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- consumers Power POWERINli NllCHlliAN'S PROliRESS General Offices: 1945 West Parnell Road, Jackson, Ml 49201 * (517) 788-0550 February 8, 1990 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR PALISADES PLANT -
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 90-001 - MANUAL REACTOR TRIP FOLLOWING TRIP OF MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP Licensee Event Report (LER)90-001 (Manual Reactor Trip Following Trip of Main Feedwater Pump) is attached.
This event is reportable to the NRC per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).
Brian D Johnson Staff Licensing Engineer CC Administrator, Region III, USNRC NRC Resident Inspector - Palisades Attachment 9002230093 900?og PDR ADOCR b~650~55 S
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1...:11 Abstract On January 9, 1990 at 0514 with power at a steady state of 35 percent, the reactor was manually tripped following the loss of all main feedwater flow.
main feedwater was lost at 0512 when "A" main feedwater pump was secured as part of the normal power reduction procedure for preparation for condenser [SG;COND]* tube leak identification and repair.
The Plant response to the trip was considered normal with no safety significant deviations or anomalies observed.
The root cause of the event has not yet been conclusively determined.
Troubleshooting is ongoing.
A supplemental Licensee Event Report will be submitted pending the results of the investigation.
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Description
On January 9, 1990 at 0514, with power at a steady state of 35 percent, the reactor was manually tripped following the loss of all main feedwater flow.
Main feedwater was lost at 0512 when "A" main feedwater pump rsJ;P] tripped.
At the time of the event, "B" main feedwater pump was secured as part of the normal power reduction procedure for the preparation for condenser [SG;COND] tube leak identification and repair.
The Plant response to the trip was considered normal with no safety significant deviations or anomalies observed.
The "A" auxiliary feedwater pump, [BA;P] was manually started because steam generator level remained above the auxiliary feedwater actuation system auto start setpoint.
Equipment deficiencies observed after the trip included a loss of condenser vacuum after the Plant trip.
This was caused when moisture separator and reheater relief valves failed to properly reseat.
Condenser vacuum was restored by actions which reseated the relief valves.*
Cause Of The Event
The root cause of the main feedwater pump trip has not been conclusively determined.
Troubleshooting prior to restart included a complete hydraulic and electric checkout of the feedwater pump control system.
This checkout found a burned-out solenoid in the feedwater pump control oil dump valve.
It was inconclusive whether this solenoid failure occurred prior to the trip, or as a result of the trip.
The failure of this solenoid would maintain the oil control valve in a closed position which is its normal operating.condition.
Therefore, the failure of the solenoid was not the root cause of the trip.
Electrical schematics were reviewed to determine all potential feedwater pump trip paths.
Two trip paths, low suction pressure and thrust bearing failure, were possible. It was determined from the datalogger that the pump did not trip from low suction pressure.
In addition, the thrust bearing trip device has a seal-in feature and it was determined that this feature was not seal-in.
To provide information for further troubleshooting; a pair of strip recorders have been installed on the "A" main feed pump to monitor the governor oil pressure and the lube oil pressure.
We will continue to monitor these par_ameters and a supplemental report will be submitted pending the results of this investigation.
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Analysis Of The Event
Plant response to the reactor trip was as expected with no safety significant deviations or abnormalities observed.
Both trains of safety equipment were available throughout the transient to perform their safety functions.
Corrective Actions Taken The trip of "A" main feedwater pump is still being investigated.
In the interim we will continue to monitor governor oil pressure and lube oil pressure; Frequent walkdowns of the system are taking place.
Regarding the moisture separator and reheater relief valves, we are in the process of evaluating their possible future replacement.
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| 05000255/LER-1990-001, :on 900109,reactor Manually Tripped Following Loss of All Main Feedwater Flow When Main Feedwater Pump a Tripped.Possibly Caused by burned-out Solenoid in Dump Valve.Governor Oil Pressure Will Be Monitored |
- on 900109,reactor Manually Tripped Following Loss of All Main Feedwater Flow When Main Feedwater Pump a Tripped.Possibly Caused by burned-out Solenoid in Dump Valve.Governor Oil Pressure Will Be Monitored
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000255/LER-1990-001-02, :on 900109,reactor Manually Tripped Following Loss of Main Feedwater Flow.Cause Not Conclusively Determined.Moisture Separator & Reheater Relief Valves Replaced.W/Undated Ltr |
- on 900109,reactor Manually Tripped Following Loss of Main Feedwater Flow.Cause Not Conclusively Determined.Moisture Separator & Reheater Relief Valves Replaced.W/Undated Ltr
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000255/LER-1990-002, :on 900228,unit Experienced Unanticipated Trip of Main Feedwater Pump B.Cause of Trip Undetermined. Investigation of Trip Remains in Progress.Temporary Monitors Installed & Operators Received Addl Training |
- on 900228,unit Experienced Unanticipated Trip of Main Feedwater Pump B.Cause of Trip Undetermined. Investigation of Trip Remains in Progress.Temporary Monitors Installed & Operators Received Addl Training
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000255/LER-1990-003, :on 900322,inadvertent,automatic Initiation of Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Sys Received & Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P-8A Started.Caused by Technician Error & Procedure Weaknesses.Procedure Revised |
- on 900322,inadvertent,automatic Initiation of Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Sys Received & Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P-8A Started.Caused by Technician Error & Procedure Weaknesses.Procedure Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000255/LER-1990-004, :on 900331,failed Heater Cable Resulted in Inoperability of Concentrated Boric Acid Heat Trace Channel. Cable Failure Caused by Clamp Used to Secure Thermal Insulation.Work Order Revised & Cable Repaired |
- on 900331,failed Heater Cable Resulted in Inoperability of Concentrated Boric Acid Heat Trace Channel. Cable Failure Caused by Clamp Used to Secure Thermal Insulation.Work Order Revised & Cable Repaired
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000255/LER-1990-005, :on 900306,inoperability of Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Occurred Due to Isolation of Bottles on Backup Nitrogen Stations.Caused by Personnel Error.Pressure Gauge Will Be Placed in Nitrogen Bottle Storage Area |
- on 900306,inoperability of Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Occurred Due to Isolation of Bottles on Backup Nitrogen Stations.Caused by Personnel Error.Pressure Gauge Will Be Placed in Nitrogen Bottle Storage Area
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000255/LER-1990-006, :on 900307,portions of Primary Coolant Sys Loop Cold Leg Drain Found to Be Overstressed & in Excess of Pipe Stress Design in Fsar.Caused by Inadequate Design.Mods Made to Cold Leg Drain Piping |
- on 900307,portions of Primary Coolant Sys Loop Cold Leg Drain Found to Be Overstressed & in Excess of Pipe Stress Design in Fsar.Caused by Inadequate Design.Mods Made to Cold Leg Drain Piping
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000255/LER-1990-007, :on 900418,reanalysis of Main Steam Line Break Identified That Containment Pressure Could Exceed FSAR Values.Caused by Inadequate Design & Personnel Error.Mod Installed to Close Feedwater Valves |
- on 900418,reanalysis of Main Steam Line Break Identified That Containment Pressure Could Exceed FSAR Values.Caused by Inadequate Design & Personnel Error.Mod Installed to Close Feedwater Valves
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000255/LER-1990-008, :on 900425,during Local Leak Rate Test, Penetration Leak Rate Exceeded Cumulative Leak Rate & Nitrogen Supply Check Valve Found Leaking.Caused by Machining Marks on Valve.Valve Reworked |
- on 900425,during Local Leak Rate Test, Penetration Leak Rate Exceeded Cumulative Leak Rate & Nitrogen Supply Check Valve Found Leaking.Caused by Machining Marks on Valve.Valve Reworked
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000255/LER-1990-009, :on 900516,atmospheric Steam Dump Valves Unexpectedly Opened Resulting in Automatic Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal Initiations.Caused by Electrical Noise.Temporary Mod Installed to Stop Noise |
- on 900516,atmospheric Steam Dump Valves Unexpectedly Opened Resulting in Automatic Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal Initiations.Caused by Electrical Noise.Temporary Mod Installed to Stop Noise
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000255/LER-1990-010, :on 900520,Tech Spec Required Sampling of Primary Coolant for Iodine Activity Delayed Due to Personnel Error.Caused by Inadequate Communication.Procedure GOP-5 Revised |
- on 900520,Tech Spec Required Sampling of Primary Coolant for Iodine Activity Delayed Due to Personnel Error.Caused by Inadequate Communication.Procedure GOP-5 Revised
| | | 05000255/LER-1990-011, :on 900615,unexpected Reactor Protection Sys Actuation Occurred During Turbine Trip Breaker Testing. Caused by Incorrect Test Procedures.Operations Checklist 36 Revised |
- on 900615,unexpected Reactor Protection Sys Actuation Occurred During Turbine Trip Breaker Testing. Caused by Incorrect Test Procedures.Operations Checklist 36 Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000255/LER-1990-012, :on 900705,svc Water to Control Room HVAC Found to Be Inadequate to Support Control Room HVAC Design Temp Due to Incorrect Heat Load Assumption.Caused by Personnel Error.Svc Water Flow Rates Rebalanced |
- on 900705,svc Water to Control Room HVAC Found to Be Inadequate to Support Control Room HVAC Design Temp Due to Incorrect Heat Load Assumption.Caused by Personnel Error.Svc Water Flow Rates Rebalanced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000255/LER-1990-013, :on 900818,determined That Overtime Limit Exceeded Due to Scheduling Oversight.Shift Engineer Worked 28 H in 48 H Period.Caused by Personnel Error.Occurrence Incorporated Into Operations Training Programs |
- on 900818,determined That Overtime Limit Exceeded Due to Scheduling Oversight.Shift Engineer Worked 28 H in 48 H Period.Caused by Personnel Error.Occurrence Incorporated Into Operations Training Programs
| | | 05000255/LER-1990-014, :on 900828,inadvertent Start of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Occurred.Caused by Unintentional Grounding of Manual Start Circuitry During Electrical Wiring Diagram Verification Activities.Channel B Tested |
- on 900828,inadvertent Start of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Occurred.Caused by Unintentional Grounding of Manual Start Circuitry During Electrical Wiring Diagram Verification Activities.Channel B Tested
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000255/LER-1990-015, :on 900706,inservice Test Not Run & Appropriate Pump Performance Values Not Reconfirmed within 7 Day Limiting Condition of Operation Period of Tech Spec 3.4.2. Caused by Personnel Error |
- on 900706,inservice Test Not Run & Appropriate Pump Performance Values Not Reconfirmed within 7 Day Limiting Condition of Operation Period of Tech Spec 3.4.2. Caused by Personnel Error
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000255/LER-1990-016, :on 900911,primary Coolant Sys Vent Valve Sizing Error Discovered Due to Personnel Error |
- on 900911,primary Coolant Sys Vent Valve Sizing Error Discovered Due to Personnel Error
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000255/LER-1990-017, :on 900926,primary Coolant Sys Vent Path Not Verified Every 12 H When Vent Used for Overpressure Protection |
- on 900926,primary Coolant Sys Vent Path Not Verified Every 12 H When Vent Used for Overpressure Protection
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000255/LER-1990-018, :on 900930,flow Rates for Each of Two Primary Coolant Sys Hot Legs Less than Acceptance Criteria of 250 Gpm.Caused by Short Disk Guides & Inefficient Drainage.Hot Leg Check Valves Replaced |
- on 900930,flow Rates for Each of Two Primary Coolant Sys Hot Legs Less than Acceptance Criteria of 250 Gpm.Caused by Short Disk Guides & Inefficient Drainage.Hot Leg Check Valves Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000255/LER-1990-019, :on 901101,inadvertent Right Channel Containment Isolation Occurred |
- on 901101,inadvertent Right Channel Containment Isolation Occurred
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000255/LER-1990-020, :on 901110,when Startup Breaker Racked Into Test Position,Transfer Control Circuitry Initiated,Causing Safeguards Power Breaker to Open.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Procedures Revised |
- on 901110,when Startup Breaker Racked Into Test Position,Transfer Control Circuitry Initiated,Causing Safeguards Power Breaker to Open.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000255/LER-1990-021, :on 901116,discovered That Level Switches Have Potential to Drift as Much as 2 Inches.Inspector Questioned Switch Indication During 900727-0827 Insp.Caused by Lack of Personnel Knowledge.Tech Spec Change Submitted |
- on 901116,discovered That Level Switches Have Potential to Drift as Much as 2 Inches.Inspector Questioned Switch Indication During 900727-0827 Insp.Caused by Lack of Personnel Knowledge.Tech Spec Change Submitted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) |
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