05000255/LER-1987-001, :on 870114,plant Engineering Personnel Discovered Four Containment Penetrations Did Not Employ Redundant Isolation Logic.Caused by Architect/Engineer Error.Mod Being Performed

:on 870114,plant Engineering Personnel Discovered Four Containment Penetrations Did Not Employ Redundant Isolation Logic.Caused by Architect/Engineer Error.Mod Being Performed

ML20212A338
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	02/26/1987
From:	Johnson B, Kozup C CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-87-001, LER-87-1, NUDOCS 8703030334
Download: ML20212A338 (5)

LER-1987-001, on 870114,plant Engineering Personnel Discovered Four Containment Penetrations Did Not Employ Redundant Isolation Logic.Caused by Architect/Engineer Error.Mod Being Performed

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vi) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
2551987001R00 - NRC Website

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an nei While reviewing containment isolation circuitry on January 14, 1987, plant engineering personnel discovered that four containment penetrations (PEN]

associated with the containment hydrogen monitoring system [IK;45] did not employ 'edundant isolation logic. Containment penetrations 21, 21A, 40A and 40B each contain two solenoid-operated isolation valves (IK;ISV]; however, both valves are operated by the same containment isolation channel. The Plant was in cold shutdown condition at the time of discovery.

A modification is being performed which'will provide redundant containment isolation to both independent channels of the containment hydrogen monitoring system, such that isolation of all eight solenoid valves is completed via an isolation signal from either the left or right channel containment high pressure or radiation signals.

In order to further eliminate the possibility of single mode failure, an additional auxiliary relay will be installed between the containment isolation contacts and the solenoids controlling the containment isolation valves. The modifications described above are scheduled to be complaced before the primary coolant system temperature is taken above 210 degrees.

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Description

While reviewing containment isolation circuitry on January 14, 1987, plant engineering personnel discovered that four containment penetrations [ PEN]

associated with the containment hydrogen monitoring system [1K;45] did not employ redundant isolation logic. Containment penetrations 21, 21A, 40A and 40B each contain two solenoid-operated isolation valves [IK;ISV); however, both valves are operated by the same containment isolation channel. The Plant was in cold shutdown condition at the time of discovery.

The containment hydrogen monitoring system consists of two independent channels which provide separate and redundant indication of containment hydrogen concentration. Presently, containment isolation initiated by the left channel of a containment high pressure or radiation signal closes both isolation valves on penetrations 21 and 21A, while containment isolation by the right channel closes both isolation valves on penetrations 40A and 40B.

Review of the records pertaining to the major modifications completed in 1983 indicate that system design criteria given to the architect / engineer (Gilbert / Commonwealth Associates) were not developed as prescribed.

Subsequently, the containment hydrogen monitoring system was installed as designed by the architect / engineer lacking redundant containment isolation logic, subject to single mode failure.

Cause of the Event

On June 24, 1982, the system design description for the containment hydrogen monitoring system was completed by architect / engineer (AE), Gilbert /

Commonwealth Associates. The system design description was prepared under system design criteria provided by the licensee; however, subsequent records review indicate that the AE did not wholly implement the design criteria as prescribed. Consequently, the containment hydrogen monitoring system was installed utilizing the system design description provided by the AE without redundant containment isolation logic, subject to single mode failure.

Analysis of the Event

The event is being reported under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(vi) due to the subsequent discovery of a design inadequacy associated with the containment hydrogen monitoring system.

The resultant safety consequences discovered within this event are considered to be insignificant in that:

1. The piping associated with the containment hydrogen monitoring system has a combined area less than 0.5 square inches.

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2. The containment hydrogen monitoring system is a closed system (all supply air from the containment building is returned to the containment building).

3. In order to have fission products escape through one of the associated penetrations and not be returned to the containment building the following must occur concurrently:

a) an accident which breaches the primary coolant system b) core damage from that accident c) failure of containment isolation d) failure of the monitoring system piping

Corrective Actions

A modification is being performed which will provide redundant containment isolation to both independent channels of the containment hydrogen monitoring system, such that isolation of all eight solenoid valves is completed via an isolation signal from either the left or right channel containment high pressure or radiation signals.

In order to further eliminate the possibility of single mode failure, an additional auxiliary relay will be installed between the containment isolation contacts and the solenoids controlling the containment isolation valves.

The modifications described above are scheduled to be completed before the primary coolant system temperature is taken above 210 degrees.

Plant engineering is reviewing circuitry for all valves closed by containment isolation signals to assure proper system operation is achieved. Also, all other modifications in which the AE described above was involved will be i

reviewed to determine if similar design problems exist.

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Additional Information

, Containment Penetration Associated Isolation Valves 21 SV-2415A SV-2415B 21A SV-2413A SV-2413B 40A SV-2414A SV-2414B 40B SV-2412A SV-2412B l

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- t Consumers Power rewaums AMENIEAAr5 MISERE55 General Offices: 1946 West Pernali Road, Jackson, MI 49201 + (517) 788-0550 February 26, 1987 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR PALISADES PLANT -

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 87-001, REVISION 1 - NON-REDUNDAN2 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION ASSOCIATED WITH H MONITORING SYSTEM 2

Licensee Event Report (LER) 87-01, Revision 1 (Non-Redundant Containment Isolation Associated with H Monitoring System) is attached. This event is 2

reportable to the NRC per IUCFR50.73(a)(2)(v). The revision is necessary to update the Corrective Action section as indicated by vertical bars in the margin.

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J Brian D Johnson Staff Licensing Engineer CC Administrator, Region III, USNRC NRC Resident Inspector - Palisades Attachment i l i

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