ML18033A553
| ML18033A553 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 11/05/1987 |
| From: | Brown W TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML082340470 | List:
|
| References | |
| 23000, 23000-V02-R03, 23000-V2-R3, NUDOCS 8902150009 | |
| Download: ML18033A553 (78) | |
Text
EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROG VOLMAE2 ENGINEERING CATEGORY SUBCATEGORY REPORT 23000 HVACDESIGN UPDATED TVA NUCLEAR POWER 8qg g/SDQQQ pop AQQt K
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT TYPE:
SUBCATEGORY REPORT FOR ENGINEERING TITLE:
HVAC OESIGiV REPORT NUMBER'3000 REVISION NUMBER: 3 Page 1 of 35 2.
3.
Revised to incorporate SRP and TAS comments.
Revised to incorporate SRP comments.
'Revised to incorporate TAS comments and to add Attachment C
(References).
PREPARATION IGNA URE OA R
V I
iV
/~ (g 87 OATE i!<8 CONCURREiVCES CEG-H:
A'lAA i/-l/-f7 IGNATURE OATE SRP:
SIGNA UR
~I-td Z GATE APPROVEO MAMA
- MU W
~DA f CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY)
SRP Secretary's signature denotes SRP concurrences are in files.
y5'
TVA EMPLOYEE,CONCERNS
. SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
23000 REVISION NUMBER:
3 Page ES-1 of 2 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
This subcategory report summarizes and evaluates the r esults of nine Employee Concerns Special Program (ECSP) element evaluations prepared under Engineering Subcategory
- 23000, HVAC Oesign.
The element evaluations document the reviews of 30 issues related to TVA's four nuclear power plant sites - Sequoyah, Watts
- Bar, Browns Ferry, and Bellefonte.
The issues were derived from a total of five employee concerns, which. cited presumed deficiencies or inadequacies in the design of HVAC systems.
This subcategory contains concerns about testing of fire. dampers, temperature control in computer and battery rooms, leak tightness of duct joints and weight of duct supports, heat buildup in the containment, and airborne contamination in the Condensate Oemineralizer Waste Evaporator Building (COWEB).
Of the 30 issues evaluated, 21 were found to require no corrective action.
For the remainder, eight corrective actions were identified to remedy the nine negative findings.
One of the corrective actions was initiated by TVA before the Employee Concerns Task Group evaluations, five are new actions required to resolve the issues, and two are actions required to resolve peripheral findings identified during the evaluations.
Causes for the negative findings are concentrated in the management effectiveness and design process effectiveness areas.
None of the corrective actions for this subcategory were judged to be siqnificant from a nuclear safety standpoint.
Although the element evaluations for this subcategory did identify some valid
- concerns, the relatively small number of negative findings and the corrective actions already taken or initiated led to the conclusion that the HVAC design does not pose a major problem for the Sequoyah, Watts Bar, and Bellefonte
. nuclear power plant si,tes.
- However, the failure at Browns Ferry to respond in a timely fashion to the NRC-mandated 10 CFR 21 notice from the manufacturer reqardinq fire damper closure against airflow constitutes a breakdown in communication and tracking of an issue that was declared a condition adverse to quality for Watts Bar.
This 10 CFR 21 notice did not result in an NRC IE Bulletin requiring mandatory action on TVA's part, and, therefore, no NRC reoorting requirements were violated.
The corrective action for Br owns Ferry will evaluate or test all curtain-type fire dampers in fire barriers required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, criteria.
Administrative procedures will be instituted for shutdown of airflow through fire dampers that may not close during a fire in the area.
Surveillance procedures also will require periodic closure testing of fire dampers.
26420-R15 (10/15/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL.
PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER: '3000
'EVI'ON NUMBER Page ES-2 of 2 The reason Browns Ferry fai 1 ed to examine the issue raised by the 10 CFR 21 notice, could not be determined and is bey'ond the 'causes identified in thi's report 'for the finding of unassured damper closing.
Underlying or root causes,'re identified in category eva'luations, The Corp'orate~ Nuclear Performance Plan, in conjunction with plant-specific nuclear
'performance
- plans, describes',
the centralized Division of Nuclear Engineering, the Corporate Comnitment'racking
- System, and the Tracking and Recording of Open Items system.
Tiiesh steps will improve communicatipns and timely resolution of open items, thus minimizing recurrence of the negative findings evaluated in this report.
The grouped evaluations of this subcategory regorlt are~ being examined from a wider perspective in the Engineering category evaluation.,
26420-R15 (10/15/87) 0
- Preface, Glossary, and -List of Acronyms for ECTG Subcategory Reports HISTORY OF REVISION REV NUMBER PAGES REVISED REASON FOR CURRENT REVISION To clarify that one or more attachments will help the reader find where a particular concern is evaluated
0
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
23000 FRONT MATTER REV:
3 PAGE i OF viii Preface This subcategory report is one of a series of reports prepared for the Employee Concerns Special Program (ECSP) of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).
The ECSP and the organization which carried out the program, the Employee Concerns Task Group (ECTG), were established by TVA's Manager of Nuclear Power to evaluate and report on those Office of Nucleac Power
<ONP) employee concerns filed before February 1,
1986.
Concerns fi'led aftec that date are handled by the ongoing ONP Employee Concecns Program (ECP).
The ECSP addressed over 5800 employee concerns.
Each of the concerns was a
formal, written description of a circumstance or'ircumstances thag an employee thought was unsafe, unjust, inefficient, or inappropriate.
The mission of the Employee Concerns Special Program was to thoroughl'y investigate all issues presented in the concerns and to report the results of those investigations in a form accessible to ONP employees, the
- NRC, and the, general publi,c.
The results of these investigations are communicated by four levels of ECSP reports:
- element, subcategocy,
- category, and final.
Element reports, the lowest reporting level, will be published only for those concerns directly affecting the cestact of Sequoyah "Nuclear Plant's reactor unit 2.
An element consists of one or more closel'y related issues.
An issue is a potential pcoblem identified by ECTG during the evaluation process as having been raised in one or more concerns.
For efficient handling, what appeared to be sirnilac concerns were grouped into elements early in the program, but issue definitions emerged from the evaluation process itself.
Consequently, some elements did include only one issue, but often the ECTG evaluation found more than one issue pec element.
Subcategory reports summarize the evaluation of a number of elements.
- However, the subcategory report does.more than collect element level evaluations.
The subcategory level overview of element findings leads to an integration of information that cannot take place at the element level..
This integration of information reveals the extent to which problems overlap more than one element and will therefore cequire corrective action for underlying causes not fully apparent at the element level.
Xo make the subcategory reports easier to undecstand, throe items have been placed at the front of each report:
a preface, a glossary of the terminology unique to ECSP cepocts, and a list of acconyms.
Additionally, at the end of each subcategory repoct will be a Subcategory Summary Table that includes the concern numbers; identifies othec subcategories that share a concecn; designates nuclear safely.related, safety significant, or non-safety related concerns; designates gonecic applicability; and briefly states each concern.
Either the Subcategory Summary Table or another attachment or a combination of'he two will enable the reader to find the repoct section or sections in which the issue raised by the concern is evaluated.
TVA EMPLOYEIE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER."
23000 FRONT MATTER REV:
2 PAGE ii OF viii The subcategories are themselves summarized~ in a series of eight category reports.
Each category report reviews the maj~or~findi'ngs and collecti,ve significance of'he subcategory reports in one of the following areast management and personnel relationIs industrial safety construction material control operations quality assurance/quality control welding engineering A separate report on employee concerns deal'ing with'pecific contentions of intimidation, hex assment and wrongdoing will be released by the TVA Off'ice of the Inspector General.,
Just as the subcategory re'ports integrate t'e information collected at, the element level, the category reports integrate the information assembled in all the subcategory reports within the category, addressing particularly'he underlying causes of those problems that dun'across more than one subcategory.
A final report wi,ll integrate and assess th6 i~nformation collected
'by all of the lower level reports Iprepared for the ECSP including the Xnspec'toe General's report.
For more detail on the methods by whic~h ECTG employee concerns were'valuated and reported, consult the Te'nn5ss0e
~Valley Authority Employee Concerns Task Group Program Manual.
TIhe Madual Spells'ut the program's objectives,
- scope, organisation, and responSibilities.
Xt also specifies the procedures that were followed in.tahe'inves'tigation',
reporting, and closeout of the issues raised by empldye& cbnc'erns.'
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
23000 FRONT MATTER REV:
2 PAGE iii OF viii ECSP GLOSSARY OF REPORT TERMS" classification of evaluated issues the evaluation of an issue leads to one of the following determinations:
Class A:
Issue cannot be verified as factual Class B:
Issue is factually accurate,
'but what is described is not a
problem (i.e., not a condition requiring corrective action)
Class C:
Issue is factual and identifies a problem, but corrective action for the problem was initiated before the evaluation of the issue was undertaken Class D:
Issue is factual and presents a problem for which corrective action has
- been, or is being, taken as a result of an evaluation Class E:
A problem, requiring corrective action, which was not identified by an employee
- concern, but was revealed during the ECTG evaluation of an issue raised by an employee concern.
collective si nificance an analysis which determines the importance and consequences of the findings in a particular ECSP report by putting those findings in the proper perspective.
concern (see "employee concern")
corrective action steps taken to fix specific deficiencies or discrepancies revealed by a negative finding and, when necessary, to correct causes in order to prevent recurrence.
criterion
( lural:
criteria) a basis for defining a performance,
- behavior, or quality which ONP imposes on itself (see also "requirement").
element or element re ort an optional level of ECSP report, below the subcategory level, that deals with one or more issues.
em lo ee concern a formal, written description of a circumstance or circumstances that an employee thinks unsafe, unjust, ineffic.ient or inappropriate; usually documented on a K-form or a form equivalent to the K-form.
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECTAL, PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
23000 I?RONT MATTER REV:
2 PAGE iv OP viii evaluator(s) the, individual(s) assigned the responsibility to assess
.a spe'cific'rouping of employee concerns.
~ffndfn s includes both statements of fact and the judgments made about those facts during the evaluation processnegative findings require corrective action.
issue a potential problem, as interpreted by thk ECTG during the evaluation
- process, rai,sed in one or more concerns.
K-form (see "employee concern")
evaluation judgment or decision may be based.
root cause the underlying reason for a proble'm.
'Terms essential to the program but which requir6 detailed definition have been defined in the ECTG Procedure Manual (e.gss
- generic, specific,,
nuclear safety-related, unreviewed safety-significant question).
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
23000 FRONT MATTER REV:
2 PAGE v OF viii Acronyms AI AISC ANSI Administrative Instruction American Institute of Steel Construction As Low As Reasonably Achievable American Nuclear Society American National Standards Institute ASME ASTM AMS BFN BLN CAQ CAR CATD CCTS CEG-H CFR CI American Society of Mechanical Engineers American Society for Testing and Materials American Melding Society Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Condition Adverse to Quality Corrective Action Report Corrective Action Tracking Document Corporate Commitment Tracking System Category Evaluation Group Head Code of Federal Regulations Concerned Individual CMTR COC Certified Material Test Report Certificate of Conformance/Compliance OCR
'DNC Design Change Request Division of Nuclear Construction (see also NU CON)
TVh EMPLOYEE! CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
23000 FRONT MATTER REV:
"2 PhGE vi OF vii.i ONE DNQA DNT DOE DPO DR ECN ECP ECP-SR ECSP
'ECTG EEOC EMRT Division of Nuclear lEngineering, Division of Nuclear Quality Ashurhncb Division of :uclear Training~
Department of Energy Division Personnel Officer Di,screpancy Report or Deviation Report Engineering Change Notice Employee Concerns Program Employee Concerns Program-Site Re/re'sentative Employee Concerns'pecial Progr'am'mployee Concerns Task Group'qual Employment Opportuni.ty'ommkss'ion, Environmental Qualification
'mergency Medical Response Thah EN DES Engineering -Design ERT FCR FSAR GET HCI Employee
Response
Team or Emhrg'ency Res'ponse Team Field Change Request Final Safety Analysis Report Fiscal Year General Employee Training Hazard Control Instruction HVAC INPO Heating, Ventilating Air Condi~tidning Installation Instruction Institute of Nuclear Power Oper'ati',ons Inspection Rejection Notice
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
23000 FRONT MATTER REV:
2 PAGE vii OF viii
'L/R M&AI MI
'Labor Relations Staff Modifications and Additions Instruction Maintenance Instruction, MSPB Merit Systems Protection Board MT NCR NDE'PP NPS Magnetic Particle Testing Nonconforming Condition Report Nondestructive Examination Nuclear Performance Plan Non-plant Specific or Nuclear Procedures System NQAM NRC Nuclear Quality Assurance, Manual
'Nuclear Regulatory Commission
.NSB.
NSRS Nuclear Services Branch
.Nuclear Safety Review Staff NU CON
'Division of Nuclear Construction (obsolete abbreviation, soe DNC)
NUMARC Nuclear Utility Management and Resources Committee OSHA ONP OWCP Occupational Safety and Health Administration (or Act)
Office of Nuclear Power Office of Workers. Compensation Program.
PHR P.T QA QAP QC QCI Personal History Record Liquid Penetrant Testing Quality Assurance Quality. Assurance Procedures Quality Control Quality Control Instruction
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAI PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
23000 FRONT MATTER REV:
2 PAGE vii i, OF v i,i.i QCP QTC RIF SQN SZ SOP SRP SWEC TAS Quality Control Procedure Quality Technology Company Reduct:ion in Force Radi,ographic Testing Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Surveillance Instruction Standard Operating Procedure Seni,or Review Panel Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation, Technical Assistance Staff TEL Trades and Labor TVTLC UT VT WBECSP WBN Tennessee Valley Authority Tennessee Valley Trades and Labor Council Ultrasonic Testing Visual Testing Watts Bar Employee Concer'n Special Program Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Work. Request, or Work. Rules Workplans
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
23000 REVISION NUMBER:
3 Page 2 of 35 Section
. Executive Summary Preface ECSP Glossary of. Report Terms
'Acronyms CONTENTS
~Pa e
ES-1 1
.Introduction 2
Summary of Issues/Generic Applicability 3
Evaluation Process 4
Findings 5
Corrective Actions 6
Causes 7
Collective Significance Glossary Supplement for the Engineering'ategory 3
4 25 27 33 Attachments A
Employee Concerns for Subcategory 23000 8
Summary of Issues,
- Findings, and Corrective Actions for Subcategory 23000 C
References TABLES Table 1
Classification of Findinas and Corrective Actions 2
Findings Summary 3
Matrix of El'ements, Corrective Actions, and Causes C-1
~Pa e
29 30 31 26420-R16 (10/19/87)
0 0
0
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
23000 REVISION NUMBER:
3 Page 3 of 35 1.
INTROOUCTION This subcategory report summarizes and evaluates the results of the ECSP element evaluations prepared under Engineering Subcategory
- 23000, HVAC Oesign.
The evaluations of 30 issues related to TVA's four nuclear power plant sites-Sequoyah (SgN), Watts Bar (WBN), Browns Ferry (BFN), and Bellefonte (BLN)-
are documented in this report.
The issues were derived from five employee concerns that cited presumed design and testing deficiencies in various HVAC systems and components.
The employee concerns are evaluated and listed in Attachment A by element.
The nuclear plant site where the concern was originally raised and the applicability to other nuclear plant sites, as determined by TVA, are also shown in Attachment A.
The balance of this report consists of the following sections:
Section 2 summarizes, by element, the issues derived from the employee concerns and explains the rationale for generic appl icabi 1 ity Section 3.outlines the process followed for the element and subcategory evaluations o
Section 4 summarizes, by element, the findings and identifies the negative findings that must be corrected o
Section 5 -- highlights the corrective actions required for resolution of the negative findings cited in Section 4 by element and shows their applicability to plant sites o
Section 6 -- identifies causes of the negative findings o
Section 7 -- assesses the significance of the negative findings o
Attachment A -- lists, by element, each employee concern evaluated in this report, along with the plant site(s) to wnich it is applicable.
The concern is quoted as received by TVA, and characterized by TVA as safety related (SR), not safety related (NO), or safety significant (SS).
o Attachment B contains a summary listing of issues,
- findings, and corrective actions by element.
The concerns in Attachment A are linked by element number and plant site to Attachment B.
The corrective action description in Attachment 8 is linked by the CATO number in parentheses to the causes and significance in Table 3.
2642D-R16 (10/19/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
,'23000, REVISIOIN NUMBER".
'3 Page 4 of 35 The term "Peripheral finding" in the issue column refers to an isSue that arose durinq the course of evaluatinq an emp'loyee concern, but was not directly derived from i'. 'hese'ssues are classified as "E" in 'lables 1
arid 2 of t;his report Attachmtent C lists the references'ited in this report 2.
SUMMARY
OF ISSUES/GENERIC APPLICABILITY The employee concerns listecl in Attachment A for ieach element and olan't have been examined, and the potential prI)blems raised by the five concerns have been identified as 30 issues..
Results of the review of these issues are presented in the nine element tevaluations.
A summary of the 30 issues. evaluated under this subcateqory, qrouped by
- element, is listed beltow.
o 230.'i~Fire Oamoer Latchina Test - Curt',alp-type fire d<<amoers were not tested uiHer actual ooerataingicoinditions to assure their closure and latchina.
These issues are aeneric tb Ruskin Manufacturina Company brand fire damoers, wnicn are used at all four plants; consequent:ly, the issues were evaluaited for all four olants.
o 230.Z,. Computer/Batte~r Room Temperature - The desiqn,
- location, and and battery;rooms are cIleficient.
These issues were evaluated at the site of the concern (MBN)e No other site evaluations were deemed to be necessary because tnte issues were~ determined to be ccmponent deficiencies typically found and corrected durinq plant; commissioning ands therefore, specific to MBN.
o 230.3 Leak T~i htness or guet Seals lany HVAC duct systems dq not meeEWe
<inst gn r q eruteem~tsurer eak Cigintnes."
and use ettcesst've amouints of'ealinq qlue and excessively heavy suooortse These'ssutes were evailuated at the site of concern
('~IBN) and found to be partially factuala
- However, no adverse effects were identified due to this condition,.
The concern was determined not to be applicable to S(jN and BLN because the issues were found not to be valid at:
NIBN and because similar designs and design criteria were u<<Sed at SQN and BLN.
TVA"s qeneric applicabiliity statemeint indicates t:hat.the concern is not applicable to BFN.
However, durinq the evaluat ion of a related concern at BFN, a pot:ential ciuct leakaqe problem was'dentified.
Tiiis BFN cluct leakage and control room habitabiility i
concern was not. evaluated as an employee concern.
- Instead, a
corrective action plan (CAP 200 BI=N Ole Ref..
141) was initiated, in which TVA committiad to evaluating and correctina the problem outside the ECSP.
26420-R17 (10/1 cl/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
23000 REVISION NUMBER:
3 Page 5 of 35 o
. 230.4 Heat Buildup in Containment Dome - Fxcessive heat buildup in the upper reactor bui ding and steam generator compartments limits personnel access.
These issues were evaluated at the site of the concern (WBN) and found not to be valid because the concern was based on and erroneous presumption of the design basis for the containment temperature.
No other site evaluations were deemed appropriate.
o 230.5 Airborne Radioactivit in CDWE Building - Personnel could be exposed to radioactivity from the condensate demineralizer waste evaporator (CDWE) during an Auxiliary Building isolation (ABI). when noncondensibles, back up from the closed building exhaust dampers.
As this system and its separate building are unique to SgN and
- WBN, this concern was evaluated only at these two sites.
The issues summarized. under the elements above deal with presumed deficiencies or inadequacies in the design of the HVAC systems.
More specifically, four of the summarized issues are concerned with the adequacy of the design or the uality of components (elements 230.2, 230.3, 230.4, and 230.5) and one 230. 1) is concerned with the adequacy of functional tests.
Three of the above summarized issues were found to be val:id at the time TVA received the associated concern and required corrective action (elements 230. 1, 230.2, and 230.5).
Two of these (230.
1 and 230.2) nad all or par t of the corrective action initiated before the ECTG evaluation.
Two summarized issues required corrective action as a result of the ECTG evaluation (230.
1 and 230.5).
Each issue reviewed within the element evaluations is stated fully in Attachment B, which also lists corresponding findings and corrective actions that are discussed in Sections 4 and 5 of this report.
3.
EVALUATION PROCESS This section defines the element and subcategory evaluation processes related to the issues summarized in Section 2.
3.
1 Element Evaluation Process The element evaluation process. consisted of the following steps:
a.
Defined the issues for each element from the employee concerns.
b.
Reviewed current regulatory requirements, industry standards, and TVA criteria documents related to the issues. to develop an understanding of the design basis.
p g II 26420-R16 (10/19/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE C()NCERtllS SPECj[AL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER: '3000 REVISION NUMBER:
3 Page 6 of 35 c.
Reviewecl applicaIble desi'gn documents and conducted facility walkdowns; as appropriate, to develop design understanding and to verify imp'Iement:at i on st:atu s.
d.
Reviewed applicable
and SER Supplements to understand scope and basis of NRC review, to determine regulatory compliance, and to ident,ify any open issues or TVA commitments related to the designe e.
Reviewed any other documents applicable to the issues and determined
~
to be needed for the evaluation>>
such as correspondence, transcripts of interviews, procedures, test reports evaluation repc)rts, etC.
f.
Interviewed TVA corporate and site personnel in person and by phone to develop understanding of problems not:ed.
9 ~
Oiscussed component problems with supplier (venclor) representatives.
3.2
~Subcate ory 2'va'luatioo Process h.
Using the results from steps a through cl above, evaluated the iSsues for each e'lementre j ~
Tabulated Iissues,,
findings,,
and corrective actions from the.e~lement evaluations in a, pilant-by-plant arrangement (see Aistachnient ").
Prepared Tables 1,
2, and 3 to.permit comparison and identifi<atioh of common'nd unique issues, findings~,
and corrective actiOns among.
the four pilants.
Classified the findings and cor rective actions from the eleme'nt
'valuations using t:he EC'SP definitions.
On the basis of ECSP guide'lines, analyzed the causes and established the collect'.ive significance of the finding:, from the element evaluations.
n.
Evaluated clefined corrective actions to determine if aadirional actions are required as a result of causes found in. step 1.
Provided aclditional judgment or ~infortnat'ion that may not be aoparent at the element level.
4.
F INOINGS The findinqs from each of the nine element evaluations for this subcategory are contained in thi's section and sumnarized in Attachment 8 by element number and"by plant.
The references cited in thi's section are listed in Att;achment'C.'6420-R16 (10/ilg/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
23000 REVISION NUMBER:
3 Page 7 of 35 4.1 Fire Dam er Latchin Test - Element 230.1 The concerned individual (CI) referred to a summer 1982 time frame when Ruskin brand fire dampers failed to latch when tested at WBN.
Curtain-type fire dampers manufactured by Ruskin Manufacturing Company (Ruskin) have been subject to a variety of problems in the past, including improper installation and incomplete closure of the curtain.
In a telephone conversation (Ref. 1), T. Arnold of Ruskin agreed that the type of fire damper release itself (fusible link, ETL, COq or manual by string for testing only) does not affect the closing and latching operation.
This concern is, therefore, discussed below as two separate issues:
fusible link failure and damper closure failure.
In a later telephone conversation with TVA (Ref.
- 2) reqarding the same issue for BFN, a knowledgeable indi vidual disputed the sequence of events durinq fire damper testing, shown, in the concern for WBN.
According to his account (Ref. 3), the damper curtains were first released by hand.
Damper curtains that did not close were then reset and released by fusing a link.
This sequence of events would have made evaluation of fusible link failures unnecessary;
- however, at the time of above telephone conversation, this issue had already been evaluated; Release Mechanism (Fus ib 1 e Link) Failure Single purpose fire dampers are released by melting a fusible link under external heat (normally at 160'F).
Dual purpose smoke control/fire dampers are released by melting an electrothermal link (ETL) either under external heat or by an electric current.passed through,it from a smoke control panel,.
Nuclear Power Experience, Inc. reports for domestic and foreiqn nuclear power plants up to August 1986 (Ref.
- 4) do not indicate any generic fusible link or ETL failures of Ruskin or other brand fire dampers.
A few release mechanism failures were attributed to mechanical interference of electrical conduits with ETLs, binding of curtain retaining cables, corrosion, and in one case, an unexplained melted fusible link..
The latter resulted in inadvertent damper closure.
Watts Bar.
A significant condition adverse to quality (CA(}) was identified at i~yonconformance Report NCR W-210-P (Ref. 5), which reported fai:lures of ETLs durinq initial performance of the fire detector panel tests per Surveillance Instruction SI-L601 (Ref.
- 6).
Attacnment A to NCR 210-P determined improper installation or concealed damage from handlinq as root causes of ETL failures.
An evaluation showed that the smoke control function of dampers is not required for safe shutdown of the plant.
Therefore, ETLs were replaced by fusible links on dampers in fire barriers, and dampers not required for,fire compartmentalization were locked, open.
Surveillance Instruction SI-L601 was revised for dampers maintained.
as dual function smoke/fire control devices (for economic reasons),
to include 2642D-R17 (10/19/87)
TVA, EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM Rl:PORT NUMBER:
23000 RI=VISION NUMBER:
3 Page 8 of 35 0
post-installati on checking of the ETLs'lectrical resistance, in lieu of firing them.
Installation deficiencies, which resulted in impeded ETL
- release, were corrected per ECN 5523 (Ref.
8) and as described in a
TVA memo (Ref. 9).
TVA General Oesiqn Guide for Fire Oamper Aoplication, Selection and Installation (Ref.
7) was revised to specify plost-installation testing of fusible links'lectrical resistance in order to avoid recurrence of failures..
~scone an.
A TYA memo (Ref.
137) responded to slEII's request frir a potential generic applicability evaluation (Ref.
10).
This memo declared that the condition of NCR M-210-P did not exist at SQN.
Bellefonte.
In response to a reauest for a potential generic condition evaluation (OE-EP1.52)
(Ref.
10) e BLN replied twice, by memo (Refs.
11 and
'2),
that an inspection of ETLs f'r the Control Buildi.nq confirmed acceptable resistances.
The memo from the BLN Project Manager to the Engineerinq Project Manaaer (Ref.
- 12) further committed to addinq tht~ ETLs tio the Preventive Maintenance Quality Control Procedu're (QCP)
(Refe
- 13) for checkinq after installation and bef.ore transfer to the Oivision of Nuclear Power (NUC PR).
The preventive maintenance equipment list, Attachment
'S to the QCP (Ref.I 13I),I has not yet been preparecl.
The ETL resistance check must also be included mini the Technical Specif'ication and Surveillance Instructions; the QCP only covIers the time period from receipt until transf'er of equipment to i'IUC PR.
condition evalluation (OE-EP'1.52)
(Ref.
14),
BFN replied by memo (Ref.
- 15) that the condition does not exist.
An evaluation (Ref'.
- 16) revealed no ETLs in Vs't BFN.
4.1.2 Oamper Closure Failure
';watts Sar.
A 'TVA memo (Refe
- 19) reported failure to comoletely close aqainst
~asr t ow of curtain-type gr viaty-p< orated fire damper s frcm Rustiin Manufacturing Company.
This was discovered ffurinq preooerationalI teSt of fire dampers per Instruction TVA-24 (Ref. 20).
NCR dfBN MEB8203, Rev.
0 (Ref. '21),
'as
- issued, which shows the addition of oositive closure sorinosdeletion of some
22) a<a corrective actions.
Revision 1 of NCR NBH 'RES8203 (Ref.
21) and the completion sneet show ECH 3761 (Ref.23) and the neqator sorinq contract (Ref'.
24) as c 1 osinq out this NCR.
Ruskin' Quality Assurance procedure for the positive closure spring kits (Ref.
- 25) stated that vercic~l model IBO 23 (l-l/2 hr rated) fire damoers will close aaainst fnaximum 5,()00 feet per minute air velocity or 10 inches water qauge static pressure swnen furnished with the specif'ied neqator spri,nqs.
Subseauent to implementation of the above cbrr'ective actions, NRC inspIeCtiOhs I
at WBN and othier nuClear power plants revealed improperly insta11led and rated fire dampers, which prompted issuance of NRC Information Notice IE 83-69 (Ref. 26).
The ensuinq spot check by TVA resulted in issuance of NCR 5036 26420-R16
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
23000 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
3 Page 9 of 35 (Ref. 27), which attributed the insufficient clearance between the dampers and embedded sleeves to lack of proper installation design documents.
28 and 29) therefore requested revision of'll fire damoer installation drawings to reflect manufacturer's requirements and verification of actual installations.
A TVA memo (Ref. 30) reported impending completion of these fire damper installation inspections and closure testing by fusible link removal.
No specifics as to air flow velocity during these closure tests were given.
This memo also reported requisitioning of replacements for dampers which were installed with less than manufacturer specified clearances or which failed the closure test.
.Per purchase documents (Ref. 31),
new 3 hr fire rated model NIB023 fire dampers were ordered with the same closure spring sizes as shown in the corrective action to the earlier NCR (Ref.
- 21) subject to confirmation of TVA's closure test findings by Ruskin tests.
In 1984, Ruskin found that its test methods for fire damper closure against air flow did not correspond with the actual installed configuration of most dampers at nuclear power plants.
Ruskin's test configuration was essentially a wall mounting as showing in Air Movement and Control Association (AMCA)
Standard 500 (Ref. 32) Figure 5.5 instead of duct installation per Figure 5.3 as stated in Ruskin's catalog.
The wall-mounted configuration did not account for dynamic flow effects and resulted in nigher allowable air velocities for closure.
Since Ruskin dampers are installed in the majority of U.S. nuclear power plants, Ruskin then issued a
10 CFR 21 notice to the NRC and a
corresponding letter (Ref. 33) to TVA.
This letter recommended retesting of all fire dampers with closure springs under air flow, to verify proper operation.
It also pointed out that Underwriters Laboratories (UL) Standard 555 (Ref. 34) does not require fire damoers to be tested with air flow; reduced air flow capability will not affect the fire rating.
A second Ruskin letter (Ref'. 35) followed with new limiting fire damper air flow velocity test results for duct installation per AMCA standard 500-83, Fiqure 5.3.
On the basis of these two Ruskin letters, TVA issued NCR WBNHEB 8513 (Ref. 36) because the design basis for the dampers was not adequately changed as outlined in a TVA memo (Ref. 37) earlier.
NRC was informed of this inadequacy as shown on TVA Oetermination of Reportability Information Worksheet for 10 CFR 50.55(e)
(Ref. 38).
A Ouality Information Release (gIR) (Ref.
- 39) served as corrective action for NCR WBNMEB 8513 committing to change of the HVAC system descriptions ror the Auxiliary, Control, and Fuel Buildings, and to institute administrative procedures for fan shutdowns, allowing the fire dampers to close.
A FAIR (Ref. 40) shows the result of an analysis of.';WBg,,fire dampers versus the test data from Ruskin (Ref. 35).
Seventy-six fire dampers were identified as requiring shutdown of the associated ventilation fans to assure complete closure.
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3 Page 10 of 35 TVA's administrative solution tlo the Ruskin damperlos'ur6 p~oblem was presented to the NRC in a meeti,ng he'Id on March 27,
- 1985, documented in an NRC i
letter (Ref. 41).
The NRC's comments were confined to the degree of freedom to be given to Ithe fire brigade leader in dedidinq whether or not to, shut off the associated ventilation systems.
A TVA letter (Ref. 42) to NRC clarified this concern by proposing mandatory shutdOwn of the fans for the areas where the 76 fire damper s may not close under air fIow following receipt by t'e'perator of two or more alarms.
The abnormal operating instructions for plant f~ires (Ref. 43) were then'hanged to include references to the system operating instructions (SOIs) for the fire detection system (Ref. '44).
These. SOIs list specific fan.controlls and impose the operat,ing sequence as requested by NRC.
The General. Oesign Guide for Fire Dampers '(Ref.') has been revised to inClude the limitations of air flow velocities under which curtain-type fire daimpers, even with negator springs, will close.
The preoperational test instructions for the fire dampers (RI!f. 20) were revised to define the "normal mode" for closure testing as being without airflow.
The concern is no longer valid for MBN because all curtain-tvpe fire daimper deficiencies have been corrected prior to the ECTG evaluation, by modification,,replacement, or administrative procedur'es.
,The design documents were also corrected to clarify the limitatioh of airflow under which curtain-type fire dampers, even with negator springswill close.
The preoperational test procedure changes included a definition of normal mode fear closing tests being without airflow.
Sequovah.
In response to the TVA memo (Ref.
- 19) noted
- above, NCR SQHHEB82'07
~Ref.
a
) was i.;sued, following determination of generic applicability.
filis NCR resulted in the addition of Ruskin-supplied negator springs and positilve blade latching mechanisms to 100 fire damperS, and replacement of 15 dainpers which would not accept springs.
Except for One damper, corrective modifications and full drop tests were completed in March 1984.
Proper'i're'amper
.installation clearances were verified by th'e Oivlsion of Construction Quality Control inspector, as reported in
'a NA'meino (Ref.,18).
Morkolan 10483 of lECN-L5847 (Ref. 46) r eportd that one of the 15 replacement dampers did not fit the penetration
- sleeve, and a tefnporary alteration control form (TACF), 1-84-039-31l, was issued for r'esizing 'the damper.
This damper, 0-31C-1744, was never reinstalled, however.
AcCording to a t,elephone call on November 20, 1986 (Ref. 47), it may hlave been lost, but is on reorder.
The originally installed damper was destroyed tvhein kembved.
Past: exp'erience i'
voted in workp1lan 10483, indicating, that damper 0-31C-1744 and its coinpanion 0-31C-1743) willi Fail the full flow drop 'tes't.
'rlorkplan 10483 also records postmodificatibn tekt completion of the SQN fire dampers with closure springs under full flow.
No functional test procedure is referenced in the workp1lan, only a visual surveillance instruction (Ref'.
1'36).
l 1
i I
I i
I 0
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
23000 REVISION NUMBER' Page ll of 35 A TVA memo of April 30, 1985 (Ref. 48), lists the 12 dampers that either failed a full flow drop test or are expected to fail based on tests at WBN or engineering judgment.
For nine of these 12 dampers, the proposed corrective action was to institute administrative operating procedures for ventilation flow shutdown to assure their closure.
Two of the remaining three fire dampers were determined to be in systems operating less than 1,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> per
- year, and one damper is no longer required per 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, evaluation.
SON System Operating Instruction (SOI) "Fire Interaction Manual" (Ref. 49) gives instructions for shutting area supply and exhaust fans, closing isolation dampers, or initiating Auxiliary Building isolation, in order to interrupt airflow to the nine fire dampers of concern.
The appropriate action depends on the specific location of the damper.
These instructions,
- however, do not specify a fire alarm or personal notification criteria for shutting off a specific airflow and do not designate the manual fan and damper controls and their locations for the fire brigade leader.
A meeting between TVA and NRC was held on March 27, 1985, to discuss the Ruskin fire damper concerns for WBN.
Following this meeting, a TVA letter to the NRC (Ref. 42)'larified the administrative procedures proposed for shutting off the ventilation flow in areas where fire dampers may not close under air flow.
For WBN, Abnormal Operating Instruction "Plant Fires" (Ref. 43) and System Operating Instruction "Fire Oetection System" (Ref. 44) give detailed instructions for the sequence to be followed in shutting off tne area fan(s),
and specific locations of their controls.
These instructions also incorporate the NRC's requirement for r estricting the fire brigade leader's judqment in decidinq if fans should be shut down.
The fire brigade leader may, instead,
~equest restart of fans after fire scene assessment.
The concern is not valid as to fire damper closure tests not representing actual operatinq conditions.
Such tests have been performed since summer
- 1982, and administrative procedures have been issued. for assuring closure of dampers that failed the tests.
- However, the System Operating Instructions for SgN (Ref. 49) are not as explicit as the ones For WBN.
TVA has submitted a corrective action plan (Ref.
119) that includes the followinq commitments:
a.
to revise the Abnormal -Operating Instructions (Ref.
73) so that, in case of fire, operators wi'll-,take specific ventilating system actions necessary to assure fire damper closure; and b.
to install a new 0-31C-1744 damper after the next Unit 2 refueling outage.
The corrective action plan is satisfactory to the evaluation team.
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3 Page
'l2 of 35 Dl, Oesign Services Manager to review the above-mentioned Ruskin letters and to report possible fire damper closure problems at BPN.'he. Project Manager also offered to analyze the BFN fire damper installlations versus Ruskin's net ties'ata, in case onsite testing was not possible.
This analysis would have been performed as part of BF-OCR 2949 (Ref'. 5l), Qhilch deals with fire damper rating verification.
No response to the Project Manager's memo could be
- found, and OCR 2949 did not request a fird dhmphr.closure analysis.
In August 1985, a
TVA memo (Ref.
- 52) reported on an Appendix R Compliance-Fire Oamper Installation Walkdown and Inspection, stating that "this r epor't does not address fire dampe'r closure against airflow.,"
Note 15 on mechanical HVAC drawings (Ref. 53), issued in 1987 for BFN unknit 2i Reactor Building only, specifies that "fire damper closure shall be verified with no airflow through the sys'em by remdvihg thd fusible link(s) and allowing the damper curtain to cycle."
No test procedure reference is given.
The Technical Specifications for BFN (Ref. 68) co~tain visual surveillance requirements for the fire barriers, inc'luding fire, dampers.
The requirements are partially complied with by Surveillance Instructions (SI) for Visual Inspection of Fire Oampers (Ref. 69),- whicih, ihoweverq do not include functional closure tests-under actual airfilow.
i The SI also contain superseded damper lists and fire area compartmentation drawings,, conti adicting the'i're'rea compartmentation and zone drawings (Reft 7O).
The BFN Fire 'Protection Plan (Ref.
- 71) on p. 97 in'structs the shift engineer to ensure ventilation system operation during a fire emergency, because "ventilation wi'll exhaust toxic gases and also smoke and thus provide impr'oved
'isibility for fire fighters."
- However, oper ation of the ventilation system could spread fire if dampers do not close.
The instrvction contradictsl the NRC's request, expressed in a meeting summary or ':lBN (Ref. 72), "hat the ventilation system be shut off immediately upon notification of a.fire to',
assure fire damper closure.
The concern is valid for BFN.
There are no full closure test procedures and reports and there is no evaluation of the 'vendor t'est results against the installed fire damoers at BFN.
.The surveillance instructions for the
,ire dampers do not contain periodic tests to d'emonstra'te'operabillity.
Newly issued HVAC drawings oniy require closure tests without airflow and llack detailed instr'uctions.
No adlministrative procedures'have
'been instituted foi'huttinq off the airflow through the dampers in case of fire as an alternate measure to assure fire damper c'losure.
TVA has submitted a corrective action plan (Ref.
118) that includes the'ol lowing commii:ments:
0 26420-R16
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3 Page 13 of 35 a ~
Review and verify all curtain-type fire damper installations in designated fire barriers (per 10 CFR 50, Appendix R evaluation) to determine'which ones may not close against system airflow.
This review is to consist of:
o Oetermining duct velocities at fire damper locations and comparing them with manufacturer's test data.
Identifying and documenting problem dampers.
o Oocumenting any fire damper that is expected not to close against airflow on a Condition Adverse to Quality Report (CAQR).
o Revising the BFN Fire Protection Plan to require periodic fire damper closure testing.
b.
Resolve any problems noted by CAQRs in accordance with NEP 9.1.
This step may consist of damper closure tests against airflow or issuance of administrative instructions to shut off the ventilation system in the fire-affected areas where fire dampers have been determined not 'to close against airflow.
c.
Include revised fire compartmentation drawings in surveillance instructions.
The Technical Specifications and Surveillance Instructions are revised'during the modification as per existing procedures and are not issued until the modification is complete (full implementation of 10 CFR. 50, Appendix R program).
The corrective action plan is satisfactory to the evaluation team.
Bellefonte.
In r esponse to an NRC IE Information Notice (Ref. 26),
TVA issued NNSLN Nf88403 (Ref.
54) in April l984 covering fire damper installation deficiencies.
This NCR also reported closure problems with fire dampers, fi~st identified at WBN, but declared generic to all TVA nuclear plants.
The installation-deficiencies were corrected per ECN 2945 (Ref.
- 55) by repairinq or replacing the fire dampers that did not meet the manufacturer's UL-aooroved installation instructions, reflected in TVA drawinas (Ref.
56) and a
TVA quality control procedure (QC?) (Ref. 64).
The subject NCR (Ref.
- 54) attributed the assignable cause of the installation deficiencies to lack of proper and thorough understanding by TVA of the apolication, selection, and installation or fire dampers in meeting NFPA 90A and 90B standards (Ref. 57) and thus 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.
The planned corrective actions for damper closure failure were committed in a "final report" (Ref. 58) to NRC for completion 6 months before fuel load of unit 1
and unit 2, respectively.
The associated ECN {Ref. 55) initiated the following actions, which are tracked for completion by the Tracking of Open.
Items (TROI) system (Ref. 59).
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3 Page 14 of 35 Ii" I
o Add negator spr inigs to curtain-type fire dampers not already so
- equipped, to enhance closure against airflow.
The afFected dampiers were listed iini thie fire damper installation guide (Ref. 56),
and the closure springs were purchased from thei original two dampier supplie'rs, as shown by TVA purchase documents (Refs.
60 and 61).
o Analyzie the actual air velocities through multisectional curtain-type fire dampers at BLN and'ompaz e them with maximum allowable vel'ocities per Ruskin's tests (Ref 35),.
The comparison will determine which aiz movers require shutdown in order to assure damper closure.
An OE anailysis (Ref. 62) of air velocities through fire dampers hasi been pierformed, and the subject air mover s have t>een identified.
Note that, UL Standard 555 (Ref. 34) and the TVA specification for dampers (Ref.
- 63) did not require fire dampers to close under ai rf1ow.
Revise the mechanical design guide (Ref.
- 7) fair fire damper application,, selection, and installation and the OE standard specificatir)n (Ref. 22) for HVAC system dampers to pzevent recurzience of the installation and closuz e problems.
These documents have already been zevised and a construction quailitiy control pzoceduz e (r)CP) (Ref. 64) provides guidance to assure installation in accordance with clesign drawings and damper manufacturer inst,ructions.
o Issue appropriate system descriptions and system operating instructions (fire protection, HVAC, environmental control),
including fan shutdown pzocedures for assuring c'losure of dampers identified in the Ol= analysis (Ref.
62')
as having "abnormal" airflow.
The operating procedures must further comply with the sequence of fan shutdown required by NRC as stated, in its meeting minutes on the same subject at
'ilBN (Ref., 41).
General Construction Specifications for fiz e protection systems (Ref. 6')
require formal documented preoperational tests for fire dampers.
.The subject preoperational test procedrlre, PT-VC-Ol, is also referred to in an ECN (Ref.
- 55) but has not yet been issued.
The technical specifications and survei 1'lance instructions for fire damper.;
(ETL z esistance ancl closure and latching test) have niot yet been issued.
In March 1985, an NCR (Ref.
- 66) reported a fire damper (OVC-MDMP-368-N) failing to close when repeatedly actuated pez Division aif Construction
()CP (Ref. 64), Section 6.5.5.1.,3.
This damper is in, the Auxiliary Buitlding at 26420-R16
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3 Page 15 of 35 elevation 610 feet next to the elevator shaft and not the one referred to in the concern that originated at WBN.
The gCP (Ref. 64) does not require testing under airflow and is, therefore, no substitute for a preoperational test.
The cause of the damper closure fai lure could not be established, and replacement with a new damper was completed in 07/86.
As part of the installation inspection, the closure test was then repeated and acceptance documented in Attachment 0 (Ref. 67) of the above-mentioned gCP.
The concern is no longer valid for BLN because the fire dampers have been
- modified, and test procedures and administrative measures to assure their closure have been committed.to prior to fuel load.
4.2 Computer/Batter Room Temperatures
- Element 230.2 This concern fo'r Watts Bar asserts that the HVAC system design for the battery and computer rooms and the operation of components is deficient because the battery room temperature falls to 55'F while the system maintains the computer room at its required temperatur e of 55'F.
The electrical board room air conditioning system is part of the Control Building HVAC system.
It serves the nonsafety-related 250 V and 48/24 V
battery and battery board rooms and communications rooms at elevation 692 feet,'nd the computer and auxiliary instrumentation rooms at elevation 708 feet.
According to the WBNP FSAR (Ref. 95),
the Control Building air conditioning systems are designed to maintain a temperature e of approximatel,y 75'F in all equipment and personnel areas during all modes of normal and accident noeration.
The Control Building air supply is heated to a minimum of 60'F by means of an electric heater.
This fresh air (approximately 8 percent of total) is mixed with exhaust air from the auxiliary instrument
- rooms, computer
- room, and mechanical equipment rooms for reconditioning (filtering and cooling) by the electrical board room air handling units (AHU).
These AHUs supply the auxiliary instrument, battery board, comnunication and computer rooms.
A 10
<W capacity thermostatically controlled electric supply duct heater maintains the computer room at approximately 70'F (Ref. 92).
There is no reauirement to keep the computer room at 55'F.
The battery room air supply is through wall penetrations from the corridor which collects exhaust air orimari ly from the battery board rooms.
The battery room supply air temoerature will, therefore, be higher than the unheated computer room supply air temperature.
Even if the battery rooms were maintained at 55'F, whicn is below the 60'F minimum for rated battery capacity, there would be minimal deqradation of the batteries ability to perform the nonsafety-related function.
The WBN design documents reviewed (Refs.
74, 75, and 76) and comparisons made with the SON design did not reveal unusual design, or, location of the HVAC system for the rooms of concern.
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3 Page 16 of 35 iIi According to the notes from a
HVAC equipment maintenance coordination meeting (Ref. 77), "overheating of the computer room" and "borderline temperature" in the battery board and communications rooms were some of the problems discussed, and a design study was requested (Re~F. 78).
This design study (Ref.
- 79) attributed the temperature deviations to fouled ai r handling uniit cooling coils and 'the frequent breakdowns of the electric board room HVAC system to specific component design deficiienciies.
The corrective action recommended in a first phase consisted of cleaning the battery board room,AHU cooling coils by a contractor (Ref. 80),.
The second. phase of the design study (Ref. 81) suggested solutions to the HVAC sy0teI component.
problems (fan
- bearings, dampe~
blades filter supports, motor adjustments).
The concern is valid as to reliability of HEY system components.
CorreCtive actions suggested in the OS have not been implemented yet because the component deficiencies constitute mainly maintenance inconvenience rather than public safety or oiperability hazards.
TVA's corrective action plan (Ref. 82) commits to follow up on the, Phase-I, work OSR-21 by having the cooling coils of the air hand'ling units cleaned gaby a; contractor.
This work will be scheduled by TVA's maintenance section.
In addition, the mechanical maintenance section has submitted a design change request (OSR-692) to the change control bo'ard tQ a'pprove corrective action work per Phase II of the design study.
The OCR,in'eludes corrective action's for all other equiipment deficiencies identified as causing frequent maintenance outages of the electrical board room HVAC system.
Because the'hase
{I items are 'modified for" reduced maintenance rather than operabi,lity,,
these changes are scheduled for completion afte~ fuel loading.
7ne completed corrective actions by the maintenance
- section, as prooosed be TVA ONE, will resolve the concern as -perceived by this evaluation.
4.3 Leak Tiqhtness of Duct Seals
- Element 230.3 0
This concern ra',ised three issues for 'watts Bar:
that HVAC d~icting cannot
'be'aintained 100 percent leak tight; that ductwork supports are excessiveily i
heavy; and that an excessive amount of glue has been required to achieve this dearee of'eak tightn'ess.
4.3.
1 Leak Tightness
'latts Bar.
The
':JBN HVAC systems were designed in the early 1970s and employed then-current nuclear industrj oractice for diic".work design.
These practices were documented in the Sheet fletal and Air Cdnditioning Contractors Nationial i
Association (SMACNA) standard (Ref. 83),
as modified by a portion of the Oak Ridge National Laboratories Report ORNL-NSIC-65 (Ref. 84).
In the evaluation
.team's judgment these practices are characterized as high-grade industria,l practices, supp'lemented by care~Ful consideration of opera'ting conditions, especially external and internal pressures.
26420-R16
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3 Page 17 of 35 In the mid-1970s, througn 'development of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref.
85) and its companion industry standard ANSI N509 (Ref. 86), substantial chanaes occurred in requirements for safety-related HVAC systems.
Regulatory Guide 1.52 references ANSI N509 Section
- 4. 12 for leak tiantness and Section
- 5. 10 for ductwork design, construction, and testing.
ANSI N509 Section
- 4. 12 imposes a
0.5 percent of flow leak tiahtness requirement for enqineered safety feature (ESF) systems (0. 1 percent of flow for control room HVAC).
For non-ESF
- systems, the requirement is 1.0 percent of flow.
ANSI N509 Section
- 5. 10 allows qasketed transverse joints.
SMACNA High Velocity Ouct Construction Standards (Ref.
- 83) are acceptable for longitudinal seals.
Neither Regulatory Guide 1.52 nor ANSI N509 have "100 percent leak tightness" reauirements as outlined in the concern.
TVA Oesiqn Criteria MB-OC-40-36.,1 (Ref.
87) was first issued early in 1975, well before Reaulatory Guide 1.52, R2 in 1978.
It incorporates the practices documented in the SMACNA standards and ORNL-NSIC-65 (Refs.
83 and 84), wnicn were applied to all safety-related ductwork.
Tnose systems that could contain hiqnly r adi oactive air in post-accident conditions (e.q.,
the emerqency gas treatment system) were subject to additional requirements.
Specificall.y, duct sections were to be all-welded, although flanged joints witn neoprene seals were aWTowed between duct sections.
- However, some of these systems were also required to use all-welded joints wnere operational conditions dictated application of such r equirements (e.g.,
Tnese systems are covered in Table 3.3-1 of the TVA desian criteria (Ref.
87, notes 4 and 5).
Leak tightness requirements for HVAC systems were specified on construction drawings for the individual systems.
As descrioed in TVA General Construction Specification G-37 (Ref. 88), only tnose ducts defined as "low leakaae" on the
- drawings, and ducts on the discnarqe side or fans, are required to be leak tested by oressurization, as oooosed to leak cnecked.
Leak cneckinq consists
~or ccatinq leaks by feel or sound.
'az testznq measures actual leakaae rates to verify ccmpliance with the maximum allowable 1 percent of the system flow at 25 percent above specified system desiqn pressure (Ref. 88, Section 3.3.3).
TVA documented tne safety-related ductwork practices frcm Construction Specification G-37 (Ref.
88) and Oesian Criteria tlB-OC-40-31.8 (Ref.
87) in FSAR Table 3.2-6 (Ref. 95).
Compliance uitn Requlatory Guide 1.52 (Ref.
85) for the emergency qas treatment system, Auxiliary Building qas treatment
- system, Reactor Buildinq purge ventilation system, and main control room air cleanup system was documented in FSAR Tables 6.5-1, 6.5-2, 6.5-3, and. 6w5-~,
respectively.
Exceptions to the leak tiahtness criteria were provided in the footnotes.
These exceptions are summarized below:
o The majority nf the ductwork upstream of the fans was located within secondary containment or pressurized control room areas, so that any out-leakage frcm the systems would be'conta'ined and processed by the gas treatment system for that area, rather than.leaking directly to the atmosphere.
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3 Pag'e 18 of 35 o
The ductwork would be at a,negative pressure relative to itS surr oundinq area, and any leakage would be in-leakaqe rather than out-leakage.,
The NRC, using Regulatory Guitie 1.52 as a criterion, found MBN's ductWor'k practices acceptable on a system-by-system
- baSis, c%s indicated in the. Safety Evaluation Report (Ref'.
89)..
As part of a program to verify weld adequacy for all safety-related HVAC ductwork (Refs.
'90 and 91), leak testing to 1 percent of, total volume, not flow, was successfully conducted in 1981.
The control room HVAC system and the post,-TMI habitability requirements evaluated in FSAR Section 6.4 could. give the impression of usinq "100 pdrc0nt tightness" as a design parameter.
This is because duct leakage values of 0 (zero)
CFM (FSAR Table 6.4-'I) are used to evaluate the control room habitability.
In this particular case, "duct leakage"'efers to leakaqd of contaminated outside air into the c.ontrol roan HVAC system ductwork, hot'O leakage of "clean" room air into the ducts.
Note 7 of'FSAR Table 6.5-4 (Ref.
- 95) justifies the use. of commerCial 4rade 'dudtwbrk fOr this application.
The justification is that thd m4in cOntrol room habitab'ili'ty'ystem (MCRHS) includes the HVAC ductinq and recirculation fans inSidh the pressurized cOntir ol room volume.
Any actual duct.leakage would not bh uncontrolled contaminated outside air but room air.
Therefore, the abtu'al
'uantity of duct leakage frcm tne pressuriZed volume has no impact,on'MCRHS habitability and safet:.y.
The commercial qrade leak tiohtness criterion identified in FSAR Table 6.5-4 was accep'ted b.'y NRC in the
- SER, A furtne'r reviewof the Control. Buildinq ductwork failed to find any leakaqe oaths not already evaluated.
Browns Ferry.
Althouqh,no ECTG evaluation was conclucted at
- BFN, a related ducts -routina unfiltered outside air throuqh the cont~ol room to othei post-accident cooled rooms in the building.
TVA nas bonmitted to conductinq an evaluation (Ref.
139) of the control,room aiVAC system at BFN and to correcting al11 deficiencies d;iscovered.
Under the conditions stated In a
letter (Ref.
1140), the correci:ive action plan is acceptable to the ECTG.
4.3.2 HVAC Supports The EC stated that some of th>>
HVAC c/uct supports are "excessively heavy."
Unless specifiic neqative effects of'he alleged excessively heavy supportS are identified, an unsatisfactory condition for plant operation or for the o'ub1ic'ealth and safety cannot be found.
The use of "heavy" supports is ccmmon throughout the nIuclear power;industry lt results friom a combination of conservati.ve regulatory requirements, economic factors, and design standardization.
The supports 'for ductwork are desianed to account for at least the ccmponent
- load, a 250 lb additional load (e.g.,
a person walking one the'duct),
and the eff'ects of seismic forces.
A seismic load on a compdnerit
'sually imparts a freguency of vibration of less than 33 Hz (often in the 10 0 26420-R16 (10/19/87)
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If the structure has a natural frequency greater than 33 Hz, it is considered to be "rigid" and the seismic loads heccme nonadditive.
A viable design technique is to build "rigid" supports with standard components.
The resul.ting support design may then be excessively heavy for the ductwork dead load alone.
4.3.3 Excessive Sealing Glue The issue of "excessive" use of RTV glue is subjective.
The use of it as sealant is a most effective and ccmmon method of achieving the required leak tiqhtness requirements with the existina ductwork.
Sealant is generally used on tne gasketed and mechanical joints to minimize leakage.
As previously indicated, the finished ductwork complies with the commitments made in FSAR Tables 6.5-1 through 6.5-4 (Ref. 95).
Glue is an acceptable sealant (Ref.
86) and does not result in unacceptable operating conditions.
For newer HVAC
- systems, all-welded ducting systems are preferred for meeting tne new.leak tiqhtness criteria.
This evaluation concluded that there is no basis to the concern that the HVAC duct systems are inadequately designed for the functions intended.
The assertion concerninq "excessive use of glue" and "excessively heavy supports"
.are subjective.
The design may be overly conservative and, therefore, does not reduce the ability of the plant to pr otect the health and safety of tne pdb1 ic.
4.4 Heat Buildup in Containment Dome - Element 230.4 This EC refers to hiqh temperatures that occur at two locations inside the primary containment:
the upper portion of tne steam qenerator enclosure and the dome of the containment itself.
As shown in ':IBN eauipment location drawinqs (Refs.
93 and 94), the top slabs of the steam generator enclosures are part of the boundary between the upper and lower containment compartments, which is a feature of the ice condenser containment concept.
The lower compartment contains all hiqh enerqy oipina, and directs blowdown flow frcm a postulated pipe break through the ice condenser.
The WBN containment ventilation
- system, described in iARN FSAR Section 9.4.7 (Ref. 95), is divided into two major subsystems to serve tne upper and lower containment ccmpartments discussed in the orevious paragraph.
Tne lower compartment air cooling system is designed to maintain a maximum air temoerature nf 120'F in the lower compartment
- spaces, includina the steam generator enclosure, during normal; plant operation.
Tnis temperature limit is based on eauipment environmental aualificati ons.
These lower compartment spaces are rarely, accessed during normal operation, and many, including tne steam qenerator enclosure, are inaccessible due to hiqh radiation levels.
The upper containment compartment air cooling system is designed to maintain a
maximum temperature of 110'F in the containment dane during normal plant operation.
Access to the containment deme is also limited during normal plant operation.
Therefore, the desiqn temperatures for the containment ventilation systems were not based on personnel access considerations.
For both of these 26420-R16
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- systems, temperature is controlled by thirot'tling'he cooling water flow (Ref.
- 96).
Tnuseven with rel ativel.y 1 ow heat
~l oads,'he upper por t i ons of the steam generator enclosures and the c'ont'ainment dome are at an uncomfortable temperature when the system is in automatic control.
MBN FSAR Section 9.4.7.4 (Ref.
- 95) ccmmits to preoperational testing of the HVAC system ccrnponents, inclucling the temperature controllinq devices.'VA Division of Nuclear Engineering (ONE) r'eviewed the EC and prepared a'esponse conta,ininq the followinq statement (Ref. 97):
"The concern correctly st.ates that the design, of, the containment to some dearee and the design of the steam qenerator enclosures to a large deqree r etain heat.,"
The remainder of the response dealt with'he ven'tilat'ion modifications suggested in the employee concern.
It, concluded'ith the fol'lowing statement:
"Because of the safety function performed by the primary containrnen't and'he steam generator enclosure and because of the exist,ing plant ventilation systems, it is concluded that the addition of vents would result in an additional risk to the health and safety of tne public, and tnerefore,
- cannot, be justified."
The additional risk to the public with the concerned
'individual's suaaestecl redesign stems mainly from the need for additional larae penetrations in ttie containment anted in the barrier sieoaratinq the upper and lower containment ccmpartments.
Fast-closinq isolation valves would be required for these'enetrati ons.
Such valves have a mucn niaher fai lure nrobabi lity tharr the existing pass'i,ve containment and barrier structures.
For a simi lar desiqn condition involvinq other olants contaihmeInt ourae lines, the
.'IRc r
o.coa'nized'he inherent c cmpromise or containmenr. reliaoility ny requirinq "najor desiqn chanqes.
This conriition involved normally closed valves, wnich cornoromisecl the safety less than the normally open isolation valves required in the reccmmended desiqn of tne concernedl individual.
This concern its not valid because equipment errvironmental qualifications and nOt perSOnnel aCCeSS i'S the baSiS fOr the COntainment HVAC SVStem rleSiqn temperature.
-'. 5 Airborne ?adioact'vi ty in C'll!JE ":..1 1'>ina -lement 230. 5 Tnis concern asserts that personnel in the Condensate Oemineralizer Waste Evaporator Building (co'rli=s) could be exposed ko r adioac".ivity during isolation of the Auxiliary Builclinq.
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System Description
With minor exceptions, the COWE system, HVAC system, and COWES of Watts Bar and Sequoyan are identical as described in this secti on.
The COWE is located in a separate building adjacent to the northeast and southeast corner of the Auxiliary Building, for MBN and SgN, respectively.
The 30-gpm-capacity evaporator package was provided by Morton Process Oesian (HPD) Inc.
and is a
forced-circulation, vertical tube heater type.
It was primarily intended for concentrating the neutralized spent reqeneratina liquids fr om the condensate polishing demineralizer system (CPOS).
The CPOS was designed for full-flow treatment of the secondary (turbine steam) loop condensate.
The COME was also designed as backup to the 2-gpm-capacity waste evaporator and the 15-gom-capacity auxiliary waste evaporator for processina floor and tritiated drain wastes.
Air induced by the 1200-cfm-capacity CDWEB supply fan through a duct from the Auxiliary Building is used for ventilation.
This ventilation air is supplied to areas of low potential for radioactive contamination and migrates to areas of progressively higher potential for contamination.
The 1400-cfm-capacity COWES exhaust fan returns air from the area with highest contamination potential through a duct to the fuel handling area exhaust system in the Auxiliary Buildina.
Double isolation dampers in the ventilation ducts penetrating 'the COWEB-to-Auxiliary Building boun'dary close when the Auxiliary Buildina stack monitor detects high r adiation.
This Auxiliary Buildina isolation (ABI) may occur as a result of fuel handlinq accidents or spills and leaks within tne Auxiliary Buildinq.
A loss of coolant'ccident (LOCA) also results in an ABI as part of the secondary containment enclosure (SCE) isolation.
The CDWE is not part of the SCE.
The double isolation dampers nave a manual override switcn in the waste packaging area.
Fire damoers are also installed in the COWEB-to-Auxiliary Buildinq wall oenetrations.
Two separate air conditioning systems are pr ovided in the COMEB for heat removal, one servinq rooms of low potential for contamination, and one servinq rooms of hiqh potential for contamination.
The COWEB has a monitored door to tne outside for emergency exit.
Per HPO piping and instrument diaqrams 101 throuah 106 (Refs.
98 and 99),
tnere are four equipment vent lines originating frcm the COWE package:
a 6-inch heater relief val.ve discnarqe line and a 2-inch blowdown tank line exhausting throuqh the r oof; one 2-inch vent line fr cm the bottoms tank; and a
1-inch line frcm the vent aas cooler.
The latter two:(ere oriainallv routed to one;(aste gas system
(',<GS) in one Auxiliary Building.
A 1-incn zl e((iown tank rupture disc vents into the COMEB atmosphere.
A TVA memo from O. R. Patterson to R. M. Pierce (Ref.
100), dated November 13,
- 1979, addressina SON, initiated reroutinq of the CDWE eau'ipment vents at SgN and MBN through the COWEB roof to the atmosphere.
The reason for rerouting was that the vent aas cooler noncondensible mass flow (45 lb/hr) exceeded the WGS capacity.
More importantly, the"MGS processes hydrogen-rich gases frcm the chemical and volume control system (CVCS) holdup vessels, and gases containing oxyqen are specifically excluded.
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3 Page 22 of 35 A letter from HP() to T'VA, (Ref.
101),
datied Ocfl;aber 23.,
1986, corrected the noncondensible mass flow to 4>>5 lb/hrdowni from 45 lb/hr.
The recommendation of the above memo (Ref.
100) was incorporated into tne desiqn by ECN SQN 2744 (Ref.
102), reflected in iOrawinq 45M4 47W560-23 R'ev.,
Section G23 - G23 (Ref.
i03) and by ECN WBN 2257'Ref>>
104), reflected, i' Orawinq 85M 47W560-22, Rev.
9 (Ref. 105), rlesbectitel.g.
'hese changes created the potential for unrnonitored releases.
A TVA memo frcm i).
iC. Standifer to G. Wadewit~ (Ref.
106),.dated Odceinbe~r 22,~
1983, replied to an earl ier memo from G. Wadewitk to J.
C. Standifer (Ref.
107), which auotes an HPO Inc. design representative expressinai concerni over a remote possilbility of contaminants exhausting throuqh the vent qas cooler vent line under abnormal evapor atior ioperation.
i Standifer added that, in view of the recent idecision to use the COWE for routinely concentrating effluent frcm newly ad'ded hyperfiltratioln units (HFU) as replacement for the radwaste evaporators, the vent'. gas coole'r 1'inc shou'ld'be'..rerouted again, this time into the CDWEB ventilation duct returninri to the Auxiliary Buildina~.
~The radwaste radioact:ivity is orders of magniitudeihigher than that of turbine steam condensate.,
lhe TVA imemo (Ref.
106) further committed to issuina an ECN for routing the vent gas cooler vent line i'ntO the CDWE exhaust ventilation duct.
4.5.2 Watts Bar Evaluation ECN 4598 (Ref.
108) incorporated the vent line reroutina in TVA drawinas (Refs.
98 and 105).
T'ne blowdown tank viant lfine -remained ventinq through the roof because
.of the poss.ible high moistuire corrteints..
The blowdown tank is only used for containing steam condenSate and vapor body relief valve discharqe, wnich have minor potential for radiioabtivity.
ThiS routina was verified by a sit:e inspection (Ref s.
109 and 110).
It minimited the potential for unmonitored release f-rom the COWEB, butl ckealted the potential For backuo of radioactive containmants iri the COWES during periods of in 'BI.
Table 11.2.2-2 ofe SNi'SAR (Ref.
111) shows the expected radionucllide discharae rates f'ron the waste evaporator and auxiliary waste evaporat:or packaae vents (includina iodines) under normall operation to he nealialble.
Tne equivalent table in l he WBNP.
FSAR (Ref. 95) was deleted;
- nowever, tne similarity of the two plants supports an assumption of similar radioactivity levels in the waste streams.
These discnarqe~rates~
correspond to t>>e CD'..'""
packaae vent rates wnen processina radwaSte'.
Per tel&phone conversation with TVA (Ref.
112),
new radionuclide release rates aire being calculated for an ALARA study in proqress f'r Seauoyah.
The waste evaporator areas in the Auxiliary'uilding.are monit:ored t'or area radiation levels.,
Since the COWE is now routinely processinq, radwaste, the same criteria for monitorina could apply to the f.OWEB as well.
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3 Page 23 of 35 However Tables 12.3-4 and -5 of the MBNP FSAR (Ref.
95) snow that no plant area or airborne oarticulate activity radiation monitors are located in the CDWEB.
TVA general design guidelines for radiation protection - ALARA (Ref.
113) specify four to ten air chanqes per hour in airborne radiation enclosures.
The COWES ventilation system only affords one air chanqe per hour for the entire building, or 3.5 air changes,per
.hour for radiation zone II ( less than 5 mr/hr) rooms.
Nuclear Operating Experience Inc. Reports 352 and 353 (Ref.
120) state that frequent ABIs occurred
.at SON from January through April 1984 because of normal'aintenance operations and spurious siqnals.
Based on the similarity between SgN and MBN, similar frequency of ABIs is possible at WBN.
ABI is a
safety-related function; therefore, control, room annunciation is provided.
The COWE system operating instructions (SOI) (Ref.
114) require alignment of the dampers per checklist shown.in the Auxiliary Buildinq aeneral supply and exhaust fan operating instructions (Ref.
117) as a prerequisite for COWE operation.
This checklist reauires that the supply duct isolation dampers for the COWEB be open prior to restarting the fans.
- However, the exhaust dampers are not shown in the damper alionment checklist; These damoers are listed in the system operatinq instructions for the fuel handlinq area exnaust fans (Ref.
125),
but execution of these instructions was not made a prereauisite for COME operation.
The COWE SOI (Ref.
114) and the SOI for recovery fran an ABI (Ref.
115) do not instruct shutdown of the COME in case ot an ABI and opening of the COWEB ventilation damoers prior to restart.
The eauivalent SON instructions (Ref.
116) impose a 15-minute limit on COME operation with the ouildinq ventilation exhaust dampers closed.
Tne coME sOI (Ref.
114) further refers to a deleted vent ~as cooler vent valve in the valve checklist but do not include the blowdown tank valves.
The blowdown tank is not described. in the instructions.
The concern is valid for abnormal operation of tne COME simultaneously with an ABI.
Ourinq normal operation, tne expected airborne radioactivitv is negligible.
A follow-up investigation further showed that the COWE neatinq steam supply valves close upon an ABI (Ref.
121); thus, a limit on the time of operation during an ABI is not reauired.
In a telephone conversation (Ref.
122),
the COWE manufacturer assured that qassina off noncondensibles will cease within seconds of heating steam interruption.
The concern is further valid that no area or particulate air monitors are provided in the COWEB.
TVA has committed (Ref.. 123) to updatinq the SOIs.,for the CWOE oer as-built condition, and to including implementation of SOIs 'for Auxiliary Buildinq general supply and exhaust, fans (Ref.
1'l7) and fuel handlinq area. exhaust fans (Ref.
125) as a condition for COWE start.
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3
-Page 24 of 35 TVA has committed (Ref.
124) to initiating an'LAR@ Heview'f the COWEBi'toi establish the need for radiation monitoring devices
'(Ref. 126).
This review is to be performed before fuel load in unit l.
4.5.3 Sequoyah Evaluat ion A TVA memo from H. J.
Green to M. N. Sprouse (Ref.
127),, dated November 9, 1983, transmitted a field-completed OCR (Rhf.
128) that'documented rerouting of the vent gas cooler aind slurzy tank vent 1,'ines to the ventilation duct.
This change has not been incorporated into design drawings; however, it was verified by a site inspection (Ref. 129).
This change removed the potential f'r unmonitored release from the COWEB, but c'reated the potential for backup of radioactive contaminants in t:he COWEB during periods, of an ABI'.
Per Table 12.1.4-'
cf the Updated SNP FSAR (Ref.,
130)', there is no area radiation monitor 'located.
in the COWEB.
Table 11.2.2-2 of the orig.inal SNP FSAR,(Ref.
111) shows the radionuclide discharge rates from the waste evaporator and auxiliary'wa'ste! 'evaporator package vents (including iodines) under normal operation to be negligibile.
These rates correspond to the COWE package'ent'rates when processing radwaste.
Per telephone, conversat'ion ~ith TV'A ('Ref.
134),
a COME vent activity release rate study is presently in progress to confirm this.
The waste evaporator areas in the Auxiliary Building are monitored for ar ea radiation levels.
Since the COME is novi routinely processing radwaste (Refs 106 and 132),,
tlhe sarge criteria for con'itor ing could apply to the COWES as well.
Nuclear Ooerating Experience.Inc..:keports 352 and B53 (Ref'.
120) state thac frequent ABIs occurr'ed at Sequoyah from January, through 'pri 1 1984 because of normal maintenance ooerations and sour ious'i'gnals'.
ABI. is a'safety-c elated function and control room annunciation is provided.
TVA System Operating Instruction SOI-77. 183 ('Ref.
131') r'equires snuttincl down the CDWE upon an ABI, and verifying isolation damper opening prior to restartina the COME.
TVA System Oiierating Instruction SOI-30.50 (Ref.
1I16) requires that the Auxiliary Building isolation Signal be reset wi,thin 15 minutes of an ABI or shutting dcrwn the COME.
The concern is not valid for normal operation of'he COME simultaneously with an ABI.
Besides the low expected activity, the SOIs recluce the potential For noncondensible back-up into the COBWEB..
A folilow-up evaluation further showed an identical supply steam valve control logic to the
'COME as for MBN (Ref.
133).
The concern is valid in that there are no area or particulate air monitors provided in the COWEB to assure compliance with ALARA guidelines.
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3 Page 25 of 35 TVA has committed (Ref.
135) to revising the appropriate drawings per OCR (Ref.
128) and to evaluating and documenting ALARA concerns for the CDWEB.
4.6 Summar of Subcate or Findin s
The classified findings are summarized in Table 1.
Class A and B findings indicate there is no problem and that corrective action is not required.
Class C, 0, and E are termed "negative findings" requiring corrective action.
The corrective action class, defined in the Glossary Supplement, is identified in the table by the numeral combined with the finding class.
For example, the designation 02 in Table 1 indicates that the evaluated issue was found to be valid (finding Class 0) and that a corrective action involving some type of procedure is 'required (corrective action Class 2).
Findings are summarized by classification in Table 2.
Of the 30 findings identified by a classification in Table 2, 21 require no corrective action.
Of the remaining nine, two had corrective actions initiated by TVA before the ECTG evaluation, six required corrective actions as a result of the ECTG evaluation of a concern, and one required corrective action as a result of a peripheral issue uncovered during the ECTG evaluation.
Table 2 shows that at Watts Bar, where most of the issues were originated, only three. out of a total of 15 issues were found to be valid.and in need of corrective action, and one of these three issues had corrective'ction initiated before the ECTG evaluation.
5.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Table 2 identifies nine negative findings (Class C, 0, and E) that require corrective action.
Since one of the corrective actions applies to more than a
sinqle olant, only eight different actions are required or have already been initiated to remedy the nine negative findings.
The detailed corrective action descriptions are contained in Attachment B.
A condensation of this information by element, with the applicable plant identified in parentheses, fol-lows:
o 230. 1, Fire Oamoer Latchin Test - As required by the
'IRC ior WBN, abnorma operating instructions (AOI) need to be revised to incluae more specific action to take in case of fire (S(jN).
Installation of one new fire damper will be required after the unit 2, cycle 3, refueling outage to replace an oversized fire damper, which will jam in the penetration (SON).
Evaluation of the installed fire dampers against new damper manufacturer closure test data with system air flow will identify which dampers require actual tests or administrative instructions
'.o
'hut the ventilation system down in fire affected areas (BFN).
26420-R16 (10/19/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORl NUMBER:
'3000 REVISION NUMBER' Page 26 of 35 The surveillance. instructions for fire dampers requirie revision 'to include 'the latest fire compartmentation drawings in compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appenidix R requirements (BFN).
o 230.2 Co~outer IRoom/13atter Room Temperatures
- Cleaning of cooling coils and modiification of HVAC system components is planned per design study request (DSR) recommendations (WBN).
o 230.5u, Airborne Radioactivit in CCWE Suilclin
- Appropriate drawsrsgs recu>re revs.;ion to ref ect existing piping configuration per local OCR-L andi the flowsheet requires revision in accordance with corrected vendor information (SQN).
lhe system operating instructions. require revision to minimize airborne radioactivity (WBN)e The modified piping and process changes require evaluation:
.for compliance with ALARA (WBN, SQN).
These corrective actions also appear in Table 3>> along with their corresponding finding/corriective action classifications.
The table shows the plant or plants foir which a corrective action is s'till required in the Corrective Action Tracking Oocument (CATO) column.
The Finding/Corrective Action C1lassification column of Table 3 shows thie eight corrective. actions, of which two require hardware or plant modification, tuo involve additional evaluation, three require procedural
- changes, and one requires documenta'tion remiedy.
In addition, the CATO column of Table. 3 shows that, in most cases, a par ticular corrective action is applicable to only a single olant.
The corrective. action for element 230.5, which involves ALARA'valuations, is thie only corrective action. applicable to more than one planti The element requiring the largest, number of dorrecItiv'e actions is 230.1, Fire Oamper Latching Test, which hias four.
In lail chse~s,
~the evaluation teain found the completed or planned corrective actions acceptable to resolve the negaitive findings.
I 6.
CAIJSES
'Table 3 identifies one or more causes,. for each negative finding requirihg
'orrective action.
For each corrective action, the, most important cause i~s identified; howeveir, in many instances it uas reit that, the problem resulted from a combination of causes, each of'hich Should be identified.
In those
- cases, more than-one cause is identified.
Engineering
,judgment was used to establish the causes, and was oasea on the findings in Attachment B.
For the.eight corrective aictions described in Table 3, l3 causes have been identified.
These are shown in the table and totalled at the end.
Tne moist frequent cau'ses are
" Inadequate Communication" and
" Inadequate As-built Reconciliation.'"
The lattIer cause is discussed more fu'Ily in Subcategory Report 20600.
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3 Page 27 of 35 "Inadequate Communication" reflects deficiencies in communication between departments within a project orqanization (e.g.,
enqineerina and operation) and between projects (e.g.,
The TVA qeneral desiqn quidelines clarifyinq the requirement for closure of fire dampers without airflow were issued after the purchase orders for Sequoyah, Watts Bar, and Browns Ferry fire dampers were issued.
This situation led Operations personnel to issue fire protection instructions based on erroneous vendor cataloq information on allowable airflows against which fire dampers close.
The Corporate Nuclear Performance Plan (CNPP), Revision 4, describes chanqes that will make a centralized Oivision of Nuclear Engineering (ONE) responsible for accuracy,
- adequacy, and control of drawinqs and technical documents, including validation of as-built drawings.
The BFN Nuclear Performance
- Plan, Attachment IV-2, commitment item 81, issued in Auqust
- 1986, shows detail review of all fire protection system surveillance instruction ror tecnnical adequacy and compliance with technical specifications onqoinq and to be completed before r estart.
"Untimely Resolution of Issues" is a contributinq cause for the uncertainty of fire damper closure against ventilation flow at Browns Ferry.
No action has been taken since the 10 CFR 21 notice from the vendor in November 1984'he CNPP, Appendix 8, Commitments 018 and 021, describes a single Corporate Commitment Tracking System (CCTS) and a Trackinq and Recordina of Open Items (TROI) system for CAgs as a remedy for untimely corrective action and for identification of problems apolicable to more than one plant.
The cause "Inadequate As-built Reconciliation" is closely related to the lack of communication.
Two causes fall into the technical adeauacy area under "Vendor Errors."
They include erroneous vendor catalog information on fire damper capabilities and poor detail desiqn of standard air handlinq unit components.
7.
COLLECTIVE SIGNIFICANCE The evaluation team's judqment as to the siqnificance of the corrective actions listed in Table 3 is indicated in the last three columns.
The issues evaluated in this subcateqory do not reauire siqnificant corrective actions.
The HVAC designs for the Sequoyan, Watts Bar, and Bellefonte nuclear power plants do not indicate major problems because most issues raised hy the concerns were corrected'efore the ECTG evaluations.
- However, tne corrective actions required, especially for fire dampers at BFN, indicate a shortccminq in the timely resolution and ccmmunicati on of important issues, which are causes in the manaqement effectiveness area.
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3 Page 28 of 35 The 10 CFR 21 notice from the'ire damper manufacturer to most domestic nuclear oower plants in November 1984 did not result in an NRC IE Bulletin requiring mandatory action on TVA's part.
Also,, UL standards for fire dampers do not require fi're damper closure aqainst airflow.
Therefore,,no NRC reportinq requirements were violated by the failure oi. the Browns Ferry Site Oesign Services Manager to respond to a memo on this issue frcm TVA's BFEP Project Manager.
"Vendor Errors" in cataloq information and detail desian of standard manufactured equipment (fire clampers, ait handling iunits) are normally not detectable by the purchaser's (TVA) customary review of the desiqn dm;uments.
The results of this subcategory evaluation are being combined with the other subcategory evaluations and reassessed for the Enqineerinq cateqory in a
single report.
il 26420>>R16 (10/19/87)
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3 Page 29 of 35 TABLE 1
CLASSIFICATION OF FINDINGS AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Element Issue/
~Findin **
Findinq/Corrective Action Class*
N WBN N
LN 230.
1 Fire Damper-Latchinq Test 230.2 Computer and Battery Rocm Temperatures 230.3 Leak Tightness of Duct Seals A
A 02 El A
A A
A A
A A
06 A
E2 A
A Cl 230. 4 230. 5 Heat Buildup in Containment Dome Airborne Radioactivity in CDWE Bui ldinq 03 3
00 8
02 00
- Classification of Findinas and Corrective Actions A.
Issue not valid.
No corrective action required.
B.
Issue valid but consequences acceptable.
No corrective action required.
C.
Issue valid.
Corrective action initiated before ECTG evaluation.
Issue valid.
Corrective action taken as a result of ECTG evaluation.
E.
Peripheral issue uncovered durinq ECTG evaluation.
Corrective action required.
- "Defined for each plant in Attachment B
- 1. Hardware
- 2. Procedure
- 3. Documentation
- 4. Traininq
- 5. Analysis
- o. Evaluation
- 7. Other 2642D-R16
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TAJJLE 3 ISAINIX OF ftfkfNIS, CORkfCTIVE ACTIONS, ANO CAUSES SUJJCAIEGORY 23000 REVISION INJOERl 3 PAGE 32 UF 35 NANAGENENT fFfECTIVINESS CAUSES OF NEGATIVE FIIJOINGS n DESIGN PRUCESS ffffCIIVfNESS TECHNICAL AOE CY F INOING/
CORRECTIVE ACTION fLol CLASS.nn COKRfCl 1vf ACTION LAIU '
2 3
a 5
6 7
8 g
'IO ll 12 13 Id 15 16 (Frag-
)
/
/proce-)Inade-/
)Inade-/
/fngrg /Design/Insuf.)
)nented)lnade-/Inadv-/dures
/quate-/Un-
/
)Inade-f (quate
/ Lack (tudgnt/crit/ )vertf (stds
/Uigan-/quate (quate
/Not (con-
/tinuly/Lack
)quate /Inade-/As-bit/
of
/ not
/cot<<alt/oocu-
/Not
( Iaa-
/
Q-
/Proce-Jfol-
/nunl- /Res of/of Hgt(0estgn/quate
/Recon-/Design/Oocu-
/ Not
/nenta-[Fol-
'/fngrg t Ion trn dures loved c ~ lion Issues Atten Oases Calcs cll.
Detail <<anted Net tlon loved Error Iy
) Slgnlfl-
) cance of
[ Correcttve[
Jlee e
I e ee e'
I H
ee 230.5
'3 Revise the appropriate Urn<<lout ln ref leel e ISI ln e
plplng conf lguratlon per local OCK L ano lhe l loll sheet per corrected vendur Lnfornatlon.
Revise systoe operating Instruct lont tO rnlninlle nl
~
ee n
nln n ~ I I ~
~
v ~
SQN Ol Nek Ul kl evaluate the noel f led pip log and process changes for SJIN U2 coop 1 lance <<1th ALAkA.
INJN U?
IUIAL5
~
Oefined In the Glossary Supplvuunt.
~I Oaf lned in Taole le 26930-RI3
( 10/15/8/)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
23000 REVISION NUMBER:
3 Page 30 of 35 TABL'E 2 F INOINGS
SUMMARY
P,l ant Classification of Findin s
A.
Issue not valid.
No corrective action required.
BFN BL'N 2
8 2
3 Total 15 B.
Issue valid but consequences acceptable.
2 4
0 No corrective action required.
C.
Issue valid.
Corrective action initiated before ECTG evaluation.
0.
Issue valid.
Corrective action taken as a result of ECTG evaluation.
E.
'Peripheral issue uncovered durinq ECTG evaluati,on.
Correct.ive action required.
0 0
3 2
1 0
1 1
0 Total 8
15 4
3 30 26420-R16
( 10/19/87)
IANLE 3 HAlkla OF ELMNTS, CORkECIIVE ACIIONS~ AND CAUSES SUUCAIEGORV 23OUU REVISION NUHUER: 3 PAGE 31 OF 35 I
I HANAQHENT tfFECTIVENESS I
2 3
a 5
n y
CAUSES OF NEGATIVE FINDINGS 4 DESIGN PROCESS EFFECTIVENESS 8
9 10 11 12 13 la TECHNICAL AOE V
15
'16 ly F IhDING/
CORREC TIVE ACTION ELEH CLASS.44 CORRECTIVE ACTION CAfU (lnade-(
(Engrg Design(insuf.
Inade-(
(quate
( I.ach (budget crit/ (verlf stds quate (Inade-(As-hit(
of
( not coaaalt(0ocu-kot (Design(quate (Recon-(Design(Oocu-( Not (nenta-(Fol-(E (Frag-(
(
(Proce-(lnade-(
(wanted( Inade-( Inade-(dures (quate (Un-(organ-(quate (quate (Not (con-(tinely Lack I laa-(
tl-(Proce-(Fol-(nuni- (Res of(of Hgt ngr9 sion trn auras lowed cation Issues Atten 8ases Calcs cil.
Detail nented Het t lan lowed Error Significa-ncece of Coirect lve v a4 Acyl f
L H tl[
230.1 D2 Revise Ahnornal Operating InttruCtlOnt (AUI) tO InClude F
4 RAii [1 >>I4Ip 4' I
~
~
4 In case of fire, as required oy NRC forMS'UN Ol kl El install one new fire daapvr after unit 2 cycle 3 refuelln9 OULage as 4
~
~
~ ~
A w I I vol~ ~
U ~ v ~ ct s ~ 44v danper which will 3an In penetration.
Silk Ul kl 06 EValuate Inttalled I tre danpers aua lost aanufacturer's test data >>ith systen airflow.
Periorn closure tests and/or Institute operating lnkiruttiOnS tp Shut dnwn Ventllat IOn flOw where danpers nay-rot-close-In-fire affected areas.
kfN Ul E2 Rev Isa surve IIlance Instructtons for daapers to Include latest' Ire coepartnentatlon drawings In conpliance wtth In rfk 50, Appendla R require>>ants.
UFN 01 230.2 Cl Cooplete cleaning of cooling coils and nodlfylng HvAC systen cowponent per desikn Study requeSL (OSR) ret~idat IONS ~
NUN Ul I
I I
I I
I I
~
Defined in the Glossary Supple>>cut.
~ 4 Defined in iahie 1,
26930-R13
( IO/I5/82)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
23000 REVISION NUMBER:
3 Page 33 of 35 GLOSSARY SUPPLEMENT FOR THE ENGINEERING CATEGORY Causes of Neqative Findinqs - the causes for findinqs that require corrective action are categorized as ollows:
1.
Fr aqmented orqanization - Lines of authority, resoonsibi lity, and accountabi ity were not clearly defined.
2.
Inadequate quality (Q) trainino - Personnel were not fully trained in the procedures estab ished or design process control and in the maintenance of desiqn documents, includinq audits.
3.
Inadequate procedures
- Oesiqn and modification control methods and procedures were deficient in establishinq reauirements and did noi ensure an effective design control program in some areas.
4..
Procedures not followed - Existinq procedures controllinq the desian process were not u
y adhered to.
5.
Inadequate communications - Communication, coordination, and cooperati on were not u
y effective in supplying needed information within plants, between plants and orqanizations (e.a.,'Enaineerino, Construction, Licensing, and Operations),
and between interorqanizational disciplines and departments.
6.
Untimely resolution of issues
- Proolems were not resolved in a
time y manner, and their resolution
.vas not aoqressively oursued.
7.
Lack of management attention - There was a lack of manaqement attention: in ensurinq tnat proqrams reauired for an erf~ctive desion process were established and implemented.
8.
Inadequate desiqn bases
- Oesiqn bases were lackinq,
- vague, or incomp ete or design execution and verification and for desiqn change evaluation.
9.
Inadequate calculations
- Oesiqn calculations were incomplete, used incorrect input or assumptions, or otherwise failed to fully demonstrate compliance with desian reauirements or suooort desiqn output documents.
~
~
10.
Inadequate as-built reconciliation - Reconciliation of desian and icensing documents with p ant as-built condition was lackinq or inccmplete.
1,1.
Lack of desiqn detail - Oetai 1 in desiqn output documents, was insu icient to ensure ccmpliance with desiqn requirements.
26420-R16 (10/19/87)
TVA BIPLt3YEE CONCERNS SPEC,'IAL PROGRAI'fi REPORT NUfABER:
03000 REVISION NUMBEiIl:
3 Page 34 of 35 I 12.
Failure t(l document e~ni~ineerinc~iadnments
- Documentation ddsttfgind enggineeririq,judgments used in t.he'e'scan process was lacking oiI.
incanp 1 etc.
13.
Desion cri'te'r ia/c(snmitments noa mi't - Des'ion criteria or licensino conmtments lsere not met; 14.
Insufficient verif'ication docuttIentat'i oh - Oocumentation (O) wa3 snsu1Vicient tol audit the adeqUacy ot Resign and installatidn.'5.
Standards not folllowed - Code qr industry standards and practices were not ccmplied with.
16.
Enqineerinq error - 'lhere were 'ert or's dr bve'rsiqhts in thh assumptions, methodology, or judgments used i'n the design pHocd.ss.
17.'endor error - Vendor design ort suopli4d items were deficient f'r the "intendled purpose.
Classification of Corrective Actions - cqrrgctivg a4ti'one at'e classified as n
1.
Hardware - physical plant chanaes 2.
Procedure
- changed or generated p pr ccedure, 3.
Oocumentati on - affected CiA records 4.
Training - required personnel eduCation 5.
~Anal isis - reauired desiqn calculations, etcae to resolve 6.
Evaluation - initial corrective aqtion plan indicated a need'd evaEuate t'ne issue before a definitive plan could be established.
Therefore, alii hardware, procedure, etc.,
cnanges are not yet k'nown Otner - items not listed above Peripheral Findinq~lssue} - A negative finding that does not result diirectly evaluating an employee concern.,
By definition., p'eriphr'.ral findings
( issues) require corrective action.
Siqnificance of Correct:ive Actions - The,evaluation team's j'udqment as td tHe significance of'he corrective actions listed in Table 3 is indicated in 'thd last three columns of t'e table.
Siqnifiicance is rated in accordance With the~
type or types of changes that may be expeicted to result from the correcti've
'ction.
Changes are categorized, as:
26420-R16 (10/19/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
23000 REVISION NUMBER:
3 Page 35 of 35 o
Oocumentation change (0) - This is a change to any design input or output document (e.g.,
drawinq, specification, calculation, or procedure) that, does not result in a significant reduction in desiqn marqin.
Change in design marqin (M) - This is a chanqe in desiqn interpretation (minimum requirement vs actual capability) that results in a siqnificant
( outside normal limits of expected accuracy) chanqe in the design margin.
All designs include marqins to allow for error and unforeseeable events.
Chanqes in desiqn margins are a normal and acceptable part of the desiqn and construction process as lonq as the final design marains satisfy regulatory requirements and applicable codes and standards.
E Chanqe of hardware (H) - Tnis is a physical chanqe to an existinq plant structure or component that results from a cnanqe in the desiqn basis, or that is required to correct an initially inadeauate design or design error.
If the change resultinq from the corrective action is judqed to be significant, either an "A" for actual or "P" for potential is entered into the appropriate column of Table 3.
Actual is distinquished from potential because corrective actions are not complete and, conseauently, the scope of required chanqes may not be known.
Corrective actions are judged to be siqnificant if tne reSultant ChanqeS affeCt the Overall quality, perfOrmanCe, Or marqin Of a safety-related structure,
- system, or comoonent.
26420-R16
( 10/19/87)
ii il 0
TVA'MPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
23000 REVISION NUMBER: 3 Page A-1 of 3 ATTACHMENT A EMPLOYEE CONCERNS FOR SUBCATEGORY'3000 Attachment A -- lists, by element, each employee concern evaluated in the subcategory.,
The concern's number is given, along with notation of any other element or category with which the concern is shared; the plant sites to which
.it could be applicable are noted; and the concern is quoted as received by TVA, and characterized as safety related, not safety
. elated, or safety Siqnificant.
0107A-R41 (10/07/87)
CONCERN ELEIIEIT IUIIIEK PLANI LOCAIiun AIIACNNtNI A ENPLOYEE CUNCtKNS FOK SOBCAIEGORZ 23000 APPL ICAUILIIV N
KUN U
N CONCERN OESCRIPI'ION n REVISION NUHBER:
3 PAGE A-2 OF 3 230.1 u'h1
'J
~ J SI
~
EX-OS-02?-OOl III sSC 7th SillI
~ I~ IIJ I CC VMJ MBN "NVAC.dampers in the auxiliary and control buildings (one location given west end of control building - Elev. ?I3'?)
were tested under actual'operating conditions (use of fuse link to release daETTpers),
and the daEETpers ~ould not latch.
Hanufacturer (Ruskin) was contacted, and recumuended changing of test to use a hand release of dampers, which was dona, and damners latched Ct ic cnni erneil that orinlnal intent of test (to demonstrate operability under actual conditions) was not
.. ~
Is Ecs11 siss c ~
1 Jnt
-"itTure are two fioors, eiev. 692' elev. /OU'orking on one chiller duct, system 3l.
Ihe rooms on these floors Include:
battery rooms, public safety, teiecomnunication
- rooEns, aux instrumentation rooms: f clvtllluter rooETss In order to keen rnmnsitns
~ nnml c tnmneratsii Ii ilnwn tn SS degrees F, tne battery room's temp. also drops to 55 degrees F.
Uesign anld locationE of air-hanulers i the equipment for the system is wrong.
Air handlers, daTETPers, 4 filter racks don't work as they are supposed to."
(SR) 230.3 IN-85-82 l-OO3 230i4 IN lgd-UOI RBN NUN "NaEty NVAC duct systeTETS and duct supports are inadequately designed.
SN equ t t Pig I
Osc t igrstrse Js as e lies igned witrs mechainloal 30 intS I thereby requiring excessive aEnounts,of RIV glue to seal.
SoEne HVAC supports are buiit excessiveiy heavy to actual fleid use.
Located in control building, reactor buildings I
X 2."
(SS)
"IVA snould redesign Reactor UEEIIdfna domes and Steam generator spaces to include a vent at the top to allow hot air.to escape.
Present OTIC IEP hulsds, in tOO imitrh heat aEtd tna nrohlem Will net WOPSe diirjnn plant operation; only robots will be able to work,in the con t a IOT~Iti
( II0)
I
~
csO. b
~s ~
~
I n.
~ c Uo tt uUOt AEI anonymous aiieger stated that the vent condenser at tne Condensate oeTEtneraiizer Building (coHE).vents noncondensible oases to the duct in tne COKE building where it 'is discharged to the Auxiliary Building d ldgt Lliss ing aP ElssX ~ Bldgi icnlatiusssi tihie eXliauSt dw~srs Isolate the CURE building from the Aux. Bldg and noncondensible gases caii build up In ihTO CORE Bldg.
At times, the iodine concentration in tne couE Bldg are apparently somewhat (high, which renders the cDMEB]
inaccessible and [the exhaust dampers]
may go unnoticed in the closed position for long periods of time.
sK/No/ss indicates safety related, nut saiuty related, ur satuly s lgnitlcaot per deturEuinatlon criteria in the EcIU progrmu manual and applied 2/
(igiddidij
CONCERN ELEHENT NUHUER ATTACIIHEtli A EN'LUYEE CUNCLRNS FOR SUBCATEGORY 23000 PLANT APPL ICRUILI TY LOCAIIutt StLN WUN U tt ULN CONCERN OESCRIPTION a
REVISION NUHBER:
3 PAGE A-3 OF 3 230.5 (Cont'd)
"TVA Should evaluate this situation and if in fact the problem currently exists, take Imtnediate action to preclude unnecessary exposure of personnel to airborne radioactivity.
In addition, TVA ShOuld take aCtiOnS tO minimiZe the airbOrne prOblemS in the COME Bldg.
ThiS may inClude SuCh aCtiOnS aS prOViding additiOnal filtered ventilation, better access and control of the dampers.
The corrective actions should be documented and an expanded followup program performed to d<<termine that the corrective actions solved the pruulem.
Tne followup program should be documented.
This allegation is specific to Sequoyah;
- however, there are generic implications for Otn<<r TVA nuCle~r plantS SuCh aS WattS Uar."
(SR) a SN/ttU/SS indicates sat<<ty r<<lat<<d, >>ut sat'uty rulat<<d, ur sat<<ty sty>tt tca>>t pur duturwi>>atiu>> crt teria in the LCIG I'rugraai manual aud applied by TVA b<<tore evaluattuns.
( IU/UU/U1]
~O il
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
23000 REVISION NUMBER: 3 Page B-l of Ml<
ATTACHMENT B
SUMMARY
OF
- ISSUES, FINOINGS, ANO CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR
'SUBCATEGORY 23000 Attachment B contains a summary of the element-level evaluations.
Each issue is listed, by element number and plant, opposite its corresponding findings and'corrective actions.
The reader may trace a concern from Attachment A to an issue in Attachment.
8 by using the element number and applicable plant.
The reader may relate a corrective action descriotion in Attachment B to causes and significance in Table 3 by using the CATO number which appears in Attachment B in parentheses at the end of the corrective action description.
The term "Peripheral finding" in the issue column refers to a finding that occurred during the course of evaluating a concern but did not stem directly from a employee concern.
These are classified as "E" in Tables 1
and 2 of this report 0107A-R41 (10/07/87)
issues ATTACINENT 0 SUHHAKY UF
- ISSUES, FINUINUS, ANU CONNECTIVE ACTIUNS FOR SUUCATEOUilY 23000 Findings REVISION NUHUERL 3
Page 8-2 of 12 Colrectlve Actions
>>>>>>a>>a>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>,
E leiiient 230. I.
- Fire Udiiiper Latching Test
>>>>a>>>>>>>>>>>>>>j>>>>
SlIN Fire dampers would nut ldtcn wlieil tested under actual operating rssnsi 1 t lan c Sqh ssiiirss s.ssisniissr lsiuv wisua tis ic ranrus a as ac ni
~
~ ~
~
~ ~
<>ltse
~ a dt kUN dnd S4N hdve undergone extensive evaludLlons, LOSLIlig~ mudlf Ii.at lolls ~
I epldcemL'nt dliu reieSiing tO assure their proper functioning under actual operating cunUiLiuns.
This process was monitored by NNC on various uccdsluns.
Iiie fire ddiimer manufacturer lkusxini also perfortiiud independent tests.
a ~
NiiAc fequlrud.
(Tiie Husk lA brand fire ddiitpers are identical to Lhe ones at kUN that faiied tile preoperatlonal closure test instruction TVA-24>> RO.
I'hey were thereforn I
Included In a generic 10 CFR 21 notice and lssssact lssatasi 1 avral't lua <<at in c
I
~ t
~
~ s,<<c
~
ssu
<< ~ ssssa
<<ussa I aa lrS'JJ of damper replaceiient, net)ator spring auditloii, revision of design criteria and operating Instructions were completed before receipt of. the concern by TVA.)
b.
iest waS Cnanged tu reiudSO dampers by hand.
c.
Original intent of test to ue>>iunstrate operability under actual conditions mdy-Aot have been at, li Nuclear Puwer Experience reports Uu not lnulCate a generlC PrOblein With fuSible linXSs The CltS stateia.nt is, therefore, considered inaccurate ds to the rduSe Of U>>sssts r riucsurn fdllusre, Tha type Of
", a,r, release mechanism (fusible link or manual) does not
>>sleet Lhe closure arid <aicpiliig piocess-of tne fire U>>>>4tersi
- c. For g uf the 12 fire dd>>tiers at SMN that failed the
. post-nugatur spring modification test under actual Pe aL
~ sg f suW s vssu
~ <<suna Os lllds I UU IU AUt UC lehleu ~
system uPeratlng instructions were instituted for ventll>>tion air. fiuw interruption in the fire zones.
lnese instructions however are not explicit as Lo sequence of fire location veriflcat loii, ventilation flow Sliutdovn Scene dssessisannt ansi rnct art nt'ent I lat ldn flow, it required.
Location dnd identification of Cunstsols fos vessLI las
~ Osn.sniitdiiiiii dre Aot SAuwsnc I lit. remaining three fIre Ua>>ipers were acceptable as is bec>>use of their liiuitud time in use or their location ln walls,nu longer required as fire barriers per 10 CFR 50, App. N, evaluations b.
None required.
( In response to a request fer a netnnt lal a>>naris rnaditina evaluation, SiIN found'before receipt of the coitcern thai, the colidltion uoes Aot exist.J Thn nnnrat Inac cac ~ Iaa will s avlca Ssik AOI-30 so that, In case of fire, operators will td'xe specific ventiiating system actions necessary to assure fire damper closure.
This revision Is scheduled for after the unit 2 cvcle 3 refuelino because lt only enhances the instructioiis; ICATUi 230 nl s:AN 01 Nl)
P<<arlPhes dl f IAdlnsg U. Umiper 0-3IC-I/44 il>>s noL iieeii Installed>>AU succi.'ssful ly tested or IncluUOU ill tile systmil opei'>>tiiig procedure for u>>>>4ters expectuIi tu fbi tne Tu11, flow drop test.
The'Nodificatiun section wili install d new I
0-31C-1744 damper after the Unit 2 cycle 3 refueling uutage.
(CATU 230 Ol Sl)N 01 NI) '
23100-13 b/8l)
Issues KI IiN.ItItrIII U
SUMrt>>KY UF ISSULS, I'litUIN4S, KNU CUI<lttCTIVE ACTIONS FUK S'UUCKTEOUKY 2JUOU F I>>d l>>iJs IIEVISION NUMIIEN:
3 Page 8-3 of 12 Corrective Aetio>>s EleIIIeot 2JO. I - ttttN a.
Fire daIIIpers would iIUL l<<tc>> Hheo tested under aCtual oper<<ting condttlons (use of fusible Il>>k tu release daIIIpers).
b.
Test wdS Cnanged tu release dali'IPers by lid>>0 ~
dS feColUIIUOIted by the UIanufacturer.
c.
Original intenL of Lest lu deinoostrate operdb I)ity unu<<r actual conditions
<<Jay nut ti<<ve 4
been tact.
il, st>>ce sul>>liel Igtk, I.UI'L4io lylie t Ire It<<lllpi.'rs <<t ttUN ttave U>>defiJU>>e UTIL<<>>s lve tesl t>>iJ ~ ev<<IUJL IU>>, IIIUdlfle<<tie>>,
rept<<ceIIIe>>t,
<<nd rvlestl>>d bec<<usv uf 4 variety of
. PrubleiiIS, suc>>
<<s tvprupvr inst<<ll<<tlu>>, t<<llure of vlectrulII<<rv<<al I)>>ks (t.)L), 4>>d Iwc>>IIti!ate closure 4>>d l<<tCtti>>g.
I>>)S Pruf<<ss>><>ltufed by NKl'. Un varluus ucc<<stu>>s.
urigln<<l TVK teSt IequtreIIIU>>ts till'IUSUI'e U>>Iler dlr tluw HUI e p4cl I 4 I ly 44>ed U>> err>>we>>us ve>>ItUI'>>t UCIIIJLIu>>.
F lre U<<ep<<r c)us>>re uiiU<<r "<<ctu<<l" Upvr<<ling cuiidltluiIS, Js IIIUJ>> I>>IJ U>>Iter <<ir iluH," ls>>ul I I.qulrvU by U>>derHI.I ters Lduur<<lury (ULI St.<<iIUJI'US.
- b. ('UI'lscusstu>> Hll>> t>><< t II'e UJIIp<<I'<<J>>ul<<clur<<I', llie iiWi>>IS ut Curt<<l>> Cele<<s<<(tuslule II>>k, t. TL, LUg, or na>>d rele<<S<<by SLr log fur Lest t>>g)
UUUS nut at tI.CL Loe curtain clusing a>>U latctII>>g itself.
T>><<. prvoperaliuw4l t lre d<<<<per lest Instructlun Jl IUHS rvle<<sv "by JOy iced>>S U<<4CLlvdLlng twv fusible llttk>>uldl>>g ll>>kage."
siwI<< t>>st<<ll<<tlun l>>tefteri:>>c<<s ut el<<ctrlcdl cu>>dulls tur EILs Hll>> Itdillpi.'I'UI'Lilt>>s>><<vi.'ee>> I.UI'rected.
F<<l lures ui LILS Here LI'4CId lu d<<u<<iJe t tuiII lid>>illl>>iJ ul'>>stall<<tie>>.
Sucvet ll<<wc<< l>>street le>>s tur flIU UULvctur tests H<<fe L>><<future JIIIU>>UI.'d lu I>>cluuv pust i>>Stall<<tlun teSLI>>g uf t>><<eleftrlCal reSISti>>iC<<uf LTLs.
TtIere Jr<<ou repurts ui gb>>eric tuslbl<< ll>>k ur EIL failures dt >>ucle<<I'uwer P)4>>ls.
- c. U<<c<<use ut p<<rsistlwg clusur<<prinili~Iis <<il>> Kuski>> t'ire U<<iuPers u>>Uvr <<lrt luw, I>><< IV>> preupvr<<tlu>>JI test instruclluos tur Lwe ticl~ Il<<l]IUIS Hi'cl~ ci'vis>>4 Lu U<<t IIHI t>>I.'IIUflll41 IIWUU t Ul'es l I>>J JS II<<Vl>>iJ>>U 4lr t IUH, f>>i'lie>>er Jl Ue>tg>> IIUtdel l>>es tur Fire UJ<<ip<<r " dues out cl"qUIre closure Jg<<t>>st air I luw.
Itic <>uraial upi.'fall>>iJ Iiistrucllu>>s tur pl<<>>t t lres Jiid L>>e fire dvl<<clluii ySteeI UpVr<<lii<<J t>>SLCUCtiu>>S >>elis C>>4>>IJUJ Lu I>>Stllule IIIJ>>U4) t<<>> s>>UlitUH>>s I>> ve>>LII4ltIi>> systIVIIS cu>>ldl>>t>>(J Cuftdlii-type fire d<<idlers Id<<wllfied 4S>>ul C)usi>>g under
<<ir ilUH.
T>>e i>>le>>i ut liw'ile UJIIitieIS Is l>>i:Iefufe IIwt uod<<r LtI<<CIi<<>>ged Lestl>>g fequlI<<ieewls, Hnlco s lillUI 4 lI.'
UIIII>> I s lI'<<L Ive Iy cu>> lI'U I I 44 Ie iIC LU4 I p I4>>l Luwdlllu>>S.
ttt)N a.
tione r<<quired.
(The Musk ln'brand fire ddIIPers that fal)ed the preoperatlonal test were )ater Inc)uded in the Investigation of a generic 10 CFII 21 notice.
Tttts investigation resulted In correct lve actions to replace
- daIIperS, add negator springs and revise design guides and oper<<ting Instructions.
The corrective actions were COINPteted and tne adequacy coHPared to CJ<<nufaCturer'S teSt reSults as duc>>IIIented by t)IK MEU85011 before receipt of the concern by TVA.)
ttuiie required.
(So<<Ie Insta) 1 at lun Inlvrtet'ences of ETL were corrected dnd surveillance Instructions for resistance teStlng Here lnStltuted befOre reCelpt Of L>>e concern by TVA.)
C.
ttune r<<quired.
(Uvfufe receipt uf ttIe cuiicern by TVA, operatt>>g Instructions were revised tu require Iaanual f<<n shutdown In ve>>tildllu>> systeus containing fire daIIpers tn<<L >>Iay iiul close under air flow in case of a fire.)
23)UU-)2 (IU/Ib/Ul)
issues AffACIIHLNf0 SMOKY UF ISSULSt FINU)ttliS> At)U CUHktCflVE ACIIONS FUK SUUCATEGOILY <.'JOOU F 1iid lngs REVISION NUHUER:
3 Page U-4 vf )Z Corrective Actions Element
<!30.1 - UFN Ut'l Fire da<i<pers would nut latLU i<hen tested under actual operating conditions (use of tuslble linx Lo release da<t<pers).
b.
1est
'was ctlailged'lv release tix<<<alit C hu h Jt<r<
ic
~ U
~ -
~ -In.I.-I
'7 J
t
'UJ
~ \\ \\ Vlli<U n444 by tne manufaCturer.
c.
Original intent ot test to demonstrate operaol)lty uiider actual conditions may not nave hDJh IUJt I
~ I ~
IUI 4 ~
"d.
Per ipiiera) finding.
- a. F<ccvrdiug lv Lite vendor ut'ne fire ua<i<p<<rS, ttie type of r<<lease
<xeciianisa< used uncs not affect tne closure operation Itself.
No generic failures of fusible links vccurred vn t'Ire daayers.
tto EfLs are used at UFN.
- b. Itic lssu<<vt "et<4<<y<<d test" du<<s nvt apply to UFN because i<<i pr<<upe<<4lfuaial or later ua<<<per Clusure tests at'e dvcua<eiiteu.
1ne surve I I la<ice In~truct ious require only visuai insp<<ctivii.
C.
Ine lacx ui r<<curds substantiating successful closure I Utt Inl~ Ia<lllli iat Ilii. ~ I ~ F il'I c I.III~ innc JU.<III~
7
~
l 4 i'4 ~ 4
~ VI~ J UnVt VI III~
eva)uatlun against veneur te~ts, dues nut assure t<revvnilun vf fire spreauing.
Itiewiy issued tiVAC drawing I<utes require t lre daii<per closure testing wlttlout alrf)uw.
Adaiinlstrat lve procedures to shut down the airflow In case uf fire as a)ternati
<I<cans to assure da<<<per Closure, are nvt Instituted.
Itic fire protection p)an req<il<iIS Oiieralluii iif Liie Vuiitl)aLIV<ISyStem iiul lilg 4 fire.
d, visual survill I iaiice iiistriictlviis tui Ltl<<i i'uiitalii sup<<rseueu fire.c<x<<parta<entat)v<i drawings and da<aper IISLsl al Ii~
C ~
<I ~
None required.
(In response to a requ<<st tor a potential generic condition evaluation, UFti found before receipt of ttie concern that the condlLlon do<<s not exist.)
None required.
ftie Operations Section will review and verify all f1< c dauber s In ues)gnaicu fire barriers as deteruilned in the iu CFR 50 Appendix R study to determine which dampers may not close against system airflow, Uy August 8,
)gt)1, the da<i<per closure test res<it<".'rovided by the manufacturer wil) be
~
..<ed with the air f)ows through Lhe installed dampers, and dOCumented.
OamnerS that wl)) nbt C)OSe as per this review, wl)) be listed ln a t'noel I t Ini< Jl<uaccci tl~
~. ~i I I ~ I. JII "
~
O'U ~ \\ ~ Jl Uu ilIU~
~ Uy
~ I PV<
(CAI)k).
Any prob)em noted In the CAt)k wll) be resolved according to nuclear engineering procedure (NEP) g.).
Corrective action may consist of damper closure tests
~
~ UII I vl Uual ~ ~ ~ ~ Jtt UU ~ Ve Jna inc t <<I ~ Finv Jnltlnr i << i ~.IctUt ~ i Instructions to shut off the venti)ation system ln tne fire affecteu area where dampers have been determined not to close against airflow'.
fhe fire protection plan wll) be revised-ta require periodic fire damper c)osure.testing.
tr<LTU $30 01 UFN Oi) ln accordance wit)i existing procedures, the Operations Section will revise Lhe survel1)ance Instiuct lens tu include the latest fIre co<i<part<<ientatlon @>winos
<u r 10 CFR 50, Appendix R requir<<<vents prlur Lv rescart.-
(CAlU 230 Ol UFN Ol)
't<3) OU-12
(
I )
0 f<II<<C<hlLNI U SUN<V<t<Y UF
- ISSUES, F INU)NGS, ANU Cu<INECT IVE ACTIONS Fu<t SUUCAIEGu<tY 'dSU00 NE VlS I UN NUHUEtt:
3 Page U-5 of 12 Issues I'nd lngs Corrective Actions Ele<nent 230.) - ULN ULN Fire dd<npers wuulu not late>>
w>>co tested under actual operating conditions (use of fusible link tu release dd<npers).
b.
Test was chdng<<d lo r<<lvds<<
dd<npers Dy odod, as recon>><ended by the n<anufacturer.
Original intent of test, Lu de<nonstrate operdDi llty under actual conditions
<nay r<ut >>ave been n<et.
J ~
C ~
Pcr dlscusslu>> wit>> t>><<
t irc Udn<pcr <ndoufacturer, the n<cdos of curtal>> release )fusible link, Eit., COg, or adnual by sir)>>g tur tesll>>g) docs nut affect the curtain clos)>>g d>>J late>>l>>g ltseit.
Nuclear Power Experience rcpurls uu>>ut s>>uw gco<<ric tuslblc li>>L fdl)>>res on
<tusk)>> ur ulocr brand tire Ud>>ycrS.
ULN inspected the ETLs tuf'oe Cu>>tf'ui du) IUI>>g d>>U tuu>>U L>>e resistance values acccpLdulc.
>>U<nl>>)strut lvc procvdureS tu avuld lulu<'e pruDlcn> Eit.s>>ave Dei>>
ln<p)c<nc>>te4 or p)a>>>>ed.
lhe fire Udnv<crs wvre actuated tu verity prvper l>>stal )allo>> per a I<)vis lun uf Cu>>struct )un qCP.
Acceptance ut I>>stdl latiu>> ls Uucunent<>ls test,
- however, is>>u substitute fur tt<e planned preuperdt)of<a) teStS r<<quired Dy a Genvral Cunstfuctlon SpcclflcaLlon.
Nu c>>doge I>> tunctlonal test procedure has b<<en
<ndde because t lr<<ddn<pcrs failed to rcledse uf'
)use toi'urLdlo.
Ih<<<nec>>d>>led) design guide fur t ire ddnycr appl lcat luo, select luo, and l>>stallatluo o>>d thc std>>dard spvciflcdtlo>> fur IIVAC syste<n dd<npcrs odv<<been revlsvd tu dvuld recurrence ut sel<<et)on d>>d instatlaliun d<<f icie>>cies.
Prcuperat,luna) t<<sl prucedurcs tur curtd)>>-type t Ire dan<per c lusur<< under actual dirt luw >>nve >>ut yet oeen issued.
Uan<pcrs tt<at will out clusc u>>dir airflow odvc D<<eo Identified uy d>>dlys ls agni>>st ve>>dur tesl data.
Ncgdtur sprl>>gs wvrc aUU<<d lu Un<>>pc< s>>UL already su equipped.
Systcn< d<<sCrlpL)u>>5 a>>d Systan ope< dt lng l>>structlo>>s fur air <nuv<<r soutduw>>
In systeas woere U~npers will nut. close u>>dir dirt luw wiri cunfnitled Lu N<<C fur cu<nplctlu>> six au>>l.>>s prlur Lo u>>lt I n>>U unit C
fuel ludd, rcSpcct.iv<<iy.
f<<cs<< instruille>>s aust c<nnply wit>> thc Sequc>>cv rcqu<r<<U Uy N<<C fuf'oc sdn<e SuDJCCL dL I<UN.
a.
None required.
(ETLs for the Control Uul)ding were inspected and found acceptable before receipt of concern by TVA; adn<)n)strat)ve procedures are planned.
The General Oeslgn Guide for Fire Ud<nper AppllcaL)on, Selection aod )>>std))at)un was revised to include post-InstallaL)on testing of fusible links to avoid recurrence of failures.)
b.
None required.
(Ti<e deSlgn guide for fire dan<per app) ICat!On, SeleCt)On, and Installation was revised before receipt of t<<e concern by TVA.)
c.
Nunc required.
(Itardwdre ct<anges were In<pli~<ented before receipt of the concern by TVA; procedures, I>>structlons, and tests are p)cooed.)
Toe Tet>>>><led) spcc lt lcdL)u>>s d>>U burvcl I ld>>Ce l>>strucllu>>s tur t irc Udnt<cr closure d>>U laic>>i>>g d>>U LIL res)std>>ce tests>>dvc>>ut y<<l Di<<>> issued.
l>>c c<x<<t<lctlu>> uf l>><<s<<ui>c>>
ite>>S iS LrdiXCU Dy the
)V>>
Irdikl>>g uf UP<<>> Ilcn<s (It<<j)) Systiw<.
23)UU-IP
( IU/ID/Ul)
lssueS Ai IAOIIILNI 0 SUHHAKY Ul'SSUES, FIHUlttUS, ANU COKKECIIVE ACTIUttS FOK SUUCAIEiiUKY 23U00 F llidlngs REVISION NUHUER:
3 Page 0-6 of i2 Corrective Actions 111111111111AA 1 111 Elenent 230.2
- Cunyuter Kuuni/Uattery Kuuni lmiyeratures 1111 ~ 1*~ AAAAA11111 SIIN (H/A)
, (H/A)
(H/A) a.
In Order tO Keep ttie COIIputer rOum teinperature below SS degrees Fabreiineit the bat tl rv rolvn tl<<lulerdiure also drops to Ss degrees Fanrerhielt.
b.
Tne design and location uf tne air handling'units (AHU) for this system ls Inadeauate c.
AHUs, ddinpei'S, and filter racKS are nut worKlng correctly.
Wtitt ihe cunniuter ruINII Is nialntalwed at /0',
Lucre Is iio requlrinneitt tu Keep twe ruon at SSAF.
Tne 2>0 V and dwl'Jd u nnncrt
~ u rul
~
l I
L ~ Lhr. r
~..
r.,
c ~-
I ~. J..Ill
~ I
~
~
~
~ l
~ ULULe4
~ u ~ Ll,~ J
~ uuuiJ u ~ u Ju<<il ~ luu n ~ Lll air frinn d corrldur, wwlcw, ln Lur>>, coll<<cts ttie electrical Iiuaru room exnaust air.
Iiiesil electricai board rooms are supplied by the electrical board roon air wandiing units (AHU) awd ar<<maintain<<d at approximately 7>'F with tne aid of aw elect.rlc duct neater, One of tne specific prub)einS Investigated
.In tiie design study
~Ilcr Ll l I I ~ I I Ih II I Al 1 Lr
\\
~ ~ I F
~ L
~.
ru urru4
~ ~
~
~ ~I4 ~ IIg l
lluJ UVu~ Ill,UL~ ~lg Ul Luu l UulpuLcl ruom.
l U. kevlew of tii<<equlpineiit lucat lun drawings aild air f luw dlagranIS did nut reveal unusual layout of this systenI.
III LIIe aiJSelIre nf cl.er I I'Irc lul fllriher InVect Inat Inn ulc attempted.
Inadequate design uf certain equlpinent'nas veen ulscoverev In tne design stkLI7 IwvLALIgat ion ur IIVIII equipment failures discussed In F lndlwy "cLA
- c. Itic Hecliaillcal Halntewawce section requested a desigil study (osK-021) ut'laiIL Hvwc equlpkient because uf Cuwt liluu>>s Ial tui'l S af tel' e>>air ur re>>taremllntS IIavl ween made.
Twe desiyii study was CIAApleted aiid tiie
~ llJli ~ ~ J L ~ uiisiii~ L Lulu Lu Liie llnll J
~ LI ul,'J
~ iJO Jel V Il,e mdnager On April 29, lotto.
Th<<se.r<<sulLS COntalned SuggeSted suiutiuiiS tur aii HV>id <<quipkmnt prebiens, including AtIUs,. Uaiiitlers, awd filters of tii<<electrical board room HVAi.. SySLeni.
Uverh<<atlwg of twe coayuter rooui was related tul YI>>>lll),cliulink rol ls.
Tw>> rurrert tke actions suggested In tiie it<<sigii study are nuw In'progress.
Wgtt a
Wdne re>>ulreli b.
None required.
c.
Ttie Hecnanlcal Halntenance section will follow up on the Pliase I wurK of Ueslgn Stuliu we>>eeet IISK I12I ilu haulnn Ihu cooling coils of ttie air 'handling units I le4ned Uy a cofitractoi ~
Ibis wol'K wi I I also be sctieduled by Ltie Halntenance section.
in addition, the Hechanlcal Halntenance mr t inn hac Suimnltted a ldns tgn rhangn
.re'quest (UCk-692) to the change control tiuard-to approve CvrrCCL lve aCLIOn worK per Phase ll of OSR-021.
Ttie OCR Includes corrective actions for all oth<<r equipment deficiencies Identified as causing fr'equent maintenance outages of unlun I'lMIll1 I AJIUU
~l ~lulI
Issues Rllnuu4t.nl U
SUNKANV UF ISSULS, I INUINUS, RNU CUKNLCflVLACtIUNS FUk SUUCRTE4UKY 2JUUU F iud ings REVISION IIOHUEII:
3 Page B-/ of 12 Currectlve Actions Element 230.8 -
NUN (Cuntl!!uud) tne electrical board room IIVAC system.
Because the Phase ll items of USII-02I are modified for reduced maintenance rather than operability, these changes are scheduled for completion after fuel loading.
li!e completed corrective actions by the Maintenance section, as proposed by TVA ONE, will resolve the co!!cern as perceived by this evaluation.
(L'AIU 230 U2 NUN 01)
Ui N (N/HJ bLN IN/R)
UFN (N/A)
ULN (N/R)
- A*AAA*AAAA*AAA*A Element 23U.J
- Leak fight!!OsS ot UuCL Seals AAAAAlllAAAAA*AAAA (N/A)
SqN (N/A)
Sqn (N/AJ QBN Hdh NUN a.
Many NYAC duct systaqs do not AA:ut tne design requirea!ants for leak tlgntness.
- a. Lxtenslvu r<<vl<<w ui NKC, IVR, and ANSI d<<sign standard>
did not estaullsn a ruqu!re~newt tur IW percent IIVAC duct l<<ak tlghtnuss as claimed In tnu concern.
Tne existing systems me<<t tn<<wdn d<<sign require!A<<uts for leak Lightness
( I porc<<nt uf I low fur engln<<<<rud safety feature systems) as verit iud tor safety-'r<<lated systems by leak tests ln lgdl.
lusting req'uireu!Unts were reviewed and tound ad<<quate.
fne NUN leak Lightness requirements are less string<<>>L tnan Current NkC guidelines
( less than U.S percent o! flow for ESF Systeu!ST or Iu'ss than U, I percqnt oi I IUW Ior couLroi roomS)
~ buL ll!Oy w<<re fuuu!I Lu be aCCOPtaulu by Lne
(<l<t because tne duct locations are inside lne secundary conLdll4JI.'nt and becau'su ulost ductwork wi I I ue suuJecL
'Lu I!!-leakage rather tna!! out-l<<akagu.
Nunc r<<quired.
( IU/Ib/U/J
issueS AiIIICllrh.ni U SUIV&HY UI
- ISSULS, F IHUIHGS, IIHO LUIIRt.CIIVE ACilUNS FUR SUUCAIE4UIIV 2JUUO F IlidliuJS REVlSIUN RUNNER:
3 Page U-8 of 12 Currect lve Act lons Eieinent 2JO.J - HUH (Continued) b.
SOine IIVAC SuppOrtS are built excessively heavy.
- b. UuCt Suppurts Jre desigiied wilw appropriate niarglns tur selsinlc rigidity dS well as norindl weight luddlngs.
illese design oases Indy lnJXe toinll dpPidl'u lii exCelslvely iieavy fur nurnial duct load suppurt purpuses.
Tnls condlLlow, wuw<<ver, ls iiot.twv result ut unacceptable iseaagaasv aaua as
~i u iuwusl sow wiiIcli uei'us Lu'ui'orrect<<d beidusv. It'ues iiot Jtfecl Lwe iiealtn dnd sdtety ut llli'politic.
b.
None required.
c.
Hecnanlcal Jolilts require excesslv<<
ainounts of Rlv olue to 's'edl BFN
- c. Ilie IneCwalilcdl Jollits Jod Lov lllv glue sedlpilts used tur ttie ilVAI disdaCLWsark as a'>> dCs'sst sbl>>
sJeas lssn a ~ as t ls ue F
RUN.
Ihe Juugnieiit Ot wnJL CuostituteS "exr<<SSlve" glue ls d SiibJeC tive iiii<<.
Iivwever, tile use uf Llle giue Wiii nul, result ln uwdccvptdul<<upirdlluns, Jnu does ln fait enable Lne ductwork ledkdg<< to bv I'edui'.<<it to dn acceptable lvvel.
IUFH c.
None required.
(rA)
(N/A)
(N/Aj ULH ULN (N/A)
(H/A)
(H/A) ddddddd ~ dddddd104d E ieinent 23U.4
- Iiedt Uuiiuup iw cuwidiinneot liunie dddddddddddddddddd SUN SOH luld1 ls ~FnF I H /AI l'ss 'I I ~sisal I ~ aFsaF wUN wuN NUN a.
Excess neat buildup in twe upp<<r portions of tne rvactor building Jiid stedia generator cuinpartinents will sev>>r Iu lisnlt peicoslsaaal dCCesslblllLy.
a.
Iwe dr<<JS inewt lulled Iii tlie eupluyeb cuwcerw Jrv. iiuL liitended.to be Jcc<<~sed by p<<rsuiwiel duriiig plaul dperdtluo.
veotildlioo systuu desigii criteria dre bds<<d
~aw ea aialp ieasi ~
sapul>>iasnsua al>>l q
s
~ I IFis'llis Fu>>
~ V areas.
fwe I.sAR cunuiltted lu fji'e-up<<rdtluoJI tvstiwg ut tiie systein cunsioiieots, iiiciuding Liiv teniperdture coiltro1 I lng dev,lees.
Hone required.
!ssues Rl IACII<4LNI SU<4<4R<IY uf IS>UL>, FINUINbi, tutu CulhttCIIVE aCTIONS FUK SUUCATEIIu<IY 2JUUU f I>>d1>>gs kEVlSIUN NUHUEN:
3 Page 8-g of l2 Correctivd AcLiuns E led<cot 2J0.4 -
I<UN (Cootl>>ued) b.
Additional ventilation cow>>ectiuws snould be provided at tne tops ot tnese areas.
U. I.urther, Inuditlcdtlu>>s lu Lne syst<x<I lu pruvlde uere coull<<g, ds prupused in Lwe tY., wuuld sigolflca>>tly degrdd<<pld>>t safely.
Uy requiring the dddltlun of ldrge penetr Jl Iuws ~
w I to Is>>I Jl i>>>> v dives Iw I.'It<le<'VJJUr c<x<4<drtll<eots wllh'Iw cu>>l J I>>ak:>>L ~ u<'w the contd In<went itself.
U.
Hone required.
8FN UtN UFN (N/A)
ULN (N/A)
(N/n)
ULH (8/R)
(N/n)
ULN (NIR) tttttttttttttt*111 E le<tent 23U. 5
- R irburne NJd luJel I v i ty I>> Cuwt dul ldl>>g 111111111111111111 SqN a.
Twe vent gas cuul<<r uf Lt<e cuwdeosdtu ded<lweralizer waste evdpurdtur (CUIIL) condenser In tt<e CU<IE building ve>>ts noncondenslble gdses Inlu Ln<<duct
, leading to tne auxiliary oui ldi>>g.
Sqh J.
LCNs d>>d ULII> cu>>I I<1< ruull>>g Ut l<<e ve>>L gds cuulur d>>d uth<<I lUwt pd<.kdge ve>>ts l>>lu l>><<ve>>LI IJLlun duct leddlwg tu Ltt<<. Juxllldry Uulldl>>g.
1>><<evdpurdtur ve<<dur dt'Jwlwgs J>>d iv>> drdwlwgs t<dvu>>ul be<>>< revised tu r<<fleet ttt<<s<<cwd>>g<<s.
I sqtl HLU will Issue Jw ECN to revis<< the Invulved drawings In ord<<r lu reflect th<< existing conflguratiun of Lne COWE vent lines per Sq-UCN-L-IU4I.
Tt<e flow sheet frox< IIPD will also be currect<<d tu show the vent gas cuolei'oncundenslble flow rate per later IIPU letter.
(CAIU 2JU UU S<IN UI) b.
Our lng auxiliary building isuldtiu>>,
nuncondenslble gdses build up in Lout CURE building Jnd iodloe cunc<<ntrd-tlons
<<day be unJCCeptdble heed>>su isuld-t ion dd<npers could re<odin uonotic<<J in a closed pusiliun fur lu>>g periud>.
b.
T<<<<t'e is d I'a~It<Le pul<<t<lidl tur Udekup ut rddludct tv>>
du>>tat<1>>J>>ts iw th<< ve>>t du<.t during p<<riuds uf Juxilldry building lsuldliu>> J>>d si<<<>>ILJ>>euus Jbwur<tdl evdpurdtur uperdliun.
It<e <<xp<<cled cu>>tJ<>>i>>J>>l l<<v<<.l Is <<egllglUI>>
duilog wun<IJI evJPurdlur up<<rdtiu<t.
I>>is is <<vldenced by lsutupic reluds<<rdtuw s>>uw>>
lw lt<e urigi>>JI FsRII Iur rddwdste evdpurdlur>>u>>cuwdewsIUle ve<<ls.
U.
Nunc r<<quired.
( lu/ IU/8/]
AffACIU4tfff U SUI4%XY Ul IS'SULS, FINU!i<US, <<f<U CUkkff.'flVE Af TIONS FUk SUUCA!E<iUkY 2JUUO NEVISION NUHUEk:
3 Page U-IO of 12
!ssues F t<idlugs CorrecLtve Actions Element 23O.S - SIIH (Continued)
C.
TYA should taxe teiaedlate curre<.tive action Lo preclude unnecessary exposure uf personnel tu airborne radioactivity and mtnt<atze airborne radioactivity ln tne CUME Uul!ding.
d.
The corrective aetio<is shuu Id UL documented and d fullowup pru<jr4>>i nerf or<<<DQ an<i slnosvssnnt esl ~
- c. I'Jst filstury ludlcdtes ti<JL erru<<LUUS Isuldtlon of tne auxiliary buildlug a<id assoLldted Jutw<<dttc closing of tne Isulat IN<i udvp<<rs in tnv v<<Altlatlun ducts can be
<<xpected.
!fie putentldl fur rddludftive exposure to P<<rSOnne!
ULCdUSL uf tilts IS ns'Ullssf <lie Sf<as'D t<sn
< <UUE 5'yste<d Operating'Instructiuiis (SOIL Include references to S<< I
< ~ sn
~ nnssu ss fn n nasl In s ~.
< ~ "
~...
~
~....
s
~
s
~
rL J
~ ~ <nn nua
~
w<l ~ a il
~ a<uris Liie L <ii<U lier <UU of CUxt operation with coACurrenl <<UI.
<IJnual uverrlde SWitCiies drV pruVid<<u, aiiuWiug up<<nlnsj uf tne ISOldtlen dd<<<pers for exiidusttng.<.UMEU Jlr.
<f Sll'ICt Ilo I<i<<<L'dlate
<'.Uf'<'LLLIV<< d>><f lad<IS
.ss's n <'essaru ns ~
ducumeutdtlun ls requlrvd.
If tnv curru<il IVA review uf LII CUs<K Ves<L 4C L I V ~ ay
~ 4 L ~ S SUsJsJ<sy ls JUU <<<sJ 4<< sire4 Ur cuntlnuuus Jlr N<uiittur Lo'tne CUxlif, IL wilt b<i IIUCU<<le<ILLQ Ull<<L'I'ile dS iux JS fLaisulldfily JC<lieVJU!e (ALANA) progrmn.
c.
None required.
sI Nd<<'l I I Dun<a asn rs s
snn,.'
sss
<assn
~
~
a
~
~
u usudru us<4
<auuu<<sassu na.nnn concerns ln the CUMEU.
(CAIO 23O US S<!N O2) a Tire VD<st gDS CDQ<en Of
~ faaa r Qy s nSJL demlneraltzer waste evdpurdlur (CU<<E) conoenspr ln tne CO<<K but Id!fig vvnts noncondenslble gases Into tne duct leading to tne duxilldry building.
xi<N J ~
Ps Site tnspLCLIU<< COAI If<<<La<< Liiv I'UULlii<J <if Liie v<<f<L,<jds cuoler Ji<d Uuttu<xs tsniK vent llii<<s uf tiiu <.Uudeilsdte uL~itnerdltfLr Maste Lvdpurdtur ICL<NE) pJCKJ<JU PLr !YA Jnd cu<ft supplier (Nortun PruLess Uvslgn lnc. [IIPUJ) drawings.
f>>vse lines Jre cuunvcled tu tfie CUME Uul ldlng exhaust vvuti-!ation duct.- Actudt fo L!<ig uf t>ie b!uwdown tanx veiit line thruug<< tfiv CUME.uullding roof to tne dtux<sphefe dlsu Jgr<<e> with tfie drdwings.
MIJN d.
fiuiie requ lred.
b.
Our IA9 duX I I ldfy building Isuldl luil, noncondenslble gases build up In the COME bui!ding dnd iodine cuncentra-ttoAs mav be undcceotdble b<<Cduse lsuld-tlon dd<<<pers could.remain unnoticed Iss s's C!OSCd pos!LIOA for IOAg pcs tuds, U,
I<le CO<It but ldl<isj V<<utl ldl fuii duels dre CuuiieCLVd lu tiie auXI I ldry building Vent, I ldtiui< SySLLWI rnid duuul<<
Isolation u4<<s<ers at the Uulldli>>j Uuunudrtes close Upuu reCetvt<isj J<i auxiliary but lu!i! s fsL<ldtlsu! (AU<f f S!<s!!Ji.
Aii AUI Is atdf<<<ed h< L(iL main cuntfol fu<x<i.
!iie
~ J<11odCt tVILy Of tiie SsUXL Iiu<<culld<.'f<Sibid Vent g Js IS Iluf<lidilyiiegi t<jtbli
~ Ji>>f t<iv f luw rate luw, Uut LAe radtOMCLtVlty Cuuid tiicreJSe uiidLr du<iurmal LaOXE uperatiuil, ill cdsL uf dli AUI i<le YLIIL <pses will UJLK up In tfiv veULlldtiun duCt Jiid tutu.tiiv LUXE uut fdiug dlv<ospfle<'L u.
Nun<< rvqulred.
(Tfie aux l I 1ary bul ldlng Isoldt tun standi wfifch rauSDS r fnessrD nf
.tnv COMEU ventilation da<<<pers, also s n arne tss nnn ~ In nrns 1.... l..
ruunuu rs ~ <
~ ss us
~ ~ ay a 4 a% aun SUP<a sy V4 < V44 FCV-12-7g and FCV-!2-82, arranged tn
- series, tu close isee drawing 47wbl 1 I].
ffiese valves admi t Steaei fru<x tfie auxfliary butler tu a11 plant evdpofators.
In a telephone co<<versation, tne COME suppll<<r gave assurance tliat
@XISSin<i Of
~ionnussdunS<blnr ff s>j Stedu< Siiutoff Ihe dl'QP
<A tediperature wi<en adding and reclrculatlllg unheated waste llquld ln the Standby
<<<u<<L tu urLsVL<it LI VSLJl I I?df ln<<
Wf f I pr<.vent nuncondih<s lbIL'voiuLluii.
23 IUU-!L U7) 0
Issues H) ihCIMLIII U SUtgtAKY Ul
- ISSUCS, FIND)th 5 ~
ANU CUKRECIIVE ACTIONS Frttr SUUCAIEGUKY 23UUU I'ndings REVISIUN NUNDER:
Page U-ll of )2 Corrective Actions E)ement 23U.b - NUtt (Continued) c.
fVA should take laoiedidce corr<<cclve action to preclude ururecessary exposure of personnel tu alrburhe rddlodct1v Icy dnd ra)nlrrrILe d)rbunre radioactivity In ttre CUNE oui ldirrg.
c.
Ihe CUwr. bulldlrrg oper atur areaS are Zurred fur regulat<<d access;
- rrowever, oo area radiatluo ruurriturs or dlrburne par'Lieu)ate dcLlvlty rrrurlltul s are Irlstalled.
lire syscerrr uperatirrg prur:edureS tur reCuvery trurrr arr AUI and tor the t.'UNE du out cautlun agdirrst ur sr:c a thae )balt fur CUNE uperat)un during arr AUI.
Past rristory at Sr)N SuggestS tost errurreuuS Auls carr he extreCti:d dt, ttgt.
Ine systear uperdL lrrg illstr'uct lurls lur the aux I I lary Uui )ding gerlerdl supply and exrraust fdos du rrut 115L tne CUNt building exhaust ducC darrrpers In tire ddrxPer a) lgrrrnent list.
During an AUI, therefure, no potentla))y radioactive noncondenslbles >>il) back up Into tne atmospnere of the cOKEU, and it ls not necessary to lndicaLe In ttre CURE uperaLlng instructions a time )Imlt of operation during an ASIA
)
the CURE systera operating instructions, SUI 77.IUI, will be revised to include the bio>>down tank, which was added to the SyStem )ater, and to show the operating status of tne associated valves.
this valve status list will further be corrected to delete the manual vent gas cooler vent valve, 77-7g0.
)tris v'dive was rerreved frora ttre line during reruut lng of the vent gas cooler vent line to tire CORED venti)ation duct.
In
- addition, ttre CURE systeia.operat)ng InstrucCluns wll) be revised to include hrrp)errrentat)on of SOI 30.5A, Auxiliary Uui idlog General Supply Fans arrd Exnaust
- Fans, and SUI 30.50, I'uel Handling Area Extraust Fans, in their entirety as cundi t luns of op<<rat lon.
Ttrese instructions will be referenced to ensure v<<nti )at ion darapers are oper> and air ls circulating tnruugh tire CURED wtrll<<. ttre evapuratur is ln op<<ration.
)his corrective action resolves the Issue of potent) ally radloacL I ve noncondeosible releaSe IntO the CUNCU during an AUI (accident corrdl t ion).
lo addltlurr, tire RUN Operations Section will Initiate a UeSlgn Study RequeSt (USR) for Util. Cu exm ~ lrre the nec<<sslty drrd feaslbl )icy uf lrrcluding Lhe LURED lrr Lhe auxiliary bul)ding s<<currddry cuotalrrraent enclosure.
(CrllU 230 05 RUN Ul)
A 231UU-) 2
( IU/Ib/U7)
Issues ATTACliHENT U SUKKAKY Ui' SSUL S ~
F INUINiiS~
ANU COKKECTIVE ACIIONS FOK SUUCATEBUKY 23U00 F iiidlllgs KEVISION NUHUEK:
3 Page B-12 of 12 Corrective Actions Element 230.5 - Mdtl (Continued) d.
Tne corrective actions should bu doc>>taunted and a followup prugraiit performed and documented.
- d. A>>y Clis>>igeS tu SySteitt upurati<ig i>>StruCtlu>>S are ducume>>ted by ustdbllsnud procedures.
Tne air cnange freque>>cy in t>>u CUKEU is l<<ss tnon specified ln TVA HuChsttliCal U<<Sign Guide Utt-HIU./.I, KadiatiOn PrOteCtiOn (ALAKtt) Uesign Uuid<<lines.
Ii t>>e current TVA review of tni CUMt. ve>>t dCL Ivity rates suggests.addltig an area ralstlat llliiuds>>itsls
~ss'irt ssrn.
ssas t Is sslatss act lvitu tdunitpr I>> the COKE building, it will be docuitiented under tiie ds iow ds redsiiiiuuly; acn iuvstu le (iYii'liLA) program.
lifN d.
TVA's corrective action plan will determine compliance with ALARA guidelines and the necessity of placing airborne particulate ttonitors in the COME building.
TVA has issued Uuality information Kequest (t)IK) HEB U/045 fur
>st dt dUd s nni nd tnn i fits<<A
~
t
~ss ~
sst.ssstss
~ ry ~ I II st I lssr I tsns tsu ~ Issu IIVI4sa
~
operation prior to fuel loading of unit I.
The evaluation. teaiit concurs with tiie TVA corrective action plan described above.
(CATO 230 US MUN 02)
IifN Itlldi tsststt BLN
~ IS I 1
tII/At ULN ULN (N/A)
(N/A)
(N/A) 23IUU-)3~/0/)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
23000 REVISION NUMBER:
3 Page C-1 of 10 ATTACHMENT C REFERENCES 1.
Telephone call from W. Blumer, Bechtel, to T. Arnold, Ruskin, IOM 351, (10/27/86) 2.
Telephone call from H.
A Mahlman/G. Silver/S. Ooak/J.
Castleman/
- 0. Price, TVA, to W. Blumer, Bechtel, IOM 922, (04/22/87) 3.
4 ~
Telecopy from H.
A Mahlman, TVA, to W. Blumer, Bechtel, transmi.tting comments to ECSP Report 230. 1(C),
IOM 923, (04/20/87) 4 Nuclear Power Experience, published by The S.
M. Stoller Corp.,
(through 08/86),
Volume PWR-2, VII Safety Systems, E. Miscellaneous Reports 94,
- 127, 140, 241; XIV, Buildings and Containment, B. Miscellaneous Report 379; Volume BWR-2, VII Safety Systems, F. Miscellaneous, Report 108; XIV, Buildings and Containment, A. Penetrations, Report 54 5.
NCR W-210-P including Attachment A,
[WBN 850118 110], (1'1/28/84) 6.
TVA Surveillance Instruction SI-L601, R9, Fire Oetector Test - Panel L601, Units 1
and 2
7.
TVA General Oesign Guidelines, "Fire Damper Application, Selection and Installation," OG-M18.2.15, Rl, [842 850823 512], (08/12/85) 8.
WBN ECN 5523, Oata Sheets 1, Rl; 2, RO; 3, Rl; 4, RO; Attachments 1,
2, and 3,
[B26 850305 520], (02/26/85) 9.
TVA memo from J.
C. Standifer to G. Wadewitz, Final Oisposition of NCR W-220-P,
[MEB 850227 018], (02/27/85) 10.
TVA memo from C. A. Chandley to J.
S. Belk, "Potential Generic Condition Evaluation,"
[844 850315 002], (03/15/85) 11.
TVA memo, from J.
S. Belk to C. A. Chandley,
[B21 850716 003], (07/16/85) 12.
'TVA memo from L. S.
Cox to R.
M'. Hodges, (CZO 850607 465], (06/07/85) 13.
TVA BNP-gCP-1.3, RB, Preventive Maintenance,
[CZO 860129 460], (02/03/86) 14.
TVA memo from C. A. Chandley to H. E. Crisler, Potential Generic Condition Evaluation,
[B44 850315 002], (03/15/85) 15.
TVA memo from 'H. E. Crisler to C. A. Chandley, gBZZ 850719 002],
(07/19/85) 38270-R3
( 10/15/87)
TVA: EMPILOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORl
.NUMBER:
23050 REVISION NUMBER:
3 Page C-2. of 10 16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
'21.
22.
.23.
24.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
TVA Calculation BFEP-M2-ETLE'V-l, RO,'v'aluat'ion of Fire and Smoke'ampers,
['822 850i'19 101],,
(07/18/85)
TVA memo from J.
P. Vineyard to J..
A'. Raulst'on,'NRC'-OI,E Reportability Information Distribution -
WBN NCR 5036 -'Applicability to SQN,"
LPWP 831018 006]
(10/18/83)
TVA memo from Rank'.in to Vineyard, SQN 10CFR50 Appendix R - Fire Dampers,
[S01 850501 843], (05/06/85)
TVA memo from C. A. Chandley to J.
C. Standifer, "SQN and WBN - Fire Damper Negator Spring Kits," [MEB 830217 018], i(02/17/83)
TVA WBN Preop Test Instruction TVA-24, Fire Dampers, RO, (09/08/78) and changes 3,
5,, 9, ll, 12, 1I4, 15, 17, 18,
and Rl
[MEB 830630 001], including completion,'sheet'[MEB',830705 020]
TVA Standard Specification, "Technical Specification fair Heating, Ventilating, and Air-conditioning SyStem scampers for TVA Projects,,"
MEB-SS-10.3, Rl ECN 3761
[SWP 830512 007],
(03/18/83i)
TVA Contract 83'K71-832769, LMED 821227 '503],'(12/23/82)
Ruskin Manufacturing Company, Quality Assurance Procedure 20483A, Rl (02/18/83)
NRC IE Information Notice 83-69,
" Improoerly In'stalled'ire Dampers a-.
luclear Power Plants,,"
[A02 831027 002], (10/21/83)
[WBN 830819 104],
(08/1 g/83); Rl, LWBN 830926 013]',
(09/23/83);
R3,
[W'BN 840203 114],
(02/0'3/84)'CN
- 4297, Data Sheets 1, R3; 2, RO; Atti'achment 1,
[WBP 831128 51'8],
(09/26/83)
[WBP 850102 503],
(12/20/8'4)
'VA memo from J.
C,'. Standifer to G. Wad'ewi'tz,',
NCR 5036, Rl
[WBP 831117 004], (11/17/83)
Purchase Contraict 84K71-834574, FireiDampers,~
LMED 831207 510],
(1 1/02/83) and Rl
( MEB 831 'I 14 4CI1 ] i (1 1/14/83) ili 38270-R3 (10/15/Bi')
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
23000 REVISION NUMBER:
3 Page C-3 of 10 32.
Air Movement and Control Association (AMCA) Standard 500-83 33.
Ruskin Manufacturing Division letter to TVA, [MEB 841113 517], (ll/06/84) 34
'5.
Underwriters Laboratories Inc. Standard for Safety, Fire Dampers and Ceiling Dampers UL 555, Third Ed., Rev. 05/86 Ruskin Manufacturing Division letter transmitting Generic Test Reports (01/08/85 and 02/11/85) for Horizontal and Vertical Mounted Fire
[MEB 850215 522], (02/12/85) 36.
TVA NCR WBNMEB8513, [844 850301 014], (02/28/85) 37.
TVA memo from J.
C. Standifer to E. R. Ennis
[MEB 840824 044],
38.
NCR WBNMEB8513, "Determination of Reportabi lity Information Worksheet for 10 CFR 50.55(e),"
[845 850307 269], (03/04/85) 39.
40.
TVA Ouality Information Release (QIR) MEB 85005, Administrative Controls to Assure Fire Damper Closure
[B44 850311 005], (03/06/85)
TVA Ouality Information Release (QIR) MEB 85011, System Fire Damper Data, for Administrative Controls,
[B44 850424 003], (04/18/85) 41.
Meeting minutes by T. J.
- Kenyon, "WBN-Ruskin Fire Dampers,"
[L44 850429 597], (04/18/85) 42.
Letter from D. K. McCloud, TVA, to K. Adensam, NRC, [L44 850328 806],
(03/28/85) 43.
WBN Abnormal Operating Instruction, AOI-30, R6, "Plant Fires" 44.
WBN System Operating Instruction, SOI-13. 1, R4, "Fire Detection System" 45.
TVA NCR, Sequoyah, SQNMEB8207,
[MEB 821206 018], (12/06/82) 46.
ECN L5847 including Workplan 10483 and TACF 1-84-039-31, I SWP 830318 801 1, (03/04/83) 47.
Telephone call from W. Blumer, Bechtel, to J.
T. Herd, TVA Sequoyah, IOM 417, (11/20/86) 48.
TVA memo from J.
H. Sullivan to Appendix R Project Files, "Appendix R-Fire Dampers,"
[SOl 850430 833], (04/30/85) 49.
SQN System Operating Instruction, SOI-26.2, R3, "Fire Interaction Manual" 3827D-R3 (10/15/87)
TVA EMPI'YEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM ftEPORT NUMB'ER:
23000 ftEVISION NUMBER:
3 Page C-4 of.10 50.
51.
52.
53.
TVA memo from N. R. Beasley to G. R.'a'll,',
BFN-Ruskin Fire Oampers, 10 CFR 21 Report,
[844 850313 009], (03/14/85)
TVA memo from J.
A. Coffey to R.
Lf. Cantrell'equesting implementation of BF-OCR 2949, HVAC-Fire Oampers,
[OES. 840330 007], (03/29/84)
TVA memo fvom B. F. Crosslin to MEB Fil'es,'FN Appendix R Compliance-Fire Damper installation 4Ialkdown and I'nspection f'B44 850806 002]
(08/06/85)
TVA drawing, Reactor Building Unit 2h Mechanical HVAC General
- 54. 'CR BLN MEB8403
[MEB 840406 014], (04/04/84) 55.
56.
ECN 2945',
HVAC Fire Oampers,
.[BLP 840608 043], (06/08/84),
closed 04/08/85 TVA drawings series 88MBBB0900 Mechanical Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning Sheet Metal'etai.ls,:
-35, Rl; -36, R4; -37, R6; -38, R4; -39, R2,; -43, R2;, -44, R2; -45, ft4; -46, R4; -47,,
R2; -48, R2;; -49, R2; -50, Rl; -5'I, Rl;, -52, RZ; -53, Rl; -54, Rl; -55,,
R2; and -57, Rl 57.
National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) Standards 90A and 908 58.
Letter fvom R,. L. Gridley, TVA, to Or.
Q. iN. ~Grace, NRC;
)L44 860528 803], (05/28/86) or TVA memo C. A. Chandley to F.
E.
'ilbert, Report 2 (final): t'o BLN MEB8403,
[B44 860512 004], (05/12'/86) 59.
TVA Trackinq of Open Items (TROI) for NCR BLN-MEB 8403, (06/05/87)
'60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
TVA Contract 85KM8-836361, "Neoator Closure Spring Kiits for HVAC System Fire Dampers,"
Ruskin Manufacturing Division f IMS 841127 508],
(11/20/84)
TVA Contract 85KM8-836360, "Negator Closure Spring Kits for HVAC System'ire Oampers,"
American Warming and Ventilating, Inc.,
l TAS 850117 518],
(01/04/85)-
TVA OE Caliculation BLN-VA-0052, FSG-KTM-021986, Rl, '"Fire Dampers with Abnormal Velocities," [844 861022 007], (10/21/86)
TVA Specification 2929, "Grilles, Ceiling Oiffusers, and Oampers f'r
'eactor and Control Buifldings," (Contract 71-820434)
TVA Quality Control Procedure.
BNP-QCP-64, R9, HVAC Ductwork,
[C26 870812 459 ), (02/26/87),
(ftl issued 12/27/76) 38270-R3
( 10/15/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
23000 REVISION NUMBER:
3 Page C-5 of 10 65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
7n.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
7R.
79.
80.
TVA General Construction Specification G-73, Rl, "Inspection, Testing, and Documentation Requirements for Fire Protection Systems and Features,"
(03/14/84),
RO, (03/16/82)
NCR 4099, Rl, "Fire Damper Fails to Close Properly Upon Actuation,"
[G20 850402 136j, (07/08/86)
OVC-MDMP-368-N, Damper Installation Inspection Card Test 93 Technical Specification for BFN units 1
and 2, Section 3.11/4.11, (03/11/83)
Surveillance Instructions SI 4.11.E.2, RO, Visual Inspection of Fire
- Dampers, (07/25/86)
Fire Protection - 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Fire Area Compartmentation and Zone Drawings, Series 67M47W216-51; Rl, and -56, -57, -59, -60, and -61, RO BFN Fire Protection Plan (BF-FPP),
R3, p. 97, (03/27/87)
NRC letter to TVA, summary of meeting to discuss Ruskin fire dampers at the Watts Bar Nuclear plant, units 1
and 2, [L44 850429 597j, (04/18/85)
SON Abnormal Operating Instruction AOI-30, R4, "Plant Fires" TVA drawinq 47W866-4, R22, Control Building Flow Diagram, HVAC Air Flow (FSAR Fig. 9.4-1)
TVA drawinq 47W610-31-1, R10, Control Building Electrical Air Conditioning. Control Diagram (FSAR Fig. 9.4-4)
TVA drawing 47861.1-31-1, R7, Control Building Electrical Logic Diagram, Air Conditioning System (FSAR Fig. 9.4-6)
TVA memo from T. E. Col.lins to MEB files, WBN-HVAC equipment maintenance
,coordination meeting,
[B44 860227 010j, (02/27/86)
TVA memo from D.
W. Wi.lson to J.
C. Standifer, WBN-DSR Number 21 Investigat'ion of HVAC equipment failures,
[T15 860219 842j, (02/19/86)
TVA memo from J.
C. Standifer to D.
W. Wilson, WBN-DSR-021 Investigation of electrical board room air handling units'ooling coil
- problems,
[844 860310 010j, (03/10/86)
TVA memo from J.
C.. Standifer to D.
W. Wilson, WBN-DSR-021 Investigation of electrical board room air, handling units'ooling coils problem (transmittal of Tr ane proposal),
[B26 860423 011 j, (04/23/86) 38270-R3 (10/15/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER
'3000 REVISION NUMBER:
P'age C-6 of 10 81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
'9.
90.
91.
TVA memo from J.
C. Standifer to O.
W. Wilson, WBN-DSR-.021-Investigation of electrical board ro6n air handlinq units'earinqs, dampers, filters, and motor adjustment
- problems,
[826 860429 016],
(04/29/ri6)
Letter fran G. R. McNutt, TVA, to G. L. Parkinson, Bechtel, transrriittinq CATO 230 02 WBN 01, TCAB-238, (03/'05/87)
Sheet Metal and Ai;r Conditioning Contra~:tars National Association (SMACNA) publication, High Velocity Duct Construction Standards, Second
- Edition, 1969 ORNL-NSIC-65, Design, Construction and iestinq of Hiqh-EfficienCy Aid Filtration Systems fair Nuclear App'lication, Oak Ridge National
'aboratory,,
January 197()
NRC Requlatory Guide 1.52,
- Design, Teistlng and Mai'ntenance Cr iteri'a for'ost Accident Engineered-Safety-FeatUre Atmosphere Cleanup System Aid Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power
- Plants, Rev.
2, March, lI978.
(Note that thi6 regulat,ory guide was issued after the WBNP HVAC systems were desiqned.
TVA document d 'it<
degree of ccmpliance with RG 1.52 in FSAR Sec.tion 6.5.)
'American National Standard ANSI/ASME N509-1976, "Nuclear Power Plant Air Cleaning Units and Components,"
1976 TVA Design Criteria WB-DC-40-36. 1, The Cla'ssi'fiCatiorii of'eatinq, Ventilating and Air Conditioninq Systems, Rl,
[ESB 831121 206],
( 11/15/83)
TVA Genera'I Construction Specificatiain G-37, 'Te.'>ti'nq and Balancinq~ of Heating, Ventilating and Air-Conditioninq Systems, R3,
[042 850620'01],',
(07/23/85)
NRC Safety Evaluation Renort for WBNP, Section 6.5 TVA memo H., B. Bounds to J,. A. McDonald,, "Watts Bar Nuclear, Plant-Units 1
and 2 - Safety-Related HVAC Duct W4ldind 10 CFR 50.55(e)
Report 1 (Intierim) -'CR WBN7077, WBNMEB8714, WBNMEB8721; and WBNMEB8722,," [826 870408 003],
(04/09/8>+)
- Telecon, J.
TVA drawing 85M47E235-17, R2, Control Building Environmental
- Data,
'Environment - MildEl. 708.0 ili 38270-R3
( 10/15/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
23000 REVISION NUMBER:
3 Page C-7 of 10 93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
TVA drawing 47M200-13, R4, "Equipment, Reactor Building Section,"
(FSAR Figure 1.2-13)
TVA drawing 47M200-11, R6, "Eauipment, Reactor Building Plan,"
(FSAR Figure 1.2-22)
WBNP FSAR Sections 1.2, 3.2, 6.2, 6.4, 6.5, 9.4, 9.4. 1, 9.4.3, 9.4.7, 9.4.8, 10.4.6, 11.2, 12.2, and 12.3 through Amendment 57 TVA drawing 47W866-1,
- R19, "Reactor Building Flow Diagram, Heatinq, and Ventilating Air Flow," (FSAR Figure 9.4-28)
TVA memo frcm Cantrell to Thcmpson, "Response to IN-86-198-001," (no RIMS number),
(12/19/85)
Horton Process Design (HPO) Inc. Orawinqs (TVA Contract 477K64-821338):
- 101, R901
- 102, R3
- 103, R906
- 104, R902
- 105, R4
- 106, R902
- 300, R902
- 301, R901
- 302, R902
- 407, R908 Hourly Process Flowsheet COWE SNP P&IO, COWE SNP P&IO, COWE SNP P&ID, COWE SNP P&ID, COWE SNP P&IO and Process Flowsheet for CDWE for Blowdown Tank and Distillate Test System SNP General Arranqement Plans COME SNP General Arrangement Elevations COME SNP General Arrangement Elevations CO!AE SNP Small Piping COME SNP 99.
Horton Process Oesiqn (HPD) Inc. Drawings
{TVA Contract
=77K64-821338):
100.
- 101, R901
- 102, R904
- 103, R905
- 104, R908
- 105, R907
- 106, R904
- 300, R903
- 301, R903
- 302, Q903
- 402, R912
- 403, R912
- 407, R909
- 408, R907 TVA memo frcm
( 11/13/79)
Hourly Pr ocess Flowsneet CO'IE MBN P&IO, CDWE MBN P&ID COME MBN P&ID, COWE WBN P&IO, COME MB!'l PAID and Process Flowsheet for COME For Blowdown Tank and Distillate Test System MBN General Arranqement Plans COME ':lBN General Arrangement Elevati ons COWE
';lBN.
General Arrangement
"- levations COME MBN Small Piping CDWE ':IBN Small,Piping COWE MBN Small Pipinq COME MBN Distillate Skid COME WBN O.
R. Patterson to R.
M. Pi'erce"(MEB 791113 122),
38270-R3 (10/15/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM R'EPORT NUMBER
'3000 R',EVIS ION NUMBER:
3 Page C-8 of 10 101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
112.
113.
114.
115.
Letter from A. M. Washburn (llPD) to C. Chandley (TVA); (10/23/86),,
contract 77K64-821338, CDWE noncondenstble f'lowrate (transmitted tiy TTS 140/5)'gN ECN 2744
[SWP 791217 518], (12/11/79)
TVA 'Drawings:
45M4 47W803-7, R9 Mechanical, Flow Oiagr'am, Waste Oisoosa'1
~ystemi 45M4 47W560-23, R3 Mechanical Waste Disposal System 45M4 47W560-22, R7 Mechanical, Waste OiSposal System WBN ECN 2257 (791211 528],
( 12/07/'79)
TVA Drawings:
85M 47W830-7, R14 Mechanical, Flow Diagram, Waste Disposal System 85M 47W560-23, R10 Mechanical,, Waste Disposal System 85M 47W560-22, R9 Mechanical, Waste DiSposal System TVA memo frcm J.
C. Standifer'o.G.
bladewitz, (MEB 831222 010),
(12/22/83)
TVA memo from G. Wadewitz to J.
C. Standifer, (WBN 830928 905),'09/28/83)
(02/12/'"4)'emo with attached sketches from E. Croi't, Becntel at:IBN to ':I. Blumer,
- Sechtel, IOM 1338,
{02/07/87)
Memo, uith attacned sketcn from E..r'oft, Bechtel at
':IBN to W.
'3lu'mer',
- Becntel, IOM 1339, (02/111/B7)
SNP FSAR', Table 11.2.2-2,, Original Telephone call from W. Blumer, Bechtel to G. R. McNutt/H. A. Ifahlman/
G. Gibbs,
- TVA, 10M 461, (12/17/86)
TVA General Design Guidelines (GDC) DG-H18.7.1, RO, "Radiation Protection (ALAR'A) Desiqn Guide] ines,"
{llf20/81)
WBN System Operating Instruction SOI-77.101
- Units 1
and 2-,
R9,,
"Condensate Demineralizer Waste Ev'aporator" WBN, System Operatinq Instruction SOI-30l50 - Units 1
and 2,
page 35,
- R10, "Recovery f'rcm Auxiliary Building Iso'lation" 9
4kl 38270-R3
( 10/15/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
23000 REVISION NUMBER:
3 Page C-9 of 10 116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
SON System Operating Instruction SOI-30.5D - Units 1
and 2, R27, "Recovery from Auxiliary Buildinq Isolation" WBN System Operating Instruction SOI-30.5A - Units 1
and 2, R10, "Auxiliary Building General Supply Fans and Exhaust Fans" Letter frcm G. R. McNutt, TVA, to G. L. Parkinson, Bechtel, transmittinq CATO 230 01 BFN 01, TCAB-463, (07/26/87)
Letters frcm G. R. McNutt, TVA, to G. L. Parkinson,
- Bechtel, transmitting CATO 230 01 S0N 01 and Rl, TCAB-036, (12/19/86) and TCAB-058, (01/15/87)
Nuclear Operating Experience Inc. Reports published by the S.
M. Stoller Corp.,
Volume PWR-2,Section XIV, "Buildings and Containment,"
B.
Miscellaneous, Articles 352 and 353 (Sequoyah)
TVA drawing 85E 47W611-12, R7, Powerhouse Units 1
and 2, "Electrical Logic Oiaqram Auxiliary Boiler" Telephone call from A. Washburn, HPO, to 0. Cinoilli/H. Harvey/
O. Orouhard, TVA, and W. Blumer, Bechtel, IOM 752, (03/09/87)
Letter from G. R. McNutt, TVA, to G. L. Park'inson, Bechtel, transmitting CATO 230 05 WBN 01, R 1, TCAB-266, (03/12/87)
Letter frcm G. R. McNutt, TVA, to G. L. Parkinson, Bechtel, transmitting CATO 230 05 WBN 02, TCAB 242, (03/06/87)
WBN System Operating Instruction SGI-30.5B - Units 1
and 2,
R7, "Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Fans" TVA 0IR MEB 87045, "Radiation Levels Inside tne COWE Buildinq,"
[B26 870304 200),. (03/04/87)
TVA memo frcm H. J.
Green to M. N. Sorouse, fOES 831117 001], (11/09/83)
SQ-OCR-L-1941, (06/08/83)
Memo with attached sketch frcm E. Croft, Bechtel SON to W. Blumer,
- Bechtel, IOM -1629, (01/03/87)
Updated SNP FSAR and Amendments 2 and 3, Sections 1.2, 6.2; 9.4.2, 9.4.9, 10.4.6, 11.2, 11.4,
- 12. 1.3, and
- 12. 1.4 SON System Operatinq Instruction SOI-77.183 - Unit 0, R42, "Condensate Oemineralizer Waste Evaporator" 38270-R3
( 10/15/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
23060 REVISION NUMBER:
3 Page C-10 of 10 132; TVA General
.Design Criteria SQN-DC-V-22.0, R2, "Liquid Radwaste Dispos'al
'ystem Modification" 133.
TVA dz awing 45M4 47W61'I-12-1, R7, "Powerhouse Units 1
and 2 Mechanica'1 Logic Diagram Auxiliary Boiler" 134.
Telephone conversation from H. A. Mahlman, lVA, to W. Blumer, Bechtel, (10/31/86),
IOt1 3i68 135.
Letter from G. R. McNutt, TVA, to G) Li Parkinson, Bechtel, transmitting CATDs 230 05 SQN 01 and 02, TCAB-018, (12/05/86)
'36.
TVA'QN Surveillance Instruction SI-233, R15, "Visual Inspections of Penetration Fire Barriers and Fire Stops" (cancelled to be divided into five different instructions) 137.
TVA memo From i). C.
Key to C. A. Chandley,
[B25 850513 006], (05/13/85) 138.
Letter from G. L. Parkinson,
BLT-'165, '(03/31/87) 139.
Letter from G.
R. McNutt, TVA, to G.
L< Parkinson',
Bechtel, transmitting CATO 200 BFN 01, TCAB-493, (08/19/87I) 140.
Lette'r from G. L. Parkinson,
- Bechtel, to G.
R. McNutt, TVA, "Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Corrective Action Flan 200'BFN 01," BLT-446, (08/28/87) 141.
Letter from G. R. McNutt, TVA to G. L. Parki'nsdn, Bechtel, transmitting CATO 200-BFN-01 (revised CAP),
TCA'B-I493, (08/19/87) il~
'8 (10/15/87)