L-78-121, License No. DPR-67 Application for Amendment: Appendix a Technical Specification Proposed Change Concerning Supporting Operation of the Containment Spray Additive System Scheduled to Be Installed at Facility

License No. DPR-67 Application for Amendment: Appendix a Technical Specification Proposed Change Concerning Supporting Operation of the Containment Spray Additive System Scheduled to Be Installed at Facility

ML18088B273
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	04/05/1978
From:	Robert E. Uhrig Florida Power & Light Co
To:	Stello V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
L-78-121
Download: ML18088B273 (13)

Text

REGULATORY INFORMATION DI "TRIBUTION SY TEM (RIDS)

DISTRIBUTION FOR INCOMING MATERIAL ~0--35 REC: STELLO V ORG: UHRIG R E DOCDATE: 04/05/78 NRC FL PWR '< LIGiHT DATE RCVD: 04f 0l' 78 DOCTYPE: LETTER NOTARIZED: YES COPIES RECEIVED

SUBJECT:

LTR 3 ENCL 40 LICENSE NO DPR-67 APPL FOR AMEND: APPENDIX A TECH SPECS PROPOSED CHANGE CONCERNING SUPPORTING OPERATION OF THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM SCH>>DULED TO BE I¹TALLED AT SUBJECT FAC1LITY DURING THE UPCOMINGi REFUELING OUTAGE {SPRING }978>... NOTARIZED PLANT NAME: ST LUCIE 51

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REVIEWER INITIAL: X JM DISTR I PUTOR INITIAL:

DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MATERIAL IS AS FOLLOWS GENERAL DISTRIBUTION FOR AFTER ISSUANCE OF OPERATING LICENSE.

( D I STR I BUT ION CODE A001 )

FOR ACTION: BR CHIEF REID<+W/7 ENCL INTERNAL: REG F ILE+4 WfENCL NRC PDR++Wf I 5 E++W/2 ENCL E NLY HANAUER++l VENCL CHECK< +WfENCL E I SENHUT++W/ENCL SHAO+4W/ENCL BAER~~W/ENCL BUTLER++W/ENCL GR IMES++W/ENCL J COLLINS4+W/ENCL J. MCGOUGH++W/ENCL EXTERNAL: LPDRiS FT PIERCEi FL++W/ENCL T I C++WfENCL NS I C++W/ENCL ACR - CAT B++Wf 1 C ENCL DISTRIBUTION: LTR 40 ENCL . 9 CONTROL NER: 780'>~700 -'7 S1ZE: - P+6P 6+ w+444 w+00'.+ %4%+%%%%%4%44 4+4%+w%%4% THE END 4 %04 W%% 4 4% 4%4%%% 0% %00% ++ +WOW%

t P. O. BOX 013100, MIAMI, FL 33101 gyM l/g FLORIDA POWER 84 LIGHT COMPANY April 5, 1978 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. Victor Stello, Director g.gag t)IKK6@

Division of Operating Reactor U. S. Nucleax Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Stello:

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Re: St. Lucie Unit .u~:, ~g Docket No. 50-335 1

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Proposed Amendment to Facilit Operatin License DPR-67 Cy I

p~~'i 4 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.30, Florida Power and Light Company submits herewith three (3) signed originals and forty (40) conformed copies of a request to amend Appendix A of Facility Operating License DPR-67.

The proposed amendment supports operation of the containment spray additive system scheduled to be installed at St. Lucie Unit 1 duxing the upcoming refueling outage (Spring 1978).

The system will be installed to comply with Condition of 'Operating License DPR-67. The proposed amendment is des-I.l cribed below and shown on the accompanying Technical Speci-fication pages bearing the date of this letter in the lower right

~/

hand corner.

Surveillance Requirements 4.5.2.d.3 and 4.5.2.d.4 are deleted. The requirements apply to the trisodium phosphate dodecahy-drate (TSP) storage baskets. The function of the TSP (containment sump ph control) will be taken over by the NaOH spray add-itive system.

Pa e 3/4 6-16a New Specifications 3.6.2.2 and 4.6.2.2 apply to the planned NaOH containment spray add-itive system.

~1qy037 PEOPLE... SERVING PEOPLE

Mr'. Victor S tello Page Two Re: St. Lucie Unit 1 Facilit 0 eratin License DPR-67 Pa e 3/4 6-17 The Specification number for the containment fan cooler Limiting Condition for Operation is changed from 3.6.2.2 to 3.6.2.3.

Pa e B 3/4 5-1 The discussion of TSP is deleted from the Bases for ECCS Subsystems.

Pa e B 3/4 6-3 Bases Section 3/4.6.2.2 is renumbered 3/4.6.2.3.

A discussion of the Spray Additive System is added as Section 3/4.6.2.2.

Condition of License I.l requires that the NaOH spray additive system be installed either prior to startup following the first regularly scheduled refueling outage or by Yiarch 1, 1979, which-ever occurs first. FPL fully intends to install the system during the present refueling outage. At the moment, however, we are experiencing difficulties in the procurement of materials, and completion before .startup could be impacted. Should this occur, in order to not delay startup, we would propose to leave the TSP baskets and their pertinent technical specifications in place and to request that completion of the NaOH spray additive system be deferred until the 1979 refueling outage (expected to begin in April 1979). Ne shall keep you advised of the status of procurement and installation and will be prepared to discuss with you the bases for an extension of this Condition of License should that appear to be necessary.

Since the proposed technical specification is being submitted in conjunction with the installation of the NaOH spray additive system as required by the Commission in its Safety Evaluation Report for St. Lucie 1 and Condition of License I.l, FPL believes that. this amendment falls in the category described by Footnote 2 of 10 CFR 170.22 and is therefore exempt from the facility license amendment fee schedule.

Mr .'ictor tello S

Page Three Re: St. Lucie Unit Facilit 0 l

eratin License DPR-67 The proposed amendment has been reviewed by the St. Lucie Facility Review Group and the Florida Power 6 Light Company Nuclear Review Board. They have concluded that involve an unreviewed safety question.

it does not Very truly yours, Robert E. Uhrig.

Vice President REU:MAS:sl, Attachment cc: Mr. Peter B. Erickson Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Region Harold F. Reis, Esquire II

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS Continued

5. Verifying that each valve (manual,'ower operated or automa-tic) in. the flow path that is not locked', sealed, or other-wise secured in position, is in its correct position.

6. Verifying that each ECCS subsystem is'aligned to receive electrical power from separate OPERABLE emergency.. busses.

c ~ By a visual inspection which verifies that ho loose debris

'rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of the pump suctions during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall be performed:

1. For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and

2. Of the areas affected withir. containment ai the completion of containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.

d., At least once per 18 months by:

1.. Verifying automatic isolation of the shutdown cooling system from the Reactor Coolant System when the Reactor Coolant, System pressure is above 300 psig.

'. A visual'nspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 3/4 5-5 1

5/5/78

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.2 The spray additive system shall be OPERABLE with:

a. A spray additive tank containing a,volume of greater than 4010 gallons of between -30 and 32 g by weight. NaOH solution, and

b. Two spray additive eductors each capable of adding NaOH solution from the chemical additive tank to a containment spray system pump flow.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3".

ACTION:

llith the spray additive system inoperable, restore the system to OPERABL'E status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore the spray additive system to OPERABI E status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURYEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS, 4.6.2.2 The spray additive system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

b. At least once per 6 months by:

1. 'erifying the contained solution volume in the tank, and

2. -

Verifying the concentration of the NaOH solution by .,

chemical analysis.-

c~ At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position .on a cps test signal.

"Applicable when pressurizer pressure 1750 psia.

ST. WCIE UNIT 1 3/4 6-16a 5/5/78

CONTA I Ni IENT S YSTEI IS CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEil LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2. 3 Four containment fan coolers shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: NODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a~ V!th one containment fan cooler inoperable and both containment spray systems OPERABLE, restore th inoperable fan cooler to, OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in HOT SHUTDOt;IN within.

the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

b. Mith one containment fan cooler inoperable'nd one containment spray system inoperable, restore eith r the inoperable fan cooler or the inoperable spray system to OPEPABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT SHUTDO>!N within th next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

I IURUEILLRECE REtRUIRII ERTI 4.6.2.3 Each containment fan cooler shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST 8ASIS by:

a. Starting each unit from the control room,

b. Verifying that each unit operates for at least 15 minutes, and c Verifying a cooling water flow rate of > 1200 gpm to each cooling unit.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 1 3/4 6-17 5/5/78

3/4.5 'EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS BASES 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS The OPERABILITY of each of. the RCS safety injection tanks ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be i@mediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold le'gs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the safety injection tanks. This initial surge of water ihto the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The limits on safety injection tank volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for safety injection tank injection in the accident analysis are met.

The limit of one hou} for operation with an inoperable .safety injection tank minimizes the time exposure of'the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional safety injection may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures'.

tank'hich 3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEhS The OPERABILITY of two separate and independent CCS'subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cool'ing capability will be avail--

able in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of 'one subsystem through any single failure consideration. Either subsystem operating in conjunc-.

tion with the safety injection tanks is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all .postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

ST. LUG I E - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-1 5/5/78

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.2.2 SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM The OPERABII ITY of the spray additive system ensures that sufficient l'laOH is added to the containment spray in the event of a LOCA. The limits on flaOH volume and concentration ensure a pH value of between

{8.5) and (11.0) for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems.

and components. The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics. These assumptions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the accident analyses.

CONTAINl"IENT COOLING SYSTEM '/4.6.2.

The OPERABILITY of the containment cooling system ensures that 1) the containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, and 2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the containment spray systems during post-LOCA conditions.

3/4;6:3'ONTAINtlENT ISOLATIOil VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment -in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmos-phere or pressurization of the containment. Containment isolation within the time limits specified ensures that the rel ase of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.

3/4:6;4 COllBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment wilil be available to maintain th" hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with 1) zirconium-water reactions, 2) radiolytic decomposition of water and 3) corrosion of metals within containment.

The containment fan coolers are used in a secondary function to ensure adequate mixing of the containment atmosphere following a LOCA.

This mixing action will prevent localized accumulations of hydrogen from exceeding the flammable limit.

3/4.6.5 VACUUM RELIEF VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment vessel to annulus vacuum relief valves ensures that they will open at a pressure differential of 2.25 + 0.25 inches Hater Gauge. This condition is necessary to prevent exceeding the-containment design limit for internal pressure differential of 0.70 psi.

ST. LUCIE -. UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-3 5/5/78

l STATE OF FLORXDA )

) ss COUNTY OF DADE )

Robert E. Uhrig, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

That he is a Vice President of Florida Power & Light Company, the Licensee herein; That he has executed the foregoing document; that the state-ments made in this said document are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief, and that he is authorized to execute the document on behalf of said Licensee.

Robert E. Uhrig Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 19~1 NOTARY PUBL1C, in and for the County of Dade, State of Florida NOTARY PUBUC STATE OF FLORIDA st LARGE MY COMMISSION EXPIRES AUGUST 24, Ny commission expires: BONDED T'HRU MAYNARD BONDING AGENCY

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