3) Containment spray actuation signal (CSAS)
- 4) Main steam isolation signal (MSIS)
- 5) Auxiliary feedwater actuation signal (AFAS)
- i.
AC Power System The ac power system comprises two qualified circuits from the offsite transmission network to the switchyard, two qualified circuits from the switchyard to the onsite Class 1E distribution system, four diesel generators (each capable of supplying one train of the onsite Class 1E ac distribution system, and automatic load sequencing for four trains of supported equipment that must be operable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4).
The non-Class 1E 13.8 kV power system consists of four non-safety switchgears.
Each of two unit auxiliary transformers (UATs) normally supplies two of the 13.8 kV switchgears. The non-Class 1E 13.8 kV power system furnishes power to large motors such as the RCP motors, condensate pump motors, circulating water pump motors, and associated 480V load centers.
The Class 1E safety systems are divided into four redundant and independent distribution systems. Each distribution system can be powered from the following sources:
- 1) Unit auxiliary transformer (UAT)
- 2) Standby auxiliary transformer (SAT)
- 4) Alternate AC (AAC)
If both the offsite power sources and the standby EDGs are unavailable, 4.16 kVac buses may be powered from the AAC power source. The AAC provides an independent and diverse power source, which is furnished with a battery and charger to provide power to its associated dc loads.
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APR1400 DCD TIER 2 19.1-52 d)
Flow diversion (SY-A13) is considered a potential system failure if the flow diversion pathway occurs due to failures that do not meet the screening criteria of SY-A15 and can result in failure to meet the system success criteria. The flow diversion paths that are excluded are documented.
Dependency Analysis The systems that are included in the systems analysis for internal events are provided in Table 19.1-9. Simplified diagrams of major systems are shown in Figures 19.1-1 through 19.1-14. Tables are provided to summarize the initiator-to-system and system-to-system dependencies.
- a.
Dependency between Initiating Events and Front Line Systems (Table 19.1-10a)
- b.
Dependency between Initiating Events and Support Systems (Table 19.1-10b)
- c.
Dependency between Front Line System and Supporting Systems (Table 19.1-11a)
- d.
Dependency between Supporting System and Other Supporting Systems (Table 19.1-11b) 19.1.4.1.1.5 Data Analysis The purpose of the data analysis task is to tabulate estimates of the failure rates, demand failure probabilities, and unavailability data for basic events in the PRA model. The data developed during this task include:
- a.
Component unreliability data
- b.
Component unavailability data due to test and maintenance
- c.
CCF data
- d.
Special event data including recovery action failures For each component type and failure mode identified in the system analysis, the failure rates are extracted from available generic data sources. Potential sources of generic failure data are:
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APR1400 DCD TIER 2 19.1-69 is only a minor decrease in CDF. This sensitivity case impacts only SBO sequences.
- e.
Hot Leg Injection Sensitivity Case: For medium break LOCA, a hot leg injection (HLI) is assumed not needed. A sensitivity case was performed that required HLI for a medium break LOCA, and the result showed the CDF increases by 10 percent to 1.4 x 10-6/year.
19.1.4.1.2.8 Risk Insights The APR1400 is an evolutionary PWR plant, and CDF is dominated by LOOP events (approximately 39 percent). Still, total LOOP CDF is small at less than 1.5 x 10-7/year, which is a result of the high redundancy in trains and diversity in emergency power supplies.
Loss of cooling systems (CCWS and ESWS) and seal LOCA contributions to CDF are approximately 26 percent, which includes the total/partial losses of CCW or ESW. This relatively large contribution, which contributes to RCP seal LOCA, is a result of the lack of diversity in the redundant cooling trains.
The top cutsets show that the plant risk is strongly influenced by the performance of support systems (i.e., CCWS and ESWS). This is because the support systems are common dependencies of highly redundant safety systems.
Level 2 Internal Events PRA for Operations at Power 19.1.4.2 A description of the Level 2 internal events PRA for operations at-power, including the results of the analysis, is provided in the following subsections.
19.1.4.2.1 Description of Level 2 Internal Events PRA for Operations at Power The PRA comprises two major areas of analysis: 1) identification of sequences of events that could lead to core damage and estimation of their frequencies of occurrence (the Level 1 analysis); and 2) evaluation of the potential response of the containment to these sequences, with emphasis on the possible modes of containment failure and the corresponding radionuclide source terms (the Level 2 analysis).
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Propriet The purpose of this attachment is to provide additional explanation regarding the CCF of operating software and application software RAWs are almost the same in Table 19.1-22.
From Table 19.1-22:
CCF Event Description RAW PPSO-OS-PPS CCF OF PPS OPERATING SYSTEM SOFTWARE 2426 PPSO-AP-LC CCF OF PPS LC APPLICATION SOFTWARE 2376 PPSO-AP-GC CCF OF PPS GC APPLICATION SOFTWARE 771 PPSO-AP-BPM CCF OF PPS BPM APPLICATION SOFTWARE 87 PPSO-AP-LCL CCF OF PPS LCL APPLICATION SOFTWARE 87 Based on these results it is clear that the operating system software CCF (which fails all applications),
and each application software CCF are all risk significant with respect to RAW since RAW >> 2 for each CCF event. The amount of importance with respect to RAW is based on both the base failure probability of the event as well as its impact on the model. If the impact on the model is the same, the event with the smaller failure probability will have a higher RAW. If the events have the same probability, but one event is involved in more sequences, the more involved event will have a higher RAW. If both the model impact and failure probability are the same, we would expect to see the same RAW value.
Recall that the failure probability of the operating system software is > @76demand, and the failure probability of all application software is > @76demand. Also, recall that a failure of the operating system fails all applications. For example, all bistables are assumed to fail if either the bistable processor module application software fails (PPSO-AP-BPM) or if the operating system software fails.
Hence, one would expect to see that the operating system CCF has a higher RAW than any individual application software CCF (which we see).
Regarding the application software, the bistable (PPSO-AP-BPM) and LCL module (PPSO-AP-LCL) have the same function (i.e., develop output signals to both RPS and ESF), and the same failure probability; hence, their RAWs should be identical (which we see). Note that for RPS, both of these application software failures can be compensated for by DPS, or manual reactor trip. In addition, recall that all LOOP/SBO events (which represent about 35% of the CDF) result in automatic trip, so failure of LCL or BPM software has no impact on 35% of all CDF. For ESF, both of these application system failures can be compensated for by remote manual ESF actuation, remote manual component control via ESCM (ESF-CCS soft control module), DPS and DMA. Therefore, although they support both RPS and ESF, there are several methods to compensate for their failures, and they end up having the lowest RAW.
Group controller software CCF only fails ESF equipment (i.e., does not impact reactor trip), but their failure also fails remote manual ESF signals (e.g., manual SI or AFAS from the MCR). However, signals to individual components can still be actuated via signals sent to the Loop Controllers from the ESCM. In addition, DPS and DMA can still actuate equipment.
For LC software failure, all ESF and ESCM signals are failed, and only DPS and DMA are available to start ESF equipment.
Hence, we would expect that the LCs are more important than the GCs which are more important than the LCLs or BPMs (which we see).
Finally, as previously stated, failure of the operating system fails all application software; hence, it has to have the highest RAW of all (which we see).
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