ML18033A548
| ML18033A548 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 03/21/1988 |
| From: | Russell J TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML082340470 | List:
|
| References | |
| 25000, 25000-V02-R03, 25000-V2-R3, NUDOCS 8902140472 | |
| Download: ML18033A548 (94) | |
Text
EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROG VOLTE2 ENGINEERING CATEGORY CIVIL/STRU SUBCATEGORY REPORT 250GO DTDRAE DESIGN AISD PIPE WHIP RESTRAINT DESIGN UPDATED NUCLEAR POWER il M. >(
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REPORT TYPE:
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SP';( IAI PROGRAM SUBCATEGORY REPORT FOR ENGINEERING REPORT NUMBER:
25000 REVISION NUMBER:
3 TITLE:
CIVIL/STRUCTURAL DESIGN (21500)
AND PIPE WHIP RESTRAINT DESIGN (22700)
Page 1 of 37 REASON FOR REVISION:
Revised to incorporate initial SRP and TAS comments and to add BFN and BLN Corrective Action Plans.
3.
Revised to incorporate additional SRP and TAS comments and to add Attachment C.(References).
Revised per TLB-085 request, deleted element 215.8, and incorporated SRP and TAS comments.
PREPARED BY:
SIGNATURE PREPARATION REVIEWS a-( l 8e DATE TAS:
REVIEW COMMITTE SI TU 3-l -88 DATE SIGNAT E
CONCURRENOES D
E SIGNATURE DATE CEG-H SRP:
)P W'YLAl
- g. ~pa
~zi~
SIGNAT DATE APPROVED BY:
R CSP MANAGER 3-2l-Q DATE SRP Secretary's signature denotes SRP concurrences are in files.
TVA EHPLO'VEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25000 REVTSION NUMBER:
3 Page ES-2 of 2
TVA has developed corporate and plant-specific nuclear performance plans (NPPs).
These plans identify correc:tive actions to remedy existihg problems and to improve TVA's nuclear program.
The findings of this subcategory are combined with
'those of othe'ubCategOry'eports and reassessed in the Engineering category evaluation, which has assessed the broader issues identified - effective and thorough design process and has issuecl the necessary corrective action tracking doc'uments.
26360-R23 (03/l5/88)
TVh ENPLOyEE CONCERNS SPECIhL PROGRhN REPORT NUMBER:
2S000 FRONT NhTTER REV:
3 PhGB i OF viii Preface This subcategory report is one of a series of reports prepared for the Employee Concerns Special" Program (ECSP), of the Tennessee Valley huthority (TVh).
The ECSP and the organization which carried out. the program, the Employee Concerns Task Group (ECTG), were established by IVh's Nanager of Nuclear Power to evaluate and report on those Office of Nuclear Power (ONP) employee concerns filed before February 1,
1986.
Concerns filed after that date are handled by the ongoing ONP Employee Concerns Program (ECP).
The ECSP addressed over 5800 employee concerns.
Each of the concerns was a
formal, written description of a circumstance or circumstances that an employee thought was unsafe, unjust, inefficient, or inappropriate.
The mission of the Employee Concerns Special Program was to thoroughly investigate all issues presented in the concerns and to report the results of those investigations in a form accessible to ONP employees, the
- NRC, and the general public.
The results of these investigations are communicated by four levels of ECSP reports:
- element, subcategory,
- category, and final.
Element reports, the lowest reporting level, will be published only for those concerns directly affecting the restart of Sequoyah Nuclear Plant's reactor unit 2.,
hn element consists of one or more closely related issues.
hn issue is a potential problem identified by ECTG during. the evaluation process as having been raised in one or more concerns.
For efficient handling, what appeared to be similar concerns were grouped into elements early in the program, but issue definitions emerged from the evaluation process itself.
Consequently, some elements did include only one issue, but often the ECTG evaluation found more than one issue per element.
Subcategory reports summarize the evaluation of a number of elements.
- However, the subcategory report does more than collect element level evaluations.
The subcategory level overview of element findings leads to an integration of information that cannot take place at the element level.
This integration of information reveals the extent to which problems overlap more than one element and will'therefore require corrective action for underlying causes not fully apparent at the element level.
To make the subcategory reports easier to understand, three items have been placed at the front of each report:
a preface, a glossary of the terminology unique to ECSP reports, and a list of acronyms.
hdditionally, at the end of each subcategory report vill be a Subcategory Summary Table that includes the concern numbers; identifies other subcategories that share a concern; designates nuclear safety-related, safety significant, or non-safety related concerns; designates generic applicability;, and briefly states each concern.
Either the Subcate ory Summary Table or another attachment or a combination o
the two vill enable the reader to find the report section or sections in which the issue raised by the. concern is evaluated.
TVh EMPLOYEE CONCERNS S P ECIh L P ROG RhM REPORT NUMBER:
25000 FRONT KlTTER REV:
2 PhGK ii OF viii 8
The subcategories ars~ themselves summarized in
'a series of eight category
'eports.
Each category report reviews
'the mijor fin~iings and collective significance of the subcategory reports in, one of.the following. areas:
management and personnel relations industrial safety construction m'aterial control operations qual ity assurance/qual ity control welding engineering h separate report on employee concerns dealing with specific contentions of intimidation, harassment, and, wrongdoing will be released by the TVh'ffike of the Inspector General.
Just as the subcategory reports integrate the information c'ollected at the element level, the category reports integrate the information assembled in all the subcategory reports within the category, addressing particularly the.underlying causes of those problems that run across more than one subcategory.
h final report w'ill integrate and assess the information collected by all of, the lower level reports prepared for'h'e FCSP, 'including the Inspector General's report.
For more detail on the methods by which KCTG employee concerns were evaluated and reported, consult the Yenhessel V'all'ey'uthority Employee Concerns Task Group Program Manual.
The Manuil'pells out the program's objectives,
- scope, organizationand redpo'nsibili(ieIs.
It'. also specifies the procedures that were followed in the investigation, reporting, and closeout of the issues 'raised by employJ.e
'coerce'ms.
TVA ENPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUNBER:
25000 FRONT NATTER REV:
2 PAGE iii OF viii ECSP GLOSSARY OF REPORT TERMS~
classification of evaluated issues the evaluation of an issue leads to one of the following determinations:
Class h:
Issue cannot be verified as factual Class B:
Issue is.factually accurate, but, what is described is not a
problem (i.e., not a condition requiring corrective action)
Class C:
Issue is factual and identifies a problem, but corrective action for the problem was initiated before the evaluat,ion of the issue was undertaken Class 0:
Issue is factual and presents a problem for which corrective action has
- been, or is being, taken as a result oi an evaluat,ion Class E:
h problem, requiring corrective action,, which was not identified by an employee
- concern, but was revealed during the ECTG evaluation of an issue raised by an employee concern.
collective si nificance an analysis which determines the importance and consequences of the findings in a particular ECSP report by putting those findings in the proper perspective.
concern (see "employee concern" )
corrective action steps taken to fix specific deficiencies or discrepancies revealed by a negative finding and, when necessary, to correct causes in order to prevent recurrence.
criterion
( lural:
criteria a basis for.defining a performance,
- behavior, or quality which ONP imposes on itself (see also "requirement" ).
element or element re ort an optional level of ECSP report, below the subcategory level, that deals with one or more issues.
em lo ee concern a formal, written description of a circumstance or circumstances that an employee thinks unsafe, unjust, inefficient or inappropriate; usually documented on a K-form or a form equivalent to the K-form.
'TVh, E)(PLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIhL PROGRhiN REPORT NU)(HER:
25000 FRONT NATTER REP:
2 PhGB iv OF viii evaluator(s) the individual(s) assigned the responsibilitj( to. assess a
specific'rouping of employee concerns.
~findin s inoiudes both stateuents of faut and the judtuents made about those facts during the. evaluation process; negative'findings require corrective action.
issue a potential problem, a: s interpreted by'he ECTG during the evaluition
- process, raised in one or more concerns.
K-form (see "employee concern" )
la I evaluation
)udgment or decision may be based.
root cause the underlying reason for a problem.'Terms esse'ntial to the program but, which require detail,ed definition have been defined in: the ECTG Procedure Nanual (e.gue generiic, specific, nuclear safety-related, unreviewed safety-significant'uestion).
TVA ENPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAN
.REPORT NUNBER:
2'5000 FRONT NATTER REV:
2 PAGE v OP viii hcronyma AI AISC ALARA Administrative Instruction American Institute of Steel Construction hs Low hs Reasonably Achievable ANS ANSI ASNE ASTN AMS BFN BLN Amer ican Nuclear Society American Hational Standards Institute American Society of Nechanical Engineers American Society for Testing and Naterials American Melding Society Brogans Ferry Nuclear Plant Bellefonte Nuclear Plant CAQ CAR CATD CCTS
,CEG-H CFR CI CNTR COC DCF DNC
'Condition Adverse to Quality Corrective Action Report Corrective Action Tracking Document Corporate Commitment Tracking System Category Evaluation Group Head Code of Federal Regulations Concerned Individual Certified Naterial Test Report Certificate of Conformance/Compliance Design Change Request Division of Nuclear Construction (see also HU CON)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECXhi PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25000 FRONT MATTER REV:
PAGE vi OF viii ONE Division of Nuclear Engineet'ing ONQA Division of Nuclear Quality Ass'urance ONT Division of Nuclear
.Craining OOE Department, ol.'nergy DPO Division P'ersonnel, Officer DR Discrepancy Report, or Deviation Report ECN Engineering Change Notice ECP Employee Concerns Program ECP-SR Elaployee C'oncerns Program-Site Repre'sentative ECSP Employee Concerns Special Programi ECTG Employee Concerns Task Group EEOC Equal Employment Opportunity Commiission EQ Environmental Qual,if'ication EMRT Emergency Medical Response Team EN OES Engineering Design Employee
Response
Team or Emergency
~Response Team FCR Field Change Request FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report Fiscal Year GET General Employee Training HCI Hazard Control Instruction HVAC Heating, Ventilating, hir Conditi'oni'ng,'nstallation Instruction.
INPO institute of Nuclear Power Operat'ions IRN Inspect',ion Rejection Notice
TVh EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIhL PROGRhM REPORT NUMBER:
<S00O FRONT MhTTER REV:
2 PhGE, vii OF viii L/R M&AI MI MSPB MT NCR NPP NPS NQhM NRC NSB NSRS NU CON NUMhRC OSHh ONP OWCP Labor Relations Staff Modifications.and hdditions Instruction Maintenance Instruction Merit Systems Protection Board Magnetic Particle Testing Nonconforming Condition Report
- Nondestructive Examination Nuclear Performance Plan Non-plant Specific or Nuclear Procedurea System Nuclear Quality hssurance
- Manual, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Services Branch Nuclear Safety Review Staff.
Division of Nuclear Construction (obsolete abbreviation, see DNC)
Nuclear Uti'lity Management and Resources Committee Occupational'afety and Health hdministration (or hct)
Office of Nuclear Power Office of Workers Compensation Program P,HR PT Qh QhP QC
'QCI Personal History Record Liquid Penetrant. Testing Quality hssurance Quality hssurance Procedures Quality Control Quality Control Instruction
TVk, EPlPLOYEE.CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAH REPORT NUMBER:
2SOOO PRONT NATTER REV:
2 PAGE viii OP viii QCP QTC RIP SQN SI Quality Control Procedure Quality Technology Company Reduction in Porce Radiographic Testing Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Surveillance Instruction SOP SRP Standard Operating Procedure 4
Senior Review Panel SWEC TAS Stone and Webster Engineering Cor'por';at'ion Technical Assistance Staff Trades and'abor TVA Tennessee Valley Authority TVILC VT WBECSP WBN Tennessee Valley Trades and Labor Council.
Ultrasonic Testing, Visual Testing Watts Bar Employee Concern Special Program Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Work Request or Work Rules Workplans
TVA EMPLOYE[
CONi ERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25000 REVISION NUMBER:
3 Page 2 of 37 Section Executive Summary Preface ECSP Glossary of Report Terms Acronyms 1
Introduc t i on 2
Summary of.Issues 3
Evaluation Process 4
Findings 5
Corrective Actions 6
Causes 7
Collective Significance CONTENTS Pa<ac ES-1 10 23 25 28 Glossary Supplement for the Engineering Category Attachments A
Employee Concerns for Subcategory 25000 B
Summary of Issues,
- Findings, and Corrective Actions for Subcategory 25000 C
References A-1 B-1 C-1 TABLES Table 1
Classification of Findings and Corrective Actions 2
Findings Summary 3
Matrix of Elements, Corrective. Actions, and Causes
~Pa e
31 33 34
0 0
ik
TVA EMPLOYING CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAH REPORT NUMBER:
25000 REVISION NU11BER:
3 Page 3 of 37 1.
INTROOUCT ION This subcategory report summarizes and integrates the results of the ECSP element evaluations dealing with civillstructural design and pipe whip restraint design.
These element evaluations addressed a variety of topics, which covered seismic criteria, seismic analysis of radiation shielding, cut rebar control, hanger loads on structures, roofing design, crane service, sleeve
- covers, and whip restraints.
Structural steel connection design (element 215.9),
as evaluated for SQN and l<BN, is assigned to Subcategory Report 25500.
Fourteen employee concerns provide the basis for the element evaluations and are listed by element number in Attachment A.
The plant location where each concern was originally identified and the applicability of the concern to other TVA nuclear plants are also shown.
The evaluations are summarized in the balance of this report as follows:
o Section 2 -- summarizes, by element, the issues stated oi implied in the employee concerns o
Section 3 outlines the process followed for the element and subcategory evaluations, cites documents
- reviewed, and addresses determination of generic applicability o
Section 4 -- summarizes, by element, the findings and identifies the negative Findings that must be resolved o
Section 5 highlights the corrective actions required for Iesolution of the negative Findings cited in Section 4 and relates them to element and to plant site o
Section 6 identifies causes of the negative findings o
Section 7 assesses the significance of the negative findings o
Attachment A lists, by element, each employee concern evaluated in the subcategory.
The concern number is given along with notation of any other element or category with which the concern is shared, the plant sites to which it could be applicable are noted, the concern is quoted as received by TVA and characterized as safety
- related, not safety related, or safety significant.
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Attachment, B contains a
summary of'he element-level evaluations,.
Each issue i. 1'isted, by element number and plant,'pposite its corresponding findings and corrective actions.
The
.reader may trace a concern From Attadhmhnt! A'o ah issue in Attachment 8 by using the elemerit number and apipl icable plant.
The reader may relate a corrective action descriptio~
in Attachment 8 t'o causes and signif'icance in Table 3 by usinig the CATO numbei which appears in Attachment 8 in parentheses a.t the -end of the correc'tive'ction description.
The term "Peripheral Finding" in the 'isdue'Olumn refers to a finding thai: occurred during the course of evaluating.
a concern but did not stem directly from an employee concern.
These are classified as "E'" in Tables 1
and 2 of this report.
o Attachment C -- lists thie references cited in the text.
2.
SUMMARY
OF ISSUES The employee concerns listed in Attachment A fcir I.ac'h I.le'meht
'and plant have been
- examined, and the piotential negative findings raised by the 13 concerns have been, identified as 42 separate issues.
These issijes ar'e evaluated as 17 elements' summary of the issues ieva,1 uated under this subcategory, grouped by element, is listed below:
0 215.1, Seismic Criteria An earthquake Fault e'xtend'ing from Chattanooga to Knoxville runs under SQN and HBN, and plant structures could fail in an earthquake.
215.2, Cut Rebar Control - Lack of procedural control and'assessment of cut rebar raise questions about the structural integrity of concrete walls and slabs.
215.3 Radiation Sh'ieldin~Seismic An~al sis -
Tlhe present case-by-case approach for.seismic analysis of'adiation shielding takes more time and money.
215.4'urb>ne and !service Build~inRooein 'he Turbine and Service Building roofing design is im'pr per and'oofing iS leaking.
walls and slabs is quest'lonablle because of the excessive number of hangers and lack of assessment calculations.
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215.7 Auxiliar Building ('rane Service -
ONE does not appreciate the role of field engineei ing to make the designs work.
The Auxiliary Building 125-ton crane can set load on only two out of five floors, and hatch.grating is rated only for 100 psf.
o 215.10, Feedwater Heater Monorail Des~i n - The structural integrity of hangers for the feedwater heater monorails is questionable.
o 215.11, Floor Sleeve Covers - Metal covers need to be installed over floor sleeve foam seals.
0 227. i, Pipe Huis Res train~thee i n - Pipe whip restraints in the unit 1 Reactor Building have problems as shown on drawing 41H1700 series.
o 227.2 Pi e Hhi Restraint Desi n
Nhip restraints are needed on the decay heat removal pipe coming from,the borated water storage tank.
The element summaries above deal with perceived deficiencies in the design of the civil/structural components.
More specifically, four of the elements are concerned with the quality of the design (215.2, 215.3, 215.6, and 215.11),
one deals with the adequacy of design criteria provided (215.1),
and five suggest errors or oversights in the design (215.4, 215.7, 215.10, 227.1, and 227.2).
As the following sections show, four of the above 10 e'lements were found to have valid issues and require corrective action (215.2, 215.b.
215.11.
and 227.2).
Three of these involve design quality, and the remaining one involves documentation error.
- Thus, this subcategory contains some valid issues and these are quite diverse in nature.
3.
EVALUATION PROCESS This subcategory report is based on the informa ti'on evaluated to address the specific employee concerns related to the issues broadly defined in Section 2.
The evaluation process is described in the following subsections.
As part of the evaluation
- process, the employee
- concerns, which originated for specific TVA nuclear plant sites, were evaluated for their generic applicability to other TVA nuclear plant sites.
Applicability was determined with consideration of the concerns'lant-uniqueness and their effect on safety-related structures,
- systems, and components.
The employee concerns 26360-R23 (03/16/88)
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25000 REVISION NUMBER:
3 Page 6 of 37 were categorized by their impact on safety per EC1G determination criteria as identified in Attachment A,.
The generic applic'ability're'view is summarized for each element as follows.
o 215.1 Seismic Criteria - Both concerns under this element are safety-relai:ed and allude to an earthquake fault-that runs under the Sequoyah and Natts Bar plant sites.
Thus.
these two concerns are site-specific and do not apply to oth'er'two plants.
o 215.2, Cut Rebar Control - Both concerns under,thi,s element originated at HBhl and are safety-relate).
.The evaluation team determined that they also applied to the other three plants.
0 215.3, Radiation Shieldin~Seismic Andi sis I
The 'cohcern under t'his element is not safety-related It addresses cost-effect.ive metho'ds'f performing seismic analysis of radiation shielding installation.
The element evaluation for Hatts Bar revealed as discussed in detail in Section 4
that TVA, to the degree practicable was
, implementing appropriate analytical methods.
In view of the foregoing, it was determiined that this element is not generically'pplicable to the other TVA plants.
o 215.4 Turbine and Service Build~in Root,ing -
The concern under this element is not safety-rellated.
It address~is leaking roof of Turb'ine'nd Service Buildings at Hatts Bar'.
The eiIaluation established that:
TVA already had tak<>n corrective measure's to al llev'late this iobvious problem.
Therefore the evaluation tI.ani dPtermined that the concj i.nI was plant-spec'ific and not applicable'o the 'other plants.
"'"H'"""
"".l!!-'-". "'! """'"""" !"'"'":"
originated at NBN and are safety-r'elated.
The evaluation team determined that they also applied to the other three 'plants.
0 215.7, Auxi liar~Build~in Crane Service - The concern under this element is not safety-related.
It addre'ss4s
'desigh engineering/field engineering interface, crane
- access, and hatch grating capacity.
The interface concern focused on the lack of appreciation of field engineering work by design engineers. rather than a potential breakdown in communication or coordination.
In
- addition, crane access as designed was deemed adequate at Natts Bar.
The hatch grating identified was a temporary construction-period grating.
On the basis of the foregoing, the evaluation team determined that the concern was site-specific and did not apply to the other
'I'VA plants.,
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215.10 Feedwater Heater Monorail Oesi n
The concern under this element identifies monorails which were installed in the Sequoyah Turbine Building to facilitate replacement of its feedwater heaters for operational reasons.
The concern is not safety-related and is plant-specific.
Therefore, the evaluation team determined it not to be applicable to the other TVA plants.
o 215.11, Floor Sleeve Covers The concern under this element is not safety-related.
It addresses foam in abandoned large sleeves at Watts Bar.
The element evaluation revealed
- as discussed in detail in Section 4 - that the concern was valid.
Gener.ic applicability was determined before the complete element evaluation was done for Watts Bar.
At that time a determination was made that the element was site-specific and did not apply to the other plants.
- However, in light of the element findings at Watts Bar, it is plausible that similar abandoned sleeves may exist at the other TVA plants.
This report does not address plants other than WBN foi this element because the evaluation team has not evaluated the other plants.
In
- addition, CATQs 'have not been issued for other plants to investigate generic applicability because the concern is not safety-related.
o 227.1, Pi e
Whi Restraint Des~i n - The concern under.this element is safety-related.
It addresses specific welding notes for pipe whip restraints at Watts Bar.
Meanwhile.
TVA had performed the required inspection and prepared documentation to correct the inconsistencies between the des.ign drawings and the as-built configuration.
The inconsistencies were that the welding of the pipe whip restraints was not in accordance with the design drawing requirements.
Subsequent in'spection and documentation were based on an inappropriate inspection procedure.
As a result, no additional corrective action was specified by the evaluation team.
Thus this concern was determined to be an isolated. plant-specific case.
"'9's safety-related.
It addresses a need for a specific whip.
restraint at
.Be llefonte.
Because the concern is specific for a pipe coming from the borated water storage
- tank, the evaluation team determined that it was plant-specific.
Furthermore, the concern was subsequently found to be invalid, and a peripheral finding of a minor drafting error was identified.
Therefore, it was determined that the concern did not apply to the other TVA plants.
3.2 General Evaluation Process This subsection describes the general evaluation process that was used to evaluate the civil/structural elements identified under this subcategory.
Additional specific evaluation processes are described in the following subsection by element as applicable.
a.
Defined issues for each element from the employee concerns.
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3 Page 8 of 37 b.
Determined gener'ic applicab'1 i ty of klekents'on'he basis of their plant-uniqueness and iheir effects o6 shfetyirelated structures,
- systems, and components.
c.
Reviewed applicable FSAR, Safety Evaluation Report
.<'SER),
and SERI supplements to understand TVA's commitments related to the specific design issues.
d.
Reviewed applicable industry codes and standards and current regulatory requirements and practices to understand related engineering design recluirements.
e.
Reviewed relevant TVA d'esign cri.teria, specifications, prOcedures,
- drawings, and calculations to devellop an understanding of the design basis.
f.
Performed pl,ant )ialkdowns, as appropriate, to develop a first-han'd understanding of the issues.
g.
Reviewed issue-related correspondence, test reports, and nonconforming condition reports (NCRs) to evaluate actions taken by TVA.
h.
On the basis of this composite review, evaluated the issues for each element and described findings
<see Section 4).
i.
Reviewed ancl concurred with corrective action plans prepared by TVA for the issues requiring specific corrective actions.
j.
Tabulated the
- issues, findings, and corrective actions arranged first by elements and then by plants
<i6 Attachment 8).
3.3 S ecific Evaluation Process In addition to the general evaluat'jon, as described
- above, performed by the'valuation team for each element, specific docui~ents also were reviewed fori each plant based on their applicability to the 'issues.
These documents and other unique 'information are identified belo~.
o 215.1 Seismic Criteria a.
Reviewed Section 2.5. of both the FSAR and SER of Sequoyah and Natts Bar (Refs.
6, 30 and 31).
b.
Reviewed TVA, NSRS Report I-86-110-SQN'(Ref
- 32) for Sequoyah.
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215.2 Cut Rebar Control a.
Sought programs to control jobsite rebar cutting, record cuts, and forward records to engineering for evaluation at all plants.
Reviewed for all plants engineering process of recording and evaluating the effect of such cut rebars both single cuts and cumulative effects.
by selecting a
sample of drawings and calculations (Refs.
33 through 36).
215.3, Radiation Shielding Seismic Ana~l sis Reviewed on-going TVA methodology used in the design of radiation shielding with cost-effectiveness considerations at Natts Bar (Ref. 63).
215.4 Turbine and Service Building Roof~in Reviewed roofing design and performance, and TVA actions taken to correct problems at Hatts Bar (Refs.
15.
28 and 62).
o 215.6, Hanger Loads on Structures Sought procedures for systematic structural review of hangers attached to concrete walls and slabs.
b.
Reviewed live load evaluation for all plants based on as-built hanger installation.
c.
Determined whether structural review considered feedback from cut rebar considerations.
- I5.7, nuxi lia~rBuil~din Crane Service a.
Reviewed organizational responsibilities of design and construction engineering.
(Ref.
50) b.
Reviewed crane and'atch cover design bases (Ref. 50).
o 215.10, Feedwater Heater Monorail Design a.
Reviewed monorail drawings and calculations (Ref.
52) b.
Determined that monorai.ls were load-tested and obtained related documentation (Ref.
24 and 52).
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3 Page 10 of'7 215.11, Floor '.Sleevre Covers a.
Reviewed Dow Corning Corp.'s information about "silicone RTV foam (Ref. 37)."
b.
Reviewed T'/A CIEB Report 82-2 cover'ing silicone foam seal.
testing resul ts (Ref. 38).
227.1, Pi e Nhig Restraint Design a.
Reviewed 48111700 series drawings (Ref.
- 39) to determine nature of problem.
b.
Reviewed INCRs,3001R and 3523R (Ref. 40).
a.
Reviewed IBLN drra~rings (Ref.
- 41) for DHR piping coming from boratecl water storage tank.
b.
Reviewed IBLhl calculations (Ref.
- 42) for pipe supports and nozzle desicln.
4.
FINDINGS The, findings From each oF the 17 element evaluations for this. subcategory are contained in Attachment IB, where they arre 1 iste'd t)y 'element number and by plant in a matrix Form along with corresponding issues and corrective actions The discussion and summarized element findings for each e'lemen't follow.
4.1 Seismic Criteria Element 215.1 4.1.1 Sequoyah ancl Natts IBar Plants The Sequoyah and Hatts Bar sites arre located in the Valley and Ridge Physiographic Province oF the Appalachian Highlands.
This province is characterized by highly folded and faulted northeast-t~ ending sedlimentary rocks of Paleozoic era (25Cl to 580 million years old).
Both sites are underlain by several thrust: faults, one of which irs the Kinc~stron fault.
It i<
a major, extensive fault which is exposed at ground su&face approximately 1
mile northwest of both sites and underl les the sites at a deptlh of several thousand feet.
The evidence clearly shows that the Kingston fault and the other thrust fault%
of similar age and origin under the sites have foi decades been considered
~to~
be inactive faults, and they are still considered to be inactive by geologist:
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3 Page 11 of 37 and seismologists.
The evaluation team is not aware of any evidence, or even hypothesis, that the Kingston fault or the other thrust faults that developed near the end of the Paleozoic era are capable faults.
On the contrary, the available evidence indi'cates they are not.
Historically, earthquakes in the Appalachians which have been accurately located as to their hypocentral depth, typically occur below a depth of 7
km (4.3 miles),
which is several kilometers below the thrust faults and the decollement zone.
Consequently these earthquakes do not furnish any evidence for the ex'istence of "an earthquake fault that runs from around Chattanooga to north of Knoxville," and underlies both the Sequoyah and Watts Bar sites.
As stated in the FSAR and the literature, thrust faults exist under the site but the evidence indicates that they are not capable faults, or "earthquake faul.ts."
TVA addressed the geology, seismology, and geotechnical engineering conditions in FSAR Section 2.5, has thoroughly examined the subject (Ref. 6),
and has concluded that the 0.18 g Safe Shutdown Earthquake
<SSE) seismic response spectra are adequate as the basis for the seismic design of Sequoyah and Watts Bar to ensure a safe shutdown of the plants.
In addition, TVA reviewed the existing design employing a 0.22 g site-specific seismic response spectra which uses the 84th percentile of 13 actual earthquake recordings.
This review of both plants determined that all Category I structures are adequate for seismic loading associlted with this site specific spectra.
- Further, TVA has concluded that the 0.09 g Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE and sometimes referred to as "1/2 SSE" for SQN) seismic response spectra are adequate as the basis for the seismic design of Sequoyah and Wa'tts Bar to ensure continued operation of the plants.
4.1.2 Summarized Element Findings The faultS at SQN and WBN alluded to in the concerns are thrust faults which are not capable of producing significant earthquakes.
As presented in its licensing documents, TVA assessed the seismic significance of these faul,ts.
The design of seismic Category I structures has been accepted and documented by NRC in supplements to Safety Evaluation Reports (SER) for SQN and WBN.
4.2 Cut Rebar Control - Element 215.2 4.2.1 Sequoyah Plant The evaluation team's review of TVA procedure AI-17 (Ref.
- 7) found that it
.required engineering review for only electrical and mechanical disciplines; civil review was not required prior to concrete drilling and chipping.
The review also found that AI-17 d.id not reference specification G-2 requirements (TVA specification G-2, Sec'tion 8.3 (Ref. 43) contains ONE requirements for cutting of rebar),
did not require prior ONE approval for cutting rebar or 2636D-R23 (03/16/88)
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3 IPage 12 of 37 caution against cutting without it, and dict not reference a procedure or instruction addressing how such ONE approval
~is ~ob~tai'ned iRef. 7),
NCRs 2975 and 2836 are examples of lack, of Civil Engineering Branch (CI.B) prior approval (Ref. 44).
The NRC issued Deficiency Report 04.3-1 in 04/86 which indicated that there was no documented evidence of CEB eval'uation in the structural calculations of cut rebar effect for.
ECNs L6495 and L'.i202 (Ref. 8).
The evaluation team determined that the rebar cuts were reviewed andi approved by engineering judgment by engineers familiar with the design.
However, calculations were not made and drawings were not always updated.
4.2.2 Natts Bar Plant The.issue that cutting of rebar in reactor containment and the crane walls inside the reactor building could have weakened thL structure, has been addressed by TVA.
TVA has documented individiual cist rebar'~/
use of Quaii ty'ontrol Procedure HBNP-QcP 1.7 (Ref.
9) and the Fell/EIcN/NcR process, and has satisfactorily assessed the cumulative effects of such cut rebar iin concr0 td calculations.
Since the start of construction there are approximately 1,400 bar cuts in both Unit 1
and 2 reactor buildings.
Each has been investigated, and they do not impair the structural i ntegi i ty of the reactor building concrete structures.'VA has an effective program to control and document rebar cuts.
This TVA program is in place and in use.
In acldition, based on its inspections the NRC has concluded that the design evaluation
- program, as established, is adequate
.to ensure structural integrity (Ref.
10).
4.2.3 Browns Ferry Plant In a letter to NRC (Rei 11),
TVA indicated that'hfi'ciency 04.3-II identified at SQN is also applicable to BFN.
The stated corrective action in "Browne Ferry Applicabi-lity to 04.3-1" attached in the TVA's letter to NRC is that an evaluation wi 11 be performed, to identify areas where unevaluated rebar cu'ts
'xist and determine if a loss of function or reduction in capability of tlhe concrete resulted from cut rebar; The evaluatiOn
'team found that the BFN~ cult rebar evaluation program had already been plahned hs a res'ult of.
t:he NRC audit at SQN (Browns Ferry Applicability to Deficiency 04.3-1).
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3 Page 13 of 37 4.2.4 Bel lefonte Plant Discussions
<<ith cognizant TVA engineei s
and a
i eview of drawings, procedures, and other documents (Refs.
36, 46 and 47~ disclosed that the following methods I
are being used by TVA to control cutting and damage of rebar.
Drilling and chipping operations are controlled by notes on drawings and are enforced by BLN Quality Control Procedure BNP-QCP-10.6, "Work Release,"
Section 6.2, which requires a <<ritten engineei ing release before drilling or chipping of permanent structures (Ref.
1 2).
If drawings do not permit cutting rebar without engineering
- approval, then permission is obtained from TVA ONE, and a
field change request (FCR) is issued to identify rebar to be cut.
NRC performed a special inspection of the BLN facilities in 04/82 (Ref.
13)
- and, among other. subjects, reviewed design controls for evaluations of rebar cutting.
The inspector examined the program for documentation and evaluation of cut rebar.
His review disclosed that the locations of cut rebar are being shown on the drawings, bu't that the design evaluation may not be documented in accordance with the r equi remen ts of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
Therefore NRC identified these factors as Unresolved Items 438/82-10-01 and 439/82-10-01.
TVA has not furnished evidence to the evaluation team that these items are closed.
The Sample calcul'ations (Ref.
- 36) reviewed by the evaluation team we~ e found perfunctory and lacking in sufficient detail for complete assessment.
Moreover.,
they do not addiess cumulative effects of multipl'e cuts.
DNE has already identified the lack of documents for rebar cut evaluation and accpetability in.BLN CAQR BLF 870073 (Ref. 47).
4.2.5 Summarized Element Findings NBN has an effective program to control, documen.t, and assess the effect of'ut
- rebar, including cumulative effect, on concrete calculations.
On the basis of its inspection, the NRC has concluded'hat the design evaluation program as established is adequate to ensure structural integrity.
SQN and BFN do not have a documented procedure or program for processing, evaluating, and controlling cut rebar.
BLN Division of Nuclear Construction (DNC) has an effective program to cont~ ol and document rebar cuts in the field, but BLN Division of Nuclear Engineering (DNE) does not have an engineering procedure for processing, evaluating, and controlling the cuoiulative effects of cut rebar.
Assessment calculations of Category-I concrete elements for cut rebar are not complete at
4.3 Radiation Shielding Sei'smic Analysis - Element 215.3 4.3.1 Natts Bar Plant Major radiation shielding is provided in the plant layout and is based on conservative source term models.
This layout general,ly consists of normal 2636D-R23 (03/16/88)
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These permanent plant features are installed as a part of normal plant design completion which includes ALARA programs.
These shielding provisions are verified, and'odifie'd as 'required, during the~
- design, testing, star tup, and pliant operation p'haSes of a nuclear, plant's life.
As indicated in the concern, thiis is not.a plant safety concern.
This concern relates to cost-effectiveness of radiation shielding used during plant operation.
It is not practicable to perfOrm a generic seismic analysis as there are many locations with d'ifferent physical
- geometry, radiation
- sources, and radiation ievels that need to be evaluated.'VA'S involved in improving the cost-effectiveness of its radiatiion shielding program.
One approach being pursued by DNE and Plant Operations is the implementation of a computer
- program, Pb SHIELDING, and/or the impiementation of a set. oi'ables or nomographs defining acceptable ioadings versus diiFferent pipe sizes or configurations (Ref'.
14).
4.3.2 Summarized Element.Finding At HBN, generic seismic.analysis of required radiation shielding during plant~
operation and maintenance 1s not practical.
TVA is, actively improving the
~
cost-effectiveness of its existing approach of.designing shielding on a
case-by-case basis.
4.4 Turbine and Service Bui ldi ncaa Roofi n
- Element 2 15.4 4.4.1 Natts Bar Plant The Turbine and Service Builclings are non-Category 1 structures.
The or,igina,l built-up roofing was installed in accordance'ith'VA Specificatiion 2600 (Ref.
- 58) with minor-substitutlons.
The TVA archi'teetu'ral'oof pians
<snd sectioris indicate walkway over both buildings.
There is an indication 1:hat the turbine building roofing had sustained some damage during the construction phase as evidenced by the 1'VA memo from Touchstone to Liakonis (Ref.
- 28) where the need for reroofing is stated as, follows:
"Apparently, due to poor workmanship arid heavy construction traffic that occurred during construction the membrane was'punctured in. many places thereby permi'tting water,to enter the syst: em, thus resulting in a shof t lifespan requiring the roof to Ibe replaced."
Protective boards are provided in foot traffic areas as delineated in TVA drawings (Ref.
15).
This design will mitigate leakage caused by foot trafiFic on walkways.
Since construction in now comple'te and access to the roof is limited and controlled, further damage to the roofing is not anticipated.
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3 Page 15 of 37 4.4.2 Summarized Element Finding At NBN, the leaking of the original roofing was not caused by improper design, but by poor workmanship and uncontrolled heavy foot traffic during construction..
The roofing always had designed walkways in foot traffic areas..
4.5 H~an er Loads on Structures Element 2I5.6 4.5.1 Sequoyah and Watts Bar Plants SQN Oesign Criteria V-1.3.3.1 and NBN Design Cri.teria 20-1.1 state:
"A review and reevaluation for loads estimated or assumed during the design and construction process shall be made.
The review/
reevaluation shall be made after the total plant design and construction has progressed to a point where the actual loads can be determined with a reasonable degree of certainty.
A live load to be used by the plant operating personnel shall be ascertained and documented on a drawing for use during the operating plant life."
(Refs.
16 and 18)
There was. an implicit recognition that some areas of the plant might have greater loads than originally assumed.
However, reevaluation was not performed.
NCR SQN CEB 8403 and NCR NBN NBP 8338 identified that, during a
postulated seismic event, two 8-inch thick reinforced concrete partition walls were overstressed because of the attachment of conduits and fire protection piping supports.
TVA's review of the NCR concluded that originally it had designed these walls for the weight of, the walls only and had not considered any attachment'oadings.
As a result, the corrective action required additional steel braces to qualify the partition walls (Refs.
l7 and 191.
TVA Engineering Procedure, EN OES-EP 4.04 entitled "Squadcheck Process,"
described how to submit drawings For the purpose of review and comment.
The evaluation team determined that compliance with these procedures was not always achieved.
All elevated concrete floors in the Auxiliary Control Building and Reactoi Building were originally designed using the working stress design method of ACI 318-63 as described in SQN and NBN FSARs (Ref. 48).
- However, the current assessment is based on the ultimate strength design method (ACI 318-'/7) permitted by SQN and NBN design criteria, and this method has resulted in higher floor load capacities.
Furthermore, moments in slabs are redistributed using ACI 318-77 code instead of the 318-63 code stated in the FSAR.
Although the use of either code version is technically acceptable, such differences indicate that TVA's licensing commitments are.not fully met.
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3 Page 16 of 37 4'.5.2 Browns Ferry Plant Generally, in early st:ages of st:ructural
- design, principal loads for majOr equipment and structures ar'e i easonably well defined; but other loads including hanger
- loads, are conservatively estimated to allow for various components, e.g.,
process piping, electrical
- raceways, HVAC ducts, and small equipment.
This approach is necessary since final locations and exact loads are unknown for these components until their detailed analyses are perfo'r med
.'he final loads are then compared with the estimated'oads ILo assure margins of safety meet FSAR commitments.
This iterative proicess is nor~ally satisfactory unless significant design additions have been made.
The additions can be particularly signif.icant at plants such as BFN, since the concrete structures have been subjected to many additional new systemS ahd
'omponents.
TVA Engineering Procedure, EN DES-EP 4.04 entitled, "Squadcheck Process,"
described how to submit hanger drawings fair-the purpose of r'evies and comments (Ref. 20).
The evaluation team did not find evidence of compliance with these procedures at BFN.
The evaluation team reviewed SFN design drawings icovering generail notes fort pipe supports.
The drawings do not require coordination and transfer of'anger design information to concrete design engiheersi nor do BFN procedures require such coordination.
Neither could the evailuation team identify any'amples.
of informal coordination.
Furthermore, BFN has design drawings specifying design floor live load in a note (Ref. 21).
- However, the evaluation team has not found any calculatioins to demonstrate that the stated allowable live load is sti11 unimpaired abater numierous. component additions since the original design.
4.5.3 Bellefonte Plant 0
0 Section 3.10.5 of criterion N4-50-0702 states "A r'eview and reevaluation foi loads es'tiniatied 'or assumed during the design and'onstruction process shall be made.
The review/
reevaluation shaill be made prior to initial plant operation,,
Prior tO commercial operation, a live load to be uSed by the plant operating personnel shall be ascertained and documented on a drawing for use dudinti the operating plant life."
(Ref.
22)
TVA stated that it has not performed the reevaluation -bas'ed'n walkdowns yet but is planning to do so before fuel load date)
- However, there is no documented evidence that TVA plans this to be a ciomprehensive review for the effects of accumula.ted loading based on the as-bull,t conditions at BLN for Category I concrete structures.
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3 Page
)7 of 37 The evaluation team reviewed BLN design drawings (Ref.
- 49) covering general notes for component supports.
The di awings do not
- equire coordination and transfer of hanger design information to concrete design engineers nor do BLN procedures require such coordination.
'Neither could the evaluation team identify any samples of informal coordination.
Furthermore.
BLN has design drawings specifying design floor live load.
- However, the calculations are not available to demonstrate that the stated allowable 1'ive load is still unimpaired after numerous component additions since the original design.
The evaluation team observed that the civil engineering discipline neither has a
formal procedure for nor a practice of evaluating cumulative effects of hanger loads.
4.5.4 Summarized Element Finding TVA design calculations have not evaluated all individual and cumulative effects of as-built hangers on concrete walls and slabs of Category I
'structures to establish structural integrity for all four plants.
At present.
for SQN and NBN, there are differences between the FSARs and the final design bases for Category I concrete elements.
1'VA does not have formal programs to coordinate and evaluate the effects of cumulative loading from different commodities, or to consider feedback from cut rebar effects.
4.6 Auxiliar~ Building Crane Service - Element 215.7 4.6.1 Watts Bar Plant A TVA memo from Cantrell throughout TVA's en ineer and Bonine which received wide distribution g
ing and construction organizations, establishes poiicy to clearly define the role and responsibilities of the two organizations as follows:
"It is the responsibility of the Office oF Engineering (OE) to provide all requirements in the design output documents to ensure that the Final product.
when constructed in accordance with these requirements, will compy,with and perform in accordance with the design criteria and specifications
. -All of the requirements necessary for construction activities are not specified by the design output documents.
In those
'reas where the necessary requirements to control, the fabrication, installation, or testing are not defined, it is the responsibility of the Construction Engineering Organization (CEO) to provide the requirements."
(Ref.
23)
The main hook of the 125-ton crane services floor elevations 729'-0" and 757'-0" with a hook'eaching down to elevation 722'-0" for maneuvering the Fuel cask in the cask loading area at elevation 709'-0".
The auxiliary hook
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3 Page 18 of 37 services floor elevations 676'-0", 692'-0",
713'-0~',
737'-0",,
and 757'-.0" wi th a hook reach down tolevatlon 677'-6'".
TVA drawings (Ref. 50) show the service areas of the auxili'ary hook which is through hatch openings approxi,mately 8-'-0" by 10,'-0".
Materials, are hdisted'r lowered through 'this
'haft to the desired ellevation and then moved into position horizontally with come-alongs or similar devices.
Section 1.3.4 of the AISC Specification for the Oesign, Fabrication and Erection of Structural Steel ror Buildiiigs specifies that the crane.
runways be designed for a lateral force of 20 percent of the sum of the weights of'he lifted'oad (crane rated load) and of the crane ti'olley.
In addition, the crane runway is to be designed for a longitudinal force of 10 percent of the maximum wheel loads.
Such diesign is industry standarid practice for construction and operation of industrial facilities, (including. nuclear power plants) throughout the country.
This provision more than adequately ensures safe crane operation when come-alongs or similar devices are used to horizontally move the lifted load attached to, and freely suspended from,'th' cable and hook.
The sub)ect of crane side pulls is addressed in Subcategory Report 30800,'R2 (Ref. 61), (09/04/87).
A'merican National Standards Institute (ANSI)
B30.2.0-1976 (Ref. 60), Section 2-0.2.2.45 defines a side pull as:
"The portion of the hoist pul 1 acting horizontally Iwhkn th@ hoi St lines are not operated vertically."
Section 2-3.2.3(d) of'he ANSI standard stateS:
"Cranes shall not be used for side pulls except rthen specificali'y
'uthorized by a qualified person who has det:ermined that the stability of the crane is not thereby kndan$ ei'ed,nd that various parts of the crane will not be overstressed."
Nhen qualified personnel act in an intel ligent arid priident manner to pe~form the work described
- above, thie crane operation wil 1 meet any implied or statel ANSI requirements given above.
- Further, when such personnel act as described.
there is, no necessity to evaluate the structures to which the come-alongs are attached.
Such practice is industry standard 'foi'bnltruction and operation of industrial facilities including nuclear pow'er. plants.
The grating on the floor rated at 100 psf cited in the concern is the one located at elevation 692'-0".
It is for temporary constituction access.
- This grating is used during the construction stage for easy access to the lo~~er floors.
This grating will carry approximately 100 psf 1'I've,load based on thk 8-foot span.
This grating w'Ill be replaced by thle ]ei'manent plant grating with a design live load capacity of 200 psf 4.6.2 Summarized Element Finding The interface between engineering and construc tion organizatil>ns 1>> proper'ly
'oordinated through published documents.
The TVA'(ec'if)cations and design 26360-R23 (03/16/88)
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3 Page 19 of 37 requirements applicable to the 125-ton Auxiliary Building crane at WBN are satisfactory.
The 3-1/2-inch-opening grating at elevation 692 feet is temporary.
The final grating is specified on the applicable design drawing and wi 11 be instal.led according to the current plan.
4.7 Feedwater Heater Monorail Design - Element 215.10 4.7.
1 Sequoyah P'lant TVA decided to replace a total. of 12 out or 42 feedwater heaters in late 1984 on both of the
'SQN units because of mechanical problems encountered.
The feedwater heater replacement involved moving large, heavy (89.000 lb) equipment over long distances through confined spaced.
The replacement, therefore.
required additional monorails at various locations in the turbine building to transport the heaters.
The SQN turbine building and monorail supports are not Category I structures.
The AISC specification (Ref.
- 51) covers design, fabrication, and erection of structural s-teel.
The evaluation team reviewed the feedwater heater
- drawings, and confirmed that the correct lifting weights were used in the design calculations.
The design calculations and drawings (Ref.
- 52) were reviewed For assumptions, logic, analysis, code interpretations, member selections, connections, and clarity of presentations.
The evaluation team found the design documents well organized.
- complete, and meeting the AIS(; requirements.
1'he team also performed a field walkdown of the as-built installation including connections.
I'he installation appeared satisfactory.
The SQN site director had requested a monorail load test prior to lifting the heaters to ascertain the soundness of the system design.
The test was considered successful by visual observations (Ref. 24).
Following the test.
the feedwater.
heaters were replaced successfully.
4.7.2 Summarized Element Finding At SQN, the hangers are structurally adequate for the rated load.
Other
- reviews, the load test, and the successful heater replacement operation confirm adequate design.
4.8
. Floor Sleeve Covers - Element 215.11 4.8.1 Watts Bar Plant All mechanical floor sleeve seals in the Auxil.iary Building are tabulated in drawing 47W472 series (Ref. 53).
A review of these drawings indicated that all spare sleeve penetration sea,ls are Type III seal, made of Oow Corning 3-6548 silicon RTV foam with a minimum thickness of 8 inches.
All Type III penetration seals are fire-barr.ier seals with no air-pressure requirement.
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3 Page 20 of 37 The sleeves protrude 4 inchies above the floor slab and are filled with silicon Foam fire-proofing material..
The, top surfaces of the si1 1icon foam are dished (concave) and appear as though someone has stepped on them.
The out;side surfaces of the sleeves are covered with yellow and black striped reflective tape which identifies a ha ard.
The protruding spare sleeves may create a safety hazard if they are. located along, across, or in aisles and passageways because workers may trip on the protruding sleeves.
OSHA Standards require aisles and passage(iays to be, kep't clean and in good repair, with no obstruction across or in aisles that could create a hazard
( Ref. 25).
In addition to the trippling hazai d, a larger abandoned floor sleeve may also create a, hazard if the seal is. accidentally stepped on and is unable to support the weight of a worker.
4.8;2 Summarized Element Finding.
The potential safety hazard caused by protruding sleeves requires
.a worker safety evaluation for compliance with OSHA standards,.
(The documents are not available to ensure the adequacy of seal foam to support the weight of a
person.)
0, 4.9.1 Natts Bar Plant The concern indicates that the oroblems can be identified 'by examination of the drawing series 48W1700 (Ref.
39) anal further indicate.
that: this is a.
construction department concern.
1'herefore special emphasis was given to the changes required to compilete construction of the pipe whip r'estraints, From a
review of the drawings and documents,
'it: is observed that the general engineering design requirements as issued for cdnstruction a're'similar to those used widely in the nuclear power industryi.
Review of the origi,nal notes provided on tlhese drawings indicates that adequate tolerance and fllexibilitywere provided to construction in the area of welding by notes.
However a further review1 os dhcu'mehts'6ch as
39 and
- 40) indicates that~ a ~defic~iency existed in the area of weld inspect, )on and documentation.
This defici'ency was discovered by TVA in February 1981 duriing the review of tne turnover ~paCkage for the.pipe~
whip restraints after the transfer of site engineering and iris(ectio responsibility to the Civil Engineering Design 0nit.
After the location and review of all existing documentation and a random inspect'ion of the as-built pipe whip restraints, a nonconformiing condition was determined to exist.
Based on this, NCR-3001R was 'initiated by TVA to determine the full extent bf the deficiency and to evaluate its impact on the Safety of'he plant.
As a
result of this evaluation, TVA reported that a significant defliciency existed which could have affected p'lant safety.
Therefore, the above information was
'onveyed to the NRC in April 'l981.
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3 Page 21 of 37 Subsequently, TVA reviewed, evaluated, arid correc,ted any weld deficiency that might have existed for all affected pipe whip i estraints as described in TVA memo from Cantrell to Wilkins (Ref.
56 and 57> dated 1981 and January 1982 and further documented in NCRs 3001R and 3523.
Final TVA closure of pipe whip restraint welding and inspection issues was November 1985 (Ref. 58).
NRC ME Inspection Reports 50-390/83-27 and 50-391/83-19 (August 1983) indicate that the NRC has reviewed documentation and inspection sheets for NCRs 3001R and 3523 and has found them and the corrective action to be acceptable for NRC closure of pipe whip i estraint welding and inspection issues (Ref. 26).
4.9.2 Summarized Element Finding The concern is related to reconciliation of the as-built condi tion wiCh the design requirements regarding the welding of pipe whip restraints.
Construction Engineering Oepartment used incorrect inspection procedures, which resulted in improper inspection and insufficient documentat'ion.
This condition was corrected.
The NRC reviewed the applicable correction documents and found them and the corrective action to be acceptable.
4.10 Pipe Wh~i Restraint Design - El'ement 227.2
- 4. 10.1 Be llefonte Plant The stated concern indicates that whip restraints are needed on the 36-inch decay heat removal (OHR) piping coming fr'om the borated water storage tank
( BWST).
Pipe whip res tra i nts are structural protecti ve devices that permit some pipe motion and rotation but limit or prevent unrestricted pipe whip.
Pipe whip is the movement oF a pipe caused by the jet thi'ust resulting rrom a pipe failure.
The postulated types of pipe failure and the criteria for cori.esponding applicable piping are (Ref. 27):
o Circumferential ruptui'-es and longitudinal splits, which necessitate pipe whip restraints in high energy lines o
- cracks, which do not require provision of pipe whip restraints, in moderate energy lines The criteria for establishing high and moderate energy system classification are governed by the maximum operating temperatures and pressures in the system.
According to BLN FSAR the OHR is a moderate energy system (Ref.
27)
In addition, the review indicated that there is no 36-inch OHR piping coming from the BWST.
BLN design criteria diagram drawing shows that the DHR pipe 26360-R23 (03/16/88)
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3 Page 2,2 oF 37 coming from the BHST has a 36-inch diameter at the nozzle location with a reducer to 24-inch-'diameter pipe.
The detailed section at the nozzle in the drawing used for construction shows a 30=inch diameter nozzle.
4.10.2 Summarized Element: Findling The problem relates to the alecay heat removal piping, whiclh is a moderate energy line at BLN and therefore does not require whip iestra,ints.
In
- addition, a discrepancy was notedl between the design documents and the FSAR regarding the nozzle size.
4.11 Summarized SubcaterLor~ Findings A summary of the classi,fied.findings is provided in Table 1.
Class A and B
findings indicate there is no problem and thaIL corrective action is hot required.
Class C, 0, and E findings require'cdrr0ct'ive actions.
The corrective action class, definied in the.Glossary Supplement, is ideni:ified in the table by the numeral combined with the finding class.
The summary of findings by classification is givieniin~ Table 2.
Nhere more than one corrective action is identified in Table 1 for a single finding (e.g.,
element 215.11, Finding "a"), T'able 2 counts only a single classification.
- Thus, Table 2 ialentifies one finding for each issue evaluated.
Of the 42 findings iclentified by 6 claosification in Table 1,
16 require no corrective action.
Of'lhe remaining '26'th'at required cor~ective
- actions, eight resulted From peripheral issue".
uncOvered during the IECTG evaluation.
Even though TVA had inlitiated some corrective actions before ECTG evalua'tion that relate to two findings each for BFN and BLN of element 215.2 addressing cut rebar, its origina'I scope was very limited, requi'ring only a cursory review.
Similarly, TVA was also conducting floor live load evaluations for
~
SQN and NBN that relate to one finding each of elemen't 215.6, wlhich addresses hanger loads on structures.
- Again, TVA's initial Scope was not comprehensive enough to address the findings.
Therefore, for 'the p'urpos'es of Tables 1
and 2, complete corrective actions are corrsidered" ta'ken a',a result of the ECTG evaluation.
From Table 2, the ratios of issues d'or fi'ndiing's r'equir'ing corrective action to the total number of issues evaluated, by plant, are as follows:
Issues or Findings requiring corrective action Total number of issues evaluated N13iN S~N BF N
,'5','7 6
1'7 '0 BLN 2636D-R23 (03/16/88)
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3 Page 23 of 37 The apparent differences between the ratio for HBN and the ratios for the other plants are due to the sequence of evaluation and the utilization of the results obtained from HBN..
The Employee Concern Special Program started at HBN and was then expanded to cover all other plants.
Through the general approach revie~ process, those issues that were site-specific, and not safety-related, were not evaluated at the other plants.
5.
CORR'ECTIVE ACTIONS The evaluation team reviewed the corrective action plans for all four plants and found them acceptable to resolve the findings.
The corrective action plans are described in Attachment B.
The general areas of corrective action are described below for each element reviewed for this subcategory.
Following this is a
summary discussion of the information presented in Table 3.
5.1 Cut Rebar Control and Hanger Loads on Striictures - Elements 215.2 and 215.6 TVA plans to combine the corrective actions f'r these two elements at
0 o
Perform document search and compile i elevant information on drawings o
Supplement with field walkdowns and reconcile with drawings o
Select the most critical concrete elements f'r detailed evaluation to verify their adequacy to meet the design commi tments o
Revise FSAR as needed to identify the design methods used in the evaluation o
Oeve lop procedures to control construction and operation activities and to.provide engineering direction for evaluation to address future plant modifications TVA also plans. to follow the corrective actions described above for element 215.6 at HBN.
Corrective ac.tion plan detail is provided in Attachment 8 to this Subcategory Report.
5.2 Floor Sleeve Covers Element 215.11 To comply with personne,l safety requirements, TVA has,committed to the following actions at HBN:
o Perform personnel safety inspection of the plant area to identify and eliminate tripping hazards k
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3 Page
!4 of 37 o
Evaluate adequacy of floor sleeve seals to determine if they can support anticipated loads Corrective action plan detail is provided in Attachment B to this Subcategory Report.
5.
~i il iR TVA has committed to the Following actions at BLN:
o Review all safety-related piping/tank interfaces fair consistency between the design, criteria di.agrams and all other applicable design'ocuments IIO o
Identify all discrepancies among the documents and co~rect them'as'ppropriate 5.4 Summar of Corrective Actions Table 2 identifies 2i6 findings that require corrective action.
Because sdme'f the findings were combined and were common for more than one plant, there are eight corrective action descriptions in this subcategory.
Table 3 shows these eight corrective action descriptions, along with Finding/corrective'ction classifications.
Ihe corrective action diescriptions are a
condenshtl'on'f the more detailed corrective action informa'tion.provided in Attachment'B.'able 3 indicates the plant or plants to which a corrective action is applicable by the'orrective Action Tiacking Oocument (CATO> coilumn where th' applicable plant is identified by the CATO number.
From the Finding/Corrective Action Classification column of Table 3, it chn be seen that of the eight corrective action descriptions Identified, three involve additional evaluation to deiermine if plant modifirations are necessary, two require changes to procedures, and the rema'ining three requirh some type of documentation remedy.
In acidition, the'ATO col'umn of Table 3
shows that, in most cases.
a particular corrective action description is applicable to more than a singlle plant.
Finally, with respect to corrective
- actions, Table 3 shows that, of'he ten elements in, this subcategory only four require corrective actions, ancl elements
'215.2 and 215.6 require mast:
of'he corrective actions.
0 The "significance of corrective actions" column of 'Tablesh'ows that the primary activity to be performed by TVA is document'ation change as a result of the eight corrective action descriptions.
This activity requires preparing new calculations,
- drawings, and procedures.
Two'f the eight corrective action descriptions will result in reduc.tions in design margins
- and, as Table 3 shows, three of the eight could potentially rf.quire physical modifications of the plant.
Ttie necessary evalluhtiond which 'have not been 2636D-R23 (03/16/88)
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3 Page 25 of 37 completed for all plants will determine the extent of physical modifications.
- However, on the basis of experience with other nuclear plants, this possibility seems remote.
5.5 Corrective Action Status The following is the current (September 1987) status of the corrective actions for this subcategory,:
o 215.2 and 215.6, Cut Rebar Control and Han er Loads on Structures The corrective actions, necessary for 'SQN restart are complete, were reviewed by the evaluation team in June
- 1987, and were deemed acceptable (Ref. 29).
As discussed in Section 4, NBN already had an acceptable cut rebar control program.
And the corrective actions to assess cumulative effects of'anger attachments at NBN are based on comparison with SQN because NBN is a sister plant to SQN.
The related work is essentially complete.
BFN awarded a contract in the summer of 1987 to an architect/engineer company to verify the structural adequacy of its Class I concrete elements.
The related work is in progress.
BLN has, initiated appropriate corrective actions for this substantial task because of the large number of cut rebar releases and hanger attachments that have undocumented engineering judgments (CAQR BLF 870073).
o 215.11, floor Sleeve Covers (at WSN o~nl and 227.2, Pi~eflhl Restraint Oesi n (at BLN onl
) - The required corrective actions for these two elements are not complete.
6.
CAUSES Table 3 identifies one or more main causes f'r each problem requiring corrective action.
For each corrective action, the most important cause is identified; however,
.in many instances it was observed that the problem resulted from a combination of causes, each of whi.ch should be identified.
Therefore, more than one cause is identified for those corrective actions.
The following discussion describes the causes identified in Table 3 and the associated element evaluations with negative findings identified in Section 4.
'h h
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONC'ERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM 6.1 Cut Rebar Control Element 215.2 REPORT NUMBER:
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3 Page 26 oi.
37 0
The evaluation team found that assessment calculations (Refs.
34,,
35, anId 36) of Category I concrete elements for cut rebar were either incomplete or
'navailable at
- SQN, BFN, and BLN'ecause engineerIing judgments were often made without performing detailed calculation, Iti a'ddilti'on,',
u'pdaIted as-built cut rebar drawings were not available for an overall ass'essment of the concrete structures.
This subject was not. adequately addressed'by.'ngineering because of lack of sufficient involvement in technical matters by responsible first-line and second-line engineering supervis'or~
- Also, SQN did not have documented procedures'fo'r-mon'itoriing and evaluating cut rebar.
This deficiency occurred because pradtide<
then current within the industry were not followed.
In addition, at all plants except
- NBN, communication/coord'ination was not adequate between Engineer.ing, Construction,,
and Operations to assess the effects of cut r'eb'ar,'esuilting in a degree of'omp'artmentalization for this subject.
At BLN, NRC 1982 inspectIion items have remaihed openi.
This lack of resolution of items occurred because of a lapse in comm6nidatioh betwee'n -Engineering atid
'icensing.
.6 TVA did not evaluate cumulative effects of as-built hangers on Category it concrete walls and slabs and establish structural in6eg'ri ty 'for'll four nuclear plants.
This resulted from the practicI of exercising engineeririig judgment by engineers designing hangeir'upports for various Category I
components.
Furthermore, compIete as-built drai'win'gs'showiing all major ha'ngor
'ttachments were not available to facilitate overall asse~;sment.
The main cause for this practice continuing at all four flantI; was lack of sufficient leadership in technical matters by the firs't-arid second-1'ine engineering supervisors.
A contributing cause was a lack oF consistent policy and procedure to address as-built information requirements.
TVA does not have formal procedures requiring c()ordination and evaluation ot'umulative effects of hanger attachments.
This deficiency at all four plants resulted from inadequate interaction and communication among Engineering disciplines as well as among EngineerIing, Con'sti'uc'tihn,'nd
- later, Operations.
Also, prevailing nuclear industry practice was not followed in this regard.
For SQN and HBN, at present, there are differences between the govei.ning building codes identified in the FSARs and th'e cod'es'sed in the final assessment calculations.
The lack of timely resolution of dlfferi~nces resulted from inadeq~uate training in the procedures established for design process. control.
Thiis deficiency also resulted from lack of communication between the design engineers arid their superv'is5rs'egarding technical matters.
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3 Page 27 of 37 6.3 Floor Sleeve Covers
- Element 215.11 The evaluation team determined that abandoned protruding sleeves at NBN were not documented as to whether they created industrial safety hazards.
- Clearly, compliance to OSHA regulations was not evident.
The abandoned sleeves resulted from inadequate, coordination among the responsible mechanical, electrical, and civil engineers.
In addition, the structural adequacy of seal foam within the sleeves was not documented.
as to whether it met physical separation requirements of a nuclear, power plant.
TVA ONE apparently had accepted the adequacy of sleeve foam based on engineering judgment but without documenting the logic and i ationale.
6.4 Pi e
Whi Restraint Desi n - Element 227.2 The tank nozzle size for the decay heat removal piping at BLN was found to be incorrect on a drawing.
This discrepancy resulted from engineering error in transcribing the information on the BLN design criteria diagram.
6.5 Summar~of Causes The consideration of main cause showed that, for this subcategory, three major groups of causes were represented management effectiveness, design process effectiveness, and technical adequacy.
Using these
- groups, the unweighted totals from Table 3 show that 12 causes are in the management effectiveness category.
five are in the design process
- category, and four are in the technical adequacy category.
- Thus, the management effectiveness
- category, covering supervisory effectiveness.
dominates in evaluating the summation of main causes.
The following observations apply to all four nuclear plants.
The extent to which supervision is engaged in design work was examined on the basis of the negative findings identi-fied.
The responsibility of first-and second-line engineering supervision usually includes the overall review of the design and document control, and establishing and maintaining procedures that ensure compliance with the FSAR commitments.
- However, the combination of unclear design
- bases, undocumented design judgments and practices, lack of design commitment compliance, and absence of design ver.ification 'documentation contributed to uncertainty regarding the design control process in this area of review.
The observation of insufficient technical design and document control, which was encountered in the findings related to che cut rebar and hanger
- supports, indicates there was.insufficient involvement on the part of engineering supervision in the design and control process in these two areas.
The errors that occurred for this subcategory are those of omission.
Inadequate procedures and lack of supervisory attention led to oversight in both verifying the design and properly control ling and directing construction regarding installation and modification in these two areas.
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3 Page 28 of'7 However, evaluation of the other findings in'th'is 'subcategory indicated that there were adequate procedure.>
and acceptable'updrv'isory control, of the associated design process.
7.
COLLECTIVE S IGNIFICANCE Evaluation of the civi 1/structural design isdue's r'ai'sed by 13 TVA employee concerns that were identlified in this sribcatr>goVy 'indidated that a generic problem that would affect desiign margins of concrete components existed
'ecause of lack of assessment and ciocumentati'on'f'r'ons'trbction completion and design modification,.
Two common elements indlicating thiis were the cut rebar control (element 215.2) and the hanger loads on structures (element 215.6).
The construction completion and iimoclification 'cortisol'methods and procedures for 'these elements were found to be insufficient to document the as-installed design margins.
Issues rai seel in fiour of thei 13 donl;erns addressed this problem.
Another concern dealt with a potent;ial violatlioilr df kta'ndard's and improp4r coordination (element 215.11) and was seen as an i'so'lated instance.
Morkov'er,',
a documentation.error, which cloes not directly I'elate t'o the'xpressed cr>incerri and had no effect on the design margins, was identif ied (element 227.2).
Issues raised in the other seven concierns were
'Found by the evaluat'ion t4am t5 be invalid, and therefore, no further corrective action was needed.
In investigating the specific reasons. of the identif'ied problems, the evaluation team f'ound a broader issue of insufficient attention to detail and thoroughness in reviewing calculations.
The design of nuclear power plarits requires the consideration of many unique items not generally consiclered in nonnuclear applications.
Tlherefore, it is essential that the first-lirie engineering supervision be cognizant with nuclear po~er pliant design in Order to anticipate and address all thie d'esign needs ln a logical manner.
Corrective action plans f'r thee Four nuclear plants for this subcategory, as well as for a CAP closure program f'r the SQN restart were prepared.
by TVA and submitted to the evaluation team for concui re'ncaa. 'enerally, the team observed that the documents submitted init'lally by cc)gnizant engineers of'll four plants were incomplete and ~equi~ed several resubmittais before the) wlerk deemed acceptable.
This ac tivity is indicative of lick'f appr'eciation by first-line supervisors for the documentation needs of nuclear power plants, and reinforces the riced f'r more attention toward ensuring tlhat programs required for an effective and thorough design process are established ancl implemented.
One observation of the first-line engineering supervisors is that their actions in this area appeared to be a cont'inuat1ion of'ast.practices whek documentation requirement's For nuclear power plants were not as extens,ive.
In light of the. major events that have transformed the nuclear indlustry, TVA, to some degree, has demonstrated a lFailure to document the collective needs
~of a 8
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3 Page 29.of 37 complex multidiscipline effort.
- Indeed, a compelling close relationship between commitments, engineei ed design, and constructed plant is essential for these discrepant issues.
To address the general broader issues of TVA's past difficulties in the nuclear area, the Corporate Nuclear Performance Plan (CNPP) was created (Ref. 5).
In addition,
- SQN, NBN, and BFN have generated plant-specific nuclear performance plans (NPPs) to further define the programmatic actions to be taken for their facilities (BLN is broadly addressed in the CNPP)
~
In general, TVA senior management has identified the need for strengthening its Engineering organization in response to the requirements of nuclear plant design.
The Engineering organization is.responsible for the content and quality of the design documents and for ensuring that they conform to sound engineering principles, licensing commitments, and Quality Assurance
'program requirements.
This need for strengthening is based, in part, on deficiencies in design process effectiveness, which are partially illustrated by the cause discussion in Section 6.
This need is also partially based on past implementation of the TVA Quality Assurance program.
- Thus, the need For strengthening the Engineering organization, as indicated by the
- NPPs, is accompl,ished primarily through additional training of the ONE personnel to the requirements of that program and to basic management principles.
ONE Nuclear Engineering Procedure NEP-5.2 (Ref.
54) and policy memo PM 87-35 (Ref.
55) clearly delineate the responsibility, authority, and accountability of the Project Engineers and Branch Chiefs.
The Project Engineer is responsible for work scope,
- budget, and schedule, and for ensuring that project work is executed according to plan and in conformance with the technical direction of the Branch Chi'efs and the requirements of the corporate QA program.
The Branch Chiefs are responsible For staffing levels and qualifications of technical personnel on the projects, and For the technical adequacy of the engineering design.
The Branch Chiefs are the final technical. authority within ONE, and have the authority to stop work that does not conform to established requirements.
In the past.
Branch Chiefs'uthority or resources to fully administer technical reviews was limited.
Under the restructured organization, the Branch Chief provides engineers and technical direction for the Project Engineer; the Branch Chief also assesses the need for technical
- reviews, develops a document review. and approval matrix, and schedules reviews as required.
These programs have been started but have not, as of Revision 2
of this report, been fully implemented.
An independent audit on the effectiveness of the implementation of the total Quality Assurance program is instituted by Engineering management, as a
management tool, to additiona.lly ensure that management policy is being enforced.
This audit function is provided by the Engineering Assurance (EA) organization.
The focus of this report has been on related negative findings.
However, it is important to emphasize that employee concerns i'n this subcategory 26360-R23 (03/16/88)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25i000 REVIS I<ON NUMBER:
3 Page 30 of 37 identified only a fraction ol the tota'I tecnnicall scoi)e of the TVA'ivt,l/structural design group.
In add'ition, a's dis'cu0sed earlier in this
- section, out of a total of 13 employee
- concerns, five'we're'found 'to be valid, and there is remote potentia'I For plant modifications.
The resulting corrective actions are mainly to compi'ie and to prepare
'documentation.
The TVA design process addressed within the limited area Of this subcategory was determi ned to be generally sound with a few excegtion!i.
as discussed, f<or cut rebar control and the'umulative effects of hanger loads.
The findings of this subcategory are combined with thOse of'ther subcate)or) reports and reassessed in the Engineering category evaluation, which has assessed the broader
=issues identified and has issued necessary corrective actions tracking documents.
2636D-R23
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3 Page 31 of 37 TABLE 1
CLASSIFICATION OF FINDINGS ANO CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Element 215.1 Seismic Cri'teria Issue/
Flndin~"
Finding/Corrective Action Class*
S~N kl8N SFN BLN A
A A
A 215.2 Cut Rebar Control 06 A
06 A.
02 A
06 06 06 06 02 02 E3 215.3 Radiation Shielding Se,ismic Analysis d
b 215. 4 215.6 Turbine and Service Building a
Roofing Hanger Loads on 5 tl uctul es 06 06 E3 E2 D6 D6 E3 E2 D6 06 06 06 E2 E2 215.7 Auxiliary Bui,lding 2
'Service Crane A
A 215.10 Feedwater Heater Monorai 1
Design
- Expl'anation of classes is on the next page.
"Defined for each plant in Attachment B.
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- =PORT NUMBER
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':-t/IS ION NUMBER:
3 P:.ge 32 of'7 Element 215.11 Floor Sleeve Covers TABLE 1 (Cont'd)
Issue/
Finding*'()N Fi ding/Corrective
-'ction Class*
NBN BFN BLN 06 07 2Z7.1 Pipe Nhip Restraint Design a
227.Z Pipe Hhip Restraint Desiijn a
b A
E3
'Classification of Findin~s and Corrective Ac'ti6ns'.
Issue. not valid.
No corrective ac:tion required.
B.
Issue valid but consequences acceptable.
No corrective action required.
C.
Issue valid.
Corrective action initiated before ECTG evaluation.
0.
Issue vaiid.
Corrective action taken as a result of ECTG evaluati,on.
E.
Peripheral issue uncovered during ECTG evaluation.
Corrective action required.
"Defined. for each plant in Attachment B.
1.
H decare 2.
P
>cedure
- 3. f.'umentation 4.
T !ining 5,
lysis 6.
E luation 1.
i'.
er (Compliance h
()SHA )
26360-R23 (03/16/88)
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25000 REVISION-NUMBER:
3 Page 33 of 37 TABLE 2 F INOINGS SU11MARY Classification of, Findin s
A.
Issue not valid.
No corrective action required.
11 0
1 Total 15 B.
Issue valid but consequences acceptable.
0 I
0 0
No corrective action required.
C.
Issue valid.
Corrective action initiated before ECTG evaluation.
0 0
0 0
0.
Issue valid.
Corrective action taken as a result of ECTG evaluation.
E.
Peripheral issue uncovered during ECTG evaluation.
Corrective action required.
Total 5
3 5
5 2
2 1
3
'10 17 6
9 18 26360-R23 (03/16/88>
tASLE )
HAtR!a ff ELEHENIS, CORCECTIVE ACTtONS, ANO CAUSES SUBCATEGORV 25000 REVISIOI NUIOER: )
PAGf. 3i OF 37 HAMAGEHENT EfFECTI/ENESS CAUSES OF NEGATIVE FtlOINGS~
TECHNICAL DESIGN PROCESS EFFECT)VENESS ADEOU)cv 4
5 6
1 8
9 10 11 12 13 TC iS 16 17 FiNDitf)/
CORRECTLVE ACTlON E LEH CLA55.<<'ORRECilVE A TION CAID
)
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(
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( not
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)
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)proce-(fol-(nunl- (Rcs of(ut ligt(Design)qwce
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~ ~
vi Ju' vvv 215 02 BFN 01 2iS 02 BLN Ul 02 Develop/revise procedures to control rebar cuts.
E)
Aaarcss NRC 1982 open itens 215.6 06 Revle<<, evaluate, and doeunCOC Cuuulatlre hannev 1oaa assessncnts.
Develop/revise procedures Lo control han)er
~ ttachsencs.
EJ Revise FSAR to reflect design
~Cthoac used 2IS 02 SON Ol 602 I
215 02 BFN 01 l
21S 02 SLN Oi
)
I 215 02 SLN 01 I
2IS Oo SON Ol 215 06 ui<< Ov
~
2IS 06 SFN 01 215 06 SLN 01 215 06 SON 02 215 06 NSN 02 2IS 06 SFN 02 215 Odv BLN 02 I
215 06 SON 0) 215 06 NSN 03 1
215 11 parrot+ wstnr vvr
~
evaluation of Cre protruding t loof sleeves ior cospiiance vlth OSHA standards, and design evalwtlon ot the adequacy of sleeve foan seals.
av<<
vv ugvv uv vv<<
~ ~
n 215 ll NSN 02 227.2 E3 Revise a dra<<1ng and FSAR to 227 Ui'LN Ol reflect correct norale site.
101AL5 Defined In che Glossary Supplcucnt.
215 2 06 Re<<le<<
eva!.,ave docuuent Cut rcbar condition I
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ul/id/o81
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
25000 REVISION NUMBER:
3 Page 35 of 37 GLOSSARY SUPPLEMENT FOR THE Ee'ENGINEERING CATEGORY Causes of Ne ative Findi~n s
the causes for findings that require corrective action are categorized as follows:
1.
~Fra mented organization Lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability were not clearly defined.
in the procedures established foi design process control and in the maintenance of design documents, including audits.
3.
inadequate rocedures
- Design and modification control methods and procedures were deficient in establishing requirements and did not ensure an effective design control program-in some areas.
4.
Procedures not followed - Existing procedures controlling the design'rocess were not fully adhel ed to.
5.
Inadequate communications Communication, coordination, and cooperation were not fully eff'ective in supplying needed information within plan.ts, between plants and organizations (e.g.,
Engineering, Construction, Licensing, and Operations),
and between interorganizational disciplines and departments.
6.
UntifIiel~iesolution of issues
- Problems were not resolved in a
time.ly manner, and their resolution was not aggressively pursued.
7.
Lack of management attention -
1'here was a lack of management attention in ensuring that programs required for an effective design process were established and implemented.
'"um" 'u incomplete for design execution and verification and for design change evaluation.
incorrect input or assumptions, or otherwise failed.to fully demonstrate compliance with des.ign requirements or support design output documents.
i0.
Inad~e uate as-built reconciliation - Reconciliation of design and licensing documents with plant as-built condition was lacking or incomplete.
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3 Page 36 of 37 11.
Lack of des~i n detail - Detail in design output documents was
'nsufficient to ensurie compliance with design requirements.
12.
Failure to document engineering~udgments
- Documentation justifying engineering judgments used in the design pl ocess was lacking or
'ncomplete.
13.
D~dsi n cr'iteria/commitments not met
< t/esign'riteria or iicensing
'ommitments were not met.
6 14.
Insufficient verification document'ation
- Documentation (Q) was insufficient to audi t the adequacy'f d'esign and installation.'5.
Standards not followed Code or industry standards and practices were not complied with.
16.
17 assumptions, methodology, or judgments
'used in the design process.
,r Vendor error Vendor design or supplied items were, deficient for the intended purpose.
Classification of Corrective Aci:ions - corre'ctive'ctions are classifiied as belonging to one or more of the fol lowing groups:
Hardware physical plant changes 2.
Procedure
- changed oi generated a procedure 3.
Documentation affect:ed QA record's 6
4.
~Trainin
- required personnel education 5.
Anal~sis - required design calculations, etc...to, resolve 6.
Evaluation - initial corrective action plan indicated
- a. need tb evaluate the issue
'before
- a. defini.tive plan could be establishiad.
Therefore, all hardware, procedure, etc.,
changes are not yet kno'wn'.
Other items not listed above Peri heral Findin
( Issue)
A negative finding that does not result directly'rom an employee concern but that was uncovered during the process of evaluating an employee concern.
By definition, peripheral firidings (issues) require corrective action.
2636D-R23 (03/16I88)
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25000 REi/IS ION NUMBER:
3 Page 37 of 37 Si nificance of Corrective Actions -
The evaluation team's judgment as to the significance of the corrective actions listed in-Table 3 is indicated in the last three columns of the table.
S.ignificance is rated in accordance with the type or types of changes that may be expected to result from the corrective action.
Changes are categorized as:
o Oocumentation change
<0) - This is a change to any design input or output document (e.g.,
drawing, specifi'cation, calculation, or procedure) that does not result in a si.gnificant reduction in design margin.
o Change in design margin (M)
This is a change in design interpretation (minimum requirement vs actual capability) that results in a significant <outside normal limits of expected accuracy) change in the design margin.
All designs include margins to allow for error and unforeseeable events.
Changes in design margins are a normal and acceptable part of the design and construction process as long as
.the final design margins satisfy regulatory requirements and applicable codes and standards.
o Change of hardware (H) - This is a physical change to an existing plant structure or component that results from a change in the design basis, or that is required to correct an initially inadequate design or-design error.
If the change resulting from the corrective action is judged to be significant., either an "A" for actual or "P" For potential is entered into the appropriate column of Table 3.
Actual is distinguished fi om potentiai because
- corrective actions are not complete
- and, consequently, the scope of required changes may not be known.
Corrective actions are judged to be significant if the resultant changes affect the overall quality, performance, or margin of a safety-related structure,
- system, o~
component.
26360-R23 (03/16/88)
0 0
<VA EMPLOYER CONCFRNS SPECIAL PROGRAM ATTACHMENT A EMPLOYEE CONCERNS FOR SUBCATEGORY 25000 REPORT NUMBER:
25000 REVISION NUMBER:
3 Page A-) of 3
Attachment A -- lists, by element, each employee concern evaluated.
in the subcategory.
The concern numbe~
is given, along with notation of any other element or category with which the concern i.s shared; the plant sites to which it could be applicable are noted; and the.concern is quoted as rece,ived by TVA, and is characterized as safety. related, not safety related, or safety significant.
0107A-R64 (03I16I88)
CUNCEtttt ELEHENT NUHUER AIIACIIHEttT A t'HPLUYEE CUttCERttS FOR SUBCATEGORY 25000 PLANT Ftiii QD <L i i<
LUC<<iiti
~<<
Nlltl itli ULH CONCERtl DESCRIPTION REVISION ttUHIIEk:
3 PAGE A-2 OF 3
215. I UU-Ub-UUb-009 Utt-Ub-UU/-UUI
<tdtt x
x "bequuyah Nuclear Plant's sited on an earthquake fault tt<at runs fr'>><<
around Chatta<<ooga to north of Knoxvi1 I<i'.
If there were an earthq<<ak.
power plant structures could Fail."
(SS)
"watts Bar is sited on an earthquake fault that runs from around Chattanonga to north of Knoxville.
If there were an earthquake i<<<<<'f ntwnt <<tr<<et>>roc cn<<td fail."
IS<It IN Ub 2gl Vub Itt-Ub-UGU-UU4 wdN atructurd<
i<<ae<jrii.y'i un<<tat<<a<<en'>>u
<.i a<<L iia ~ <S
~ Ii \\ ~ <e
~ i u% <<\\
~
building is in question because of over.8000 k<<own.released to core dr i II/cut rebdr...."
(SR)
"Cl stated tt<at cutting uf ret<a< s i<<crane walls RU-I did:<<t-II t.ii
<<unct r it in<i uf i<<<r t <<
I O<<dt 1 ~ t <<and ni<<es reii1 id tiate<
W i ik.i<<e.i t tie overall structure.
Cl declined tu provide additiu<<al
- ~
s
<i' \\
InlOr<i<at lou 1 Dl\\ J 215. 3 Itt-Uo-jig-ttul 215.4 Itt-Ub-Uel-Uul wd:I Ad<It "I< 'ed ge<<e<'1c selsi<< ic a<<alysis
- pie<<t wtd
~ - t<t e<<<,e.>>te Inst.<111<i 1
rattati<<<<st<ii ldinn.
Present appruach reu<<ires case-by-c.tse u<<tlv.t".
w<<ICh ls <<<Ore C<<stl/ uve<'t<e.I 1fe Of tt<<! pie<<'t.
(iieet)
"<tant i<<g on Iurbtne and Servtce Uliljs. <<Ot properly de.t t<<i;il - h.<.
already been repidced 0<<ce, 1<<d is stiil subiect to <<pri<<<t leaks everywhere that so<<cone steps on it.
Uesigner omitted a critical layer of protective buard between insulation and fiberglas. 3 pty
<nett inn Pen<<le tnt<1 TYA t4dnane<<<<nt that thiS wni<<ld t<aP<<<ni but IVA ignored them.
N<t furtt<er details.dvaiiable."
(tl0) 215.6 lit-U5-220-UU3 (Shared wtth 10200)
III-U6-113-001 wttN
~iuN "In Unit 2, due tO e~CeSSiVe nuviber Of hangerS heing uSud in ri!<i'l.,r bldg.
a<t<tulus dredS dnd atr PocketS in ConCrete wdiis in an<<<<iuc <r!t.
from azimuth 292 to 358.
the structural integrity of the supp,<rti<<ij wails/floors is questionable...."
(SR)
"CI is concerned tt<at d sign calculations have not considered tt<e weight uf dl I ext1'd ndngers added w i th respect to concrete structures (wai ls 6 ceilings)...."
(SR)
~
SR/N<)/SS 1<<dicate safety re a
e 1<
SR/
/
S t
S f t t '0 at Jt 't I t'14t< it 0< Saiity S Iij<<1t <Cant PCI ECiu date<'i'it<<dt iui1 Crt tert a ttt the XCTG +rugfdm r<<a<<<ad I dn t'<nnt
<rd <<v vA <<eiturit uval<<Jt tu<<s
~
20200 1 it (vj/<J/Ltit)
CuNCEKN tLEHENI 1JM8EL PLANT LUCAT)ON AIIAC)mLNI 6 CHPLUVtt, l.'INICENHS FUtI SUUCATEGUkY 25UUU AA'LI LABILI I Y
~bi N NBN ur N BLN CONCEkN DESCRIPTION'EVISION NUHBLR:
3 PAGE A-3 OF 3
815.7 IN-do-28)-UU3 kdN "The TVA design organization has an 'inflated'dea of their abilities, due to their not realizing the amount of field engineerinq which is required to make the designs work at al).
CI stated, as a
typical example, the Auxiliary Building 125 ton crane, which can only set a load on 2 out of 5 floorS due to the floor opening design.
Also, on one floor, design has used 3 I/2" opening grating, which is only rated at IUO lbs. per square feet load.
Nuclear Power concern.
Ci has no further information."
(NO)
- 2) 5.)0
~ 215. 11 LUA-85-UUI wdN-U283 227.
1 Ex-85-U3/-UUI-kI SUN NBN "Structural integrity of the feedwater heater monoral)-hangers."
(NUI "Beta) covers need to be instal)ed over sleeves In the floors of the Auxiliary Building whiCh have been found.
An exatnp)e ~ould be in security on the west side of the elevator on elevation 713."
(No)
I "Protective devices (P.o.o's) also known as pipe whip restraint structures in reactor building Unit I have problems.
The drawings 4i3a)700 series can be referred tu for identification of the problems.
(SR) 227 '
uih'-t)CP-IU.35-8-6 BLN x
"whip restraints needed on 36" ss DHR piping coming from BksT."
(sk) 5k/NU/ss Indicates Jiuty related, not safety related, or safety signii icant per ECTG determination criteria in the ECTG program manual arui appl >ed by IVA butvru evaluations.
26200-1U (03/15/881
TVA EHP LOYE E CONC ER NS SPECIAL PROGRAM
'ATTACHMENT B REPORT NUMBER:
25000 REVISION NUMBER:
3 Page B-1 of, 28
SUMMARY
Of
- ISSUES, FINOINGS,.ANO CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SUBCATEGORY 25000 Attachment B -- contains a
summary of the element-level evaiuations.
Each issue is l i s ted by plant'. opposite i ts corresponding findings and correc ti ve actions.
The reader may trace a concern from Attachment A to an issue in.
Attachment 8 by using the element number and applicable plant.
The reader may relate a corrective action description in Attachment B. to causes and significance in Table 3 by using the CATO number which appears in Attachment B
in parentheses at the end of the corrective action descr iption.
The term "Peripheral finding" in.the issue.
column refers to a finding that occurred during the course of evaluating a concern but did not stem directly from an employee concern.
These are, classified as "E" in Tables 1
and 2 of this report.
0107A-R64 (03/T6/88)
Issues i'fIA:iafhl 0 bu)S)s RY UF I>SOCS, FINUINOS, Aku,COIIRECflVt ACTIONS FOR SUOCAfft>>ukf c5000 FinJings RF v I5 I ON NONIItk:
3 Page B-2 of 28 LOrreCt)ve ActlonS 111111111111111111 Element 215. I
- Seismic Criteria 111111 ~ 11111AAAA11 a.
sIIN is on an earthqua'ke fault t'hat runs from Chattanooga to Knoxville.
Suk a.
flic Selii,i/>>i Nii;ICJI I IJilt IS IOCJted lrl dn dred with several tlirdst IJJll>> <<hi ii trend t)ortheast-soutitwest.
ttnn nt
~ I. r
~ ~...
~
~
.. I r
~..
ar a \\>>I \\ ~ a ~ U>>\\
I OU ~ A>> Oi'c I,UI>>n IUci cU cdI a III)unxl faults ii.c., fa<<its capaola; of producing >ignlflcdAt CdrtliquaiCS wul 'h Coul J duvet'Scly dffeCS the SequoyJh NUCIcdf VIJtitl.
'51)N
,a.
No corrective action is requiri!J.
b.
Plant structures could feil in Jn eat thquake.
0 fvA 'liiva!>>II lat)uair>> aif 1)ia ~ u,a1)oilai se'isinnln >>4 and geol<<C)nile Jl CI)aJliiuurlilg CUAdlt)OAS JS Pfesentcad ltl F SAR Up I I ac
~ Sect iuii 2. 5 tiiriiugii AncAu nciit J have tiiofough ly cxdnineJ tlit suojcct Jnd have concluded that the seismic feSPJASC>>
SIICCtfJ JSa! J ln t)ia'..IOSign fOr Sequoya)i are ddeuuate lo ensure sale'tiutdJ<<n of the plant
~ ~
II'a BA
~
~ I '.:.~
ar a va
~ C\\>>
~
~I 4t ~
a a ~ UJ I I Jiil I
~ cva ia I>> ~
>>a)c aalC IlJ>>
a,vna.
~ iivcU thai:
O fliC pra!SC)it a)CSI.III biSIS Ior SJN iS adequate to witnstJAJ tiie crfects of a Jrthqatdxc>>s <<itttout loss of CJOJDil)ty t
> I)ei'fiarni tn
~ raquirCd SafelV funrti1iiS i
i I
4 ~
a luaa>>
4 ~ o oaoaapa>>vl
~
~ va SC)sit)le Ia IJ liials C JICUI Jta!d Oil tliu 0 JSIS Uf tl)C 04th pcrccnt i li site-spec ific response spectra d<id.n<<ct the UDJecliv<<.if Sita'ect la)n 9.7.
udk IIOU '
~ ~.
~..
x
.I ~
~ I
~ ~
4 ~
iiva~ IA val Oal coa A ~aquonc
~ 4U ~ A ca>>ac runs from Chdttdnuuga to lnoxville.
b.
Pidnt struciur'es could fail in Jn earthquake.
IABN 4 ~
IIIC atJlls I>>JI IIaic Ie JI I IJila ls IVC )tCJ Iri dii df I J a>>1th SeVerdl tnru<.t IJ ilt: <<l)I n trend nOrthCJSt-soutnwest.
fheSe ttuust faultS Jri'i)l CUASldeied Caafttiiltane faultS (i.e.a fJiltn CJRJDIU uf pr>duCinO Sionificant eaftna)UJXI.'S ail)a.li CUUIJ J()va!fScly JfteCt tne '>>fatt'dr Nur 14.r Pl alii I f'fA it)vest I JJI Ijita,rl ilia. IJaaaila)()ya sc>>1sinailugya JAJ geotecnn)cdl citg>>icicring cont)itions as present<<d in the FSAR, SUCliJU 2r5 thrvugn Aiaendmcnl.
54 have ttiurOugiily examined lne sunjcct Jt)d have concluded El)at ttle seismic response spectra used ln tlii>> design for Natts liar are adeqit JI ia to-UASUf6 Sd)U-nba)tain<<rr X1f - tsie plat)t I J,
a)J Cot I ective dCt lo)1 IS I Cqi) II Cai) ~
NU corrective action is reqiireJ.
(0l/III/udl
i I I -.'.
YJNi~IAl<Y ul I'>~U', f INJItt Fust SUBCAI LuÃ<<(.CIIVE ACIIt)tt>
'bl)ud tttv I Iuh Page 9-3 I rrrJ irrg.
Corr<<c t i ve Act iuiis Element 2IS.
1 - HBN (Continuedt ln the HdN SCN thruugii Suptrluourit 4, the tt<<C has concluded tiiat based on revru~ cu>>parisorr of the geology, seismology, aiiJ structural siaiilarities of Atttt and Si}N, TVA has provided tire staff ~itti all irrforrrr>>Lion necessary to evaluate, ass<<ss.
mid Suptiart TVA's coiiclusions concerning tiie safety of the <<atts Bar site.
ln the SI}N SErt ttiruuyh SuppleIrrant 6, the NIIC has concluded that:
o The present design tiasis for SQN is adequate to withstand the effects of earthquakes without loss of capability to perforn the required safety functions.
o the S(}N seismic Category 1 structures are acceptable far SeiSmiC IOadinqS CalCulated On the baSiS Of ttie 84th percerrti}e site-specific response spectra and meet the objective of Standard Review Plan (SRP)
Section 3.1.
UPtt
,(N/A) t3LN (N/A)
(N/A)
IILN (N!A)
Bttt (N/A)
>>*>>>>>>>>>>>>l>>*1>>>>*>>>>t Element 215.2
- Cut Rebar Control 1>>0*>>>>0>>>>0>>>>>>>>>>>>*$
SQN SQtt Si}N a.
Cutting of rebar in reactor containment and the crane ~alls inside the reactor building could have weakened the structure.
a.
Ihe issue that cutting ot rehar in reactor containment and the crane walls inside the reactor building could have weakened ttie structure is a valid.issue that needs to be addressed.
The evaluation
- team, however, could not IVA's corrective action plan (CAP) assesses cut rebar to ensure structural integrity of concrete members i
ral and of th s ield all CAP g
ygIR AS~ ~~@~
cumulative assess<ne c
a fo ng tota e the effect of cu rebar and Lakes into consideration determine if such cutting Iias adversely weakened th rane wall i i
s structure because of d
s e
i fc l n
nt, n
futur ass 24/90-14 (Ol/18/88)
issues AllACNNENl 8 SV(4(4A<<Y VF l;Suib, FINVINCS, ANV CV<<<<ECIlYE ACIIO(6 FO<< SVBCATEBuky 25000 Ftndings NEYlSIUN NUMBER:
3 Page 8-4 of 28 Corrective Acttons Element 2I5.2 - StiN (Continued) the reduction of member capacity as well as increases due to additional hanqer loads.
This CAP is. for both pre rest.trt and post restart activities.
e Restart
<<~~hie activities will include revt".ws, l N Jva i%at ione
~ and or iter i 4 chaItrsas or
~h~gre Fi s
as reluired.
In.adJitwu.
W o~
vttrt~t (tfocedures will be revised and ykljggpg to describe the process for
- proval, and documentation of cKea A
~INC tu~ ttt+n Lite Keac Col uul lullu)
~ T(o~egby a series of lYA 5g nd5+48'oethe construction (thas n% n! turnover to p
tiona ~
n 'l.
A baseline m.tn u(
e CutS u
Veluped bated On t( s'nforma a
d 'n-plant inspuctiu<<
tO O
a baS(
t aSSeSS;rent Ol thu Cui at ve effe t~
bar CutS.
As th>>
React r ui ng4%>eld all and crane wall a e fical~ttt d in -the-employe c
are& t structura I features
~ly iqnificautiy affected
~~>a ve been selected f 4P%ged t
n prior tn plant res(a 'the ev n
earn considers th s
ect o
s two walls to be 'ap fv r(ate
~ ~
asons stated above.
/ field walkdo~n ii ar fy general consistenc b
- I map and the s-buil p.~
at for these walls.
24~
(Ol/IN/88)
v Issues A I I p'II.'IiNI' I 8 bulSLINf dii Ib>U<S, F INUINBS, ANU CUiINtCIIVt ACIIUNS FOpI SUUCAitBURY 85000 Findings Ntvl:,IUN Nba<;~:
s Page 8-5 of 28 Corrective Actions Eleuient 215.2 - SIIN (Coiitinuud)
These walls will then be evaluated for combined eFfects oF cut rebar (215.2) aiid hanger loads
( 15v6) to ensure and document ey meet the design cr'aS II coniiitments.
Auxiliary i g Slabs V
eggijd he floor slabs of t
I Mructu es at SI}N and has c nc t~x liary Building floor el v
ions lg--$34 and 749 are the most cr ti al slabs,~
aluating cut rebar as h
are sLQgo the prescrioed loa in athej-t)t4n hielding and are most li I
NiNK c t rebar.
The eval t
e c~paur with this selec io ifhi3@s s stated and becaus slai)s~p eSent the majori i~~8 'lding siaos which a e
'@~tpe ost heavily loaded infoR<i)i41 s and are suscepti 1
to havF~f, r bar.
Oe'u TVA will are dr/in f AN and NBN to utiliz M
compl cu rebar data.
A general ie d walk P f F)N will be made to ver f d
c ib lity and make data i
ca
'o s as n
essary.
This approac w
tpstatgjft(i grass percentage o
c QagjnSlo ation fui use in the de ai&dxiss
>t o ensure and document c nf~gce s g:i criteria and F
Rvkoaait i tna results of this fi st a
it do not meet these requ
.e a
tical techniques will e
ef ned applicable floor i
I lowered or hardwa provided.
Iloveve evict'valuations to dat finalized, indicate f e
lt.
Thus there is reaso b
as tl this assessment is a do umen t
nrt rattier ttian a struct grity issue.
This is cons ent witii evaluation team experience on other nuclear power plant applications.
2419u-14 (OI/ IU/UB)
Issues AlIACN itNI 8 SUHMAkf Ur'S>UES, FINUINGS, AIIU CURkECTIVc. ACTIUNS F0< SU8CAIEUukY 25000 F IllJ Ill>>)s kCV IS IUN NINUCk:
3 Page 8-6 of 28 Corrective Actions Element 215.2 -
St)N (Continued) tural Walls TVA re ie<<ed th AN Au iliary 8 critic I struct the>> U-inl95h AI5 fo di~~
has hea y~
e PPlct ra u'Iggg or uggjieie en I g~n co dVI'aTua io is mos'k I rrrel evalu t
n for8 arm r a
U~npPeted
/~pe >>~I'UrrI>>
s ss.nent~ns n or>>iranCa~e
.n I tirientst co>>c sme>>
n s
an aly a
t u
IiarawafPRx io~al i@Sit)i!III
.t s
Ie%abs41 I walls of tii>>~
the most ts and s>>>>le>>'t>>>>i lumns Al 3.)Q.I n.
This wall by the seisuic tn l>>>>VO C>>>>t am concurs wltli
'suni's stateu
~
events n
rebar.,
Th this SC
'Cl IVA will C to utili e A field $
I inudlf iCa O
apii ~ OOC>>I percentag detailed 5
ducumant 4) and FSAR g this fir>>i requiremen Iie r'efi!led provided a
d assessed.
of 5>>)ti and>>rir>>>>
ut rebar data.
II be made tn
>>nil i>>>>
L w>> ~
I>>
~ i>> i >>i >>I
>>>>4>>>>>>
Tnis I uss uSe in th.
r'>>'. aud Iqil Ci'lt>>.!>>'i i Iie results>>r!
t muet tliu.>>!
liniques wi I I w!T) be s will Iie I Is Auxiliary 8 TVA reviewe Auxitiary 8 are approxi groupings o
thick up t lhe raajorit larger size 24 inches t base the cr size qroupi
- spans, and
~
wal! of eac ProCess as I
of trie rr!N d that thure n ten size ill 17 lnciius qreatur.
e in the ely I)3-ar>>!
IVA will I for each n itions ci critical u
tne same ural walls.
t 2
)
s n(has r>>
n 0
y oi co h
k I
C ng o lo d h
l or re de Auxiliary'Uuildini
Issues Al IAb;r)NCtii 8 Suamdf ur I.
'r.~ ~ ritiltittr', Atni CuddfCIIVE ACTIONS IVR MSCAIful)!IY CSOL10 t lndlngs HfVlblurt Nt)NI)tq:
I
~
Page H-l of 28 Corrective Actions Element 215.2 -
SQN (Conti<<uudl s biith this rriccs s, am CannOt r!.irh tn tire results note that tes that eneral 1 y hb!C.),rl ~
her than a
lhinner COI)CUI Itlcb uvalu on H
evibr ai geriei al ation p u tion te us Ons as rc pt to e indica th al c
P of this io pr i
rel tR~e a d CuRFnnb th)cher I'Is g ti~o t rat I In~y issue bb birr),t d t crfo~ri a
C r ~d v
en I
n rev e b
struct r I
y Bui n
f quate a
e ed dur e
nd th 48Rt b b+~b ai SQN da str t ra bla I I y
Post e
IVA S NDN Cu beCaus 0
and be u
)tBN.
T l Categar I
the Aur>>
brniCh an a
been corn I
activitie bihich the from that these othe based on a
to theb MB Building gathered turnover gathered documcnte described used as a
requests.
tailert revic~:Ii aluations t similarities is cu:nplctc f.)r perforiilcd for rentS Other tn.lu or slabs fur elina IIIII ti).:
star't Building ior f SQtt differs a
line for tits u)11 IJ
'a in addition ctor on <<ill h=
uildinq All Suah orma Ily er as
- ties, and rebar 10
)I res art i
or fut e
t d,
a For p bas s
N a
or R
ad fo c
a r
to I
t pe s
24 7gD-14 (Ol/ I)I/HBI
<<I I<<CI!A.ttI 8
SUttttAKY uf
- ISSUES, F lttbltIGS, ANU CUKKECTIVE ACTIONS FUt SUUCAIE0uky 25000 REVISION NLIULK:
Page 8-8 of 28 issues FinJings Corrective Actions Element 2I5.2 -
SQN (Continued)
TvA will also revise ttIe SQN FSAk to clarify Section 3.8 on the use of latir ACI code editions which contain newer
~ i n or assessment methodologies wtIICti wi I I Culbl I ~<ili during.tiie an
- doCuslk, tion an cca dnd desiqn drawinqs.
IPAII< 9<r. <)') cl<<< nl <
PiEg %II<)fI/II I fr<sow<< ~<<<<<~<<los<.
s
<<<su kLf)F<<<<t gori "jigeigg'ie ooi o"""'.
There are OVer 2,UUU knu 4 ruledSOS for core drills.
b tn<'. Isouu LI<JL lii<<i' di'i uv<<<<'uu alla<in releases Iu<'ure dr) lls is a vdlIJ i:sui that n<<OJS Lo be dddre'sed.
Ih<<evaluation L).IO. I>>waiver, could nol duster<!)inc the opto<It uf r. li<<Co<I I Inu Indi
<iaS taio 4 ptdei or aitvrrsetv wedkeued Lhe SlruCturi biCO,I;<<Ot the lack ot prociodurdl Cunt ~ O IS Jnd CuiiiulakIVO dsieSS IICnts I <OP)euoanted by
< VA be
)D<<<d ds "d ODOVe ~
, and,Al-ll will be sober tn enessre Strsirt<ir <I is<to<<rttv of cuncrete is in question.
Ing cu ri)dr was
~jj<II$,JITEM
- ,,'""bATE:
Lva lu Il!nil d<<c<<eu.nt ing < and con
-tound w I Loin SqN Uttt..
I 0
kubdr Cuts Jur)ng t)ie Csin>truCti
'(pr<<-IVU?) ar<<nut iniluJiJ ou t (a dSsess Oint uf thi <:ffeCts ut rebf 4
d~ cHISuc>>
Igni c
re f o
- ing, Iq Its S
doc t<)d A<1<<is<i
< ~
~l ~ ss.
Io< ~
< urt <<On AI I 7
'lu ed b Sf N Uttf, an 5 0 qtt 02)
Ch!p))ing a<<d E~cdvdtin)" rileas>>
orn des na requ)re review uy a Civii Eng)neer prior tu concrete erCavat ion.
Al-I) does not requ)re Prior DNE/0E approval for cutti<ig re)<<fOrCing Stiet or CautiOn zlgj 2 Sd<IJ o2.-
against cutting <<ithuut it.
,O'PAIIIBAiI:9i'IIPI,ET'
"""-'(j4TE.i'~~
c.
Procedural contrul/dssesv)<int uf cut c.
0 tto duiu4< ntuJ pr<:;iiluru Jr,)rogrd<I< for pracessl i I, C.
ixist!tn t~n rocidur 4
(Ul/I.t/8J)
Issues
- II i <<l-I l<l d sUeQJf uF I suiS, FIHOINGs.
ANU CURJLCIIVE ACTIUNs FJJ SUBCATEGuRY c50<)0 i <ndings NEVI ~ I NI JU lULJ ~
3 Page 8-9 of 2N Corrective Act<uns Ele<<<ent 215.2 - MBN Cutting of rebar
>n reactor containment and the crane <<a)Is inSide the reaCLOr building COuld have weakened the StruCLure.
a.
Ihe iss<<e tnJ( cuttin
) ui rebar in reactor conta<nm nt and the cr>>ne <<a)Is inside the re.<ctur building could have
<<eakened the structure
)<as been addressed by TVA.
TvA has docua<ented indiviJ>>31 cut rebar by use of 0>>ality Control Procedu<'e NdhP-<)CP 1.) and the FCR/ECN/NCR
- process, and has satisfactorily ass ssed the cumulative effects of such cut rebar in cuncrete calculations.
NUN a.
No correCtlve aCtion
<s required.
b.
There are over 2,000 mown releasi's for core drills.
c.
Procedural cont< ul/assess.<<ent of cut rebar to ensure structural integrity of concrete is
<n question.
- b. Since the sLart of co<<struction there are appro<<i<<<ately 1,400 bar cutS in hot)< unit I and 2 Reactor Buildings.
Each has t den <nvestigated and they do not impair the StruCtural integrity Of the reaCtdr Oui)ding COOCrete structures.
c IUA h3s 3<< et<Oct <ve p<'
)<'3'<< I
< c>>nt<'.<I 3nd Jocu<<<ent rebar cuts.
I<>>> I/4 pro)ran is in place a<<J in>>se.
ln audit<>>n, uas<il on tl<eir <nvpect<o<is, tne NRC has COOCluded l.hat L<<e design evaluation p<aqra<<<,
as eStabliShe I, iS aden>>ate Lu ensure StruCtural inte<)rily.
b.
No corrective action is required.
C.
IN> CurreCtive adti>>n iS re.i<<<r<. ~I.
BFN a.
Cutting of rebar in t<<e Reactor Building could have wea<:coed t<<e structure.
BFN a.
The i'ssu<.
Ll<JL
<. <Lll<<) u<<L',;,l<'u the Reactor Du<Id>nq could have
<<e>>
.ned t>>
st@<<et>>re is 3 valid issue that n<'.<'.ds to o<.'
J.I< ess<.d.
I<>t I<3n team, ho<<ever, c<<uld nut deturui<<e it sudh Cutting has adversely weakened t.ne struct res bJCJ>>Se Of the lack of procedural controls a>>J c<<.<<<jlatiie assess.<<ents by IYA.
JFN a.
The subject CAi's tranS<n>tted b/ TCAJ-
..'nd 459, both dated Ul/26/37, respnn)s t)
Corrective Action Trackinq Documents /)5 U
'FN Ul, 2)5 06 BFN Ol, an I 2)5 06 BI'H Uy u<<
co<nnits TVA to the. following actions:
TVA, with the help of a consultinq engineering organilation, has cen<<itt<
I L>>
the following corrective action plan ICAP) to co<<<p)y with Lhe design requireeents.
The CAP will assess cut rebar effects,
>>lan')
with the cumulative effects of hang<<r l<>>.ls, to ensure structural integrity of as-b>>ilt class I concrete elements.
This CAP will also establish effective procedural cnnLr<<ls to monitor future rebar cutting and future additional hanger loads.
The initial pl>>n is for Unit 2; Units I and 3 will be evaluated later, but prior to their respective restarts.
24 I90-14 (0 I/ I g/88)
Al liu INL!Il U SUMialKY UF ISSUCb, Fl!iUIII<<S, AIIU COI!iitCIIVE ACTIUIIS Fun SUUCATEdulty 25ouu III:ViblUIIIIUIIUUI:
Page 0-IU of 2U Issues r llidlilgS Cnrrvctive Actions tlement 215.2 - BFII (Continued]
IVA will review t!ie uriqioal design CalCulatiOnS,
~hiCh uSed the "warkiiill stress" design methud aod wi II use, as necessary, tliu alternate "uitiliiate sti.aiuit<<
design metiiod and the revised moia nt distribution method permitted by later versioris uf American Concrete Iostitulli (ACI) codes.
The current FSAit wi1 I Iil!
revised.
as necessary, to'ocument these aspects of new desion.
rkhhli h II h.
t I I.
JV'
~
~
~')
pa ua)a V"~ wi
~ I Vu pa;I I I~ ~ aalcau Lil establish a reasonable assurance that tii.
,aS-built CnnCrete eiemuntS Sul>jell tl'.d t ) <'i re!iar anil hanger loJils satisfy deSiqii
'elluiremeuts.
Tiiu representat ive salva>I
~. ~i Eja Ol IUS Of tile tat 4 I
~ vllil'ii.
~ er iS I ~ S
~
<<ill bu biaSed tuWard WurSt Caco, an,l tiin sampling pfogl nm wl I I ue lri ai.i.uiliJiia: liliu thu applica!ile mettiodningy sections oi Nuclear Constriction Issues Group (lltli)
U2; "Saivilii<l Iiuiosp I,tl lal Of WealdS."
T!ie SeleCted Slab.
and W.lll; wiII be tha moSt unfavorab!e Sirurtural elm<<ants.
They will have relatively lai-i.
Silan tO tiiiCkneSS rat iOS and iiunteraaS hangers supporting piping, cable trays,
- condults, and IIVAC ducts.
Tyli wi I I comp i lb cut rebai infnrmat iull IlJ'au> < Ihi IL'I !If u
)UH!Qltf ur I ))ui), t IiFDINC)~
A!IU I.Ji!AEilIVE ACIIUN)
Fiii< SUIICAIECJIIY 250UO Fiodi>>gS HEVI)IDN NNIUc.~:
)
Page B-ll of 2U Corrective Actions Element 215.2 - BFN (Continued)
IVA <<ill perforin detailed calculat!uns o>>
these elements.
It will consider cut rihars and the cumulative effects of hangers, i>>
addition to all other design loads, such as
- seisinic, tornado depressurilat ion, anil pipi.
break loads.
Correct hangir loads/react i>>o>>
to concrete elein iitS based on the as-built conditions will be either calculated or obtainid from othi'r groups.
b.
There are an unknown ou;nber of releases for core drills at UFN.
b.
Ihe
>ssue t>>at tni:i'i uri ao uiiknown oui>>her uf releases for core drills at UFN i>>
a valid issui ttiat needs to be addressed.
Ioe evaluation
- tean,
>>o~ever, could not deternine tlie eitent of ribar cutting that has taken place or adversely wiakened the Str>>Cture becauSe of tne lac'k of procedural co>>trois aod cumulative assessments by TVA.
For the selected sainples, calculati>>os will be prepared to veriFy the structural adequacy of the cogcri'te eleinents uoiier applicable loading coi!ditions.
Should condition of overstress
- develop, TVA will perforin a thorough evaluation of the erti>>t of the condition a>>d will di'sign a
modiFication to ensure >>tructural ad:I>>icy.
(CAID 215 02 UFN 01) b.
Sane aS "a" abOve.
c.
Procedural control/assessineot of cut rebar to ensure structural integrity of concrete is in question.
C.
There is no dacu.nented procedure or program for processing, evaluat,iog, and controlling cut rebar.
- Also, there are no assess,bent calculations of Class I concrete elements for cut rihars other than t!ie recent calculation on N-line wall o!'hu deactor Building.
TVA Division of Nuclear E'ogineeriog i>> developing a prograin for cut rebar evalual.ion for UFN.
Ibis proposed assessment prograin
<>s Ferry).
c.
Plant procedures Mill be developed to io>>>>ri coordination between plant operatio!is and ONE and to require cognizant concrete desiqn engineers to monitor and control rebar Cutting and hanger attac!vnent loads.
(CATO 215 02 BFFI 01) 24190- IR (Ol/ IU/UU)
AI IACII!IGNI B 50!UIARY Ui 155ut..'I, i ltlUlttGS, ANU Cut<L'CIIVE ACTION~
FOR 5UBCAIEGURY 25000 NEVI'cilUN NUHBEk:
I Page 8-12 of 20 Issues F lnd 1 its) S CnrfuCtive ActlonS Element 215.2 - BLN Cutting of rebar in the Rudctoi'uilding could have weakened the structure.
- a. Cutting ut ruudr in tnu Reactor Uuildirig could wedxen the structure.
Ihe evaluat ion team cauld nut determine lf SOCn Cutting hdS wedkened the structure becauSe Of the lack of detailed calculations for cumulative dssussme<<t by IVA.
BLN IvA has coinltiT.ted to the fullowinq COI I OCt iVe aCtiOn pi sin- (CAP) tO CO<<ply with the deSign requirementS Tlie CAP will assess cut rebar eflects
~ dl.<<isl witll the CsilnulatiVD Dfforte nf hisiner I l st to ensure structural inteqrity of as-liuilt Cdtegnfy I Coi1i.ruLu utuiiie<<a>.
t<<ts i.nr <<i ii also estab I ish ef Feet ive proced ira I cu<<tr ils to ntdnitor future rebar cutting ail(I futiii'l!
.additional hanger loads.
BLN proiect civil group will cenplete this eFfort in two ct Jnhc nf.sit 7 luc lc r si ~ Dni sn 7l c ic si 7
4 J J J ~
4 4 ~ t J
~ J
~
final analysis in accordance
<<1th CAt)R I',.t'/00i3.
Tne current effort wili be performed in the near future, dnd tlie fi>>I effort will be completed prior to BLN <<<<lt I
-fuel Ioadinln Reiausn ttie ilnit I Fsl;i loadinq date is approximately fivel years d<<sly s TVA wIlI pal fOfsms tliC i Clld i s Cd dCtivitieS during the appropriate Stdh!.
IVA will compile cut rebar infuriaatiun hl;:d on the available "drilling releases" geti,"rctnit nv rnnctructjots
<<sse th Franc ti.-dL and ECNS and place the data on drawings.
TVA will perform fie)d walxdowns to veriiv consistency between the documented ddtd di:st the as-built plant configuration.
Rheo the data is Incoiloletec conservative ass<<nxttion,.
will be made.
IvA will select critical concrete elein!<<ts to ensure that all the elements are structurally adequate.
They will have relatively large span-to-thicknesssratios dildi ilusllnrO lc hafsqnf c cusppnf t inh plhlnq ~
cable trays, conduits, and NVAC ducts.
IVA wII I anaiyie tilcsc eletfients In detdi I.
will consider cut rebarS and the cumuldtlvr effects of hangers, ln aiidition to dll other.
design loads such as seismic.
tornado depressurization, and pipe break loads.
2 (Ol/Id/BUJ
I AI IAC>NL'iVI 8 SUtttsqtty Ut'SSUE'.>,
Fit>UlttGS, ANU CUIt>IECTIVE ACT IUtA FO>t 5lt8"ATEGURV '>5000 ttLVI'IUtt NIINBEK:
3 Page B-I3 of 28 Issues Findings Cor'rective Actions Element 215.2 - BLtt (Continued)
Correct hanger loads/reactions to concrete elements based on the as-built conditions will be either calculated or obtained fram other groupS.
If a condition of overstress develops in this analysis, TVA <<ill perfor>>1 a thorough evaluation of the extent of the condition and will design a modification to ensure structural adequacy of the concrete elements.
b.
There are an un<<uw>>
nu>>bur ur ~
releases for core drills at JLN.
As a part of an as-built evaluation, TVA will address all floor slabs as to their reserve live load capacity in accordance with Section 3. 10.5 of BLN Oesign Criteria N4-50-0702.
(CATit 215 02 BLtt 01) b.
Trlere are an unkn >w>r uu>>nur ur ieleas:s fur core >trllls at b.
Sa>ae as "a above.
JLN.
The evaluatran
- tean, I>nw<<Ve>r, Could nut deter>>ine the extent uf rebar cutti>lg tt>at t>as taken place or tnat has weakened Lhe structure
~ because uf the lack or procedural cunt>v>ls before 05//8 anJ tne inCumpleteness ot'rawing recurds uy Ivq.
c.
Procedural contr.>l/assessu>;nt of cut rebar to ensure structural integrity of concrete is-in question.
c.
TYA tras an ut rect rvu Pr>t> au Lu C>>>tral anJ JOCu>>ent c.
rebar cuts tn tt>u t roid.
tta<<ever, tnere is no docur<<:nted proceJure uy UttE tor prncessrng,
<valuatrng, and controlling cut rehar.
Also, assessment calculations of Cate>)ory I concrete el<<:1 <<ts for cut rebar are not C>lu>p Ietc.
Plant procedures will be developed to ensure coordination between Construction and ONE and to require cognizant concrete desiqn engineers to monitor and control rebar cutting and hanger attach>>rent loads.
The procedure will address receipt of data fram Construction, method of tracking by OttE, placing of data on drawings, and analysis ui concrete members for reinforcing bar cutS.
The procedure will also address the revie~
and approval Jf future hanger attachments
( loads of which may exceed a threshold value) to concrute elements and their continuous tracking.
(CATO 215 02 BLN 01) d.
Peripheral find><<g.
l>l aJJrt lu>> ~ tile >.'valuat l>>u Lua>>1 t>lu>ld Lllat t>>IC rtnresulveJ lte>uS 433/J?-Id-Ul ant 43)/J2-10-01 rexrain open.
ttRC 1982 Unresolved items 438/82-10-01 anJ 439/82-10-01 will be resolved and clused with appropriate correspondence transmitt
>4 to tptC.
(CATO 215 02 BLN Ol) 24/')it-l I (Ol /18/88)
Issues AITACtNENT 8 SUNDRY UF
- ISSUES, FINDINGS, AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SUBCATEGORY 25000 Findings REVISIOtl NUtIBER:
3 Page B-14 of 28 Corrective Actions 11 ~ 11 ~ 11 ~111111111 Element 2I5.3
- Radiation St>>elding Seismic Analysis 1111111111 ~ 1111111 SON (N/A) uBN 4 ~
tll'edI geneI IC 'su I SII1IC J>>4 lyb II ul radi at ion shielding to elIPid I te installation.
St) ft (N/A) a.
itle uVaiutlun tgan f>>luS tIIJl thiS issue is the cost-uffuct tvLness of radiation shielding used during plant operat ion and I.laintenance to protect uorkers from plplrnl nriginatt I] soturr.i torms A nonortc coicmtc analysis uf tt>>s typL uf radiatiun shielding is not p
a' Col v Ie tv thL Inatt/ VVI I ah les aSSOC lated IIlttl each case
~
(N/A)
MBfl a.
No corrective action is required.
o.
Present case-ay-case appraacti is toJ costly.
BFN I N/AI
'b.
Ine evaluatiun tealt finds ttIJt IVA in imprOVing the COSt-eff4CtiveneSS pl'ogramt BFtt I N/A)
Is actively involved ot its e~isting
~ iI
~ n I.
In
~vi ~ vt ~
0 11 tv Iv IIIV h
ttn I'nt I eot iVo at t inn ic
~ ontt tl otd BFN VLit Jt It
( N/A)
Vt It VLI~
ULN (tt/A) 4 (Ol/IB/hatt)
Issues AI IA~iNntlI UNitAxf uf I >but.b, F INDlttu>, ANU Cuh(ECI Ivi ACI!Utts FUR SUUCAT'EuuXV 25MO F lndlngs RLVISIUtt tiL%LX:
Page 8-l5 of 28 Corrective Actions i0400000110notistt Element 2I5.4
- Turbine/Service Building Roofing 0<<1n00 ~ 10000144104 SQN (N/A)
MBN (N/A)
RUN'QN (N/A)
MBN Turbine and service building roofing was not properly designed, has been replaced
- once, and is still Ieay.ing.
d.
The evidence sho<<s Lhat both the orlgindl roof dnd tiie reroofing were designed in accordance
<<itn the TVA specifications and industry standards and there is qo juStifiCatian uf Lne t:I'S Statement that the "ROOfing On turbine and ServlCe dui ldlngS [iS ) nuL properly designed."
inc urigina'I rOOf had luakS.
HO<<ever, tneSe leakS db not appear tu be caused by improper'esign but by poor
<<orkmanshlp dnd danage frou uncontrolled heavy fuat traffic uuring construction.
Protective boards were pruvld:d in iout traffic areas.
Tnis p'ruvis io<< <kage fr~a fuut trnffic on
<<dlk<<ays.
Since constructiun is no<< conpleie, access to the roof is limited dnd conLrulled.
a Nu correct lve aCt lOn i S required BFN BFN UFtt (H/A)
BLN BLtt (H/A)
(N/A)
(N/A) n1*Naatt00nntkitkk Element 2I5.6
- Hanger Loads on Structures 0 0 0 n n I> IE 0 0 n 0 n 1 IPti1 SQH Sl)tt SI)tt a.
Structural integrity of concreLe
<<alls and slabs in the annulus area of the Unit 2 Reactor Building is questionable due to excessive number of hdngers.
a.
IYA UttE, at prese<<t, hds not cunyleted assassnent calculations to estaulisn structural integrity uf concrete <<alls and slabs in ttle annulus area of the Unit 2 Reactur Bui l Ini u
cunsld ~rini a.
To comply with the desiqn requirements, IVA has comnitted to the following corrective action plan (CAP).
THIS mM eRTILLV t:OMPLETEO g
~e'E: 8 24/90- I 4 (Ol/!U/8J)
Issues AIIACW Rl 8 SUHHARZ UF 155Ut".), FINUIHG5, ARU CO>tRECIIVE ACTIONS FO>t SUOCAIEGURZ 25000 Fit)J)ngs REVIblUR RUZutw:
3 Page 8-16 of 28 Corrective Actions Element 215.6 - Sgtl (Continued)
IVA is tly ce<<paring the final n 'r loads >>ith the assuihod loads u )ng the earlier desiqn proces v
ious Category I Flour slabs.
se ected slabs are -the u<<tst r
+ttgctural ele>t>ents havi<<il ive y Iar<L span-to-depth ratios
.)i<<l
>>v08%ah)tsb'hp>yers support tng ptpt<<il, n sty ). ~ t nbs
)na.s
~ te nna lluhl'issy
~
Vg will p~s>t )etailed calculations
<<il K 'l(d t itiqp e~>t>a nest w) <t constuer
<<>>L)t]
ts)of hangers in addit to<<
tg a te~sig( loads.
Iia<<i]er l,),i.l data Z'Le d ymai11d by reviewiitd>
d,gipsy'ddd i)tidds ssd.by t>ei $
~dt l std>d>btd>
I>I<<)>d b b is>llv ~
.~ \\
It>e gf 'rts of rib)ar oit struct<<r II stre@)t oF slJT 'I(also he evaluat d
and i c porate final analysis.
I))IS a
MSSeS t
()>surly CO><<pl>st,b and in ic tes th 'd origin)lly the>Jnl.
lb.iet't
'5 Sltff IC I<<lit I y and Cun i!r ativel h t audit)un u(
as-l>uiit li y
lo o't.
itnt i>t>patr th" StruCtur 1
i y s
ds tat>s 11>. ~
results o
'se t oF tiie i<<)st unfavors>b i
t I
I prov )dc reasonable
)
ce
'a I Cate>iiry I
concrete s
u At co>nttit>t itt.
u
- Further, IV w
a S
I ted t<<OSt tf~vorable t
tqsg a$ >>
s nd sttielding>>a s
cu v
effects of as-built irang rs u
f rcirig bars iit addition t o
i >tde g
s.
Itic selected wa I is i
i ld wall and crane wall n
a a of t<<o Reactor 8uildin.
a i
theb e><<Ployec conceri sse 11 of the Auxiliary 8u Id <<g will inciuded since, iy I'~n n to otner design loads, it s also subjected to tOrnadO depreSSuriaotiOn and pipe breau loads
A> l>><<di 11
'>JHi%4lI Uf I -ibUt. S, fI AllI 00 5 ~ >>Hu CUKKlC I I VE At.'I Id>i'S EUK SUUCAIEvuKY 850UO KI,VIS1011 ligli:1:
Page 5-Il of ci Issues F IuJ1ng S Corrective Actions Element 215. 6 -
St)N (Cont 1nued)
Structural assessmunl of the selectui
>>ails>>ill be performed in detail sin1)ar to that outlined for the slabs.
Iva h!s f)I'Oninitted tO eStabliShing that the actual design stresses are less than the allo>>able stresses.
If, necessary, desi p1 ations will be issued to me.t the de nnnltment and sample si!es f/)
I increa establish an 0
Ia enc 1.
Ihe resu s 0 t o mast un orabl s
I r
ufan l
I
'V g mi the n1nil '
4 IVA's CAP a rib<<et its faut con1nitment for the ory cr e
structures at Sl)N.
The e
ion
- ean, therefore, concludes that the st CAP is an acceptable resolution of tlie concerns and should also preclude lu!ir recurrence.
(CATO 215 06 SOU Ol) b.
Design calculations havu not evalu-ated individual and cumulative effects of han'gers on concrete walls and slabs.
b.
TvA design calculal1nns 11avu nOl evaluated all individual and cu>>1ulative effects of hangers o1i concrete ~alls and slabs of Category I structures.
An assessment is currently either in tne p lann1ng stage or in progress, and some calculations are being Finalized.
The assessment, when Final, will determine the adequacy of the structures.
Inus, the issue of design calculations is valid.
o.
Same as "a" above.
24790-14 (01/18/88)
issues AII'h:IctiN I 8 SUNMl>)V UF laSUcS, F INUINGS, ANU CU<tkECIIVE ACTIONS FOR SUUCAIEGUkf 25000 Fi>>dings RE VISI0)l NL<IBEk:
3 Page 8-18 of 28 Corrective'Actions Element 215I6 - S)jN (Coritinuiidj c.
Peripheral finding.
Cui)<>It tu AC I
>>>etliod.
Nuriuvu tlidt ~
IIl su<~>>
due<<<<>Lots wire u c<L>A>< na>i c 'i'I a
stre>>g ugsi<3n >nethod RC uSeS the ult iri>it
'\\ ~
I 'I I design i)o-II Cuuu.
II>lf'eiu bdsls dra Aut IA I)gfei reVise thi'SA<I t~e ri.',~F ea)ii<I't d t STD TV%'s position Qa
~ I U I i IVII c.
SUN F'f)k suct iu>>s 3.8.4.3.2 i<<J 3.8.4.4.1 ds well is A,
will re idoles 3.8.3-1 and 3.8.4-esign Sec ion Ai r
Isii t i~
ISi<l ri.ti Il7 il d.
Peripheral, finding.
d.
A d<<finitive prucedure/prolrifn to fur<<>ally coordinate and' CValiiate flAil liariljiir lOadS due io piping, raCeways
~ af er ductwork, etc.,
I<r>pOSed on Cu>>arete various loading conditions nis not III.
load trinsfer at points of attic)i<<i<.r4 eViluated;
- hOneVer, Cuff)aidtiVe effeC w.ill ac tne ef fer tc nf i uit reibdirc nii
,for c'on reti floors, wills, a>>J part UNE Procedure NE'P-5.2 dei)riiS genera interfacing a<<d detaiied step-by-ste follow.
Nowiiver. 4/AU50 sdriiis drawl )Qs cover)no I
n)echanicdI seis>>ic
- supports, ur similar docu<>ent(sl, do
~Iot eave Spul
~ fIC >)oil s riV>it IAg COO I V Iliation of 4Mgei support riiactions <<ith other e>>gineering groupS.
TVA will revi<<
'>
\\ v7wlAveee concr des&fn e I
A 'Iil
>rtural lntenr ity nf rnni r.ite walls and slabs in the annulus area of the Unit 2 kedctor uuildinij is questionable due to excessive nufn)>er of hangers.
At preC int
~
W>Jh ridS ni>t COA1pliiief) aSSOSSent Calcei lat ioriC to establisti structural integrity of concreti. <<dlls and slii>s iA thu an<<ulus ared Of ti>e UAit 2 RedCtnr Buildir>g by cons ideriiig al I hi>><3er loddS.
io COI<>pic< <<3th thai+<<ilgA ron
~ ~ re~intr IVA has coa)nitted to the following corrective actiorr ltlan fCAPj.
TVA is presently c)Lr4)acing the final as-l>uilt hanger loads <<ith the ass<a<)<< I loads uSed during-the earlier design process for various Category
< f!o r slabs.
lhe Selected slabs are the:>)ost unfavoraole structural ele<)>ents having relatively lar<le span-to-depth ratios )iil witli nuf<>erous hangers SupPurting pipiiig, rat>in trave rnnituitc and NYAC fhirtc IYA will perfor<<) detailed calculations
<<n lliese elu<Tfe<itS arid wi I I CiiiiSiuei 24 1g~III/ I t)/;UII
Al I u i<."...:>I u
- >JR)t<af ur I
..h. >, Fil>:>lhb'>,
<<>ICAIi>>oKY Z<a0<>0 RLVIbl<lk I>IN<kg Pag. U-lg of 2d lssui's r i<<d><<<ys Corrective Actions Element 215.6 - IIIIII (Continuedl Cu<<uiat>vi> el feitS ol hang<:rs
>n add>t>>.<< t<<
all ot>ii>r design loads.
>la<>gi>r l>>el dat i will be compiled by ri'viiwinq drawin Is a<< I calculations and by performing fii>ld walkdown inspections.
Ine effects of cut rebar on StruCtural strenqth of sl>h; <<ill also be inCorPorated in tlie final an >lysis.
Ihe Slab assessment perform d tn date indicates that TVA had originally des> hi<:d co<>crete structures sufficiently and conservatively so that addition of as-built hanger loads shou'Id not i<<>pair the structural integrity of th<. 'Slalis.
1>i<~
results of t>iis assess nt uf the aust unfavorable element,s shuuld provide reasonable assurance that all Category I
concrete s labs meit IIIIN FSA<t co<<<><It<<<L'nt>.
- Furtlier, IVA will assi'ss selected est uii> avOrable structural walls and shiel lid
walls for cumulative effects of as-Iuilt hangers and cut reinforcing bars in a.>d>t>.
i tu Other deSign IOadS ~
Ihe SeleCted
.<allo
<<ill includi shield wall and crane w>II betwaen azi<<>uths 292'nd 35II'n t><<
annulus area of the ki'actor Oui lding.is identified in the e<<<ployee concern.
I><u "u" line wall of the Auxiliary Building will also be included since, in addition t<> othe<
design loads, it is also subjected to tornado depressurization and pipe brea'oads.
Structural assess<<>L<<t of the selected w.ills will be perfor<<<ed in detail similar Io t>>il.
outlined for the slabs.
IVA has co<<><<itt. I to establishing that tlie actual design strusses are less than the allowable stresses.
If necessary, design
<<<odlfications will be issued tu meet thL>
FSAR design co<<<<>itmL>nt and sample siz'is will be increased to establisii an appropriate confidence level.
The results of this assess<<<ent of the most unfavnrable waII elements should provide reasonable assurauc<
that all Category I concrete walls meet I>i<~
NIIII FSAII co<nnit<<<ent.
A I I A<<,L'8,Nl SUI4ISI<KT OF I rSULsI I'NUINGS ~
ANU CUIUIECIIVE ACTIONS FUI> sUUCAIE<'Uiy 25000 IIEV I'SION NUMUEII:
3 Page 8-20 of 28 Issues t li<dlllgs Currective AcLions Element 215.6 - >)BN (Continued) b.
Uesign calculations nave liut evalu-ated individual and c<AAulative efFects of hanuers on concrete
<<alls and slabs.
b.
HILN duS> )ii CPICI<ldt>u<<S
<<dv'U iiut OValuuted CuhulaLiVe e)<acts I)f hJA<jurs uil cI)llcr<ItlIWJlls and slabs of Catt<nary I str<<Ctores.
A<<assuss<j!At is Current)v in pro)russ wit>i calculutiu<iuing findlized lur SlIN.
UI Pilju L IIL II>> ~ jlgl~
PjjCjjil>> <IL will t)iI:ii beI u basis for iUII.
I>ie iUN assess<A<!nt, W>ien final, wlli dcteri<<inu t>iL aJequacy of the structures.
IVA's CAP as described will meet its FSAN co,nhit<4ent for the Category I 'concrete struCtures at NON.
The evaluation tea<4, therefore, concludes that the stated CAP is an acceptable resolution of the concerns and should also'reclude Lheir
~ LLUI ~ \\ ALC ~
(CAIO 215 06 '>dN OI)
'Lt ~
Sd<4U as "Il" diiovi.'
c.
Peripheral findi>>g.
<<nr in<In<jl fIniinn
- c. I<<additiuo,
.>Pri<<IJ tn<<
iI)atlo<t~ till! Uvdluatiun tI I n FII in l
~ i It
'<tl<P FSA i 5 Iri innL ) A d 22 anI<
3.8.4.4.I as <<II as Tali)us 3.8.3-)
and 3.8. I-I Ior Catugul /
I cul> fat<I dus I<)4>t tu AC I 318 03 a<id 3)U-)l codes uSing L>ie wartin) StreSS design methoJ.
Mureuvur, Sections 3.8.3.?
and 3.J.4.2 state that, "ln soihe InstancusI later revisions of t>ie listed docwh<ints wu< e Used where dLs>i)ii sp>uty was out co<Apl'olilsud.
~II~
~ j \\ iiil UIIL uj ) ~ s j
~ IIL <II UI)
P 4 ~
la ILVLI~
Ujl >>
~
ultimate stre<<)lh desi<)ii mi:tliud arid t>ie ACI 318-7/
UI<de.
T><urufo< e, thL Fgk) dlid t>le l lAal uuslgil bJsls Jfe Aot lA agree<<4:AL at <<tusunt.
8 fv.iluat iuil ol thj< lovI!e Lu<<LL'ms lor cUL rebpr (elehh!<<t 215.'ur 'iatts Uar) has stuteJ that TV/i has an U<<uc,siva IifiiIJIP4 Lo cuiit ~ ul iiid ducii>>LAL
~ <<our ciits
>II Category I concrete struLturI<s.
Uut d definitive integrated prucedurL'/pr.<grP.<<
><as not boun found Lo forinally coordinate and evaluate li<
- e LO I) lp l<<J rdCC<<ays
~
a<id doc LWUfh
- CtC,
- suPPort, reactions <<ith Civil Desi Jn Section.
- supports, or similar document(:)
- ISSUES, FINDINGS, AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SUUCATEGDRY 25000 Findings REVISION NDNUER:
- uSed, whiCh iS only rated for 100 psf.
- Ueudf UF ISSUI'5,
- FINUINGS, ANU Cud>IECIIVE ACTIONS FOR SUUCATEuuR'f '5000 REV ISION NUNBER:
- reViewS, the load teSt.
- 155UES, FINUIN(>>s, ANU CURRECtivE ACtlONS FOrl SUUCAIEOURY 25000 REVISION NUNUER:
- 2. Identify ail cases of discr<<pancy betWeen dOCu>nentS COrreSpOnding ta tn!
- 3. Evaluate rpsultts fran paragrap>h 2.
- tean, therefore, coAcludes thai the stated CVi iS an aCCeptable reSOlutiOn Of the peripheral negat ive finuing t>>ai <<as identified during the evaluation process, and should also preclude. its recur rence.
- Plan, Volume 1,
- Plan, Volume 2, Rev.
- Plan, Volume 3, Rev.
- Plan, Volume 4, Draft (03/87) 2.
- Reports,
- NRC, "BFN Applicability
- Long, NRC, to H.
- Concrete, Structural, and IHiscellaneous Steel,'~
- 41N785, Revi.
- 1910, Subpart 0 - Walking Surfaces, Section 1910.22(b)(l),
- Bechtel, ILo G.
- R10, "Crane Hall" TVA Engineering Change Notices o
- 3130, R12
- 5508, R10 Ib26 860212 503]
- 41N785, R14 "Powerhouse Reactor Building~ - Units 1
- 41N786, R16 "Powerhouse Reactor Building - Unit.;
- 41N339, RB "Powerhouse Reactor Building Unit 2 - Goner ete Control
- 41N980, R4
- 41N981, R4 "Powerhouse Reactor Building - Unit 2 - (oncrete Bay Halls Reinforcement Sheet 1"
- FCRs, F-3261,,
- FCRs, F-1946 F-1783, and F-'1688
- FCfls, F-3269 Rl, F-2659, F-1877, 'F-1778,'n'd F-1685 Fcfl, F-1768 Rl
- FCRs, F-.-2983 F-2940, F-1621',
- FCR, F-1766 Rl FCfls, A-10454, F-1662, and F-1621'Cfls, F-3219 F-3061, F-2973, F-2974, F-2420 Rl: F-1871 Rl; F-ll850, F-171 1, and F-1505 FCfl's, I'984, F 1547, and F-1572 F-3009, F-2644, F-2680,,
- bib, sheet 3
- 570, sheet 2
- ~i>
- R18,
- R14,
- 30210,
- 176i6, TVA BLN NCR 2'!280, TVA BLN NCR. 2,592, TVA BLN NCR 322!5, TVA BLN NCR 3499, TVA SLN NCR 3521, TVA BL'N NCR 4750, TVA BLN CAQR BLF
- Bonine, Jr.,
- 2126, "125-Ton Overhead Traveling Crane for Aux. Bldg.
- R16, (04/09/83)
- R13, (03/09/86)
- Design, Fabrication, and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings,"
- R35, R34,
- R20, R29,
- R33, R51, RS, R7,
- R25, R30, "Mechanical "Mlechanical "Mechanical "Mechanical "M'echanical "Mechanical "Mechanical "Mechanical "Mechanical "Mechanical Sleeve Sleeve Sleeve Sleeve Sleeve Sleeve Sleeve Sleeve Sleeve Sleeve Seal s'4
- 1976, "Overhead and Gantry Cranes" 61.
Subject:
"All Nuclear Plants - Responsibi 1,i ties,"
[OEN 841 123 001],
( lll23/84)
TYA Specification
at HBNP Units 1
and 2" TVA Drawings:
47H200-1 47H200-2 47H200-3 47H200-'4 47H200-5 47H200-6 47H200-7 47H200-8 47H200-9 48N1250-1 41N704-1 46H502-5 44N300 44N301 "Equipment Plans - Roof," R9,
( 11/09/79)
"Equipment Plan - El 772.0 and Above," Rll, (09/28/84)
"Equipment Plan - El 757.0 and E=l. 755.0,"
'"Equipment Plan El 757.0 and El. 729.0," R17,'(10/09/85)
"Equipment Plan - El 713.0 and El. 708.0,"
R19.
(10/09/85)
"Equipment Plan El 692.0 and El. 685.S,"
"Equipment Plan El 750.5 and El. 730.S, El. 676.0 and El.
666.0,"
R7, (03/04/86)
"Equipment Transverse Section AB-A8," R6, (03/04/86)
"Equipment Longitudinal Section A9-A9," RS, (05/14/84)
Miscellaneous Steel Hatch Frames and Covers,"
R6,
<01/23/86)
"Concrete 'Floor Design Data," Rl, (03/31./28)
"Architectural Plan El. 676.0 and 692.0 Temporary Barrier," R5, (05/06/83)
"125-ton Crane Arrangement."
R3, (09/26/85)
"125-ton Crane Trolley Arrangement,"
R2, (07/01/75) 51.
American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC), "Specification for the
effective 11/0I/78 52.
TVA EN OES Calculations, IB25 8S09I2 800],
"Feedwat'er Neater Replacement, Turbine Building, Monorai.l From Rail Bay to Center Aisle, Above El. 706,"
SCG-lS2, Rl, (09/06/85)
[B25 850912 805],
"Feedwater Heater Replacement
- Monorail' Oiagnonal Above El. 706," SCG-lS5, Rl, (09/06/85)
TVA OE Calculations, f.B25 850912 801],
"Load Tests for the Feedwater Heater Honorails," SCG-lS15, (09/ll/85)
Southwestern Engineering Company Drawings:
H-83825, R3, Feedwater Heaters 1Al, 1Bl, and 1Cl H-83826, R3, Intermediate Feedwater Heaters lA2, 1B2, and 1C2 37790-5 (03/16/88)
TVA EMPLOYFE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM IREPORT NUMBER:
25000-
~
REVI S ION NUMBER 3
Page C-10 of ll 53.
Yuba Heat Transfer Corporation Orawin~Is 84-H-89;l-lC-II, Rl High Pressure
'Heater No-.
1Cl 84-H-89il-2-1,,
RZ, Inter'mediate Pressuie Heater Nos.
1A2, 182,'nd
'1C~
48N338-il through -16 FN Heater Replacement Monrorai,ls, the latest: revisions as of 08/24/86 TVA memo from V.
R. Oefenderfer t'o SQN Project Files,
[825 850813
'019],'SQN Design Review of'urbinie Building Feedwater Heater IReplacement,"
(08/13/85)
TVA memo from 3.
P.
Vineyard to H. 8. Rankin,
[825 850819 013], "SQN-Oesign Review of Monorail Structure,"
(08/19/85)
TVA memo from J.
F'. 'Vineyard! to H. 8. Rarikin, [825 85082'1 004],
"SQN-ECN L5938 Feedwater Heater Monorail System Configurat:ion Inspection,"
(08/21/85)
Impell Corporation lietter from S.
F. S'trang to R.
Q. Barnett (Impell/TVA-85-594), "Personal Service Contract No. TV-65378A, SQN-Design Revi'ew of Monorail Structure,"
(08/ll6/85)
TVA Drawings:
-47W472-1, 47H472-2, 47N472-3, 47W472-4, 47W472-5, 47N472-6, 47N472-7, 47H472-8, 47H472-9, 47W472-10
~
Sea 1
s'4'eal s'4'eals'4 Seals'4'eals" Seals" Seals" Seals" Seals" 54, 55 56 57 58.
TVA ONE Nuclear Engineering Procedure, "Review," NEP-5.2, RO (07/Oil/86)
TVA Policy Memorandum PM 87-35 (ONE) fronii R,.
H. Cantrell, "Project/Branc'h Responsibilities,"
[801 870123.002 ] (Ol/23/87)
TVA memo from R,.
W. Cantrell to J.
E. Hilkins',
[SWP 810916 010],
(09/14/81)
TVA memo from R.,
W. Cantrel1 to J.
E. Nilkins,
[SWP 820128 017],
(01/26/82)
TVA memo from,J.C. Standifer to G,. Nadewitz
[SNP 8!51126 007]
( ll/26/85) 3779D-5 (03/16/88)
~
~
~ e s si I ~
a V i LL I IJIXLC.t(ng SPECIAL PROGRAM Ktl'UKI NUNUt.K:
25000 RFVIS ION NUMB'ER:
3 Page C-ll of 11 59.
TVA CEB Report 82-2, "Testing of Silicon Foam Seals, "RO LCEB 820408 005], (04/08/82) 60.
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard ANSI B30.2.0
TVA Employee Concerns Special Program Subcategory Repoi t 30800, Revision 2, "Maintenance,"
(09/04/87) 62.
TVA Invitation, Bid, and Acceptance, Oakridge Roofing Co., Inc., Built-up Roofing and Related Materials, Installed
[TVA Ref.
No. 75K52-86697],
(05/12/75)
TVA Specification 2600 for Built-up Composition Roofing and Related Materials for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant iTVA Ref.
No. 75K52-86697]
63.
TVA memo from 0.
H. Wilson to J.
C. Standifer, LT15 850430 955],
(04/30/85)
TVA memo from J.
E.
McCord to HBN Files,
[826 850712 001], (07/12/85)
TVA informal memo from T.
C. Cruise to R.
O. Hernandez and H. A. English, (07/17/85)
TVA informal memo from H. A. English to T.
C. Cruise, (09/85)
TVA memo from J.
H.
Coan to 0.
W. Wilson, 1:826 850918 003], (09/18/85)
P. Vineyard to H.
B. Rankin, L'B25 851009 002],
(10/09/85)
TVA memo from 0.
H. Wilson to J.
C. Standifer, L'T15 860121 991],
(01/21/86)
TVA memo from J.
C. Standifer to 0.
H. Wilson, LB26 860303 016],
(03/03/86) 37790-5 (03/16/88)
~
1I ~
iO 0
0