ML18152A229
| ML18152A229 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 11/28/1989 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Holland W, Larry Nicholson, York J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A230 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-89-31, 50-281-89-31, NUDOCS 8912130192 | |
| Download: ML18152A229 (19) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1989031
Text
.. ,/*
- 'I ****
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W .
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
50-280/89-31 and 50-281/89-31
Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company
5000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA
23060
Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281
Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2
License Nos.:
Inspection Conduct.ed:
October 1 - 28, 1989
Inspectors:
~;:f?;7. ~
4
. W. 'E. Ho 11 and, Senior sldent Inspector
Approved
Scope:
~~/L-/ifs
J. W. York, Resident nspector
L.
InspecY,J
'lr~~
Fredrickson, Section Chief
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Date Signed
Date Signed
Date Signed
11/-:>-1-f P'I
Dlte s, gned
This routine resident inspection was conducted on site in the areas of plant
operations, plant maintenance, plant surveillance, information meetings with
local officials, and licensee event report review.
Certain tours were conducted on backshifts or weekends.
Backshift or weekend
tours.were conducted on October 9, 11, 12, 19, 21, 22, and 25.
Results:
During this inspection period, one violation with two examples was identified
regarding licensed operators failure to follow procedures and/or instructions
(paragraph 3.a).
One unresolved item was identified regarding followup on
material problems associated with safety-related check valve maintenance
(paragraph 4.c).
In addition, seven non-cited violations were identified
during closeout of licensee event reports (paragraph 7) ..
These violations
involved personnel errors, procedural inadequacies and failure to perform
required samples .
8912130192 891128
ADOCK 05000280
Q
- ..
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
REPORT DETAILS
- W. Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing
- R. Bilyeu, Licensing Engineer
R. Blount, Superintendent of Technical Services
D. Christian, Assistant Station Manager
D. Erickson, Superintendent of Health Physics
- E. Grecheck, Assistant Station Manager
M. Kansler, Station Manager
T. Kendzia, Supervisor, Safety Engineering
- J. McCarthy, Superintendent of Operations
G. Miller, Licensing Coordinator, Surry
J. Ogren, Superintendent of Maintenance
- T. Sowers, Superintendent of Engineering
- E. Smith, Site Quality Assurance Manager
- Attended exit interview.
Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift
technical advisors, shift supervisors and other plant personnel.
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
2.
Plant Status
Unit 1 began the reporting period at power.
The unit operated at power
for the duration of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the reporting period with the unit increasing power after
turbine balancing evolutions had been completed.
The unit reached full
power on October 8, 1989, and operated at power until October 12, 1989,
when identification of leakage past a pressurizer safety valve required
that the unit be shut down for repairs. The unit was subcritical at 1116
hours on October 12, and reached the cold shutdown condition on October
13.
The unit remained in cold shutdown for the duration of the inspection
period.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707 & 42700)
a.
Daily Inspections
Inspections were conducted daily in the following areas:
control
room staffing, access, and operator behavior; operator adherence to
approved procedures, TS, and LCOs; examination of panels containing
2
instrumentation and other RPS elements to determine that required
channels are operable; and review of control room operator logs,
operating orders, plant deviation reports, tagout logs, jumper logs,
and tags on components to verify ~ompliance with approved procedures.
(1)
During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed an
operational event associated with the incorrect system alignment
of a Unit 2 AFW pump during performance of the monthly TS
operability test.
The event sequence was as follows:
On October 8, 1989, a licensed operator on the midnight shift
was directed to conduct the monthly surveillance tests for* the
Unit 1 and 2 B train AFW pumps in accordance with procedures
1-PT-15.lB and 2-PT-15.lB, respectively.
The operator obtained
copies of each approved test procedure, other support equipment,
and went to the Unit 1 safeguards area to conduct the test on
the Unit 1 B pump (l-FW-P-38) in accordance with l-PT-15.lB.
After conducting all necessary prestart" alignments, the operator
requested the Unit 1 CRO to start the B pump as required by
procedure.
At this time the shift supervisor (a licensed SRO)
reported to the pump location and conducted a material condition
check of l-FW-P-3B prior to pump start. The PT for the Unit 1
pump was completed satisfactorily and the system was returned to
its
normal
operational
lineup.
The
procedure
required
independent verification for returning the system to normal
lineup.
The operator then preceded to the Unit 2 safeguards
area to conduct the same test on the Unit 2 B *pump (2-FW-P-3B)
in accordance with 2-PT-15.lB.
However, the operator performed
the re qui red a 1 i gnments on the Unit 2 A pump in stead of the
Unit 2 B pump as required by procedure.
These alignments
include shutting of the discharge isolation valves for the pump
to be tested. After completion of the alignments and a similar
verification of the material condition of the pump by the shift
supervisor, the Unit 2 CRO started the B pump as required by
procedure and noted flow to the steam generators (this condition
was not expected).
The C"RO immediately secured the B AFW pump
and the operator and shift supervisor at the pump 1 ocat ion
determined that *the wrong pump *had been a 1 i gned for testing
(i.e. the A pump discharge valves had been closed instead of the
B pump discharge valves). The operator immediately opened the A
pump discharge valves after the mistake was realized.
The B
pump was then aligned for testing in accordance with 2~PT-15.1B
and the test was satisfactorily completed.
After learning about the above event, station management
reviewed the event with those individuals involved and concluded
the following:
The operator did not strictly follow procedure during
performance of the PT.
This fact was obvious when the
- <
3
field copies were reviewed and very few signature blocks
were initialed as indicating performance of required.steps .
. The relative room location of the Unit 2 pumps are reversed
from the Unit 1 location. However, the pumps in the Unit 2
safeguards area were clearly labeled.
Immediate corrective actions were taken by station management to
include stern re,nstruction of all operating shifts with regards
to the requirement for strict procedure adherence and attention
to detail.
In addition, the operators involved in the event
were taken off shift and disciplinary actions were taken.
The inspector was present during the management review with the
involved individuals and concluded that the station upper- and
mid-level
management considered the performance of these
operators as unsatisfactory and that procedure adherence was
mandatory in the future.
The inspector agrees with licensee
management's assessment of the event; however, he also considers
that the lack of procedure adherence and attention to detail is
a lingering weakness which needs continued aggressive reinforce-
ment in order to eliminate the problem.
The inspect9r reviewed
the procedure for performance of the test and noted that strict
procedure adherence would have prevented this everit.
Failure to
follow procedure 2-PT-15.lB is identified as a violation of
TS 6.4 (VIO 280, 281/89-31-01).
.
(2) A second operational event occurred on October 25 that involved
a dilution of the Unit 2 RCS.
The unit was in cold shutdown in
a reduced inventory condition for repair of leaking SI check
valves.
Maintenance had completed the va,lve repair and the
opera tors were f i 11 i ng the RCS when the di 1 ut ion occurred.
Adequate shutdown margin was maintained during the event with no
increase in count rate on the source range nuclear instrumenta-
tion.
Containment integrity was not established during this
dilution event.
TS 3.8.A.6 requires that a boron dilution shall
not be made unless containment intergrity is intact.
The RO initiated filling the RCS from a standpipe level o~ 13.6
feet at 0120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> tin October 25.
tion was listed as 2130 ppm.
Samples taken during the initial
phase of *the fill indicated that the makeup blend was resulting
in a slight boration (2300 ppm at 0320 hours0.0037 days <br />0.0889 hours <br />5.291005e-4 weeks <br />1.2176e-4 months <br />).
In addition to
correcting this bl end, the RO a 1 s'o increased the fi 11 rate by
placing the boric acid valve controller in manual and opening
the acid valve to fully open._ This action resulted in the boron
flow rate indication available to the RO going offscale high.
An adjustment of the pure water valve was al so made in an
attempt to maintain the same mixture.
. '
4
The RO secured the filling evolution at 0455 hours0.00527 days <br />0.126 hours <br />7.523148e-4 weeks <br />1.731275e-4 months <br /> to allow
transfer of inventory between boric acid tanks.
The RCS fill
was resumed at 0548 hours0.00634 days <br />0.152 hours <br />9.060847e-4 weeks <br />2.08514e-4 months <br />. It appears that at this time the RO
returned the boric acid valve controller to the automatic mode.
This action caused the controller to take control and close the
acid valve from the approximately 17 gpm full open flow rate
down to the 9. 5 gpm -that had been previously set on the
controller.
The reactor operator did not verify that the blend
settings were correct when he resumed the RCS fi 11 and did not
realize that this action resulted in a dilution of the makeup
blend.
The RCS fill was completed at 0752 hours0.0087 days <br />0.209 hours <br />0.00124 weeks <br />2.86136e-4 months <br /> with a boron
concentration of approximately 2065 ppm.
Although the oncoming dayshift operators recognized .that a
dilution had occurred and submitted a station deviition, they
did not determine the cause of the event.
Consequently, at 1052
hours the operators initiated a makeup to the RCS to increase
primary pressure without verifying the proper blender setting.
This resulted in a second unplanned dilution from approximately
2065 ppm to 1996 ppm at 1340 hours0.0155 days <br />0.372 hours <br />0.00222 weeks <br />5.0987e-4 months <br />.
The operators discovered
the error and performed a borat ion that resulted in an RCS
concentration of 2110 ppm at 1505 hours0.0174 days <br />0.418 hours <br />0.00249 weeks <br />5.726525e-4 months <br />.
Filling of the RCS is specified per operations procedure
2-0P-5.1.L
Step 5.10 requires that boric acid and primary_
grade water flow rates be in accordance with the blended flow
nomograph in the station curve book.
In addition, the licensee
has considered operation of the blender system as
11 skill of the
craft
11 *
This philosophy was defined by the Superintendent of
Operations as a task that is so routine that it could be
performed -by a licensed operator without the use of deta i 1 ed
procedures.
The
licensee also stated that training and
instructions direct that the boric acid and pure water flow
rates be verified in accordance with the blended flow nomograph
whenever an RCS makeup is initiated.
Contrary to these instructions, the operator initiated an RCS
fill after performing* a boric ac*id transfer without verifying
the correct fl ow rates.
In addition, the operators on the
following shift reinitiated RCS fill without verifying that the
flow rates were in accordance with the proper nomograph.
The
iispectors discussed this event with various licensed operators
and noticed an attitude that a dilution to recover from an
unplanned boration was not considered significant and did not
require the establishment of containment integrity.
The
licensee management expressed concern over this attitude and was
initiating actions to reinstruct all licensed operators as the
.,**
5
inspection period ended.
This failure to follow instructions,
which also resulted in a violation of TS 3.8.A.6, is a second
example of Violation 280, 281/89-31-01.
b.
Weekly Inspections
The inspectofs conducted weekly inspections in the following areas:
verification of operability of selected ESF
systems by
valve
alignment, breaker positions, condition of equipment or component,
and operability of instrumentation and support jtems essential to-
system actuation or performance.
Plant tours were conducted which
included observation of* general plant/equipment conditions, fire
protection and preventative measures, control of activities in
progress, radiation protection controls, physical security controls,
plant housekeeping conditions/cleanliness, and missile hazards.
The
inspectors routinely monitored the temperature of the AFW pump
discharge piping to ensure increases in temperature were being
properly monitored and evaluated by the licensee.
c.
Biweekly Inspections
The inspectors conducted biweekly inspections in the following areas:
verification review and walkdown of safety-related tagouts in effect;
review of sampling program (e.g., primary and secondary coolant
samples, boric acid tank samples, plant liquid and gaseous samples);
observation of control room shift turnover; review of implementation
of the plant problem identification system; verification of selected
portions of containment isolation lineups; and verification that
notices to workers are posted as required by 10 CFR 19.
d.
Other Inspection Activities
Inspections included areas in the Units 1 and 2 cable vaults, vital
battery rooms, steam safeguards areas, emergency switchgear rooms,
diesel generator rooms, control room, auxiliary building, Unit 2
containment, cable penetration areas, independent spent fuer storage
facility, low-level intake structure, and the safeguards valve pit
and pump pit areas. RCS 1-eak rates were reviewed to ensure that
detected or suspected leakage from
the system was
recorded,
investigated, and evaluated; and that appropriate actions were taken,
if required.
The inspectors routinely* independently calculated RCS
leak rates using the ~RC Independent Measurements Leak Rate Program
(RCSLK9).
On a regular basis, RWPs were reviewed and specific work
activ1ties were monitored to assure they were being conducted per the
RWPs.
Selected radiation protection instruments were periodically-
checked, and equipment operability and ca 1 i brat ion frequency were
verified .
6 -
e.
Physical Security Program Inspections
In the course of monthly activities, the inspectors included a review
of the li.censee's physical security program.
The performance of
various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of
daily activities to include: protected and vital areas access*
controls;
searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge
issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and
compensatory posts.
Within the areas inspected, one violation was identified.
4.
Maintenance Inspections (62703 & 42700) -
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed maintenance '
activities to
assure
compliance with
the appropriate procedures.
Inspection areas included the following:
a.
Modification to Service Water Piping to MER3
During this i-nspection period, the licensee continued with modifica-
tions to the service-water piping which supplies flow to the safety-
related components (MCR chillers and charging pump SW pumps) in MER 3
and 4.
This modification was being accomplished in accordance with
Design Change 87-34-3, Servic~ Water Pipe Replacement /Surr~/1 & 2.
The inspector noted the periods in which the licensee entered TS LCOs
in order to complete required connections to portions of the existing
system.
In order to accomplish these hookups, the licensee had
installed and placed in service a temporary SW supply line, as
allowed by TS Amendment No. 134 dated October 5, 1989.
This LCO was
entered twice in accordance with the modification schedule.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee work package for this modifica-
tion, frequently visited the jobsite to observe work in progress and
specifically reviewed the TS requirements associated with LCO entry.
The licensee had prepared special procedures to insure that LCO entry
was well coordinated and that all actions required by the TS was
implemented as necessary. *No discrep~ncies were noted.
b.
Repair of Unit 2 Pressurizer Safety Valve (2-SV-2251B)
On October 11,* 1989, at 2230 hours0.0258 days <br />0.619 hours <br />0.00369 weeks <br />8.48515e-4 months <br />, Surry Unit 2 received a
pressurizer safety valve open alarm while.operating at 100% power.
The
CR operators *noted that the primary relief tank level and
pressure were increasing.
The alarm cleared approximately I-hour
later but then came back in several times during the next hour.
The
iicensee commenced an orderly shutdown of the unit at 0355 hours0.00411 days <br />0.0986 hours <br />5.869709e-4 weeks <br />1.350775e-4 months <br /> on
- -**
7
October 12.
All three pressurizer safety valves were subsequently
removed and transported to the Westinghouse Western Service Center
for testing and repair.
Surry has three (3) Crosby style 6xK2x6 self-actuated relief valves
that are mounted downstream of hpt loop seals (water) on top of the
pressurizer. A recent design change added mirrored insulation to the
loop seals in order to maintain the seals at an elevated temperature.
The seals have thermocouples installed that facilitate a local
temperature reading of the seal piping.
In addition, safety valve
tailpipe temperature and acoustic monitors are provided to alert the
CR of safety valve problems.
A review of the data following the
ab_ove event indicated that the B safety valve (2-RC-SV-2551B) was
leaking.
It was also noted that the inlet flange studs on the B
valve were discolored blue, indicating an abnormally high pipe
temperature.
The as-found test results of the three valves substantiates the
conclusion that" valve piping temperature effects the safety valve
lift setpoint as stated by Westinghouse in their informal memorandum
to Virginia
Power
on
October 12,
1989.
The
licensee
has
traditionally used steam with no loop seal (water seal) to set and/or
verify the valve lift setpoints.
The as-found data supports the conclusion that this technique results
in an actual lift setpoint, after installation with a loop seal,
somewhat higher than the plus or minus one percent allowed by the TS.
The worst case data from the three unit 2 safety valves are given
below.
The numbers in parenthesis represent the amount the setpoint
was above the allowable 2485 psig.
Vave
2-RC-2551A
2-RC-25518
2-RC-2551C
As-Found/Water Seal
2566 psig (3.25%)
2563.8 psig (3.2%)
2589 psig (4.2%)
As-Found/Steam
2433 psig
2462 psig
2497 psig
The inspectors closely followed the issues concerning safety valve
performance both at Surry and industry-wide as they developed.
The
licensee responded appropriately regarding the generic increased
setpoint concern by removing all three valves from Unit 2 and testing
the setpoints in an as-installed condition (with loop seal).
A
conference call on October 19, 1989, between the licensee and the NRC
identified that the as-found setpoints were below the 2635 psig
maximum pressure (105.4% of nominal) that analysis determined was
necessary to maintain the peak RCS pressure below the 110% design
overpressure limit.
The results did indicate, however, that the
actual lift setpo1nts were above the 2485 plus or minus 6ne percent
psig allowed by TS.
8
The licensee submitted the safety valve test results for Unit 2 with
a Justification for .Continued Operation for Unit 1 in a request for
Discretionary Enforcement dated October 23, 1989.
This letter
acknowledged that the potential exists for the Unit 1 valves to
exceed the one percent TS to 1 erance . and requested Di scret i ona ry
Enforcement until December l, 1989, to allow time for resolution of
this generic issue.
A separate issue developed from the generic concern above was the
premature. leaking that occurred on October 11.
The inspectors
discussed with the licensee the concern that the temperature of the
loop seal can affect the lift setpoint.
The drain valve under the B
valve loop seal (2~RC-136) was found to have a broken packing flange.
The licensee has postulated that the loop seal inventory could have
been lost through the broken drain valve and therefore allowed the
inlet piping temperature to increase to a point that safety valve
leakage occurred.
The inspectors reviewed all work. involving the
above valves.
No discrepancies were identified.
c.
Safety Injection Check Valve Repair
The inspectors reviewed the repair of SI* check valve 2-SI-79 as
authorized by work order 3800086812 and in accordance with procedure
MCM-0417-1.
The six inch Velan check valve exhibited excessive
backleakage into the cold leg SI piping.
This same valve was
disassembled and overhauled during the previous Unit 2 outage.
Inspection of the valve internals indicated severe damage to the
body/bonnet gasket which appears to have been caused by an incorrect
size gasket and/or improper gasket alignment with respect to the
valve body.
The bonnet sheared a portion of the
11 Flexitallicll gasket
which caused the spiral ribbon construction of the gasket to unwind.
EWR 89~684 was issued detailing the problems and d~termined that the
four to six feet of 304 stainless steel ribbon and the carbon filler
material that was removed from the valve had prevented the valve
disc from fully seating.
The valve was reassembled using the correct
gasket and returned to operations.
The inspector reviewed the
documentation and discussed with the* station staff the following
con c 1 u s i on s-:
An incorrect size gasket had been installed during the previous
valve maintenance.
Correct replacement parts have not been maintained in spare
parts inventory.
Adherence to an established foreign material exclusion program
was evident .
9
Adherence to procedure was evident.
The procedure had been
upgraded to the new format with clear, concise instructions and
useful diagrams.
The licensee adequately evaluated the implications of the above
failure on the. remaining check valves that had been worked.
The licensee was continuing an investigation of the above failure as
. the inspection period ended.
Plans were being made to open two
additional check valves that records indicate may have a gasket
material problem.
This item is identified as an unresolved item
(280, 281/89-31-02) pending final determination of the cause of the
check valve maierial discrepancies.
Within the areas inspected, no violations were identified.
5.
Surveillance Inspections
(61726 & 42700)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed various
surveillance activities to assure compliance with
the appropriate
procedures as follows:
Test prerequisites were met.
Tests *were performed in accordance with approved procedures.
Test procedures appeared to perform their intended function.
Adequate coordination existed among pe~sonnel involved in the test.
Test data was properly collected and recorded.
Inspection areas included the following:
a.
Heat Tracing
b.
On October 11, 1989, selected portions bf periodic test l-PT-27H,
Heat Tracing (Panels 2Al, Bl, and 5-Thermon and Strip Heaters), were
witnessed.
The
inspector observed the recording of amperage,
voltage, and temperature niea surements of several channels. in panel
2Bl.
The test procedure was reviewed to ensure that initial
conditions and test steps had been performed.
No discrepancies were
noted.
Safety Injection Control Isolation Logic
On October 13, 1989, selected portions of periodic test l-PT-8.3A,
Safety Injection and
Feedwater Control
Isolation
Logic,
were
witnessed.
The .inspector observed the pretest briefing, the
determination of the condition (energized or not) of certain relays
10
on
both train A and train B, and the activation of -certain
annunciators in Unit 1 CR when cert~in test switches were activated
in the relay cabinets. The procedur~ was reviewed and the inspector
observed the signing and accomplishment of certain steps during the
testing.
No discrepancies were noted.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were
identified.
6.
Information Meetings with Local Officials
(94600)
On October 26 and 27, 1989, the Senior Resident Inspector, accompanied by
the Section Chief from the Region II office responsible for the -Virginia
Power plants, conducted meetings with local officials in the surrounding
counties and cities. The counties visited included York, Surry and James
City County. The city visited was Newport News.
The meetings were held to
update the officials on the current NRC organization, provide.appropriate
business telephone numbers and points of contact, and to discuss the
status of Surry Power Station and related community concerns with the
local officials. The meetings were held with appropriate people including
the 1 oca 1 government coordinators, county -administrators, and other
government offic'ial s.
The meetings were constructive with no major
concerns identified. The inspectors also left a standing invitation for
additional meetings with interested parties and/or city/county officials
to discuss matters of mutual interest.
7.
Licensee Event Report Review
(92700)
The inspectors reviewed the LER's listed below to ascertain whether NRC
reporting requirements were being met and to determine appropriateness of
the corrective actions. The inspector's review also included followup on
. implementation of corrective action and review of licensee documentation
that all required corrective actions were complete.
LERs that identify violations of regulations and that meet the criteria of
10 CFR, Part*2, Appendix C,Section V shall be identified.as NCV in the
following closeout paragraphs.
NCVs are considered first-time occurrence
violations which meet the* NRC* Enforcemen-t Policy for exemption from
_ issuance of a Notice of Violation.
These items are identified to allow
for proper evaluations of corrective actions in the event that similar
events occur in the future .
.
(Closed) LER 280/89-01, Unplanned Auto Start of No. 3 EOG Due to Failed
Diode.
The issue involved an automatic start of the subject EOG due .to a
failed diode in the engine control circuit.
Corrective action included
replacement of the diode and proper testing of the- engine control circuit
after repairs were made.
This LER is closed.
(Closed) LER 280/89-03, Degraded IRSP Motor Power Feeder Cables and Motor
The issue involved identification of damage to the subject pump
11
motor cables during reinstallation of one of the pump motors.
Corrective
actions included shipping the motors to the vendors* for corrective
actions.
This issue was inspected by region based inspectors and was
addressed in NRC Inspection Report 280, 281/89-03.
This LER is closed.
(Closed) LER 280/89-04, Cable Tray Covers Not Properly Installed for
Compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.
The issue involved the identifica-
tion of: a condition where cable tray cover installation was not in
compliance with Appendix R commitments.
This issue was ins-pected by
region based inspectors and was addressed in NRC Inspection Report 280,
281/89-12.
This LER is closed.
(Closed) LER 280/89-05, Auto Start of No. 1 and No. 3 EDGs Upon Loss ~f F
Transfer Bus.
The issue involved the subject ESF actuations due to the
failure of a 4160 volt breaker to close.
Correct"ive actions inclu_ded
refurbishment of all 4160 volt safety-related circuit breakers prior to
unit restart.
This issue was closely followed by both region based and
resident inspectors and is addressed in NRC Inspection Reports
280,
281/89-06 and 89-12.
This LER is closed.
(Closed)
LER 280/89-06, Spu*rious Safety Injection Due to Inadequate
Special Test Procedure.
The issue involved various ESF actuations which
occurred during testing due to an inadequate procedure.
CorrectiVe action
_included
changing
the test procedure
to
prevent recurrence
and
satisfactorily completing the test.
This issue was addressed in NRC
Inspection Report 280, 281/89-06.
This LER is closed.
(Closed)
Failure to Initiate Alternate Radiological
Sampling of Ventilation Vent Due to Personnel Error.
The issue tnvolv~~ a
failure to initiate alternate sampling of ventilation flowpath within
one-hour after loss of normal sampling as required by TS 3.7-5(b).
The
alternate sampling was not initiated because operators thought that they
could restore normal *sampling within the one-hour period.
Corrective
actions included reinstruction of all operati_ons and health physics
personnel.
The inspecto.r reviewed the LER and corrective actions.
This
issue is identified as a NCV 280/89-31-03 for failure to commence
alternate sampling in accordance with TS.
This LER is closed.
(Closed)
LER 280/89-08, A and B Inside Recirculation Spray Pumps
Inoperable Due to Replicator Shaft Sleeves.
The issue involved identifica-
tion of replicator parts which had been installed in several safety-
related pumps.
Corrective actions included purchase order review to
identify the scope of the problem and replacement of all identified
replicas in safety-related applications. This issue was closely monitored
by the resident inspectors and was addressed in NRC Inspection Reports
280, 281/88-51, 89-06, 89-13, and 89-17.
This LER is closed,
(Closed) LER 280/89-09, Inadvertent Isolation of Component Cooling Watef
to Operating RHR Heat Exchanger Due to Inadequate Awareness of System
12
Configuration.
The issue involved improper alignment of the subject heat
exchanger due to operator error. This issue was closely monitored by the
resident inspectors and was addressed in NRC Inspection Report * 280,
281/89-08.
This LER is closed.
(Closed)
LER 280/89-10, Lockout of No.2 Auto-tie Transformer Due to
Failure of Lighting Arrestor and Subsequent De-energization of lH and 2J
Emergency Buses.
The issue involved the subject failure and resultant ESF
actuations due to undervoltage conditions sensed on emergertcy buses.
The
event evaluation was closely monitored by the residents and was addressed
in NRC Inspection Report 280, 281/89-13.
This LER is closed.
(Closed) LER 280/89-11, TS Required Fire Watch* Patrol Not Maintained While
Containment *smoke Detectors Were Inoperable.
The issue involved a failure
to have a continuous firewatch patrol in the Unit 1 containment when smoke
detectors were inoperable. The firewatch exited the containment without
proper relief.
The failure to maintain .a required firewatch patrol was
attributed to poor communications.
The inspector reviewed the LER.
This
~ssue is identified as a NCV 280/89-31-04 for failure to maintain required
firewatches as required by TS.
This LER is closed.
(Closed) LER 280/89-12, Reanalysis of CR Dose Following OBA With Manual
Discharge of Air Bbttles Results in Exceeding GDC-19 Limits.
The issue
involved the subject reanalysis and the resulting conclusion that
automatic initiation of an air bottle dump was required to meet the new
analysis. Corrective action included redesign and installation of an auto
air bottle dump signal on SI initiation. The inspectors reviewed the LER
and verified that the auto-dump modification was implemented and tested
satisfactorily.
This LER is closed.
(Closed) LER 280/89-13, Lockout of 230 KV Bus No.3 Due to Personnel Error
and Subsequent De-energization of lH and 2J Emergency Buses.
The issue
involved loss of one source of offsite power to personnel error in the
Corrective actions included restoration of offsite power and
the placement of stricter controls-on workers in the switchyard.
The
resident inspectors monitored the licensee evaluation and reviewed the
operator actions during the event.
This effort was addressed in NRC
Inspection Report 280, 281/89-13.
This LER is clos~d.
(Closed) LER 280/89-14, Main Control Room Ve~tilation Isolation (Unplanned
ESF Actuation) Due to a Spurious Chlorine Gas Detector Alarm.
The issue
involved an ESF actuation due to a spurious signal from a detector which
is no longer required.
Corrective action included reioval of the detector
from service.
The inspector reviewed the LER and verified that chlorine
monitoring was no longer required by TS.
This LER is closed.
(Closed) LER 280/89-15, Setpoints Required for Auto Start of Fire Pumps Do
Not Correspond to TS Requirements.
The issue i nvo 1 ved auto start
setpoi nts for fire pumps that .were 1 ower than those specified in TS.
Corrective action included changing the auto start setpoint to comply with
the TS.
The inspector reviewed the LER.
This LER is closed.
.-.
13
(Closed) LER 280/89-16, Inadvertent Positive Reactivity Additton by Boron
Dilution Wi~hout Containment Integrity Intact Due to Leaking RCP Standpipe
Makeup Valve.
The issue involved an inleakage of water into the RCS which
slowly decreased boron
concentration.
Corrective action
included
identification of the leak point and corrective maintenance to the leaking
valve.
The inspector reviewed the LER and also the operator actions
during the leakage determination timeframe.
This LER is closed.
(Closed) LER 280/89-17, Failure to Sample CC Heat Exchangers Within 12
Hours Due to Personne 1 Error.
The issue i nvo 1 ved a vi o 1 at ion of TS
required sampling periodicity due to personnel error. The individual who
failed to properly evaluate the samples was reinstructed on TS require-
ments;
The inspector reviewed the LER.
This issue is identified as a NCV
280/89-31-05 fo*r fa i 1 ure to sample required systems in accordance with TS.
This LER is closed.
(Closed) LER 280/89-18, Failure to Obtain the WGDT Sample Within TS
Required 24 Hour Frequency Due to Personnel Error.
The issue involved a
violation of TS required sampling periodicity due to personnel error. The
error occurred due to an operator misreading the log for the time requi~ed
to take the sample.
Corrective actions included additional written
guidance to operators to insure that samples are obtained within the
required TS times.
The inspector reviewed the LER.
This issue i-s
identified as NCV 280/89-31-06 for failure to take a TS required sample .
This LER is closed.
(Closed) LER 280/89-19, Unplanned ESF Component Actuation (Auxiliary Vent
Fans Tripped Due to Test Rig Design).
The issue involved an inadvertent
ESF actuation due to a test rig that was
inadequately designed.
Corrective action included removal of the test rig and restarting of
required fans.
Additional actions included discussions with personnel
responsible for preparation and revision of special tests. The inspector
reviewed the LER.
This LER is ciosed.
(Closed) LER 280/89-20, Potentially Inoperable Reactor Protection Channel
Due to High Leakage Currents in Cable While in Harsh Containment.
The.
issue involved identification of the subject concern during review of a
similar problem at the Nor-th Al'lna Station.-
Corrective actions included
replacement of the suspect cables.
The resident inspectors monitored the
licensee 1 s evaluation and corrective actions for this issue. This LER is
closed.
(Closed) LER 280/89-21, Contra 1 /Re 1 ay Room Chi 11 ers I noperab 1 e Due to
Inadequate Service Water Flow.
The issue involved the tripping of the
operable control room chiller due to high condenser discharge pressure.
Corrective action
included restarting of the chiller.
Additional
corrective actions are underway to upgrade the capacity of service water
flow to the chillers.
The inspector reviewed the LER, the licensee
1 s
,.
14
corrective action, and monitored the Service Water System upgrades that
affect this area.
This LER is closed.
(Closed)
Component
Cooling
Water
Heat
Exchangers Due* to Vac~um Priming Seismic Restraints Not Installed.
The
issue involved impr*oper supporting of vacuum priming line due to the
missing restraints.
Corrective action included reinstallation of the
supports.
This issue was discussed in
NRC
Inspection Report 280,
281/88-14.
This LER is closed.
(Closed)
LER 281/88-11, Control/Relay Room Chiller Inoperable Due to
Fouled Fi 1 ter-Dryer Element.
The issue i nvo 1 ved the remova 1 of the
operating chiller from service in order to replace the filter/dryer
elements.
One of the other chillers was inoperable due to being tagged
out for maintenance.
Corrective action included replacement of the
elements and returning the chiller to service.
Tbe inspector reviewed the
LER and the licensee's actions.
This LER is closed.
(Closed) LER 281/88-13,. Reactor Trip Breakers Opened Due to Inadequate
Procedure.
The issue involved an ESF actuation of reactor trip breakers
due to improper control of power supplies to simulated signals for S/G
level.
No immediate corrective action was required due to the reactor
being already shutdown and in a rnainten9-nce condition.
Additional
instruction was provided to personnel with regards to the need for clarity
when deviating procedures.
The inspector reviewed the LER.
This LER is
closed.
(Closed)
LER 281/88-14, Lifting of Power Operated Relief Valve Due to
Procedural Inadequacy.
The issue involved the lifti*ng and reclosing of a
The PORV 1 i fted due to the fa i 1 ure to
identify proper starting pressure when starting an RCP.
The inspector
reviewed the LER.
This issue is identified as NCV 281/89-31-07 for
failure to provide adequate procedure when starting RCPs for RCS venting.
This LER is closed.
(Closed)
LER 281/88-15, . Commencement of Shutdown Due to Rod Centro 1
Circuitry Failure.
The issue involved commencement of a TS
required
shutdown due to a rod control LCO.
After the shutdo~n was commenced, the
rod control problem* was corrected and properly tested.
Unit 2 then *
resumed normal operation.
The inspector reviewed the LER.
This LER is
closed.
(Closed) LER 281/88-18, * B S/G Stearn Flow Channel III Failed High Due To
Fail,ed Multiplier/Divider.
The issue involved a failure of the subject
component requiring that the unit enter TS 3.0.1.
Corrective action
included placing affected protection bistables in trip and replacing the
failed component.
After satisfactory testing of the replaced component,
the protection circuitry was returned to normal alignment and Unit 2
exited TS 3.0.1.
The inspector reviewed the LER.
This LER is closed .
15
(Closed)
LER 281/88-19, Unplanned Actuation of ESF Component, Inside
Containment Slowdown Trip Valve.
The issue involved the closure of the
inside containment A S/G blowdown isolation valve for an unknow~ reason.
Corrective action included a containment entry to correct the operability
condition.
After resetting of the high fl ow so 1 enoi d in containment,
proper valve operation was obtained and verified. The inspector reviewed
the LER.
This LER is closed.
(Closed) LER 281/88-21, B LHSI Pump Not Tested Within Required 8-Hour
Interval Due to Inoperable Test Equipment.
The issue involved the
required testing of the subject pump while the redundant pump was in a
maintenance condition.-
The test was not accomplished in the specified
timeframe due to equipment problems.
The inspector reviewed the LER.
This LER is closed.
(Closed) LER 281/88-22, Reactor T~ip by Turbine Trip Due to Inadequate
Procedure, Faulty Valve Position Limiter Indication and Response.
The
issue involved an unplanned reactor trip due to turbine trip.
No
immediate corrective actions were required other than to stabilize the
plant after the trip in accordance with procedure. This issue was closely
followed by the resident inspectors and was addressed in NRC Inspection
Report 280, 281/88-36.
This LER is closed.
(Closed)
LER 281/88-23, Inadvertent ESF Component Actuation Due to
Personnel Error.
The issue involved inadvertent closure of three contain-
ment trip valves associated with radiation monitoring and sampling due to
an electrician incorrectly li'fting leads to support maintenance activities
on another trip valve.
Corrective action included properly relanding of
the lead and appropriate testing of the affected components for
operability.
The inspector reviewed the LER.
This issue is identified ~s
an NCV (281/89-31-08) for failure to provide adequate instructions (proper
identification of leads to be lifted) for a maintenance activity which
affected operability of safety-related components.
This LER is closed.
(Closed) LER 281/89-01,
Loss of Containment Integrity During Refueling
Operations Due to Loss of Administrative Control.
The issue involved the
improper installation of a blank flange on one of the
11A
11 SG safety valve
openings
during refueling operations.
When
discovired,
refueling
evolutions were stopped and a proper blank was inst~lled.
In addition,
the b 1 an ks _ were tagged to prevent unauthori z'ed remova 1.
The in specter
reviewed the LER.
This issue is identified as an NCV (281/89-31-09) for
failure to provide for containment integrity as required* by TS during
refueling operations.
This LER is closed.
(Closed) LER 281/89-02,
Unplanned Auto-Start of EOG During Performance of
PT-22.6B Due to Previously Unrecognized EOG Control Circuit Logic.
The
issue involved the subject ESF actuation due to the failure to reset
appropriate relays prior to placing the EOG selector switches in AUTO.
This issue was discussed in NRC Inspection Report 280, 281/89-17.
In that
8.
16
- report, this event and a similar earlier event were identified as a
weakness o: past corrective action problems.
No further enforcement
action is required.
This LER is closed.
Exit Interview*
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 31, 1989,
with those individuals identified by an asterisk in paragraph 1.
The
following new items were identified by the inspectors during this exit:
One violation with two examples was identified (paragraph 3.a) for failure
to follow procedures and/or instructions (281/89-31-01).
One unresolved item was identified (paragraph 4.c) regarding followup on
material problems associated with safety-related check valve maintenance
. (280, 281/89-31-02).
One non-cited violation was identified (paragraph 7) for falure to
initiate alternate radiological sampling of ventilation vents as required
by TS (280/89-31-03).
One non-cited violation was identified (paragraph 7) for failure to
maintain a TS required fire watch patrol while containment smoke detectors
were inoperable (280/89-31-04).
One non-cited violation was identified (paragraph 7) for failure to sampl*e
the component cooling heat exchangers within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> as required by TS
(280/89-31-05).
One non-cited violation was identified (paragraph 7) for failure to take a
TS required sample (280/89-31-06).
One
non-cited violation was
identified (paragraph 7) regarding an
inadequate procedure that resulted with the lifting of a power operated
relief valve (281/89-31-07).
One non-cited violation was identified (paragraph 7) for failure to
provide adequate instructions that resulted in an ESF component actuation
( 281/89-31-08). *
One non-cited violation was identified (paragraph 7) for failure to
provide con~ainment *integrity-as required by
TS
during refueling
opirations (281/89-31-09).
The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings with no dissenting comments.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to
or reviewed by the i_nspectors during this inspection.
. '
' '
17
9.
INDEX OF INITIALISMS
ANSI
AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS INSTITUTE
.ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE
COMPUTER AIDED DESIGN
CONFIRMATION OF ACTION LETTER
COMPONENT COOLING
COMPONENT COOLING WATER
- CFR
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
CLS
CONSEQUENCE LIMITING SAFEGUARD
CRO
. CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR
CIRCULATING WATER
DESIGN BASES ACCIDENT
DPI
DELTA PRESSURE INDICATORS
DR
DEVIATION REPORT
EOG
EMP
ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE
EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER
ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST
GDC
GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA
GPM
GALLONS PER MINUTE
HEALTH PHYSICS
HEAT EXCHANGER
HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION
INSTRUMENT AIR
INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
IFI
INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP ITEM
IRSP
INSIDE RECIRCULATION SPRAY PUMP
IDER
INDEPENDENT OFFSITE EVALUATION REVIEW
IRPI
INDIVIDUAL ROD POSITION INDICATION
INSERVICE INSPECTION
KV
KILOVOLT
LER
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
LCD
LIMITING CONDITIONS OF OPERATION
LHSI
LOW HEAD SAFETY INJECTION
LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT
MER
MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ROOM
MDV
MOTOR OPERATED VALVE
'MCR
MAIN CONTROL ROOM
NON-CITED VIOLATION
NRC
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
OP
OPERATING PROCEDURE
ORS
OUTSIDE RECIRCULATION SPRAY
. ,.
' . ,,
..
ti
, .,-
'I
RO *
SNSOC
sov
SPOS
TAVG
TI
TS
vs
WGOT
18
PNEUMATIC CONTROL VALVE
PRESSURE INDICATOR
PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE
.POWER AND OPERATED RELIEF VALVE
PARTS PER MILLION
POUNDS PER SQUARE INCH
POUNDS PER SQUARE INCH GAUGE
PERIODIC TEST
QUALITY ASSURANCE
QUALITY CONTROL
RESIDENT ACTION ITEM
REACTOR COOLANT PUMP .
REGULATORY GUIDES
REACTOR OPERATOR.
RECIRCULATION SPRAY SYSTEM
RADIATION WORK PERMIT
REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK
STANDARD CUBIC FEET PER MINUTE
SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT
SAFETY INJECTION
STATION NUCLEAR SAFETY ANO OPERATING COMMITTEE
SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE
SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM
SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR
AVERAGE TEMPERATURE OF RCS
TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
UNRESOLVED ITEM
UNDER VOLTAGE
VENTILATION SYSTEM
WASTE GAS OE{AY TANK