ML18033A556
| ML18033A556 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 10/29/1987 |
| From: | TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML082340470 | List:
|
| References | |
| 22400, 22400-V02-R02, 22400-V2-R2, NUDOCS 8902150050 | |
| Download: ML18033A556 (54) | |
Text
EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROG VOLUBLE2 ENGINEERING CATEGORY SUBCATEGORY REPORT 22400 RACEWAYSUPPORT DESIGN i
UPDATED TVA NUCLEAR POWER
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT TYPE:
SUBCATEGORY REPORT FOR ENGINEERING REPORT NUMBER:
22400 REVISION NUMBER:
2 TITLE:
RACEWAY SUPPORT DESIGN Page 1 of 21 R AS N
R R
V N:
1.
Revised to incorporate initial SRP comments and latest element evaluation status.
2.
Revised to incorporate additional SRP and TAS comments; added Attachment C
(References).
S IGNATUR la te 7
ATE REVIEW COMMI E
A:
GNA U DAT o
CEG-H:
&eA i~ ~7.~7 SRP:
~co -at 8 APPROVED BY CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY)
SRP Secretary's signature denotes SRP concurrences are in files.
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22400 REVISION NUMBER: 2 Page ES-1 of 1
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
This subcategory addresses employee concerns about electrical raceway support design and includes such items as seismic requirements, support connections, support design, seismic safety of nonsupported Flamastic-covered
- cable, provision for expansion of conduit, and seismic qualification of locally mounted electrical motor boxes.
The concerned employees generally cited a
presumed deficiency or inadequacy in the design of raceway supports.
For ten issues evaluated (derived fran a total of 11 employee concerns),
three corrective actions were identified.
Two of the corrective actions were initiated by TVA before the Employee Concerns Task Group evaluations and have been ccepleted.
The remaining one is new action required to resolve a Watts Bar peripheral issue identified during the evaluations.
The causes for the negative findings were diverse, with weaknesses in the design process dominating.
Only one of the three corrective actions for this subcategory was judged to be important from a safety standpoint.
It requires revision of two Watts Bar documents to remove.discrepancies and will include new calculations to verify adequacy of design; it may also require minor hardware modifications.
The employee concerns and issues examined during the evaluations did identify a few valid problems that. require resolution.
- However, because of the relatively small number of negative findings and the randem nature of the causes, it cannot be concluded that raceway support design, for the areas evaluated in this subcategory constitute a serious problem for Watts Bar,
- Sequoyah, Browns Ferry, or Bellefonte nuclear power plants sites.
The causes identified and other evaluation results are being reexamined from a wider perspective in the Engineering category evaluation.
27230-R14 (10/09/87)
~O I,
0 Cl
- Preface, Glossary, and List of Acronyms for ECTG Subcategory Reports HISTORY OF REVISION
'REV NUNBER PAGES REVISED REASON FOR 'CURRENT REVISION To clarify that one or more attachments will help the reader find where a particular concern is evaluated
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TVh EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECTdL PROGRhlf REPORT NUMBER:
22400 FRONT lDLTTER REV:
3 PdGE i OF viii Preface This subcategory report is one of a series of reports prepared for the Employee Concerns Special Program (ECSP) of the Tennessee Valley huthority (TVA).
The ECSP and the organization which carried out the program, the Employee Concerns Task Group (ECTG), were established by TVA's Manager of Nuclear Power to evaluate and.report on those Office of Nuclear Power (ONP) employee concerns filed before February 1, 1986.
Concerns filed after that date are handled by the ongoing ONP Employee Concerns Program (ECP).
The ECSP addressed over 5800 employee concerns.
Each of the concerns was a
formal, written description of a circumstance or circumstances that an employee thought was unsafe, unjust, inefficient, or inappropriate.
The mission of the Employee Concerns Special Program was to thoroughly investigate all issues presented in the concerns and to report the results of those investigations in a form accessible to ONP employees, the
- NRC, and the general public.
The results of these investigations are communicated by four levels of ECSP reports:
- element, subcategory,
- category, and final.
Element reports, the lowest reporting level, will be published only for those concerns directly affecting the restart of Sequoyah Nuclear Plant's reactor unit 2.
hn element consists of one or more closely related issues.
hn issue is a potential problem identified by ECTG during the evaluation process as having been.raised in one or more concerns.
For efficient handling, what appeared to,be similar concerns were grouped.into elements early. in the program, but issue definitions emerged from the evaluation process itself.
Consequently, some elements did include only one issue, but often the ECTG evaluati'on found more than one issue per element.
Subcategory reports summarize the evaluation of a number of elements.
- However, the subcategory report does more than collect element level evaluations.
The subcategory level overview of element findings leads to an integration of information that cannot take place at the element level.
This integration of information reveals the extent to which problems overlap more than one element and will therefore require corrective action for underlying causes not fully apparent at the element level.
To mako the subcategory reports easier to understand, three items have been placed at the front of'ach report:
a preface, a glossary of'he terminology unique to.ECSP reports, and a list of acronyms.
Additionally, at the end of each subcategory report will be a Subcategory Summary Table that includes, the concern numbers; identifies other subcategories that share a concern; designates nuclear safety-related, safqgy yig0ificant, or non-safety related concerns; designates generic appiscaoA>ty; and briefly states each concern.
Either the Subcatogory Summar Tab wh y
lo or another altachment or bi hich the issue raised b
h e
e reader to find t a
corn nation y t e concern is evaluated.
the report section or se ti
TVh, ENPLOTEE CONCERNS SPECIA14 PROGBhN REPORT NL1NBER:
22400 FRONT KNITTER REV:
2 PhGE ii OF viii The subcategories are themselves summarised in a series of eight category reports.
-Each category report reviews the major findings, and collective significance of the subcategory repocts in one of the following areas:
management and personnel relations industrial safety construction material control operations quality assurance/quality control welding onginoori,ng A soyarato report on omp.'Loyoo concerns dialing, with'p'ectific contentio'ns 'of intimidation, harassment, and wrongdoing will be. released by the TVA Offi,ce of the inspector General,.
Just as tho subcategory roports intlagrjatl the information collected't'he element:Level, the category reports~ i6tejrate 'thA ihfo'cmation assembled in all the subcategory reports within thI category, addressing particularly
'he underlying, causes of those problems that run across more tha4 o4e
'ubcategory.
A, final royort will integrate and assoss'tho information collected by 'all of the lower level reports prepared'oc the ECSP including, the Xnsgec'tot'eneral's report.
For moro dotail on the mothods by which ECTG employee. concerns were evaluated and repor'tod, consult tho, Tennessee VaILley huthority EolplIbye'e Concerns Task Group Program Nanuil.
Tjhe Halnual spells out the program's objoctivos,
- scopo, organisation,
.and cjosgonsibilxties.
Xt also:petcifie.',
the procoduros that woro followod in t'ho'investigation, reporting, and closeout of the issues raised by em'yloyee concerns.
TVh EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRhlt REPORT NIAtBER:
22400 FRONT NATTER REV:
2 PAGE iii OF viii ECSP GLOSSARY OF REPORT TERNS>>
classification of evaluated issues the evaluation of an issue leads to one of the following determinations:
Class h:
Issue cannot be verified as factual Class B:
Issue is factually accurate, but what is described is not a
problem (i.e., not a condition requiring corrective action)
Class C:
Issue is factual and identifies a problem, but corrective action for the problem was initiated before the evaluation of the issue was undertaken Class 0:
Issue is factual and presents a problem for which corrective action has
- been, or is being, taken as a result of an evaluation Class E:
A problem, requiring corrective action, which was not identified by an employee
- concern, but was revealed during the ECTG evaluation of an issue raised by an employee concern.
collective si nificance an analysis which determines the importance and consequences of the findings in a particular ECSP report by putting those findings in the proper perspective.
concern (see "employee.concern" )
corrective action steps taken to fix specific deficiencies or discrepancies revealed by a negative finding and, when necessary, to correct causes in order to prevent recurrence.
criterion lural:
criteria a basis for defining a performance,
- behavior, or quality which ONP imposes on itself (see also "requirement" ).
element or element re ort an optional level of ECSP report, below the subcategory level, that deals with one or more issues.
em lo ee concern a formal, written description of a circumstance or circumstances that an employee thinks unsafe, unjust, inef'ficient or inappropriate; usually documented on a K-form or a form equivalent to the K-form.
'JWd EMPLOYEIE CONCERNS SPECIdls PROGRhN REPORT NUMBER:
22400 ERONT NhXTER RIKV:
2,'hGl?
iv GP viii eValuatar(S) the indiVidual(S) aSSigned thIe deSPOnhibnility'O aSSeSS a SpedifiC grouping of employee concerns.
~findin s includes both stateaients of fact and. 'the juddnents sade about those facts during the evaluation process(
nhghtile, fin'dings require cotre'cti've'ction.
issue a potential problem, as interpreted by 'the ECTG durihg the evaluation
- process, raised in one or more concern's.
'-form (see employee concern")
evaluation, judgment or decision may'be'ased.
root cause the underlying reason for a problem.'Terms essential to the. program but which rIequirh deta'iled definition hav'e beeh defined in the ECTG Procedure Manual (elg., genlric, specific, nuclear safety-related, unreviewed safety-signiit'icIant qitestion).'l
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22400 FRONT KNITTER REV:
2 PAGE v OF viii Acronyms AI AISC ANS ANSI ASME.
ASTH AMS BFN CAQ CAR CATD CCTS CEG-H CFR CI CNTR COC Administrative Instruction American Institute of Steel Construction hs Low As Reasonably Achievable American Nuclear Society American National Standards Institute American Society of Nechanical Engineers American Society.for Testing and Materials American Melding Society Brogans Ferry Nuclear Plant Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Condition Adverse to Quality Corrective Action, Report Corrective Action Tracking Document Corporate Commitment Tracking System Category "Evaluation Group Head Code of Federal Regulations Concerned Individual Certified Material Test Report Corti'ficate of Conformance/Compliance DCR DNC Design Change Request Division of Nuclear Construction (see also NU CON)
TVA EHPGOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM IREPORT NlJNBER:
22400 FRONT HATTER REV:
2 PhGE vi OF viii DNE DNQA DOE DPO Division of. Nuclear Eng,ineering Division of Nuclear Quality Assurance Division of Nuclear Training department of Energy Diivision Per.sonnel Officer DR ECN ECP ECP-SR ECSP EEOC EQ EN DES ERT FCR GET HCI HVAC INPD IRN Discrepancy Report or Deviation Report Engineering, Change Notice Employee Concerns Program Employee Concerns Program-Site Representative Employee Concerns Special Pcogram Employee Concerns Task Group Equal Fmployment Opportunity Commissiois.
Environmental Qualification Emergency Hedical Response Team Engineering Design Employee
Response
Team or Emergency
Response
Team Field Change Reques t'inal
.'safety hnalysis Report; Fiscal Year General Employee Traint.ng Hazard Control Instruction Heating' Ventilating, Air Conditioning Install,ation Instruction Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Inspection Rejection Notice 0
il
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22400 FRONT MATTER REV:
2 PhGE vii OF viii L/R MMI MI MSPB Labor Relations Staff'odifications and Additions Instruction Maintenance Instruction Merit Systems Protection Board MT Magnetic Particle Testing NDE NPP NPS Nonconforming Condition Report Nondestructive Examination Nuclear Performance Plan Non-plant Specific or Nuclear Procedures System Nuclear Quality hssurance Manual NRC NSB Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Services Branch NSRS NU CON NUMARC OSHA ONP OWCP PHR PT Qh QAP
,Nuclear Safety Review Staff Division of Nuclear Construction (obsolete abbreviation, see DNC)
Nuclear Utility Management and Resources Committee Occupational Safety and Health Administration (or hct)
Office of Nuclear Power Office of Workers Compensation Program Personal History Record Liquid Penetrant Testing Quality Assurance Quality Assurance Procedures QC QCI Quality Control, Quality Control Instruction
TVA KKPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIhL PROGRhN REPORT NUMBER:
22400 FRONT NhTTER REV'.
2 Pk.GiE viii OF vii,i QCP QTC RIF RT
'SQN'X SOP SRP SMEC TAS TEL Quality Control Procedure Quality Technology Company Reduction in Force Radiographic Testing Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Surveillance Instruction Standard Operating Procedure SenIior Review Panel Stone,and Webster Erigi.neering Corporation Technical Assistance Staff Trades and Labor TVTLC UT WBECSP MBN Tennessee Valley,huthority Tennessee Valley Trades and Labor Council Ultrasonic Testing Visual Testing Watts Bar,Employee Concern Special Program Watts Bar Nuclear Plant WP Mock Request or Mock Rules Morkplans
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22400 REVISION NUMBER: 2 Page 2 of 21 Section Executive Summary Preface ECSP Glossary of Report Terms Acronyms CONTENTS
~Pa e
ES-1 1
Introduction 2
Generic Applicability/Summary of Issues 3
Evaluation Process 4
Findings 5
Corrective Actions 6
Causes 7
Collective Significance Glossary Supplement for the Engineering Category Attachments A
Employee Concerns for Subcategory 22400 B
Summary of Issues,
- Findings, and Corrective Actions for Subcategory 22400 C
References 12
'14 15 19 A-1 B-1 C-1 TABLES Tahle 1
Classification of Findings and Corrective Actions 2
Findings Summary 3
Matrix of Elements, Corrective Actions, and Causes
~Pa e
16 17 18 27230-R14 (10/09/87)
0 0
0
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS
. SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22400 REVISION NUMBER: 2 Page 3 of 21 1.
INTRODUCTION This subcategory report summarizes and evaluates the results of the ECSP element evaluations prepared under Engineering 'Subcategory
- 22400, Raceway Support Design, and includes such items as seismic requirements, support connections, suoport design, seismic safety of nonsupported Flamastic-covered
- cable, orovision for expansion of conduit, and seismic qualification of locally mounted electrical motor, boxes.
Eleveh employee concerns provide the basis for the element evaluations and are listed by element number in Attachment A.
The plant location where the concern was originally identified and the applicability of the concern to other TVA nuclear plant sites are also identified.
The evaluations are summarized in the balance of this report as follows:
o Section 2 summarizes, by element, the issues stated or implied in the employee concerns and addresses the determination of generic aopl icabi 1 ity o
Section 3'
outlines the process followed for the element and subcategory evaluation and cites documents reviewed o
Section 4 summarizes, by element, the findings and identifies the negative findings that must be resolved o
Section 5 highlights the corrective actions required for resolution of the negative findings cited in Section 4 and relates them to element and to plant site o
Section 6 identifies causes of the negative findings o
Section 7 assesses the significance of the negative findings o
Attachment
'A lists, by element, each employee concern evaluated in the subcategory.
The concern's number is given along with notation of any other element or category with which the concern is
- shared, the plant sites to which it could be applicabl'e are noted, the concern is quoted as received by TVA, and is characterized as safety related',
not safety related, or safety significant 2723D-R14 (10/09/87)
'TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGIRAMi REPORT 'NUMBER:,
2240iO REVISION NUMBER: 2 Page 4 of 21 o
Attachment 8 contains a summary of the element-level evaluations.
Eachi issuie is listed, by element number and plant opposite its corresponding findings aind correct'ive actions.
The reader may tracie
- a. conciern fromi Atitachment A to an issue in Attachmient 8 by using the-element numbei and applicable plant.
The reader may relate a corrective action desc'ription in Attachment B to causes and significance in Table 3 by using the CATD number which appears in Attachment B in. parenth'eses at the end of the corrective action description.
The tecum "Peripheral finding" in the isSue column refers to a
finding that occurred during the course of evaluating a concern
- but, did not stem directly from a employed cOncern.
These are classified as "E" in Tables 1
and 2 of thi.L r'epa'irt' Attachment C lists the references cited in the text 2.
GENERIC APPLICABILITY/
SUMMARY
OF ISSIIES The employee concerns listed in Attachment A fair each element and plant have been
- examined, and the potential problems ra'ised by the 11 concerns have been identified as ten issues.
These issues were reviewed in the element evaluations for the six e'lements of this report.
Not all issues apply to every plant because not a'll of the employee concerns from which they.orhginaife apply to every plant.
Applicability determinations of each concern, within each-element, were made in accordance with 'Section 7.3 of Employee Concern's Task Group Procedure ECTG M. 1, Program Description,'-'ey.
5.
The criteria for making the generic applicability determinations are described in ECTG M. 1, Attachment, Ee The. criteri a Clearly limit the determinations iof i
generic applicabi'lity to c.ircumstances where there i," "I'easonable factual, basis (not:merely speculation)" for concluding ithat a concern is genersi'nd apolicable to other iplants or plarlt featur'es.
2.1
~Generic A gliicabil~it r Distermination The generic applicability determinations Aadh are given'elow:
2.1.1 Elements 224.1, 224.2, and 224.3 Concerns IN-85-289-003, IN-8!5-289-N08, IN '85'10'/-001
> IN-'85-289-'004, IN-85-325-004, EX-85-066-001, and EX-85-068-001 were evaluated f'r WBN.
Upon evaluation these concerns we're found not to be val'id.
In addition, the evaluation concluded that the concerned indiyidiuals had an incomplete understanding of the design process in the, concern area.
Therefore, these concer ns were not reviewekl for the other plantsi.
2723D-R14 (10/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22400 REVISION NUMBER: 2 Page 5 of 21
- 2. 1.2 Element 224.5 Concern MAS-86-005 was evaluated only for SQN because of its specific reference to SQN features.
- Also, TVA had already initiated corrective action for this concern before the ECTG evaluation, and no further corrective action was specified by the evaluation team.
Thus, this concern was not evaluated for the other plants.
- 2. 1.3 Element 224.7 Concern BNP-QCP-10.35-8-1 was evaluated for BLN.
Upon evaluation, this concern was found not to be valid.
In addition, the concern cited BLN unique features.
Therefore,.this concern was not evaluated for other plants.
- 2. 1.4 Element 224.9 Concerns BNP-QCP-10.35-16 and OE-QMS-6 were evaluated for BLN regarding seismic qualification of ERCW pump motor boxes and installation.
The evaluation team determined that while the concerns were valid when initiated, a technical. issue no longer existed because of the adequate seismic qualification documentation prepared by BLN after the date of the concern.
This corrective action was initiated before the ECTG evaluation, and no further corrective action was specified by the evaluation team.
Therefore, these concerns were not evaluated for the other plants.
2.2 Summar of Issues A summary of the ten issues evaluated under this subcategory, grouped by
- element, is listed 'below.
o 224.
1 Cateqor I vs Noncate or I Racewa
- The cable tray and conduit support seismic requirements in the Turbine and Control Buildings are less than those for the supports in the Auxiliary and Reactor Buildings (applied to WBN).
27230-R14 (10/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
2I24OO REVISION NUMBER:
Page 6 of 21 o
224.~2 Racew~a Connections
- 'Cable tray supports should be assumed as piinned so that moments are not developed
'at 'ceiling embedded plates which, are not, strong enough to resist imposed moments.
Beveled full penetraItion welds should have been used in the conduit
~
suppori: design instead of butt'welds'r fillet welds (appllied to WBN).
o 224.~3Racew~a La~out - Conduits do 'not have adequate support design because the number o7 support types for supporting multiple conduits on a
common supoort is insufficient.
Conduit routing was poorly planned
- and, a.
a result, conduits require too many supports'n'd are'oorly located (applied tio WBN).
~ o 224.~5Supoort of Cables
- The nonsupported Flamastic-covered cable in the cable spreading room that penetrates walls and ceiling may not be seism~ically safe (applied to SgN).
o 224.~7 Conduit ~Expansion/Movement' Oifferential movements between structural elements Mothe~unst Reactor Bulldinq are not considered in the design of electrical conduits.(tipplied to BLN).
o 224.~9ERCW Pum~Electr ical Motor Boxes - The lack of seismii:
~ana ysis and mounting details for the electrical motor boxes attached to the ERCW pump motors is an 'oversight by the manufacturer'nd Enginieering (applied to BLN).,'he issue summaries, above deal with presumed defi~ciencies or inadequacies in the design of raceway supports.
More specific'all'y, four of the issue summaries are concerned with the design adequacy '(224.'1, 224.2,,
224'.3,'and 224.5) and the other two suggest, oversights or errors in the design (224e7 and 224.9).
As the followinq sections show, three of ithe above summarized. issues were found to be valid and require corrective actions (224.3, 224.5 and 224;9).
Two of these involve design
- adequacy, and the otheriinvolves design oversights or errors.
Each issue evaluated within the element is stated fully in Attachment B, which also lists corresponding findings and corrective actions that are discossLd
'in
'ections 4 and 5 of this report.
27230-R14 (10/09'/87) ii
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22400 REVISION NUMBER:
2 Page 7 of 21 3.
EVALUATION PROCESS This subcategory report is based. on the information contained in the applicable element evaluations addressing the speciric employee concerns related to the issues summarized in Section 2.
The evaluation process consisted of the general methodology used in the evaluation (Section
- 3. 1) as well as the specific method employed in each element evaluation (Section 3.2).
3.1 General'valuation Process The general evaluation process is as follows:
a ~
b.
Defined issues for each element from the employee concerns.
Reviewed current regulatory requirements, industry standards, and TVA criteria documents related to the issues to develop an understanding of the design basis.
c.
Reviewed applicable design documents and conducted facility walkdowns, as appropriate, to develop design understanding and to verify implementation status.
d.
Reviewed applicable FSAR to determine regulatory compliance and to identify TVA commitments related to the design.
e.
Reviewed any other documents applicable to the issues and determined to be needed for the evaluation, such as correspondence, transcripts of interviews, procedures, test reports,
- reports, etc.
f.
Using the results from steps a through e above, evaluated the issues for each element.
q.
Tabulated
- issues, findings, and corrective actions from the element evaluations in a plant-by-plant arrangement (see Attachment B).
h.
Prepared Tables 1, 2, and 3 to permit comparison and identification of common and unique issues,
- findings, and corrective actions among the four plants.
1
~
Classified the findings and corrective actions from the element evaluations using the ECSP definitions.
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPI.:CIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
,22400, REVISION NUMBER: 2 I
Page 8 ofI j.
On the basis of ECSP guidelines, analyzed the causes and'established the collective significance of'he findings from the element evaluations.
k.
Evaluated defined corrective actioriis to determine if additional actions are required as a result of causes found in step j.
1.
Provided additional judgment or information that may not be appar'ent at the element level.
3.2 Specific Evaluation Process The evaluation process For each element is given below.
o
~Cate
~a~r I vs.
Noncateoo~r 1 Racewa (Matte Ear
-. Element 224.1 a.
IReviewed FSAR licensing commitments.
b.
Reviewed Design Criteria WB 00-20-21.
1 (Ref.
- 2) and WB-DC-40;31e10 (Ref. 3) c.
Performed plar>t walkdown in the Control and Auxiliary Buildings to compare raceway support configurations.
o Racewa~Connection.;
(lsatts Rar) - Element 2'24s2 a.
IReviewed Design Criteria WB-DC-20-2l.l (Ref.
2). and IAB-OC-40.31.1() (Ref. 3) and also raiceway support dr<awings.
b.
Performed detail review of cable tray supports located at, Auxiliary Building elevation 757e0 feet, and Control Buil'di~'ig
'levation 755. O,Feet.
c.
IReviewed cable t:ray support Calculation WCG-2-28 (Ref.'4).
d.
Reviewed specified welding types and sizes of conduit support 1
in drawing series 47A056 (Ref., 5).
o Raceway~La Eout~Watts Ba~r-Eleiment 224.3 a.
'Reviewed FSAR licensing commitments.
b.
IReviewed Design Criteria WB-OC-40-31.10 (Re'F;
- 3) for conduit sup(ports.
2723D-R14 (10/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22400 REVISION NUMBER: 2 Page 9 of 21 c.
Reviewed drawing series 47A056 (Ref.
- 5) conduit support.
d.
Performed walkdown to observe conduit support details.
o Support of Cables Sequo ah
. - Element 224.5 a.
Reviewed appropriate design documents that support the existinq configurati on.
b.
c ~
Performed walkdowns of the cable spreading roce and main control room to review existing conditions.
Identified vertical and horizontal support at the cable spreading room ceiling and determined if there are other supports.
Perf ormed required analysi s.
o Conduit Ex ansion/Movement Bell'efonte) - Element 224.7 a.
Reviewed General Construction Specification G-40 (Ref.
- 6) for installation of electrical conduits.
b.
Walked down unit 1 Reactor Building at elevation 662 feet around azimuth '300 degree of both the primary containment and the secondary shielding wall (0-ring wal.l) to observe conduit installation interface between the two structural elements.
c.
Reviewed drawing 5RW0816-RU-9 (Ref.
- 7) for electrical raceway layout at location in question.
o ERCW Pump Electrical Motor Boxes (Bellefonte) - Element 224.9 a.
'Reviewed appropriate design documents and OE Calculation CEB-CAS-179 (Ref.
- 8) that support the existing configuration.
b.
Performed a walkdown of the ERCW pump electrical motor boxes located in the Int'ake Pumping Station.
Identified mounting installation between electrical box and ERCW pump motor.
c.
Perf ormed required analysis.
4.
F INO INGS The findings from each of the six element evaluations for this subcateqory are contained in Attachment B.
The findings are listed by element number and by plant.
2723D-R14 (10/09/87)
lVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22400 REVISION NUMBER: 2 Page 10 of 21 The findings for each element are summarized below:
4.1
~Cate or
[ vs tloncatecro~r I Racewa
- Elersent 2'24e 1
Class lE electrical service.is provided in Category I structures which include the Reactor, Auxiliary,, and Control Buildings.'For comparable elevations in the Auxiliary and Control Buildings at WBN, the design basis and design output for cable tray and conduit supports are the same.
The electrical services provided in non-Category I facilities, such as the Turbine Building, are not essential to the safe shutdown of the power lplanti or. to maintaining radiation limits within NRC prescribed limits at thie sith bbuddafy.'hus, the Turbine Building cable tray supports are non-Category I and are designed to a
1'esser'esign
- basis, and this i's adequate.
4.2
~Racewa Connect,iona
- E',lament 2'24.2 Since cable tray support members are welded 'to'the embed plates at, WBN, the design assumption fair the connection should not be c'hanged,from a rigid to a
pin connection,.
Design. calculations of tien cable tray supports (Ref. 4) which imposed loads to the embed plates were revie'wed. 'hese supports were selected to'nclude those with longer cantilever distance from the ceiling support and those with a larger number of attached cable trays to provide an envelope assessment of 'larger imposedi moments.
This review indicates that the embed plates and anchors are adequate to resist the forces and moments imposed during seismic events.
Also, the weld type and size specified on the conduit support design drawing 47A056 series (Ref.
- 5) are found to be sufficient to meet design req'uirements.
4.3
~Racewa La~out - Element 224.3 Watts Bar conduit drawing 47A056 series (Ref.
- 5) has show'n bioth multiple and single conduit suipport types.
The use of single conduit supports is frequently necessitated by'.plant layout. 'uring a p'lant walkdawn in March 1986, the evaluation team observed that both multiple and single conduit suoports were used.
The conduit routing and'umber of 'supports are adequaite A review of the Watts Bar. Finall Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Section 3.10.3 (Ref. 9) and conduit support Design Criteria WB-DC-40.31. 10 (Ref. 3) has identified a disalgreement in conduit damping values in the design of conduit suooorts.
Also, the desirgn criteria do not require the conduit support evaluation for an operating basis earthquake (OBE).
2723D-R14 (10/09/87),
0
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22400 REVISION NUMBER: 2 Page 11 of 21 4.4 Support of Cables - Element 224.5 On the basis of several walkdowns and subsequent evaluations (Refs.
1 and 10) performed by the evaluation team on the laterally unsupported Flamastic-covered vertical cables in the SgN. cable spreading room,. adequate vertical and horizontal cable restraint is provided to support the vertical cable runs under any design load.
SgN had performed a full-scale shake table test of as-built configuration of Flamastic-covered cables (Ref. 11).
The test was initiated before ECTG investigation..
This test together with the above walkdowns and evaluations adequately demonstrates the seismic qualification of the laterally unsupported and Flamastic-covered vertical cables in the SON cable spreading room.
4.5 Conduit Expansion/Movement - Element 224.7 General Construction Specification G-40 (Ref.
- 6) states that flexible conduit shall be used to interface the rigid conduit system with electrical equipment when they are subject to relative movements due to either thermal or seismic loading.
In addition, drawing 5RW0816-RU-9 (Ref.
- 7) explicitly requires the use of flexible conduit to prevent rigid attachments between the primary containment.
and either the secondary containment or the containment internal structures.
A walkdown was performed by the evaluation team to observe a portion of the interface between the primary containment shell and adjacent structures.
In all cases, including a specific review at elevation 622 feet, azimuth 300',
no violations to the above criteria were observed.
Contrary to the concern, flexible conduit was installed where electrical cables were attached to both structural elements.
In an effort to locate the specific installation identified in the concern (unit 1 Reactor Building, elevation 622 feet and azimuth 300'), the evaluation team viewed the secondary shield wall (0-ring wall) at the corresponding location.
At approximately a 10'ffset on either side of azimuth 300'n the outside of the steam generator compartment, two series of conduits came out of
-the floor and connected to. an electrical box attached to the wall.
One series of conduits used a portion of flexible conduit and the other adjacent series used only rigid conduit.
This installation is detailed in drawing 5RW0816-RU-13 as section A13-A13 (Ref. 12).
It is evident to the evaluation team that this was the source of the concern filed.
The structural configuration was.reviewed at the locations in question as detailed in the BLN FSAR, Figure 3.8.3-4 (Ref. 13), Section A6-A6.. This figure revealed that the floor slab at elevation 622 feet and the secondary shield wall were.integrally attached utilizing reinforcing-dowels.
On the 2723D-R14 (10/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22400 REVISION NUMBER:
Page 12 ofI basis of this fact, it is evident that there willi bie no appreciable, differential moviement between the floor penetration and the wall-mounted
'lectrical box.
Therefore, flexible conduit is not necessary for the installations.,
'l'he fact that flexible conduit was used f'r one series'f conduits has rio yegative impact on the d@sign and does not viol.ate anyi TVA i
requirements cir commitments.
4e6 ERCW Pump Electrical Miotor Boxes - Element '24.9 The ERCW pump electrical motor boxes of'Conceran are thermal element juinctiioA boxes.
There are four ERCW pump motors for'arth 'unit 'and one thermal element junction box f'r each motor.
The ERCW pump electri~mal motor boxes and installation at BLN were evaluated by TVA before the ECTG investigation.
TVA qual'ified the motor boxes and installation to 'seismic Category I(L) anI determined that no additional supports ar'e required for the boxes, (Ref< 8i).
i Ai walkdown of the motor boxes and subsequent evaluatiOn performed by the evaluation team confirmed the seismic quailification,.
On the basis of 6 General Electric Company (Gl=) letter to TVA (Ref. 14),
thie ERCW pump electrical motor boxes are'ot considered critiical to the operation of the motors.
While the boxes do monitor temperature conditions, the motors will continue to operate without them.'.7
~Summer of liubcatecLci~r Findi~ns The classified fiindings are summarized ini Table 1.
Class A and B findings indicate there is no probilern and that correcti ve action is not required.
Class C, 0, and E findings require corrective actions..
The corrective action
- class, defined in the Glossary Supplement, iis identified in the table by the numeral combined with the,f inding class.
'indings are summarized by classification in Table 2.
Of the ten findings identified by a classificat'ion in Table 1,
seven require no corrective action.
Of the remainingi-three, two had. corrective actions initiated bIefdre'he ECTG evaluationwhich have been completed.
One required a
new corrective action to resolve a peripheral issue noted during the ECTiG evaluation.
i~
5.
CORRECTIVE.ACTIiONS Table 2 identifies three findings that require corrective action.
Eachi finding is addressed by a sing'le corrective 'action description for an individual plaint.
lhere are a total of'hree different corrective acti'on'escriptions required to remedy the three'e'gat!ivL findings.
The corrective
- actions, along with their finding/correctiveI adtiibn classifications, ar' summarized in 'lable 3.
Two of the corrective actions were initiated before the ECTG evaluations and have been completed.
The remaining one i's net adti6n'l 27230-R14 (10/09/87)
~8
~ ~, ~
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22400 REVISION NUMBER: 2 Page 13 of 21'equired to resolve a Watts Bar peripheral issue identified during the evaluations.
This corrective action is described in detail in Attachment B.
A summary of the corrective actions by element, with the applicable plant identified in. parentheses, fol 1ows:
o 224.3, Raceway Layout - The FSAR and conduit support design criteria wi be revised as required to show the correct conduit damping values used for both OBE and SSE load conditions.
Also, the OBE load condition with its associated damping values will be evaluated or its exclusion fran conduit support design criteria will be justified (WBN).
o 224.5, Support of Cable - A shake table test by TVA, together with severa wa downs and subsequent evaluations performed by the evaluation team on cable anchorage at the cable spreading roan ceiling,.confirmed the seismic qualification of the laterally unsupported and Flamastic-covered vertical cables in the cable spreading room (SON).
o 224.9 ERCW Pump Electrical Motor Boxes -
ONE qualified the ERCW pump e ectrica motor boxes and insta ation as seismic Category I(L) and determined that no additional supports are required for the boxes.
A walkdown of the pump motor boxes and subsequent evaluation performed by the evaluation team confirmed the seismic qualification of the ERCW pump electrical motor box installation (BLN).
Table 3 indicates the plant or plants to which a corrective-action is applicable by the Corrective Action Tracking Document (CATO) column where the applicable plant is identified by the CATO number.
Fr om the Finding/Corrective Action Classification column of Table 3, it can be seen that of the three corrective actions identified, the first requir es some type of documentation remedy and evaluation to verify adequacy of design, the second involved testing and evaluations to validate the desiqn, and the third required analysis to justify the installation.
In addition, the CATO column of the table shows that a particular corrective action is applicable to only a single plant.
The corrective actions for elements 224.5 and 224.9 were initiated before the ECTG evaluation and have been completed.
Therefore, no CATDs were generated for these two elements.
With respect to corrective actions, Table 3 shows that, of the six elements in this subcategory, three require no corrective action (namely, elements 224. 1, 224.2',
and 224. 7) and three require corrective action (namely, elements 224.3, 224.5, and 224.9);
two corrective actions were initiated before the ECTG evaluation and have been completed.
27230-R14 (10/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERI'tS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
224OO REVISION NUMBER 2
Page 14 of 21 The evaluation team found the corrective actior> plan for element 224.3 and the completed corrective actions for elements'24.5 ahd '224.9'o be acceptable to resolve the findings.
6.
CAUSES Table 3 identifies one or more causes for each prioblem requiring corrective action.
For each corrective. action, the dos't impbrtant cause is:identified; however, in some instances, it was felt that tHe problem resulted from a combination of causes, each of which should
'be 'idI nt'ified,,
Therefore, more than one cause is identified for some of 'the corrective actions,.
For the three corrective action descriptibns listed in Table 3, six causes have been checked.
These.are shown in the table and totaled at the end.
The most frequent cause is "Inadequate Design Bases,"
column 8.
This cause, which reflects on the design
- process, and more particularly on design documentation, represents two of the six causes checked.
The following identifies the causes of Table 3 and the associated.
element evaluations with the negative findings id<~ntified sn Section 4:
o Reconci'l,iation of the FSAR and (:onduit support design criteri'a t'o
'liminate inconsistencies in cohdu'it 'daniping values is required for Watts Bar because of inconsistent and contradictory design bases in estabilishi,ng design requirement4.
Also,, evaluation of the OBE load condition to verify adequacy of conduit sul>port or justifiCattion fear its exc'lusion from the conduit Cup5or't design criteri a is r eqdired because of fai lure toi meet design commitment.
i 0
0 Seismic safety of the late~ally unsupported vertical cables in the Sequoyah cable spreading rdoms was'co'nfirmed to be adequate by. a shake tablie test and several walkdowns and subsequent evaluations.
The cause of this problem appeared to b6 incoiinpl'ete design bases, in establishing design requirements,.
DNE qualified. the I=RCW plump eleCtrical rtlotdr box'es and installation at Bellefonte as seismic Category I(L) and determined that no additional supports are required for the boxes.
The lack of Drevious seisimic qualification of t'.he'RCW pump electrical motor boxes is an, oversight or error by both the vendor and TVA Engineering..
This oversight or error also led to the omissior'i of design of support detail regardi~ng ~the iinstallation.
4l 2723D-R14 (10/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22400 REVISION NUMBER: 2 Page 15 of 21 7.
COLLECTIVE S IGNIFICANCE The evaluation team's judgment as to the significance of the corrective actions listed in Table 3 is indicated in the last three columns of the table.
Significance is. rated in accordance with the type or types of chanqes that may be expected to result from the corrective action.
The ll concerns expressed by TVA employees and covered in this subcategory directly resulted in three corrective actions.
SON corrective action (element 224.5) and BLN corrective action (element 224.9) had been initiated before the ECTG evaluation and have been completed.
Watts Bar corrective action for element 224.3 was considered individually important fran a safety standpoint because it requires reconciliation of FSAR and conduit support design criteria to show that the same conduit damping values are used for design of conduit support.
Evaluation of the OBE load condition to verify adequacy of conduit support design or justify its exclusion frcm conduit support design criteria may result in minor hardware modification.
Because of the relatively low number of negative findings in this subcategory and the random nature of the causes, it cannot be concluded that the raceway support design for the four plant sites investigated and for the areas evaluated in this subcategory represents a serious technical problem.
No broader issues can be identified in this area.
On the basis of these conclusions, the subject matter of this subcategory report does not require specific treatment in the TVA Nuclear Performance Plans.
The findings of this subcategory are being combined with the other subcateqory reports and reassessed in the Engineering category evaluation.
27230-R14 (10/09/87)
lVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REIPORT NUMBER: '2400 REVISIOII NUMBER: 2 Page 16 of 21
'IABLE 1
CLASSIFICA1 ION OF FINDINGS ANI3'ORRECTIVE ACTIONS 224.
1 Element Category I vs Noncategory I Raceway Issue/
Fi nding">>indi ng/Correct ive
'Action Class'"
, BLN B
224.2 Raceway Connect:ions 224.3 Raceway Layout 224.5 Support', of Cables a
b c
a b
c C6 A
A A
A
,A E6 224. 7 224. 9 Conduit, Expansion/
Movement ERCW Pump Electrical Motor Boxes C5 II
- Classification of'indinqs and Corrective A(;tions, A.
Issue not valid.
No corrective action required.
B.
Issue valid but consequences acceptable.
No corrective action required.
C.
Issue valid.
Corrective action initiated before ECTG evaluation.,
D.
Issue valid.
Corrective action taken as a result of ECTG evaluation.
E.
Peripheral issue uncovered dur'ing ECTG evaluation.
Corrective action required.
- >>'Defined for each plant in Attachment B.
1.
Har'dware
', 2. Procedure
- 3. Documentation
- 4. Training
- 5. Analys,is
- 6. i.:valuati.on
- 7. Other 0
27230-R14 (10/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22400 REVISION NUMBER: 2 Page 17 of 21 TABLE 2 FINDINGS
SUMMARY
Plant Classification of Findin s
A.
Issue not valid.
No corrective action required.
SON
5.
0 1
6 B.
Issue valid but consequences acceptable.
0 1
0 0
No corrective acti on required.
C.
Issue valid.
Corrective action initiated before ECTG evaluation.
1 0
0 1
D.
E.
Issue valid.
Corrective acti on taken as a result of ECTG evaluation.
Peripheral issue uncovered during ECTG evaluation.
Corrective action required.
0 0
0 0
0 1,
0 0
Total 1
7 0
2 10 2723D-R14 (10/09/87)
IASLE 3 NAIRIX Of ELEMENTS~ CURRECflVE ACTIONS ~ AND CAUSES SUSCAIEQNY 22400'EVISIONlnautERT 2 PAGE 18 OF 21 IKNAGENENI EFFECT IVENESS CAUSES Of NEGATIVE FINDINGS +
I TECNN ICAL DESIGN PROCESS EfFECTIVENESS ADE Y
I 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
9 10
. I I 12
'13 14 IS
'6 if I
224+3 E6 F INDIN6/
CORRECTIVE ACTION ElEN CLASS "
CNRECIIVE ACTION Correct dlsagreenent between the conduit daaptng vaiues Shuwn In the FSAR and deaign crlter l~.
Evaluate DSE load condition or JusltIFy the basis for Its exclusion In the rhhdw le
~lahhhtf Akclllh criteria.
Frag-
)
)
)Preen-)Inade-)
)Inade-)
)Engrg )Design) lnsuf.)
)nented)lnade-)Inade-)dures
)quate
)Un-
)
)Inade-)
)quate
) lack )tudgnt)crit/ )Yerlf )stds
)Organ-)quate
)quate
)Not
)Cou-
)tlnely)tack
)quate )Inade-)As-bit) of
) not
)Ccoalt)0ocu-
)Not
) laa-
)
0-
)Proce-)Fol-
)nunl- )Res of)of Hgt(Design/quate (Recon-)Design)Oocu-
) Not
)nenta-)Fol-CATD tlon t
dures lowed cation Issues Atten Bases Calcs cll.
Detail nented Net tlon lowed VSN 01
)
Significa-
) ncece of
) Corrective
)Engrg )Vendor)
Actions'rror Error 0
H N
I I
I
)Alp)PI 224+$
Corrective action for SON uas Inltlate4 before the ECTC evaluation.
A shake table test and several walkdownt evalwat ihns were perforned.
They conf Trued the seisn'Ic qualification of the laterally unsupported F3anastic-covered verticai cables In the cable spreading roon (SON) 224+9 CS Corrective action for SLN uas iniv s ~ vew be(A a
~ ha r ran evaluation.
ONE qualified the ERCV puup ~lectrical notor boxes and Installatfon
~s selsnlc Category I(L) and requires no additional supportw A uaikdown and evaluat404 by 1 4 evaluation tean conflrned the selsnlc quaiification.
{SLN)
X X
TOTALS I
I
~
Oeflsal In the Glnaaary Supplenent,'efined In Table I ~
2 124 D-RS (ID/Og/81)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22400 REVISION NUMBER: 2 Page 19 of 21-GLOSSARY SUPPLEMENT FOR THE ENGINEERING CATEGORY Causes of Ne ative Findin s - the causes for findings that require corrective action are categorize as ollows:
1.
Fra mented or anization - Lines of authority, responsibility, and accountabi ity were not clearly defined.
2.
3.
Inadequate qualit (Q) trainin
- Personnel were not fully trained in the procedures esta ished or design process control and in the maintenance of design documents, including audits.
Inadequate pr ocedures - Design and, modification control methods and procedures were de scient in establishing requirements and did not.
ensure an'ffective'esign control program in some areas.
4.
Procedures not followed - Existing procedures controlling the design process were not u
y adhered to.
5.
Inadequate conmunications - Communication, coordination, and cooperation were not i.u y effective-in supplying needed information within plants, between plants and organizations (e.q.,
Engineering, Construction, Licensing, and Operations),
and between interorganizati onal disciplines and departments.
6.
Untimel resolution of issues
- Problems were not resolved in a
time y manner, an t eir resolution was not agqressively pursued.
7.
Lack of mana ement attention - There was a lack of management attention in ensurinq that programs required for an effective desiqn process were established and implemented.
\\
8.
Inadequate desiqn bases
- Desiqn bases were lacking,
- vague, or incomp ete for design execution and verification and for design change evaluation.
9.
Inadequate calculations - Design calculations were inccmplete, used incorrec inpu or assumptions, or otherwise failed to fully demonstrate compliance with design requirements or support design output documents.
10.
Inadequate as-built reconciliation - Reconciliation of design and icensing documents with p ant as-.built condition was lacking or incan 1 etc.
2723D-R14
( 10/09/87)
.EMPLOYEE CONCERNS
'SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
92460 RIEVISION NUMBER: 2 Page 20 of 21 ll.
Lack of clesi~n detail - Detail irI di~sign output d'ocuments was insi27icient to ensure compliancE. with design requirements.
12.
Failure to document engineerin~
ud ments - Documentation justIifying engineering judgments used in the design prOcess was lacking or inc omp 1 ete.
13.
Design criteria/commitments not met - Design criteria or lie'.en0inq ccmiiiitments were not met.
14.
Insufficitent veritfication documentation
- Docuimenitation (Q) was Tf
- 15.
Staindards not followed - Code or ini5ustry standards and practices were not c anp Tied w ith.
16.
~En ineerinq error - There were erroi s or oversiqhts in the assumptions,,
methodology, or judgments'Sed'in the design process.
17.
Vendor. erroir - Vendor design or supplied itl~ms were deficient for
'ttte intenMe8 purpose.
Classification o$ Corrective Actions - correcI<ive aictions are classified. as
~
fWT l.
Hardware - physical plant changes 2.
Pro."edur<! - changed or generated a procedure 3.
Documentation - affected QA recoitdsi 4.
Traini~n
- required personnel education 5.
Analysis - irequired design calcutat'jonp,,etq.,
tq resolve 6.
Evaluation - initial corrective auction, pl,an inIdicated a need tO evatua7e
'7he issue before a defiiIiitive plan could.be established.
Therefore, all hardware, procedure, etc.,
changes are not yet known Other - items not listed above 0
Peripheral FindincC +Issue) - A negative finding that does not result directly E>>
evaluating an employee concern.
By definition, peripheral findings (issues) require corrective acti on.
2723D-R14 (10/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22400 REVISION NUMBER: 2 Page 21 of 21 Si nificance of Corrective Actions - The evaluation team's judgment as to the signs icance of the corrective actions listed in Table 3 is indicated in the last three columns of the table.
Significance is rated in accordance with the type or types of changes that may be expected to result from the corrective action.
Changes are categorized as:
o Oocumentation change (0) - This is a change to any desiqn input or output document (e.g.,
drawing, specification, calculation, or procedure) that does not result in a significant reduction in design margin.
o Change in desiqn margin (M) - This is a change in design interpretation (minimum requirement vs actual capability) that.
results in a significant
( outside normal limits of expected accuracy) change in the design margin.
All designs include margins to allow for error and unforeseeable events.
Changes in desiqn margins are a normal and acceptable part of the design and construction process as long as the final design margins satisfy regulatory requirements and applicable codes and standards.
o Change of hardware (H) - This is a physical change to an existinq plant structure or component that'esults from a change in the design basis, or that is required to correct an initially inadequate design or design error.
If the change resulting from the corrective action is judged to be significant, either an "A" for actual or "P" for potential is entered into the appropriate column of Table 3.
Actual is distinguished from potential because corrective actions are not complete and, consequently, the scope of required chanqes may not be known.
Corrective actions are judqed to be siqnificant if the resultant changes affect the overall quality, performance, or margin of a
safety-related structure,
- system, or component.
27230-R14
( 10/09/87)
P L
~
h
~
I I
J
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22400 REVISION NUMBER: 2 Page A-1 of 3 ATTACHMENT A EMPLOYEE CONCERNS FOR SUBCATEGORY 22400 Attachment A -- lists, by element, each employee concern evaluated in the subcategory.
The concern number is given along with notation of any other element or category with which the concern is shared, the plant sites to which it could be applicable are noted, the concern is quoted as received by TVA, and is characterized as safety related, not safety related, or safety significant.
0107A-R43 (10/09/87)
lllllllll CONCERN IIUIIITI PLANT LOCATION AIIACIINtNT A EHPLUYEL CONCERNS FUR SUUCAIEGURY 22400 APPL ICABILI T Y CONCERN OESCRIPIIUN'I.VISIUN NUMEN; 2
PAGE. A-2 UF 3 2LT4.1 IN-85-289-.003 MUN "The requirement for cable tray supports Is far less stringent In the turbine and control building than aux and reactor buildings.
To prove the point, CI-states that cable tray supports In turbine and control buildings are not as strong as the supportS ln aux and reactor building.
Cl thinks that same earthquake Is goinq to hit all the buildings.
Cl has no more informdtlnns" (SR I IN 85-289-NUB i.'iT4 ~i.'N-Ub-iv/-Uul IN-85-289-004 MUN nur 1IIonf 1f1osl fho fss) Ir lva rr ro f
~
f lsfs'
~ I
~ ~ s.
~
ls v ~
~ vss
~ ~ v s vss\\vs I~
~ ~ srss
~ 44 Ion sss I/is I I In
~ Ilu requirement for conduit supports is far less strinqent In the turbine and controi buiidinqs than the aux.
and reactor buiidinqs.'"
(SR)
Some eel linq embedded
- plates, on which cable tray supports are
- attached, are not strono enouoh to resist hlnh T1oments du>> tn cIicmll
'.loads.
But there are no calculations to prove that they.do not work.
I nnlnoor Ic Ot tho nnin1dn that It ssosusld ha hottos 1f tT a ral la supports are assumed pinned Instead of riqid at the point of 4LLaclfnellt~ so nsoments 41 e OTot developed, CI questions design philOSOphy and haS nO hardWare SpeCiflCSro (SR)
"Oeslgn consistently calls for butt welds on cpnduit supports=built durlnq '78 and '19, Instead of bevel welds, although bevel welds are stronger during an earthquake, CT hds no cpecl fice Construction Dept. concernso (SR)
IN-85-325-004 "Butt welding ono fillet welding of conduit support hangers was InsuffTcient to p1ovide adequate strength and fiexiiiIHty. IilwaS expressed that beveled full penetration welds were necessary.
No further detailS were prOVlded.
(SR)
- (Note:
Presumed error which should read "or")
ass sos
~ IcC
~ JI U
sfaf ralston nnt Jnf nvfJJ lssv Il,olno-ov r vf
~ v sv
~
~
by IVA before evaluations.
iigh ( IU/Ub/8/)
Cdt>>tu rss i<<1>>ST OI Cat>>tv Clnnlt ICdnt n>>r n>>t>>rminatldn Criteria In the EClli Prnqrdm mdnudl dnd dppl led
CONCLRH tlkHENT IIUWltH AIIALIÃLNIA.
Ee'LUTEL CONCERNS FUK SUUCAIEGORT 22400 PLANT APPL ICADILI IT LUCAIIUN 5
NNwUN UFN ULN CUNL'tRH ULSCRIVI SUN'LVISIUN NUKULKI 2
PAGE A-3 OF 3 ZZ4.8 EX-85-066-00l EX-85-U68-001 ZZ4.4 ZZ4.5 ISAS-86-006 NUN SQN ULLETEU "Conduit runs do not have adequate support design.
Ihere are not enough supports designed for multiple conduits, resulting in too many single supports Sn the auxiliary and reactor buildings.
Construction Department concern.
cl has no additional information.
(5R)
"Engineering on conduit runs Is poorly planned.
Hanger brackets are poorly placed.
There are too many of them.
Raceways In accumulator
. room PZ.
Construction Dept concern.
Cl has no additional information."
(SR)
"Are the non-supported Flamastlc covered cables In the spreading room that penetrate the walls and ceiling seismically safe.
(SS)
ZZ4.6 ZZ4.7 SNP-QCP-)0.36-8-1 ULH 0 t L L I t U "KU AI, elevation 6/0, no provision for expansion of pipes/conduits."
(SS)
ZZ4.9 IIHP-QCP-)0.35-16 ULH "No seismic analysis was done on electrical boxes on ERCu pump motors.
Hovement of boxes during seismic event could damage safety-related components."
(SS)
OE-QIIS-6 ULN "Nountlng ot electrical motor boxes on ERcw pump motors contract 7/K36-UZUI22-H4II-IZZ does not show how electrical motor boxes are mounted.
CI feels they are not adequately supported and this Is an oversight by manufacturer and engineering."
(SS)
SH/NU/SS indicates safety related, not Safe'ty related, or Safety significant per determination criteria in the ECIG Program manual and applied by TVA before evaluatSons.
Z/460-4
( IU/Ub/8/)
y 0
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22400 REVISION NUMBER: 2 Page B-l of 9 ATTACHMENT 8
SUMMARY
OF ISSUES, 'FINOINGS, AND CORRECTIVE 'ACTIONS FOR SUBCATEGORY 22400 Attachment 8 contains a summary of. the element-level evaluations.
.Each issue is listed, by element number and plant, opposite its corresponding findings and corrective actions.
The reader may trace a concern from Attachment A to an issue in Attachment B by using the element number and applicable plant.
The reader may relate a corrective action description in Attachment 8 to causes and significance in Table 3 by using the CATO number which appears in Attachment B in parentheses at the end of the corrective action description.
The term "Peripheral finding" in the issue column refers to a finding that occurred during the course of evaluating a concern but did not stem directly from a employee concern.
These are classified as "E" in Tables 1
and 2 of this report.
I 0107A-R43 (10/09/87)
ASTACS94t.NI 8 SUtuUUIY OF
- ISSUES, FINDINGS, ANU CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FUR SUSCATEGURY 22400 RtVISIUH NUMUtR:
Page 8-2 of 9 Issues Findings Corrective Actions
~aaaaaaaaaaaaa*aaa Dement 224.1
- Category l.vs Honcategory I Raceway 1111111 ~ 111 ~ aal ~ 111, (H/A)
.NUN (N/A)HUN'JN HUN a.
The:,seismic requirement for cable tray and conduit supports ls less ln the turblno and cnntt nl bulldlnne than Sn the auxiliary and reactor bui)dlr>qs These supports,ln ihe turbine and control bulldlnqs are not as stronq as those ln the auxl)Sary'nd reactor buildlnos.
Any earthquake tf)I) affect a)) bu()d)nqs.
a.
The services pr'ov'Sued sn'non-categorv I facllltlos s>>ch as the,turbine Duildlnq, are not essential 'to the safe s
u Own of the po<<el plant or lo a>alnlalnlllg.radiation
)Smlts tfitnin NRC prescribed
) lmits at tne 'site boundary.
ious,,ior these non-Category,l facilities, lt Ss not a requirement from eltner a safety or an.economic viewpoSnt to apply the more severe seismic,design criteria.wnicn are used for Catenory I farS)itles.-
Tne evaluation team pertormea a general walkdown of the
-- f)lar>t on U3/yb/88 ~ ad I <<CUI vnd In OLI Innt daLCQ U4/UU/Ub.
The. turbine building cable tray supports are; much.liqhter in construction tnan those in Category I
tacS lltlei..The concerns, no<<evert group the control building race<<ay supports (Category I) <<1th those of the turbine busldlnq Tn.noin u>nder stan>t this dsnoct of the
~
- concerns, the evaluation team made a more specific plant WalkdMa> ~ On 04/16/88 to C>r>tlai e thi qiniral Strengtht rlqldlty', and detailing of Cateqory I electrical
- raceway, (both cable tray, ano conduit j supports ln the auxlllary and control bui)dlnqs.
The walkdown observations indicate tnat, for comparable elevatlons ln the auxiliary'nd control buildings, the desiqn basis and construCtlon.
for Category I electrical> raceway supports are"the'same.
Tho'E equlreeet>ts fo>
Cateno> y j rara<<ay sunp>n ts a> o detailed ln design criteria wU-UC-ZU-ZI.) (cable tray);
and RS-UC-40-31. IU (Candult).
Ihe deSlgn Criteria apply equally to all Category I race<<ay supports.
Hnno ronulred, BFH UFN OFN (H/n)'OLN (N/A)-
nbn (N/A)
(H/A)
Lssues AlIACIIHtNI 8 SUQQNT Ut
- ISSUES, FIHUlHGS, AHU COKKCCTIVt ACTIOHS FUK SUUCAItUURT F2400 Findings RCVI5IUH HUK8tR:
I'aqe 8-3 of 9 Corrective Actions 11w*1www0twww**100 blement P/4.2
- Raceway Connections AOSOI1S1011* ~ 10P10 (N/A)
MSN SUH (N/AI (N/AI wUN a.
Some Ceiling embedded plates for cable tray supports are not stronq enough to reSlst imposed moments.
- a. t1evation 155.0 feet In the control building and elevation 75/.0 feet ln the auxiliary buildlnq were selected for detail revie~ because they contain a sample of the heavier loaded cable tray supports subjected to hlgner seismic torces, thus providing a conservative 1 oadlnq envelope.
The supports located at elevation /bb.U feet In control building are attached to the bottom ot structural steel beams wnlch support the ceiling slab and not to the eaoed plateS in the Ceiling Slab.
IhlS framing 'IS Shawn On dr'awing series 48H 1331 and 48N133b.
Ihe supports at elevation /5/.U feet In auxIIIary building are attacned tO embedded plates In the ceiling
.as shown on drawlnq 48Hly/5-9.
Ihe cable tray supports In this area are snown on drawings 48wlÃ9/-I through 14 and are supported from embed types c-Ict through HK-8CT Shown on drawing 48NIPZ5-9.
The embeds uSed to support the cable trays In other areas of the auxiliary and control buildings are similar.
ihe evaluation team reviewed tne desiqn calculations for 10 cable tray supports which Imposed loading to the previously discussed embed plates.
These supports were selected to Include those <<1th longer cantilever distance from tne ceiling support and tnuse <<ith a larger number of attached cable trays to provides an envelope assessment of larger imposed moments.
This revie~
indicates tnat tne eased plates and anchurs are adequate to resist the forces and moments Iayosed during design seismic events.
a.
Hone required.
Issues A)IACNHI.NI U Slpuwif 01
- ISSUtS, FINDINGS, ANU CUkktCIIVt ACTIONS FUR SUUCAIEGUNY %%400 F indlngs ktVI5IUN NUMUtk:
Vaqe U-4 of 9 Corrective Actions f)ement 224.2 - wUN (Continued) b.
Cable tray supports should be assumed as pinned so moments are not devc Ioped at ce I I In g embedded plates.
c.
Bevel full penetration welds should h)us hs4h
~IcsA 'll tka r h<<
a A
~
~Isla VI II VilV
~ ~ ~
NI% 4urrMI ~ 'Vga ~ ljlI instead of butt <<elds or fillet wc)dS.
UFN (N/A)
ULN IN/AI b.
Tne deslqn of cable tray suppurts Is adequate.
Since the support members are we)dud to tne embeds, the desiqn assumption should not be changed from riqld to pin condition.
Changing the assumption would reaulie cnanglng the actual we)aed connection to a bolted COnneCtian td ellmlnate the transfer Of ssnenntS frbm the support to the embed.
ThiS Is neither practical nor CS
~ r ahIC UCCCUSC Changing thC COOOCCl lon I INI r lulu cU pin condition would require tnu.addition of bracing members in both the longitudinal and transverse dlreetlOn.
That Cnange wOu)d reSu)t In inCreaSed congestion and Interference and In unnecessary cost.
C. Ver AwS Ul.l, square butt welds and bevel penetration we)ds aic Intcrchangeab)e for matei lal thickness up to
)/2-'Incn maximum.
Both of tnese are classified as penetration we)ds and wi)) provide the sane strength for a given partial or full penetration depth.
It Is true that a fillet we)d may provide )ess Strength than a
ful)'r parsja) penetration weld.
However, for materia) of smal)er thicknesses, such as used for raceway supports, a
14 Iieet- <<e)d 4S-adequate If-properly -designed to develop the design forces.
Urawing series 41AUSb Indicates tnat tne majority of the materia) used for design of conduft supports consists of steel tubing 3 inches x 3 Inches or 4 Inches x 4 inches with a wall thickness of I/4 incn or 3/U Inch and of Un)strut materia!- with a wall thICkness-Of MaPrOXImate!"
I/O lncn.
Ihe most comnonly speclf Ied weld on the drawinqs is 3/)6-incn or I/O-incn ililet we)a on a)) four sides of the tuoe or, wnere necessary, a fillet weld on two sides witn a partial or full penetration butt weld on the other sides.
considering tne size..of the member and the maximum load anticipated at tne connection consistent with overall support conf!quratlon the evaluation team finds that the weld specified Uy design Is sufficient to meet.the design rcquirenents.
UFN (N/A)
ULN (N/A) b.
None required.
C.
None required.
UIN (N/A)
ULN (N/A)
'ssues Al IACRMLHI 8 SINMARY UI
- ISSUES, FINUINUS. ANU CURRu;TIVt ACTIONS FUR SUUCAILGURI ZZ4UO t Indinqs RLVISIUH HUKUtR:
Z Page 8-5 of 9 Corrective Actions 1111111111111111'11 I
Element ZZ4.3
- Raceway Layout 111111111111111
~ 11 SON (N/A) wUH a.
Condults do not have adequate support design because the number of support types for supporting multiple conduits on a coneon support is insufficient.
- Further, too many Single conduit supports are theretore used in the auxiliary and reactor buildings.
b.
I:ondult routing was poorly planned by englneerlng.
As a,result, conduits require too many supitorts and are poorly located.
An example of this occurs ln accumulator room 2.
(H/A) wUN a.
Ihe Issue that condults do not have adequate support designs because not enough multiple supports are provided ls not valid.
Itulttp)e conduit support oesiqns are shown on numerous drawIngs (dra<<lng series 41AOSb).
Some conduit runs occupy coamun area witn other conduits; ho~ever, they do not necessarily serve the same equipment, and theSe COndult runS dO nOt neCeSSarlly lend themselves to coneon routing and coneon supportS.
- IhuS, the use of single conduit supports ls frequently necessitated by plant layout.
This usage ls necessary even though a sufficient number ot multiple conduit SuPPOrt tyPes may be available.
Ihe evaluation team made a qeneral walkdo<<n of tne plant on U3/Zb/Ub as recorded In ULI-Uub (U4/08/86). It was observed that the multiple conduit supports were used, whenever feasible, In the auxiliary and control buildings.
- b. Uased on a revle<<of the planning and Installation process of conduit run and support
- system, the conduit routing and number of supports are adequate.
The Division of Nuclear Engineering (UNE) Is respo'nslble for designing typical conduit supports, deflnlnq schematic conduit routing (e.g., routlnq from point A to point 8),
and providing guidelines and criteria for detailed conduit routing and conduit SupPort Selection to the Olvlslon of Nuclear Construction (UNC).
The UNC Is responsible for determining detailed conduit rout lnq and selecting the appropriate conduit supports.
UNC responsibility also Incluues providing the most economical conduit and conduit support configuration.
SIIN (N/A)
RUN a.
Hone required.
b.
Hone required.
Z48zu-Iz I Iu/ub/8/ I
Issues ATTACWtNT 8 SUHNARY UF ISSUES, FIHUINGS, ANU CORRECTIVE ACTIONS-FUR SUSCATEGURY 22400 F lndlngs REVISION NURSER:
2 Page 8-6 of 9 Corrective Actions Element 224.3 - HSN (Continued) c.
Peripheral flndlng.
- c. In addition, tne evaluation team noted that desiqn criteria for conduit supports are specified In FSAR Section 3.1U.3 and TVA Ueslgn Criteria <<B-VC-40-3I. IO, Rcv ~ 3, Selsmlcal ly IIuallfying Conduit Supporis.=
The revie<<results Indicated thatathe dampIn'g values sp'ecified for the conduit support design are different In theSe dOCumentS.
The'FSAR StateS:
"al PerCent damning for OSE and 2.0 percent damping.'Incomplete Setatnneh I
lln thn nthna hsnat thn aansl n
~
~ It I s a
'sa an t
saaI vl n ~ ja ~ \\
a
~ sa
~
~ aa state:
'2 percent damping Is assumed for both the OBE arid SSE ~
Oes'Ign CI Iteria also do noi require ihe conduit support evaluation for UBE.
c.
TVA transmittal TCAB-255 (03/I I/87) submits corrective action plan (CAP) which <<Ill correct the disagreement between the damping values as shown In FSAR Section 3.10.3 and Oeslgn Criteria NS-VC-40-3I.IO, ReV. 3.
TVA ONE will reVIcaa tbas a'rltaanIs snal rsdU se
~ nn. ~ I
~
~
n a
aa J
~ \\ lu ~ ~ ~ aa and ensure that they agree <<1th each othei.
Any FSAR change will be preceded by a-letter to the HRC requesting the chanqe.
The change <<III be Initiated after HRC concurrence Is obtained.
In
- addition, TVA ONE will evaluate the OBE load condition or Iustify the basis fnr Its exclusion In the above design na Itna Is s a
~ ~ a
~
~ aa ~
The evaluaiion ieam conciudes that the stated CAP Is an acceptable resolution of the finding.
{CATO 224 03 NBH Olg SFN Isa ldt Saagnd BLH
,(N/A)
SFN I aa Id I laadnl (H/A)
HFN (H/A)-
BLN (N/A) 24820-12~6/8>)
I
Issues Al IACNMLNI U SUMHART OF
- ISSUES, FINDINGS, ANU CURktCTIVt ALTIONS FUK SUUCAltGUkT ??4UO F lndinqs RtVIIIUH NUKIItR:
Z Vage 5-1 of 9 Corrective Actions ass**a***sassas**a tlement ?24.b
- Support of Cables
~ssaas**as*ass*s*s a.
The non-supported F Iamastic-coverea cable in the spreading room that penetrates
<<alls and ceilinq may not be seismlcaily safe.
SQH a.
Based on several
<<alkaowns ana subsequent evaluations perforeva by tne evaluation team on the laterally unsupportea Flamestic-coverea vertical cables In the cable spreading room, aaequate vertical ana horizonta1 cable restraint is providea to support the vertical cable runs under any desiqn load.
The shake table test report Tk Ct5 M-IDIO has been revie<<ea by tne evaluation team <<ith the conclusion that It aaequately demonstrates the seismic qualification of
'the vertical unsupported ana Flamastlc coverea cables in the spreading room.
This conclusion Is based on the fact tnat, aur(ng testing, the cables stayea <<(thin allo<<able conductor tensile load ratinqs with no loss of po<<er or siqnltlcant current fluctuation on the instrumented cables.
SQH None required.
The evaluation team also performed a structural calculation, Rev. 0 (09/UV/Ub), on a representative cable configuration to corroborate the above conclusion.
This calculation confirms tne above conclusion of seismic qua I IfIcation.
<<UH (N/A)
'FN (H/A)
ULN (H/A)
MUH (N/A)
NN (N/A)
ULH (N/A)
<<BH (M/A)
SFH (H/A)
OLN (H/A)
Issues ATTACfNENT 8 SUWAkT OF
- ISSUES, FINUIKGS, ANU CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SUUCATEGORT 22400 FIndings RE VI5IO!I NUHBER:
2 Page 8-8 of 9 Corrective Actions (N/A)
NHN I
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa E)eeent 224.7
- Conduit Expansion/Nuveeent
~aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa SQH I
(N/A)
NBN Sx IN I ss I4 1 g ssi ss X KBN fNIA)
(H/A)
BLN I sssu 1
gssissp uFN (N/A)
BLH (H/A)
UFN (N/A)
BLH a.
Olfferentia).xoveeents between structuras e)ersents of unit )
Reactor Bul)ding are not provided ior in the'design of electrical
<<ondul ts.
- a. General Construction Specification G-40 states that fiexibie conduit ShaH be uSed to Interface the rigid conduit systee with electrlca) equipeent when they are subject to re)atlve eoveeents due to either theroa) or selsrxlc loading ln additions ~ dra In~ SRussa)8 Rss a Rev.
)1 expliclty requires the use of flexible conduit to preverst r ~gld attacraTsents between the prluary containxx!nt and either the secondary containment or the contalneent internai structures.
a.
None required.
On the basis of an evaluation of requireeents for cons iderino differentia) aavemnt affectinss alerts ls 4)
- condults, adequate provisions for differential eoveeent
)s ss sssssnlnsssssS Ssss al II tn sss n a i
~
sw.
~
~
~
s
~
x x
~
v ws \\ sl s
~
ssssy ssMVs s Ja
~ Islpssl, I ~
ua)kdo<<ns conducted by the eva)uatlon team conf lreed the proper use of f)exib<e conduits at expansion/contraction joints between adjacent structures to prevent daeage to conduit resulting froo differentia) xuvexx.nts.
u
?482D-) 2 ~/81)
Issues ATTACINENT 8
SUMMARY
UF ISSUES, FINDINGS, AMD CURRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SUBCATEGURY 22400 Findings REVISIOH NUMBER:
2 Page 8-9 of 9 Corrective Actions 111AA*1111111111*1 Element 224.9
- ERC'M Pump Electrical Hotor Boxes
- 1*1111**1***11111 (H/A)
MBN (H/A)
(N/A)
BLN a.
The lack of seismic analyiis and mounting details for the electrical motor boxes attached to the essential raw cooling water (ERCM) pump motors is an oversignt by manufacturer and Engineering.
SCRIM (N/A)
MBH (N/A)
BFN (N/A)
BLN a.
Tne concerned EKCM pump electrical motor boxes are thermal junction boxes.
There are four ERCM pump motors for eacn unit and one thermal junction box for each motor.
On the basis of a GE letter to TVA (07/17/85),
tne ERCM pump electrical motor boxes (tnermal junction boxes) are not considered critical to the operation of tne motors.
Mhile tne boxes do monitor temperature conditionS, the motors will continue to operate witnout tnem.
Therefore, tne boxes are not normally addressed in the seismic qualification report.
TVA UE calculation CEB-CAS-I79, Rev. 0, "Oualificatlon of Electrical Box on ERCM Pump Motors," has been reviewed by the evaluation team witn tne conclusion tnat the ERCM pump electrical motor boxes and mounting installation are seismically adequate and require no additional support to remain qualified seismic category I(L).
The structural calculation, Hev. 0 (06/18/87),
per(ormed by the evaluation team confirmed tne conclusion of seismic qualification.
SqN (N/A)
MBN (M/A)
BFN (N/A)
BLN a.
Mone required.
24820-12 (10/05/87)
I I
'I It
'I if' il
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22400 REVISION NUMBER:
2 Page C-1 of 2 ATTACHMENT C REFERENCES 1.
Sequoyah.Element Report 224.5, "Support of Cables,"
Rev.
0, (09/29/86) 2.
WBN Design Criteria WB-DC-20-21. 1, "Design Criteria for Category I Cable Tray Supports,"
Rev.
2 3.
WBN Design Criteria WB-DC-40-31. 10, "Seismically gualifying Conduit Supports,"
Rev.
3 4.
WBN DNE Calculation WCG-2-28, "Auxiliary Building Cable Tray Supports Below Elevation 757 Feet," Rev.
4,
[841 870116 953], (01/15/87) 5.
WBN Drawing 47A056 Series, Seismic Category I Structures, Mechanical Category I Conduit Supports, (revision current as of 05/12/86) 6.
TVA General Construction Specification G-40, "Installing Electrical Conduit Systems and Conduit Boxes," Rev.
9,
[842 851219 509], (01/15/86) 7.
BLN Drawing 5RW0816-RU-9, "Conduit and Gr ounding, Floor Elevation 622.0, Details," Rev.
17 8.
BLN OE Calculation CEB-CAS-179, "gualification of Electrical Box on ERCW Pump Motors," Rev.
0 [B41 860206 003], (02/06/86) 9.
WBN FSAR through Amendment 56, Section
- 3. 10.3, "Methods and Procedures of Analysis or Testing of Supports of Electrical Equipment and Instrumentation" 10.
Letter fran G. L. Parkinson, Bechtel, to G. R. McNutt, TVA, transmitting 04/15-16/87 SgN site visit trip report for walkdowns performed in control roc'nd cable spreading
- room, and also a copy of evaluation team calculation 224.5(B)-l, Rev.
0, BLT-197, (04/27/87) 11.
TVA informal memo fran T. C. Cruise to C.
N. Johnson of Sequoyah on the subject of employee concerns of Sequoyah element 224.5, with attached Preliminary Summary Test Report TR-CEB-N-1010, (07/18/86) 12.
BLN Drawing 5RW0816-RU-13, "Conduit and Grounding Floor Elevation 622.0, Details," Rev.
10 3804D-Rl
( 10/09/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER
'22400'EVISION NUMBER:
2 Page C-2 of 2 13.
BLN FSAR through Amendment 27, Figure '3.8.3-4,,"Reactor Building Walls and Base Slab-'Reinforcing, TVA Drawing No. 4RW0751-Xl-6R3" 14.
Letter from K. Kool,, General Electric, to C.',.
- Chandley, TVA.
Subject:
"Stator Winding Thermal Junction Box,," [B44 850723 502],',
(07/17/85) 0 3804D "Rl (10/Og/87)