ML18151A626

Forwards Summary of 980715 Workshop on Operator Licensing Exam Techniques at RB Russell Bldg & Extends Invitation to Attend This Yr Training Managers Conference on 981105 in Atlanta,Ga.Slides Used for Discussions Encl

ML18151A626
Person / Time
Site:	Surry, North Anna
Issue date:	08/24/1998
From:	Peebles T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	Ohanlon J VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
References
NUDOCS 9809300176
Download: ML18151A626 (97)

Text

_:i_.

Virginia Electric and Power Company ATTN: Mr. J.P. O'Hanlon, Senior Vice President - Nuclear Innsbrook Technical Center 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060 e

August 24, 1998

SUBJECT:

MEETING

SUMMARY

AND

PUBLIC MEETING ANNOUNCEMENT

- JULY 1998 NRC REGION II EXAMINATION WORKSHOP AND NOVEMBER 1998 TRAINING MANAGERS' CONFERENCE - NORTH ANNA AND SURRY POWER STATIONS

Dear Mr. O'Hanlon:

Region II facilitated a workshop ori Operator Licensing Examination Techniques on July 15, 1998, conducted at the Richard B. Russell Building. The workshop attendees included representatives from all Region II facilities. It is our opinion that the workshop was beneficial and provided an excellent opportunity for open discussion on the operating test portion of the operator licensing examination process.

During the workshop, we covered a preliminary response to concerns expressed at the January 1998 workshop and a synopsis was promised, but due to the status of the program, cannot be provided. The slides used for our discussions are enclosed.

Also, I would like to extend an invitation to you, and to members of your operations. and training staff, to attend this year's Training Managers' Conference to be held on November 5, 1998. Our goal for the meeting is to provide an open forum for discussion of operator licensing issues.

The site for this year's conference will be in the Richard B. Russell Building Auditorium on Spring Street in downtown Atlanta. As of this da~e. the agenda is open. We encourage yoLi to

. submit, via telephone, a list of topics that you would like to have discussed.

Additionally, we would appreciate an update of the home addresses of your licensed operators.

Please send them in an envelope marked "To Be Opened by Addressee Only" to either Ms.

Beverly Michael or myself. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact Bev at (404) 562-.4640 or me at (404) 562-4638.

9809300176 980824 PDR ADOCK 05000280 V

PDR Sincerely, (Original signed by T.A. Peebles)

Thomas A. Peebles, Chief Operator Licensing and Human Performance Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.: 50-338, 50-339, 50-280, and 50-281 License Nos.: NPF-4, NPF-7, DPR-32, and DPR-37

Enclosures:

As Stated

e VEPCO cc w/encls:

W. R. Matthews, Station Manager, North Anna Power Station E. S. Grecheck, Station Manager, Surry Power Station J. H. McCarthy, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Operations Support Distribution:

PUBLIC B. Michael, DRS Rll:DRS POC 8/

. /98 Rll:D~

~BLES:BTM 8/2f'98 e

2

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• -* I r; "-

/ ot '.'., ~i:*:*~1ttif ~f ~{ f :f tft:'.(;i;yyrPC\\: *

,.. EE:JlNG*t

SUMMARY

AND.. PUBLIC MEETING

','t.*}A1xffiboi'lc°EMENT.::*Jul Y '1998 NRG REGION

• • 1.:::¥:~AMlN.~J.)ON :~ORl<S~OP AND '

O.VEMBER >1'9'98.. TRAINING MANAGERS

?.'C'6f'tF;ERENCE 2 NORTH ANNA AND SURRY

_.?\\'.\\'... {).~.. ***' '~

,.:... \\*..

-NOTICE-THE ATTACHED FILES ARE

• OFFICAL RECORDS OF THE i

OCIO/INFORMATION..

MANAGEMENT DIVISION. THEY HAVE BEEN CHARGED TO YOU FOR A LIMITED TIME PERIOD AND MUST BE RETURNED TO THE RECORDS AND ARCHIVES SERVICES SECTION, T--5C3. PLEASE

.DO NOT SEND DOCUMENTS CHARGED OUT THROUGH THE MAIL. REMOVAL :OF ANY PAGE(S)

FROM DOCUMENTS FOR REPRODUCTION MUST BE REFERRED TO FILE PERSONNEL.

._ ~NOTICE-.,,_.

OPERATING TEST WORKSHOP Richard 8. Russell Auditorium July 15, 1998 8:00 Opening Remarks (Johns Jaudon) 8:20 Standard JPM format (SSNTA) 8:40 JPM critical tasks (Hopper & Mellen)

What constitutes a critical task?

The importance of measurable criteria?

• Good examples

• Bad examples Discrimination (it has to be failable!)

• Good examples

• Bad examples 9:30 JPM Questions (Baldwin)

Direct look up. As defined in ES-602. Attachment 1, B.2.e (p.15)

• examples

• "fixes" to those examples Use of Open and Closed Reference items as defined in ES-301, D.1.1 (p.9) which states: "closed reference items may be used to evaluate the immediate actions for emergency and other procedures, certain automatic actions, operating characteristics, interlocks, and set points... "

• examples

• "fixes" to those examples 10:30 Administrative JP Ms (Steiner) 11 :DO Scheduling (Steiner) 11 :30 Lunch

• ways to optimize the material developed

• simulator bottle necks

• control room JPMs

• reasonable daily work loads

• candidate stress

• exam delays 1 :DO Exam predictability and exam security (Payne) 1 :30 Simulator scenario development (Payne & Hopper)

• scheduling and*crew makeup

• evaluation tool

• malfunctions in relation to major event

• level of detail 3:30 Questions and Answers 4:30 Closing

_ __J

David Lane Larry Kelley John Brewer REGION II WORKSHOP - OPERATING TEST JULY 15, 1998 Richard B. Russell Building Strom Auditorium Examiner - Sonalysts Training Advisor - OHN/Pickering Manager - Authorization Training - Ontario Hydro Nuclear Carolina Power and Light Company Tom Hackler Curtis Dunsmore Tony Pearson Terry Toler Rick Garner Dwayne Coffey Dave Neal Scott Poteat Requal Training - Brunswick Initial Training - Brunswick Initial Training - Lead - Brunswick Instructor - Harris Sperviisor - Ops Training - Harris LOCT Supervisor - Robinson OIT Lead - Robinson Support Lead - Robinson Duke Energy Corporation - Catawba, McGuire, and Oconee David Re Charles Sawyer James Presten Brent Moore Bill Caudill E.T. Beedle Reggie Kimray John Supte Rob Billings Steve Helms Robby Pope Rick Robinson Robin Lane J. R. Steely David Covar Randall Yarbrough Bobby Ayers Training Instructor Senior Tech Spec Instructor Instructor Nuclear Instructor Instructor - Catawba Nuclear Instructor - Catawba Operations - Catawba Instructor - McGuire Instructor - McGuire Supervissor - Mcguire Ops Training Coordinator - Oconee Training Instructor - Oconee Training Instructor - Oconee Nuclear Instructor - Oconee Nuclear Instructor - Oconee Ops Instructor - Oconee Florida Power Corporation Ivan Wilson Ops Manager Jack Springer Johnie Smith Supervisor - Training - Crystal River Ops Training Supervisor - Crystal River

Operating Test Workshop 2

Florida Power and Light Company Dave Brown Tim Bolander Mike Croteau Rich Bretton Initial Training - St. Lucie Simulator and Exams - St. Lucie Instructor - Training - Turkey Point LOCT Supervisor - Training - Turkey Point South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Jim Callicott Perry Ramicone Senior Instructor Instructor - V. C. Summer Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC)

Tom Blindauer Bill Oldfield Steve Be Ken Drawdy Thad N. Thompson Perry Tucker Michael Henry Leon Ray Fred Howard Perry Vannier Charlton Sal Steve Dyer Senior Plant Instructor - Simulator - Farley Training - Farley Training ~ Hatch Training Instructor - Vogtle Ops Training Instructor - Vogtle Ops Training Instructor - Vogtle Nuclear Instructor - Vogtle Ops Training Supervisor - Vogtle Ops Reg Instructor - Vogtle Initial Training - Vogtle Requal Training - Vogtle Requal Training - Vogtle Tennessee Valley Authority Phillip H, Case Denny Campbell Marvin Meer Jim.Kearney Dave Davidson Steve Taylor Ricky C. King Ed Keyser Tom Wallace Terry L. Newman Jack Cox John Roden Randy Evans Simulator Instructor - NC Training Ops Instructor -Browns Ferry Ops Instructor - Browns Ferry Ops Instructor - Sequoyah Ops Instructor - Sequoyah Ops Instructor - Sequoyah Senior Ops Instructor - Sequoyah Simulator Instructor - Sequoyah Supervisor - Watts Bar Ops Instructor - Watts Bar Training Manager - Watts Bar Ops Training Manager - Watts Bar HL T Lead - Watts Bar July 15, 1998

Operating Test Workshop 3

Virginia Electric and Power and Power Company Walt Shura Steve Crawford Ken Grove Ray Simmons Supervisor - Training - North Anna Senior Instructor (Nuclear) - North Anna Senior Instructor - Surry Senior Instructor - Surry July 15, 1998

I.

~-------

EXAM REVIEW GUIDELINES TECHNICAL ACCURACY Is there more than one correct answer?

Is the given answer correct?

Adequate data in the stem?

Is data in the stem.consistent and plausible?

II.

PSYCHOMETRICS: The process of app lyi n*g sound qua 1 itat i ve processes to mental measurements.

PSYCHOMETRIC FLAWS THAT COULD DIMINISH THE VALIDITY OF THE EXAMINATION!.

FLAW

.GUIDANCE APPENDIX B REFERENCE

,: 1. Low level of Question should be written to reflect App. B knowledge the level of knowledge most l.d appropriate for a specific K/A..

When there is a choice. try to write the question to reflect the higher level.

• SEE LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE BELOW 2. Low operational Does the question test the intent of*

App. B validity the K/A?

1.a/b/e Could someone do the job safely and 2.k effectively without being-able to answer the question?

3. Low discriminatory Will a less than competent candidate App. B validity miss the item?

1. d Can a person understand the principle 2.g being tested and still miss the item?

• SEE LEVEL OF DIFFICULTY BELOW.

4. Implausible Can a distractor be eliminated with App. B Di stractors.

out undefstanding the concept being 2.b/f/h/m tested?

5. Confusing or State the question as concisely as App. B ambiguous language possible but provide all necessary l.c information.

6. Confusing negatives Avoid negative stems.

App.B 2.e

7. Collection of Each item should focus on one K/A App.B true/false item determined by the stem.

1. f 2.c

8. ba~kwards logic Examine on a topic in a way that is App.B consistent with how the KIA should be

1. h remembered and used.

LEVEL OF DIFFICULTY Establish a level of difficulty that will enable an applicant who is capable of safely operating the plant to complete and review the examination 1t1ithin four hours and achieve a grade of 80 percent or greater. [ES-401 p.4]

Since item difficulty can usually be decreased or increased by revision. the examination author need not be overly preoccupied with difficulty when writing the items.

The author should focus on achieving a valid measure of the concept he is attempting to evaluate.

[Appendix B. p.

6]

LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE Level 1: FUNDAMENTAL KNOWLEDGE The recall or recognition of discrete bits of information.

- knowledge of terminology definiti*ons set points

- other specific facts Level 2: COMPREHENSION Involves the metal process of understanding the material through relating it to its own parts or some qther material.

- describing or recognizing relationships

- recognizing how systems interact

- consequences or implications of events Level 3: ANALYSIS. SYNTHESIS OR APPLICATION Involves assembling. sorting or integrating information to predict an event or outcome.

Requires mentally using the knowledge and its meaning to solve problems.

/

NUREG-10?1. APPENDIX B. GUIDANCE

1.

a.

b.

C.

d.

e.

.f.

9_:

h.

2.

a.

b.

C,

d.

e.

T

g.

h.

I.

j.

k.

l.

m.

Generic Princioles Ensure that the concept being measured has a direct. important relation ship to the ability to perform the job.

Make sure that the question matches the intent of the K/A.

State the question unambiguously and precisely.

Write the question at the highest level of knowledge reflected in the testing objective.

Avoid questions that are unnecessarily difficult or irrelevant.

Limit the question to one concept or topic. unless a synthesis of concepts is being tested.

Avoid copying text directly forma training or other reference material.

Avoid backward logic questions.

Other Construction Guidelines Use four answers.

Do not use "none of the above* or "all of the above*.

Do not present a collection of true-fals~ statements.

Define the question.* task or problem in the stem.

Avoid using negatively stated stems when possible.

Provided sufficient counter balance in questions with multi-part answers.

Include common misconceptions.as Distractors.

Make all answer options homogeneous and highly plausible.

If the answers have a logical seque~ce. put them in order.

Avoid overlapping answer options.

Do not include trivial distractors with more important distractors.

Vary the location of the correct answer.

Avoid specific determiners that give clues as to the correct answer.

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

~

distractors that do not follow grammatically from the stem, options that can be judged correct or incorrect without reading the stem.

equivalent and /or synonymous options which rule out both options.

an option which includes another option.

implausible distractors.

a correct answer which is longer that the distractors.

qualifiers in the correct answer unless they are used i~

distractors.

(e.g. probably. ordinarily) words such as "never*. ~always* which suggest a wrong answer.

a correct option that differs from the distractors in favorableness. style. or terminology.

III.

BEANS R;.11,,5.

/?/:!;VS

/--:-;:.-~/-5

[_,,._/' '

,, ****,,,;_,,_,,.I,,,,,,,,,,,_.,_,...

• BEAN LIMIT REFERENCE Knowledge level questions

< 50 ES-401 p.4 SRO/ RO overlap 2 75 ES-401 p.5 Questions from training class quizzes 2 25 ES-401 p.5 OR last two NRC exams.

Questions from licensee audit exam

.::: 0 ES-401 p.5

.(same author for audit exam)

Questions from licensee audit exam

.::: 5 ES-401 p.5 (independent author for audit exam)

Questions from licensee bank

< 50 ES-401 p.5 New questions at comprehension or

10 ES-401 p.5 analysis

JPM CRITICAL TASKS AND MEASURABLE CRITERIA G.

HOPPER

. L.

MELLEN

3.

~elop Performance Criteria The JPM should h~ve meaningful performance requirements that will provide a legiti~ate basis for evaluating the examinee's ability to safely operate the system or the plant. Artificially subdividing" existing ta*sks to generate new ones may dilute the value of the JPMs to a point wh~re they become meaningless.

The JPM shall identify specific performance standards, or check points, that will permit the examiner to evaluate successful progress toward.

completing the task in*accordance with the procedural references.

Detailed control arid indication nomenclature and criteria (e.g., switch positions and meter readings) should be identified whenever possible, even if these criteria are not specified in the procedural step.

The JPM should also note any important observations that should be made by the examinee while performing the task.

The JPM must clearly identify the task standard; i.e~, the predetermined outcome* (qualitative and/or quant*itative) against which task performance wi 11

• be measured *. -~~_ygnYri*.P.n9.. g~q~r.aJ~;.$t.ep i t_ha.~,the **e;Xarn.i n~e.:must perform r.cf9t,f'$'9tlY.'\\~{:itre.:~'tf~fJ.~~u:rate 1 y,'_-'fin* the*, proper, s equen*c~,.,\\and /,at:*,; the. prop~ n: -

il\\i rn'e').-_:;til\\).J.r*diif;frtq_\\aG*c amp 1 is h :* the :task *standard sh a 11 -.. be.. *; dent; f i ed as"'a:*

. -icti ti car*.~tep*~. and sh a 11 have an as soc i ated performance stand a rd.

Ii there are any specific procedural restrictions on the sequence in which the steps are performed they shall be clearly. noted in the JPM.

, Measurab 1 e Performance Indicators*

A measurable performance indicator*

consi~ts of positive actions that an obser.*ver can objectively.identify taken by an individual(/crew).

Examples:

Actions taken in the EOPs such as in response to an ATWS.

Control manipulations such as a man.ual reactor trip or the start of an ECCS pump.

V:erba l reports or noti fi cation of abnormal parameters or conditions.

I

~ ~ ~ - - - - -

Non-measurable Performance Indit:ators:

Verification that an expected response has occurred:

.... l)Verification and/or ensure steps which require no action.

Passive observations such as monitoring the performance of a system.

~ ~ - - - - -

DEFINED TASK STANDARDS Tas~ standards should include objective.requirements with allowable -

tolerances agreed upon by the facility and the NRC.

The icceptance criteria ~ust be able

.to discriminate/identify.. poor performance!

Bad Examples:

11 If pressure fa 11 s below 1400 psi,

start pump..., " is a perf orma nee measure that is not objecti.ve.

The operator performing this task could conceivably start the pump when pressure reaches O psi and still not

. yiolate the performance measure stated in the* procedure, even though the facility _licensee expects the operator to start the pump sooner.

The NRC and facility licensee should agree in writing that the limits for each CS or CT are accepLable before*

the examination begins.

For the example given above, adding an

acceptable pressure tolerance (e.g.,

within 200 psi)._would clarify the stanpard of performance that is expected.

"Immedi ate.l y borate the RCS if below rod insertion limits":

There is no defin.ition of immediate in this situation. Anywhere form one to ten minutes might be argued as acceptable.

• Proper Cueing External stimulus should prbmpt an operator to respond by taking.certain actions.

The indications of a system or a.tomponent mal-funttion (including passive failures)by metefs and alarms must be accurate and include all

. expected indications.

/

Initial conditions:

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Provide this page to the Candidate*

A Station Blackout has occurred on Unit 2. Unit 1 is in a LOOP with both Emergency Diesel Generators in service.. The NPS and ANPS have determined the need to crosstie electrical power from the 1A EOG to the 2A3 4.16 KV switchgear via the SBO AB Bus Crosstie.

Initiating Cue:

The ANPS has directed you to accomplish the Unit to Unit crosstie to the 2A3 4.16 KV Bus by performing 2-EOP-99, Table 7 and then 2-EOP-99, App. V within 10 minutes.

0521129, Rev 02 Page 1£ of 16

.JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (C) Indicates a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST

1.

(C)

2.

(C)

OS21129, Rev 02 Element/Step A.

Standard:

Cue:

B.

Standard:

Cue:

C.

Standard:

Cue:

D.

Standard:

Cue:

Element/Step A.

Standard:

OPEN and GREEN FLAG the following startup transformer breakers:

S.U. Transformer 2A {2-30102)

GREEN UGHT ON, F~G GREEN S.U. Transformer 2B (2-30202)

GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN S.U. Transformer 2A (2-20102)

GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN S.U. Transformer 2B (2-20302)

GREEN LIGHT ON, ~LAG GREEN Ensure the following breakers are GREEN FLAGGED and

• OPEN:

Aux Transformer 2A (2-30101 ) (2W87)

Cue:

GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN Standard:

Aux Transformer 2B (2-30201) (2W85)

Cue:

GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN Comments: ________________________ _

Page£ cf 16

(C) Indicates a Critical Step JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE PERFORMANCE CHECKUST *

2. (Cont'd) 0521129, Rev 02 B.

Standard:

Cue:

Standard:

Cue:

Aux Transformer 2A (2-20101) (1 WB6)

GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN Aux Transformer 2B (2-20301) (1 WB4)

GREEN LIGHT ON, FLA~* GREEN C.

Element/Step Tie breakers between normal and emergency 4150V buses:

Standard:

Cue:

Standard:

Cue:

Standard:

Cue:

Standard:

Cue:

4.16 KV Bus Tie 2A2-2A3 (2-20109)

GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN 4.16 KV Bus Tie 2A3-2A2 (2-20209 GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN 4.16 KV Bus Tie 2B2-2B3 (2-20309)

GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN 4.16 KV Bus Tie 2B3-2B2 (2-20411)

GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN D.

Element/Step 4.16 KV Bus 2AB Tie breakers Standard:

Cue:

Standard:

Cue:

feed "to 4.16 KV Bus 2AB (2-20208)

GREEN UGHT ON, FLAG GREEN incoming feeder from 4.16 KV bus 2A3 (2-20505)

GREEN UGHT ON, FLAG GREEN Page 7 of"16

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE.

(C) Indicates a Critical Step 2.0. (Cont'd)

Standard:

Cue:

Standard:

Cue:

3.

(C)

Element/Step A.

Standard:

Cue:

B.

Standard:

Cue:

C.

Standard:

Cue:

D.

Standard:

Cue:

i::

Standard:

Cue:

0621129, Rel/ 02 PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST Incoming feeder from 4.16 KV bus 2B3 (2-20504)

GREEN UGHT ON, FLAG GREEN feed to 4.16 KV Bus 2AB (2-20409)

GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN OPEN the following 4.16 KV feeder breakers to the station service transformers:

Station Service Transformer 2A 1 (2-20110)

GREEN LIGHT ON Station Service Transformer 2A5 (2-20210)

GREEN LIGHT ON Station Service Transformer 2A2. (2-20213)

GREEN LIGHT ON Station Service Transformer 2B1 (2-20310)

GREEN LIGHT ON Station Service Transform<2r 2B2/2B5 (2~20402)

GREEN LIGHT ON Page 8 of 15

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (C) Indicates a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKUST

4.

(C) 0821129, Rev 02 Element/Step A.

Standard:

Cue:

B.

Standard:

Cue:

C.

Standard:

Cue:

D.

Standard:

Cue:

E.

Standard:

Cue:

F.

Standard:

Cue:

OPEN and GREEN FLAG the following 480V feeder breakers from the station service transformers:

480V Bus 2A1 Feeder (2-40103)

GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN 480V Bus 2A5 Feeder {2"'40361)

GREEN UGHT ON, fLAG GREEN 480V Bus 2A2 F~eder (2-40219)

GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN 480V Bus 2E1 feeder (2-40419)

GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN 480V Bus 2B5 Feeder (2-40653)

GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN 480V Bus 2E2 Feeder (2-40503)

GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN SAT UNSAT Comments:

Pagt! 9 of 15

.JOEP~RFORMANCEMEASURE (C) lndi~es a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST

5.

(C) 0821129, Rev 02 Elemen11Step A.

Standard:

OPEN the following 4SOV bus tie breakers 4SOV Bus Tie 2A2-2AB (2-40220)

Cue:

GREEN UGHT ON B.

Standard:

4SOV Bus Tie 2AB-2A2 (2-:40702)

Cue:

GREEN LIGHT ON C.

Standard:

4SOV Bus Tie 2AB-2B2 (2-40706)

Cue:

GREEN LIGHT ON D.

Standard:

480V Bus Tie 2B2-2AB (2-40504)

Cue:

GREEN LIGHT ON SAT UNSAT Comments:. ________________________ _

Page10 of15

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (C) lndicales a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKUST

6.

(C)

7.

(C)

(C) 0821129, Rev 02

• Element/Step Establish communications with Unit 1 Standard:

ESTABUSH COMMUNICATIONS with Unit 1 via Gai-Tronics or plant radio (if available).

Cue:

COMMUNICATIONS ARE ESTABUSHED Elemen1/Step PLACE the following pump switches in the PULL TO LOCK position:

A.

Standard:

2AICWPump Cue:

SWITCH tN PULL TO LOCK B.

Standard:

2B ICWPump Cue:

SWITCH IN PULL TO LOCK,

Standard:

2C ICWPurnp Cue:

SWITCH 1N PULL TO LOCK D.

Standard:

2A CCWPurnp Cue:

SWITCH 1N PULL TO LOCK E.

Standard:

2B CCWPump Cue:

SWITCH tN PULL to LOCK 0

Standard:

2C CCWPump Cue:

SWITCH 1N PULL TO LOCK SAT UNSAT Comments:

-Page 1-1 ot16

e JOBPERFORMANCE~EASURE (C) lndica'tes a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKUST

8. 8 Element/Step Verify the EDG oulput breaker on the selected 4.16 KV bus is open

9.

(C)

10.

(C)

Standard:

Cue:

VERJFY the EOG output breaker on the selected 4.16 KV bus (2-20211) is OPEN GREEN UGHT ts ON. REPORT UNlT 1 ts READY TO CROSSTIE AB 4.16 KV BUSES.

Element/Step Close in the Unit 2 SBO breaker Standard:.

Cue:

CLOSE IN the Unit 2 SBO breaker 2-20501.

RED LIGHT ON Element/Step Request the Unit 1 control room to close the Unit 1 SBO breaker Standard:

Cue:

REQUEST the Unit 1 control room to close the Unit 1 SBO breaker 1-20501.

UNlT 1 ACKNOWLEDGES REQUEST.

END Element/Step TERMINATION Standard:

Student requests Unit 1 to close the Unit 1 SEO crcsstie breaker.

Commenis; ______________________________ _

0821129, Rev 02 Page12of15

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (C) lndicat~s a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST

1.

2.

3.

Element/Step:

Review the EOOS log and determine if channel RM-26-18 (PAG-203) has been declared out of service.

Standard:

Verifies RM-26-18 is not out of service.

Cue:*.

RM-26-18 IS NOT OUT Of SERVICE.

Eiement!Step:

• . Check the Met Tower for operability Standard:

Cue:

Eh!ment/Step:

Verifies Met Tower chart recorder working properly..

MET TOWER CHART RECORDER TRACKING PROPERLY.

Verify gas release permit properly filled out and authorized, enter reiease permit number and tank to be released en procedure.

Standard:

Verifies permit filled out properly and authorized, enters release permit number (98-007) and 2C GOT on procedure.

• Cue:

9~07 AND 2C GOT ENTERED ON PROCEDURE

4. (C) Element/Step:

Verify the following 11alve alignment:

Standard:

Cue:

V5745 V06"'142 V7071 V7070 V7072 V£742 acsed Open Open Open Lociced Closed Locked Closed Verify all above iisted v~lves in proper positions V6745 FULLY CLOCKWISE V06142 FULLY COUNTERCLOCKWfSE V7071 FULLY COUNTERCLOCKWISE V7070 FULLY COUNTERCLOCKWISE V7072 FULLY CLOCKWISE WITH LOCK ATIACHED V6742 FULLY CLOCKWISE WtTH LOCK ATIACHED SAT UNSAT Comments: -'---------------------------

08211£3, Rev 00 Page:5 of 12

JDS PERFORMANCE MEASURE.

{C) Indicates a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKUST

4.

Element/Step Check dosed fCV-25-9, *eontinuous Containment/Hydrogen Purge Standard:

Cue:.*

SAT Comments:

Control Valve Filter Inlet."

A11he NON-SAFETY VENTILATION HVAC PANEL:

VERIFY CLOSED FCV-25-9 0%, GREEN UGHT ON! RED UGHT OFF UNSAT

5. (C) Element/Step Throttle FCV-25-28, *continuous Containment/Hydrogen Purge Control Valve Bypass" to ~pproximateiy 10°/o OPEN position.

Standard:

At the NON-SAFETY VENTILATION HVAC PANEL: POS1TION FCV 2S to the open position UNTIL the valve position indicates 10% OPEN Cue:

10%, BOTH RED & GREEN UGHTS ON SAT UNSAT Comments:

-s.'rd Element/Step

!\\

Standard:

Cue:

SAT Comments:

0821058, Reo,, 06 Start HVE-6B, *shield Building Exhaust fan."

At the B TRAIN EMERGENCY VENTILATION HVAC PANEL:

POS1Tf0N HVE-6B corrtrol switch "to START RED UGHT ON, GREEN UGHT OFF UNSAT Page£of12

-JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE C. -=-=*

The system/equipment status reflects 'the overall intent of what the JPM required upon completion.

D.

Correctfy perlorm all critical steps.

. Aff steps where procedural guidance exists may be considered critical. Perlormance of Off-Normal Operating Procedure immediate actions will be from memory.

During the course of1he JPM, 'there may be some tasks you will have to perlorm that will require you to i~plement contingency actions in order to complete them. Even in these.cases, you are expected to make decisions and ta~e actions based on the indications available and in accordance with the facility's.procedural guidance.

lnttiating Cue(s):

The ANPS has directed you to respond to the abnormal alarm IAW 1-0120035.

References:

ONP 1-0120035, Rev 18 During the performa_nce of 'the task I will tell you which steps to simulate or discuss.

Verbalize each step before you do it. This gives you a cilance to self<heck and use STOP during the performance of each task element.

Verify the position or condition of equipment or components by pointing to 'the instrumentation and providing a brief explanation of how the indication is used for verification.

I will provide you witti the appropriate cues for steps which are simulated or discussed.

You may use any approved reference materiajs normally availab4e in the execution of this Job Performance Measure, i~ciuding logs.

Do you understand these directions?

ff you have any questions, ask1hem now, and I will answer them.

During the test I cannot answer questions.

When ~ou complete all steps correctly, you will pass this job performance measure.

Begin the task now.

0621043, Rev 05 Page -4 t1f 10

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE PERFORMANCE CHECKUST

1.

Elemen11Step Verify pressurizer spray, proportional and backup heaters are operating Standard:

properly in automatic.

OBSERVE any of the following Pressurizer press.ure indications on RTGB 103 and/or RTGB 106 to DETERMINE improper automatic response:

PR-1100 PIC-1100X PIC-110DY Pt-1102A Pt-11026 Pt-1102C Pt-1102D PIA-1102ALL PIA-1102BU PIA-1102.CU PIA-1102DU Observe the proportional heater control and indication for P-1 and P-2 Observe the E/U heater control and indication for banks B-1 through B-6 Observe the spray valve controller HIC-1100 NOTE TO EXAMINER: The CUEs should provide sufficient infonnation to diagnose the failure of the seleded pressure channel LOW. it should be recognized that Pressurizer pressure is aduaHy increasing. All of"the indicators Hsted may not be used by the operator when diagnosing this problem. The student may refer to Appendix "A* for e:cpeded automatic responses.

Cue:

for PR-1100, PIC-1100X, PIC-1100Y:

SELECTED CHANNEL-DOWNSCALE LOW, NONSELECTED CHANNEL JS =2300 ?SIA AND SLOWLY INCREASING.

for o1her Pl ins1ruments:

• 1NDfCATED PRESSURE JS =2300 ?SlA AND SLOWLY INCREASING for Pressurizer heaters:

SW1TCHES IN AUTO, HEATERS UGHTS INDICATE ON for Pressurizer spray controller HIC-1100:

CNO(CATES NO OUTPUT SAT UNSAT Comments:

082"1043, Reo.' 06 Page5 tif 10

. (C) lndical~s a Critical Step JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST

2. (C) Element/Step jfthe seleded pressure channel has failed, Then shfft to the operable pressure channel.

Standard:

Cue::*

At RTGE 103: POSITION HS-1100 to the alternate pressure control channel Al TERNATE CHANNEL SELECTED. PROPORTIONAL HEATER OUTPUT REDUCING, SPRAY VALVE OUTPUT RSSING, PZR PRESSURE RETURNING TO NORMAL/

NOTE - The ANPS directs that the rest of the ONP be carried out.

SAT UNSAT Comments:

3.

Element/Step Verify SE-02-03 and SE-02-04 "Auxiliary Spray Valves", are closed Standard:

Cue:

SAT Comments:

At RTGE 103: DETERMJNE keyswitches and indicating lights for SE-02-03 and SE-02-04 to be CLOSED SE-D2--03, SE-D2-04 GREEN UGHTS ON AND RED UGHTS Of'f' UNSAT

4.

• Element/Step Verify power operated relief valves are closed.

Standard:

• At RTGE 103:: DETERMfNE position indica-ting lights for both poljlfer operated relief valves CLOSED Cue:

PORV-1402, PORV-14~ GREEN UGHTS ON AND RED UGHTS Of'f' SAT UNSAT Comments:

Page£of 10

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST

5.

E4emen1/Step Ensure that PORVs V1402 and V1404 hand switches are in the proper Standard:

Cue:

SAT.-

Comments:

position for existing plant conditions.

At RTGB 103: DETERMINE PORVs hand switches are in NORMAL PORVs HAND SWITCHES IN NORMAL UNSAT

6.

Elemen1/Step Verify pressure anomaly is NOT caused by a Jarge rate of change ofTavg.

Standard:

At RTGB 103: OBSERVE any of.the following indications and DETERMINE tha1 T~vg is fairly stable:

TR-1111Xt1121X, Tl-1102A, TR-1115/1125, Tl-11D2B, TIA-1111.X, Tl-1102C, TIA-1121.X, Tl-1102D, TJC-1111Y, TIC-1121Y Cue:

Tavg HAS BEEN STABLE THROUGHOUT THE EVOLUTION SAT UNSAT Comments:

END E4emen11Step* TERMCNATCON Standard:

0821043, Re<1 06 The pressurizer pressure control system is responding properly to control pressure at :2250 psia.

nge 7 of 1 0

OPERATING TEST

. WORKSHOP RUSSELL BUILDING JPM QUESTIONS.

RICK BALDWIN JULY 15, 1998

ES-301, D1 (I)

States:

The prescriRted questions for Categories A and B may include a como1nation of open-and closed-

. reference items. Open-reference items that require ar2plicants to ag_gjy their knowledge of the plant to pbslulated normal, an normal and emergency situations are preferred. Closed-reference items may be used to evaluate the immediate actions of mergency and other procedure,s, certain a~fo.mattc actions, operatjnQ *

-charact~r1st1cs, 1nterlqqks, s~t P.OlflfS as appropriate to the fac1l1ty. M1n1~1ze the use of c-losed-reference quest1qns that rely solely on memo[}', and avoid the use. of open~reference questions whose answer can simfllY be looked up if the applicant can ind the correct document.

Refer to Section B.6 of Appendix *C for

• more guidance regarding the e:.:!evelopment and use of open reference questions for the walk-through test.

• Appendix C:

States:

6. Devel9p Pre-scripted Follow-up Questions If the JPM will be used during an initial licensing examination, it shalT include a sufficienl number of prescripted questions with answers ana references to evaluate the examinee's understan inQ of two knowledge and/or*

bility (KIA)* slatements related to the

. system or task. M-ore than one question may be required to effectively evaluate some K/A statements.

Th*e most appropriate format for this application 1s the short-answer question, which requires the examinee to compose a response rather th~n

• select from among a set of alternative resP.onses, as is tne case with: multiple-choice, matching, and true/false AUestions. Keep the following a.1uidelines, in ~dditiqn to the. generic.

-item construction pnnc1ples in Appendix

. B,. in mind when preparing.the questions:

a. Provide clear, explicit directions

/guidelines for answering the question so that the examinee understands what constitutes a fully correct response.

Choose words ca*refully to ensure that the stipulations and requirements of the question are appropriately conveved. Words such as "evaluate " -outline " and "explain," can invite a lot of' detail tha is not necessarily relevant.

b. Make sure that the answ~r k~Y.

• response matches (and 1s l1m1ted to) the requirements posed in the

~uestion. When appropriate, indicate the amount of. partial credit to be *granted for an. incomplete answer.

For questions requiring computation, specify the degree of precision expected. Trylo make the answer turn out to be whole numbers.

ec. Avoid giving away part or all of the answer b'L fhe way th~ question is worded. For example:

"If the letdown line became obstructed, could boration of the plant be accomplish-ed shortly after a reactor trio t_o put the 12lant in cold shutdown? If so, how?"

A test-wise examinee can realize that the answer has to be yes, or.

else the second part of the 9uest1on would have read something ike "If not, why not?"

d. A*void what could be considered "trick" questions i'l which the answer key does not precisely match the.

~uestion. For e_xarr.,pTe, 9sk~ng "How

[ao] the SI term1nat1on cr1ter1a

~harJge followinQ a $1 re_initiati.on?"

1mplles that the lerm1nat1on cr1ter1a will change, when in actuality they do not.

ee. Avoid direct look-up questions that only require the examinee to recall where to find the answer to the question.

The *operational orientation required of questions on the walk-through test

• and the examinee's access to reference documents1 argue against the use of questions that test for recall and memorization. Any questions that do not require any an~lysis, synthesis, or appl_ication of 1nlormatlon by the exam1nee should be answerable without the aid of reference materials.- Refer to ES-602, Attachment 1, for a more detailed discussion of direct look-up questions.

• • Form ES-602-1, "NRC Checklist for Open-Reference Test Items,"

contains a list of questions that _can be used to evaluate the suitability of the follow-up questions planned for the walk-through portion of the operatinQ test. Arthough the checklisf was developed for* use in

evaluating requalification written examinations, most of the criteria (i.e.*, an excep.t 9, 10, 11, and t~e f</A rating on item 7) are generically applicable and could be used as a basis for revisinQ or rejecting proposed walk-tflrough queslions.

S-602 NRC Checklist for Open-Reference Test Items Form ES-602-1 Test Item Level

1.

Does each test item have a documented link to important licensee tasks, K/As, and/or facility learning objectives?

2.

Is each question operationally oriented (i.e., is there a correlation between job demands and test demands)?

3.

Is the question at least at the comprehension-level of knowledge?

4.

ls the context of the questions realistic and free of window dressing and backwards logic?

5.

Does the item require an appropriate use of references (i.e., use of analysis skills or synthesis of information either to discern what procedures were applicable or to consult the procedures to obtain the answer)?

6.

ls*the question a "direct look-up" q1.1estion, or does one question on the examination compromise another? A "direct look-up question" is defined as a question that immediately directs an licensee to a particular reference where the answer is readily available.

7.

Does the question possess a high KIA importance factor (3 or greater) for the job position?

8.

Does the question discriminate a competent licensee from one who is not?

9.

Is the question appropriate for the written examination and the multiple choice format?

10.

Do questions in Section A take advantage of the simulator control room setting?

11.

Does any question have the potential of being i3 "double-jeopardy" question?

12.

Is the question clear, precise, and easy to read and understand?

13.

Is there only one correct answer to the question?

14.

Does the question pose situations and problems other than those presented during training?

15.

Does the question have a reasonable estimated response time?

CONCLUSIONS CD Open-reference questions whose answer can simpry be looked up if the applicant can find the correct document are NOT acceptable.

@ Analysis, Synthesis, Comprehension queslions should be used to avoid direct look-up problems.

@ On all questions where the exRected

• . resRonses are multipart we will notify the candidate of the number of known* correct answers and the number n,eeded for full creditm

@ Examiners will ask non-prescripted follqw up que?tions, as ne~essary, to clarify. or confirm the candidate's understanding of P.rescripted guestions or pre-planned tasks. The followup questions should be to further explore the lack of candidate knowl.edge in the specific area in question

I Assign point yalues to each answer that n.as multq?.le parts,. to ensure

. examiner grading consistency.

@ Identify on the candidate's sheet the status of reference material usage.

There is proposal to impose an allowance o only 30o/o closed-reference guestions of either Category A or B.

I

DIRECT LOOK QUESTIONS WITH ACCEPT ABLE CORRECTIONS

RO Admin. A.1 (Fuel Handling), Question 1 2.1.23 3-:914.0 QUESTION:

Given the following plant conditions:

Reactor shutdown for refueling outage Unit offline:

1/1/97 12:01 AM Entered Mode 3: 1/1/97 2:10 AM Entered Mode 4: 1/1/97 6:17 AM

• . Entered Mode 5: 1/1/97 11 :45 PM What is the earliest date/time core offload can commence?

ANSWER:

1/5/97 6:10 AM 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> after shutdown

REFERENCE:

GP-010, "Refueling", step 5.3.l 01/06/98 5:43 AM

AUTHORIZED COPY 5.228 IF needed for SFP water clarity, THEN place the SFP skimmer in service IAW OP-910.

5.3

• Fuel Assembly and Core Component Movement

--** ~---* -~* :*--***--. -

INIT NOTE:

A case evaluation has been performed IAW PLP-037 for each major evolution in this section. The case determination is defined prior to each applicable evolution.

~,*5.3.1*

5.3.2 Check that the Reactor has been subcritical for at least 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> AND record hours subcritical. (TAMS 3.12)

Verify EST-001 is complete.

___ hrs NOTE:

moving fuel.

The following equipment tests need to be completed prior to 5.3.3 Verify the following equipment necessary to support fuel off-load has been tested IAW EST-030 AND mark the equipment that is not needed to support fuel off-load N/ A.

Fuel Transfer System (Section 8.6.2)

Manipulator Crane (Section 8.6.3)

CV RCC Change Fixture (Section 8.6.4)

New Fuel Handling Equipment (Section 8.4)

NFS New Fuel Litt (Section 8.5.1)

SFP New Fuel Monorail (Section 8.5.2)

SFP Bridge Crane (Section 8.5.3)

SFP New Fuel Elevator (Section 8.5.4)

ENG ENG ENG ENG ENG ENG ENG ENG ENG Rev. 36 Page 24 of 79 j

3.12 J)ECAY. TIME Decay Time 3.12 TRMS 3.12 Movement of fuel within the core shall not be (CTS 3.8.1.h) initiated prior to 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> after shutdown.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 6.

COMPENSATORY MEASURES

;:=============;:==

CONDITION A.

Requirements of TRMS not met.

TEST REQUIREMENTS None.

REQUIRED COMPENSATORY MEASURE A.l Suspend movement of fuel within the*core.

TEST 3.12*1 COMPLETION TIME Immed'iately

/

FREQUENCY NA

B 3.12 DECAY TIME BASES Decay Time B 3.12 The restriction of not moving fuel in the reactor for a period of 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> after shutdown reduces the consequences of a fuel handling accident by providing for decay of short-lived fission products and the reduction of fission gas inventory in any potentially failed fuel.

Fuel handling accidents in containment and the Spent Fuel Building have been evaluated by postulating that the failure of all fuel rods in one assembly occurs 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> after shutdown.

B 3.12-1

RO Admin. A.1 (Fuel Handling), Question 1 2.1.23 1.9/4.0 REFERENCE ALLOWED QUESTION:

Given the following plant conditions:

Reactor shutdown for refueling outage Unit offline:

1/1/98 12:01 AM

• .* Entered Mode 2: 1/1/98 12:38 AM

• . Entered Mode 3:. 1/1/98 2:10 AM Entered Mode 4: 1/1/98 6:17 AM Entered Mode 5: 1/1/98 11:45 PM What is the earliest date/time core offload can commence?

ANSWER:

1/5/98 6: 10 AM (100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> after shutdown)

REFERENCE:

GP-010, "Refueling", step 5.3.1 PLP-100 (Technical Requirements Manual), section 3.12 02/13/98 9:58 AM

RO JPM CR-019, Question 2 006 Kl.. 03 4.2/4.3 QUESTION:

Given the plant conditions:

Mode 1, 100% power Accumulator levels / pressure "A"

68%

600 psig "B. 70%

630 psig "C"

70%

645 psig Annunciator APP-002-B4 "SI ACCUM A HI/LO PRESS" illuminated Describe the basis for NOT being allowed to raise the pressure in the "A" Accumulator and lower the pressure in the "C" Accumulator by simultaneously opening the vent valves for the two accumulators.

ANSWER:

Simultaneously opening the accumulator vent valves would connect the two accumulator gas spaces. If a large break LOCA were to occur on either of the loops ("A" or "C".) both accumulators would depressurize invalidating the LOCA analysis.

(Not required for credit: Accumulator design capacity is based on one accumulator spilling to the containment floor through the break, the other two accumulators fill the core to the mid-plane.).

REFERENCE:

FSAR section 6.3.2.2.6 OP 202, step 4.20 APP-002-B4 "SI ACCUM A HI/LO PRESS" 01/06/98 5:43 AM

UPDATED FSAR

3.

Finally the second low level alarm on the RWST sounds.

At this time, the~operator performs the switchover operation.

The changeover from injection to recirculation is effected by the operator in the Control Room via a series of manual switching operations according to written procedures.

Valves SI-856A and Bare manually closed at the valves.

Remotely operated valves for the injection phase of the SIS (Figures 6.3.1-1 and 6.3.1-2) which are under manual control, (this is, valves which normally are in their ready position and do not receive a SI signal) have their positions indicated on a common portion of the control board.

At any time during operation, when one of these valves is not in the ready position for injection, it is shown visually on the board.

Table 6.3.2-1 is a listing of the instrumentation readouts on the control board which the operator can monitor during recirculation.

In addition, an audible annunciation alerts the operator to the condition.

6.3.2.2.5.1 Location.of the major components required for recirculation.

The RHR pumps are located in the RHR pump pit (Elevation 203 ft O in.) which is below the basement floor of the Auxiliary Building (Elevation 226 ft O in).

The RHR pump pit is located between the Containment Building and the Auxiliary Building.

The residual heat exchangers are located on the first floor of the Auxiliary Building.

The high head SI pumps, component cooling pumps and component cooling heat exchangers are located in the Auxiliary Building (Elevation 226 ft O in).

The service water pumps are located in the intake structure, and the redundant piping to the component cooling heat exchangers is run underground.

6.3.2.2.6 Accumulators.

The accumulators are pressure vessels filled with borated water and pressurized with nitrogen gas.

During normal plant operation, each accumulator is isolated from the RCS by two check valves in series.

Should the RCS pressure fall below the accumulator pressure, the check valves npen and borated water is forced into the RCS.

Mechanical operation of the swing-disc check valves is the only action required to open the injection path from the accumulators to the,core via the cold leg.

The accumulators are passive engineered safety features (ESF) because the gas forces injection; no external source of power or signal transmission is needed to obtain fast-acting, high-flow capability when the need arises.

One accumulator is attached to each of the cold*legs of the RCS.

The design capacity of the accumulators is based on the as~umption that flow from one of the ~ccumulators spills onto the containment floor through the ruptured loop.

ne flow from the remaining accumulators provides sufficient water to fill the volume outside of the core barrel belo~ the nozzles, the bottom plenum, and one-half the core.

6.3.2-6 Amendment No. 12

4.0 0?-202 (Continued)

16.

A case evaluation has been performed for each section of this procedure IAW PLP-037.

The case determination and any associated additional requirements are defined at the beginning of each section.

17.

The Dedicated Operator utilized for filling SI Accumulators shall be any active licensed individual other than the Reactor Operator on watch, and shall remain at ~he RTGB until the filling evolution is complete.

18.

If any SI Accumulator level increases greater than 10% (70 gal) due to inleakage when the RCS pressure is >1000 psig, then the affected accumulator shall be sampled within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

(ITS SR 3.5.1.4)

19.

When drawing an oil sample from an SI Pu.~p, remove the Control Power Fuses.

Reinstall the Control Power Fuses when sampling ~as been completed A.:.'ID the oil reservoir has been refilled to the normal level. During the interval with fueses removed, the SI Pump is inoperable.

20.

_Do NOT open more than one SI Accumulator Vent valve at a time when the SI Accumulators are required to be operable to prevent invalidating the LOCA Analysis. (Westinghouse Memo CPL-95-210)

21.

Operation with RWST level greater than the high level setpoint should be avoided to prevent water level at the Spring Line of the RWST.

Rev.

Page 10 of 120

RO JPM CR-019, Question 2.

006 Kl.D3 4.2/4.3 REFERENCE ALLOWED QUESTION:

Given the plant conditions:

Mode 1, 100% power Accumulator levels / pressure "A"

68%

600 psig "B"

70%

630 psig "C"

70%

645 psig

• Annunciator APP-002-B4 "SI ACCUM A HI/LO PRESS" illuminated QUESTION A:

Determine which accumulator parameter(s) are outside the normal operating band.

ANSWERA:

"A" Accumulator pressure is low (normal band= 614 to 646 psig)

REFERENCE ALLOWED QUESTIONB:

Can this evolution be performed and describe the basis for your response.

ANSWERB:

No, -not allowed. Simultaneously opening the accumulator vent valves would connect the

... two accumulator gas spaces. If a large break LOCA were to occur on either of the loops

("A" or "C") both accumulators would depressurize invalidating the LOCA analysis.

(Not required for credit: Accumulator design capacity is based on one accumulator spilling to the containment floor through the break, the other two accumulators fill the core to the mid-plane.)

REFERENCE:

FSAR section 6.3.2.2.6 OP 202, step 4.20 APP-002-B4 "SI ACCUM A HI/LO PRESS" 02/13/93 9:53 AM A:s

RO JPM CR-025, Question 1 005 K4..07 3.2/3.5 QUESTION:

Given the following plant conditions:

RCS cooldown is in progress Plant is in Mode 4 RCS Tavg is 348°F RCS pressure

+. PT-402 = 468 psig

+. PT-403 = 470 psig

+ PT-404 = 4 72 psig What must be done to opel\\~OV-750r751 t<? place RHR in se~ice?

ANSWER:

Reduce RCS pressure (sensed by PT-403) to less than 465 psig Verify SI-862A/B "RWST TO RHR" and SI-863A/B "RHR LOOP RECIRC" closed with breakers closed and control power switches in "NORMAL"

REFERENCE:

OP-201, "Residual Heat Removal System",: _

System

Description:

.Kesidual Heat Removal System 01/08/98 12:51 PM

AUTHORIZED COPY 4.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 4.1 Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure shall be less than 350°F and 375 psig before the Residual Heat Removal System is i:iut iri-*service, and the RHR system will be removed from service before RCS pressure and temperature are raised above these values.

4.2 To prevent boiling the CCW liquid contained in an RHR HX, CCW flow should not _be isolated to an RHR HX when the temperature of the RHR System is greater than 200°F. (CR 95-00565) r:.=.*..

4.3

_Neither"RHR-750 nor RHR-751 will open unless ttie following conditions are

satisfied:,

The breakers for Sl-862A and B are closed.

The breakers for Sl-863A and Bare closed.

The control power switches for Sl~862A and B are in NORMAL.

The control power switches for Sl-863A and Bare in NORMAL.

Valves Sl-862A and Bare closed.

Valves Sl-863A ahd B are closed.

RCS pressure is less than 465 psig.

4.4 Sl-862A & B, and Sl-863A & B are interlocked so they cannot be opened unless the RHR loop pressure is less than 210 psig.

4.5 When the Residual Heat Removal System is providing Core Cooling AND seal injection flow is desired to maintain a positive liP across the Thermal Barrier of the Reactor Coolant Pumps, letdown flow through HCV-142 and PCV-145 should be maintained to provide makeup to the VCT.

4.6 When RHR-757C or RHR-7570 is closed, 3,350 gpm flow, indicated on Fl-605, with one RHR pump running or 6,700 gpm flow with two RHR pumps running shall not be exceeded, except as allowed/required by approved test procedu~es for which flowrates on Fl-605 may be as high as 3800 gpm for one pump or 7600 gpm for two pumps.

Rev. 34 I

Page 6 of 67 /

RO JPM CR-025, Question 1 005 K4,.07 3.2/3.5 REFERENCE ALLOWED QUESTION:

Given the following plant conditions:

RCS cooldown is in progress Plant is in Mode 4 RCS Tavg is 348°F RCS pressure

+ PT-402 = 461 p.sig *

+ PT-403 = 4 70 psig

+ PT-404 = 4 72 psig What conditions must be satisfied to open MOV-750/751 to place RHR in service?

ANSWER:

[.5] Reduce RCS pressure (sensed by PT-403) to less than 465 psig

[.5] Verify SI-862A/B "RWST TO RHR" and SI-863A/B "RHR LOOP RECIRC" closed with breakers closed and control power switches in "NORMAL"

REFERENCE:

OP-201, "Residual Heat Removal System", step 4.3 System_Description: SD-003, Residual Heat Removal System 02/13/98 9:58 AM

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION C.

Required Action and C.l associated Completion Time of Condition A*

not met.

DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 in the unacceptable region of Figure 3.4.16-1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED ACTION Be in MODE 3 with Tavg < 500°F.

RCS Specific Activity 3.4.16 COMPLETION TIME 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> FREQUENCY SR 3.4.16.1 Verify reactor ~oolant gross specific 7 days activity~ 100/E µCi/gm.

SR 3.4.16.2

---

NOTE--------------------

-~

Only required to be performed in MODE 1.

Verify reactor coolant DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 specific acti"vity ~ 1.0 µCi/gm.

3..4-46 14 days Between 2.and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after a THERMAL POWER change of.

~ 15% RTP within a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period (continued)

RCS Specific Activity B-3.4.16 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.4.16.1 SR 3.4.16.1 requires performing a gamma isotopic analysis as a measure of the gross specific activity of the reactor coolant at least once every 7 days.

The analysis shall consist of a qualitative measurement of the total radioactivity of the primary coolant in units of µCi/gm.

While basically a quantitative measure of raoionuclides with half lives longer than 15 minutes. excluding iodines, this measurement is the sum of the degassed gamma activities and the gaseous gamma activities in the sample taken. This Surveillance provides an indication of any increase in gross specific activity.

Trending the results of this Surveillance allows proper remedial action to be taken before reaching the LCD limit under normal operating conditions. The Surveillance is applicable in MODES 1 and 2. and in MODE 3 with Ta.v,9 at least SDD°F.

The 7 day Frequency considers the unlikel1nood of a gross fuel failure during the time.

SR 3.4.16.2 This Surveillance is performed in MODE 1 only to ensure iodine remains within limit during normal operation and following fast power changes when fuel failure is more apt to occur. The 14 day Frequency is adequate to trend changes in the iodine activity level. considering gross activity is monitored every 7 days. The Frequency, between 2 and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after a power.change~ 15% RTP within a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period, is established because the iodine levels peak during this time following fuel failure: samples at other times would provide inaccurate results.

SR 3.4.16.3 A radiochemical analysis for E determination is required every 184 days (6 months) witb the plant operating in MODE 1 equilibrium conditions. The E determination directly rel ates to the LCD and is req*ui red to verify pl ant operation within the specified gross activity LCD limit. The analysis for Eis a measurement of the average energies per disintegration for isotopes with half lives longer than (continued)

B 3.4-102

SRO(I) Admin. A.1, (Plant Chemistry), Question 1 2.1.14 --;.2.5/3.3 REFERENCE ALLOWED QUESTION:

Given the following plant conditions:

The plant is at 100% power, equilibrium Xenon, all systems aligned for normal operation (Jan 15, 1998, 12:01 AM)

Chemistry personnel report they have completed obtaining RCS and Pressurizer liquid. samples (9:00 AM)

A runback due to a dropped rod occurred at 9: 15 AM Recovery actions are in progress QUESTION A:

What are the chemistry sampling requirements for this plant condition?

ANSWERA:

[.5] Between 2 and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> following a reactor power change of~ 15% in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (in Mode 1 ), RCS Dose Equivalent I-131 shall be verified.:s_ 1. 0 micro-curies / gram.

(Between 11 :15 AM and 3:15 PM)

NO REFERENCE ALLOWED QUESTIONB:

What is.the basis for the time frame after the power change?

ANSWER:

[.5] Ensure Iodine remains within limit following fast power changes when fuel failure is more apt to occur. 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> following a power change of~ 15% in a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period is established because this is when the Iodine level in the RCS would peak due to fuel failure.

REFERENCE:

OMM-001-13, "Plant Chemistry", section 5.2 ITS, SR 3.4.16.2 6tuEJ 02/13/98. 9:58 AM

SRO(I) Admin. A.I, (Plant C~emistry), Question 1 2.1.14 -; 2.5/3.3 QUESTION:

Given the following plant conditions:

The plant is at 100% power, equilibrium Xenon, all systems aligned for normal operation (Jan 15, 1998, 12:01 AM)

Chemistry personnel report they have completed obtaining RCS and Pressurizer liquid samples (9:00 AM)

A runback due to a dropped rod occurred at 9:15 AM The plant is now stable at -68%

• Recovery actions are in progress What are ~e chemistry sampling requirements and basis for this plant condition?

ANSWER:

Between 2 and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> following a reactor power change of~ 15% in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (in Mode 1),

RCS Dose Equivalent I-131 shall be verified~ 1.0 micro-curies/ gram. (Between 11:15 AM and 3:15 PM)

Ensure Iodine remains within limit following fast power changes when fuel failure is more apt to occur. 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> following a power change of~ 15% in a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period is established because this is when the Iodine level in the RCS would peak due to fuel failure.

REFERENCE:

. Plant Chemistry", section 5.2 SR 3.4.16.2 01/08/98 10:38 AM

KA: 062AA1.01 Importance: 3.413.B Reference allowed (FSAR)

POOR QUESTIONS Question: \\Nh~t is the limiting factor on the amount of current that can be passed from-Unit 1 to Unit 2 through the SBO crosstie?

. Expected Response: The electrical cable between the two units is the limiting factor.

-1

KA: 033000K303 Importance: 3.0/3.3 Reference allowed Question: What is the response of the Spent Fuel Pool Coolina Svstem fKFl. and whv, reqardinq

~

• temperature and level following a Blackout?

[NOTE: Assume NO operator action is taken]

Expected Response: Spent Fuel Pool level and temperature will increase due to decay heat of the spent fuel assemblies.

Conduct of Operation (SRO l)

Fire Brigade KA:

Lesson Plan:

l9400lKll6 3.5/4.2 EAP-SEP

Reference:

Fire Plan, (E-Plan) RP/l000/29 Fire Brigade Response, NSD 112, Fire Brigade Organization, Training, and Responsibilities Task:

2610000, 37l0001 Source:

NEW PRA 3-18-97

4.

As the Operations Shift Supervisor serving as the Fire Brigade Leader during an actual fire or fire drill, you have several responsibilities.

Describe the normal duties as the Fire Brigade Leader at the fire scene?

ANSWER:

1-Serve as the Fire Brigade Commander and direct the Fire Brigade during the event.

2-

• Obtain support as needed such as Security, Radiation Protection, Chemistry, Offsite Fire Department and Hazmat.

(3-Ensure all fire protection equipment is restore to full capability immediately following the event).

(4-Complete the Fire Emergency Report and forward the report to the EP (Emergency Planning) Section).

KA:

Lesson Plan:

Reference:

Task:

Source:

QUESTION:

062000A401 (3.3/3.l)

EL EPD Objective RB page 25 OMP 002630001 Bank EL 96 (JPM CRO 08) RO Describe the safety and personnel requirements for manual operation of switchyard disconnects.

ANSWER:

Rubber safety gloves and safety glasses must be worn.

At least two people in the crew performing the task, one of which is a supervisor.

Nomex suits should be worn by the breaker operator.

Conduct of Operations Self Checking/STAR (SRO 1)

KA:

Lesson Plan:

194001Kl01 (3.6/3.7)

ADM-OMP

Reference:

OMP 1-22, Job Assignments 3610052 Task:

Source:

PRA 3-6-97 NEW

1.

As an SRO (Shift Supervisor) you have the responsibility of performing Pre-Job BL'iefs with other operators on your sh_ift, you make the decision of the level of detail and information within the Pre-job Brief.

What are several guidelines that you will use to determine the amount of detail of the Pre-Job Brief presentation and describe the "STAR" component of the Pre-Job Brief?

ANSWER:

(2 of* 5)

1)

Complexity of the task Consequences of the task Importance of the task Frequency of the task Unfamiliarly of the task to the performer

2)

"STAR" is a self checking method (that operators use to reduce the potential of errors).

("S" - Stop)

( "T" - Think)

("A" Act)

("R" - Review)

ACCEPTABLE QUESTIONS Importance: 2. 6/3. 0

Reference:

Steam Tables Question: The RCS is at 2250 psia, Quench tank pressure is 3.5psig. If a small leak developed in the seat of Code Safety V 1201, what temperature would you expect to see on TIA-1107?

Expected Response: 230 degrees

Question #1.

KA: 001K5.02 Importance: 2.9/3.4

Reference:

Unit 2 Plant Physics Curves Question: Unit 2 has 6,000 EFPH on the core and experiences a dropped rod resulting in the NI power level changes from 100°/o to 93°/o, what is the approximate worth of the dropped rod?

Expected Response: Approximately 75 to 100 pcm.

Question # 2.

KA: 001K5.28 Importance: 3.513.B

Reference:

Unit 2 Plant Physics Curves Question: In order to withdraw the same CEA without changing the power level or temperature of the RCS, how much would RCS boron concentration have to be changed?.(PPM)

• • If Question 1 is missed: Assum_ing the worth of a dropped CEA was *100 pcm, how much would boron concentration have to be changed to withdraw the rod without changing power level or temperature?

Expected Response: approximately 12 PPM (Boron worth for the present conditions is 8.38pcm/ppm)

"HLC EXAM DEVELOPMENT EXAM BANK" TEST ITEM DATA.SHEET

=================---===================================----------------

I. CROSS-REFERENCE DATA RECORD NUMBER: 1427 LESSON 1: LOR-SIM-JP-019-AOS STYLE: Short Essay/Other REVISION: 3 ENTERED BY:

MODIFIED BY:

DATE LAST US.ED:

(approved by:-*

ASSOCIATED TASKS:

TYPE: General Use LESSON 1 OBJECTIVES: 01 POINT VALUE: 1.00 TIME TO COMPLETE:

4 Minutes DATE ENTERED:

10/10/94 DATE MODIFIED:

04/27/98 No Tasks are currently referenced to this question.

ASSOCIATED K/A's:

206000 Al._01

• ROI: 4.3 SROI: 4.4 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated

. with operating HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM REACTOR WATER LEVEL:

BWR-2,3,4 controls

REFERENCES:

2 APP A-01 3-1 /R21

================================================================-

II. QUESTION:

HPCI started on high drywell pressure, but tripped on high RPV level.

Explain how HPCI responds as level lowers from.the high level trip to Lo Level 3.

Additionally, if you wanted to restart HPCI at 120 11, what actions would be required to perform that action?

III. ANSWER:

As level lowers~ HPCI will not restart until level reaches LL-2 (105).

HPCI will then reset its trips and start and inject.with no operator action.

HPCI will continue to run as level lowers to LL-3.

To restart HPCI prior to reaching LL-2, depress the high water level..

trip reset pushbutton, the drywell signal will then restart HPCI and' cause it to inject.

PAGE 1 OF 1

"NRC JPM 98, Rev 011 EXAMINATION QUESTION 3 POINT VALUE: 1.00 Using the attached diagram, explain how it is possible to reset a scram with the mode switch in SHUTDOWN.

PAGE 3

~

V) a..

0:::

u

<t: >

0

(\\J -

SHORTING LINK

)

K13A Al IK13C A2 r------,

NEUTRON

MONITORING :

L~-~l~SJ J_K138 IK.130 81 82 r------,

I OPEN IN I

SHUTDOWN 1 I

POSmON I

'-r-----....J

...J K16A K17A TDC 2 SEC F'USH TO 1

SCRAM t,(Af,lUAl SCRJW S-11 I

I i

r:I ~~~~gJ I

I I

--,~~

I ¥ :

I 16A "---

s1 L_r I~

I bsi5C 1

~

1

~ ~

K17A

~~---* ___ ' ___ i _________..

1 __

~-1 _6A _________

_,'] ~~~c.

• K19A:::::::

K15A -K15C K19C i

RESET I I I T

RES~

J l

~

l REACTOR MANUAL SCRAM SHVTDOWN SCRAM RESET INTERLOCK TRIP CHANNEL * ~

TRIP SYSTEM "A" Figure 03 Shutdown Scram Reset Interlock

....... e;,

?age 9C : ~

~ C* ~

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Provide this page to the Candidate Health Physics has performed a survey of the Unit 2 Charging Pump rooms and hallway. Given a survey map, determine how each room and hallway should be posted.

Page 6 of7

~

r DATE HPS-.207 CHARGING PUMPS ELEVATION..Q.S FT.

T~E--------

1.AONITOA --------

/

SMEAI\\S l~ooc,,,,2 I 1

.c.. j K 2 ___

.c...... 1 ~le...__ __ _

l --,(,-* ~I IS'-'-----

":>_t_K..__ __ _

s---'->_J'--',-'~----

< 1 K e--

1 9--------

0--------

10 --------

11 12 ---------

13 ------~-

14

• 15 --------

1e --------

11 ----------

18 --------

IQ ----~----

20 --------

R~ --------*

DATE OOC1 DOCH HPS ;;>07 S20f>S SYS

. W COMP ITM I CAL DUE I 81(Q Clplll I l ~

,I CD

~

JPM SCHEDULING PAUL STEINER

JPM SCHEDULING CONSIDERATIONS Amount of material to be generated:

Licensee Cost.

Licensee Manpqwer.

Examiner Review Time.

Validation Time on Simulator During Prep-Week.

The current trend is a shift towards a single JPM set, administered piece by piece, with all applicants receiving the same. piece each day.

Considerations with this technique:

Availability of both Simulator and Booth Operators for two shifts.

Sequestering.

Candidate Stress.

Examiner Stress.

(No laughing:pleasel)

~

Current Problems

.lPMc: ;:iro l;:ic+-ir1n 1n m-in,1+.oC" +n 1 h,...... ""'

,._._, v, 11::, vv 111 I I llAl,L.~

l,U

..L I IUUI

• Longer is not better.

Take the time it takes a staff instructor to perform the task, with questions, and* double it.

The last three examinations have run past 10:00 pm and were scheduled to end at 6:00 pm.

Applicants are arr1v1ng at 7:00 am and are not being examjned until 7:00 pm.

No margin for error or simulator failure.

ADMINISTRATIVE TOPICS.

JPMs vs QUESTIONS Paul Steiner

ES-301 Specific Instructions for Category A Although Admin topics may be examined separately, it is preferable, whenever po~sible, to link? associate, or integrate th~m with.tasks and events* conducted during Categories Band C Using a single Admin JPM is generally preferred,.however, two prescripted questions may be used.

If the* applicant has a "U." in only one Admin topic, the examiner may fail the applicant in Category A depending on the importance of the identified deficiency.

- Topics in the administrative portion of the NRC initial examination are weighted the highest of all examination areas, and are thus the most likely to result in a failing grade.

- A single knowledge weakness/ or applicant error can result in an initial examination failure.

Common Single Failure Points:

Clearance Error.

Reactivity Balance Error.

The key is a balance between questions and JPM's.

All JPMs will *result in a long Admin exam, with a high potential to fail a candidate for a single error.

All questions usually results 1n a weak Admin exam.

Examples of Good Admin JPMs Shutdown Margin Calculation.

Approval of a Clearance Order.

c r n r -. 1,...,. 1.... -l,... -= - *-

L VI L, a I L. u I d l., l u r I

• Manual Leak Rate Calculation.

Risk Matrix Utilization.

Off-Site Dose Projection.

Review a Survey Map and Demonstrate Knowledge of Radiological Hazards in a Work Zone.

Evaluate the Applicants Scenarios for Emergency Plan Application and Make Protective Action Recommendations.

The key to success with these types of tasks is solid and thorough validation.

- If.the task is not clear, and well defined, the applicants 01i l l become confused.

If the task -is too long, it will beg1n to loose its evaluating ability.

Examples of Poor Admin JPMs Check out a key from the key locker.

Make a log entry.

Frisk out an item.

Do you want an appl.icant to fail for touching the surface?

Make a call-in for emergent work while reading from a procedure.

Perform a pre-job brief.

These are items of Low Discriminatory Validity, and if performed poorly can result in severe grading.

Other Difficulties With Admin SRO applicants should be evaluated at greater depth on Admin topics.

_ There must be a difference between the

_.* RO and S-RO Admi n examinations.

Contra l Room Software not available on the simulator or applicants don't have the*

proper password.

The question does not solicit the answer.

Put validators in the mind set of applicant.

Assigning point values to multiple answer questions.

The l~mit is 80%.

• 1f there are four answers, the applicant must get a77 four correct.

Don't require applicants to catch integrity issues, or misspelled words when approv1ng clearances or valve line-ups.

Direct look -ups a re pro hi bi ted !

r

• EXAMINATION SECURITY -~- :.~:~.

r.. 11n t\\l~U.

~.,.

EXAMINATION PREDICTABILITY C. PAYNE

EXAMINATI SECURITY PER 10 CFR 55. 49 -

"APPLICANTS, LI_CENSEES, AND FACILITY LICENSEES SHALL NOT ENGAGE IN ANY ACTIVITY THAT COMPROMISE.$

THE INTEGRITY OF ANY APPLICATION,** -TEST, OR EXAMINATION BY THIS PART"

,i RULE IMPLEMENTED IN NUREG-1021 ES-201 - C.1 & C.2 & C.3 (RESPONSIBILITIES)

ES-201 - 0.2 (PERSONNEL RESTRICTIONS)

ES-201 - ATTACHMENT 1 (PHYSICAL SECURITY & EXAM BANK LIMITATIONS)

ES-201 - FORM ES-201-3 (SECURITY AGREEMENT)

ES-205 - GFES EXAM ADMINISTRATION ES-402 - C.1 (RESPONSIBILITIES)

ES-402 - E.3 (POST-EXAM REVIEWS)

ES-501 - POST-EXAM DOCUMENTATION APPENDIX D, SECTION F (SIMULATOR SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS)

~ I

EXAMPLES INSTRUCTOR SIGNED SECURITY AGREEMENT AND DISCUSSED EXAM CONTENT WITH EXAMINEES REVEALING OF WHAT IS NOT ON THE EXAM (APPLICANTS SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PREDICT OR NARROW THE POSSIBLE SCOPE OR CONTENT OF EXAM BASED ON YOUR TEST DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES)

BIAS OF SCOPE, CONTENT, OR LEVEL OF DIFFICULTY OF AN EXAM TO ENHANCE CHANCES OF CANDIDATES PASSING TEST LOSS OF CONTROL OF EXAM MATERIAL (NOT LOCKED UP WHEN LEAVE OFFICE, PARTS OF EXAM LEFT IN COPIER, PARTS OF EXAM LEFT IN.SIMULATOR BOOTH AFTER VALIDATION)

~

INSTRUCTOR ON SECURITY AGREEMENT INTERACTS WITH SRO(U) CANDIDATE DURING REQUAL (TAUGHT CLASS, EVALUATED SIM. SCENARIOS, SAT*ON AUDIT BOARD)

WRITE EXAM ro SAME FORMAT EVERY TIME so IT BECOMES PREDICTABLE CHANGING K/A NUMBERS ON OLD QUESTIONS IN ORDER TO FIT NEW SAMPLE PLAN PERSONNEL NOT ON SECURITY AGREEMENT IGNORE WARNING SIGNS AND WALK IN ON EXAM DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES DRAF.T EXAM MATERIAL NOT PROPERLY PACKAGED WHEN SENT TO NRC AND WAS DELIVERED OPEN

CONSEQUENCES NUREG-1600, "GENERAL STATEMENT OF POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR NRC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS" APPLIES IF HAVE INDICATION OF COMPROMISE, ACTION WILL BE TAKEN TO ENSURE AND RESTORE THE INTEGRITY AND SECURITY OF PROCESS.

INCLUDES:

NOT GIVING EXAM I'

I\\ *,:

1.:1

• . 1 't

'i

• . l!

1.

MAKING ADDITIONAL CHANGES TO EXAM VOIDING EXAM RESULTS IF EXAM ALREADY. GIVEN *.,i

i REEVALUATING LICENSING DECISIONS PER 55.6l(b)

.*i::.:.,*

1 I'

POSSIBLY IMPOSING ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS INCLUDING:*

CIVIL PENALTIES ORDERS IMPLEMENTATION OF DELIBERATE MISCONDUCT RULE (l0 1CFR 50.5)'

i i

,I,I

EXAM PREO. [TABILITY

~

APPLICANTS SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PREDICT OR NARROW THE POSSIBLE SCOPE DR CONTENT OF EXAM BASED ON YOUR TEST DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES EXAM DEVELOPMENT TECHNIQUES DR RULES SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH THE CANDIDATES (e.g., 25%. OF WRITIEN WILL BE OFF THE MOST RECENT. EXAM)

/

EXAM METHODOLGY SHOULD BE VARIED FROM EXAM TO EXAM (e.g., SECTION A.4 SHOULD NOT ALWAYS BE "CLASSIFY THE SCENARIO" FOR SRO' s.)

• EXAM DEVELOPMENT CRITERIA LIMITATIONS SHOULD NOT ALWAYS 13E THE BASIS OF THE EXAM CONTENT (e.g., NO OVERLAP WITH THE AUDIT TEST SHOULD NOT BE A RULE STRICTLY FOLLOWED WITH NO EXCEPTION) IF DONE CANDIDATES CAN EXCLUDE EVERY THING FROM THEIR AUDIT AS NOT BEING ON THEIR TEST WHICH NA~RDWS THE SCOPE.

ALLOW AUDIT AND LICENSE EXAMS TO DEVELOP INDEPENDENTLY AND IDENTIFY TO THE CHIEF EXAMINER THOSE AREAS THAT OVERLAP WITH A PROPOSED RESOLUTION, IF NEEDED.

AREAS TO WATCH:

NO OVERLAP FROM AUDIT EXAM 25% FROM THE LAST TWO NRC EXAMS 50% FUNDAMENTAL KNOWLEDGE

, :-- \\<

..

• i'.

NO TEST ITEM REPEATS FROM DAY TO DAY WRITIEN EXAM ANSWERS FAVOR a,b,c, OR d ALL JPMs DONE ONLY ON A SPECIFIC UNIT

SIMULATOR SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT C.

PAYNE G.

HOPPER

CRITICAL TASKS What constitutes a critical task?

The requalification examination uses criti*cal tasks (CTs) for**evaluati.ng crew performance on ta~ks that have

. safety significance to the plant or the public.

The CTs are objective measures for determining whether an individual's or a crew's performance*

is satisfactory or unsatisfactory.

Although CTs are not directly used to evaluate operator performance on the initial licensing examinations, the concept of focusing on those tasks*

that have a significant impact on the

• safety of the plant or the public*

remains valid and should be taken into consideration when evaluating the competence of initial licehse applicants.

The Importance Of Safet~

Significance and Measura~le Criteria

• In re-viewing each proposed CT, assess the task to ensure that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if the improper performance or omission of this task by an operator will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant.

If an automatically.actuated plant system would have* been requ-ired to mitigate the consequences of an t*ndi.vi dual 's incorrect performance or the performance necessitates the cr~w taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant.

j' Examples of CTs involving e~sential safety actions include those for whicti operation or correct performance prevents--

• degradati.on of any barrier to fi.~sion µroduct release.

• degraded emergency co~e cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity.

• a violation of a safety limit.

• a violation of the facility license condition.

• incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate emergency boration or standby liquid control, or manually insert.

control rods).

a* significant reduction of safety margin beyond that i*rreparably introduced by the scenario.

~-

Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions -include those for

• which a crew demonstrates the ability to:

~ effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety fea~ure CESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.

• recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.

• take one or more actions that*

wou.ld prevent a challenge to plant*

safety.

• prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation).

I

-~~----

~ j 1

j I

I i I i l ! i

.- I I

Aopendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-0-1 Facility:

Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: 1 ObJeciives: To evaluate the students ability to implement ONOPs for loss of a vital 48 V load center, an off-normal Pressurizer pressure and Letdown condition, and failure of a Steam Generator level transmitter; to perform a normal power reductir~m; and tg execute EOPs for a Steam Generator Tube Rupture cqm.bined with an.Excess Steam Demand (EOP-15)

Initial Conditions: Unit 2 is at 100% power, MOL Turnover: Unit 2 is at 100% power MOL the 2B Charging pum~ is out of service for packing replacement, expected back in four hours. The 2A eater Drain Pump has a unisolable oil leak requiring the pumrf to be taken out of service. Shift instr~ctions is to reduce pr;>wer to 92% an remove the 2A Heater Drain Pump from service.

Additional failures: 2A Containment Spray Pump fails to start on CSAS Event Malf.

Event Event No.

No.

Tvoe~

Description 1

N-BOP Power reduction from 1 00% to 92%

R-RO 2

I-RO PIC-11 OOX (PZR oressure transmitter) drift..,L~

C-BOP/ 2AB Load Center deenerqizes

. r:_ >,

3 n~-- ~..,..i,:,"')

t'1

• IJ V

'(}

4 C-RO 2~ CCW Pump trips 5

l-BOP.

FIC-9011, 2A Steam Generator flow transmitter fails low.

6 M-2A Steam Generator tube rupture (250 GPM), 2A BOP main steam line break inside containment on reactor M-RO trip..

/"

~

l":°i".-r' ~£)~ /'_,, _ _.c, P'.:P.:-~ ~ ~

r I

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Facility:""

Scenario No.: 1a Op-Test No.: 1 Objectives: To evaluate the students ability to implement. ONOPs for loss of a vital 480V load center, an off-normal Pressurizer pressure and Letdown condition, and failure of a Steam Generator steam flow transmitter; to ~rform a normal power reduction; and to execute EOPs for a Steam Generator Tube upture combined with a Main Feedwater line break inside containment (EOP-15).

Initial Conditions: Unit 2 is at 100% power, MOL Turnover: Unit 2 is ai 1UD% power MOL The 2A Chargin~ pump is out of service for a lube oil PM, expected back in three hours. The 2B Mam eedwater Pump has a unisolable discha~e flange_leak requiring the pump to be taken out of service. 2A Main*

Steam Line Radiation Monitor is out of service, not expected back this shift. 2-HVS-1A containment cooler is out of service. Chemistry reports a 15 GPD tube leak on the 2B S/G. Management.has decided to continue jower operations due to the system load.

Shift instructions are to reduce power to 45° o. and remove the 2B Main Feed water Pump from service. Thunderstorms have been reported to be approaching the St. Lucie County area Additional failures: A train CSAS fails to actuate and FCV071 A fails to fuli open 2B Containment Spray pump develops a sheared sha on start.

2A Main Feedwater pump fails to trip on low suctio~ressure 2A Main Feedwater isolation valves fail to close on SIS Event Malf.

Event Event No.

No.

Type" Description 1

N-BOP Power reduction from 100% to 45%

R-RO 2

~-RO PIG-1100X {PZR pressure setpoint) drifts high 3

C-Ro*

2AB Lead Center deenergiies, 2B Charging pump trip,sfl~

4 N-BOP

• Realignment of charging and letdown 5

C-BOP 2B CCW Pump trips-

--e IBGP

~R E!G~ ~, ~,o, ~tG s1eam ;le'1,' 1;::aRsm~eF fails Ai§R 7

M-BOP 2A St~arn Generator tube rupture (250 GPM), 2A main M-RO feed fine break inside containment on reactor trip C

A train CSAS fails. to actuate C

2A Main Feed Isolation valves fail to close on MSIS (MFIV failure, continues to feed containment)

I C

FCV 071 A fails to fully open (N)ormal, (R)eaciivrry, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

ES-301 Simulator Scenario Quality Assurance Checklist Fonn ES-301-4 Facility:

Date of Exam:

Scenario Numbers:

I I

Operating Test No.:

QUAUTAllYE ATTRIBUlES Initials II b

C

1.

The scenarios have cl.. rty stated objectill9S in the scenario summaries.

z.

The initial conditions ere realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the operators into expected events.

3.

The scenarios consist mostly of related events.

4.

Each event descrq,tion consists of the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated the matfunction(s) that ere entered to initiate the event the symptoms/cues that Wl11 be ~ble to the crew the ex;,ected operetor actions (by shift position) tne event tennination point (if ap~icable)

5.

No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incor;,oreted into the scenario without II credible preceding incident such as II seismic event.

6.

The events are wlid with regard to ph'fSics end thermodynamics.

7.

Sequencing and timing of events is -,easonable, and allows the examination team to obtain COmJMete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.

8.

If time COffl?ression techniques are used, the scenario summary cleiirly so indicates.

Operators haw, sufficient time to carry out ex;,ected activities without undue time constraints. Cues are giwn.

9.

The simulator modeling is not altered.

10.

The scenarios haw, been Ylllideted.

11.

Every operator will be evaluated usi~ et least one new scenario. All other scenarios ha Ye been modified in accordance with Section D.4 of ES-301 *

12.

. All individual operator com;,etencies can be eltaluated, as Yerified using Form ES-301-6 (submit the form along with the simulator scenarios).

13.

Each applicant ww11 be significantly inYOI~ in the minimum number af tran54ents end eYents specified on form ES-301-5 (submit the form along with the simulator scenarios).

}4.

The level of difficufty is appropriate.to su;,poTt licensing dacisions for each crew position.

TARGET QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES (Pel SC9/ARIO)

Actual Attributes

1.

Total malfunctions (S-8)

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2.

Malfunctions after £:Of' entry (1-2)

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3.

Abnannel e,,,oents (2-4)

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4.

Major transients (1-2)

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5.

EOf's entered/requiring substanti1t11 actions (1-2)

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6.

fOf' contingencies niquiring substenti1te actions (0-2)

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7.

Critics! tasks (2-3)

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NUREG-1021.

24 of 26 lntErim Rev. B, January 1997

ES-301 Applicant Type

• • RO As RO SRO-I As SRO SRO-U Instructions:

Author:

Chief Examiner:

NUREG-1021 (1)

(2)

Transient and Event Checklist Fonn ES-301-5 OPERATING TEST NO.:

Evolution Minimum Scenario Number Type Number 1

2

• 3 4

Reactivitv 1

Normal 1

Instrument 2

Comoonent 2

Ha.ior 1

Reactivitv 1

Normal 0

Instrument 1

Comoonent 1

Maier 1

Reactivitv 0

Nonnal 1

Instrument 1

Comoonent 1

Maior 1

Reactivity 0

Nonnal 1

Instrument 1

Comnonent 1

Ma.ior

• 1 Enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each evolution type.

Reactivity manipulations must be significant as defined in Appendix D.

25 of 2£ Interim Rev. 8, January 1997

ES-301.

Competencies Checklist form ES-301-6 Applicant #1

. Applicant #2

. Applicant #3 RO/SRO-I/SRO-U RO/SRO-I/SRO-U RO/SRO-I/SRO-U C~peten<<:=i E:~.

SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1

2 3

4 1

2 3

4 1

2 3

4 Understand and Interpret Annunciators and Alarms Diagnose Events and Conditions Understand Plant and System Response Comply With and Use Procedures (1)

Operate Control Boards (2)

Co11111unicate and Interact With the Crew Demonstrate Supervisory Ability (3)

Comply With and Use Tech. Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1)

Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) *0n1y applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Circle the applicant's license type and enter the event numbers that test the competency for each scenario in the set.

Author:

Chi-ef Examiner:

NUREG-1021

• 26 of 26 Interim Rev. 8, January -1997