ML18033A579
| ML18033A579 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 12/14/1987 |
| From: | Peters A TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML082340470 | List:
|
| References | |
| 25500, 25500-V02-R04, 25500-V2-R4, NUDOCS 8902150204 | |
| Download: ML18033A579 (100) | |
Text
EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PRQG VOLTE2 ENGINEERING CATEGORY SUBCATEGORY REPORT 2S500 SUPPORT WELD DESIGN UPDATED TVA NUCLWWPOWER 0~~4
=-~0 POP AOQCl( 0.>00025/
II i~
C) g
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT TYPE:
SUBCATEGORY REPORT FOR ENGINEERING TITLE:
SUPPORT MELD DESIGN REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 1 of 30 REASON FOR REVISION:
Revised to incorporate SRP and TAS comments and CAPs.
2.
3.
4.
Revised to incorporate SRP and TAS comments and to add Attachment C
(References).
Revised to incorporate SRP and TAS comments.
Revised to incorporate TAS comments.
PR PARATION SIG ATURE REVIEW COMMI EE:
RV WS IZ /0 ATE S
A E
DATE NA N
N
/I 7
CEG-N:
EA SRP SIGN TUR 2 ~/'Fgg DA E APPROVED BY:
PCSP MANAGER SRP Secretary's signature denotes SRP concurrences are in files.
0
TVA.EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM-REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page ES-1 of 2 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
This subcategory report sumnarizes and evaluates the results of 22 Employee Concern Special Program element evaluations prepared under Engineering element number series 22200 (Support Weld Oesign) and 21500 (Structural, Steel Connection Oesign).
The issues from employee concerns relating to pipe support weld designs were addressed in this subcategory.
Welding issues other than design-related were evaluated in TVA's Welding Project Review Plan.
The element evaluations document the review of 14 issues and four peripheral findings relating to TVA's four nuclear plants:
Sequoyah (SAN), Watts Bar (WBN), Browns Ferry (BFN), and Bellefonte (BLN).
The issues were derived from 22 employee concerns citing perceived deficiencies in the design of pipe support welds and structural steel connection design.
The 14 issues reviewed. resulted in 35 findings of which 28 require corrective actions.
The corrective actions for 14 findings were initiated by TVA before the Employee Concerns Task Group evaluations;
- however, some did not fully address the problems.
Four of the remaining 14 corrective actions were for peripheral findings related to support weld design and structural steel connection design.
The evaluation of these issues revealed a number of design deficiencies, such as incomplete weld details, incorrect weld design assumptions, minimum weld criteria not followed, weld fused to process
- pipe, and clamps modified without vendor approval.
In some instances, the design calculations were not available for review.
Five causes dominate:
"Inadequate Procedures,"
"Procedures Not Followed,"
"Inadequate Calculations,"
Lack of Oesign Oetail," and "Standards Not Followed."
The corrective actions in the subcategory were judged to be of significance and are summarized as follows:
Evaluate box anchor rear plate weld fused to the process pipe and determine if any rework is required (WBN, BFN, BLN); qualify the modified pipe support vendor components (WBN); and analyze the welds used to replace bolts in a mixed bolted/welded connection (SON, WBN, BFN, BLN).
The corrective action plans received by the evaluation team have been reviewed and found acceptable.
Since the corrective actions proposed by TVA for the negative findings include analysis and evaluations, they may result in hardware changes or modifications of support components.
Therefore, the final significance of the corrective actions cannot be determined until the required corrective actions are completed.
However, the preliminary evaluations completed to date by TVA and the verification of as-built configurations do not lead to the conclusion that support weld design/structural steel connection constitutes a significant problem to Sequoyah, Watts Bar, Browns Ferry, or Bellefonte nuclear power plants.
26380-R22 (12/09/87)
TVA, EMPLOYEE'ONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
255OO REVISION NUMBER 4 4'age ES-2 of 2 A review of the Nuclear Performance Plans (NPPs) by the evaluation team revealed that TVA's proposed remedial efforts will be.beneficial to its nuclear program.
The plant welding program configuration control, prOcedur'e
- update, Oesign Baseline and Verification Pr()gram, training, and branch chiefs design review are the main corrective
'act'ions related to this subcategory that are, being addressed in the Nuclear Performance Plans.
When implemenited, the'se
'rograms should resolve the root causes of problems in areas such as management effectiveness and design process efFectiveness observed i'n this subcategory.
The causes identified and other evaluation results are being reexamined from a wider perspective in the Engineering cateigory eva'luatiOn.
26380-R22 (12/09/87)
TVh EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECThL PROGRhM REPORT NUMBER:
2S500
,FRONT MhTTER REV:
3 PhGE i OP viii Preface This subcategory report is one of a series of reports prepared for the Employee Concerns Special Program (ECSP) of the Tennessee Valley huthority (TVh).
The ECSP and the organization which carried out the program, the Employee Concerns Task Group (ECTG), were established
.by TVh's Manager of Nuclear Power to evaluate and. report on those Office of Nuclear Power (ONP) employee concerns filed before February 1,
1986.
Concerns filed after that date are handled by the ongoing ONP Employee Concerns Program (ECP).
The ECSP addressed over 5800 employee concerns.
Each of the concerns was a
formal, written description of a circumstance or circumstances that.
an employee thought was unsafe,.unjust, inefficient, or inappropriate.
The mission of the Employee Concerns Special Program was to thoroughly investigate all issues presented in the concerns and to report the results of those investigations in a form accessible to ONP employees, the
- NRC, and the general public.
The results of these investigations are communicated by four levels of ECSP reports:
- element, subcategory,
- category, and final.
Element reports, the lowest reporting level, will be published only for those concerns directly affecting the restart of. Sequoyah Nuclear Plant's reactor unit 2.
hn element consists of one or more closely related issues.
hn issue is a potential problem identified by ECTG during the evaluation process as having been raised in one or more concerns.
For efficient handling, what appeared to be similar concerns were grouped into elements early in the program, but issue definitions emerged from the evaluation process itself.
Consequently, some elements did include only one issue, but often the ECTG evaluation found more than one issue per element.
Subcategory reports summarize the evaluation of a number of elements.
- However, the subcategory report does more than collect element level evaluations.
The subcategory level overview of element findings leads to an integration of information that cannot take place at the element level.
This integration of information reveals the extent to which problems overlap more than one element and will therefore require corrective action for underlying causes not fully apparent at the element level.
To make the subcategory reports easier to understand, three items have been placed at the front of each report:
a preface, a glossary of the terminology unique to ECSP reports, and a list of acronyms.
hdditionally, at the, end of each subcategory report will be a Subcategory Summary Table that includes the concern numbers; identifies other subcategories that share a concern; designates.
nuclear safety-related, safety significant, or non-safety related concerns; designates generic applicability; and briefly states each concern.
Either the Subcategory Summary Table or another attachment or a combination of the two will enable the reader to find the report section or sections in which the issue raised by the concern is evaluated.
TVh ENPLOTEE CONCERNS SPECThL PROGPJLM REPORT NUMBER:
25'SOO FRONZ NhTTER REV:
2 PhGE ii OF viii The subcategorIIes are t,hemselves sumtnac'ized in a series of eight cate'gory reports.
Each category report reviews the majoc findings
- and, cblllect'ive'ignit",icance of the subcategory reports'n one bf the followi'ng'areas:
management.
and personnel celations industrial. safety construction
'mateeial control operations quali,ty assurance/quality
'con'trOl
'elding engineeeing h separate repoet on employee cbnc'ertIs dealiqg pith specific contentions of intimidationharassment, and weon'gdoing will be released by the TVh Office of the Inspector Genecal.
Just as the subcategory reports'n'te)raj:e the information collected at t,
element level, the category report's integtate the information assembled in all t,he subcategory t'epocts within thie categoryaddressing part;icularly the underlying causes of those Iproblems that run across more than one subcategoey.
h final report will integrate ahd
'ass'ess the information collected by all of the lower level repoets pcephre6 foc'the ECSP.
in'eluding t'he'Inkpe'ctor General"s repoet.
Foc more detail on the methods by Qhi'ch ECTG 'em')loyee concern's werIa evaluated and rciported, cohsult the Tennessee Valley huthoeit'y Fmploy'ee Concernii Task Gcoup Program Nanual.
The Nanual spells out the program's objectiv ~
's?
- scope, organization,,
and responsibilities.
It al'so spkcifies the procedures t:hat were followed in the investigation, reporting, and closeout, of.'he issues raised by employee concerns.
TVh EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAl PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 FRONT MATTER REV:
2 PAGE iii OF viii ECSP GLOSShRY OF REPORT TERMS~
classification of evaluated issues the evaluation of an issue leads to one of the following determinations:
Class h:
Issue cannot be verified as factual Class B:
Issue is factually accurate, but what is described is not a
problem (i.e., not a condition requiring corrective action)
Class C:
Issue is factual and identifies a problem, but corrective action for the problem was initiated before the evaluation of the issue was undertaken Class D:
Issue is factual and presents a problem for which corrective action has
- been, or is being, taken as a result of an evaluation Class E:
h problem, requiring, corrective action, which was not identified by an employee
- concern, but was revealed during the ECTG evaluation of'n issue raised by an employee concern.
collective si nificance an analysis which determines the importance and consequences of the findings in.a particular ECSP report by putting those findings in the proper perspective.
concern (see "employee concern")
corrective action steps taken to fix specific deficiencies or discrepancies revealed by a negative finding and, when necessary, to correct causes in order to prevent recurrence.
criterion lural:
criteria a basis for defining a performance,
- behavior, or quality which ONP imposes on itself (see also "requirement").
element or element re ort an optional level of ECSP report, below the subcategory level, that deals with one or more issues.
em lo ee concern a formal, written description of a circumstance or circuastances that an employee thinks unsafe, un5ust, inefficient or inappropriate; usually documented on a K-form or a form equivalent to the K forms
TVh EMPLO'CEE CONCERNS spEczhL pRoGRaM REPORT NVMBER:
P~p5PO FRONT MaTTER REV:
PhGE zv OF v>z;i evaluato~rsg the individual(s) ass'igned, the responsibility to as'sess l spec'if it grouping of employee concerns.
~findin s
includes both statenients of fact and the sudtments made about those facts during the evaluation process,",
negative findings require corrective action.
issue a potenti,al problem, as interpreted by the ECTG during, the evaluation
- process, raised i,n one or more concerns.
K-form (,see "employee concern" )
c~euieemiant a standatd ofsec,focmahce'.ehhsiod, oe qualiti oa which an evaluati6n
.judgment or decisioh m'ay 'be'ased,.
root cause the underlying reason for a problem.
~Terms essential to the program but which, require detailed definition have been defined in the ECTG Procedure Manual (e.g.,',
gi'eneric, specific, nuclear safety-related, unreviewed safety-significant question).
TVA EMPLOYEE'ONCERNS'PECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER'55OO FRONT'ATTER REy:
2 PAGE v OF viii Acronyms AI AZSC ANS ANSI.
'AQ CAR CATD Administrative Instruction American Institute of Steel Construction hs Low hs Reasonably
'hchievable American Nuclear Society American National Standards Institute American 'Society of Mechanical Engineers American Society for Testing and Materials American Welding Society.
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Bellefonte Nuclear Pl'ant Condition Adverse to Quali'ty.
Corrective 'Action Report, Corrective Action Tracking Document CCTS Corporate Commitment Track'ing System CEG-'H CFR CI CNTR COC OCR'ategoc'y Evaluation Group: Head Code of Fedecal Regulati'ons Concerned Individual Certified Naterial Test Repoct Certificate of'onformance/Compliance Design Change Request DNC Division of Nuclear Construction (see also NU CON)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NU$BER: '~~5pp PROhfT MATTER RE!V.
2 PAGE v'i OF viii, DNE DNQA DNT DOE DPO DR ECN ECP ECP-SR ECSP ECTG EEOC EQ EMRT Division of Nuclear Engineer.ing Division of,,Nuclear Quality Assurance Division of Nuclear Training, Department of Energy Division Personnel Officer Di,screpancy Report or Deviati,on Report En'gineering. Change Notice Employee Concerns Program Employee concerns program-site.
Representative'mployee Concerns Special Pro gr am Employee Concerns Task Group Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Envit onmental Qual ificat:ion Emergency Medical Response Team EN DES ERT FCR FSAR HCI HVAC Engineering Design Employee
Response
Team or Emergency'esponse Team Field Change Request Final Safety Analysis Report Fiscal Tear General Employee Training, Hazard Control Instruction Heating, Ventilating,.Air Conditioning Installation Instructiion INPO IRN Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Inspection Rejection hlotice
,V E
~
TVh EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRhM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 FRONT MhTTER REV:
2
'PhGE vii OF viii L/R M6dLI MI MSPB MT NCR NPP NPS NQhM NRC NSB NSRS NU CON NUMhRC OSHh ONP OMCP Labor Relations Staff Modifications and hdditions Instruction Maintenance Instruction Merit Systems Protection Board Magnetic Particle Testing Nonconforming Condition Report Nondestructive Examination Nuclear Performance Plan Non-plant Specific or Nuclear Procedures System
'Nuclear Quality hssurance Manual Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear'ervices Branch Nuclear Safety Review Staff Division of Nuclear Construction (obsolete abbreviation, see DNC)
Nuclear Utility Management and Resources Committee Occupational Safety and Health hdministration (or hct)
Of'fice of Nuclear Power Office of'orkers Compensation Program PHR PT QhP QCI Personal History Record Liquid Penetrant Testing Quality hssurance Quality hssurance Procedures Quality Control Quality Control Instruction
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM',
REPORT NU)BER: 'c gPO FRONT NATTER REV:
2 PAGE viii OF viii QCP RIF RT SQN SI Quality Control Procedure Quality'echnology Company Reduction in Force Radiographic Testing Sequioyah Nuclear Plant Surveillance Instruction SOP SRP Standard Operating Procedure Senior Revie~r Panel SWEC'AS Stone and Webster Eng,ineering Corpioration Technical'Assistance Staff TVA TVTLC UT VT MBECSP WR Trades and Labor I
Tennessee Valley Authority Tennessee Valley Trades and Labor Council Ultrasonic Testing Visual Testing Watts Bsr Employee Cohcern Sphcial Program Watts Bar Nuclear Plaint Work Request or Work Rules Morkplans
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 2 of 30 Section Executive Summary Preface ECSP Glossary of Report Terms Acronyms CONTENTS
~Pa e
ES-1 l.
Introduction 2.
Summary of Issues/Generic Applicability 3.
Evaluation Process 4.
Findings 5.
Corrective Actions 6.
Causes 7.
Collective Significance Glossary Supplement for the Engineering Category 12 16 18 20 28 Attachments A
Employee Concerns for Subcategory 25500 B
Summary of Issues,
- Findings, and Corrective Actions for Subcategory 25500 C
References A-1 8-1 C-1 TABLES Table 1
Classification of Findings and Corrective Actions 2
Findings Summary 3
Matrix of Elements, Corrective Actions, and Causes
~Pa e
23 25 26 26380-R22 (12/09/87)
~O
.r J
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 3 of 30 1.
INTRODUCTION This subcategory report summarizes and evaluates the results of the ECSP element evaluations prepared under Engineering element number series 22200 (Support 'Weld Design) and 21500 (Structural Steel Connection Design).
Welding issues other than design-related were evaluated in the TVA Welding Project Review Plan (Ref. 53).
The evaluations are summarized in the balance of this report as follows:
o Section 2 summarizes, by element, the issues stated or implied in the employee concerns and addresses determination of generic appl icabi 1 ity o
Section 3 outlines the process followed for the element and subcategory evaluations and cites documents reviewed o
Section 4 summarizes, by element, the findings and identifies the negative findings that must be resolved o
Section 5 highlights the corrective actions required for resolution of the negative findings cited in Section 4 and relates them to element and to plant site o
Section 6 -- identifies causes of the negative findings o
Section 7 assesses the significance of the negative findings o
Attachment A -- lists, by element, each employee concern evaluated in the subcategory.
The concern number is given, along with notation of any other element or category with which: the concern is
- shared, the plant sites to which it could be applicable are noted, the concern is quoted as received by TVA, and is characterized as safety related, not safety related, or safety significant o
Attachment B contains a summary of the element-level evaluations.
Each issue is listed, by element number and plant, opposite its corresponding findings and corrective actions.
The reader may trace a concern from Attachment A to an issue in Attachment B by using the element number and applicable plant.
The reader may relate a corrective action description in Attachment B to causes and significance in Table 3 by using the CATO number which appears ir, Attachment B.
26380-R22 (12/09/87)
- F 1
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM RFPORT NUMBER':
'25500 REVISION NUMBFR 4
'age 4 of 30 The term "Peripheral finding" in the issue column refers to a'inding that occurred during the course of evaluating a concern but did not stem directly from an employee concern.
These are class-fied as "E" in Tables 1
and 2 of this report o
Attachment C lists the references cited in the text 2..
SUMMARY
Ol.
ISSUES/GENER,IC APPLICABILITY The employee-concerns
'listed in Attachment A for each element and plant h5ve been
- examined, and 14 issues have been identified.
Review of these, issues is presented in 22 element evaluations.
The issues reviewed under this subcategory are grouped by element and summarized, and their generic applicability determinations are addressed in the following subsectic)ns.
Quality-related Corrective Action Tracking Oocuments (CATOs) are reviewed by the applic'able site managers to identify any conditions adverse to quality (CAQ).
If h CAQ report i's prepared, generic applicability to all p'lants must be examined,.
- 2. 1 Wrona Weld Oesion on Box Handlers -lement 222.
1 An incorrect, weld was required on box hangers (box anchor rear plateg).
Jf performed as designed, the weld will fuse into the process pipe and will not allow for pipe expansion; the box anchor end plate will thus be overstressed.
This issue was evaluated for WBN, BFN, 'and BLN For'Q'N, this issue was not considered f'r evaluation because the Nuc'lear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) concluded in its Investigation Report 1-8!i-560-SQN that this problem does not exist at SQN.
2.2 Box Anchors with Excessive Weldin
-.Element 222.2 Weld between process pipe'nd box anchor front plate is, over-engineei.ed.
This issue was evaluated for SQN and WBN and found to be invalid.
There was no factual bas'is to consider it for other'pl'ants.'he issue of'verhe'ating due to excessive welding was addressed in Welding Project-'eneric Employee Concern Report WP-15-SQN (Ref. 65).
26380-R22 (12/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 5 of 30 2.3 Drawings Oo Not Alwa s Show Weld Size - Element 222.3 Pipe support drawings do not always show all details, particularly weld sizes, and welds.,are not detailed properly.
This issue was evaluated for the four plants (SQN, WBN, BFN, and BLN).
2.4 Modification of Clamps - Element 222.4 Proof tests were not performed to ensure that the vendor specifications were not compromised for the field-modified pipe clamps.
The issue of vendor standard components modified or fabricated by.field is addressed in Construction Subcategory Report 11100.
The issue of pipe clamps designed to provide two-directional restraints was evaluated for WBN only and was found to be valid.
SQN has issued Significant Condition Report (SCR)
SQN CEB 8685 (B25 861126 018) to address this issue.
In response to the potential generic condition evaluation request, BFH and BLN indicated that this condition does not exist at those plants.
I 2.5 Structural Steel Connection Oesion/Bolts Replaced b
Welds - Element 222.5 In.a mixed bolted and welded connection, the weld should be designed to carry the entire shear load.
This issue was evaluated for all four plants (SQN, WBN, BFN, and BLH).
2.6 Structural Steel Connection Oesi n - Element 215.9 Bolts and welds are used in the same connection to transfer loads from structural steel members in. concrete walls.
They are not supposed to be mixed.
(For Browns Ferry and Bellefonte, this issue is addressed in element 222.5.)
This issue was evaluated for all four plants (SQN, WBN, BFH, and BLN).
2.7 AISC Minimum Weld Criteria - Element 222.6 American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) minimum weld cri.teria were not always followed.
This issue was not considered for evaluation for BFN and BLN because no significant findings were observed in the evaluation performed for SQH and WBH and, also, ASME code case N-413 permits weld size smaller than the minimum size required per AISC, provided appropriate design loads and allowable stresses are considered in the weld design.
2638D-R22 (12/09/87)
TYA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM s
REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER': 4 Page 6 of 30 2.8 Weldina on Iwo Side.
of Tubin
- Element 222.7 Square tubing requires only top and bottom welds.
It is implied that all-around welding should bie used where possible, regardless of the'loadi'ng
'ondition.
This issue was evaluated only for. WBN 'beoauSe of itS specif ic referencfo WBiN features and was found to'ie invalid.
2.9 Verification of Weld Securin the Pads to the !inner Shell - Element
'222m 10 Weld size and supporting component size were increased, except for theiweildsl securing thie pads to the inner shell that, supports the entire hanger.
This issue was evaluated only for WBN because iof its specific reference to WBN features and was found to be invalid.
mii '~'
An undersizied welld specified for a hanger located. in unit 2 will not s(jppi'ort'he component.
This issue was not'onsidered for'valuation for SON, BFN, and BLN because no significant finding was observed in thih e'valuation performed for WBN.
2.11 Support Tube Distortion - Eleme~nt 222.12 Testing is required to determine whether 'th0 instrument/drain lines are overstressed because of distor'tion in the 8001-type pipe stanchions caused by the welding process..
The issue was not, considered fior evaluati'on'for SQN,'FN, and BLN because there was no significant finding observed in the evaluation performed for WBIN.
2.12 ~Sumnarr of Subcatis~o~r Issues The issue summaries above deal with presumed design deficiencies or inadequacies i!n weld design of pipe supports.
More specifically, seven issues are concerned with iinadequate weld designs (contained in element evaluations 222. 1, 222.2, 222.3, 222.5,15.'9, '222. 6, and 222. 11),-
two-issues suggest the strengthening of the weld sbpecified on support drawings (contained
'n element evaluations 222.7 and 222.1());
one issue requires testing to determine if tlhe distortion caused overstressing of the instrument/drain 1line (contained iin elemer!it evaluaition 222.12);
and one i.ssue is concerned with proof tests no't being. performed for modified vendor pipe clamps (contained in element evaluation 222e4).
In addition,. four peripheral findings were uncovered during ECTG evaluation and require engineering evaluation to justify the design deficienc:ies.
2638D-R22 (12/09/87) 0
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER 4
Page 7 of 30 A complete statement of each issue reviewed within the element evaluations is provided in Attachment B.
This attachment also lists findings and corrective
- actions, which will be discussed in Sections 4 and 5 of this report.
As the following sections
- show, seven of the above summarized issues were found to be valid and require corrective action.
3.
EVALUATION PROCESS This subcategory report is based on the information contained in the applicable element evaluations that address the specific employee concerns related to the issues.
summarized in Section 2.
The evaluation process consisted of the following steps (references are in Attachment C):
3.1 Wron Weld Desi n on Box Anchors - Element 222.1 Watts Bar a.
Reviewed WBN standard box anchor drawings (478100 series)
(Ref.. 1).
b.
Reviewed Office of Engineering (OE) calculations (CEB-CAS-173) and Nonconformance Report (NCR) 6264 for box anchors (Ref. 2).
c.
Reviewed TVA's corrective action pl'an (CAP) for. CATO 222 01 WBN 01.
Browns Ferry and Bellefonte a.
b.
co d.
e.
Reviewed standard box anchor design drawings (for BLN) (Ref. 3).
Reviewed a sample of box anchor drawings to verify the rear plate weld details specified on the drawings (Refs.
4 and 5).
Reviewed design and construction procedures to verify rear plate welding (gap) requirements (Refs.
6, 7,
8, and 9).
Performed field walkdown to verify the actual welds installed (Ref.
- 10).
Reviewed TVA's CAPs for CATDs 222 Ol BFN 01 and 222 01 BLN 01.
3.2 Box Anchors with Excessive Weldin
- Element 222.2
'Sequoyah a.
Reviewed a sample of box anchor drawings for 3/4-inch-and 2-inch-diameter stainless steel pipe (Ref..ll).
2638D-R22 (12/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROCiRAM I
REPORT NUMBER',:
25500 REVISION NUMSERx 4
Page 8 of 30 b.
Reviewed'nchor design criteria, and appropriate code requi~rements
~
for welding to process pipe (Refs.,
12, 13, and 48).
c.
Reviewed box anchor details
'and their calculations for weld size calculated and specified (Ref. 14).
d.
Reviewed TVA's CAP for CATO 222 02 SQN 01.,
Watts "Bar a.
Reviewed WBN standard box anChOr 478100 series drawings (Ref< 1').
Reviewed anchor design criteiia'nd appropriate code requirements for welding to process pipe '(Refs.',
13 and 15).
c.
Reviewed a sample of box anchor'rawings for 3/4-inch-and 1-inch-diameter stainless steel pipe and for carbon steel and stainless steel pipe greater than 1
inch in diameter (Ref; 16).
d.
Reviewed box anchor drawings'7A060-63-39, Rev.
0, and
'47A060-62-118, Rev.
0, referred~ to in Concerns IN-85-316-005 and IN-85-672-001.
e.
Reviewed ii'VA's CAP for CATO 222 02 WBN 01.';3 OrawinxLs Oo Not Always Show Welld Siz'e (All Plants)
- Element 222.~)
a.
Selected sample of pipe suivport drawings for review (Ref.
17).
b.
Reviewed supports selected in i'tern a'to verify completeness of the drawing s.
c.
Verified as-built condition if the drawings reviewed had incomplete i'nformation (for SQN and WBN) (Ref.
18)'.
d.
Reviewed TVA procedures applicable to p'ipe support drawings (f'r BLN) (Ref. 9).
e.
Reviewed 1*VA's CAPs for CATOs 222 03 SQN 01, 222 03 WBN 01, 222 03 BFN 01, and 222 03 BLN 01.
3.4 Modification of Cl amp~Watts B~ar
- Element 222.4 a.
Reviewed t: he subst:itution requirements for vendor-supplied components specified in noteS 49, i54')
102,~ and 167 of 47A050 series hanger drawings (Ref,. 20).
26380-R22 (12/09/87) 0
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 9 of 30 b.
Reviewed, pipe support drawings 74-1RHR-R61,.Rev.
- 904, and 47A050-3-92, Rev.
3, to verify the use of modified clamps.
c.
Reviewed calculation (WBP 840127 081) to verify the qualification documentation of the modified clamp used in support 47A050-3-92, Rev.
3.
d.
Reviewed TVA's CAP for CATO 222 04 WBN 01.
3.5 Structural Steel Connection Oesi n/Bolts Replaced b
Welds and Structural tee nnection esizn -
ements and
.9 Sequoyah b.
c ~
d.
e.
and Watts Bar (222.5)
Reviewed 47A050 series drawing notes for mixed bolted and welded connection requirements.
Reviewed design criteria and applicable codes for mixed connection requirements (Ref. 21).
Selected pipe supports having mixed bolted/welded connections for review (Ref. 55).
Reviewed support calculations for design assumption and distribution of loads among bolts and weld (Ref. 22).
Reviewed TVA's CAPs for CATOs 222 05 SQN 01 and 222 05 WBN Ol.
Sequoyah and Watts Bar (215.9) a ~
b.
C ~
d.
e.
Reviewed WBN problem identification report on this concern (for WBN)
(Ref. 23).
Identified SQN investigation on this topic (for SQN) (Ref. 24).
Reviewed NSRS investigation (Ref.
- 66) (for WBN) and Civil Engineering Branch (CEB) policy memo (PM) 86-17 (841 860911.011) on this topic.
Selected design drawings where bearing-type bolts and welds were used in the same connections (Ref. 25).
Performed walkdown in Reactor Building and verified that "mixed" connections exist (for SQN) (Ref. 26).
Reviewed drawings and calculations for cases of "mixed" connections (Ref. 27).
26380-R22 (12/09/87)
'll'VA EMPLOYEIE CONCERNS SIPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER) 4 Page 10 of 30 g.
Reviewed 'INA's CAPs for CATOs 215'09'QN 01 and 215 09 WBNI Ol.
Browns Ferry and Bellefonte (222.5)
(IElement 215.9 four BFN and BLN is addressed i n t'hi s eva1 uat ion. )
a.
Reviewed design criteria and 45ABOO and 47B435 series drawing notes for mixed bolted and welded connection requirements (for BFN)
(Ref.
2'9).,
.b.
Reviewed design criteria and'AW, '4BA, 4BB,
- 40W, 4RA., 4RB, and 4RW series drawing details and notens forimixed bolted and welded connection riequirements (for'L'N) '(Refs'. 28'nd 29).
c.
Reviewed applicable codes (Ref. 54).
d.
Selected pipe supports having mixed bolted and welded connect:ions for review (Ref. 29).
e.
Reviewed support calculati'ons for design. assumptions and dtistribution of loads among bolts and weld (Ref. 30),
Reviewed SCR BFN CEB 8621 fB41 860421 007] for these concerns ahd reviewed resulting BFN engineering activity.
Reviewed drawings and calculations for cases of mixed connections (Ref s.
29 and 30).
h.
Reviewed TVA's CAPs for CATOs 222 05 BFN Ol and 222 05 BLN 01.
3.6 AISC Miinimum Weld Criteria~Seouoiah and Watts Bar
- Element 2,'2.6 a.
Reviewed Pipe Support 'Oesign Criteria and Licensing Commitments regarding AISC minimum weld requirementS (Ref. 32).
b.
Reviewed applicable codes (Ref., 33).
c.
Reviewed pipe supports and calculations to ascertain if the codd requiremenits.
and commitments are met (Ref. 34).
,26380-R22 (12/09/87) 0
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
25500 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page ll of 30 d.
Reviewed memo E44011-01 (Ref.
- 59) cited. in the concern and associated documents (Ref. 60) (for WBN).
e.
Reviewed TVA's CAPs for CATOs 222 06 SQN 01, 222 06 SQN 02, and 222 06 WBN 01.
3.7 Weldinq on Two Sides of Tubin (Watts Bar
- Element 222.7 a.
Reviewed pipe support drawings and calculations that involve the use of square tubing (Ref. 35).
b.
Reviewed Pipe Support Oesign Manual and Oesign Criteria for Analysis of Category I component supports (Refs.
13 and 36).
c.
Reviewed Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) Report I-85-216-WBN.
d.
Performed plant walkdown during which welded connections of various pipe supports with square tubing were inspected to verify the concern and length of side welds (Ref. 37).
e.
Conducted interviews with TVA Construction and QC personnel to find the actual welding practices and/or procedures followed for square tubing (Ref. 37).
f.
Held discussions with WBN Engineering Oesign (EN OES) personnel as required (Ref. 38).
g.
Generated sample weld calculations, based on flat length of tube, for hanger 47A450-25-415, Rev.
0 (Ref. 39).
h.
Reviewed TVA's CAP for CATD 222 07 WBN 01.
3.8
'Verification of Weld Securin the Pads to the Inner Shell (Watts Bar lement 2
0 a.
Reviewed ori'ginal design drawing and calculations prepared by Chicago Bridge and Iron (CBI) for the supports attached to the inner shell of the dome (Ref. 40).
b.
Reviewed revised design drawings and calculations performed by TVA for these supports (Ref. 41).
2638D-R22 (12/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REi/ISION NUMBER 4
'age 12 of 30 3.9 Undersized Meld~S)ecified fotr a
So ort (Matte Bar) - Element 222.11 a.
Reviewed P'ipe Support Design Criteria and Pipe Support Design Manual (Ref s.
36 and 42).
b.
Reviewed 25 pipe support drawings (102 welded connections)'r'om'nits 1
and 2, along with associated idesign calculations, to ascertain whether code requirement's are'met (Ref. 43).
- 3. 10 Support Tube Distortion ('atts Bar) - Element 222. 12 a.
Reviewed design standards of 8001 type supports (Ref. 44).
. b.
Performed plant walkdown during'wh'ich various auxiliary feedwater (AFW) 8001 type supports were visually inspected tp verify the concern (06/09/'S6).-
c.
Reviewed Pipe Support OesigniManuail and Design Criteria for Analysis of'ategory I component supports (Refs.
45, 56, and 57).
d.
Performed study for various branch/stanchion welded connectio'ns
'to'Valuate the StreSSeca in the inStrument/drain line (Ref. 46).
4.
F INDI NGS The findinqs from each of the element eva'luations for this subcategory are contained in Attachment B.
The findings are listed by element number and by plant.
The summarized findings follow.'.1 Wroncr Meld DesiBn on Box planners
< Element 222.1 The employee concerns are valid for WBNI, BFN, and BLN.
Watts Bar (WBN) issued a nonconformance report to acknowledge the misapplication of the requirementS specified on standard box anchcir drawings.,
As a result, the WBN Off ice of Construction (OC) performed a walkdown to, verify the as-constructed welds for.
all box anchors installed in units 1
and 2.
~ Th~e Office of Engineering (OE) evaluated all box anchors with the weld fused or with the possibility of fusion or those that were inaccessible
~for inspection as identified by OC.'he evaluation team obseriIed that three box anc~hor's were not included in the OE evaluations.,
The.review of samples from Browns Ferry'rid iSellefonte box anchor drawings indicated that the gap requirements between the rear plate weld and the process pipe were not specified on the drawings.
If this we'Id is performed as
'2638D-R22 (12/09/87) 0
TVA EMPLOYEE'CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 13 of 30 designed for the entire length, it will run into and fuse to the process pipe.
Some. box anchor drawings contained a note, "no weld.to pipe"; however, no installation/welding guidelines were provided to ensure "no weld. to pipe" was made in such cases.
There is a possibility of the rear plate being overstressed in cases where the weld is fused to the process pipe.
The issue that overheating caused'y a large weld size could produce metal fatigue/in-service failure in circumferential welds is addressed in Welding Project - Generic Employee Concern Report WP-15-SgN (Ref. 65).
4.2 Box Anchors with Excessive Weldin
- Element.222.2 For SON and WBN, the full penetration weld specified between the process pipe and the front plate on a sample of box anchor drawings reviewed is in
~
compliance with the anchor design criteria and code requirements; therefore, the employee concern is not valid.
Ouring the evaluation of this concern, a peripheral finding was identified; one SON box anchor drawing was observed with a fillet weld specified as permitted by the anchor design criteria.
- However, the requirement of using the appropriate piping stress intensification factor (SIF) was not complied with in the stress analysis.
The calculations for this anchor were not available to verify the adequacy of the fillet weld.
This peripneral finding aopears to be an isolated case and, therefore, should not be considered for other plants.
4.3 Orawinos Oo Not Alwa s Show Weld Size - Element 222.3 Review of a sample of pipe support drawings for all four plants indicated that some drawings were found with missing information and incomplete details, sucn as no lug orientation, missing weld symbols, and welds detailed improperly.
However, the actual pipe support installations at Sequoyah were verified and all were found to be installed correctly.
SON has a drawing configuration control program, and BFN has the Site Oi rector' Program and the IE 79-14 Bulletin Program to correct missing information on pipe support drawings.
WBN issued problem identification reports (PIRs) to correct this problem.
At the time of evaluation, BLN did not have a program to correct weld detail related deficiencies.
The employee concerns are valid for all'four plants.
(SgN, WBN, BFN, and BLN) 4.4 Modification of Clamps - Element 222.4 The modified pipe clamp at WBN, which is similar to the clamp identified by a
Sequoyah
- SCR, had no documentation existing to qualify it.
Evidently, no proof tests were performed following the modification to assure that vendor (Bergen-Paterson) design, fabrication, and specifications were not compromised; therefore, the employee concern is valid.
26380-R22 (12/09/87)
IVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PIROGRAM a
REPORT NUMBER:
2'5500 REVISION NUMBERe, 4
Page 14 of 30 Another modified pipe clamp that was unacceptable to the vendor was accepted by TVA by documenting the engineering !justification in the calculations.
4.5 structural steel connection Desi n/Spills ee 1 aced ~b uelds and structural steel Connection Des~i n - Elements 215.9/222.5 The employee concerns are, valid for all four plants.
At all four plants, construction was permitted to substitute fillet weldis for concrete anchors when a surface-mcIunted plate over laps an embedded plate.
However, correct analysis assumptions were. not considered
'in 'the evaluation of mixed welded/bol ted connections.
A problem identif'icatiion report or a sIignificant condition report was issued by each plant to address the problem ahd itsl correct'ive action.
However, the corrective actions werie insufficient to c'orr'ect the design deficiency.
In additiona peripheral finding at, BLN was diiscovered during the e'val'uatioh of this concern.
In some areas, design calculhtions for pipe whip restraints under seismiic out-of-plane loads need justificatiOn for results that are determined by,judgment alone.
The generic applicabi lity of thi s peripheral finding to other plants is to be determined by TVA in the Generic Condi~tion
~
Evaluation required by CAQR BLF 870090 IR IMS 805 870714 301j.
4.6 AISC Minimum Weld Criteria - Element 222.6 The review of a sample of pipe support drawingS for SQN and WBN indicated that, in some cases, the AISC minimum weld requirements were not met~
as~
committed to in the design criteria and the FSAR.
Therefore, the employee concern is valid.
In the instancies where the AISC minimum weld rdquirements for WBN pipe
~
supports were not met, it was found that the weld sizing was properly!
performed using appropriate design loads Iand allowable weld stresses.
In addition, design calculations for 12 SQN pipe supports whose welds do not meet minimum sizes were not available f'r review to verify that appropriate design loads and allowable stresses are considered in weld designs.
- 4. 7 Weldinq on Two Sides of Tv~bin~lement
?22,7 For WBN, the adequacy of top and Ibottom welds for structural tubing was'valuated and found to be qualiified, either by analysis or by documented engineering judgment,.
Therefore, the utiliization~ of~ an all-around weld as stated by the CI is not required.
I 26380-R22 (12/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER'5500 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 15 of 30 During the evaluation of this concern, a peripheral finding was discovered:
one weld connection for the too and bottom sides of structural tubinqs was calculated based on the entire lengths (i.e.,
including the curve surface).
However, the evaluation team noted that Construction provided a weld for the flat lengths only (i.e., did not include the curve surface).
The generic applicability of this peripheral finding to other plants is to be determined by TVA in the Generic Condition Evaluation required by CARR BLF 870098 LRIMS, B05 870612 3183.
4.8 Ver ification of Weld Securinq the Pads to the Inner Shell - Element 222.10 The evaluation team reviewed the original WBN weld calculations prepared by Chicago Bridge and Iron and the revised calculations prepared by TVA for the supports attached to the pads.
An increase in weld size is not necessary.
4.9 Undersized Weld Specified for a Support - Element 222. 11 The review of a WBN sample of pipe supports indicated that, in all cases, the specified weld sizes were larger than the calculated weld sizes.
Therefore, the employee concern that undersized welds are specified on support drawings is not valid.
- 4. 10 Support Tube Distortion - Element 222. 12 A note on a
WBN 8001 sketch from an expurgated file indicated a 5/16-inch distortion in a pipe stanchion.
Distortions of this magnitude were not observed by the evaluation team durinq the visual inspection of several 8001 stanchions.
- Further, the calculations performed by the evaluation team indicate that axial stresses, would not result in a fatiaue-induced pipe failure during the expected operating life of the plant.
Additional testing is not require4 because the concern is not substantiated.
4.11 Summar of Subcate or Findin s
Each of the detailed findings in Attachment B has been classified.
A summary of the classified findings is provided in Table 1.
Class A and B findings indicate that there is no problem and that corrective action is not required.
Class C, 0, and E findings require corrective action.
The corrective action
- class, defined in the Glossary Supplement, is identified in the table by the numeral combined with the finding class.
The suamary of findings by classification is given in Table 2.
Where more than one finding/corrective action classification is listed in Table 1 for a single issue/finding, Table 2 counts only a sinqle classification.
For element 222. 1, the "C6" classification would be chosen over the "C2."
Therefore, Table 2 identifies only one finding/corrective action classification for each issue evaluated.
26380-R22
( 12/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500
'i:VISION NUMBER: 4 Page 16 of 30 Of the 35 findings identified by a classiification i'n Table 2',
seven require no corrective action.
Of the remaining 28, 14 findinqs had corrective actions initiated before the ECTG eva'luation, 10'findings had new corrective actions identified, and four were per'ipheral findings identified during the~
ECTG~
evaluation.
I=rom this table, it can be seen that at Watts Bar, where most of the issues originated., 8'ut of,a total of 13 findingS were found to be valid and require corrective action,.
Also at Irlatts Bar, there was one pekipheral'inding requiring corrective action.
5.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The corrective actions, along with their finding/corrective action classifications, are summarized in Table 3.
The corrective action descriptions in the table are a condensation of the more detailed correctivie action information provided in Attachment B.
The table indicates the plant or plants to whiich a corrective action is applicable by the Corrective ACtiOn Tracking Oocument (CATO) column, where the applicable plant.is identified by the CATO number.
Summaries of the corrective action plans are as follows:
5.1
~Wren Weld De.~i ned on Box Hangers Element 222.1'hree box tinchors will be evaluatedI that were not includied in an earlier WBN evaluation.,
WBN box anchor 478100 series drawinqs have been revised to specify gap requirements between the rear plate weld and the process pipe.
BFN has reviewed box anchors installed in,1980 or later and found 12 box anchors drawings that do not provide for a qap between the rear plate and the prOCeSS pipe.
The 12 bOX anChOrS wi.ll be eValuated/reinSpeCted fOr weld fusion to the process pipe.
Box anchors installed before 1980 will be, evaluated undier the IE Bulletin 79-14 program small bore program and class II over class I program.
BFN design criteria will be 'revised to add gap requirements.
BLN will reinspect and eva1uate.all inst'all'ed box anchors for weld fusion tio the process pipe,and. will also revise the general note-on the standard'box anchor.drawing to specify the gap requir'ement'between the rear plate wield and the process pipe.
Box anchors fiound unacceptable by the evaluat'ion will be reworked to remove the fused weld (WBfl, BFN, BLN).
5.2 Box A'nchiors with Excessive Weldin
-,Element 222e2 The adequacy of 1/4-.inch fillet we'ld used., for, anchor 1-H20-330, Rev.
5, will be verified.
To establish this occurrence as an isolated case, a random sample of box anchors will be examined to verify the as-constructed weld (S(N).
(No ciorrectivie action is required for WBN.)
26380-R22
( 12/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM A
REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 17 of 30 5.3 Orawin s
Oo Not Alwa s Show Weld Size - Element 222.3 Sequoyah commits to documenting modifications to supports on confiouration control drawings.
Watts Bar safety-related pipe supports will be revised under the existing PIRs to show missing information.
BFN pipe support drawing discrepancies for the supports installed before 1980 will be verified under IE.Bulletin 79-14 proqram, small bore pipina proqram, and class II over class I program.
Support drawings installed after 1980 will be verified for missing information by examining a random sample.
BLN will review a randomly selected sample of weld connections specified with 2 sides/3 sides symbol in support drawings.
The as-constructed weld configur ation will be verified against the calculated configuration., Oesign criteria will be revised to follow AWS weldinq symbols for the future desions.
5.4 Modification of Clamps - Element 222.4 All safety-related pipe support desiqns will be evaluated to qualify the modified vendor components (WBN).
The support desiqn manual will be revised to require any modification to vendor supplied standard support components to be qualified by the vendor or any appropriate qualified TVA desiqner (WBN).
5.5 Structural Steel Connection Oesiqn/Bolts Replaced by Weld and Structural tee onnection esian -
ements TVA commits to select a random sample of surface-mounted plates with mixed welded/bolted connections from various commodities.
The sample will be analyzed by distributinq all shear forces applied on the base olate to the weld.
The sample will be expanded, if required, to achieve a 95 percent confidence level in 95 percent conformance.
The connections that are found deficient wi 11 be strengthened.
A policy. memorandum.was issued to prevent recurrence in the future (SON, WBN, BFN, BLN).
The calculations for jet impingement barriers will be reviewed and revised to address seismic out-of-plane loads and to justify the inadequate engineerinq judgement made in the the calculations.
Oeficient structures will be modified as required (BLN).
5.6 AISC Minimum Weld Criteria - Element 222.6 Applicable design criteria and FSAR sections will be revised to reflect the use of welds smaller than the AISC minimum (SI)N, WBN).
In addition, Sequoyah will qualify by analysis the 12 supports whose welds do not meet minimum sizes.
26380-R22
( 12/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE" CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER:
,'4 Page 18 of 30 5.7 Weldinccon Two Sides of Tubin
- Element 222.7 All engineered pipe supports with tubes welded on two opposite, sides will be reviewed under the hanger and arialysiis update programs.
All required support and calculati~on revisions will be performed under these programs (WBN).
5.8 Summa'f Subcate<~or~Corrective Actions From the Fincling/Corrective Action Classification column in Table 3, it can be seen that of the 16 corrective actions identified, eight involve additional evaluation/analysis t:o meet design cdmmitm'ents and may reauire hardwa're changes or physical modificat:ion, six require, revision of support design criteria and reinstruction of'esigners to prevent, recurrence, one require.;
verification of appropriate design loads and allowable stresses used in weld
- designs, and the remaininq one requires documentation of missinq information on support dr'awings.
In addition, the CATO column in Table 3ishows that, in most cases, a similar corrective action is applicable to all plants.
The corrective action plans are found to be acceptable by the evaluati'on',team to,resolve the flindings.
6.
CAUSES Table 3 identifies one.or more causes for,each problem reauirina corr'ective action.
An attempt was made to ident:ify the most important cause for'ach'orrective action;
- however, in some instances, the problem may have resdltkd from a combinationi of causes.,
Therefore, mor'e than one cause is identified for some of the corrective actions.
However,, whenever there was direct evidence linking a cause with a correctliVe aation irequirement, SuCh evidenCe was taken into account.
6.1 Bases for Identi~f
~in Causes The bases for identifying specific causes for each corrective action i
descripticin in Table 3 and the, negative findings are as follows;,
- 6. 1. 1 Wrong Meld Oesiqlns on Box Hangers - Element; 222.
1 Installatiion procedures and standard box anchor drawings did not specify the gap requirements between t,he rear plate weld and the process pipe and detail on the drawings was not clear causing welds t;o be fused to the procesis pipe.
i Adequate procedures should have pr'evented this deficiency.
26380-R22 12/09/87) 0
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 19 of 30 6.1.2 Box Anchors With Excessive Welding - Element 222.2 Design criteria require the stress intensification factor (SIF) to be used when a fillet weld is used between the front plate of a box anchor and the process pipe.
Calculations were not performed to adhere to the design requirements.
The oversight was an engineering error.
- 6. 1.3 Drawings Do Not Always Show Weld Sizes - Element 222.3 Pipe support drawings were missing design details.
Wrong weld symbols were specified on support drawings because AWS Weld Standards were not followed.
6.1.4 Modification of Clamps - Element 222.4 Calculations performed were inadequate and enqineerinq judqment was not documented to justify the modification of vendor components.
- 6. 1.5 Structural Steel Connection Design/Bolts Replaced by Melds and Structural Steel Connection Design - Elements 215.9 and 222.5 Assumptions used in the calculations of mixed connections were unconservative.
Welds should have been designed considering the total shear load and a portion of tension
- loads, in accordance with the requirements provided in the design criteria and procedures.
- 6. 1.6 AISC Minimum Meld Criteria - Element 222.6 Design criteria and the FSAR have commitments to follow the AISC minimum weld requirements.
- However, the calculations performed did not consider the minimum weld requirements.
- 6. 1.7 Melding on Two Sides of Tubing - Element 222.7 Weld calculations performed for two sides of structural tubing were inadequate.
Only the straight Dortions of structural tubing should have been considered in sizing the weld.
Design criteria did not provide guidelines for designing such welds.
The oversiqht was an engineering error.
6.2 Groups of Causes The causes in Table 3 are assigned to broader groups as follows:
management effectiveness, design process effectiveness, and technical adequacy.
Using these
- groups, the totals from Table 3 show that 10 causes are in the management effectiveness
- group, 12 are in the design process effectiveness
- group, and 5 are in the technical adequacy group.
26380-R22
( 12/09/87)
~ ~
~
~
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM
)
REPORT NUMBER:
25!)00 REVISION NUf1BEA: 4 Page 20 of 30 6.2.1 Management Effectivenss The pattern of "Inadequate Procedures" and Procedures not Followed," which was encountered in the findings related to box anchor weld fused to proces,;
pipe, modification of'ipe clamps, analvsis of mixed bolted/weldedi connections, and welding on two sides of tubing i,ndicates there is insufficient involvement(
on the part of engineer ing supervision in providing adequate procedures and assuring that. they're followed.
TVA has comnitted in its NPPs (Ref.
- 52) to update procedures and provide
.adequate training in procedure implementat'ion.
These -steps, when properly implemented, will correct the. observdd deficiendie's.
'.2.2 Oesign Process Effectivenes's The greatest'umber of causes fall in the area of design process effectiveness and were primarily attributed to " Inadequate Calculations" and "La~'.k of OeSign Oetail."
Oesiqn calculations were either incomplete, i.,e., did not cover all components, or the design assumptions, were not properly followed.
The "Inadequate Calculations" were also a result, of "Procedures Not Followed" or "Inadequate Procedures."
These causes indicate a lack of 'attention tb documentino calculations adequately.
The proqrams addressed in the NPPs, such as the hanqer and analysiS u'pdaite'rogram, design baseline and verification, regeneration of calculations, configuration control, and technical
- audits, should correct the deficiencies ~
identified above.
Action by line management to upgrade the design review process should reduce the number of errorsi and deficiencies in desiqn output in the future.
6.2.3 Technical-Adequacy The dominating cause of technical inadequacies was that the desiqn standards were not correctly followed.
Pipe support~ drawings had missing information.
This missing information was minor, except at BLN where welds were not properly specified.
7.
COLLECTIVE SIGNIFICANCE The evaluation team's judgment as to the signif icance of the correCtive actions listed in Table 3 is 'indicated in the last three columns of the table.
Significance is rated in accdrdance With the type or types of changes that may be expected to result from the'corrective action.
Eight of the; 16 corrective actibns for this subcategory are judged to be significant.
26380-R22 (1I2/09/87) 0
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 21 of 30 On the basis of the judgment of the evaluation
- team, the overall significance of the negative findinqs and corrective actions of all four plants can be collectively summar ized as follows:
o If the box anchor rear plate welds are made as shown in the
- drawings, they will fuse into the process pipe and may not meet code requirements.
WBN evaluated all box anchors and found that three needed to be reworked to,remove the fused weld.
SgN reviewed all installed box anchors.(NSRS'nvestigation Report I-85-560-SgN) and did not find a similar condition.
o Missing information on pipe support drawings is judged to be of negligible importance except for Bellefonte.
Some welds shown in Bellefonte pipe support drawings were not detailed properly. and could be misinterpreted by Construction, causing wrong welds to be installed.
The type of welds in question were not used in a
majority of cases.
- However, BLN will evaluate all such cases'to determine any needed modification.
o Where bolts were replaced by welds for the base plate overlapping the embedment, the analysis to be performed to evaluate the adequacy of the changes may result in a hardware change or a physical modification.
SON has completed the evaluation of mixed welded/bolted connections as proposed in the corrective actiOn plan and observed no deficiency.
o The stress intensification factor (SIF) not considered in the analysis of the pipinq system at SON could cause loads to be increased and could result in higher stresses that might not meet code allowable stresses.
This was an isolated case observed durinq the SgN evaluation and appears to be insignificant.
- However, S(jH will examine a random sample of box anchors to establish that this is an isolated case.
o The modification of pioe clamps and reduction in weld lengths at WBN would result in higher stresses that may not meet code allowable stresses.
- However, a sample of welds evaluated, considerinq that
- length, were found adequate.
TVA'.s corrective action plans to,address the negative findings may result in additional hardware changes or modifications of support components.
Therefore, the final significance of the corrective actions cannot be determined until the required evaluations. are completed.
However, the preliminary evaluations completed to date by TVA and the verification of as-built configurations do not lead to the conclusion that support weld design/structural steel connection constitutes a significant problem to Sequoyah,,Watts
- Bar, Browns Ferry, or Bellefonte nuclear power plants.
26380-R22
( 12/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS
,'SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 22 of 30 The type of corrective act'ions resulting from these findings does ind'icate a
need to develop better procedures/criteria and follow them effectively in t'e design process.
The lcorrective actioins, such as correcting deficiencies in procedures/criteria and traininq to implement procedures/criteria
- properly, will minimize the deficiencies in the design process.
The TVA Nuclear Performance Plans (NPPs), outlined in the r'eference section of
.this report, should correct progranmatic, management, and design-related deficiencies.
The Corporate NPP describes'the measures that TVA has taken and
.currently intends to take to impr ove the corporate~level management. of its nuclear activities and to correct the pr"oblems that have occurred i'n thi's area.
The corporate NPP has also identified the need for stren'gthening TVA's Engineering orgainization.
This need is based, in g>ar't, on deficiencies in design process effectiveness, which are par'tially illustrated by the cause discussion in Sect.ion 6.
It also is lbased on past implementation of the TVA Quality Assur ance program.
Thus, the need for strengthening the Engineering organization, as indicated by the NPPs,-
is primarilly accomplished through additional training and augmentation bf 'th5 desi'gn'review process bury the Engineering Assurar>ce (EA) organization.
Under the restructured organization, the Branch Chief provides engineers and technical direction for the Project Engineer; the Branch Chief also assesses the need for technical
- reviews, develops a document review and appr~oval
- matrix, and schedules reviews as required.
These
- proorams, when fully implemented, would minimize the deficiencies in desiqn process effectiveness.
An independent audit on the effectiveness of the'mplementa.ion of the total Quality Assurance program is instituted by Engineering management, as a
mana'qement tool, to additionally. ensure that r'nanaqement policy is bieing enforced.
This audit function is provided by the Engineering Assudanke,,(EA) organization.
The site-specific nuclear performances plians for SQN, WBN, and BFN provide a
complete account: of the actions TVA is takin'gi to improve its nuclear program at the respective plants, and the Corporate NPP encompasses BLN nuclear
'ctivities One of the progr ams addr'essed in the NPP 'is TVA',s welding project r'eview'.
'Two separate phases were used by the welding project to evaluat;e TVA's welding proqram.
The first phase verified th'e ddeguaby 'of 'ex'istinq welding procedures to meet the FSAR/Code coranitments; the second phase verified that the TVA w'elding procedures are adequately
-imp~lemented by construct'ion,,
weldls in the plants are suitable'or
- selrvice, and welding-related employee concern.;
have no detrimental effect on the adequacy of hardware.
The results of t;his subcategory evaluation are being.combined with the other subcategory evaluations and reassessed in the Engineering category evaluation 26380-R22 (12/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER'5500 REVISION NUMBER:
4 Page 23 of 30 TABLE 1
CLASSIFICATION OF FINDINGS AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 222.
1 222.2 Element Wrong Weld Designed on Box Hanger.
Weld Will Run Into Pipe.
Box Anchors With Excessive Welding Issue/
~Fi nd i n **
F indinq/Cor recti ve Action Class*
W N
N BLN C6 C6 06 C2 02 02 C6 C6 06 A
A ES E6 222.3 Drawings Oo Not Always Show Meld Size C3 03 C3 A
C3 03 C3 06 04 04 '4 222.4 Modification of Clamps 222.5 Structural Steel Connection Oesiqn/Bolts Replaced By Melds 215.9 Structural Steel Connection a
Oesiqn C4 06 C4 06 02 06 C4 C6 C4 C6 C4 C6 C4 C6 C4 C6 C4 C6 E6
- Classification of Findinqs and Corrective Actions A.
Issue not valid.
No corrective action required.
B.
Issue valid but consequences acceptable.
No corrective action required.
C.
Issue valid.
Corrective action initiated before ECTG evaluation.
0.
Issue valid.
Corrective action taken as a result of ECTG evaluation.
E.
Peripheral issue uncovered during ECTG evaluation.
Corrective action required.
- Defined for each plant in Attachment B.
- Addressed in Element 215.9.
- Addressed in Element 222.5.
- 1. Hardware
- 2. Procedure
- 3. Documentation
- 4. Training
- 5. Analysis
- 6. Evaluation
- 7. Other
~ 26380-R22 (12/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER'5'i00 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 24 of 30 TABLE 1 (Cont'd)
Element Issue/
~Ffindin **
Findlnq/Corrective Action Class*
222.6 AISC Minimum Weld Criteria 222.7 Welding on Two Sides of Tubinq 222.10 Verification of Weld Securing the Pads to the Inner Shell 222. 11 Under s i zed Weld Spec iified for a Support:
222.12 Supoort Tube Oistortiion a
b a
02 E5 02 A
E6 E2 A
A
- Classification of Findinos and Corrective Actions A.
Issue not valid.
No corrective action required.
B.
Issue valid but consequences
.acceptable.
No corrective action required.
C.
Issue valid.
Correcti've action initiated before ECTG evaluation'.
Issue valid.
Correctiive action taken as a result of ECTG evaluation.
E.
Peripheral issue uncovered during ECTG evaluation.
Corrective action rkquirdd.
- Oefined for each plant in Attachmeht 8.
1',. Hardware
?
l rocedlure
- 3. Oocumentation
- 4. Training
- 5. Analysis
- 6. Evaluation
- 7. Other 26380-R22 (12/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 25 of 30 TABLE 2 FINOINGS
SUMMARY
Classification of Findin s
A.
Issue not valid.
No corrective action required.
5 0
1 Total B.
Issue valid but consequences acceptable.
0 0
0 0
No corrective action required.
0 C.
Issue valid.
Corrective action initiated before ECTG evaluation.
0.
Issue valid.
Corrective action taken as a result of ECTG evaluation.
E.
Peripheral issue uncovered during FCSP evaluation.
Corrective action required.
2 4
6 2
3 4
0 3
2 1
0 1
14 10 Total 8
14 6
7 35 26380-R22 (12/09/87)
IABLE 3 NA)RIX OF ELEHENTSI CORRECflVE ACTIONS, ANO CAUSES SUBCAfEGORV 25500 REVISION INKBERL 4 PAGE 26 OF, 30 CAUSES OF NEGATIVE FINDINGS t NANAGEHENT EffECIIVINESS DESIGN PROC SS EFFECIIVfnfSS IECHNICAL AUE CV F INOING/
CORRECTIVE
~ACTION ELEN CLASS. ~t m.l 06, C6 CORRfCTIVE ACTION Evaluate all Installed box anchors and repair lf
'ATO NBN 0!
7 8
g 10 frag-
)
P roc'-
~anted) lnade-Inade-(uvres Organ-equate
)quate ikot Ila t ion (Preen-(fol-tr
[dures (loved
)Inade-iquate Inade-)
quate (Un-(on-
)t lee 1y
~unl- )Res of catlonl lssuesl
) Inade-Lac'k quate Inade-As-bit of HgL Design quate Recon-Atten leases ICalcs oil.
I 2
3 4
5 6
II 12 Engrg Judgnt not Docu-nen >> hdl Lack of Design netalll 13 14 Design Insuf.
Crit/
Verlf Co>>walt Docu-Not nenta-u
~
I ~ ~o 16 Iy Stds Not Fol-I.. V>>
IV IV Sl gn ifI-cance of Correct lve Actions' ngrg Vendor I
I I>>
~
~
L ~ ~ III II Il 11 r
Vl I
I I
l IAIPIPI
~Ih Vh utt LC m.2 ES Revise appiicabie design criteria/Installation docunents.
Verify the adequacy of
>>>>a
~
L ~ ~ I ~
~
~
~I hler.l ~
~
~ ~ IVL letv uteu>>ur
~nChor I-H20-330.
teN Ol Bfn Ol BLN Ol SON Ol X
x
.I AIPIP E6 22c 3
OJ>> CJ To establish this occurrence as an isolated case.
eaanlne 4 randon Sant>>le Of box anchors to verify the t>> th
~
~ Vtg>>A h IV Ooc>>event ~issing infornation on pipe support drfuings.
SON 01 SON Ol NBN 01 BFN Ol I
I I
I
)
iA)
O 04 Evaluate wld connections
>>nec>>fled vlth '26/36
~ ~ls on pipe support draulngs.
Reinstruct support designers to prevent recurrence.
/ A P
I A
.222 4 D6 Evaluate all Safttv related pipe support designs to qiiat1fy the autdlf led vendor cowponent s.
Len 0}
~
Defined ln the Glossary Supplenent.
Defined ln Table I.
26390-R lg. (12/Og/Bl)
IASLE 3 IHINIIOf ttfHENIS ~ CUkkECIIVE ACIIUNS, ANU CAUSES SUUCAILGURV 2SSUO CAUSES OF NEGAIIVE FlkUINGS ~'EVISIONNJNSER:
a PAGE 21 OF 30 HANALENINIffFLCIIVthfSS I
lECHJI ICAL OESIGN PROCfSS EFffCIIVfkfSS AUf ACV F I NO INC/
CORRECFIVE ACilON ELOI CLASS.~L CORRECTIVE ACEION.
( Slgnlf I-I cance of I Corrective(
JE g g JE m J E EE E
E g
H NJ I
2 3
a 5
6 f
8 g
lo ll 12 '3 Ia Is 16
- Iy I
(frag-I
(
(Proce-(Inane-I Ilnade-I (Engrg IUeslgn( Insuf.(
(wenteo( Inane-I Inade-Inures (quate (un-(Inane-I (quate I LacJJ (Judgnt(crit/ IVerlf IStds (Organ-(quate (quate (kot ICon-(timely(tact (quate (Inade-IAs-bit(
of I not (Coaaalt(Uocu-(Not
( Iaa-I V-IProce-Ifol-(ngg'ni- (kes of(of Ngt(Ueslgn(quate (Recon-(Uestgn(uocu-I Jiot (nenta-Ifol-t Ion tr dures lowed cation Issues Att<<n Bases Calcs cll.
Uetai I nenteEJ Net tlon loved 02 Revise the support design nanuat to require any Jaodlf ication to vendor-supplied standard support coJJponents to be qualified by the vendor or by appropriate quallf led IVA designers.
MBN Ol AI-222.5/ 06, C6 215.9 Evaluate surface-nounted plates with ~Ixed welded/bolted connections.
SVN Ol (222)
SVN Ol (2IS) I MSN 01 {222) I MSN Ol (215)
(
BfN Ol (222)
(
BLN 01 (222)
I AIP( P
(
ca Provide Instructions for deSlgnlng ~IXed bOlted/welded connections.
SVN 01 MSN Ol BFJI Ol BLN Ol E6 222.6 02 ES Review/evaluate Jet IJEEplngegggent calculations.
Revise applicable design crlterla apd licensing coaw Itgaent s.
Perforw analytical verlflcaLion of twelve supports whose welds do not neet alnlngxa size.
SLN Ol SJIJI 01 MSN 01 SVN 02 I
I I
I I
I I
P
(
222. 7 E6 Evaluate welds on two opposite sides of structural tubing.
IJSN Ol (A(PIP(
E2 Revlae pipe support gaanual to MBN Ol COnSider flat lengtnS In weld desi gii~
IOIAL5 Oef lned In the Glossary Supp lenent ~
Oaf lned In labia l.
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUiiBEA: 4 Page 28 of 30 GLOSSARY SUPPLEMENT
. FOR THE ENGINEERING CATEGORY Causes of Neoative Find'its - the cause." for findinas that require corrective action-are categorized as Follows:
1.,Fragmented organization
- Lin<!s pf autho!t.ity, resoonsibility, and accountability were. not clearlly defined.
2.
Inadequate qualit~(0) trainin
- Personnel were not fully traingd sn the procedures estab
>shed olr design process control anI9 in the maintenance, of desiqn documents, in'eluding audits.
3.
Inadequate procedures
- Oesigr>
apd moclification Control methods and procedures were deficient inc!stablishinIl requirements and did not ensure an effective design control program in some areas.
4.
Procedures not followed - Existing procedures controllinq the desiqn process were notMuT7y adherecl tIr.
5.
6.
Inadequate communications
- Cqmmpnicat:iona coordination,
,'and coooeration were notiu Ty effeci.ive in."uoolyinq needed iniorinat'.ion within plants, betwieen plan'ts'and o'rqanizat'ions (e.qee Enqineerinoe Construction, Licensing, and Cloerations!.t and bet:ween interorqanizational disciplines and departments.
untime~i resp'lotions of issues
- Problems were not: resolved in a
tmiMe y manner anMtneir iesollution was not aggressively oufsuedi 7.
Lack of iman~aement attention; There was a lack of management att:antlion in ensuring ttiat oroqrams required for an effe tice vdesion process were established and implementede 8.
Inadequate desiqn biases - OesIiqn bases were lackinq, vaq<Ie, or'>ncomp~ete 7orVessgn executit)n and verification and for design change evaluation.
9.
Inadequate calculations
- DesIign calculations were incom!IIlete, used incorrect input or. assumptiones, Ior otherI~ise fai'led to fully demonstrate compliance withI dksign re4uiirem'ents or support desiqn output docuiments.
10.
Inadequate as-built, reconci liatiion - Reconciliation of design and Ticen. ing dlocuments wite~nant as-buillt condition was lacking or incomplete.
26380-R22
'( 12/09/87) 41
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL'ROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER' Page 29 of 30 11.
Lack of desi n detail - Detail in design output documents was snsu
. scient to ensure compliance with design requirements.
12.
Failure to document en ineerin jud ments - Documentation justifying engsneersng judgments use
~n the design process was lacking or incomplete..
13.
Design criteria/commitments not met - Design criteria or licensinq commitments were not met.
14.
Insufficient verification documentation
- Documentation (g) was snsu scient to audit the adequacy o
design and installation.
15.
Standards not followed - Code or industry standards and orqctices were not comp ied with.
assumptions, methodology, or judgments used in the design process.
17..
Vendor error - Vendor design or supplied items were deficient for Classification of Corrective Actions - corrective actions are classified as be onging to one or more o
the fol owing groups:
1.
'Hardware - physical plant chanqes 2.
Procedure
- changed or generated a procedure 3.
Documentation - affected gA records 4.
~Trainin
- required personnel education 5.
Analysis - required design calculations, etc., to resolve 6.
Evaluation - initial corrective action plan indicated a need to
~eva uate the issue before a definitive plan could be established.
Therefore, al 1 hardware, pr ocedure, etc.,
changes are not yet known 7.
Other - items not listed above Peripheral Findin Issue)
- A negative finding that does not result directly rom an emp oyee concern but that was uncovered durinq the process of evaluating an employee concern.
By definition, peripheral findings (issues) require corrective action.
26380-R22
( 12/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS
,'SPECIAL PROGRAM h
REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER: 4
- Page, 30 of 30 Si nificance of Corrective Actions - The evaluation t5am's judgment as to the ssgni icance oMthe correctsve actions listed in Table 3 is indicated in the last three columns of the table.
Significance is rated in acCordance with the type or tyoes of changes that may be expected to result from the corrective action.
- Changes, are categorized as:
o Documentation change (0) - thi's is a change to any design input or output document (e.g.,
dr awting, specification, calculation, or procedure) that does not result in a significant reduction in design margin.
o change.
in design margin (M) - IThis hs
'a change in desiqn interpretation (minimum requirements vs actual capability) that results in a significant (outside normal limits of expected accuracy) change in the design margin.'ll designs include margins to allow for error and unforeseeable events>>
Chanqes in design margins are a normal and acceptable part of the design and construction process as lonq a~s the~final design margins satisfy regulatory reqluirements and applicable~ codes and standards.
o Change of hard'ware (H) - Thlis lis a bhysical chanqe to an existinq plant structure or component that results from a change in the design basis, or that is reoui~red to correct an initially inadequate design or design error.
If the change resu'Iting from the corrective aCtion is judaed to be significant, either an "A'-'or actual or "P" for potential is enter'ed'into
'th appropriate column of Table 3.
Actual is distinguished From potential because corrective actions are not complete
- and, consequently,,
the scbpe of required changes may not be known.
Corrective actions are jiudqed to be siqnificant if the resultant changes affect the overall qualtity', performahceor miargin of a safety-related strIicture,
- system, or component.
2638D-R22 (1,2/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page A-1 of 5 ATTACHMENT A EMPLOYEE CONCERNS FOR SUBCATEGORY 25500 Attachment A -- lists, by element, each emoloyee concern evaluated in the subcategory.
The concern number is given along with notation of any other element or category with which the concern is shared, the plant sites to which it could be applicable are noted, the concern is quoted as received by TVA and characterized as safety related, not safety related, or safety significant.
0107A-R65 (12/09/87)
ELESSEIII CONCERN IISSSII EI PLANT LOCATIUN ATTACINiNT A LHPLOYEL CONCERNS Fuk SUBCATEGORY 25500 AP PL ICABIL I I Y SIC KBN N
CONCERN OESCRIPTIUH>>
REVISION NUHBER:
4 PAGE A-2 OF 5 2)5.9
~nn CCC ~ I IH-85-297-003 EX 85 03g 003 (shared w>th Subcategory 50300)
Iu Ar. Jnc nnl
~
VV IVV VV~
(shared with Subcategory 503UU)
(shared w>th Element 222.2)
IH-85-634-OOI XX-85-OBb-002 KBN KOH
~IVII I IIS st KBH BLH X
X X
X "Structual steel connections (I-beams to embed plates) are both welded and bolted.
One method
>s for vibration and the other method is for dead loads.
Both type connections are being used on the same I-Bealn and these
'are not Supposed to be mixed'.
Construction Dent.
concern.
CI declined to provide further information."
(Sk)
"watts Bar:
A design deficiency has a 'wrong weld'equired on box hswnnstrc vhinh IC nnnV
.I
~ v
~
~ ~
ya
~ svslttclt w'cs O441'IJII ~ L4ubub Lnu wLIu cu run lnLQ the pipe (ss or carbon steel code pipe).
const.
Dept. concern.
ci has nu furtncrr lnforllldtlon (SR)
VPuss>b>iity of metal fatigue/in-service failure in circumferentia'I WuldS ~
COnneCting SS pipe tO 'bOX'anaerS Prddtsetialsn IsreSSLlre IO meet weekly quotas causes welding continuously rather than, allowing to co
~
~ siss Ittlgttt ctlcovl agc Us IrIIJ LCLessive amperage and larger weld rod.
Nany.of'hese hangers have excessive weld metal (cg
~ I wL'IU fof p pipej.
iianger design uoesn't allow for pipe expansiun.
Both un>ts Reactor Bldg, Aux, and 'race~ay'."
ISS) dEIx dnchor end plants may be stl essed duc to extended wc!ding.
Example may be found Jt el. 687'n tunnel of f2 pipe chase."
(Sk)
"Bellefonte:
A ues>gn defic>cncy has a 'wrong weld'equired on box hangC S-wlhltCh, If pel'formed per dcsfgn, causes the weld to run )nto the p>pe (SS or carbon steel
'code pipe).
Const. Dept. concern.
CI nas no further fnfbrlnatfon."
(SR)
XX-85-UBO-U03 (shared with Subcategory 50300)
VV IIL litt lllsn nn=vv=vvv=vvv IS C ~
VI II X
X "Sequuyah:
A design deficiency has a '~rong weld'equir<<d on box hangers which Lf pewforIEled pcr design, causes-the weld to run into ttle p>pc (SS or carbon steel code ptpc).
Const. Dept. concern.
CI ilas no fut ther Informat'o (Sk nbrOWnS Ferry:
A deSign deflCienCy naS a 'Wrong Weld'equired On bOX hangers wh>cn, if performed per design, causes the weld to run into tile pipe (ss or carbon steel code pipe).
const..
UepL. concern.
cl ilas nu further Infurlllation."
(SR)
Addressed in Elclllcnt 222.5 SR/HO/SS indicates safety related, not safety related, ur safely signlf>cant pcr dcterminatiun criteria In the ECTG I'rngram manual Jnd JPPIILIl hv TYA befnre eve lssat Innc
" i20-8 (I2i Ogiilgj
CONCERN ELEHENT NUHBER ATIAOIHENT A EHPLUYLE CONCERNS Fbit SUBCATEGORY 25500 PLANT APPL ICABILI TY l.OCAtlON
~N wtlt<
6 f IILH CONCERN UESCRIPTIONi REVISION NUHBER:
4 PAGE A-3 OF 5
222.2 IN-85-316-UUS MBH "Pipe support design by ENUES puts excessive tieat and weld on circixiiferential)y restrained small bore pipe
( I" fillet).
Uesign cuncern; one e'xample:
RB2, Accuiiwlatur il, 7)6'le. pipe, support 4/n-UuO-63-3g.
CI has no further information Uept. concern."
(SR)
IH-85-405-OU)
(shared with Subcategory 50300)
(Shared with Element 222.))
IH-85-b)3-001 (shared with Subcategory 60300)
IH-8S-672-001 OM-85-003-00)
HBN MBN "Pussibil sty of iaeta) fatigue/ in-service failure in circumferential wulds.
Connecting ss pipe to 'box'angers.
Production pressure to meet weekly quotas causes welding ContinuOuS)y rather than allowing weldment tO cool.
This might encourage using excessive amperage and larger weld rod.
Hany uf these hangers have excessive weld metal (eg I" weld for 6" pipe).
Hanger design doesn't allow for pipe expansion.
Both units Reactor Bldg, Aux, and 'raceway'."
(SS)
"Therma) stresS cauSed by I/2"- I" circumferential weld on pipe to install box hanger.
(generic concern)"
(SR)
"uux anchors on stainless pipe requires extreme heat lu complete the
~elding process.
This weld generated heat is applied fur extended periods.
The pipe could be weakened in these areas.
This condition exists tnrough out both units.
However examples may 6<< fuund in Unit
)2 reactor at el. 692" inside reactor area door."
(sR)
"T)ie box anchors on the 3/4" and I" stainless pipe (no further lOCatiOn detai
)S knOwn) are OVer-engineered.
CI iS COnCe'mud that when, 'all that metal is welded on', the pipe has to geL so hot tiiat it could adverSely aff<<ct the pipe material.
Cl has no further inturmation.
(SR) 222.3 KBP-86-007-00)
(Shared with Subcategory 50300)
Ex-85-061-004 (shared with Subcategory 20400)
"dux anchors are improperly designed plait-wide.
Tiie design r<<quirus aii excessive airount of weld metal to be applied which could result in overheating of the materia) and resultariLly weaken the material.
consLruction Uepartment concern.
ci has no further information."
(sR)
"Urawings do not always sho'w complete details, i.e., specific weld size.
construction concern.
ci Iias no additional detail."
(sR)
SR/NO/SS indicates safety relaled, not safety related, ur safely sip>>I icant p<<r deierminaliun criteria in the ECTO Prugram nmnual and applied by TVA before evaluaLions.
27720-8
()2/Ug/87)
ATTACNNENT A ENPI.UYtE CUNCLRHS FUK SuuCAIEGUKY 25500 KEVISIOH HUNUEK:
4 PAGE A-4 OF 5 ELEKENT CUHCERN KUKBEK PLANT LUCATIUN APPL ICAUILIIY Lii CUHCEKH OESCKIPTIOHo 222.3 (Cont'd)
OE-ONS-8 (shared with Subcategory 10400)
IIPS X
X X
X "Two areas regard>ng design methous for pipe supports are not receiving proper consideration:
o Effect of baseplate'flexibility on anchor loads.
222.4 IH-85-305-N02 222.5 IN-85-log-002 X
X X
o Octa>ling methods for weids "
(SS)
Hki'slont sf ion tho fol lo
~
I Iscr
~.
~ ~.
r o r
~
~
~ ~
~
ro V ~ SVO ~ SSJ VVSsl Vs II
~ I wm I]II Kepul C
~ El QQ JUa-Vui ~
"Proof test not performed following field modificatiun of clamps to assn e that VenUrOI des l9sl SPeC ifi Cat iOAS Were nut C044lrumi Sed aS a
result to field modificat>on.
(SR)
X "Bolts replaced by welding to embedded nlates.
The Cl Is nf the opinion that the weld should be analyzed for carrying the entire luad (AUX 8uiidino 8 leV 747 ~ Or 757K IJ El 1 I '>\\ T..
I I I
meEEsus (correspond ence known) describe this condit>on.
Time frame was I., 1,.
IOU'I'l I Col vis I7
~ JUJ ~
poll/
222
! Hr85v 509=003 kgk X
X ohiSC Ninixxxn Weld Criteria is violated by NeEEEo E44011-01.'ames are knoisn."
(Sk) 222.7 IH-85-541-001 "CunCern.
HnrK norkona ronssisoc vol.ssnn Ioo KoA h rs
'I..
~
o
~
q
~ ~
v 4 \\ v Kvv vssv vvKlUso vss Iy Uls 'oliUolI tubing welds even though there is no interference from other srsslal lotions ~
This I eku lred welding on uniy two sides uf tubing exists throughout the site.
Example:
keactor P2, raceway 70g'iev.,
Ai 270, 3" Lub>ng.o (SK)
OOO IO CCC ~ IV Ili 85 Q70 00i KBH Concern:
keactor tZ, inner snell of dossle.
Tne requirements
- changed, after
>nSta liat>On - fran 3"X3"Xl/4" angle LO 4oX4VXI/2o 4 I'
~ an I weld sizes were increased accord>ngly except for the welds securing t iso hxslc En tho sonar chal 1
~ hsrh I rv orlr
~ ~
~ I.. ~...
I
..I r-v
~ cuvvv ~ vc
~ sse eoc
~ I e siaiiuQI zpip lug cunf>gurat>on.
iianyers support 2 IU" 9 lines and 2 U" 0 lines.
Jiiiu.'g85 (still inplucess wolk)
A rougll sKetch is ave>iabie."
(N)
Sk/NO/SS indicates safety related, not safety related, ur safeLy sign>f>cant per determinaLion cr>ter ia
>n the ECTG Prugroxl ma<lual and applied bv TVA ha fere aValssat ibnS I ~ IIIaI
~'ll i IC/U7/QE 7
0 CONCERN ELEHENT NUHBER A1TACUHENT A LHPLUZEL CUNCENNS FUN SUUCATEGURZ 2SSUO PLANT APPL ICAUILI I Z LUCN< <UN Lllll'IIN II N IILII CONCERN OESCRIPT ION REVISION NUHBER:
4 PAGE A-5 OF 5 222.11 IN-86-003-OUI 222.12 MBH-86-002-001 WBN "LI haS the concern that the weld specified for a hanger is undersized and w>II not support co<nponent.
Uetails known to qTC, withheld due to conf>dentiality.
Hanger located in Unit 2.
ConstrucLion Uept.
concern.
Cl has no further Information."
(SR)
"U-UUI type pipe support on safety-related system (Ex. AFM, SIS) have a welding-cauSed condit>on which produces an elliptical shape in the support tune.
Test>ng needs to De done to determine if.the distorLion of the SuPport tuhe cauSed overstressing in instru<aent/drain line it supports; Nuclear Po~er concern.
CI has no further information."
(SN)
~
5N/Nd/55 indicaLus safety related.
not. safety related, or saiuty s><3n>t >cant pur deter<<<>nation cr>ter>a in the ICTG Pro<gra<<<<<<anual and applied oy TVA uefore evaluat>ons.
27/ZU-8 (12/Ug/Ul)
'll 0
\\
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 8-1 of 33 ATTACHMENT 8
SUMMARY
OF
- ISSUES, FINDINGS, AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SUBCATEGORY 25500 Attachment 8 contains a summary of the element-level evaluations.
Each issue is listed, by element number and plant, opposite its corresponding findinqs and corrective actions.
The reader may trace a concern from Attachment A to an issue in Attachment 8 by using the element number and applicable plant.
The reader may relate a corrective action description in Attachment 8 to causes and significance in Table 3 6y using the CATO number that appears in Attachment B.
The term "Peripheral findinq" in the issue column refers to a findinq that occurred during the cour se of evaluating a concern but did not stem directly from an employee concern.
These are classified as "E" in Tables 1
and 2 of this report.
0107A-R65 (12/09/87)
Issues ATIACNNENT 8 SUNNANY VF ISSUlS, FINUINVSt ANU LUkkECTIVE ACTIONS FVi) SOUCATEOVNY 26SOU Fi<<dings HEY)SION NUNBEN:
4 Page 8-2 of 33 Corrective Actions oooooo ~ ooooooooooo Element 222.1
- Mrong Meld Design on 8ox Hangers
- 1ooooo*o~ oo ~ o ~ ooo SIIN (H/A)
S)IN a.
Mrong weld requ>red on box hangers (anchor plate).
If performed as designed.
weld will run into process pipe.
MDN a.
MDN issued Aonconformassce report INCH) 6/o4 in Ou/85 to acknowledge the misapplication of tne requirements specified iri drawinas 4/8)ix)-2 and 4181ivi Construction atleuipted to make a weld fOr the entire ionr t ~
Srr
~
rrtnr
~.rr t t ~
%.i t
~
~ r r ger ~
Sr rrar. ~rrr ~ ~rg uy ttr irrc yltricot ytyC/ 'ttl
~ IIC SSSSI anchor rear p)ate.
This resulted in the weld actually fusing to the process pipe.
Matts 8ar Office of Construction (OC) Perfurmed a
walkduwn of 46b box anchors that do nat shuts gap requirements between the rear plate and the process
- pipe, Ad
~ OOAd Ir6 as COnstructed buX anChurS iiitht itic possibility of weld fused to the process pipe.
Uf tne 146 anchors identified, 24 hao fused we Ids, /8 had the possibility of fused welds, and 44 were inaccessible for verification.
Uffice of tngineering
)UE) evaluated (kef. 2) 142 of tiie 14/t hnt tnyhni c inon ~ ~ s iorl t iii'
~
~.rr
~
~ rr r
X vr ~
~ Wtv rrtrX orto ~Irr ~
(2'-10-219 and 2-70-359)
Were nOl aCCeptau)e and required f Ic)d s eiioli lo rcmuvc the fused we)ds.
Furthermore UC volunteered to rework box anChor 4/AU60-61-81, but the remaining 'three box anchors, 4/AUisv-82-3, 4/A060-82-4, and 4/AU6U-82-5, were nut evaluated.
MUN a.
In its corrective aetio<<>>laa ICApi (TCAd-232,. 03/05/87) in CAID 222 01 MDN Rs sttd
~ ~
~
I..
~
t ~
i i
~ ~ ~
~ r>> itrototto its cVoiiioic itic sctmsosAs>>g three bux anChors (41AO60-U2-3, -4, and
-5) a<<d include this evaluation in the box anchor evaluation calculations (CE8-CAS-113).
This corrective action wi II be tracked by Problem identification report (Plk)
MBN MUP 8150, kU.
Three box anchors (2-10-219, 2-70-359, and 4/s 060-67-8))
have been reworked to remove the fused weld per construction work packages
- JO10D34, JU/UD02, and J061036.
Uox aacluit'78160 serirrt rls t tnnt r rn revised to specify gap requirements bctisceii liie
~ eor pliiic iield aAu the outcr
~ surface of the process pipe.
This should prevent recurrence of tiie prub)em.
the evaluation teain concurs with t)se CAP.
SubSequenlly, box anc<<or 4/d)00 syrii s iisawings were revised to incorporate weld gap requireme<<tS where butii the rear p.ate-of l:ie bux anChus aisd tiie process pipe are of the sang materia).
24680~( )2/Og/8/)
~
]
Issues ATIACttNtNT 8 SUtUIAHY UF
- ISSUES, FittUINGS, ANO CORKFCIIVE ACTIONS Fuk 5UBCATkGUHY 25500 Fsnd>ngs REVISION ttUMBER 4
Page 8-3 of 33 Corrective Actions E)ement 222. 1 - WBN (Continued) b.
Box anchor designs do not allow for pipe expansion due to extended fielding to the process pipe and may overstress box anchor ena plate.
NOTE:
The fo))owsng issue from Employee Concern IN-85-405-001 is addressed in Welding Project ~
Generic Employee Co'ncern Report WP-)5-.51)N:
- b. There
>s a puss>b>)>ty of the rear plate being overstressed in cases wnere th<< weld is fuSea to the process pipe.
b.
Corrective action "a" will also evaluate the overstress issue.
BFN The overheating caused by a large weld size could produce metal fatigue/in-servtce fat lure in circumferential welds.
BFN BFN a.
Wrong weld required on box hangers (ancnor plate).
If performed as
- designed, weld wiII run tnto the process pipe.
- a. Of tne Z4 anChOr arawingS (kef. 4) reVteWed by tne evaluation team, five do not spec>ty a weld gap or a "no we)d to pipe" note.
Ihey are 4/UI349-31/HU, 4781349-35/HI, 4782349-) 7/HU, 4183349-21/kl, and 4783349-29/H2.
Sim)iar findin9s were observed in the Nsks report (Ref. 41) and in the BFN response (Hef. 64) to potential genertc condition evaluation (NCH6264).
BFtt stated that it rev)awed all (3U) anchor drawings in torus attached, i'igorously analyzed, 6-inch and less diameter piptng systems.
- However, two torus attached piping anchors (478452-83/Hl and 4/8452-IbB/kl) were not included in the revtew.
Ouring the plant walkaown, tne eva)uat>on team observed tne pass)b>)>ty of weld fusion fur two anchors, 478452-)49/H3 and 478452-)50/HZ (w>th "no weld to pipe" notes on these anchor drawings).
A box anchor rear plate weld spec>f ~ed w>th a "no weld to p>pe" note is d>fficu)t to accv<<yl>sn for tne ent>re length w>tnout fusion to tne ptpe.
- However, two Bftt construCtion perSonnel
>na>cated in the interviewS
( IVA response to ttck b2b4) ttiat rear plate welds were acculyiish<<d wtthout fuston to the p>pu.
a.
In tts corrective action plan (CAP)
(TCAB-49))
>n CATU 222 OI dFN Ol, TVA cenxits to take the folluwing act>onst An engineering evaluation of 12 box anchors and affected piping will lie performed assuming localized weld fusion to pipe.
Ihese 12 box anchors were identified in BFN's review of the 40 box anchors freya all BFN plants whose design drawings are ava>)able and include two box anchors (418 452-83 and 478 452-168) that were omitted frea the previous genertc condition review.
If the engineering evaluation cannot confirm the acceptability of localized weld fusion, a field walkdown will be performed to ascertain whether weld fus>on actually exists in that support.
lf the walkdown cannot show that there is no weld fusion, the support will be dtsassernb)ed and mudtfied as necessary.
24680-H17 (12/09/81)
ATTACiUitNT.U SUHKAKY UF ISSUt.S, flMUINGS, RMU CUKKtCTIVE ACTIONS FUK SUBCATEGOKY 25500'EVISIUNNUMBER:
4 Page 8-4 of 33 Issues Findings Corrective Actions Element 222. I - BFH (Continued)
The evaluation team reviewed BFN installation procedureS (Kefs. o, 8, and 9) to deterruine whether they provided Construction with guidance wn<<n anchor drawings did not specify gap or "no w<<ld'to pipe" nute ior rear plate weld.
The team found that tiie ducuia<<nts did not provide any such auidance
.Pipe supports for seismic class I pipill9 2-1/2 inches In diaixeter and larger issued before
- 1980,
~hose drawings are nnt available wi l i bss evaluatsssd ssnsd>>r the NKC OIE Bulletin 79-14 program.
uuppos ts ful sclsiNIc cia'ss I pip lllg I<<ss than 2-I/2 inches in diameter and supports for class 2 uver class I piping will be evaluated under tiie small bor<<
.program and class 2 over class I
- proormn, Knx anrhns 9 iileniifissl siisrisin thc walxdown performed in these programs i 1 1 Sn
.s i"
~
~
.ss
-' -....... ~
~
~
~
>>e ava suaaau asia us aisub Il Ivil<<U ax described above.
Pipe support. design personnel at BFN have been made aware of the pot<<ntial implications of this drawina detailing defiCienCy.
In addition, tO enSure future uniform and prop<<si dnsign of bsov anchors at BFH, Uesign Criteria BFN-50-s25 asnd the Pip<<Sigiport iiiss19i1 Handbook for BFN are also under review.
THese actions wilT be sufficient to prevent recurrence uf this deficiency.
The isval oat lop Ze~i rnncssrs ws i i~
~ is>> CAp b.
Box anChor desions dn nnt allnw for pipe expansion due to extended usslslinn an ann >>mr>>vv n<n>>
snn >>vs
~
u vss
~ ss W vlArsJ is ~ isv ass>>
>>say overstress box anchor end plate.
NOTE:
The following issue from Employee Concern IN-B5-405-001 is addressed in Melding Proiect-Generic Employee Concern Kepurt MP l5-SIIN h
There is ~ nossini lity uf the r sar plate sbeing overstressed in cases where the weld is fus<<d to the
'process pipe ~
b.
Corrective act INi "a" will alsu evaluat<<
the overstress issue.
The overhieatii19 caiiscd by a large weld size could produce metal ifatigue/in-service failur<<
in circumferential welds.
24bB~( IZ/09/Ul)
Issues ATTACttHEHT 8 sUHHANr oF IssuEs, Flttulttds, Ahu CuxKLCTIVE ACTIONS FUit SUBCATEGUkr 25500 Findings RE'VI5 IOtt tlUHBEK:
4 Page 8-5 of 33 Corrective Actions Element 222.1 - SLN a.
@rung weld required on box hangers (anchor plate).
If performed as
- designed, weld will run into the process pipe.
SLN a.
The 30 box anchor drawings (Kef. 5) reviewed by the evaluation team did not specify a weld gap or a "no weld to pipe'ote between ttie rear plate ana the process pipe.
In response tu ttie ttBN potential generic condition evaluation ifor Ncx u2u4) 1821 U5122U uulj, BLN indicated that this condition does not exist.
Four anchors were observea to have a gap of I/32-inch'r less between the rear plate weld and ttie process pipe.
ho fused welds were evioent frost the walkduwn performed by the evaluation team.
However, general note 2u on drawing 308uuo7-00-3, R6 states "the weld joining the rear plates
~ma be terminated 3/8 inch from the surface of the pipe,"
inaicating an uptiun for Construction.
Thus, tne pOSSibility Of weld fuSed tO the prOCeSS pipe exiStS.
The evaluation team reviewed BLH installation procedures (Kefs. 7, 8, and g) to determine wtiether they provided Construction with guidance wtien anctior drawings aid not specify a "no weld to pipe" note for rear plate weld.
The team found thaL the docixxerits did riot proviae any such guidance.
BLN ln its corrective action plan (CAP)
(TCAB-617) in CATD 222 01 BLN 01, TVA couiaits to the following actions:
All installed box anchor welded rear plates will be reinspected for weld fusion to the process pipe and repaired as required.
General note 26 on drawing 3080067-00-3 will be revised to state ttiat the weld joining the sectiun of rear plates may be terminated 3/8-inch from the surface of the pipe to assure no weld fusion between the process pipe and the rear plate.
The evaluation team concurs with this CAP.
b.
Box anchor designs ao not allo~
for pipe expansion due to extended welding to the process pipe and may overstress box anchor end plate.
NOTE:
The following issue from Employee Concern IN-85-405-001 is addressea in Melding pro]ect-Generic Employee t:oncern Keport NP;15-stiHt The overheating caused oy a large weld size could produce metal fatigue/in-service fai lure in circumferential welas.
- b. There is a possibiliLy of Lhe rear plate being overstressed if the weld is fused to tne process pipe.
b.
Corrective action "a" Mill also evaluate the overstress issue.
24680-K17 (12/09/87)
Issues ATTACIIHtNT 8 SUHHARY OF ISSUES>
F INUINGS> ANO CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FUR SUUCATEUOKY 25500 Findings REVISION NUHBER 4
Page 8-6 of 33 Corrective Actions 11*1111*1*1*1111*1 Element.222.2
- Box Anchors with Excessive Nelding 11111111111111111
~
~
Me ding on I/ox 4nchors I or 3/4-inch and 1-inch diameter stainless steel piping is over-engineered.
Note:
The overheating due to larue weld size vill affect the pipe material will be addressed in U
ls>Isa n ~'
1 esvi
~ su PI VJLI I I>4>>4> >I Employee Concern Report NP-15-54N.
b.
Peripheral finding.
54N a.
The evaluation team's revie~ of the sample of engineered bOX anChOrS (Kef. 11) 4nd Slandaru i>nX ane!!nr 4?8100 series drawings did not find that tiie welds specified b&tW>s>sn thn nrnrncc
>siss as
~
> ~.
1.,
~
r rv ssv
~ sac
~ I vl>I >a>4>c 14> u over-engineered.
The welu size ('ull penetration) speci>>ed betweer!
tn!e proaeSS pipe ano i,ne front plate on the box anchor drawings (Kef. Il) is cunsistent with the ancnor design criteria (Kefs.
12 and 13) and code (Kef.,48) requirements.
b I/4 inoh f'lllei vela> cnot ~ f>sas>
hv>
assam
>4 r
I and the front plate on box anciior 1-H2U-330/R5 is p itted pe-the TVA anchor d!esiyn criteria (iiefs.
12 and 13).
- However, the requirement for using the appropriate Stress Intensification Factor (SIF) is not complied with in the pipe stress analysis.
No calculazjon for box anchor I-iQU-330/R5-was available to verify that the fillet weld iS adequate.
S4N a.
Hone required.
b.
In its corrective action pian (CAPj (TCA8-063) in CATO 222 02 S4N 01, TVA co!r!!its to perform calculations to verify the adequacy of the I/4-inch fillet weld between the process pipe and the front piate for anrhor 1 82n 330 Stresc levels in the piping system will be Veiled tO ef!Si!re th4( thiy are with!!i the code allowables when the stress intensification factor (SIF) is applied at the location of anchor 1-H20-330.
To establish this occurrence as an tsoiaf edl cace a r anslom s~~le of o
anchors from various.systems (including 2-AK>r-diameter pipe and smallerj wiil be examined to verify the as-constructed wein.
If a fillet weld is found between the process pipe and the front plate, ttie use of an appropriate stress intensification factor (sIF) in the piping analysis wili be verified.
In case t!ie SIF was not considered, furti!er evaluations will be made to determine if the stress levels in tiie prpiny system, at the location of the anchor, are within the ailowable code limits.
In addition, the adequacy uf the fillet weld will be verified'.
The sax4!le size will be eXpanded if a Sinnif!Cant nigher Of CaSeS are found ~here a full penetration weld 24680-R
/Og/8/)
0
Issues Hl IHCIINENl 8 bUNNAHY OF
- ISSUEb, F INUINGb, ANU CUkkI.CTIYE ACTIONS FOk bUUCHTEOUKY 2bbUO F lndlugs HEVISION NUNUEH:
4 Page 8-7 of 33 Corrective Actions Element 222.2 -
SQN (continued) between the front plaLe and the pipe is substituted with a fillet weld and the required SIF is not considered in the piping analysis.
lhe welds found deficient will be strengthened.
Changes in pipe supports are now handled by field ciiange requests (FCks) and variances.
This should provide the necessary control by Engineering for this type of design change and should prevent recurrence of Lhe problen.
The evaluation team concurs with this CAP.
MBN MUN MBN a.
Melding on box anchors for 3/4-incn-and I-Inch-diameter Stainless steel and for all sizes of carbon steel piping systens is over-engineered as stated in Employee Concerns OM-85-003-001, MBP-Bb-007-001, and IN-U5-316-005.
Note:
The overheating caused by large size will affect tlie pipe material weld as stated~in Employee Concerns and will be addressed in Melding Pro3ect-Generic Employee Concern Evaluation keport MP-15-SQN.
Iianger (box anchor) design is improper and does not allo~ for pipe expansion as stated in Employee Concern IN-Bb-405-001, addressed in this subcategory report MUN Element 222. l.
BFN BFN The evaluation Learn's review ui Lhu smnple uf engineered box anchors (Hef. Ib) and standard box anchur 478100 series drawings did not find thaL the wulus specified between the process pipe and tiie irunt plate were over-engineered.
Ihe weld size (lull penetration) specified between Lhe process pipe and the front plate on box anchor drawings is cunsistent with Llic anchor design criteria (ket.
13) and thu cude (kef. Ib) requiremenL.
a.
None required.
BFN (N/A)
BLN (N/A)
ULN ULN 2468D-HI7
(}2/Og/87)
Issues AT.fACKKLNT U-SUHHAkY UF lSSUES, F lkdlitdh, IINU CUKKECTIVE ACT!ONS FUR SUBCATt,00!LY 2SSUU Findings kEVlSlUN NUMBER 4
Page 8-8 of 33 Corrective Actions 111111111111111111 I
Element 222.3
- OrawingS Uo Not Always Show Meld Size 1111 ~ 1 ~11111111*1*'
~
'SQN a.
Pipe support drawings do not s!viue ct it 1 verso oouo Il ~ ~ uulu ~ !1t particularly weld sizes.
b.
Melds are not detailed properly on pipe support drawings MBN Note:
The issue of the effect of base plate flexibility on anchor bolt design is not being considered; it,is discuSSed in Constructiori Suocategory 10400.
a.
Pipe support drawings do not always shott a)T UetaHS, particuiariy weld sizes.
TSSueS*a aria b.
Tne concern is valid as SQN pipe suppurt drawings (kef.
- 11) do not always show complete details such as weld size, type, etc.
ln spite of the above incoiaplete information, the actual pipe Suppoi't irISLollatiOAS (KCI, IU) 4re Complete and the welds are adequate.
SQN nas coin!!itted tb a program plan for conversion to configuration control drawings to correct the problem of incomplete details on design drawlogc MBN
- a. keview of a sample of 30 Matts Uar pipe support drawings (Kef.
11? Indicates ttiat Lhuy do nut always show required welds for all support component ioints: e.u, two pipe supports (4?A400-11-4U/k3 and 4?A4b4-4-c/k'I!) were found whero retlu !red welds tor one connect Ion f.,
were not sho~n on the dr~~ings.
!lot!ever, note gg of Dfaiiiiig 4?i!060-1 Iiz/R3 allows Cuf!structioo to use a
specified point weld on other similar joints on the support unless otiierwise specified.
As-built welds for the two supports iueotif ted above were verified ikef. IUI in order tO deter!nine that Construction had interpreted odto gg Of drawii!u 4?AO!tb I N2 Curr rt!y lA adul'tiGA ~ )ASt41 l4tlort Ol Iei!L4L!un uf SuppurC components
>>as not specified on two suppurL drawings (4/A400-11-47/k3 aod 4/A400-11-4U/kJ).
SQN issues a and b.
ln Its corrective action plan (CAP) izrAR t!21) to rdtit a>2 i!i Ct!tt ni iuo coat!tits to documenting modificatiuns to the suppol Ls ull coiifigurat loA coiitro I drawings.
This will be done in accordance with SQN procedures S!1EP-13 and SQEP-17.
The evaluaLiun team coi!c!!rs with Lhe CAP, MUN issues a aod Li
~ Io itc rorrectivo
>r
~ tr~n ot i IAAPl (TCAB-252, 03/11/U?)
in I:A'10 222 03 IIBI1 0 t ~
TVA couttti tS Lo rev i Se Support drawings 4?A400-11-47 and 4/A40U-11-40 to show the orientation of tlie lugs and to revise support drawing 4?A4UO-21 to show an all-around weld.
The currect IOCtallatiuo OF tiio Iu sS andi the all-around weld has been verified uy fiilu Walkuowrl, TVA alii Issue! pi'Obie!!i identification report (PIK) MUN MUP 8?o0 for Unit 1 and i'lk MUN MUP U/6U for Unit 2 tu correct all safeLy-related engineered pipe support, drawings for these types uf.
inadequacies and to t!!ake any support modifications atoI/ur draw!i;g et!angus as required.
I T
246
( 12/09/87)
0 ATTAC)INLNT 8 SUNNAKY of IssUEs, FINO)e's, ANU coKKEOT)vE Ac)IUNs FOX SUUCAIEbVKV 255Ou REVISION NUNUEk:
4 Page B-g of 33 Issues f indlngs Corrective Actions E)ement 222.3 -
WBN b.
Welds are not detailed properly on pipe support drawings.
WUN
- b. 'Welos are generally found tu ue deLalleo properly.
In One inStanCe, COnflluting fillet weld detail (all arOund and two sides) was found for the saaIe cunnection on pipe support drawing 47n400-d//K3.
To prevent recurrence of this deficiency, Watts Uar pipe suppurL designers will be made aware of Lliese inadequate detailing practices by a meaerandum.
BFN The following issue from concern OE-IINS-8 is in the scope of the WBN Construction Subcategory 10400l Tne effeCt Of OaSe Plate flexibility on anchor bolt design is not being considered.
BFN BFN The evaluation teaIa COnCurS with the CAP.
a.
Pipe support drawingS do not always show all details, particularly weld sizes.
b.. Welds are not detailed properly on pipe support drawings.
NOTE:
The following issue from Concern OE-IIHS-8 is in the scope of the Construct,ion Subcategory 10400:
The effeCt Of"baSe plate flexibility on anchor bolt design is not being consideied.
Issues a and b.
O Keview of a saayle of 35 UFN pipe SuPPort drawings
()Ief. 17) has deinonstrated that the Meld details are ceaplete.
o BFN has implemented a prograIa plan for processing diawlng discrepancies (Kei. 4g) and for converting to configuration Control drawings (Kef. 50] to correct the prOO)eIa Ol InCOaIp)ete detailS On ueSlgn draWingS.
0 UFN nas laipleaIented LNI: NKL IL. Uul lutin 79-)4 program to verify tne as-construCted cunflguratlon and Create coflflgul aLlon coIILI'u) dl awlngs Illls wl I I a)so correCt the prob)ea of incoIap)etc det.ai ls on design drawings.
Issues a and il~
In its corrective action plan (CAP)
(TCAU-48b) ln CATO 222 03 BFN Ol, IVA comaits to take the following actions:
Pipe supports for seismic class I
piping 2-)/2-inches in dimaeter and larger installed before 1980 wil) tlave the drawings generated or verified for all three units at BFN using field walkduwn information under ttie NKC Oli:
Bulletin 79-)4 prograIa.
Supports for seismic class I piping less than 2-)/2-inches in diaaioter and supports for class 2 over class I piping Mil) be eva)uated under the small bore progrma and the class 2 over c lass I prograa.
Pipe support drawingS issued sin'ce
)980 for the long term torus integrity program (LTTIP) and the control rod drive (CRO) piping system from all three units are not subject to Bulletin 79-14 verification.
A randomly selected saIaple of support drawings for 24680-k)7
()2/09/87)
Issues AIIACINENIil SUNNARY OF ISSUtS, FINUINGS, nNU CUkkECTIVE ACIIUNS
. FUk SUBCAIEGUKY 2b>DU
-Findings REVISION NUNDEK 4
.Page U-IU of 33 Corrective Actions Element 222.3 - BFN (Continued)
LTTIV and CRD piping system free all three units will be reviewed to determine drawing detailing discrepancies.
If an enuineerlno evaluation determines that one or more of the discrepancies affect gualificaiion of the correspunulng
- supports, a Cni)k <<ill be generated and the sample wiii be expanded accordingly.
A memorandum will be'rel<<ased to all Drowns Ferry Engineei ing Proiect (UFEP) piping support designers reminding their nf hs
~
~ ti i
.C
.. ~
~
~
.s VI lII~
leyVI lull@'6 VI Ni4h llllJ lil4 ul OWIIIIJ details complete and accurate.
In addition, tne Site iiirector Practices DF-SDSP-9. I and UF-SUSP-9.2 for processing drawing discrepancies and configuration control drawingS, respectively, have been in4iiesilnted.
Ihese actions a.e expected to prevent future recurrence of these deficienci<<s.
Ihe evaluation tean concurs with the CAP.
i i
24680 I2IDg/87) t
ArrACKNLKT 8 SUNNAKY OF ISSUES, F IKUIKUS, AUU LUKKLCIIVI.ACTIONS FUR SU))CA)LOOKY 2SSUU kEVISIOH BUNBEk:
4 Page B-ll of 33 Issues F indings Corrective Actions Element 222.3 - BLH a.
Pipe support drawings do not always Show all details, particu)arly weld sizes.
BLK
- a. keview of a sample uf support drawings (Kef. I/)
indicdteS tndt they shuw CumP)ete uetai)s, partiCularly weld sizes.
BLK a.
Bone required.
b.
Melds are not detailed properly on pipe support drawings.
KOTEi The following issue from Concern OE-IINS-8 is in the scope of the Construction Subcategory 10400:
Effect of base plate f)exibi)ity on anchor bolt design is not being considered.
- b. Meld syndio)s for twu support urawings (zCK-NPKG-0)og/k4 and IMO-Nh<G-)04o/KZI were detai)eu witn ZS (two sides)/3s (three sides) notations and do noi. indicate which two sides/three sides require welding.
The evaluation team further revie<<eu tne installation specificdtlons (kef. g) to determine whether dny interpretation of twu sides/tiiree sides weld is provideo for Construci.ion.
Tne review of i.hese uucivaents revealed tnat nO SuCh interpretatiOn requirea~ntS Were pruVideu for Construction.
Iherefore, tnere is a possibility of misinterpreting such wl )d notdtlons silvwn in support drawings.
b.
In its corrective dctiun pldn (CAP)
(TCAB-b)8) in CATU 222 U3 UL)i Ol, TVA CWmitS tO the following actions:
From the supPorts that have a)ready been installed and inspected, a smip)e ui 64 welded connections, with 2S/3S in the tail of tne weld syinbo)s in the design drawing, will be random)y selected for field wa)kdown to determine the as-bui)t weld configuration.
This configuration wil I be compared with that uSed in the deSign calculation to ascertain if misinterpretation of the weld symbol hdd occurred.
If misinterpretations are found, a generic review will be performed to determine additional corrective action.
An interpretation of the 25 dnd JS in the tail of the weld sebo)s will be incorporated into the general notes fur drawing series 3GA UUS9-X2 fur supports not yet installed or inspected.
The Lead Civil tngineer will instruct Uellefonte civil section personnel to use standard AMS symbo)s on a)l future work.
01114*104I01I41410 Element 222.4
- Nodsfication of Cldn4is 0100 1 0 ~ AIAMN14040 The evaluation team concurs with the CAP.
()I/A)
Silk 24680-kll
()2/09/U/)
Issues ATTACIUIENT 8 SUNt(ANY OF
- ISSUES, FINUINGS, ANU CtikKECTIVE ACTIOliS FOR SUUCATEGURY 25500 Findings REVISION NUMUER:
4 Page 8-12 of 33 Corrective Actions Element 222.4 - MBN a.
Proof tests were not performed to assure that the vendor specifications were not compromised for the field modified pipe clamps.
a.
The modified pipe clamp (for pipe support 14-lkUR-k61) at MUN, which is silat lar to the clan!p identified by ScR SIINCEUUb85, had no documentation existing to qualify it.
Evidently, AO n!OOI !CSIS were
~lerfumned f IIQ
~
!h.
modification to, assure that venuor (Uerg<<n-Paterson) des igA~
! auf iCaiiuA, and SpeC IfICaL IOAS Wefe Aot coolpruansed.
Another modified pipe cia!!4I (for pipe support.
41AO50-3-92) that was unacceptable to the vendor was accepted by TVA by docINIIenting the enulneerinn JUSLIfication in the calculations LMUP 84UI21 OUIJ ~
Genera)
Notes 49, 64,
- 102, and lbl of 4/A050 series dI aWlr!gs ol lowed Const! Uct ion to suost itote components from another manufacturer for-Uergen-Paterson (UP) standard hanger componenLs withouL any further engineering (UNE) approval.
As a result, significant Condition Report (SCk)
MUN t.'tU 8654 [841 UOU516 001J was issued to a!toress the nfoblem.
Ibis issue wi I I addressed in MUN Construction Subcategory lliuu and, thefefQI e ~
!S r!QL addfeSSed ifi this fepuft ~
a.
In its corrective action plan {CAP)
(TCAU-254 in CATU 222 04 MUN Ul, 03/11/81),
TVA co!nlits to take the fol!Owiiig aCLIOAS Under the Unit I lianger and Analysis Update Program (NAAUP)! TVA will,ensure that all vendor-supp lied standard pip<<
c lamps, that were modified by fielding fear uracweis or other parts and by trinnling or cutting, will be evaluated.
this evaluation will be to qualify or revise these modified compunents.
This cori'ective action wiII be perfurul!.d anil tracked Under. Problem Identification keport (Pik) MUNMUP8158 and will include evaluat.'iofl Qf the pipe cia!I'j fil! plpc support 74-1kttk-k61.
A review was performed on Unit 2 (memorandmn from M. E. Sir<ltvnnn ~ c tn None were found.
I(owever, Plk MUNMUP8169 will be issued to evaluate and quaiify any Ilmdtf(cat tons to vendor-supplied standard pipe support conponents.
the Pipe Support Uesign Hanual (PSUtt) will be revised to require any modifications to vendor-supplied standard pipe sUppoft cokr<ponents to ue riualifil.'8 by the vendor or by appropriately qualified TVA designers.
This should prevent recurrence of pipe supporL coillponents being modified withuuL proper qual ificat iofl, Thc CVOIUatlon te&il Cotgui S Wtih this CAP 2468 (12/09/81)
nTTACliNENI B SUHHAKY UF ISSUtS, FINUIHGS, ANU CUKKECTIVE ACTIONS FOR MBCAIEUUKV 25500 kEVISION NUNBER:
4 Page B-13 of 33 Issues F >nd>>igs Corrective Actions Element 222.4 - BFN (N/A)
BLN (N/A)
BFH ULH BLN 1t41itklltAAAlljk1 Element 222.5
- Structural Steel Connection Uessgh/Bolts keplaceu Uy Holds 1I0 0 4i*4*A*4*l 1iA0 SqN a.
Hhen a mixed bolt and weld des>gn is made, the weld should be designed to carry the entire shear load.
- a. Pipe Support Design Hanual Sect>on /.lb.I.l stipulated that the weld des>go calculation
>s to be performed in accordance with the nmerican Institute of Steel constructlon(AIsc) code.
sect>on I. 15.10 of the Alsc code contains the design crateria for tne uSe of bolts in comb>nation w>th weld.
The intent vf Lh>s code is that, because sI>ppage can occur for shear forces
>n oearing-type connections, the relatlv<< rlgid weld w>II carry the shear load in tiie case of connections with mixed weld>ng and bearing-type bulLS.
Ihu reV>ew Of SIJN draW>ngS and calculations for m>xed bolted/welded connections revealed the following.
Draw>ngs 4/A050-I/K2 and 2/kb permit construction personnel to substitute fillet weld for concrete anchors when a surface-mounted plate oyerlaps an exbedded plate.
- However, UE approval
>s requ>red fvr such suvStstutlvn.
The calcuiat>on performed to qual>fy mixed bolt and weld connections for SCK suN Ctd ubUI (84I uhUIIU 021) does nvt satisfactvr>ly address Lhe inStruCLionS of pipe support design criteria.
Correct. analysss assulnptivns were nvt cons>dered
>n the evaluat>on vf mixed welded/bolted connectluns.
Uesign calculations fvr the Lwv supports (kef. 51) with mixed bolted and welded connect>vns selected for review could not be found in SLIH records.
SQN a
In lts gtl e action plan (CAP)
(TCAB-04 I~ C 0 222 05 50N Ul, TVA coumits ttfg fo iing a random sampling rogramsof 60 s
lates with combined 1~+3 b
c nections.
This r
dog>qppI selected by drawing re 'e< dng<fi I down for piping, HVA deRs
<ca a s, conduits, and stee ppfbrm ~
he Auxiliary Build g>> Cbntrol ~l 'ng, keactor Buildi (RB) shif]d&a RB crane wall, and rea tg cavity~
~'c. ~
The sampl jill+be'baffle by distribut>
g all shed('.t c
s applied on the basepl e tq ~ wel >
sample <<ill be cons>der hdpKal4' e actual calculated s
e s hu tlirt c d s less than the allo e
elan~
f o
failures are i ei
>Ii,g s xiple, then a 95 perce t
'v iu Ix:
v will have been establ s
y4 ur are encountered in tr mp e, hen th sample will be ex n ed until a 95 percent confidence e el Tn 95 perce t 24680-R17 (12/09/U7)
Issues ATTAClUIENT B SUNNARY OF
- ISSUES, FINUINGS, ANU CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
. FOR SUBCATtBORY 25500 Findings REVISION NUHBER:
4 Page B-)4 of 33 Corrective Actions Element 222.5 - S()N (Continued)
/
/'/jff~
nfereance ls achieved.
fer exaeple. lf apne ilure is encountered, the sample
/p~s w
d have to be increased to 93 to s,
4 ~pcs
~ Cnt coils IBCncc ICVe I In t co
- rmance, and so on.
If ey.rg ~dortngnayvyiiu~are encountered, the
- g-~pie sifg,gg~ac o the size of the w+fffphfacfea, QdP@~ra~af00 percenl M~,.,-,f/~~,..,
ln eee~ggg IQe sareas/jg~
~ ~ <<kd ln addition,
)
rgfumVH-86-ll provides'the
>ns c
s f es>gning structural connectilhffs utilize a combination of welds a
bo This problem in the future.
The evaiuat>on teara concurs arith the '.
246BD ~I2/09/Bl)
0 AITAuIMtNI 8
SUMMARY
OF
- ISSUES, FINUINL'S, nNU CUKNttflVE ACTIONS FUN SUUCAIELUNY BunUO NEVI SION NUMBER:
4 Page B-IS of 33 Issues I'indings Corrective Actions Element 222.5 - MBN a.
Mhen a mixed bolt and weld design is made, the weld should be designed to carry the entire shear load.
MUN
- a. Pipe Support Ousign Manual Section l. lb. I. I stipulates that the welu design calculation is to be perforined in accorda'nCe with the Anierican Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) code.
Section I. lb. IU of the AISC code contains tiie design criteria fur the use of bolts in comoination witn weld.
Ihe intent of this code is that, because slippage can occur for shear forces in bearing-type connections, tne relative rigid weld will carry the shear load in tiie case of connections with mixed welding and bearing-type bolts.
the review of MUN drawings and calculations fur mixed bolted/welded connections revealed tiie following.
Note 2/3 of drawing 4/AUbU-lti R/ allows construction personnel to substitute fillet weld for concrete anchor bolts wnen a surface>>mounted plate overlaps an embedded plate.
No additional Engineering approval is required.
The proper analysis assumption uf shear load distribution was not inade in the calculations performed to qualify inixed bolted and welded connections for NCN MUN S'KP 82/3
[SMP 830111 035).
PIR MUNCtUUb/3 (U41 Ubl22O Ulb) was issued to provide corrective actions to correct ttie design deficiency.
As a result ol this PIN, the following corrective actions are being taxen by MiINP.
o Coiiduct a field survey sarvpling of plates in whicti this condition exists to determine tne worst in-place condition KUN a.
No corrective action is required beyond the corrective action provided in Plk MUN CEB Ub/3 and i ATO 215 Og MUN Ol ior Matts Bar elenent 2lb.g.
o Evaluate the wurst case condition either by aii analytical procedure or by testing (if required) o Revise notes on drawing 4/AUSU-li) as required for future installations 24b80-R Il (12/09/8/)
Issues ATTIICttFILNT 8 SUHHARY OF ISSULS ~ FINUlfiGS~ ANU CUHktCTIVE ACTIONS Fox SUDCAIEOOHY 25oUO Findings kEVISION NUMBEki 4
Page 8-16 of 33 Corrective Actions Element 222.5 - WBN (ContInued) o Locate, evaluate, anu revise all surface;Iaountea plates fur which this condition exists, only if satitp)ing program results ore unacceptaule.-
o Comp)ete all design work per ECN 6194 (UI) and h1 itti fIIN Tiiis PIR, together with ti!e corrective action plan for watts Uar eletaent 2)5.9 (CAIU Bib U9 RBN o)), adequatelv provides the currective actions to correcL this prob)ett!.
BFN A memo from R. U. Barnett (pulicy xtemorandum PH Db-)l)
<< ~
~
~ ~ >> I
~
c
~ sc
~
IJ ~ ~ ul 4 ~ Olla
~ ul Uaa I'iJilttlg IHal Itt!!411 n) 1 I nrn>>!clnc Irc ~
~
~'....
t..i mixed we)ded and bolted connections.
BFN DFN a.
When a mixed bolt and weld design is made, the weld should be designed to carry the entitle snea!
load=
- a. Drawing 45ANOO-2/R4 for condu!L supports a!!d drawing 478436.for pipe supports permit Operations/Construction personnel, without UNL. approva),
to subStitute fillet weld for concrete anchors when a surface-mounted plate over)aps-an-etrtbeddetf p)ate-.
-iiiis method, Therefore, does not ensure that the weld is designed tu carry the total shear load and any associated additional load (bending) as the case may be.
In additiun, Btli has other coaoonent supports with mixed connections
~bien do not have correct ca)rcutat)uns (Hef.
IU)
Di'iE clvi I p'Ipe SOPports section haS 1!)entif Ied five Category I pipe supports with mixed connections for uniL C (Ref. 29, POwbrhOuSe-ki.aCtOr Building - unit 2 HechantCa)l.
The calculations for tnese
-supports concluded that tne connections were adequate.
Itic eValuatian tea!it haS reVIOWed the Ca)CO)atiunS far th>>S>>
supports and has concluded that three did not conform to Section I. )b. 10 of ti e A)SC spucif cation.
DNE perfornmd.caicuiations for a typical enveloping case in accordance with tlie AISC code to See if Conduit supports-built after IJ84 following the general note are acceptable (Hef. 3)).
The case addressed an anchor n )at>>
over)apping an emuedded strip plate where two 1/4 tnrh ili>>niit>>c
>nr lrirc nr n
I
.. ~
~.-..
I
~
Ii 8
'4 0
c I%
I
~ c Ii ~ a% eu Oy na lie>> ~
~ Iia calcu)atiun, wnicti appeared general)y saLisfactory to the a
4 Sue faCe li4unted ii>>SCplates Itt al I safety-related structures at BFN, which have we)os to unoerlying embedded plates substituted fur concrete anchors, will be qualified in accordance with policy memorandu!4 PH Uo-Ilt and !nodified as necessary.
As-inStalled conditions wi)I lte iiS>>i! in Ih>> >>Valiiat inn and F ~ c id wa)kdowns will be perforated as nuudud to cstiibt tsit Lhc as Out It I.vnf IIJUIation.
Any results of previous evaluation activities used as a pa!t of this corrective action <<ill satisfy ttiu at!ove cotitnitments, and have retrievable docueentattott stated in SCk BFfi CEB 862),
RO policy meatorandutn PH 86-)F was issue!i on September Il, 1986 st'ating requirmxunts for design of baseplates with ).his type of end condition, and routed to support designers 'of various structura I features at HFN The.renuirenm!ents nf tilei po)dc metttorandtxti were incurpurated in the Civil Design Guide DG-C).6-.4 ~ Rl, >>iiusdgn of Structural Connections."
2468D-~) 2/09/87)
AT IACiiNENI 8 SeeAHY UF ISSUEs, F INUINGS, ANO COHHI.CTIVE ACTIONS FOR SUUCATEGUHY 25500 REVISION NUNBER:
4 Page U-ll of 33 Issues Findings Corrective Actions Element 222.5 - BFN (Continued) evaluation
- tean, concluded that the installations based on this note are acceptable.
Nuwevur, ttie evaluation team did nut find either calculations aduressing the governing case of one ancnor replaced by weld or other waixuuwn-uaseu evidence to 3ustify acceptance of the referenCed nOte in dr~wing 45AUu0-8.
In addition, the evaluation team found that tne COrreCtiVe aCtiOn required tO qualify aS-built miXed bolted and welded connections for SCH UFN CtU 8621 (B41 UoOb23 007) was limited to a drawing review and did nOt require field walkduwnS tO determine the aS-built COnfiguratiOn.
It alSO did nOt SpeCify if and when the proposed program will cover all affected seismic Category I components for each UFN unit.
The evaluation team also found that Attacnxient 8 of the engineering report for SCH UFN CtU Ub21 stated that the deficiency affected expansion anchors only; however, undercut anchors were not included in the report.
Evaluations will be perforated to document qualification of the substitution of welds fur bolts, which is permitted per note 15 on TVA drawing 45AUOO-2.
The evaluations >>ill address all possible loads fren multiple attactwx!nts transferred fran the imbedded plate to the concrete.
SCR UFN CEU 862),
HO, will be reviSed to include all types of structures, such as cable trays, NVAC, and piping supports, that have been or will be reviewed For this deficiency.
The remedial corrective action for the SCk will be aS Stated in part a. of CATO 222 05 UFN Ol.
the Engineering keport (Eil) associated with the SCR BFN CEU 862),
HO will be superseded by the Ek for the revised
- Sck, The SCk BFN CFU 8621, kl will specify that this deficiency is applicable to surface mounted plates regardless of the concrete anchor type used.
TVA's CAP (TCAB-427) in CATO 222 05 UFN Ol, as described will meet TVA's FSAR coaeitment to cenply with the hnerican Institute of Steel Construction's (AISC)
"Specification for the Oesign, Fabrication, and Erection of Si,ructural Steel for Buildings" as the design code for the structural steel and its connections.
The evaluation
- team, therefore, concludes that the stated CAP is an acceptable resolution of the concerns and should alsu preclude their recurrence.
246BD-HI 7 (12/09/Ul)
issues ATTitttNLttT 8 SUNNA'F TSSUBS, Flh81NGIS, AND CUkkfCTTVE ACT10NS FOk SUBCHTtGOkY 2>500 FindingS NEVTSIOM NUMBER:
4 Page 8-18 uf 33 Corrective Actions Element 222.5 - BFN (Continued) b.
Bolts and welds are useo in the sane
'connection to transfer loads from structural steel members to concrete walls.
These are not
,supposed io be mixed.
Al N
- b. Based on the collective experience of the evaluation
- team,
,it is known that occasionally bolts and welds are used in tne same connections to transfer loads from structural steel members to concrete ~alls.
iiowevert this may be used only after adequate engineering evaluation.
A beam haVing a Welded COOOICtiOO at OOP enll and a hase inn type-bolted connect~on at its other end is acceptable and ic nnt nrJr i AnJ
~
dill t
~
I 1x I ~ ~
~
~rr I
~ i~ ~ uvt.u tiy nl Jl Ji:I.t ~ Vll
~ ~
~ J IU
'b.
Mo corrective action is required.
iiowever, the existing designs will be reviewed as a part of corrective action as abnve.
a.
iihen a mixed bolt and weld design is made, the weld should oe designed to carry the entire shear load.
- a. Calculations (Ref. 30) reviewed did not address tne desion of mixed bolt and vt Id ronniirttnnS in Alrulddnle with BLM FSAk ctxlattxients (kef. 54).
Also, tnere were no ralciaeatio Is tto justaify tthlc gellerir riotes In BLN drawings (Ref. Bl), which allow welds tu be substituted for bolts.
ln addition, the subject calculations diu not address other design requirements associateo with substitution of welds for bo!ts, such as:
o-Change-of-bouindaf'y cutidttiutts foi base plates uesigned using ctxt4tuter programs was not considered.
o A ctieck of load transfer from eIxbedded plates to concierge wdS nut perfoimed.
Corrective a'ction for PlR BLN Ctu Bttll 1841 BO0408 015) does-nut c!earl Spa:ify-revis-ing existing standard detail drawings to prevent recurrence ln future irlstallations 81.N i.
CA' Bi.F 810125 iiev. U addreSSeS tetxs a,
, c, and o
CATU 222 05 BLN 01, and cottmits TVA to:
1.1 identify all =BLN surface-axtunted base plates iiihicti uti 1 tie mixed butts atid weld in the load transfer to und<<riying structures.
ivaiuaie ail mixed connections applying the American institute of Steel Construction's (ATSC) applicable
-design requirements.
The design Cdlruiat innS gill lie
~'VI>> <<A fnr adequate design considerations, especially Iit tliP foliowing aruasi o iiistribution ot the acting loads between weld and bolts o
Transfer of load from Pldti dded plate to concrete o
Change in base plate flexibility because of the revised boundary conditions (when welds are used for bolts) i
~'468 (12/Og/BT)
iiI Int',II%.NI U SUHKARY OF ISSUtS, FINUINGS, ANU CUKKt'CIIVE ACTIONS FOR SUUCAIEGUKY 255UU REVISION NUHBER:
4 Page 8-19 of 33 Issues F indings Corrective Actions Element 222.5 - SLN (Continued) o Cases where calculations do not exist.
(For example, soaIe drawings for mixed connections hav'e generic notes that allow, under certain conditions, welds to be substituted for bolts.
Documented calculatiuns for the qualification of these generic notes were not retrievable.)
l.2 Resolve conditions identified in l. I above utilizing verifiable methods of'oad distribution between weld and bolts.
tach connectiun will be examined to pass all specified requirements in the appropriate design criteria.
Ihe evaluation can be on a Case-by-case basis or through a representative sample of each group (such as cable tray supports, pipe supports, etc.).
Ihe sample size and metiiodolo'gy will be similar to that used in the engineering design disposition to katts Oar Nuclear Plant Ulk Number 33.
Sample group will be taken from similar type supports; that is, sample taken from cable tray supports will not be mixed
<<ith sample taken from piping supports.
Saayling will be biased toward critical cases, and it will count all attaclxuents comprising a
support as one connection.
I.8 Hodify mixed connections that do nut meet the applicable design requirements.
( 12/Og/87)
Issues AITACNNENT 8
SUMMARY
UF
- ISSUES, FINUINGS, ANU CURRECTIVE ACTIONS FUR SUBCATEGORV 26500 Findings REVISION NUHBER:
4 Page 8-20 of 33 Corrective Actions Element 222.5 - BLN (Continued).
'I l.4 Prevent recurrence of conditions stated in CAI)R BLF 870)25, Rev. 0 by revising applicable design taanuals ancl ales'tinn slesinn nersonnel aS foI lows:
o IVA will revise the Pipe Support Uesign Manual to incorporate tite AISC's code requirements for mixed connections.
o The TVA lead civil engineer will us i tn s
ss ssssnr jn I tn jl1 ltn'I teFns
~tn c>vil personnel alerting them of the design requirements for mixed connections.
Also, all designers assigned to ULN will be issued a
copy of Policy Heuorandum (PH) 86-I7 (CEB) and a controlled copy of the Pipe Ssanpnrt necign Manual TVA stated that all mixed connections designed
'or revised after February 6, I986 have used verifiable methods of load distribution between anchors
'and weld.
Policy Memorandum PM 86-17 (CEU) was issued in Seotember lgOo statintt requirements for design of basi plates its,t A
~ lt i
A... lw
~ '...
n
~ ~ ss rsl ~ Xeu uus uS ussu nusu uussssuus. sufsi TheSe design requ>renlents were Incorporated in Civii Uesign uuiue UG-C.I.6.4, Rev. I, "Uesign uf Structural Connections."
2.
CA BLF 870090 iiev. I addresses itssm e o n
I t
I tt.UI coamits TVA to:
24680-R
/09/87)
AlfALNHEN1 0 SUHHARY UF
- 1SSUES, FlNUlkliS, ANU CUkkECflVE ACflONS FUK SUBCATEGUkY 25o00 kEVlSIUN NUHBEk:
4 Page B-21 of 33 issues Find>nys Corrective Actions Element 222.5 - BLN (Continued) 2.1 Review the design documents of all BLN structures used to m>Ligate the effects of pipe rupture (jet impingement barr>er Hark 1-2 and the additional barriers shown on Oesign Urawings 4kk U550-X2-1, -2, -3, and
-4 are included) for cenpleteness, correctness, compliance with the applicable acceptance criteria, and consistency between design calculations and drawings.
The design calculations will address all applicable loads and load combinat,ions ihcluding uut-of-plane seismic
- loads, document the reconciliation of as-installed condition, and provide rationale for judgments that are not intuitively obvious.
Oesign documents will be revised or generated to achieve compliance with Lhe above requirements.
2.2 Modify structures as need to reflect the design requirements from 2. 1 above.
YVA's CAP (YCAB-612) in CA10 222 05 BLN Ol, as described, <<ill meet iVA's FSAk coaroitment to:
(1) comply with the American inst>Lute of Steel Construction's (AlSC) "Specificat>on for the Oesign, Fabrication, and E'rection of Structural Steel for Buildings" as the deSign COde fOr the StruCtural Steel and its connections; and (2) provide cenplete documentation for the qualification of safety-related structures,
- systems, and cevponents.
-Yne evaluation
- Leam, therefore, concludes LhaL the staLed CAi'4680-Ril
( 12/09/0/)
ATTACHHEHT B SUHHAHY OF
. FUK SUBCATEGORY 25500 RE VI5lOII HUHBER I 4
Page B-22 of 33 issues Findings Corrective Actions Element 222.5 - BLII (Continued) b.
Bolts and we)os are used in the same
,from structural steel members to Co<<crete walls These at'e not SuppOSed tO be mixed.
c.
Peripheral findino.
- b. Based on the coliective experience uf the evaluation
- team, It iS xnown.thai uccasionaiiy buiis and weldS are uSed in the sa<ne connections
.to transfer loads from structural steel members to concrete walls.
Iiowever, this may be done only after adequate enuineerinu evaiuatinn In as34<< Iinn, dncigii ra iran<at hn I'r'nn '.s I
So-ra-
,[B2) Bo040) 404] (Hef. 30) under seisniic out-of-plane
<oads need, ir< some a< eas, jusiiiicaiion fur results thai are determined by judgment alone.
is an acceptable resolution of the concerns and the peripheral negative findings that were identified during the Du%i nt<,4
~
~
I u ouuo ouse Ws Ouch t ~
uuu auluii >
a.
comply with the design require<<<ents; expansion anchor oolts has been used for transfer%'iifnP.JP&
Tll c caraitted tn thn fnl in i.,g shear loads from structural stee) members to coq4reke" ti'. II gpeggcciv)~ion plan (iAP) (TcAB-04g) wal ic Slnni firant I'nnri ~ t Io n Berm<< t I S<K< Sqh
<IrB u6ni ov pt
~rt g)c-.n u nh rss t<4l 060! I< 02<! <<aa tSS ed far the see Oyah PPnt t
intact'!ha<rap<st<ad
<<tts<<<and<<sty Selected because 4 s <mt Iu<
cvnd< l loll ex i sieu ai ihe Hairs Biar ih p>y hsyx<pies'oU< 51a)I@pgequacy<<<<<<A minimuxi p)ant (Hef. 24).
Calculations perforated for taxed
@.a A gl-b0 sax!pfhs'wif(-.ciip~aait<<ri~e conneci,ions on urawings'42AUSU, 4/nu5i. 4/AU52, 4/A~
>'<cjtei)ory 1 sy e<<<ha)4cgegjnplkaren
- 41A055, and 47AU56 (Hef. 62),
and for SCH SUK CtB BOO) ~~
st~)wc ures will inc)bhs <tnd"pRle
[B4) 860110 02)J, do nut satisfactorily cox<P)y with the
'osmic PPorti+PiPing,'HYfllr deSion COx<<iltment (Refso
- 2) and b31 and P<slirv <i<es<ixtrandixn dlsr<c~nrtrf I ~nuatc <<~tray an Pddrl-II 4841 06091I 0! 2].
plat<orna.
l*
nnlglnutpples siibgcct to th<e ac t de~sig<a <oaf'iii During a plant walkdown in tiie SUII Reactor Building, be structurally assesse<)'~acATC nce Severai miXed COnneCtian CundiijunS Were nOted by the with the AISC SPeCifiCatiun 5<:Ct evaluation team.
Tiiese connections support a )arge duct
- 1. 15. 10.
at El. It)U'ircling tiie reactur cavity wali in ihe annulus-area approximate) v at.azimuins 330'8 350',
and 10'.
Additiona) supports with niixed cunnectiuns were OOSnrVun drsrinn thu WalirdinWn I
246BO-2/Ug/Bl)
nl lnCINENI 8 SINHARY UF
- ISSUES, FINUINUS, ANU CURRECIIVE ACIIORS FUit SUUCATtGURY 25580 RE V IS I OR RUHOER.
4 Page 8-23 of 33 Issues F lodgings Corrective Actions Element-215.9 - SI)H (Continued)
Ihe l
tual design stresses in din computed and coivpared with th w
le stresses.
Connections found de gt in welding w> Il be strengthe 8
I necessary, the sdiiiple
>de wi I' e
a ded until IVA can at 95 percent confidence I
VL gt dtal s
95 percent of Lhe as b gix mn tions at Silk seeL th d ~gnire(lldPgine ts.
I'o p elude reiCrrence of this probleiii, IVA ll ssued d
c nxmxirdnduill PH Uu-7 'nstruck '< 'neers tu follow the AIS
'col,iu s
L>on dealing with the m
con dnd explaining its ratiu a
APPlicdtlo o ftj5slvit4 i thuds dre dn acceptable i
a Mf aXg~Qn as-built installation IVA's GAP. IILisi on this staLlstlcdl u t d williifio 'd detailed calculations r
n t e adequacy of Lh r~
te sdiiiples, which
- urn, 4 give d 95 percent conf iden u Llie e>>re population of the u
ed connection As a result, YVA will t its FSAR coamltment for the a
gory I compon nts at Silk.
Ihe evaluaL o
Leam conclude that the stated CAP n acce~5Te resolution of the con rn id should also preclude recurrence of ie proble>>.
24680-R I 7 (12IU9IUi)
Issues ATTAC!OIENI 8 SUHHAKY UF ISSULS, F)NU)NUS, I!NU CUKRLCTIVE ACTIONS FUk SUUCA)ttgOKY 2bbUU Find!Ags REVISION NUHUEk:
4 Page 8-24 of 33 Corrective Actions E)ement 2)5.9 - MBN a.
BOltS and weldS are uSed in the Same connection to transfer loads from I
structural steel members to concrete wa)ls.
These are not supposed to In
~ >>A vc e>>llncv ~
2468~( 12/09/87)
MUN dn Thie r VA i~no fromi R ~ ii. Prat tg LLrerd Civtt tngloeel, to the Civil design technical supervisurs under hlS supervisioo LU2o BbUbig U)9) stated tndt Tur future evaluations of designs, w!iere anchor iiolLS and welds are mixed, the weld must be ass!maud tu carry all the shear loads.
Ih!S iaemu did riot. request dA zvatiratioo for SOCI!
i lng nf nell%
%nil efdl f ~ ~%%%%%
dellgnl.
TVA Nuclear Safety Review Stafi'NSKS) iov<<st!gated t!ie sdnre subJect iur another cooct.rn in Il/Ub (lief. bb) dnd recuarrferraed verificatluo andlys!s tu ensure todt the bolt-repldcerrrent welds are daequate dt wUN.
As a result, TVn Ijhf'grsparl a Plk Wit!I I' Ul Ub/J !A )2/Jib dckr!ow)edglrig th'e einplOyee COnCern.
I!>>S Plit iaentif!ed tne inCOrreCt aesigr! dssumptioo uf the re)at<<a calcu)dtroos.
PIR corrective plan r<<quired IYA to investigate exisLing m!Xea Coring<<Clfons by Sdmp)ing dna eVaiuating in accordance with thi: o)SC Section I. lb. IU.
Tne evaluat!On teain has fouiiu that t!ie sdafPie cuosisted primarily of DlPe suPMurt CunoeCLiorls aitd did nut have an adeuudte represent,ation uf structural steel connect!Ons fur SOPPfJr+il!IJ P )dtfOnac IIYO auirt c
.I>>ll '
l>>f' I'ra I r ltlI ~ ~
trays dnd cuodu!LM.
Urawings 4UW904-2, k8 anu 48W904-3, RI4 show structura) steel framing for stedin generatOr aCCess platforinS oetweeil the redctur cavity dod t!ie redctur bulla!ng crane wall.
Octa! IS HK3, HKJA, HK4, HKb, HKSA, HK6, HK7, and HKU uf tne iatter drawing shuw b<<aring bolts aod welds in tne sane portion of the connections.
UrdwlngS 47AOSU-IK2, K I doa 4/AUSO-lt), It/ s!iuw gen<<ral notes for Suppol'ts Of cofaPOrleots Sur'h ac ill/ill a>>f'tc nininn
- SyStemS, e)eCtr!Cdl COnduiiS, rnid IAStrtargeut )ineS.
gee%tend tl'I I >>
I I I I I.. 'I.~..
r
~4 ~vr cd 4
%%>>v I ~
~
4 ~
~ vw NI!xe4 Vsc ol
!go I fs aditi weld's when overlapping an embedded plate.
To<<refore, cixnu!nations of weldis dnd boits have been useu dl MUN 'iil the same portion of the connections..
IA dridltioA. durinu the !nvestiud!.iong L!ie evaluation Learn found that calculation
[MUP 830420 UUI] fur the ctdlell fs sllgnl ~ t>>r c tel>>>%
ee>>II I
~.>>
rr e
I
~ t ve IIV~ Vnue Q% VCrh !I ~ Ilv~ VlI%It unconservatively assumes sharing of shear loads between bolLS drlld Wc)us rid'Sed Ori equal StiffneSS.
CaiCuidtloA (MUP 83U914 230] for the general notes uf 4/AOSO series urawings is also based uo th!s incorrect dssurapt!On.
Therefore, these cd)cu latiuns du nut c>a~i lv with Uie aesign carrnftment uf Fbok Section J.8.4.2. I, AISC Code, all%I iufr PI ~ I ld'4 grl>>IIII PM dl P
a.
To conYI)y with the design requirenrerits, 1YA has coonitted'to tiie following corrective action plan (CAP)
(TCAU-2)%J) in CATO 2)b U9 MUN 01.
IVA wilI use a
sLdtlsticdl metllod wltil selectt!d sda4gles tn elntdbl ish a%le ~%guar'v Aririrrlninfl!Olv tlg
- sdfnples,
~hich will be bids<<ri tuwdl'd
~evn Oc \\ Vsck ~ Wl ~ I I VVc~
a Yell Iccy v ~
safety-related systems located io di!ferent structures dnd wiii inciude tell%!
plate cuniiections supporLing p!ping, NVIIC ducts, electrical cunauits and trays, Jod platfOrmS.
In thiS Saaiplingl IYA will include saniples identified as a result ui rorrelr'I lvel art i%in f>>r thee Plk UJfk CE8 Ub/J.
Toe m!xed-connection sdarples i!illbc Siiiijel.Lett tii the dci.udl ueslyii loads and will be structurally assessed in accordance with Lhe AISC Sp<<cificatiuii Section I. 15. 10, taking Iota,dccuuot I!i<<
wt.la eccentriciLy and plate ll<<xibility, ds applicab!e.
The nnaxiinuin actual or eriveh>ping dew>>Jrr-stresses in welding will be coinputea drill compared with Lhe a) lowab)e stresses.
.Connections found deficieiit in weldiiig wi 11 be strengthened.
If Accessary, t!ie sdrnp)e size will be exuanded until IYA can dorm!!Strata with a 9b p<<rcent conf!dence
!evel LI!at-dt t >>asi -9'erce.gt of the as-built mixed conoectiuos aL WUN meet the ai.sign requirmacrrts.
To preclude recurrence of t!>>s prublma, TVA hdS iSSued a policy ancimrdioium PH 86-1/ inStructing engin<<<<rs tu follow he AISC cpecif fcatfon set l!Oei deed)!Al with the mixed connections nod exp)a!i>>llfJ Liie rdtiuoa)u of tiie sectiuA.
~
Issues ATTACINENT 8 SUNDRY UF
- ISSUES, FINUINUS, ANU CURREClIVE ACTIONS FuR SUBCnfEGURZ 25500 Find>ngs REVISION NUMBER:
4 Page 8-25 of 33 Corrective Actions BFN BLN (Addressed in Eienent 222.5)
(Addressed in Element 222.5)
Element 215.9 - WN (Continued)
BLN BFN BLN Application of statistical methods is an acceptable means of assessing as-built installations.
TVA's CAP based on a statistical method will provide detailed calculations for establishing the adequacy of Lhe selected
- samples, which, in turn, we'll give a 95 percent confidence level to the entire population of the mixed connections.
As a result of us>ng this methodology, TVA w>ll have adequate confidence in its FSAR comnitment to meet the AISC code for the safeLy-related components at MBN.
The evaluation team concludes that the stated CAP is an acceptable reSolution of the concern and should also preclude recurrence of the problem.
2468D-R 1 )
(12/Ug/82)
AIIACiiNENT 5 SUHNKY UF ISSUES, FINDINGS, ANU COkkECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SUNCATEGOKY 25580 kEVISION NUHUEK:
4 Page 8-Zb of 33 Issues Findings Corrective Actions
- 11111tttttttttttt Element'222.6
- RISC Hinimum Meld Criteria 1111111111111111tt SI}N a.
American lnstiiuie of Sieel Construction (AISC). minimum weld criteria were not always followed.
- a. Specific. memo E44Ull-Ol cited. in ti!e cuncern by the Cl WaS reVieWeO.
Tn!S n~atu indiCated that.
TVR nad herfnr!and weld qualification tests to the require!tents of the nu( !II 1 nlala I n,.a!44.,
~ l....c....!
4 ll..~...la
.- ~
~
R-1 v
O qua
~
~ ~j
~ e!e uae ul
~
1
~ lel We lU walla I Iul than the mini!tum sizes as required by AISC.
'the review I!f ihe TYA weld qual ificaiion test results by the evaluation tean! reVealed that Out all of ti!e requirementS of Section 5.Z of AMS Ol. I wer!l n!et.
Therefore, these teSt reSultS ar>> nOt SuffiCient tO qualify the weldS that do not meet the AISC minimum weid requirmaents.
Silk ln its corrective action plans (CAP)
(TCAB-006 and TCA8-042) In CATUs 222 Ob SIIN Ol and 02, TYA counits to the following actions:
a.
Kevise applicable FSAK'- sections and Frou a review of a sa!npie of pipe support drawings IUar 114 4
~
~
I
~
a
~
~
L 1a
..0 z-
- ~ ~
~ ~
IVI~
I 4 waaa Veal l W ~nea LII4l Jl!11 U lU llut~
III 4 I I
- cases, meet the AISC niinimma weld requireaunts as coniaiiieu to in tne design criteria and Fbnk (Nefs.
3Z and 33).
b.
Peripheral finding.
- b. Pipe suupurt calculat!ons Ikef 341 were not avai!able fur review tu determine if AS'ode caSe N-413 can be ayy l ~ ea 14 supports whose welds do nut ineet mini!a!an sizes.
The. evaluation tea!n ConCurS with the CAP.
2468D 12/09/87)
Issues ATIACINENT 8 SUNHAHY UF
- ISSUES, FINUINGS, ANO CORkECTIVE ACTIONS Fuk 588CATEOOHV 25500 Findings REVISION NUMBER 4
Page 8-21 of 33 Corrective Actions Element 222.6 - WBN a.
American institute of Steel Construction (AISC) minimum weld criteria were not always followed.
- a. Specific memo E4401)-Ol cited in the conCern by the Cl was reviewed.
Ibis miwe indicated that TVA had performed weld qualificai,iun tests to the requirements of the AWS Ul. I COde tO qualify tiie uSe Of fillet weld Smaller than the minimum sizes as required by AISC.
The review of the TVA weld qualification test results by the evaluation team revealed that not all of the requirements of Section 5.2 uf Aws Ul. I were met.
Therefore, these test results are nut sufficient to qualify the welds that do not meet thi AISC minimum weld requirementS.
From a review of a sample of pipe support drawings (Hef. 34), it was determined that HUN did nut, in all
- cases, meet the AlsC minimum weld requirements as cennitted to in the design criteria and FSAH (kefs.
32 and 33).
For the instances where the AISC minhnum weld requirements were not met, it was found that the weld sizing was properly performed using appropriate design IOadS and allOwable weld StreSSeS.
ThiS iS permitted per ASHE code case N-413.
BFN WUN a.
In its corrective action plan (CAP)
(TCAU-210, 02/25/81) in CAIO 222 06 WBN 01, TVA comnits to revise the FSAH and applicable design criteria to reflect the use of welds smaller than the AISC minimum.
This will eliminate the conflict between design criteria/licensing coamitment and actual practice for the adherence to the AISC minimum weld requirements.
A Problem ldentifiCation Report (PIR)
WUN WUP 8736 will be issued to accomplish this corrective action.
In addition, TVA plans to obtain concurrence of the Nuclear kegulatory Comuission (NkC) for the use of ASHE Code case N-.413.
The evaluation team concurs with the CAP.
UFN (N/A)
BLN ULN ULN (N/A) 24680-k I 7 (12/09/Bl)
Issues ATTACNMtNT 8
SUMMARY
UF
- ISSUES, FlHDlNBS, ANU CORRECTlVE ACTTONS FUR SUUCATEGURT 25500 Findings HEVlSION NUMUER:
4 Page 8-28 of 33 Corrective Actions 1111t111111111*t11 Element 222.7
- Kelding on Two Sides of Tubing 111111111111tttt11 Si}N (li/A)
KBN 54N 54N KBH a.
Square tubing requires only top and bottom welds. it is impiied that all-around welding should be utilized wherever possible, regardless of the loadino condition b.
Peripheral finding.
- a. TVA's Nuclear SafeLy Hevie<<Staff LNSRSi identified and visually inspected the pipe support cited in the concern.
A review by Iho I{5uS (I 85 Zlb KBNl-of th support calculation established that tne calculated s ress le els al e consel vat Ive iy low Ttie evaiuat ion team verified this NSRS finding.
The evaluation team reviewed design drdwlnuS and calculations for six other pipe supports (Hef. 35) 1OCated in tiie general area ritedi in Lhu ronrern.
observed that all "top,and bottom" welds for structural tubing were qualified, either uy-analysIS or by docuiaented engineering
- judgment, and ineet tne design requirementS SpeCified in deSign Criteria (HefS.
1> and 36).
- b. The evaluation team noted that TVA's weld analysis methodology employs an assumption Lhat the top and bottom we!d nattcrn I!.e.
two s'des of LublrIg ncldeu) hts the same uniform shear resistance over the entire length in both shear directions.
Ibis assut4ILIOii 1S aCCePLaole provided tne weld is. performed over the entire "length.
ine evaluation teati conilucted interviews (Hef. 37) witn COnStruCtiOn and Uuality COntrOl:14I:) to iietermine whai length is provided fur "top and uottoiii" tube welds.
ConctruCtinn ctaiod ic w~c cito practice tha'h weld wrap around the corner of the Lube, i.e., weld length cqiials tube widtri. ilc cunsiders Lnu tiiniuiuin <<eld length to be as describudiabove.
Tiie evaluatiun Leam, verified tne above welding practice by plant walkduwn of four hangers (47A450-ZO-U2, 47R5OU-4-60.
47A450-25-415, and 47A450 1 OU).
knno ron>>irocl h
In jic rnrrorc I n
~
c i t
Ir tnc
~
'aber
~ V% w o lul~ P ~ Qn IwI (TCAB-Z78,03/13/87) in CATO 222 07 IiBH Ol, TVA coiimits to review ali engineered pipe supporLs with tubes welded on two opposite sides under the Unit 1 Hanger and Analysis Update Prograt!
and a similar program for Unit 2 In ihic reVioW nniu cwn flot be considered in the, design calculation foi this icelu condition. Ali required support and calculation revisions, and necessary iaodifications will be perforited under these programs.
For the specific case of the weld in hanger 47A450-Zb-415-Hev. 0, TVA haS perforited
!Iow calculai,ious based on the flat. length as opposed I 0 I hl nominal wiuiii,uf tile tube which was used in-the original caicuiation.
it was uetern>>neu Liiai, Liie weld stresses do not exceed codd ailowable values.
I:
c i
24680-12/09/87)
ATTi<C<IHLNI d SUHH<LRY UF ISSUES ~ fINUINGS ~
ANU CIJKKLCTIVE ACTIONS fUK SUUC<<TEGOKY 25500 REVISION NUHBER 4
Page U-29 of 33 issues Findings Corrective Actions Ele<nent 222.7 - MSN (Continued)
During the plant walkdown, the evaluation team found that, out of the sampling of seven "top and bottom" weld joinLs exa<nin<<d, one weld (betw<<en
<Lems 3 and 5, hanger 47A450-25-4 15, KU) was not perfor<ned over Lhe entire length as specified in the hanger drawing.
Ine evaluation team performed a weld calculatiun (Ref. 5U) considering the flat weld lengln a>>d fuund tne weld adequate for the applied loads.
Similar cases of weld not provided iur the entire lengln may exist elsewhere.
Mhile it is anticipated ti<al the identified (two opposite side) weld condition applies specifically to pipe
- supports, TVA will implenent a sa<nplin<3 progra<n which covers all other areas
~here structural tubing is used.
A random stat, istical sample uf bO lube joints fielded on two opposite sides will be taken to establish with a 95 percent confidence level that 95 percent of such joints will satisfy design requiren<cuts if the flat lengths are used in the design calculations.
To prevent further iecurre>>ce ui this defiCienCy, TYA Cun<nitS tO reViSe the Pipe Support U<<sig>> Hanual (PSUH) to require designerS lo consider only the flat length for ~elding a tube un two opposite sides.
In addiliun, all Matts Uar designers and cneckers uf miscellaneous steel will b<< notified by n<e<<ora<<dum of this identified weld desig>>
requ<ren<cot.
The work identified in corrective aci,iun plan (CAP)
ICAU-21U in CAIU 222 ill MUN Ol, will be initiated a<<d Lracked by Problem Identification Report PIK MUN MUPU182 Kev. 0 for Unit I and PIK MU<i MUPU183 Rev.
0 iur Unit 2.
Cundiliun Adverse to Ouaiity report, CAOK ULI U/U09U
[UU5 U1Uol2 3IOI waS
<SSued tu determi<<e generic appl ical>> lity Lo oth<<r TVA plants.
The evaluation tea<n concurs with this CAI'.
UFN UFN (N/A)
BLN'LN ULN (N/A) 2468D-R11 (12/09/81)
Issues AITACIUIENT 8 SUNMANY Uf ISSUESs fINUINGS ~ ANU CURKECIIVE ACIIONS FUII SUBCAIEGUkY 25500 FlndIngs NEVISIUN NUHBEk:
4 Page 8-30 of 33 Corrective Actions 1111111111111*1 ~ 11 Element 222. IO - VerificatIon of-weld Securing the Pads to tnu Inner Shel I AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA SI)N (N/A)
NBN
- a. If it is deemed necessary to increase the size of a pipe support'-frame member and itS asSOCIatasl uelslc uhlrh rennssr tc it to a dome pad, then the yeld that ConrsCCtS islC affcCtYd pa4 to lne Innel shell of the dome should also be strengthened accordingly.
BFN SII>>
- a. lhe eyaluatien tssmA reyley>>sI Ilus ns insnal slee i/In calculatlonS prepared by CNICago Bridge Z Iron for tne SuppertS attssl
~ scu io lsse pauS s asisC I I ass lhe reV Iseu calculations prepared by IYA (kefs.
4U and 4I). It was coricluded thai IVA's evaiuailon of the increased design loads on tne affected supports correctly establisned that an increase In size for the b/l6-Inc>> all-around pad WeldS iS nui ruuuIred.
Ihere uas adeuuaie Strs nuth margin in the initial design.
BFN QBN
~
ssunc
~ cglu ~ s cu Ss, I
u (N/A)
BLN ULN BEN 2468
( 12/Ug/Uf)
0 issues ATTACHNENT 0 SUHNARY UF lSSUtS, FINDINGS, AHD CURRECTlVl. ACTIONS FUR SUBCATEGORY 25500 Findings RE VIS lDH HUNUER:
4 Page B-31 of 33 Corrective Actions iiiiiiiii
~iiiiiiii Element 222. 11
- Undersized Weld Specified for a Support iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii (N/A)
NUN a.
An undersized weld specified for a
hanger located in Unit 2 will not support the component.
BFN (N/A)
BLN (N/A)
Silk HUH a.
Based on the review of 102 welded connections in 25 sample pipe supports tkef. 43) from various sYstems in different areas of the plant, no problem of undersized welds tnat might nut be able tu support the design loadS was found.
Also, TVA's Pipe Support Uesign Criteria and Pipe Support Uesign Nauual were found lo contain proper code allowables and requira~uents for weld design.
BFN ULN Silk RUN a.
Hone required.
UFN BLH 24680-Rll (12/Ug/UI)
AT TACIINENT U SUHNAKT DF
- ISSUES, FIND)tiGS, ANU CURKECTlVE ACTlONS FOR SUUCATEGUKT 2bb00 REV)SIO!I,NUHBEK:
4 Page B-32 of 33 issues Findings Corrective Actions nnnnnnnnnnntnAIE1n
,Element.222. )2
- Support Tube Uistortion 1n ~ntnnnnnaikltlkn S0N (N/A) a.
Oistortion in the pipe stanchion of BOO) type suppoI
~ s is I aused by the welding process.
Testing is required tO determine if thiS distortion caused overStreSsino of. the instrument/drain line.
NHN
- a. Revieweo 800)-type supports and design criteria and stanoards (Nets. 4b, b6, ano bl) used to suppOrt drain, instrument sensing.
saxip)ing radiatinn munitnrtnn and test )ines.
This type uf support consists of a stanchion pine welderl eittter It ~ reI t)u Io th~>>roccss I e or o a p-r-c)amp.that is faStened i'n turn to the process pipe.
The bsanCII line IS rlthei'ia<<lieu tO the SianChiOn Or iS routed through the stanchion and welded at both ends.
A note on a RiiN BOO) sketch from an expurgated file indicated a 5/)6-inch distortion in a pipe stanchion.
Distortions of this magnitude wet e not observed during a visit to the i)atts Bar site.
- The ev l at) n team observed a slight oya)ing in the order of l/32 inch at the fIee erId of some of thc BOU) stanIctiions used for the auxiliary feedwater (AFM) piping systemt Nu distortion of instrument/drain lines was observed.
MBN a.
None reouired.
- Secondly, the obServed distortions are not due sole)y to welding-re)atud heat effects ttut rnuiII have been ra s J partiaily by ttie stanchion fabrication process.
Furthermore, the sligitt ovalness (elliptical shape) at thc IICC cnlI Of a StanChion witt not contuse any Stresses at tne connections between the process pipe and the stanchion.
The ca)cu)atio<is (t<<<f. 4b) performed to evaluate the axial stresses tliat n!i ~ibt be IiiJuceJ in -Ih~
instrument/drain line due tu differential thermal expansion indicates tnat sucn axial stresses would not result in a fatigue-induced pipe failure during the expected operating life of tiie plant (over 1,00U cycles).
24680-R
/09/87)
0 Issues AIIACIINENI 0 SUNNARY UF ISSutb, FINUINGS, ANO CORRECTIVE nCIIONS FUK SUBCAIEGURY 25500 F ind >ngs KEVISION NUNBER:
4 Page B-33 of 33 Corrective Actions Element 222.12 - BFN (N/A)
BLN (N/A)
UFN ULN BFN 24680-R I 7 (12/09/01)
l I
I 1~
1
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER:
4 Page C-1 of 15 ATTACHMENT C REFERENCES l.
478100 Standard Box Anchor Orawings:
478100-1/R7, RO 478100-1A/RO 478100-2/R6, RO 478100-2A/R 1, RO 478100-28/R2, RO 478100-3/R5, RO 478100-3A/RS, RO 478100-38/R2, RO 478100-3C/R 1, RO
'478100-4/Rl, RO 478100-5/R 1, RO 478100-6/R 1, RO 478100-6A/R 1, RO 478100-7/R 1, RO 478100-8/R 1, RO 478100-9/R 1, RO 478100-10/R 1
478100-11/R 1, RO 478100-12/RO 478100-12A/Rl, RO 478100-13/RO 478100-14/R 1, RO 478100-15/RO 478100-16/R 1, RO 478100-16A/R 1, RO 2.
OE Box Anchor Evaluation; CEB-CAS-173, Rev.
0,
[841 860117 004]
Nonconformance Report (NCR) 6264, (08/20/85) 3.
Mechanical general notes for pipe anchor load transfer unit:
3G80067-00-3, Rev.,6, and mechanical load transfer units seismic anchor:
3GB0068-01, Rev. 4, and 3G80068-02, Rev.
0 4.
BFN Box Anchor Orawings:
478456-80/R5 4783349-27/Rl 478452-149/R3 478452-150/R2 478456-69/Rl 478458-433/R5 478455-42/R2 478452-146/R 1
478452-190/R 1
478458-58/RO 478455-108/R2 478452-195/R3 47A2349-17/RO 4782349-15/R4 47A455-415/R2 478452-83/Rl 478452-158/R3 478452-168/R 1
478452-157/R2 4781349-35/R 1
4781349-31/RO 4783349-29/R2 478452-196/R2 478452-151/RO 3809D-R9
( 12/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONICEfNS SPECIAL PROGRAM 5.
BLN Box Anchor Or'awincls:
REPORT NUMBER:
25500 RI=VISION NUMBER: '4
'age C-2 of 15
~
1R F-Mf'HG-G001/R4 1CA-MPHG-0435/RO 1CR-NPHG-1604/Rl 1GC-Nf'HG-0072/RO 1GC-Mf'HG-0198/R 1 1KE-Mf'HG-10i88/RO 1ND-Mf'HG-0694/R5 1NK-Mf'HG-0306/R3 INL-Mf'HG-0205/RO 1NS-Mi'HG-0012/R3 1NV-MPHG-0089/Rl 1RK-MPHG-0123/R3 1SV-MPHG-0135/Rl 1WD-MPHG-0274/RO OIVM-MPHG-0200/Rl QIVM-MPHG-0651/R2 OSA-MPHG-0553/R2 OWO-MPHG-0358/RO 2ICR-NPHG-0032/R1 2GC-MPHG-0137/Rl 2KE-NPHG-1539/R2 2ND-MPHG-0907/R5 2NK-MPHG-0187/Rl 2NL-NPHG-0032/Rl 2NS-MPHG-0136/R3 2NV-NPHGi-1250/Rl 2RF-NPHG-8860/R2 2RK-MPHG-0120/R3 2SV-MPHGi-2070/Rl 2WO-MPHG-0291/Rl 6.
7.
8.
9 Oetai'led Design iCriteria BFN-50-724,
'lClass 1 Seismic Pioe Support Design," Rey.
0, LB05 861002 500]
Detailed Design ~Criteria N4-50-0703,
'IBLN Pioing System Anchors installed in Category I Structures,"
Rev. il, iLB42 850501 504]
Modifications and Additions, Instruction MAI-23, "Support and Installation of Piping Systems in Category I Struct:ures,"
Rev.
0 General Construction Specification G-29C, Rev.
7,,
tESS 8'i1123 202]
General Construction Specification G-43, Rev.
8,
[842 850712 505]
BLN Construction Specification N4C~913, Rev.
4, ILB42 850712 002]
BLN Notes (3GA0059-00 Series),,
"Field Fabr icat:ion and Installation of Pipe Suppor'ts in Category 1 St;ructures,"'09/01/72) 10.
BFN plant t;rip report (03/27/87)
(BLT-166)
Walkdown of'LN box anchors (INO~MPHG*0694/'R5,', ONN-MPHG-0200/R'I, SV-MIPHG-'01I35/R 1 cond INK-'MPHG-0306/R3 (06/07/87)
( IOM 1287) ll.
Enginieered SQN Pipe Anchor, Drawings:
47A05,3-702/R 1 47A053-704/Rl 47A053-7'll/RO 47A053-1047/RO 47A053-411/RO 1-H20-330/R5 2-H20-330/R3 2-H20-368/R2 2-H20-492/R2'-H20-'I16/R2 1-H20-117/R3 12.
Detailed Oesiign Criteria SQN-OC-Y-2. 14, "Piping.'System Anchors Inst'all'ed'n Category 1 Structures,"
Rev. 0,
[805 860716 5i00]
38090-R9
( 12/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER:
4 Page C-3 of 15 13.
14.
Detailed Design Criteria WB-OC-40-31. 15, "Piping Anchors Installed in Category 1 Structures,"
Rev.
2, [no RIMS number]
WBN Pipe Support Design Manual (PSDM) Section
- 7. 11, "Pipe Anchors,"
Rev.
3, Lno RIMS number],
(06/12/85)
SAN Box Anchor Calculations:
47A053-702/R2 (B25 860707 '820) 47A053-704/R2 (B25 860707 820) 47A053-711/R2 (825 860707 820) 47A053-1047/R2 (SWP 820218 083) 47A053-411/R2 (SWP 820302 012) 2-H20-330/RO (SWP 820108 101) 2-H20-368/RO (SWP '810828 048) 2-H20-492/RO (SWP 810323 073) 15.'6.
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code - Section III - 1974 Edition WBN FSAR Section 3.9.3.4, "Component Supports,"
Amendment 26 Engineered WBN Pipe Anchor Drawings:
47A060-67-13/R2 47A060-72-8/Rl 47A060-67-14/R2 47A060-67-43/R3 47A060-67-9/R4 47A060-67-15/R6 47A060-67-26/R5 47A060-67-48/R5 47A060-67-52/R4 47A060-63-5/R6 47A060-62-118/RO 47A060-3-3/R5 47A060-62-10/R5 47A060-77-2/Rl 47A060-67-89/R3.
47A060-67-2/R2 47A060-62-22/RS 47A060-62-122/RO 47A060-67-79/R3 47A060-63-39/RO 2-63-250/R902 47A060-74-21/Rl 47A060-3-23/R2 47A060-3-4/R2 47A060-3-24/R2 47A060-72-5/R2 47A060-72-6/R3 47A060-72-20/R4 47A060-74-1/R3 47A060-74-7/RO 47A060-68-19/RO 17.
SgN Pipe Support Drawings:.
1-MSH-77(H1-17)/R2 1-MSH-130(H1-77,78)/Rl 1-MSH-165('Hl-120)/R4 1-MSH-300( 1-Hl-300) /R905 1-MSH-301(1-Hl-301) /R906 1-MSH-357(1-Hl-357) /R905 1-MSH-503( Hl-503) /R4 1-AFDH-270A(H3-280A)/R5 1-AFOH-369(H3-424)/R906 1-FDH-45(H4-43)/Rl 1-FOH-201(1-H4-201) /R 1 2-UHIH-144(2-H45-144) /R02 2-UHIH-145(2-H45-145)/R905 2-SGBH-70(2-H47-70)/Rl 2-SGBH-72(2-H47-72)/Rl 2-H10>>352(2-Hlo-352)/Rl 2-CCH-367(2-Hlo-367)/Rl 2-CCH-372(2-H10-372)/R2 2-CCH-374(2-Hlo-374)/Rl 1-CSH-44(1-H21-44)/R904 2-CSH-14(2-H21-14)/R906 2-CSH-15(2-H21-15)/R905 1-FPCH-505(H50-505)/R901 1-FPCH-527(H50-527)/R2 1-RCH-134( 1-H36-134)/R905 1-RCH-136( 1-H36-136)/R4 1-RCH-138(1-H36-138) /R 1 2-RCH-242(2-H36-242)/R903 1-S IH-365( 1-S IH-365) /R2 1-CH-78(H6-,78) /R2 2-CVCH-614(2-H34-614) /R904 2-CVCH-615(2-H34-615) /R4 2-CVCH-'806'(2-'H34-806)/R902 2-CVCH-813(2-H34-813)/RO 3809D-R9 (12/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUb)BER:
4 I
Page C-4 of 15 WBN Pipe Support Orawings.:
47A400-6-332/IR1 47A400'-6-333/IRO 47A400-6-3:37/R1 47A400-6-340/IR1 47A400-6-3!36/Rl 47A400-6-365/RO 47A400-6-2:38/R4'7A400-6-376/RO 47A400-6-198/Rl 47A400-6-102/Rl 47A400-6-303/RO 47A400-6-309/RO 47A400-6-308/RO 47A400-6-307/RO 47A400- li-3,35/RO 47A400-6-358/RO BFN Pipe Support Orawings:
478452-711/R 1
478452-708/Rl 47B452-1I82/RO 1754-5/R3 2003-3/R2 478452-'159/Rl 478458-91/RO 4784 "i8-'>8/RO 47B458-42/Rl 478456-34/I%1 1756-'5/R3 47A406-21/R2 47A455-415/R2 47A920-86/IR3 478452-454/Rl 478452-!387/R3 47B2349-15/R4 4782349-17/RO BLN Pipe Support Orawings:
2NO-0'IPHG-1011, Sh.
2/RO 2KC-MPHG-0322, Sh.
1/R2 2KO-MPHG-0016, Sh.
1/R901 2CR-MPHG-0107, Sh.
2/RO 2CA-MPHG-0050/R3 1KC-MPHG-0036/R901 47A400-11-48/R3 47A400-11-47/R'3 47A409-11-5/R4 47A409-27/RB 47A409-1-'27/RO'7A400-7-17/RO 47A400-7-'93/Rl'7A465-2-38/Rl 1-6l404/R904 1-74-ill /R907 47A464-4 2/R2 47A069-3-'23/R2'7A!427I-8~38/Rl 1-01A~309/R907'97'/RO 2006-1'/R3 478455-51/R'I 478'4 55-58/R 1
478455-75/R'1 478452-134/Rl, 478452-102/RO 478'452-797/Rl, 478920-39/R2 478'920-52/RQ 478'456-106/RO 478'3349-27/Rl 47A406-14/R 1
47B,'590-,1 02/IR 1 478'465-436/RO
'78,'408-11/RQ 47A2349-33/R2
'k',E-MPH'G-1538/R'2 1GN-MPHG-0054/RQ 1CF-blP H'G-0310/R'2 1WO-t4PH'G-1046/R2 5'(0-MPH'G-0040/R901 2!'IE-MPHG-0060/R'901 OSA-MPHG-4372/R'1 2CF-MPHG-0026/R3 2CF-MPH'G-0027/R2 2CF-MPHG-0300/RO 2CF-MPHG-0410/RQ 2KC-MPHG-0351/R2 38090-R9
( 12/09/87) 4l
TYA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER:
4 Page C-5 of 15 1CA-MPHG-Oll6, Sh.
1/R4 1CA-MPHG-0090/R902 OKC-MPHG-0125, Sh.
2/R902 2SV'-MPHG-0302, Sh.
2/Rl 2NV-MPHG-0738/R2 ZCF-MPHG-0239/R4 1RK-MPHG-0026, Sh. '2/R3 1ND-MPHG-0580, Sh.
1/R901 ONB-MPHG-0030/R2 2CR-MPHG-0169/R4 1CA-MPHG-0438/RO 1NK-MPHG-0130/Rl 1SV-MPHG-0320, Sh.
1/RO 1WD-MPHG-0420, Sh.
1/Rl 2CA-MPHG-0155/R901 2SV-MPHG-0062/R3 2ND-MPHG-0013, Sh.
1/R2 2ND-MPHG-0052/R2 2ND-MPHG-0549/Rl 2ND-MPHG-0605/R2 2KC-MPHG-0381/R6 2KC-MPHG<<0391/R6 18.
19.
20.
Zl.
22.
23.
24.
As-built information for missing welds on SQN pipe support drawings (1-MSH-77/R2, 1-AFDH-369/R906, 1-FDH-45/Rl, and 1FPCH-527/R2)
(10/09/86)
As-built information for missing information on WBN pipe support drawings (47A400-11-48/R3, 47A400-27/R3, and 474464-4-2/R2)
(06/13/86)
Detailed Design Criteria BFN-50-0706, "The Torus Integrity Long-Term Program,"
Rev.
1,
[ESB 840621 205]
General Design Criteria N4-50-0717, "Design of Safety-Related Piping Supports and Supplemental Steel,"
Rev.
4,, [B42 851112 525]
WBN 47A050 series hanger drawings for general notes:
47A050-1J3/RZ 47A050-1H/R7 47A050-lvl/Rl American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) Manual, 7th Edition, Section 1.15.10 Pipe Suppoz.t Manual, Section
- 7. 15.
1 "Design of Welded Connections,"
Rev.
2 (07/23/84)
EN DES Calculations, "Evaluation of.NCR WBN SWP8273,"
Rev.
1,
[WBP 830914 230]
TVA ONE Calculations, "For SCR SQN CEB 8601," [B24 860906 300]
TVA Problem Identification Report PIR WBN CEB 8573,
[941 851220 016]
Significant Condition Report (SCR)
SQN CEB 8601,
[B41 860110 021]
3809D-R9 (12/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER:
4 Page C-6 of 15 25.
48N905
('R24) Reactor Buildinq Units 1
5 2 - Mi'sc. Steel - S.G.,
R.C.
Pump and Press.
Rel.
Tnk. - Access P~labform Sh.
1 48N906 (R12) Reactor Building Units 1
8 2 - Misc. Steel - S.G.,
R.C.
Pump and Press.
Rel. Tnk..- Access Pilatform i Sh.
2 48N908 (no sheet"number)
(R10) Reactor Building. Units 1
8 2 - Misc. Steel
- Access Platform 48N908-1 (R7) Reactor Building Units 1
ii 2 - Misc. Steel - 'Steam Generator - Access Platform 48N908-2 (R6) Reactor Building Units Il 8
2 - Misc. Steel
- Access Platform 48N908-3 (R3) Reactor Buildinq Units ll E
2 - Misc. Steel
- Steam Generator - Access Platform 48N908-4 (Rl) Reactor Buildinq Units ll E
2 - Misc. Steel - Steam Generator - Access Platform 48N908-6 (RO) Reactor Buildinq Units 1
ii 2 - Misc. Steel - Steam Generator
- Access Platform TVA WBN Orawinqs:
48W904 (no sheet number)
(R36) Miscel'laneous Steel - Lower Ice Condenser
- Access Pllatform. El. 745.0 48W904-1 (R10) Miscellaneous Steel - Steam Generato'r Access Platforms 48W904-2/RB and R9 Reactor Building - Units 1
and 2 - Miscellaneous Steel
- Steam Generator Access Platform i
48W904-3/R 1I4 Reactor Building - Units 1
and 2 - Miscellaneous Steel - Steam. Generator Access Platform-26.
Walkdown in the Sequoyah Unit
.1 Reactor Building; by the evaluation team (09/1B/86) 27.
SQN Calculations:
TVA EN DES Calculations, "Typical Supports 47A051-21, 47A054-3,"
[PWP 840904 661]
3809D-R9
( 12/09/87) 0
TVA.EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER:
4 Page C-7 of 15 TVA ONE Calculations, "Calculations for ER for SCR SgN CEB 8601,"
[825 860904 300]
TVA ONE Calculations, "Support 47A 920-8-2," [825 860811 323] Prelim.
Rev.
1, (09/20/86)
TVA ONE Calculations, "Attachment to AB Emb.
MKICPLI 48N1277, El. 748'-0," Preliminary, (09/20/86)
TVA DNE Calculations, "gual. Attach. to Aux. Bldg.
Embed MK 23 C Below El. 749',"
Preliminary, (09/20/86)
TVA DNE Calculations, "Cable Tray Support gualifications MK-3 Aux. Bldg.
El'. 734'," Preliminary, (09/20/86)
WBN Calculations:
TVA EN OES Calculations, "Reactor Building - Miscellaneous Steel Steam Generator Platforms,"
WCG-2-40 Volume 6, Rev.
1,
[B41 860614 969]
TVA. EN OES Calculations, "Evaluation of NCR WBN SWP8273,"
WMG 3100,
[WBP 830914 230]
TVA ONE Calcul'ations, "For PIR WBN CEB 8573,"
[841 860828 900]
28.
TVA BFN "Class I Seismic Pipe Support Design," Design Criteria BFN-50-724, Rev.
0, (09/26/86)
TVA BFN "Miscellaneous Steel Components f'r Class I and II Structures,"
Design Criteria BFN-50-754, Rev.
0,
( 11/10/86)
TVA, "Design of Structural Connections," Civil Design Guide DG-C1.6.4, Rev.
0 TVA BLN "Design of Civil Structures,"
Design Criteria N4-50-0702, Rev.
5 TVA General Construction Specification G-32, "Bolt Anchors Set in Hardened Concrete,"
Rev.
11 29.
Powerhouse
- Reactor Building - Units 1-3 Mechanical General Notes - Pioe Supports 47B435-1 through -6, the latest revisions as of February 1987 Class I Structures - Electrical Seismic Supports - Conduit 45A800-2/R4 38090-R9
( 12/09/87) 4
TVA, EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVIS IOIN NUMBER:
4 Pa.ge C-8 of 1,5 Reactor Building Units 1, 2,,
and 3
Structura,l Steel - Orywell Floor Framing o
48N442/R6 - El., 563' 0-1/2" (no sheet number) o 48N443/R7 - El., 584'- 9-l/2" (no sheet number)
Powerhouse
- Reactor Building - Unit, 2 Mechanical o
R<CIC Mechanica11 System Pi pe Supports 478456-120/Rl o
RIHR System Pipe Support',s 478452-195/R3 o
G>re Spray Syst: em Pipe Supports 47A458-377/R3 (Drawing is "Av size) o Core Spray Syst,em Pipe Supports 478458-424/R;2 o
G>re Spray Syst;em Pipe Supports 478458-94/Rl TVA BLIN Oravrings:
TVA BLiN Orawinqs:
Reactor Bui'Iding, Typical Seismic Condriit Support 4RA0560-X2-28, R3; 4RA0560-X2-10, R3.; 4RA0560-X2-'l4, R4; and 4RB 0560-X2-78C, R"I TVA BLIN Or'awing:
Aux. Bldg.
and Intake Pumping Station Typical Seismic Instrument Tub'ing Support, 4BA057Q-X~2-1, R2
'VA BLIN Dravring:
Aux. G>ntro1l, E
DG Bldg. Typ<ical Seismic Instrument Tubing Support,,
4'BA0895-X2-1, RO TVA BLIH Oravring:
Aux.G>ntrol, 8
OGB Typical Seismic Conduit Sup<port Anchor Plate, 4BA0892-y!2-20, R3 TVA BLI'4 Oravring:
Aux.Gintrol, 5 DG Bldg; IMiscelllaneous Steel Seismic Conduit Supports, Notes - Sheet 1,, 488089'?-X2-1, R6 TVA BLN Structural Steel Drawings:
Primary Piping Jet Impingement Barrilars 4RW0550-X2-01, R6, and I
.4RW0550-X2-0>2, R7 Valve Room A Pipe Supports Plan Elev'ati'on'649'-0"4AW0805-X2-23, R10 Cable Tray Supports Elevation 667"-0", 4AW0887-X2-9, R6 Makeup 5 Purification Pipe Whip Prothction Devices, 4RW0552-X2-06, R6 38090-R9 (12/09/87) 0
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER:
4 Page C-9 of 15 TVA BLN Miscellaneous Steel Orawings:
,H&V Support Oetails 4AW0870-X2-01,
- R24,
& 4AW0871.-X2-04, Rl Cable Tray Support Oetai ls Sheet 5, 4AW0885-X2-13, R13 Access Platforms El. 649'-4-1/2" RC Pumps
- P1A2, P182,
- P2A1, P281, 4RW0512-X2-25, R4 H&V Equipment Support Oetails, 40W0759-X2-1, R15 H&V Ouct Support Typical Oetai ls, 4RW0532-X2-21, R14 Cable Tray Supports
& Walkway Details
& Schedule, 4RW0540-X2-18, R21 Access Platforms El. 643'-0" Reactor Coolant Pumps P181
& PlA2, 4RW0512-X2-14,R5 Access Platforms El. 650'-6-1/2" Steam Generators A & 8 4RW0512-X2-33, R6 Access Platform El. 656'-l-l/2" RC Pumps 1P181
& 2P182, 4RW0512-X2-35, R6 Access Platforms El. 640.25'eactor Coolant Pump 2RC-PlAl, 4RW0512-X2-45, RO 30.
TVA -
BWP C21071
- R61, RCIC Support R-61, Rl, [822 860113 101]
BWP C20995
- R195, RHR Anchor R-195, R2,
[B22 850423 102]
BWP C30266 R15, Core Spray Pipe Support R-15, R2,
[822 851210 140]
BWP C30303 R15A, Core Spray System; Support R15A, R2,
[822 851210 122]
TOP C20336 R13, Core Spray - R13, Rl,
[BWP 830926 106]
TVA-EN OES Calculations (BLN):
4R2-512L, RO, "Access Platforms Reactor Coolant Pumps,"
[BLP 840611 426]
4R2-512H, R2, "Access Platforms Steam Generators A&B," [BLP 840627 406]
4RW0512 8, R2, "Reactor Coolant Pumps Access Platforms,"
[BLP 840806 402]
4R2-5120, R2, "Reactor Coolant Pumps Access Platforms,"
[BLP 840926 402]
3809D-R9 (12/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL f'ROIGRAM Ri.:PORT NUMBER:
25500 RLVISION NUMBER:
4 Page C-10 of 15 TVA-OE Calculaition 4RW-0550-XZ, f16, "Jlet Impingement Barriers,"
[B21 860401
'404]
31.
TVA-OE Calculations, Typical Conduit Supports - General
- Notes, BFEP
'C2E081, Rl, t.822 860527 109]
32.
General Construction Specificati<hn 6-29CI, Rev.~ 7,
[ESS 811123 202]
SQN FSAR Section 3.8.4.5,.2, Paragraph
'.1,'Amendment 2; Section 3.8-29, Paragraph 4,
Amendment 2; and Section 3.5-54, Paragraph 5,
Amendment 2'QN Pipe Support Oesign Manual (f'SOM), Section
- 7. 15, Rey.
0, (04/22/83)
WBN Pipe Support Oesign Manual (PSOM), Section
- 7. 15 Rev. 2, (0743/84)
WBN FSAR Sections 3.8.4.2. 1(2) ahd 3.8.4.',2. 1(5),
Amendment 47 33.
American Institute of Steel Construction
- Manual, 7th Edition, Structural
'Welding Codle
'- Steel, AWS Ol.lI, (1984) 34.
SQN Pipe Support Orawings 1-MSH-77 (Hl -1 7) /R2 1-MSH-130(H1-77,78)/Rl 1-MSH-1 6!5(H1-1 20) /R4 1-MSH-;30I3(1-Hl -300) /R905 1-MSH-301 ( 1-Hl -301 ) /R906
- 1-MSH-357(1-Hl-357)/R905 1-MSH-503(Hl-503)/R4 1-AFOH-270A(H3-280A)/R5 1-AFOH-369(H3424)/R906 1-FOH-45(H4-43)/Rl 1-FOH-20'I (1-H4-201 )/Rl 2-ljHIH-144(2-I.I45-144)/ROl?
- 2-UHIH-'I 45(2-H45-145) /R905 2-SGBH-70(2-l.l47;-70) /R',1
- 2-SGBH-72(2-fl47-72) /R 1 2-H10-352 (2-Hl0-352) /R'.1
- 2-CCH-367(2-Hl 0-367) /R 1 2-CCH-372(2-H10-372)/R2
'-'CCH-374(Z-H10-.374) /R 1
'-'CSH-44 ( 1-H21-44) /R904 2-CSH-14(2-H21-14)/R906
- 2-CSH-'I5(2-H21-15)/R905 1-FPCH-505(H50-505)/R901 1-FPCH-527(H50-527)/R2
- 1-RCH-'I34( 1 H36>>1,34)/R905
- 1-RCH-'136( 1 H36-136)/R4
'1-RCH-138( 1-H36-138)/R1,
- 2 RCH 242(2 H36 2,42)/R903 1-S IH'-365 (1-S IH-36.'5) /R2 1-CH-78(H6-78) /R2 2-CVCH-614 (2-H34-614) /R904
- 2-CVCH-61 5 (2-H34-61 5) /R4
'-CVCH-806 (2-H34-806) /R~IOZ
- 2-CVCH-81 3 (2 -H34-81 3) /RO 0,
WBN Pi,pe Support Or awings:
- 67-lERC'l4-R212, f(903 1-01A-309, R907 47A920-38-3, R6 47A437-2 22,, Rl 47A400 6 333, RO 47A400-6 33>>,
Rl 47A450-2'1-128, R3 47A400-6-356, Rl 47A400-11-47)
R3 38090-R9 (12/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER:
4 Page C-ll of 15 47A465-2-38, Rl 2-70-804, R901
- 1-70-867, R901
- 1-68-131, R904 47A400-1-27, RO 1-63-404, R904 48A060-3-23, R2 47A427-8-38, R 1 47A400.-11-5, R4 47A400-6-238, R4 47A464-4-2, R2 47A400-11-48, R3
WBN Pipe Support" Calculations:
67-1ERCW-R212, R2
[WBP 840329 013]
1-70-867, Rev.
0
[WBP 841123 002]
1-68-131, Rev.
2
[WBP 841109 025]
35.
Pipe Support Orawings and Calculations Su ort Number 47A462-12-27 47A560-4-60 47A450-26-168 47A450-26-82 47A450-25-415 47A450-25-415A Orawing Revision 0
2 0
.1 0
0 Gal cul at ion RIMS Number CEB 850226 987 WBP 831019 008 B41 860210 913 841 851010 901 841 860111 900 841 860111 900 36.
WB-OC-40-31.9, "WBN Oetai led Oesign Criteria for.Location and Oesign of Piping Suoports and Supplemental Steel in Category I Structures,"
[ESB 84041 1 209], (08/29/85),
Rev.
5, (04/09/84)
WBN Pipe Support Oesign Manual (PSOM), Vols 1 to 4, Rev.
5, (02/24/86) 37.
Interview and walkdown by S. Mabie and E. Croft of Bechtel (02/28/87, 03/04/87, and 03/06/87) 38.
Telecon from C. Jordan, K. Wiedner, G. Shah, M. Stafford, S. Chitnis, and A. Pang of Bechtel to G.
M. McNutt, N. Liakonis, W.Sirrett, and J. Louis of TVA, (03/09/87) 39.
Bechtel Calculation:
PO-222-1 7, Rev.
0, (08/11/87),
(Job Number 16985-026)
[no RIMS number]
40.
Package of calculations prepared by Chicago Bridge 8 Iron (CBI) for Roof Support for RHR Spray Header JEO-JE-12, (12/03/74)
[no RIMS number]
Package of calculations prepared by Chicago Bridge 8 Iron (CBI) for Roof Support for Containment Spray Header JFO-JF-12, (12/03/74)
[no RIMS number]
38090-R9 (12/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYE'E CONCERI,'lS SPECIAL PIROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBERS 4
Page C-12, of 15 41.
42.
43.
TVA Calculat,ion Package LB41 850924 F005] (page 1-257) to qualify RHR and CSS spr'ay support fbr 'load provided by Piping Analysis Group.
These supports were originally designed by CBI (Ref.
40)
WBN Pi!pe Support.Design Manual,,
Sect,ion 7..15, Rev.
2, (07/23/86)
WBN Pipe Support Drawings and Design Calculatic~ns:
Support/Rev Cal.
R![MS Number 47A400-1-1/R 1 47A400-1-32/Rl 47A400-6-96/RO 47A400-i6-97/Rl 47A400-6-176/Rl 47A400-i6-202/RO 47A400-6-333/RO 47A400-i6-361/RO 47A427-8-38/Rl 47A435-10-21/R3 47A437-,'2-22/Rl 47A465-2.-38/R 1 1-03A-586/R901 1-03A-587/R 1
[CEB 850119 809]
841 850417 953)
WBP 831027 085]
7 WBP 840510. 016]
WBP 840311 016]
[MBP 830427,01 0]
{841 850509 955]
E 841 850509 967]
841 850827 802]
MBP 841123 001]
841 860807 854]
CEB 850126 833]
WBP 841109 006]
[WBP 841109 005]
1-i62A-328/R 1 1-63-320/RZ 1-i68-1 3ll /R904 1-70-005/Rl 1
70 86;r/R901 1-01A-309/IR907 1-'S7-068/R906 2-70-804/R901 63-1S IS-V1,32/R 1 1-63-404/R904 67-lERCM-R212/R902 WBF'41114 MBP 841108 MBP'41109 MBP 841029 MBP 841123
'WBP 840809 WBP 840725 B41 860213 CEB 850228 MBP'40110 WBP 840329 115]
005 025 019 954 044j 013~
44.
B001 Type Standard, Supports 47B001-1/R3 47B001-2/R2 478001 -3/R3 47B001-4/R3 478001 -5/R 1 47B001-6/Rl 47B001 -7/R 1 47B001-8/R5 47B001 -9/R2 478001-9A/Rl (MBN) 47B001-98/RO 478001-10/Rl 478001-1 1/R4 47BCI01-12/R5 47B001-13/R4 478001-13A/R3 478001-14/R4 47BC101-1 5/RZ',
47B001-16/RO 47BCI01-1 7/R 1 0
45.
46.
47.
48.
Pipe Support Design Manual, Volume 1, Rev.
1, Lecture 122,,
(08/16/82) and Volume 2, Rev.
3, Section 74,. (06/12/85),
Design Guide for Category I
Component, Supports Bechtel Calculation PD-222-09, Rev.
0, (07/11/86),
(Job'Number 16985-026)
[no RIINS number]
Nuclear Safety Review',Staff (NSRS) Investigation IReport I-85-560-SQN (11/19/85)
ANSI B31.1 - Power Piping Code - 1974 I.:dition 3809D-R9 (12/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER:
4 Page C-13 of 15 USA Standard 831.7, Nuclear Power Piping Code (1969 Edition),
Paragraph 1-727.4.7(d)
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel
- Code,Section III (1974 Edition), NB-4433
'and NC-4433 SQN FSAR Tables 3.2.2-1 and 3.2.2-2, Rev.
3 49.
BF-SDSP-9. 1, "Processing Drawing Discrepancies,"
Rev.
2 (09/22/86) 50.
BF-SDSP-9.2, "Configuration Control Drawings," Rev.
1 (05/09/86) 51.
Support Drawings:
1-FPCH-505 (H50-505),
Rev.
1 2-CCH-367 (2'-H10-367), Rev.
902 52.
TVA Corporate Nuclear Performance Plan Volume 1, Rev.
4 TVA Nuclear Performance
- Plans, Volume 2, Rev.
1; Volume 3, Rev. 0; and Volume 4, (Draft, 03/19/87) 53.
TVA Welding Project Review Plan, Volumes 1 through 4 (no revision/date) 54.
BFN FSAR Chapter 12, "Structures and Shielding,"
Amendment 3
"Design of Structures, Components, Equipment, and Systems,"
Amendment 27 55.
SQN Pipe Support Drawings:
1-FPCH-505 (H50-505), Rev.
1 2-CCH-367 (2-H10-367),
Rev.
902 56.
CEB Report 75-18, Small Line Attachment Details to Class 2 and 3 Piping Eaual to or La'rger than 2-1/2-inch diameter, Rev. 3,
[CEB 840522 001]
57.
EN OES-SEP 82-13, Program for NRC-OIE Bulletin, 79-14, Phase 1, Inspection at WBN Unit 1, Rev.
4,
[B41 850702 004]
58.
Bechtel Calculation PO-222-17, Rev.
0 (08/ll/87) for support 47A450-25-415,. Rev.
0, (no RIMS number]
59.
TVA memo (E44011-01) from J.
A. Raulston to J.
C. Standifer, "Clarification of Welding Requirements,"
[NEB 840120 275]
3809D-R9 (12/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYIEE CONCERNS SPECIAL
'PROGRAM iue r
REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER:
'age C-,14 of 15 60.
Bellefonte Nuclear Plant, "Melding,'Procedur'e Qualification to Melld to Embedded Pl ates Using Preheat Lower than~ AWS Prequalified ValUes '- Tes't Result,"
t'.CSB 821210 3013 Memo, from Frank V. Meter to Lonnlie S. Cox, "Bellefonte Nuclear Plant, Request for Welding Procedure Quhli'fidation'd Mould to Embedded. Plates Using Preheat Lower than AWS Prelqualified V'alues,"
fBLN 821029 551j 61.
Reactor Build'ing', Typica'1 Seismic Conduit Support 4RA0560-X2-2B,, Rev.
3:; 4RA0560-X2-10, Rek.
~3; ~4RA0560-X2-14, Rev. 4; and 4RB0560-X2-78C, IRev.
Aux.. Bldg.
and Intake Pum'pikg Station Typic'al Seismic Instrument Tubing Support, 4BA0570-X2-1, Rev.
Aux, Control, 8
OG Bldg., Typical Seismic Instrument Tubing Support, 4BA0895-X2-1, Rev.
Aux., Control, E
OG Bldg.~, T~ypical Seismic Conduit Support Anchor P'late, 4BA0892-X2~20, Revl 3'VA BLN Orawing:
Aux., Control,'8 DG 'Bldg, Miscellaneous Steel Seismic Conduit Supports, Notes - Sheet 1,
4B80892-X2-'1, Rev.
6 62.
47A050-1 (Revs.',2, 3,
and
- 6) Seismic Class I Structures
- Mechani~cal Hanger Drawing General Notes 47A050-16 (Rev.
- 1) Seismic Class I Struct;ures
- Mechanical Hanger'r'aw'ing'eneral INotes I
47A050-16A (Rev.
- 1) Seismic Class I Structures Mechanical Hanger Orawing General Notes 47A051-21A (Rev.
- 1) Seismic Class I Structures
- Mechanical Seismic Support Instr. Sensing Lines 47A052-1 (Rev.
- 9) Seismic Class I Structures
- Mechanical Seismic Supports - Radiation Mon'itoring and Sampling 47A054-1 (Rev.
- 7) Seismic Class I Structures - Mechanical Seismic Supports - Control,A'ir Lines 47A055-18 (Rev.
- 3) Seism'ic Class I Structures - Mechanical Heatin'g,
'entilating, ard Air Conditioning OUct'uppOrt's 3809D-R9 (12/09/87')
Cl
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25500 REVISION NUMBER:
4 Page C-15 of 15 47A056-lA (Rev.
- 14) Seismic Class I Structures
- Mechanical Seismic Supports - Conduits 63.
SNP FSAR update through Amendment 3
Section 3.8.4.5.2 "Structural Steel" and Tables 3.8.4-1 through 3.8.4-18 TVA SgN, "Detailed Design Criteria for Miscellaneous Steel Components for Class I Structures,"
No. SgN-DC-V-1.3.2, Rev.
8 TVA, "Design of Structural Connections," Civil Design Guide DG-C1.6.4, Rev.
0 64.
BFN Response to Potential Generic Condition Evaluation
[B22 851224 019]
65.
Welding Project - Generic Employee Concern Report WP-15-SON, Rev. 0, [no RIMS number],
(04/07/86) 66.
TVA NSRS Investigation Report I-85-246 WBN, "Bolt Replacement Welding to Embedded Plates,"
[no RIMS number],
( ll/07/85) 3809D-R9 (12/09/87)
1 ek e~
J,%;
if'I~