05000255/LER-2020-001, The Palisades Nuclear Plant Re Service Water System Inoperable for Longer than Allowed by Technical Specifications
| ML20269A166 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 09/25/2020 |
| From: | Hardy J Entergy Nuclear Operations |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| PNP 2020-030 LER 2020-001-00 | |
| Download: ML20269A166 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 2552020001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
- ~Entergy PNP 2020-030 September 25, 2020 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Palisades Nuclear Plant 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, Ml 49043 Tel 269 764 2000 Jeffery A. Hardy Regulatory Assurance Manager 10 CFR 50.73
SUBJECT:
LER 2020-001 Service Water System Inoperable for Longer than Allowed by Technical Specifications Palisades Nuclear Plant Docket 50-255 License No. DPR-20
Dear Sir or Madam:
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., hereby submits the enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER), 2020-001-00, for the Palisades Nuclear Plant. The event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as an operation or condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.
This letter contains no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments.
Should you have any questions concerning this report, please contact Mr. Jeff Hardy, Regulatory Assurance Manager, at (269) 764-2011.
Sincerely, tJ[J, JA24 Attachment: LER 2020-001-00, Service Water System Inoperable for Longer than Allowed by Technical Specifications CC Administrator, Region Ill, USNRC Project Manager, Palisades, USNRC Resident Inspector, Palisades, USNRC
ATTACHMENT LEA 2020-001-00 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM INOPERABLE FOR LONGER THAN ALLOWED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3 Pages Follow
Abstract
On July 27, 2020, at 22:45 ET, while operating in Mode 1 at 100% power, Palisades Nuclear Plant (PNP) Operators identified that the Bettis operator pin on valve CV-0826, "Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger E-54B Service Water Outlet," was incorrectly installed. This caused a failure of CV-0826 to open when demanded from the Control Room, rendering the left train of service water inoperable. The condition was corrected, and the Service Water System (SWS) was declared operable on July 28, 2020, at 00:49. Investigation into the cause of the failure concluded that the valve was inoperable since its last satisfactory surveillance test completed on May 27, 2020, until restoration on July 28, 2020. Consequently, the required actions and associated completion time of Technical Specification 3.7.8 (A) were not met.
This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) as a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications.
During the time of left train inoperability, the right train remained operable. Therefore, there were no actual consequences to the general safety of the public, nuclear safety, industrial safety or radiological safety for this event.
EVENT DESCRIPTION
On July 27, 2020, at 16:26 ET, while operating in Mode 1 at 100% power, operators attempted to throttle open CV-0826 [FCV], "Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger E-54B Service Water Outlet." During this evolution, the control room position indication for the CV-0826 actuator indicated fully open, however there was a minimal change in service water [Bl]
pressure indicating the valve itself was not operating as expected.
The Control Room cycled the valve with operators locally observing the valve operation. During this additional valve operation, it was discovered that the Bettis operating pin was incorrectly installed allowing the valve actuator coupling [CPLG] to become disengaged from the valve stem. At 22:47, Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.8 (A) was entered for left train service water.
The Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO) restored CV-0826 operability by placing the pin in the correct position and reengaging the actuator coupling. The left train SWS was declared operable following satisfactory completion of surveillance testing and the LCO was exited.
Maintenance was last performed during the previous refueling outage on November 9, 2018. During the period from November 9, 2018, to May 27, 2020, successful surveillance testing indicated that the Bettis actuator was coupled. At the time of discovery, CV-0826 Bettis actuator coupling was disengaged from the valve stem. Investigation into the cause of the failure concluded that the valve was inoperable since its last satisfactory surveillance test completed on May 27, 2020, until restoration on July 28, 2020.
CAUSE OF THE EVENT
The direct cause of the event was determined to be an incorrectly pinned Bettis actuator coupling by a non-licensed operator.
ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES
Based on the actual and potential consequences of the event, the failure of CV-0826 to actuate is of low safety significance.
The opposite train component to CV-0826 is valve CV-0823, "Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger E-54A SW Outlet." Although the design basis requires both CV-0826 and CV-0823 to open following a Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS), an existing engineering analysis demonstrates that a single component cooling water heat exchanger is adequate for heat removal following RAS. Existing procedures provide steps for operators to manually recover the valve operator with adequate time available to restore cooling.
A review of the narrative logs since May 27, 2020, determined that CV-0823 was operable during the period that CV-0826 was inoperable. Additionally, after discovery of the pin misalignment on CV-0826, the pin was verified to be installed correctly on CV-0823. The opposite train equipment in the SWS was operable and this condition was not a condition that would have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
CV-0826 was returned to its intended configuration, testing was performed, and operability was restored.
Revise procedure SOP-15, Service Water System, Attachment 1, to include steps for proper installation verification.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
None. D NUMBER I
YEAR SEQUENTIAL 001 Page 3
REV NO.
1-0 of 3