ML18040A074
| ML18040A074 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 08/21/1991 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17056C371 | List:
|
| References | |
| CON-IIT07-099.0A-91, CON-IIT07-099.0B-91, CON-IIT7-99.0A-91, CON-IIT7-99.0B-91 NUREG-1455, NUDOCS 9305070252 | |
| Download: ML18040A074 (46) | |
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OFFICIALT1VDSCRIP1'F PROCEEDINGS Agency
Title:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Incident Investigation Team Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant Interview of: ALAN DeGRACXA Docket No.
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September.
27, 1991 HEMORANDUM FOR:
Hartin J. McCormick,.Plant Manager, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FROM:
SUBJECT:
Hayne I.. Schmidt, Senior Resident Inspector, Nine Mile Point Review of IIT Interview Transcripts The IIT has sent the transcripts of interviews conducted with the personnel listed below to the resident inspector s office.
If any of the listed individuals wish to review the transcripts they should do so at the resident inspector s office by October 4, 1991.
Guidelines for the review of transcripts are provided in the enclosure.
If an individual does not review his transcript by that date we will assume that he did not wish to do so and that the statement is correct to the best of his knowledge.
Alan DeGarcia, te
- Doty, Dave Barre, Jerry Balker, Jim Burr, Bob~randall, o
e A l Julka, Perry
- rtsch, James Spadafore, Joe
- Savoca, Mike
- Colomb, James Kinsl Marty McCormick, Chris Kolod, Irin~errer, Fred Gerardine, Anthony etrelli, Jim Reid, Fred Hhite, Rick Slade, Bruce Hennigan, and Tom Tomlinson.
Thank you for your help. If there are any questions please contact me.
(ACB~ L. m~~~~~
Hayne I. Schmidt Senior Resident Inspector Nine Mile Point
ERRATA SHEET ADDENDUM
~Pa e Line Correction and Reason for Correction Date Signature
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM 4
6 Interview of 7
ALAN DeGRACIA 8
(Closed) 10 12 13 14 15 17 18 Conference Room B
Administration Building Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Two Lake Road
- Scriba, New York 13093 Wednesday, August 21, 1991 19 The interview commenced, pursuant to notice, 20 at 2:45 p.m.
21 22 23 24 25 PRESENT FOR THE IIT:
Michael Jordan, NRC John Kauffman, NRC
1
P R 0 C
E E
D I N G
S
[2:45 p.m.]
MR.
JORDAN: It's August 21, 1991. It' 4
approximately 2:45 in the afternoon.
We'e at the Nine Mile 5
Point Unit Two, in the P building.
We re conducting 6
interviews concerning a transient that occurred on August 7
13 g
199 1 ~
My name is Michael Jordan.
I 'm with the U. S
~
NRC 8
out of Region III.
MR.
KAUFFMAN:
I'm John Kauffman, and I'm out of 10 NRC headquarters, AEOD.
MR.
DeGRACIA:
I'm Al DeGracia, general 12 supervisor, operations
- support, at Nine Mile Two.
13 14 15 MR.
JORDAN:
Okay.
You want to go by Al, right?
MR.
DeGRACIA:
Yes.
MR.
JORDAN:
Okay, Al.
Why don't you give us some 16 of your background.
What's your background?
17 MR.
DeGRACIA:
Let's see. I'e been at Niagara 18 Mohawk for almost 18 years now.
I started off as a meter 19 reader.
I came to the site in 1975 as a janitor, went into 20 the operations group as an entry-level operator, went to the 21 FitzPatrick site, then came back to Nine Mile Point Unit 22
- One, where I became a reactor operator.
In 1982 I came to 23 Nine Mile Point Unit Two, in the construction
- phase, to be 24 part of the future staffing.
25 I became a station shift supervisor in 1982. I
I
3 1
licensed in 1984.
I was on shift from 1984 till January of 2
- 1991, when I came off shift and assumed the present duties I 3
have
- now, as general supervisor, ops support.
MR.
JORDAN:
You were licensed on Unit One?
MR.
DeGRACIA:
Yes, I was.
MR.
JORDAN:
When did you get licensed?
MR.
DeGRACIA: It was
'78 or '78 -- I think '79, 8
yes -- 1979.
10 12 sorry.
13 14 15 16 support.
MR.
JORDAN:
As an RO?
MR.
DeGRACIA:
As an RO, yes.
MR.
JORDAN:
What's the title you have?
I'm MR.
DeGRACIA:
Pardon me?
MR.
JORDAN:
Your current title?
MR.
DeGRACIA:
I'm general supervisor, operations 17 MR.
JORDAN:
Okay.
Give us an idea of what that 18
- does, what type of duties you have.
19 MR.
DeGRACIA:
Essentially I'm'he general 20 supervisor for a group of seven generation specialists.
21 Those people and I are tasked with procedure revisions, DER 22 responses, a lot of the paperwork responses that require 23 operations technical expertise.
We technical operations 24 input to the rest of the departments that need to have an 25 understanding of what kind of an impact their work is going
I
~
1 to have on operations.
MR.
JORDAN:
Are you like the systems engineers?
MR.
DeGRACIA:
No, we'e not, no.
We provide 4
operations -- shall we say -- expertise to the system 5
engineers.
We more or less tell them how their system is 6
going to impact the plant as it stands right now.
The fire department is under my group, also.
MR.
JORDAN:
Okay, Al.
You were coming on day 9
shift, or were you on the midnight shift?
10 MR.
DeGRACIA:
I was coming on day shift, yes.
MR.
JORDAN:
Why don't you just tell us, from the 12 time you came through the turnstiles -- about what time did 1
13 you show up for work?
Then you can just walk us through the 14 events of the day.
15 MR.
DeGRACIA:
- Well, my beeper went off, and I 16 knew that something had happened around 10 after 7, 17 something around that time.
I got to the main gate 18 approximately around 10 minutes to 8, by the time I got 19 through the road block and through the security building.
20 I could tell, because the plume of the cooling 21 tower was small to nonexistent, coupled with an emergency 22 notification on my beeper.
I knew something had gone wrong 23 but hadn't quite figured out what it was.
I came into the 24 parking lot and I saw all the people around, and that 25 baffled me some more, because I couldn't understand what
s
~
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t 5
1 they were doing outside and why they wouldn't let them go 2
in, but I was just guessing that maybe we had a leak in the 3
drywell or something.
I think I got up to the control room like shortly 5
after 8, between 8 and 8:15.
I went in the control room, 6
and I walked by the EOP boards, and I noticed that they had 7
gone into the EOPs.
I noted that reactor water level had 8
gotten down to I believe 124 inches.
When I came through 9
the control room, they were in the process of securing the 10 RCIC system.
I also noticed they had got into contingency 11 C-5, level and power control, indicating that we were in a 12 condition that the reactor might not have been shut down.
I 1
13 did not know the details at that time.
14 I talked to the SSS who was on duty and a couple 15 other people -- I don't remember who they were -- and got 16 informed that we were in contingency C-5 because we had six 17 rods that we believed were not full in, because we didn' 18 have indication that they were full in.
Then I just got 19 filled in on the details of what led up to the event, about 20 the UPS's not transferring and losing all five or six of 21 them -- five of them, I believe.
22 From that point on, I just provided ops support.
23 The firemen were up in the control room, and the fire chief 24 who was on duty, Bill Perkins, asked me what he should be 25 doing.
I said I would find out, so I called the TSC and
I
I 6
1 asked if we were still keeping people inside the control 2
room and not allowing them to go out in the plant.
That 3
was confirmed, so I told Bill Perkins, Well, you just hang 4
tight here until the SED-SSS tells you you can go back to 5
work.
I just spent the rest of the day in the control 7
room, providing oversight when they needed help and 8
additional expertise.
Matters that I got involved with were 9
the desire to -- I'm trying to remember what we did with 10 UPS.
We wanted to do an evolution with UPS's.
They were on 11 the maintenance
- supply, and I believe we wanted to put them 12 back on the normal supply.
I had a discussion with Mike 13
- Eron, Deet Willis, I think Mike Conway, and Jerry Helker 14 about which ones we should try to put on first.
I think we 15 decided that the ones that just had the lighting loads would 16 be the most prudent thing to do, since, if we did try to 17 flop them back onto normal power and they failed, then the 18 most we'd lose would be lighting.
19 20 The next evolution I got involved with MR.
JORDAN:
How did you determine which ones were 21 on lighting?
22 MR.
DeGRACIA:
- Well, we talked about UPS lA, 1B, 23 1C, and 1D.
We knew that 1A and 1B had vital instruments 24 coming off it, so we didn't want to play with those.
We 25 talked it over that C and D were the ones that essentially
1 I
1 just had lighting loads off them.
MR.
JORDAN:
How did you determine that?
MR.
DeGRACIA:
We just talked it over amongst 4
ourselves.
From memory and, I guess, everybody 5
corroborating that, yes, I remember C and D are the ones 6
that have lighting on them.
We didn't look anything up, 7
no ~
MR.
JORDAN:
Okay.
MR.
DeGRACIA:
I think the next thing I got 10 involved with:
We were trying to put the cleanup system 11 back on.
The attempt to put the cleanup system back on, it 12 isolated.
We were attempting to reject to the main 13 condenser, which was still under a vacuum.
The cleanup 14 system was still at high temperature, and essentially what 15 we did was flash the water in the -- when we lined up 16 condenser vacuum to the piping, we flashed the water in the 17 system piping, and our delta flow isolation circuit took 18 over and isolated the cleanup system.
19 I came in at the point where I was, along with the 20
- operator, trying to figure out what happened, going back 21 through the procedure and seeing what went wrong and what we 22 did wrong.
At that time, I made an initial determination 23 with the operator that we were using probably the wrong 24 section of the procedure, but that was just an initial guess 25 at first.
I
2 used?
MR.
KAUFFMAN:
Do you recall what section was MR.
DeGRACIA:
The number of the section?
The 4
section that we were trying to use was the part about trying 5
to put the system on from a cold condition.
I recall I was talking it over with George
- Moyer, 7
more or less postulating what might have happened, the 8
vacuum causing the depressurization of the piping and the 9
water flashing and delta flow instrument seeing an imbalance 10 of the flow and causing the system to isolate.
MR.
JORDAN:
You seemed to indicate there is a
12 section that would address putting it on from the conditions 13 you were at.
14 MR.
DeGRACIA:
After digging into it, we found out 15 we really don't have one to address where we were.
We 16 talked about what we should have
- done, and it sort of came 17 out that normally on a plant transient, on our shutdown 18 procedure, we have the option of either tripping the cleanup 19 system off or lining it up to full reject.
We came to the 20 conclusion,
- Jeez, we don't have a procedure that allows us 21 to flop it on the full reject, and, if we did, we'd probably 22 isolate it for the specific condition we had.
23 I think after that I was talking with Dave Wilson, 24 going through the tech specs and evaluating the tech specs 25 we presenting were in, because of the condition we were in,
I
9 1
and seeing how that impacted the EOPs.
I talked with Dave 2
and I talked with Jerry Helker about that.
After I saw that 3
Dave Wilson had been working on it, I just backed right out 4
of it and made myself available for anything else that might 5
have occurred.
The next thing I remember is that I got involved 7
in getting the shutdown cooling system on line and 8
establishing a cool-down rate.
There was a big issue
- about, 9
we had to get into mode 4, cold shutdown to be able to de-10 escalate from the site area emergency.
I was looking over 11 the shoulder of the operator as he was heating up the piping 12 in the attempt to get the shutdown cooling system on line.
t 13 I recall we had a problem with -- let's see.
What happened 14 there?
15 16
[Pause.)
MR.
DeGRACIA:
A report was given that we had a
17 48-degree-an-hour cool-down rate, and I questioned that 18 because I had been looking at the clock and looking at 19 reactor temperature and the drop in reactor temperature.
An 20 operator reported 48 degrees an hour, and I had noticed that 21 we had dropped something like 32 or 35 degrees in 17 22 minutes. I said, Something's wrong here.
I went to the 23 operator who was doing the cool-down rate calculations and 24 found out that he was taking temperatures every five 25
- minutes, and he only multiplied his temperature calculation
I
~
ll
10 1
by 6; he should have multiplied it by 12, so essentially 2
what we had was a 98-degree-an-hour cool-down rate.
If we 3
had kept on going the way we were, we would have exceeded 4
100 degrees an hour, so I promptly went to the SSS on duty 5
and said,
- Jeez, we ought to stop cooling down right now and 6
stabilize, and that's what we did.
I think we sat in that 7
stabilized condition for approximately an hour or so -- an 8
hour and 10 minutes, an hour and 20 minutes -- before we 9
continued again with the cool-down rate.
10 MR.
KAUFFMAN:
Was there a reason why you 11 stabilized there and didn't continue cool-down at a slower 12 rate, for example?
l 13 MR.
DeGRACIA:
Well, our tech spec says that 14 you'e not to exceed 100 degrees in any one-hour period, so 15 the way we take control of that is that, if it looks like 16 we'e going to have an excessive cool-down rate, we will sit 17 and stay at a zero cool-down rate, or we'l sit and 18 stabilize, and average it over the hour period so we don' 19 exceed 100 degrees an hour.
That's how we take control:
We 20 stop, let everything stabilize, and then, when we have 21 control of everything, we start again.
22 That's what we did.
I noticed that the SSS -- we 23 had a new SSS and ASSS come on duty, and they were kind of 24 flustered, because there were a lot of bosses giving them 25 information and things to do.
I recall being in the same
I
~
~
-g t
11 1
situation, so I just had to wait my turn before I got 2
involved and told them what I think they should be doing.
I worked with the operator who was controlling the 4
shutdown cooling process.
I was at the computer giving him 5
flow rates on service water so we could get a manageable 6
cool-down rate.
I do believe we average like around 20 to 7
30 degrees an hour.
Most of my time was spent calculating how much 9
temperature we dropped like in five or ten minutes, and I 10 postulated in my head what we'd have in an hour.
I spoke to 11 the operator and the SSS involved, and I said, Twenty to 12 thirty degrees an hour is really conservative; it's up to t
13 you whether you want to increase it any more, like 50 to 60, 14 which would be well within our capability.
They more or 15 less chose to take it nice and slow.
16 I think I worked on this shutdown cooling 17 evolution from about 2 o'lock to 6 o'lock.
At around 6
18 o'lock I talked with Jerry Helker, and I said, You know/
19 there's really no reason for me to be here; everything seems 20 under control.
I asked Jerry if he needed me for anything, 21 and he said no.
I said, Well, I'l take off now.
22 23 MR.
JORDAN:
And you left around 6?
MR.
DeGRACIA:
Around 6 o'lock --
6 or 6:30, 24 something like that.
25 MR.
JORDAN:
Your normal station is where?
You
~
~
~
g
12 1
normally report to the station head?
MR.
DeGRACIA:
Yes.
MR.
JORDAN:
And you were coming around 7:50, 4
almost 8:00 that morning; is that what it is?
That's your 5
normal time for showing up?
MR.
DeGRACIA:
No, no.
I was stuck in the traffic 7
jam up here.
MR.
JORDAN:
Oh, okay.
You got hooked in the 9
traffic jam trying to get in.
10 MR.
DeGRACIA:
Right.
Usually I'm here about 11 7:30.
12 13 traffic.
MR.
JORDAN:
Okay.
So you got stuck by the 14 15 MR.
DeGRACIA:
Right.
MR.
JORDAN:
The UPS transfer back to normal that 16 you said Eron and Williams and Helker were working on, do 17 you know about what time that was?
18 MR.
DeGRACIA: It seems to me it was around like 9
19 or 10 o'lock, something like that.
I recall Mike Eron 20 didn't want to do it, I remember, and we more or less had to 21 have a powwow, a talk session, and say, Well, Jeez, Mikeg 22 we'e only going to impact the lights, because he was really 23 concerned about losing instrumentation.
That's what we 24 talked about.
I do believe it was around 9 or 10.
25 MR.
JORDAN:
The mess about once you transferred
~
~
~
~
~
~
13 1
power back, what type of controls did you have on that 2
transfer -- administrative communications, what type of a 3
control process?
MR.
DeGRACIA:
Oh, I didn't have any controls over 5
it. I do believe an operator and, I believe, Bob Crandall 6
were down there, the guys who were doing the 7
troubleshooting.
I don't know exact names of people; I just 8
know that that's what we wanted to try; I didn't know who 9
was doing that.
10 I'd be guessing to say it was Perry Bertch or Bob 11 Crandall down there, one of the damage-control teams going 12 out.
13 MR.
JORDAN:
How much communication with the 14 control room was going on, to let people in the control room 15 know about the transfer?
16 MR.
DeGRACIA: I don't know.
After my discussion 17 about that, I didn't pay any more attention to it. It could 18 have occurred, and I wouldn't have known about it.
19 My capacity there wasn't in dictating that it 20 should be done; they were just asking my opinion on what I 21 thought about it.
22 MR.
JORDAN:
You mentioned that you read a gauge 23 that had the cool-down rate.
24 25 MR.
DeGRACIA:
No, reactor temperature.
MR.
JORDAN:
Oh, reactor temperature.
g
)
e
~
14 MR.
DeGRACIA:
Yes.
MR.
JORDAN:
Where is that gauge at?
MR.
DeGRACIA: It's on panel 603.
It's a digital 4
display on panel 603.
MR.
JORDAN:
And you remember seeing it one time.
MR.
DeGRACIA:
Yes.
Just naturally I look at the 7
temperature, and then I wait 15 minutes to see what the 8
change is.
If you drop 15 degrees in 15 minutes, you 9
multiply it 10 MR.
JORDAN:
What time did you notice the cool-11 down rate around?
12 MR.
DeGRACIA:
Well, it's either -- I think it' l
13 around 2:17, something like that, 14:17.
14 MR.
JORDAN: It should be easy--
15 MR.
DeGRACIA:
We had a surveillance going on, 16 tracking that temperature.
17 MR.
JORDAN:
Do you know what the surveillance 18 number was?
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MR.
DeGRACIA:
OSP-RCS9001.
MR.
JORDAN:
OSP-RCS -- at?
MR.
DeGRACIA:
Yes -- "at" sign.
MR.
JORDAN:
Oh, that sign.
MR.
DeGRACIA:
Yes -- 9001.
MR.
JORDAN:
Okay.
So that data is available.
MR.
DeGRACIA:
Oh, yes.
That's our cool-down
~
~
~ ~
)
15 MR.
JORDAN:
At the time that you saw it was going 3
at what you thought was kind of excessively fast or more 4
than what you thought, did somebody then go back to verify 5
the cool-down rate prior to that time, to see if it had 6
exceeded the 100 degrees?
MR.
DeGRACIA:
No one went back at that time.
I 8
know I remember seeing -- it was either Greg Pitts or Eli 9
Dragomer -- going to the guy that was doing the surveillance 10 and looking over his calculations.
I don't know if he went 11 back and checked everything else previous to that.
I know 12 the surveillance came down to my group for review and 13 filing, and I know it was satisfactory that we hadn' 14 exceeded 100 degrees in any one-hour period.
15 MR.
JORDAN:
By redoing the calculations, where he 16 had erred by multiplying by 6, you multiplied by 12?
17 18 MR.
DeGRACIA:
Right.
MR.
JORDAN:
And then found you still hadn' 19 exceeded the 100 degrees per hour?
20 21 22 MR.
DeGRACIA:
We had not done that yet.
MR.
JORDAN:
Okay.
We'l ask you the general question.
This is one 23 of those good things-bad things type of things.
In your 24 experience, for the activities that you do during the day, 25 is there anything in which you are glad that you had this
~
( ~
1
~
~
l 16 1
available to you to accomplish your tasks for the day, as 2
well as -- the other side of it is -- gee, I wish I would 3
have had this available to me for the tasks that I was 4
assigned during the day.
It can be as small as, Gee, I wish 5
I had a calculator; they weren't available in the control; I 6
had to go and look for them.
A classic example is the guy 7
that goes out in the plant who says, I have to go out and 8
operate a valve; when I get there, gee, there's a wrench 9
hanging on the valve, and it was so easy to operate; that 10 was great; I'm glad the wrench was there.
Or, I go out to 11 operate the valve; the wrench isn't there -- and you say to 12
- yourself, Gee, I wish they would stage a wrench there.
Is 13 there any activity that you had to do during the day that 14 you say to yourself,
- Gee, I'm glad I had this, or, Gee, I 15 wish I would have had that?
16 MR.
DeGRACIA:
No.
I had everything I needed.
17 Like I said, I was there -- everything that I was asked to 18 get involved with, I had all the tools.
19 20 21 22 MR.
JORDAN:
You had everything you needed.
MR.
DeGRACIA:
Yes.
MR.
JORDAN:
You had all the tools you needed.
MR.
DeGRACIA:
Something that I forgot to say:
I 23 think it was around noontime; I did go out and look at the B
24 transformer.
There were some people out there already.
I 25 went out and looked at the oil leaks.
I looked at the hot-
4 ( ~
17 1
spot indicator that had its cover glass blown off it.
I 2
came back to the control room.
I don't remember who I 3
discussed it with; I think it might have been the SSS on 4
duty; I'm not 100 percent sure.
I just mentioned that I 5
hoped somebody called Hugh Flanagan, the environmental 6
- person, about the oil that's leaking out on the ground out 7
there.
I do believe somebody had already contacted him.
MR.
JORDAN:
The hot-spot indicator with the glass 9
blown up -- what is that?
10 MR.
DeGRACIA:
There's a temperature indicator 11 that measure the winding temperatures.
It's a telltale 12 indicator.
It has a needle that drives another needle and 13 holds it in place when the temperature cools down. It 14 measure winding temperature.
I went out there, and I had 15 noticed that it had pegged up-scale at 180 degrees, and its 16 cover plate -- the glass was lying on the ground.
18 MR.
JORDAN:
Okay.
MR.
DeGRACIA:
When I was out there, the fireman 19 who was out there pointed out a flange leak on the 20 transformer that I looked at.
I also noticed that the 21 pressure relief indicators, these yellow tabs that stick up 22 on over-pressure, were sticking up, both of them.
23 24 Then I went back to the control room.
MR.
JORDAN:
Do you have the data that was taken 25 on the RCS-001?
Is that in your office?
t
18 1
MR.
DeGRACIA: It should be with the RAP-6 team.
2 They should have all that.
We'e got copies -- we probably 3
have the original and they have copies of that.
MR.
JORDAN:
Can I get you to get me a copy of 5
that?
10 MR.
DeGRACIA:
Sure.
MR.
KAUFFMAN:
What's a RAP-6 team'?
MR.
DeGRACIA:
RAP-6 -- that's the scram report.
MR.
JORDAN:
Has that been finalized yet?
MR.
DeGRACIA:
No.
They'e still got everything 11 spread out over there in the conference room.
12 MR.
JORDAN:
I guess the final question that I 13 have is, Is there anything that we didn't cover that you 14 have information on that you'd like to give us that would be 15 of benefit to us?
16 MR.
DeGRACIA:
No.
I don't think I left anything 17 out.
I really didn't do that much up there.
I mean, I was 18 up there for a long time, but we had so many people working 19 on thing -- you know--
20 MR.
JORDAN:
You saw no tech spec problems or 21 errors that needed to be --?
22 MR.
DeGRACIA:
No.
I remember talking with Jerry 23 Helker and saying, You know, this is the first time we ve 24 ever gotten this heavy into the
~
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l,
19 1
operating procedure, violate tech specs if you have to.
I 2
- said, Where is the point where you stop being in the EOPs 3
and back under tech spec again.
I said,
- Jeez, that's really 4
not cut and dried.
We ought to make it cut and dried.
We 5
were just talking about that -- what applies and what 6
doesn't apply.
MR.
JORDAN:
Right.
But you know of no place where to accomplish the 9
EOPs this time you had to violate any of the tech specs 10 12 MR.
DeGRACIA:
No.
MR.
JORDAN:
-- that you'e aware of.
MR.
DeGRACIA:
We installed the RPS jumpers during 1
13 the transient, and that was to try to get rods in.
That' 14 the only thing we talked about.
15 16 17 MR.
JORDAN:
Okay.
We can go off the record, then.
[Whereupon, at 3:11 p.m., the taking of the 18 interview was concluded.]
19 20 21 22 23 24 25
REPORTER'8 CERTIFICATE This is to certify that the attached proceed-ings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:
NAME OP PROCEEDING: Xnt. of ALAN DeGRACIA DOCKET NUMBER:
PLACE OF PROCEEDING: 5'cribs,>
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were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for tne file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court report-ing company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.
IAN ROTHROCK Official Reporter Ann Riley 6 Associates, Ltd.
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