ML18033A581
| ML18033A581 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 12/14/1987 |
| From: | Peters A TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML082340470 | List:
|
| References | |
| 22100, 22100-V02-R04, 22100-V2-R4, NUDOCS 8902150218 | |
| Download: ML18033A581 (86) | |
Text
EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROG VOLUME2 ENGINEERING CATEGORY SUBCATEGORY REPORT 22100 PIPE SUPPORT DESIGN UPDATED TVA NUCLEAR POWER s
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL 'PROGRAM REPORT TYPE:
SUBCATEGORY REPORT FOR ENGINEERING TITLE:
PIPE SUPPORT OESIGN REPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 1 of 40 2.
3.
4.
Revised to incorporate SRP and TAS comments.
Revised to incorporate TAS comments and to add Attachment C
(References).
Revised to incorporate SRP and TAS comments.
Revised to incorporate TAS comments and to clarify references.
PREPAREO BY:
PR PARATION
/2 O'
REVIEWS S
NA UR CEG-H:
SRP S
GNA iz i(-r2 APPROVEO BY ECSP MANAGER
~tl-87 OATE SRP Secretary' signature denotes SRP concur rences are in files.
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page ES-1 of 2 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
This report for Subcategory
- 22100, Pipe Support Oesign, summarizes and evaluates the results of 14 Employee Concerns Special Program element evaluations.
The element evaluations document the review of 24 issues (as noted in Table
and Bellefonte (BLN).
The issues were derived from a total of 13 employee concerns that cited perceived deficiencies in pipe support design.
Of the 24 issues evaluated, 17 were found to require no corrective action.
For the remainder, six corrective actions were identified to remedy the seven negative findinqs.
One of the corrective actions was initiated by TVA before the Employee Concerns Task Group evaluations, three are new actions required to resolve the issues, and'wo are actions required to resolve peripheral findings identified during the evaluation.
Four of the six corrective actions for this subcategory were judged to be significant with respect to cost and plant safety.
Regeneration of destroyed and missing calculations at Watts Bar is significant in terms of the time and cost to replace them.
Evaluation of deficient 8001 type supports at Sequoyah and Watts Bar is necessary to determine the impact on affected safety systems.
Replacement of the support in the upper head injection system at Sequoyah is required to reconcile the as-constructed. condition with the requi~ed design configuration.
The finding pertaining to destroyed and missing calculations is siqnificant because it reveals shortcomings in control of the design process and communication, and inattention on the part of TVA manaqement.
Although the related issue was not evaluated for Sequoyah, the regeneration of the pipe support design calculations, which is in progress at Sequoyah, confirms the existence of a similar condition.
This issue was not evaluated for Browns Ferry and Bellefonte;
- however, the.essential cal'culation program covered in subcategory 24600 is designed to address missing calculations for all TVA nuclear plants.
The evaluation substantiated the concern of over-torquing the clamp bolts of 8001 type supports at Sequoyah and Watts Bar.
"Lack of Oesign Oetai 1" and "Inadequate Calculations,"
as noted in Table 3, resulted in excessive torque in the clamp bolts, which requires corrective action.
To resolve this finding, plant walkdown, document revision, and evaluation wi 11 be required.
An engineering error caused the discrepancy between the installation and the piping stress analysis, for a support type in the upper head injection system at Sequoyah.
27390-R13
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TVA EMPLOYEE COIMCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM FiEPORT NUMBER:I 221OO REVISION NUMBER: i4 Page ES-2 of 2
- Thus, the employee concerns and issues evaluatted for this subcategory did identify some valid problems.,
In the case of destroyed and missing
.calculations, the design adequacy of the pipe supports cannot be fully verified until the regeneration of these calculations is complei:e.
With the exception to the above finding, examination of the overall significance of other findings and the corrective actions does not lead to the conclusion that the pipe supt)ort des;ign constitutes a signifi'cant problem for Sequoyah, Watts Bar, Browns Ferry, oi B e 1 1 efont e.
The corrective action plans received bye the evailuation team have been reviewed and were found acceptable to resolve the negative findings.
I A review of the Nuclear Performance Plahs (NPPsj by the evaluation team revealed that the issues eva'luated under this subcategory requiring corrective actions have been addressed adequately to lead to the resolution of the. e issues.
The causes identified and other results are being reexamined from a wider perspective in the Engineering category evaluation.
27390-R13 (12/08/87)
TVA ENPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRJLlf REPORT NUNBER:
22100 FRONT NATTER REV:
3 PAGE i OF viii Preface'his subcategory report is one of a series of reports prepared for the Employee Concerns Special Program (ECSP) of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).
The ECSP and the organisation which carried out the program, the Employee Concerns Task Group (ECTG), were established by TVA's Nanager of Nuclear Power to evaluate and report on those Office of Nuclear Power (ONP) employee concerns filed before February 1,
1986.
Concerns filed after that date are handled by the ongoing ONP Employee Concerns Program (ECP).
The ECSP addressed over 5800 employee concerns.
Each of the concerns was a
formal, written description of a circumstance or circumstances that an employee thought was unsafe, unjust, inefficient, or inappropriate.
The missi'on of the Employee Concerns Special Program was to thoroughly investigate all issues presented in the concerns and to report the results of those investigations in a form accessible to ONP employees, the
- NRC, and the general public.
The results of these investigations are communicated by four levels of ECSP reports:
- element, subcategory,
- category, and final.
Element reports, the lowest reporting level, will be published only for those concerns directly affecting the restart of Sequoyah Nuclear Plant's reactor unit 2.
An element consists of one or more closely related'ssues.
An issue is a potential problem identified by ECTG during the evaluation process as having been raised in one or more concerns.
For efficient handling, what appeared to be similar concerns were grouped into elements early in the program, but issue definitions emerged from the evaluation process itself.
Consequently, some elements did include only one issue, but often the ECTG evaluation found more than one issue per element.
Subcategory reports summarize the evaluation of a number of elements.
- However, the subcategory report does more than collect element level evaluations.
The subcategory level overview of element findings leads to an integration of information that cannot take place at the element level.
This integration of information reveals the eztent to which problems overlap more than one element and will therefore require corrective action for underlying causes not fully apparent at the element level.
To make the subcategory reports easier to understand, three items have been placed at the front of each report:
a preface, a glossary of the terminology unique to ECSP reports, and a list of acronyms, Additionally, at the end of each subcategory report will be a Subcategory Summary Table that includes the concern numbers; identifies other subcategories that share a concern; designates nuclear safety-related, safety significant, or non-safety related concerns; designates generic applicability; and briefly states each concern.
Either the Subcategory Summary Table or another attachment or.a combination of the two will enable the reader to find the report section or sections in which the issue raised by the concern is evaluated.
TVh ENPLOl(EE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRhN REPORT NUNSER:
'22100 FRONT mTTER REV:
Ph,GE ii OF viii The subcategories are themselves suaanarized in a series of eight categor'y reports.
Each category report reviews the major findings and collective~
significance of the subcategory reports in one of the following areas:
management and personnel relations industrial safety construction material control operati,ons quality assurance/quality control welding engineering h separate report on employee concerns dealing with specific contehti'onS of intimidation, harassment, and wrongdoing will be released by the.TVh 'Office of the Inspector General.
'Just a:s the subcategory reports integrate the information collected at the element level, the category reports integrate the information assembled in all the subcategory reports within the category, addressing particularly the underlying causes of those problems that run across more than one subcategory.
h final report will integrate and assess the information collected by all of'he lower level reports prepared for the
- ECSP, including the Inspector General's report.
For more detail on the methods by~wh~ich ECTG employee concerns were evaluated and reportedconsult the Tennessee Valley huthority Employee Concerns Task Group Program Nanual.
~ The Manual spells out the program's objectives,
- scope, organization, and'esponsibilities.
It also speci,fies the procedures that were followed~ in~ the invest~igation, reporting, and closeout of the issues
'raised by kmplogee.lconcerns.
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECZAL PROGRAN REPORT NUMBER:
22l00 FRONT NATTER REV:
2 PAGE iii OF viii ECSP GLOSSARY OF REPORT TERNS C
classification of evaluated issues the evaluation of an issue leads to one of the. fol'lowing determinations:
Class A:
Issue cannot be verified as factual Class B:
Issue is factually accurate, but what is described is not a
p"oblem (i.e.,
not, a condition requiring cor'rective action)
Class C:.
Issue is factual and identifies a problem, but corrective action for the problem was initiated before the evaluation of the issue was under taken Class D:
Issue is factual and pr'esents a problem for which corrective action has
- been, or is being, taken as a result of an evaluation Class E:
h problem, requiring corrective action, which was not identified by an employee
- concern, but was revealed during the ECTG evaluation of an issue raised by an employee concern.
collective si nificance an analysis which determines the importance and consequences of the fxndings in a particular ECSP report by putting, those findings in the proper perspective.
concern (see "employee concern" )
corrective action steps taken to fix specific deficiencies or discrepancies revealed by a negative finding and, when necessary, to correct causes in order to prevent recurrence.
criterion
( lural:
criteria a basis for defining a performance,
- behavior, or quality which ONP impodea on itself (see also "requirement"),
element or element re ort an optional level of ECSP report, below the subcategory level, that deals with one or more issues.
em lo ee concern a formal, written description of a circumstance or circumstances that an employee thinks unsafe, unjust, inefficient or inappropriate; usually documented on a K-form or' form equivalent to the K-form.
TVb, El/PLOYEE COERCER!lS'PECIhil PROGRhà REPORT NUMBER: '2100 FRONT KLTXER, REV:
2 PhGE iv OF viii, group.ing of emplioyee concerns.
~rindin s
- includes both statessents of yaht hnd the,!udtments made about.
those facts during the evaluation process;,
nega'tive findings require icorereI'.tive
'ction.
issue a potential problem, as interpretld by the ECTG'uring the evaluation
- process, raised in one or more concerns.
'-form (see "employee concern'a)
~re u1eeissnC a standard oy perforuaance, iieharior, or quality on which an evalusition judgment or decision may be based..
root cause the underlying reason for a Plroblem.
- Terms essential to the program but which rlquire'etailed defi,nitioh h'ave bleen defined in the ECTG Procedure Nanual (e.g.
e gisneric, specific, nuclear safety-related, unrevieMed safety-significant question)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUNBER:
22100 FRONT lDLTTER REV:
2 PAGE v OF 'vii-i hcronyms AI AISC ANSI ASNE ASTN AWS BFN BLN CA/
CAR CATD'dministrative Instruction American Institute of Steel Construction hs Low hs Reasonably Achievable American Nuclear Society American National Standards Institute American Society of Nechanical Engineers American Soci'ety for Testing and 'Materials American Welding Society Brains Ferry Nuclear Plant Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Condition Adverse to Quality Corrective Action Report-Corrective Action Tracking Document CCTS Corporate Commitment Tracking System CEG-H Category Evaluation Group 'Head CFR Code of Federal Regulations CI CNTR COC OCR DNC Concerned Individual Certified Naterial Test Report Certificate of Conformance/Compliance Design Change Request Divis'ion of Nuclear Construction-.(see,also NU CON)
TVA EXPLOITER CONCERNS Sl?ECZAL PROGRAN REPORT NUNBER:
22100 PRONT NATTER REV:
2 PAGE vi OP viii DNQA DOE DPO Division of Nuclear Engineeri,ng Division of Nuclear Qu'silty Assurance Division of Nuclear Training Department of Energy Divi,sion Personnel Officer DR Discrepancy Report ot Deviation Report ECN ECP ECP-SR ECSP ECTG EEOC EN DES ERT FCR FSAR GET HCI HVAC INPO IRN Engineering Change Notice Employee Concerns Program Employee Concerns Program-Site Representative Employee Concerns Special Program Employee Concerns Task Group Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Environmental Qualification Emergency Nedical
Response
Team Engineering Design Employee
Response
Team or Emergency
Response
Team Field Change Request Final S'afety Analysis Report Fiscal Year General Employee Training Hazard Control Instruction Heating Ventilating, Ai.r-Conditioning Installatiion Instruction Institute of Nuclear Pover Operations Inspection Rejection Notice 4
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22100 FRONT MATTER REV:
2 PAGE vii OF viii L/R'&AI MI MSPB NCR NDE NPP NPS NQAM NRC NSB NSRS Labor Relations Staff Modifications and hdditions Instruction Maintenance Instruction Merit Systems Protection Board Magnetic Particle Testing Nonconforming Condition Report Nondestructive Examination Nuclear Performance Plan Non-plant Specific or Nuclear Procedures System Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Services Branch Nuclear Safety Review Staff NU CON Division of Nuclear Construction (obsolete abbreviation, see DNC)
NUMARC OSHA ONP OVCP Nuclear Utility Management and Resources Committee Occupational Safety and Health Administration (or hct)
Office'f Nuclear Power Office oi Morkers Compensation Program PHR Personal History Record Liquid Penetrant Testing QAP QCI Quality Assurance Quality Assurance Procedures Quality Control Quality Control Ins truction
'TVh, EXPLOTEE CONCERNS
'SPECIAL.PROGRAPl REPORT NUNBER:
2210()
1 FRONT NATTER REV:.2 PAGE viii OF viii QCP QTC RZF RT SQN SI Quality Conti'ol Procedure Qiuality Technology Company Reduction in Force Radiographic Testing Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Surveillance Instruction SOP SRP SMEC TAS Standard Operating Procedure Senior Review Panel Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation Technical Assistance Stat'f'EL TVTLC UT
'MBECSP WBN MR MP Trades and Laboc Tennessee Valley Authority Tennessee Valley Trades and Labor Council Ultrasonic: Testing Visual Testing Watts Bar Employee Concern Spiecli,al Program Watts Bar Nucleac Plant Mairk Request or Moc'k Rules Vairkplans 0
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER-'
Page 2 of 40 Section Executive Summary Preface ECSP Glossary of Report Terms Acronyms CONTENTS
~Pa e
ES-1 1
Introduction 2
Summary of Issues/Generic Applicability 3
Evaluation Process 4
Findings 5
Corrective Actions 6
Causes 7
Col lecti ve Significance Glossary Supplement for the Engineering Category Attachments A
Emol'oyee Concerns for Subcategory 22100 B
Sugary of Issues,
- Findings, and Corrective Actions for Subcategory 22100 C,Refer ences 13 29 31 32 38 A-1 8-1 C-1 TABLES Table 1
Classification of Findings and 'Corrective Actions 2
Findings Summary 3
Matrix of Elements, Corrective Actions, and Causes
~Pa e
34 36 37 27390-R13 (12/08/87)
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL 'PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 3 of 40 1.
INTRODUCTION This subcategory report summarizes
.and reviews the results of the Employee Concerns Special Program (ECSP) element evaluations prepared, under Engineering Subcategory
- 22100, Pipe Support Oesign.
The element evaluations of this subcategory contain the review of the concerns related to pipe support design and its impact on the piping stress analysis.
The issues evaluated include the design adequacy of pipe supports, inadequate supports and its impact on pipe stress, use of supports that are incompatible with stress
- analysis, and the retention of permanent records for pipe support design calculations.
The employee concerns provide the basis for the element evaluations and are listed by element number in Attachment A.
1:he plant location where the concern was originally identified and the applicability of the concern to other TVA nuclear plants are also shown.
The evaluations are summarized in the balance of this report as fol.lows:
o Section 2 summarizes, by element, the issues stated or implied in the employee concerns and addresses the determination of generic app 1 icab i 1 ity o
Section 3 outlines the process followed for the element and the subcategory evaluations and cites documents reviewed o
Section 4 summarizes, by element, the findings and identifies the negative findings that must be resolved o
Section 5 -- highlights the corrective actions required for resolution of the negative findings cited in Section.
4 and relates them to element and to plant site o
Section 6 identifies causes of the negative findings o
Section 7 assesses the significance of the negative findings o
Attachment A lists, by element, each employee concern evaluated in the subcategory.
The concern number is given along with notation of any other element or category with which the concern is shared, the plant sites to which it could be applicable are noted, the concern is quoted as received by TVA, and is characterized as safety
- related, not safety related, or safety significant 2739D-R13 (12/08/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS
,'SPECIAL PROGRPN REPORT NUMBER:i 22160'EVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 4 of 40 o
Attachment 8 -- contains a summary, of the element-level evaluations.
Each iss,ue is listed, by e1lement number and plant, opposite its corresponding findir>>gs and corrective actions.
The reader may trace a concern from Attachment A to an issue in'ttachment 8 by using the element number and applicable plant.,'T'e, reader may relate a correctivei a>>ttibn 'description in Attachment 8 to causes and significance in Table 3
Iby using the CATO number which appears in Attachment 8.
The term "Periipheral finding" in the issue column refers-to a
finding that occurred during the colursle Of evaluating a concern but did not stem-directly from, an employee, concern,.
These are classified as "E"'n Tables 1
and 2, of;,.this, report o
Attachment C -- lists the references cited in the text 2.
SUMMARY
OF ISSUES/GENERIC APPLICABILITY The employee cor>>ce'ms listed in Attachment',A,for, each, element and plant have been examinedl, and the pot1entia11 problems r ai,sed by the 13 concerns have been identified as 24 separate issues.
Evaluation of these issues is presented in the 14 element evaluations.
The issues summarizedl-here deal with perceived deficiencies or inadequacies in the pipe support designn A summary of the's'sues evaluated under thi,s subcategory, grouped by element>>
aind their qeneric applicability is presented below.
0 2.1
~Desi n Adersuac~of Pine Suooort.Anchofs and Retention of Permanent Records - i.lement I?21.1 The pipe support design calculations have been destroyed; therefore, the potential problems in the designs 1cannot be identified.
The procedural aspects of this issue have also been addreissed in Subcategory 21200.
The issue of pipe support anc:hor bolt design is addressed in Subcategory 10400.
The issue was dei iveci from a concern originally identified at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN).
Although this issue was evaluated only for WBN,i the reqeneration of the ciestroyeci and missinq pipe support design calculatiqns at Sequoyah Nuc1lear.Plant (SQN), which is currently in progress, confirms that the issue should have been made applicable to SQN.
On the basis of tlhe above 27390-R13
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM'EPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 5 of 40 situation at SQN, it is believed that this issue has generic implications and should be evaluated for Browns Ferry (BFN) and Bellefonte (BLN) nuclear plants.
- However, the essential calculation program covered in Subcategory 24600 is desiqned to address the issue of missing calculations for all TVA nuclear plants.
2.2 Evaluation of Oifference in Anal zed Oesi n Loads for Pipe Suoports-ement N
The pipe support design is not adequate without considering the load due to zero period acceleration (ZPA).
The issue of addressing ZPA at SQN was evaluated and was found not to be valid.
- However, a corrective action was issued to finalize the pr elipinary reviews and studies performed to address ZPA application.
In the evaluation of element 218.6 for WBN, it was found that ZPA had not been considered for rigorous analysis and some alternate analyses of the piping system.
The corrective action plan for this WBN evaluation covers ZPA in future revisions to these piping analyses.
Significant Condition Reports (SCR WBN CEB8631, Rl
[841 860709 021]
and SCR WBN CEB8553, Rl [841 860709 024]) for WBN require a
generic applicability evaluation of this issue by TVA.
This evaluation will determine the applicabil.ity of the ZPA issue to BFN and BLN.
2.3 Ma or Oifference in Analyzed Oesiqn Loads for Similar (Unit 1 vs Unit 2)
>pe upoorts -
ement W
N The issue of inadequate pipe support desiqn because of major differences in analyzed loads of similar pipe supports in units 1
and 2 is identified for the concern at WBN.
Although not specific, the issue implies a condition at WBN.
Furthermore, the statement of "generic" in the concern is interpreted to mean generic to WBN.
In the WBN evaluation, the issue was found not to be valid.
Therefore, no further evaluation is required.
2'.4 Missin or Uninstalled Pipe Supports - Element 221.3 Inadequate supports resulting from the lack of a program for trackinq hanger installation will cause overstress in the pipe.
The issue, resulting from the concern identified at WBN, deals with a deficiency in the program for tracking hanger installation.
The issue was found not to be valid in the evaluation at WBN.
Therefore, no additional evaluation is required.
In addition, the IE Bulletin 79-14 progr am (for details see Subcatgory Report 21200),
which requires a walkdown inspection of all pipe supports, will identify any missing or uninstalled supports for all plants (SQN, WBN, BFN, and BLN).
27390-R13 (12/08/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
I22100 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 6 of 40 2.5 Deletion oi'in~no'nta - E'lement 221ea The design of'he hanger in the vicinity oF undersupported HVAC piping in the Auxiliary Build'ing (unit 2) is inadequate beclauke kicker's have been remdved from the hanger The issue is based on a concern that describes the deficiency in pipe supports in a specific piping system and location at WBN (unit 2).
The eva'iuation revealed that: the issue is not valid, and theref'ore no f'urther evaluation is required.
2.6 Pipe Support Base Plate Installed Ovei an Expansion Joint - Element 221e5 The pipe support is not designed to sustain the effect of interference between the support base plate and the containment wall.
The issue, resulting from the concern of an insufficient qap, is identified for WBN, unit 1.
The concern specifies the exact area and location where an insufficient gap between. the base plate and the containment wall may exist~due to extension of the base plate over an expansion joint.
The evaluation showed that the above issue is not valid.
A plant walkdown (Ref. 81) revealed only an isolated case where
'the base plate grout extends, over an expansion joint.
Therefore, the issue is not generic.
2.7 Observed Bendinci oF Pipe C'lamp Ears - Element 22'1.6 Pipe support clamps are overstressed due to excessive torque on the clamp bolts.
0 The issue re. ulted from the concern stating that ears on small 8001 support clamps at WBN are bent.
Bectiuse 8001 type supports are used at SQN and
- BLN, as well as at WIBN, the issue is applicable tq a'll three of these nuclear plants.
TVA evaluation of generic applicabi 1ity of this issue indicates, that B001 type supports are not used at BFN, and hence the issue is not applicable to BFN.
2.8 Damaoed Pine Suooonta
- El ment 22'l.7 The design of pipe supports found to be damaqled during Iin-service inspection is inadequate.
The issue originated from the concern stat'ing that'uppOrt damage was found during in-service inspeiction at BFN.
The 'evaluation revealed that the pipe supports were damaged due to an unanticipated loading of the piping system.,
and repair to the damaged supports was required,;
- However, the issue that pipe supports required repair because of inadequate design was not substantiated.
27390-R13 (i2/08/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 7 of 40 2.9 Relief Valve Vent Line Han er - Element 221.8 The pipe support on the relief valve vent line of chiller B is overdesigned with a very high factor of safety.
The issue is based on the concern of excessive overdesiqn of a pipe support at a specified location at WBN.
Because the evaluation team could not identify the support specified in the concern, the supports in the vicinity of the identified area that fit the description in the concern were evaluated.
The evaluation could not substantiate excessive overdesign of these
- supports, and hence the issue was found not to be valid.
- 2. 10 Sharp Ed e of Han er Steel Clearance with Pipe Runnin Throu h the Hanger Steel Frame -
ement 1.9 The gap between the hanger's sharp edge and the pipe is insufficient and will cause additional stress in the pipe due to interference.
The issue stems from the concern that there is interference between the support edge and the pipe at a specific location at WBN.
The evaluation found the issue not to be valid.
Because this issue is based on a specific support at an identified location, it is not generic.
- 2. 11 Use of Snubber - Element 221.10 A snubber-type support is used on the vertical riser of the upoer head injection system instead of a rigid-type support as required.
This issue is from a concern identified at SgN.
The: evaluation revealed that the issue is valid for SAN.
Because the, issue addresses a specific support at an identified location, it is not qeneric.
I
- 2. 12 Heav MOV Sup orts - Element 221.11 The motor operated valves (MOV) are not supported adequately.
The supports on the operator of the motor-operated valves are not adequately designed.
The issues are based on the concerns identified at BLN and are specific as to the location of the supports.
The evaluation revealed that the issues are not valid.
Therefore, they are not generic.
2739D-R13 (12/08/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPE1CIAL PROISRAM REPORT NUMBEIR:
22100 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 8 of 40 3.
EVALUATION PROCESS This subcategory evaluation is applicable eliament evaluati ons concerns
~elated to the issues in conjunction with Attachment based on the information contained in the, prepared to address the specific employee broadly defined in Section 2.
The following, C, out'lines the'valuation process.
3.1
~Desi n Adeouecv nf. Pine Suooor't Anchors snd Retention. of Pennsnent Records
- Element 221.,1 a.
Reviewed Problem Identification Report (PIR)
WBN CEB8521 (Rdf.'4)'
which reports the problem oF miscoding the support identification into TVA"s Record Information Management System (RIMS),, making it irretrievable when required.
b.
Reviewed Nonca1nformance Report (NCR)
WBN CEB8418, Rev.
1, (Ref< 5),
which reports the destruction of design calculations generated by EOS Nuclear, Ines and outlines the actions taken by TVA to verify the adequacy of affected supports.
c.
Spot-checked the existence of Bergen-Paterson design calculations in RIMS (Ref. 3).
d.
Reviewed a sample of EOS calculations regenerated by TVA (Rkfs.
1 and 2).
Reviewed TVA's corrective action plan for CATO 212 01 WBN O'I.
3.2 Evaluation of Oifference in Anal zed Desi n Loads for. Pipe Supports-Element 221I.2TSequoya~h a.
Reviewed the Final Safety Analysis Report.
(FSAR) of the Sequoyah Nuclear IPlant (Ref. 83) for specific commitment to consider ZPA effects in pip in1g ana1lys is.
b.
Reviewed Nuclear Regulatory Comniission (NRC) regulatory guide (Ref.
- 8) for any requi rements to consider.'PA, effects.
c.
Reviewed available reports (Refsi..7'4, '75, and,82) at SQN that, have addressed the issue of ZPA.
d.
Performed independent review including calculations as required (Ref,.
10).
c.
Reviewed TVA's corrective action'l'an for CATO 221 02 SQN 01.
27390-R13 (12/08/87) 0
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 9 of 40 3.3 Major Oifference in Anal zed Oesi n Loads for Similar Unit 1 vs. Unit 2 Pipe Supports - -Element 221.2 Watts Bar a.
Obtained the load tables and isometrics for a sample of piping stress calculations (Ref.
- 11) for different systems on units 1
and 2,
such as feedwater, Chemical Volume Control System (CVCS), Reactor Coolant System.(RCS), etc.,
in order to study the problem.
b.
Reviewed the load tables and isometrics of the selected calculations because they have similar routing, support locations, and functions for both units (Refs.
11, 12, and 13).
c.
Evaluated the reasons for load variations in unit 2 and tabulated the summary of the review.
3.4 Missin or Uninstalled Pipe Supports - Element 221.3 a.
Reviewed the project procedure that establishes the support desiqn scoping (Ref. 14).
b.
Reviewed the hanger trackinq program and IE Bulletin 79-14 Phase I
program (Refs.
17 and 18).
c.
Reviewed randomly selected supports (Refs.
15 and
- 16) to verify the validity of the issues raised in the concern.
d.
Held discussions with WBN Engineering Oesiqn (EN OES) personnel, as required.
3.5 Deletion of Supports - Element 221.4 a.
Reviewed the isometric drawinqs of the HVAC duct
( 12-inch pipe) for units 1
and 2 (Refs.
21, 22, 23,. and 24) to verify the location of the supports.
b.
Reviewed the pipe stress calculations of HVAC duct
( 12-inch pipe) for unit 2 (Ref. 25) to verify compliance with ASME Code requirements.
c.
Examined the design detail drawing of support 47A920-44-10 on the HVAC duct
( 12-inch pipe) for unit 2 (Refs.
26, 27, and 28).
d.
Performed a design check to verify the adequacy of support 47A920-44-10 (Ref.
29) 2739D-R13 (12/08/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:i 22li00 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 10 of 40 I
3.6 Pipe Support Base Plate Installed Over an Expansion Joint - Element 221.5 a.
Performed plant walkdown to identify the subject pipe support and to measure gaps between grout/base plate and the containment wall (Ref. 40).
b.
Evaluated the actual displacements (Ref.
40) du> iing a seismic event'or the Containment Building and the north valve room andi compared with the measured gaps in "a" above.
c.
Performed a plant walkdown to deterIinine if,the subject support'as an isolated case (Ref. 8'i).
d.
Reviewed TVA's cprrective action plan for CATO 221 05 WBN 0'i.
3.7 Observed Bendinq of'ipe Clamp Ears - Element 221.6 (Sequoyah and wWatts Wa,r a.
Evaluated torque values specified for SQN and WBN for 8001 support clamps (Ref s. 43, 44, and 46).
b.
'Performed a calculation (Ref. 45) to determine if SQN and WltN, specified torques are excessive and'could cause bending of ears.
C ~
Oetermined if these cilamps wer'e modified by weldinq stiffeners tO them to prevent them from bending.
d.
Ascertained if vendor approval was obtained and documented if the clamps were modified.
e.
Reviewed TVA's corrective action'pl'ans For CATOs.221 06 SQN 01 and 221 06 WIBN- 01.,
3.8 Observecl Bend~in i of Pipe C1lamos Ears - Eleriient 221.6 (Be'llefonte a.
Obtained and reviewed sample drawings for 8001-type supports (Ref. 47).
b.
Reviewed samp'le desiqn calculations for 800'1-type supports (Reef. i49).
Determined if these support clamps have been modified.
d.
Oetermined if vendor approval has been obtained for any modif icat ion s,.
27390-R13
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 11 of 40 3.9 Gama ed.Pipe Supports - Element 221.7 a.
Reviewed a sampling of reportable occurrence reports for damaged pipe supports (Ref. 53).
b.
Revi'ewed a sample of pipe supports (Refs.
51 and 52) identified from an inservice inspection as requiring repairs, modifications, or part replacements.
c.
Oetermined if the required modifications were due to inadequate design.
3.10 Relief Valve Vent Line Hanger - Element 221.8 a.
Conducted a walkdown (Ref.
- 84) of the area identified in the statement of concern, in order to loca'te the hanger in question.
b.
Reviewed the design calculations (Refs.
54, 55, and
- 56) for two different hanger frames that fit the general description in the statement of concern, because no hanger fitting the description in the statement of concern was found in the general area indicated.
c.
Established the member stress design margin for the larqest size member with the highest normal stress for both of the hanger frames reviewed (Ref. 57).
- 3. 11 Sharp Ed e of Hanqer Steel Clear ance with Pipe Runninq Through the Hanoer Steel Frame - Element 221.9 a.
b.
c ~
Visually inspected and photographed the subject pipe support 2-63-209 during the April 16, 1986, visit to Watts Bar unit 2
(Ref. 59).
Reviewed General Construction Specification G-43, Section 2.7, Rev.
8,
[842 850712 505], (08/08/85).
Studied the magnitude and direction of calculated thermal and seismic pipe movements at the bottom location of the pipe support
.(Ref.. 60).
3.12 Use of Snubber - Element 221.10 a.
Reviewed the applicable design calculations (Refs.
63 and 64) to identify the types of supports on the vertical risers of the upper head injection system.
2739D-R13 (12/08/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22100i REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 12 of 40 b.
Reviewed as-constructed and as-desi'gned pipe support detailI drawings to confirm the support, types (Refs.
61 and 62).
c.
Reviewed TVA' corrective action plan fo'r CATO 221 10 SQN 01.
3.13 ~Keav MCIV Snnnnrtn - Element 221.1'I a.
Ver ified the 'temporary supports clbse to valves lNL-IFCV-062N Iand
-064N by plant walkdown (Ref.'76).
Reviewed the pipe stress calculations (Refs,.
66 and 67) of the core flooding system that contains the valves in "a" (above).
c.
Reviewed the support design calculations (Refe
- 69) of the permanent supports near the valves in "a" (above).
d.
Evaluated the results of the i)ipe stress calculations (Refs.
66 and
- 67) to verify compliance wraith 1974 ASME Code requirements.
e.
Reviewed the support Idesign calculation of the component cooling SyStem hIanger (Refe 7ID) halldihg matar iOPerated ValVe (MOV) 1KC-IFCV-185.
Reviewed the pipe.;tress calculation (Ref.
73) and marking on the isometric drawing (Ref.
- 71) to verify the support type and location of the MOV supporte Reviewed the MOV support, design callculation (Ref., 70) to verify if the support would experience loading due to water hammer.
- 3. 14 SubcateI or~Evaluation Process For this subcategory
- report, the evaluation process included:
a.
Tabulated
- issues, findings and Icorrective 'actions from the element evaluatiions in a plant-by-~)lant arrangement:
(see Attachment B).
b.
Ce PrIepared Tables 1,
2, and 3 to permit, comparison and identification of conmon and unique issues,
- findings, and corrective actions among the four plants.
Classif1ied the findings and corrective actiions from the element
'valuations using "the ECSP definit;ions.
27390-R13 (12/08/87) 0
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 13 of 40 d.
On the basis of ECSP guidelines, analyzed the collective siqnificance and causes of the findings from the element evaluations.
e.
Evaluated defined corrective actions to determine if additional actions are required as a result of causes found in step d.
f.
Provided additional judgment or information that may not be apparent at the element level.
4.
F INOINGS The findings from each of the 14 element evaluations for this subcategory are contained in Attachment B.
The findings are listed, by element number end by plant.
The findings for each element are sumnarized below.
4.1 Oesi n Ade uac of Pi e
Su ort Anchors and Retention of Permanent Records - Element 221.
1 4.1.1 Oi scussion For Watts Bar, this element addressed the concern that the pipe support design calculations prepared'y EOS and Bergen-Paterson have been destroyed,
- and, as a result, no desiqn verification of the pipe supports can be performed.
On the basis of corrective action (CATO 212 01 WBN 01) for Nonconformance Report (NCR)
WBN CEB8418, Rev.
1 (Ref. 5),
and Significant Condition Report (SCR)
- CEB8531, Rev.
1, TVA committed to the NRC to regenerate a number of sample calculations and evaluate for design adequacy.
The evaluation team selected and reviewed eight designs (Ref.
- 1) from these sample calculations.
The team-found these desiqns to be acceptable.
4.1.2 Findings Contrary to the statement of concern, the review revealed that the design calculations prepared by Bergen-Paterson have not been destroyed.
- However, the review also confirmed that the original documents of the pipe support design calculations prepared by EDS were inadvertently destroyed and no copies were kept.
TVA management failed to verify that it had the original, copies, or microfilm of the above calculations in its possession before authorizing their destruction by EOS.
Further discussion of corrective action,
- causes, and significance of these findings is presented in Subcategory Reports 21200 27390-R13 (12/08/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE COINCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:I 22100 REVISION -NUMBER: 4 Page 14 of 40 and 24600.
l:n addition,, specific requirements of Ibase plates and concrete~
anchorage bo1lts, which cover the concerns of 'element 221I. 1, Issue b, are addressed in Construction Subcategory Ri~port 10400.
4.2 Evaluation of Difference in Anal zed Desi n Loads for Pipe SupportsI-
'fiement 72 MATINi 4.2.
1 Discussion For Sequoyah,,
this element addressed the concern t'hat zero period acceleration (ZPA) has not been considered in the pipe stress analysis.
Nuclear power plant piping systems that are important to safety must be designed to comply with applicable seismic requirements.
The usual approach is to perform the analysis within a range of frequencies (0 to 33 Hz) where the dynamic amplification occurs.
This practice is based on the 'fact that the seismic, excitation mainly Contains low frequency
- waves, and no dynamic amplification is expected in the high frequency range.
However, it has been noticed in some caSes that the effects of high frequency (above 33 Hz) aire signiiFicant enough to warrant coinsider ation in the design.
The contribution of t:hese high frequency',miodeIs is known as ZPA effect~s.
~ In recent years,, it has become common practice in nuclear plants to consider ZPA effects in the design o)F compon'ents.
There are no specific commitments in the SgN FSAR to address. this issiue.
There are al.o no regulatory requirements (Ref.
- 9) that specific, ally address the ZPA effects in tiie piping analysis. 'bwdver, NRC's Standard Review ~Plan
~
(SRP) Section 3.7.2 (ReiF.
- 7) has rules that can be considered adequate to address this issue.
i TVA conducted an industry survey (Ref.
85) as earl.y, as
.1972 to evaluate the application of ZPA.
The survey indic,ated 'that the consideration of ZPA. was not a comon practice at that time.
In the mid 1970s, TVA introduced ZPA rigid respon. e load case capabi'iity into the T-PIPE computer code and used this ZPA effect in the analysis of rigid piping systems (above 33 Hz).
A second survey by TVA i'n 1982 indicated-'that ZPA was considered by the industry only at the client's request or to reso'Ive identified problems.'n November 21, 1985,,
R,. 0. Barnett of TVA directed SgN to investigate the ZPA issue (Ref.
9),.
In response to this meko, a prklidiiary evaluation of ZPA effects in.S()N piping systems was conduCted i'n i'lovember and December
'~1985 by
~
Impell Corporation (Ref,. 74);
which-. found that ZPA effects on the piping system would not be -significcint enough to require any hardware modifications.
- However, Impell concluded that the evaliiation was based on limited information and recomended a thorough review.
27390-R13 (12/08/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 15 of 40 A second review was completed by an outside contractor in March 1986 (Ref.
75) to examine the implementation of ZPA effects in the piping analysis of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.
The review covered a wide range of areas including NRC's Regulatory Guide requirements (Ref.
8) and common industry practice with respect to ZPA effects in piping analysis.
The report recommended that a
parametric study for WBN be performed to verify the design margins to cove~
the ZPA effects.
A more detailed evaluation (Ref..
82) was performed by TVA during March 1986 to verify the design adequacy of the components considering ZPA effects in seismically qualified piping systems at SAN.
Nine problems potentially critical,for ZPA loading were evaluated.
The results of this preliminary evaluation revealed higher, loads on some supports due to ZPA effects as compared to loads derived from the modal analysis (OBE).
- However, al,l support loads were found to satisfy the design limits.
The recommendation and findings of the above preliminary evaluations led the evaluation team to independently examine the ZPA effects on SgN piping systems.
Al.l rigorously analyzed isometric drawings (Ref.
- 6) were systematically reviewed to identify the areas of the piping system potentially critical for ZPA loading.
A list of problems was identified through this detailed screening foi further review.
Based on judgment, five severe cases
,from the list were selected by the evaluation team for computation of ZPA loads, primarily on the equipment nozzles and restraints (Ref.
10).
These ZPA loads were evaluated by comparing them with analyzed seismic (OBE) loads and
~ al;lowable design limits.
The results of the review are as follows:
a.
Loads due to ZPA effects for two.out of five cases are higher than analyzed seismic (OBE), loads.
However, for all cases
- reviewed, the loads are well within the design limits.
b.
No hardware, modification is required for any of the evaluated components.
The studies and reviews discussed above arrive at the same conclusion:
the effect of ZPA on SAN piping system design is insignificant.
The evaluation team concurs with the conclusion.
4.2.2 Findings Although ZPA was addressed at Sequoyah in various studies and reviews (Refs.
9, 74, 75, and 82), the preliminary ZPA calculations were never finalized and incorporated into the piping analysis calculation packages.
2739D-R13 (12/08/87),
TVA EMP'LOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22100I REVISION NUMBER: ~4
'Page 16 of 40 4.3 M
or Oifference in Analyzed Desi n Loads for Similar Unit 1
and Uni 2}
ape upports - Element 22 C2 WBN 4.3. 1
. Oiscussion For Watts Bar, this element addressed tive qoqcern that the support loiads in unit 2 are significantly higher than similar supports in unit 1.
This concern applies only tto,those, piping -systems that have similar (if not identical) routing, support locations, and functions for both units.
Because of the difficulty in trying to identify any piping-system with identical features in both units, it was deemed appropriate to review unit 1
and unit 2
systems that could be considered similar enough to allow a comparison with meaningful results.
Nonsimilar systems will have different responses and will generate diff'erent loads on pipe supports.
Thus, to verify the validity of this concerri,,
a,,sampple of 11 (Ref.
- 11) similar calculations from unit 1
and unit 2 systems uterh selected. from the list of similar piping.systems provided by TVA.
The sample was selected from different systems, such as feedwater,
- CVCS, RICSI, etc., to avoid systematic bias in the sample.
The sample contains 12 isometrics (Ref.
- 12) consisting of 270 support points from each unit.
4.3.2 Findings The evaluation team examined the above sample analyses (Ref.
- 11) performed by TVA on similar piping systems for unit I and iunit 2.
A corn'parison of the pipe.
support loads resulting from these analyses shows.that only 1 percent of the unit 2 pipe supports have loads that are greater than eight times the corresponding unit 1 support loads.
The evaluation team determined that the reasons for these load increases result from differences in support configuration, flexibility, etc., of the piping systems of units 1
and 2.
These load increases do not constitute any safety concern as the supports were designed for the analyzed loads; 4.4
~Nissin or Unin.'tolled P~iie So orts - Element 221.3 4.4. 1 Discussion for Watts Bar, this element addresseri the concern that a ion'g span of unsupported pipingI is due to missing or uninstalled hangers.
TVA Project Procedure WBEP-EP 43..14, Revision 3, "P&ograrh fbr Hanger and Support Requirements.,"
estab'lishes, the suppor t des'igh s6oping activities.in Section.
4.0.
This section of the procedure mandates. the use of a Piping Analysis 27390-R13
('l2/08/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 17 of 40 Problem Review form, or its equivalent.
Included in this form is a listing of each support required for a given analysis problem number, alonq with various descriptive items (revision number, joint number, support type, required load vs. design load, etc.) for each.
The form also serves as a checklist for these
- items, as well as provides a means for tracking the status of actions required.
Samples (Ref.
- 14) of this Piping Analysis Problem Review form were selected from various systems to.verify that all supports required by the applicable piping stress analysis were listed accordingly on the form.
In all cases
- reviewed, the forms contained a..complete listing of all required supports, per the latest piping stress analysis revision.
Additional steps were taken to verify that the supports listed on the, forms were also listed in TVA's Hanger Tracking Program report (Ref.
18).
This check assures that a design drawing exists for each support listed in the scope as defined by the Piping Analysis Problem Review form.
The documentation system of TVA treats these Piping Analysis Problem Review forms as a calculation (separate from the support design calculations themselves) which includes a cover sheet to control and document the changes in each revision.
The aforementioned procedure provides sufficient control to ensure that all supports required by the piping stress analysis will be designed and accounted for.
In addition, TVA's IE Bulletin 79-14 Phase I proqram (Ref.
- 17) requires a walkdown inspection of all safety-related piping systems, thus providing added assurance that any missing or. uninstalled supports will not be overlooked.
The statement of concern does not include a specific identification of the system or pipe diameter in which an unsupported 40-foot span of pipe was observed.
If the piping mentioned in the statement of concern was a
nonsafety-related system with a nominal diameter equal to or greater than 30 inches, then a 40-foot span of straight. run pipe is possible.
In addition, the concerned individual might have, observed this 40-foot span on a piping system that has not yet been finalized with respect to hanger installation.
It is common to find situations where there may be an extended period from the time, piping is first installed unti 1 the last engineered s'uppor t for this piping is installed.
2739D-R13 (12/08/87)
TVA EMPI.OYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
'22100'EVISION NUMBER: 4 P'age 18 of 40 To evaluate the validity O'F the statement of concern,'he evaluator randomly selected piping systems with various pipe sizes from the main steam, feedwater, steam generator blowclown, and auxi'liary'feedwater systems (Ref.
15) for review.
The review was limited to siierify orIily'gravity spans for the'upports in the above piiping systems (Ref.
16).
4.4.2 Findings The evaluation revealed that, in four out of six cases, the support spans satisfy ANSI B31e 1 code-suggested (Ref.
~19)~
1'engths.
The r emaining two,cases exceeded the suggested spaiIis but were qualified by TVA using rigorous analySiS.
The eValuatiOn alSO reVealed'that
'the reVieWed SuppOrtS liSted On the Piping Analysis Problem Review forms (Ref.
- 14) 'we'e 'also listed in TVA's Hanger Tracking Program report.(Ref. 18).
Thus~
a design drawing exists for each support listed in the scope as defined by the Piping Analysis Problem Review Form.
4.5 'Deletion of Supports
- Element 221.4 4.5.
1 Oiscussiion For Matts Bar, the concern was that the HVAC piping
( 12-inch pipe, Sched'ule
- 40) in unit 2'., 'located in the Auxiliary Building at elevation 737 feet, is not adequately supportied because three hangers are deleted.
To evaluate this
- concern, the evaluation team reviewed the pip'ing draw'ings of this ilYAC system for both units 1
aind 2.
A system drawing (Reif. i20) and,the isometric drawings (Refs.
23 and 24) iof the above liVAC piping system were examined to verify, the support locations.
As per TVA, both the unit 2 ductinq of concern and the related unit 1 ducting were original,ly 4uallified by alternate.criteria (spain method)
CEB 76-!i (Ref. 86).
The support configuration based on the alte'mate'nalysis criteria lwas ref liected in the aboVe drawings.
The-unit 2 piping iwas later reanalyzed by TVA'Sing the program.T-PIPE, ia more accurate analysis methodoliogy tt>an the span method'used in the alternate analysis criteria.
Six supports, including three mentioned in the concern, originally placed in unit 2, were found'to'e'nnecessary as a result of thie reanalysis, aind therefore were deleted.
The computer analysis of this u'nit 2'VAC piping reflects the support configuratio'n as shown on the revised isometric drawings (Refs.,21 and 22).
Alternate criteria CEB 76-5, originally used for this piping system, is a much ntore conservative apprioach and'equi'reS'ore supports than called for in the T-PIPE compiuter anaily'.is.
Thus, it was possible to eliminate six supports in uhit 2 Ias the result of reanalysis by the T-PIPE computer progr aim.
The result'.s of this T-PIPE calculation (Ref. 25) of unit 2 HVAC piping stiow thiat the system, is qualified to meet the requirements of the ASME ciode (Ref.
30) and Matts Bar design criteria'Ref.
87).
I 27390-R13
( 12/08/87) 0
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 19 of 40 The element also addressed. the concern that the only remaining hanger attached to the ceiling is deficient in design because the hanger's kickers were removed.
Of the existing hangers in unit 2 HVAC piping, the only hanger attached-to the ceili'ng appears to be that shown on TVA dr'awing 47A920-44-10, Rev.
2 (Ref. 28).
The review of this design detail drawing of the hanger shows that no kicker was included in the design.
According to TVA, a kicker was installed at one time by Construction and was later removed (Ref. 30).
Kickers were not designed or shown in the hanger detail. drawings (Refs.
26 and 27) as per TVA.
The review also revealed that the subject hanger was qualified (without kicker) for the computed loads calculate'd from the reanalysis of unit 2 HVAC piping by the T-PIPE computer program.
In addition, the evaluation team reviewed'his support (Ref.
29) and determined that it is adequately designed:
no kicker is required.
- 4. 5. 2 Findings The evaluation revealed that the existing support configuration, after some pipe supports are deleted, is in compliance with the requirements of the ASME code for HVAC piping (duct).
The hanger is designed adequately for the computed, loads without kickers.
4.6 Pipe Support Base Plate Installed Over an Expansion Joint - Element 221.5 4.6.
1 Oi scussi o' For blatts Bar, the concern was that there was an insufficient gap between the containment wall and the pipe support base plate grout that extends over an expansion joint to allow for designed movements of the containment wall.
A plant walkdown was performed by the evaluation team (Refs.
40 and 81) to review the concern.
The base plate of support 47A401-9-6 (Ref. 36), situated at the location identified in the concern, does not extend over the expansion joint between the floor and the containment wall (shield wall) ~
Consequently,
'further search was performed and support 1-03A-569 was found near the east door whose hase plate grout (Ref.
- 37) extends over the expansion joint.
No other pipe supports in this valve room were found with the base plates or grout extendinq over the expansion joints.
Therefore, resolution of this concern is based on evaluation of support 1-03A-569.
The measured gaps between the shield wall and the grout and between the shield wall and the base plate are 7/8-inch and 1-7/B-inch, respectively.
At elevation 729 feet, where the pipe support is located, the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) displacements for the two structures, the Shield Building and the-north valve room, are approximately 1/32-inch each.
The combined 27390-R13 (12/08/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE 'CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
221GO REVISION NUMBER". 4 Page 20 of 40 disolacement (when the two structures-displace toward each other) is aporoximately 1/16-inc:h (Refs.
- 311, 32, 33, and 40).
As can be seen,;
the measured gaps between the shie,ld wall and the grout/base. plate are.large& than the SSE displacement of the two structures.
Therefore,.
t:he pipe support will not interfere with the movement of the shield wal,l during a seismic event.
In WBN Design Criteria WB-OC-40-31.9, paragraph 8.3.2, Rev.
5, states that
'pecial requirements are to be shown on the drawing in the torm of notes.
- However, the pipe support 1-03A-569 detai 1 drawing (Ref.
- 34) does not iidentifyi the existence of the expansioh joint either in its initiaI design or in subsequent revisions to the design because of 'field change
~equests (Refs.
35,~
38, and 39).
The evaluation teams performed a unit 1
and 2 plant walkdown (Ref.
- 81) of floor-mounted pipe supipoir t base plates in the vicinity of'xpansion joints between the following structural interfac:es.
The purpose of this inspection
- was, in part, to determine whether other'bade plhteC e'xtdnded over the; expansion joints.
Norse were f'ound.
The splecifM locations examined were:
o North valve room to Shield Building wal,.l at elevat;ion 729. feet o
Sout:h valve room to Shield Bui'iding wall at elevation 729 feet o
. Additional Equipment: Building and Auxiliary Building at eilevations 702 feet anci 729 feet o
Auxiliary Building and Shield Building wall at elevations 692 feet:,
713 feet, 737 Feet, and 757 feet 4.6.2 Findings The review revealed an isolated case where the -base plate grout extends over
'the expansion joint between the shield wall and the north valve room.
The clap between the shield wal,l and the base plate grout was found to be adequate to accommodate the maximum displaicements, but the existence of the expansion joint between the shield wall and the noHh valv& rbomI was not noted on the pipe support cirawing.
4.7 Observed Bendinci of Pipe Clam Ears - Element 221.6 4.7.1
.Discussion For Watts Bai Sequoyah, and Beliefonte, the concern as stated is that~ over ~a
~
long period of time the ears on small 8001 -.support clamps will bend becau'se
'of'xcessive torquing ancl that this bending will result in stressing A-36 material (of clamp) beyond its yield point.'739D-R13 (12/08/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 21 of 40 8001 seismic Category I supports are used to support small bore (2 inches diameter and small'er) drain lines, instrument sensing
- lines, sampling lines, radiation monitoring lines, and test and process lines containing isolation valves.
These lines are called branch lines.
Th'e 8001 support consists of a stanchion pipe welded directly to the run line or to the clamp that is fastened to the run line.
Similarly, the branch line is welded or clamped to the stanchion.
Adeauacy of the branch line and run line clamp when overtorqued is the concern addressed in this discussion.
Orawings 478001-13 (Ref. 44) and 478001-10.(Ref.
- 43) for Watts Bar and Orawings 478001-14, 14A, and'78001-12 (Ref. 46) for Sequoyah specify a torque value of 5 to 10 ft-lb (depending on the size of the bolt) for branch line clamps.
The evaluation team found the specified torque values for the branch line clamps to be reasonable.
It is not expected that the clamp ears would bend under these torque values.
The aforementioned 478001 drawings also specified a torque value of 100 ft-lb for run line clamps (regardless of clamp and bolt size).
The 100 ft-lb value may have arisen from the test program CEB 77-42 (Ref. 41) that specified this value for Bergen-Paterson clamp 298 for all pipe sizes.
Orawing 478001-10, Rev.
8 (Ref.
- 43) for Watts Bar, Orawing 478001-12, Rev.
5 (Ref. 46) for Sequoyah, and CEB Report 77-42 specify torque values for the
- bolts, whereas CEB Report 75-18 (Ref. 42), under the tabulation of parameters for anchor clamp, specifies preload values for the bolts.
To establish a
relationship between preload and torque values, the evaluation team calculated torque values for clamp sizes for 2-1/2-inch to 30-inch-diameter pipe (Ref. 45).
The calculation shows that a torque value of 100 ft-lb will produce a preload almost 2-1/2 times the value indicated in CEB Report 75-18'or, alternately, the actual torque required is about 40 percent of what was specified for installation of these clamps.
Therefore, it is evident that the 8001 suppor t clamps were over-stressed by over-torquing of the bolts and the ears could have been bent, especially for smaller size pipe clamps.
Instead of reducing the torque value to a value compatible with the bolt preload, WBN welded stiffeners to these clamps to prevent them from bending.
The clamp manufacturer's (Bergen-Paterson's) concurrence for welding stiffeners to the clamp was not obtained (Ref. 78).
The manufacturer stated that when modifications are made to the product without its prior approval, the warranty becomes void.
The vendor was asked about drawing the clamp ears within 1/8 inch of each other when torqued.
The manufacturer stated that it.
is acceptable'to do so because the clamp was designed to spring back to its original configuration when the bolts are relaxed (i.e.,
when the toraue is removed).
.However, because the clamps have been modified, they may not perform as intended.
2739D-R13 (12/08/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS
- SPECIAL, PROGIMM REPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBFR i 4 Page 22 of 40 Welding stiffeners to the clamps is likely to pr'event bending of clamp ears, but it causes
'the specified preload in thh b'olts to be exceeded.
The excessive torque value for installation of tihese clamps should be reduced to be. compatible with t:he capacity of the clamps and bolts.
The clamps., if damaged or determined to be ineffiective for 'their'intended function, should be replaced and installed at the 'lower torque value equivalent to the specified bolt preload.
SQN did not weld stiffeners to t,he clamps.
For Rellefonte, TVA has specially engineered pipe clampis for this type of support.
Each clampi is unique'ly designed with a special analysis being.
performed by ITT Grinnell fair each support.
Pretorque values are calculated in the special analysis for each clamp (Ref. 47).
The evaluation team reviewed two analyses'o'r t!heSe supports (Ref, 49)i The analyses qualify the various parts of the'8001>type
Specifically, preload torque is calculated from the results of the detailed clamp analysis (Ref. 48)
Pretorque values provided by TVA for these s'upports differ for clamps on the same size pipe..
lFor example, t'.he values for 12-inch pipe vary between 43 and 215 ft-lb.
These torque values aire uniquely'alculated in the Grinnell analysis according to the specific loading (Ref. 48).
No modifications to these clamps have been m'ade to strengthen them against, bending as the clamp and the bolt force are designed as a unit (Ref. 47).
4.7. 2 Fi nd.ing s For Watts Bar and SQN, the ears of the small'-bore'pipe
'branch line clamps would not be bent., because the tiorque values specifiei9 for their installation were reasonable.
Ears of the r'un line clamps would be bent because the torque value specified for their installation was excessive.
This excessive torque'ould also cause ioverstressing and failure of clamp bolts.
At Watts Bar, gussets were weldied on the clamps to prevent the clamps from bending.,
'I'his clamp modification was not qualified by analysis or by testing.
At SQN, no modifications havie been made to these clamps to prevent bending..
For Bellefonte t'e 8001-type c:lamps are uniquely designecl with an analysiis performed by Ill'T iGrinnell to qual ify each assembly.
27390-R13 (12/08/87)
~
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 23 of 40 4.8 Oama ed Pi e Supports - Element 221.7 4.8.
1 Oiscussion For Browns Ferry, this element addressed the concern that inadequate pipe support design caused damage to the supports found during in-service inspection.
Pipe supports are required to be designed for loadings resulting from.anticipated system behavior.
If a system undergoes, unanticipated behavior or misoperation, additional loading may be induced on the system causing damage to the pipe supports.
Such an occurrence should not be considered an inadequacy of pipe support design.
Such instances are reported to the NRC in the form of reportable occurrence reports.
Corrective action is taken to restore the system to operational condition.
If necessary, modifications to the system are implemented to ensure that there will be no recurrence of such behavior.
Examples of reportable occurrences selected by the evaluation team from a conditions adverse to quality (CA/) data base frequency report (Ref.
53). where pipe supports that were damaged at BFN were reviewed.
The above reports stated that the occurrences did not present a safety concern.
No damage to equipment was noted.
These damaged supports are indications that the piping and supports were undergoing an unanticipated loading condition.
Investigation of these supports led to modification of the system to prevent recurrence.
There are various BFN programs in place to identify pipe supports which require repai r, modification, or replacement.
One such program is inservice inspection
( ISI) (Ref. 51), which this concern makes reference to.
Inservice inspection is required by ASME Section XI to be performed during each 10-year interval of commercial service.
ASME Code equivalency has been established for BFN inservice inspection purposes.
(BFN was originally designed to ANSI/ASME B31.
1 Code requirements.)
Pipe supports requiring repair found during an ISI are reported
.in Part I, Finding, of a Notification of Indication (NOI) in accordance with procedure BFNP SI-4.6.G, "Inservice Inspection Program" (Ref. 51).
Appropriate action to he taken is noted in Part II, Oisposition, of the NOI.
Part III, Verification of the NOI, is completed after the repair work is done.
The evaluation team reviewed a sample of six NOIs (Ref. 52).
Four NOIs (NOIs U2/C5B-20, -22, -24,
-61) dealt with loose bolt connections, and one (NOI U2/C5B-39) dealt with a broken tack weld between the process pipe and insulation saddle.
These 'NOIs are instances of normal maintenance for an operating plant.
The sixth NOI (NOI U2/C58-29) dealt with an inadequate weld between the pipe and lugs.
This weld deficiency was due to the 1'ack of fusion as stated in the NOI.
27390-R13 (12/08/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAI4l REPORT NUbllBER:
22160 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 24 of 40 Replacement of parts or entire supports is not necessarily an indication that i
the original design was inadequate or that parts were damaged.
Support additions; delletions, and modifications due ta pipe stress reanalysis are not uncommon occurrences.
Pipe supports can, be damaged from transportation and installation of other commodities.
In these
- dases, the damaged parts would
~be'eplaced.
Pipe supports can also be damaged by system misoperation or unanticipated system behavior.
Support discrepancies are identified through various plant walkdowns such as those required for norma) maintenance.
Any discrepancy (both physical and documentative) may be identified by a discrepancy report (OR) in accordance with Site Oirector Standard Practic'e SOSP
- 3. 1, Corrective Action Program" (Ref. 50).
A OR may be generated by non-OA personnel;
- however, the OR is processed through gA for review and appropriate corrective action.
- 4. 8.2 Findings The review of the sample damaged pipe supports reported to the NRC reveal'ed'hat the supports were damage<I by unanticipated loading on the piping system.
The support modi;Fications were required because of pipe stress reanalysis, installation difiFiculties, and the necessity o'f minimi'zing any recurrence of such unanticipated loading.
No support design deficiencies were noticed.
4.9 Relief Valve Vent, Line Hant er - Element, 221JB 4.9.
1 Oiscussion For WBN, the statement o<F concern implieS that'he relief valve vent line hanger cited by the concerned individual has a design. margin of at least
'10.'0.'lthough the design margin concept can be applied to various aspectS of any hanger design (member stress, weld stress, stiffriiess, deflection, etc.),
'the evaluation team elected to address the concern in terms of member stress, which is the deciding factor in almost all Cases of member size determination, since the concerned individual is apparently queCtidning the choice of'member
'ize utilized in the observed hanger designl.
Since the hanger described in the statement of concern was not specifically identified, tiie evaluation team visually inSpected supports in the unit 2
Auxiliary 8'uilding (Ref. 84) located near cOlumn lines "A13" and "U'" at elevation 737 feet.
Nlo vent line was found at or near this location.
- However, two supports utilizing tube steel were identified in the adjacent chiller room.
One is a pipe support (SVS-H-53-174-11984) that utilizes a
6 x 6 x 1/2 inch square tube as its largest member Size.
The other is a cable 2739D-R13.
(12/08/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 25 of 40 tray support (MK420) with a pipe support (47A920-38-3) attached to it.
The largest member size in this cable tray/pipe support frame is an 8 x 8 x 3/8 inch square
- tube, which is actually a primary member of the cable tray support frame MK420.
The structural analysis calculations (Refs.
54, 55, and 56) for both supports were reviewed by the evaluation team with the objective of establishing a
member stress design margin for the heaviest loaded member of largest size in the entire frame.
For the purpose of this review, the member stress design margin is defined as the inverse of tHe AISC interaction value.
This interaction value is the sum of three actual vs. allowable stress ratios for axial compression
- stress, as well as bending stresses in both directions of bending.
A calculation was performed by the evaluation team (Ref.
- 57) to find the member stress design margin for the 6 x 6 x 1/2-inch structural tube for support SVS-H-53-174-1984 and 8 x 8 x 3/8-inch structural tube for support MK420.
4.9.2
'Findings The member stress desi'gn margin was found to be approximately 3 for pipe support SVS-H-53-174-1984 (Ref.
55) and 2 for cable tray support MK 420.
On the basis of a review of the structural analysis calculations for both the aforementioned support frames, the member stress design margins of 3 and 2 are reasonable.
Particularly from the standpoint of member size selection, there is no evidence that either of the supports reviewed was overdesigned.
- 4. 10 Sharp Edqe of Han er Steel Clearance with Pi e Runnin Throu h the Hanger Steel Frame - Element 221.9
- 4. 10.1'iscussion For Watts Bar, the statement of concern implies that the pipe will hit the sharp edge of structural steel and be damaged if its movement in the unrestrained direction in any mode of plant operation is greater than the clearance available.
Visual inspection of the support (Ref.
- 59) revealed a structural tube used as a shim to achieve the required horizontal clearance specified in the design drawing (Ref.
58)-.
The edge closest to the pipe in the direction in question is the round corner of this structural tube.
27390-R13 (12/08/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SP,'ECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 26 of 40 A study of calculated thermal and seismic pipe movements (Ret.
- 60) at the subject hanger location revealed that the pipe will move away from the edge Of the structural tube in question as it goes from a cold to hot condition<
The minimum gap of 1/8 inch (-0 inch) specified in the design sketch is greater than the calculated maximum seismic pipe d1splacement of +0.0243 inc4 at the hanger 1location four the, worst case safe shutddwn earthquake (SSE).
General Construction Specificat,ion G-43, Section 2.7, Rev.
8, states thlat th4 tolerances spec1fied in the. design drawing govern over construction tolerances
~
permitted in the spec1fication.
- 4. 10. 2 Findings The evaluation concluded that the clearance between the support and the pipe is adequate to avoid interference in any plant event and hence acceptable.
4.11 Use of Snubber - Element 22110
- 4. 11. 1 Discussion For SgN, the concern was that a snubber-type support was installed on the vertical riser of the upper head injection system instead of a rigid-type
'upport as anallyzed.
The evaluation team, reviewed the supports on the
'ertical riser portion of the loop for-both units (units 1 and 2), (Ref s.
61 and 62).
The results of the review show that a rigid-hype support at node point 44A'S specified in the piping analysis prolblem 15-01 (units 1 and
- 2) (Ref. 65),
while as-constructed support detail drawings (1-H45-9, Ref. 61, and 2-H45-9, Ref.
- 62) identify a snubber-type support at.this location.
In March 1986, this discrepancy was identified by TVA in Significant Condition Report BC'gN i
CEB 8615 (Section.2.0)
[B41 860306 043].
On August 24, 1986 TVA performed a
study calculat',ion for the analysis problem 15-01 (Ref. 65) specifying a'nubber-type support at node point 44A to reflect the as-constructed condition.
The results of the TVA analysis demonstrate that no failure of'he upper head injection system will result from this defic1ency.
The evaluation team agrees with 'I'VA,'s conclusion since the change from a rigid-type suppo'rt
'o a snubber,-type support will have no impact, on the seismic stress
- levels, and the thermal stress levels wil'I be generally lower due to the added flexibilityof the system,.
Ir respective of t'e study calculat1on results, TVA has decided to replace the installed snubber-type support with the r1gid-type support, befo~e restart of
~
SON unit 2.
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22100 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 27 of 40
- 4. 11.2 Findings The review revealed that a snubber-type support was installed on the vertical riser of the upper head injection system instead of a r.igid-type support, as analyzed.
This discrepancy was identified by TVA before the ECTG evaluation.
- 4. 12 Heav MOV Supports - Element 221. 11 4.12.1 Discussion For Bellefonte, this element addressed the concerns that the valves will not be, supported properly when the temporary supports are removed and that the supports on, the heavy motor operated valves (MOV) are not effectively designed to sustain plant operating conditions.
To evaluate the validity of the concern of temporary supports, the evaluation team performed a plant walkdown (Ref., 76) in the Reactor Building, unit l.
The following observations were made during the walkdown:
o No temporary supports were found in the vicinity of valves 1NL-IFCV-062N and
-064N in the core flooding system.
o The installation of permanent supports next to the above valves was noticed.
To verify the adequacy of the support configuration on the piping system, the pipe stress calculations of the core flooding system were reviewed (Refs.
66 and 67).
The review revealed the following:
o The supports next to the valves, observed during the plant walkdown, are included appropriately in the mathematical model of the piping analysis (Ref. 68).
o The above supports. are designed adequately to sustain the computed loads (Ref. 69).
o The results of the piping stress analyses comply with the requirements of the 1974 ASME code.
To evaluate a specific support holding an MOV in the component cooling system (KC), the evaluation team examined KC system isometric drawings to identify all MOVs attached to 3-inch piping on the north side of the Reactor Building, unit 1, at elevation 622 feet (Ref. 71).
The examination revealed that only one MOV (1KC-IFCV-185) out of a total of four in this area, had a support on 27390-R13 (12/08/87)
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22100 REVISION NUMBER;.
4'age 28 of 40 the operator.
Further examination of this operator support design drawing (Ref.
70) showed that the support, 'attachment was 'not at the ceiling; hence, the situation did not match that described in the concern'..
The abode finidiog led.the evaluation team to evaluate MOV suppor'ts',in, the identified location.
A plant walkdown was conducted by the evaluation steam (Ref.
- 77) in the unit 1
Reactor Buildingelevation 622 feet, to identify the 'supports on MOVs.
The following bbservations were made during t'he'plant'alkdown:
o Thirty-four MOVs were identified in seven systems.
o Of -the 34 MOVs, three were identified a~s having'upport on the operator.
The evaluation of the supports on the above MOVs revea'led the 'following:
o The support on MOV 1NL-IFCV-076A appeared to. be a temporary construction support.
Therefore; no further evaluation was performed on this support.,
The support on MOV lKC-IFCV-2078 consisted of a rectangular frame
'laced around the operator yoke and attached to the ceiling beam.
't was noticed that there were gaps langer.than 1/8-inch betweeh the frame and the operator yoke and that the frame was.not sup'portihg the MOV.
Further examination r'evealed 'that this rectangular fr arne is neither marked on the isometric drawingi nor considered in'the pipe stress calculatioh aS a support on.the MOV (Ref71).
The review of the support design drawing of this rectangular frame showed that this.upport was deleted (Ref. 72).
It was further confirmed by TVA that the construction of this support was left'ncomplete after the deletion Of the support~was transmitted to construct'ion.
TVA agreed to remove this frame (Ref. 79).
The identified support on MOV 1'KC-IFCV-186 was found to be a snubber (support
'iKC-MPHG-0884).
The evaluation of the design calculation (Ref. 70) indicated that the support design is adequate to sulsthin'he computed loads for al1, plant events.
According to TVA, no water
'ammer is experienced in this piping system (problem N4-1KC-G) during plant. operation.
1herefore, 1load combinations of'his support do not contain the water hamner loading (Ref. 73).
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22100 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 29 of 40
- 4. 12.2 Findings The evaluation revealed that the existing support configuration is adequate to support the valves.
The motor-operated valve supports are designed adequately, and the supports are marked appropriately on the isometric drawings (Ref. 71).
4.13 Summar of Subcate or Findin s
The classified findings are summarized in Table 1.
Class A and 8 findings indicate that corrective action is not required.
Class C, 0, and E findings require corrective actions.
The corrective action class, defined in the Glossary Supplement, is identified in the table by the numeral combined with the finding c 1 ass.
Findings are summarized by classification in Table 2.
Where more than one corrective action is identified in Table 1 for a single finding (e.g.,
element 221.6, Finding a), Table 2 counts only a single classification.
Thus Table 2
identifies one finding for each issue evaluated.
Of the 24 findings identified by a classification in Table 1,
17 require no corrective action.
Of the remaining, one issue had corrective actions initiated before the ECTG evaluation, four required new corrective actions to be identified, and two were peripheral issues uncovered during the ECTG evaluation.
From this table it can be seen that at Watts Bar, where most of the issues were originated, four out of a total of 12 issues were found to be valid and requi.re corrective
- action, and one of these four issues had corrective action initiated before the ECTG evaluation.
5.
CORRECTI VE ACTIONS The corrective actions that are required for the elements reviewed for this subcategory are described in detail in Attachment B.
The following is a brief description of the corrective actions by element and applicable plant.
o 221.1 Oesi n Ade uac of, Pi e
Su ort Anchors and Retention of Permanent Records - For Watts'Bar, the review confirmed that the pipe support design calculations prepared by EOS were destroyed and no copies were kept.
TVA is committed to regenerate all missing pipe support design calculations and the destroyed EDS calculations before fuel load.
TVA also plans to review all pipe support design calculations to ensure their completeness.
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4'age 30 of 40 o
221.~22ualuation of Difference in Anal zed Des~in Loads f~or Pi e
Supports - Although ZPA was addressed at
'equoyah, the ZPA study
~ca cuTations were not finalized.
Lack 'of 'proper documentation Iof ZPA calculations was the primary reason to initiate the corrective action.
TVA plans to f'inalize the preliminary reviews and studies performed on ZPA.
o 221.~5Pipe Support Base Plate Installed Over an E~xansion Rint-
'E1I grout extendingl over the expansion joint between the shield wall and the north valve room.
This, case prompted the corrective action, to incorporate not,es on the above identifi'ed'support detail drawing to clarify the existence of the expansion joint.
TVA also plans tio inform pipe support designers by memo on the above incident to avoid recurr ence of t,hi s problem.
o 221.~60bserved Bend~in of Pi e Clamb Ears - For Sequoyah and Wattls
-Bar,, the review revealed that an excessive tI)rque va'Iue has been specifiled for installat'.ion of the bolts on the run line of 8001 type supports.
As corrective action, TVA is committed to revise draI2rings 478001-12 (SQN) and 478001-10 (WBN) to provide appropriate torque values for the above bolts-.
TVA also plans to perform a plant walkdown to identify and evaluate deficient 8001 type supports.
For Watts Bar,,
TUA is also committed to qualif'y the clamps that are modified by welding gusset plates.,
o 221.~10 Use of Snubber - For SequcIyah, the review identified'an'nstalled snubbler-type support onithe viertical riser of the upper head injection system instead of a rigid-type. support as analyzed.
TVA plans to remove the snubber and install a rigid support at the identif'ied location.
A review of the corrective actions descri,'bed above for, this subcategory reveals that each requires some, documentation changes.
Evaluation and
,'nalysis are neecied as corrective action for the clamps and the associated bolts of 8001 type sup~portse A need for plant modif'icatiion. is apparent in the case of replacement of a snubber by a rigid support in the upper head injection system.
Table 2.identifies seven findings that require corrective action.
The'orrective
- actions, aliong with their finding/corrective action classifications, are summarized in Table 3.
The description of'he corrective actions in Table 3 is a condensatiorr. of the more detailled corrective action I
27390-R13 (12/08/87) ik
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 31 of 40 information provided in Attachment B.
The plant or plants to which a corrective action is applicable are shown in the Corrective Action Tracking Document (CATO) column, and are identified by the CATO number.
The CATO column in Table
.3 shows that, in most cases, a particular corrective action is applicable to only a single plant.
The corrective action for element 221.6, which involves clamp bolt torque calculations, is the only corrective action applicable to more than one plant.
In all cases, the evaluation team found the corrective action plans to be acceptable to resolve the findings.
6.
CAUSES Table 3 identifies one or more causes for each finding requiring corrective action.
For each corrective action, the most important cause is identified using the judgment of the evaluation team.
In some instances, it is judged that the finding resulted from a combination of causes, and, therefore, more than one cause is identified.
The bases for identifying the causes for each corrective action described in Table 3 and'the linkage with the negative findings are as follows:
o 221.
1 Design Ade uac of Pipe Support Anchors and Retention of Permanent Records - Inadvertent destruction of the pipe support esign ca cu ations prepared by EDS was caused: by a misunderstanding due to poor communication of the status of calculations held by TVA.
This might have been prevented if the manager responsible for the decision had been more attentive.
The other cause, inadequate quality training, resulted in,a lack of understanding by the responsible engineers of the need to control and maintain the design documents.
o 221.2 Evaluation of Difference in Anal zed Desi n Loads for Pi e
~Su orts - Although lpA calculations were performed in a study, no attempt was made to finalize those calculations.
Failure to act on this peripheral item resulted from lack of attention on the part of the first-line supervisor to establish and implement an effective design process for ZP A loading.
o 221.5, Pi e
Su ort Base Plate Installed Over an Ex ansion Joint-roce ures to show specia requirements on the drawings were not followed in the case of the omission of 'an expansion joint in the support design detail drawing.
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22160 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 32 of 40 o,221.~6 Observed Bendlin~ of Pi e
Clam Ears Over-tcirquing of the clamp bolts was the result of a design error that could have been prevented by performing adeqUat'e c,alculations.
In addition, the,re was a lack of design 'detail to establish the relationship between preload values and torque values for the bolts, which led to higher torque values whiten.
the bolts were installed.
'0 Inadequate calculations resulted. in the use of unqualified clamps modified by welding gusset plates at WBN.
This
'versight was an engineer1ing error.
Failure to obtain approval from thee pipe clamp manufacturer for the modification of the clamp resulted from the lack of management:
attention and inadequate communication.
221.10~Use of Snubber - Installation cif a snubber.
instead of a'igid s~upport as ana.lyzed was due to an engineering error.
In addition, as-built-reconciliation'as deficient as it did not ide rotify this problem.
7.
COLLECTIVE SIGNIFICANCE The last three columns of Table 3 show the significance of the correct'ive'ctions that resulted from 'the evaluation of the concerns under this subcategory.
Significance is judged by the evaluation team and is rated in accordance wit,h the type or types, of changeS that, may be expected to result from the corrective ac tion.
The 24 issues evaluated in this subcategOry resulted in seven corrective actions.
Six of the seven are judged to'be'signi'fic'.an't f'r the. expected
- changes, as indicated in the last three columns of Table 3.
Although the corrective actions require slome changes in dOcumentation, the volume of documents required to be regenerated for destroyed and missihg calculations is most significant in term0 of the 'tirhe and cost to replace'.
Furthermore, the regeneration of the pipe siipport design calculations may potentially lead to hardviare modifirations and al'so'may result in changes in design margin.
This particular concern of destroyed and missing pipe support design calculations was evaluated by ECTG or)ly'.,fo'r Watts Bar.
However the process of reglenerating the destroyed and miss>ng pipe support design calculations at Sequoyahnow in progress, dionfir'ms the existence of a'simil'ar'7390-R13 (12/08/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 33 of 40 condition.
The retrievability of design calculations for Browns Ferry and Bellefonte was not evaluated in this subcategory but is addressed in Subcategory 24600.
The corrective, action that resulted from the excessive torque applied to the clamp bolts to 8001 type supports for Sequoyah and Watts Bar was considered significant for the protection of systems required for plant safety.
The evaluation of these clamps may lead to potential hardware modifications.
However, the magnitude of the problem can be assessed only after the plant walkdown and evaluation is complete.
The other three significant corrective actions resulted from isolated events and are applicable to individual plants.
An evaluation of the types of corrective actions resulting from the findings indicates a need for better document control than existed when the issues arose.
The collective significance of the causes reveals a lack of effectiveness in management of the design process.
However, with the exception of the issue about the destroyed calculations, the evaluation of the other issues reveals that the pipe support design for the four TVA plants does not represent a significant technical problem in the area of design adequacy.
TVA's nuclear performance plans (NPPs)
(Ref. 88) for Sequoyah and Watts Bar were reviewed regarding the issues evaluated in this subcategory requiring corrective actions.
On the basis of this review, it can be concluded that these issues have been addressed adequately in the NPPs.
The causes identified and other evaluation results are being examined from a wider perspective in the Engineering category evaluation.
27390-R13 (12/08/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM TABLE 1
REPORT NUMBER':
'2100 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 34 of 40
'll CLASSIFICATION OF FINOINGS',AND CORRECTIVE. ACTIONS 221.1 221.2 221.3 Element:
Design Adequacy of P'i pe Support Anchors and Retention of Permanent, Records Maj or Oiffer ence in Analyzed Design Loads for Similar (unit
'1 vs unit 2) Pipe Supports (WBN),, and Evaluation of Difference in Analyzed Design Loads for Pipe Supports (SQN)
Missing or Uninstalled Pipe Support,s Issue/
Fs nds ng""'
c a
b Finding/Corrective Action Class'~
- 'A' A
A E3 A
,A 221.4 Deletion of Supports b
,B A
221. 5 221.6 Pipe Support, Base Plate Installed Over an Expansion Joint Observied Bending of Pipe Clamp I.:ar s A
E3 03 03 06 06 A
05 A
A
- Classification of Findings and Gorrectivie Actions A.
Issue not valid.,
No corrective action required.
B.
Issue valid but consequences acceptable.
No corrective action required.
C.
Issue valid.
Corrective action initiated before ECTG evaluation.
0.
Issue valid.
Corrective action taken as a result'f ECTG evaluation.
E.
Peripheral issue uncovered during ECTG evaluation.
Corrective action requiried.
- Defined for ieach plant in Attachment B.
- ~Addressed in Subcategory 10400.
- 1. Hardware
- 2. Procedure
-3. Documentation
~
- 4. Training
- 5. Analysis 6.'Evaluation
- 7. Other 27390-R13 (12/08/87)
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,Page 35 of 40 TABLE l,(Cont')
Element 221.7 Oamaged Pipe Supports Issue/
~Finain **
Finding/Corrective Action Class*
A 221.8 Relief Valve Vent Line Hanger a
221.9 Sharp Edge of Hanger Steel Clearance with Pipe Running Through the Hanger Steel Frame 221.10 Use of Snubber
'01 A
221.11 Heavy MOV Supports a
b c
A A
A
- Classification of Findinqs and Corrective Actions A.
Issue not valid.
No corrective action required.
B.
Issue valid but consequences acceptable.
No corrective action required.
C.
Issue valid.
Corrective action initiated before ECTG evaluation.
0.
Issue valid.
Corrective action taken as a result of ECTG evaluation.
E.
Peripheral issue uncovered during ECTG evaluation.
Corrective action required.
- Oefined for each plant in Attachment B.
- 1. Hardware
- 2. Procedure
- 3. Oocumentation
- 4. Training
- 5. Analysis
- 6. Fvaluation
- 7. Other 27390-R13 (12/08/87)
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4'age 36 of 40 TABLE 2 FINOINGS
SUMMARY
IP1 ant Classification of Findin~s SQN WBN BFN l3LN h
Total A.
Issue not va1id.
No corrective action required,.
3
5
'16 B.
Issue valid but consequences acceptabllel No corrective action required.
C.
Issue valid.
Corrective action initiated before ECTG evaluation.
0.
Issue-valid.
Corrective action takenl as a result of i.:CTG evaluation.
E.
Peripheral issue uncovered during ECTG evaluation~Corrective action required.
Total.
0
'1' 0
0 1
0 0
0 0
1 1
0 0
6 12,1 5
4 2
24 Cl 27390-R13 (12/08/87) 0
IABLE 3 HAIKIAOF t'LfHENIS, CORRECIIVE ACIIUNS, ANO CAUSES SUNCAIEGUNv 221UO RE VIS ION NUHRER t PACE 3l OF tO CAUSES OF NEOAIIVE flNOINGS ~
FINOINO/
CORRfCfIVE ACflON ELOI CLASS. ~ a CORRECVIVE ACVION 221 ~ I C3 Regcncratc
~il destroyed aad at sting calculations prior to tuc I load.
CAID Noh 01 TECHNICAL ADE HANAuLHENI ffFf6 I Ivfat 5>
I 2
3 C
5 6
l OESICN PROCESS fFfECllvfnfSS 9
10 12 13 II 15 16 Frag-I I
IProcc-Inade-I
~cntcdIInadc-Ilnade-Idurcs quate IUn-IOrgan-Iquatc Iquatc INot Con-Itlncl Engrg Ocslgn Insut.
Judgat Crit/ Verlf Stds not ICoaalt Oocu-INot 1cade quate As.alt Recon-c I1.
5l gal fI-caacc of Correct lveI Vendor Ac loat+
E D
H H
laadc-Lect of Ocslgn Detail y Lect Iquate Ilta-I 0-IProcc-Ifol-Inuni-IRcs ofIot HgtIUcslgn tson tr durcs la~ed catson Issues Attvn gas Inadeq-uatee C Ic Oocu-Not Incnta-Ifol
~anted Het on lo d
fngrg Error I
A IAIPIPI 221.2 E3 flnalltc prcll~teary rcvlcus and studlcs for 2cro Pcrlod Accclcratlon (2PA).
SON Ol 221. 5 E3 Incorporate notes on thc pipe support I-OIA-Sgg 4cL ~II craving and Issue ncno to avoid rccurrcncc of this prohlca.
lloN ol 22).6 D3 Rcvlso draulng
~ lgOUI to provide appropriate torque values.
06 Pcrtorn plant ualtdoun to ldcntlfy aa4 cvaluatc dcllclcnt
$001 type supports.
SON Ol INN Ol SON ul URN 01 I
IAI-IP 05 Duality thc clasps nodlt lcd hy uCldlag guSSCL p1atCS.
HVN Ol
-IP 221-10 Dl Rcaovc anther an4 lastall
~
rlgld type SuppOrt On thC vcrtlcal riser ot thc upper hca4 Ialect Ion'ystea.
SON Ol IUIAL5
~
Defined la the OIOSSary SupPIeoent.
~'cfincd Ia fahlc i.
2lca0-R13 (12/08/Nt)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL, PROGIVN REf'ORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page,38 of 40 GLOSSARY SUPPLEMENT IFOR, THE ENGINEERING CATEGORY action are categorizecC as&ollows:
l.
~Fra mentedI orc}anization - Lines of authority, responsibility, and accountab>Tity were not clear ly defiriied,.
2.
Inadectuate cLuali~t
((}J tra~inin' Per'sonnel were not fully trained in the Iproceclures established for design process control and in the maintenance of design documents, including a'udits.
.3.
Inade~uate~rocedures
- Oesign and modification control methods and procedures were deficient in establishing requirements and did not ensure an effective ciesign control pr'ogram in some areas.
4.
Procedures not followed - Existing procedures controlling the design process were notMuuly adhered to.
5.
Inadequate communications - Communication, coordination, and cooperation were not fulTy effective in supplying needed info'rmation
'ithin
- plants, between plarits and organizations (e.gas Engineering,,
Constructions Licensing,,
and Operations),
and between inte>organizational disciplines and departments.
6.
Untimel~resolution of issues - Problems were not resolved ini a i
timely manner, and their resolui;ion Was, not aggressively pursued.
7.
Lack of manacIement attention - There was a lack,of managements attention in ensuring that programIs rtequirhd 'for'n effective desicin process were establis,hed.
and implemented.
8.
Inadequate desig~nbases
- Oesign bases were lacking, vague,.or incomplete for design execution and verification and for design i
change ievaluation.
9.
Inadectuate calculations - Oesign calculations were incomplete, usecl incorrect input or assumptions, or otherwise failed to fully demonstrate compliance with design requirements or support design output, documents.
10.
Inadequate as-built reconciliation - Reconciliation of design and Tscenssng ilocuments sntli~pant as-built condition was lacking od incomplete.
I 27390-R13 (12/08/87)
~
s acean
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page 39 of 40 11.
Lack of design detail - Detail in design output documents was insufficient to ensure compliance with design requirements.
12.
Failure to document en ineerin
'ud ments - Documentation justifying engineering judgments used in the design process was lacking or incomp 1 ete.
13.
Oesiqn criteria/commitments not met - Design criteria or licensing commitments were not met.
14.
Insufficient verification documentation - Documentation (g) was insufficient to audit the adequacy of design and installation.
15.
Standards not followed - Code or industry standards and practices were not comp ied with.
assumptions, methodology, or judgments used in the design process.
17.
Vendor error - Vendor design or supplied items were deficient for the intended purpose.
Classification of Corrective Actions - corrective actions are classified as belonging to one or more of the following gro'ups:
1.
Hardware - physical plant changes 2.
Procedure
- changed or generated a procedure 3.
Documentation - affected gA records 4.
~Trainin
- required personnel education 5.
~Anal sis - required design calculations, etcr.t to resolve 6.
Evaluation - initial corrective action plan indicated a need to
~eva nate the issue before a definitive plan cou'id be established.
Therefore, all hardware, procedure, etc.,
changes are not yet known 7.
Other - items not listed above Peripheral Findin
( Issue) - A negative finding that does not result directly rom an emp oyee concern but that was uncovered during the process of evaluating an employee concern.
By definition, peripheral findings (issues) require corrective action.
27390-R13 (12/08/87) s
~ ~
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCUR!'IS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER!
4'age 40 of 4O
~
"'ignificance of the corrective actions lists~d in Table 3 is indicated in the last three columns of the table.
Significance is rated in accordance with the type or types of changes that may be expected to result from the corrective action.
Changes are categorized as o
Oocumentation change (O) - this is a change to any design input or output document. (e.g. drawing, specification,, calculation, or, procedure) that, does not result iri a significant reduction in design mal gin ~
o Change in design margin (ti) - This is a change in de ign interpretation (minimum requirements vs actual capability) thati results in a significant (outside normal limits of expected accuracy) change in the design margin.
All designs include margins to allow for error and unforeseeable events.
Changes in design,'argins are a normal and acceptable part of the design and construction process as long as the final design margins satisfy regulatory requirements and applicable codes and standards.
o Change of hardware (H) - This is a physical change to an existing
'lant structure or component that results from a change in the design basis, or that is required to correct an initially inadequate desiqn or design error.
If the change resulting from the correcti've'aetio'n is judged to be significant, either an "A" for actual or "P" for potential is entered int6 t'e
'opropriate column of Table 3.
Actual is distinguished from potential 'becau'se
'orrective actions are not complete and, consequently, the scope of required changes may not be known.
Corrective actions are judged to be significant if the resultant changes affect the overall quality, performance, or margin of a safety-related structure,
- system, or component.
0 2739D-R13 (12/08/87) il
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page A-1 of 3 ATTACHMENT A EMPLOYEE CONCERNS FOR SUBCATEGORY 22100 Attachment A lists, by element, each employee concern evaluated in the subcategory.
The concern's number is given, along with notation of any other element or category with which the concern is shared; the plant sites to which it could be applicable are noted; the concern is quoted as received by TVA; and the concern characterized as safety related, not safety related',
or safety significant.
0107A-R64
( 12/08/87)
~
~
~
~
I
ELEHENT CONCERN NUHDEN IITTAC))HEN) A LHPLUYLE CONCERNS FUR SUOCATEGORY 22)UO PLANf API'LI Cad)i.) IY LUCAfIUN ILN ttuN 8
OLM CONCERN UESCNIPTIUNc REVISION NUHDEkt 4
PAGE A-2 OF 3 221.1 IN-85-IIU-WI (shared with 184UO and 2OSW)
"Potent)a) for fai)ure of concrete anchors supporting critical pipe supports of pr)mary safety systems inside the Primary Contailvaunt (e.g.:
SaFety In3ection Systex, Component Cooling System, Hain Steam System, etc.).
In kuNP Unit I, due to lack of proper evaluation and aocumentation (design caics.) of their ioad carrying capabilities.
Design calculations for most engineered pipe supports from t)ergen-Paterson and tUS have been intentionally destroyed per TVA direction."
(Skl 22).2 EX-85-OUR-OUI C
s ~
U=
~ Uln I
vhl~ Uv UV4 UV 221.3
)i)-85-U9)-UU8 22 I ~ 4 EA 85 Ib I vU2 il8ii "Haiar dlffnrenrec helUeen sllnnort analvs)s nn Unit I vc Unit 2 The loads on Unit 2 went up 8-)O times what was required on Unit I. -fhis
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$ 4nt huurinlg ihe exit inierview the Ci stated that lero i'eriod Acceleration (IPA) has not'een addressed at si)N.
LPA has been discussed but management does nut want to br)ng up any new itemS to Power which mighL affect startup."
(SS)
"H)SSina ar unlncta) led hangerc Were fa>>ndr Theie hangerS had neVer been designed as being part of a specific system yet when a forty foot span of plPe occulS O'Ith no support, It, ls obvious ttiele
)S a design error.
Cl has no further inFormation.
Construction Dept. cuncern."
I~I
-unit 2, auxiiiary building, elev. Tsl't LkifI All, Iz ip/Ac sch 40 pipe.
ci stated there was (is) a horizontal to vertical to horizontal run that has 3 hangers deleted (approx.
4 mos.
ago) that left more thah 2O'etween hangers.
fhe only hanger cleft (ce)lirtg) ata4 its "kicxers" removed.
CI has no additional information.
Construction dent concern.h (Sk) 22i Ill 85 2ao LILI) lidk "wdNP, Urllt 4) ~ Noriil valve room ~
2 feedwatef ptpe beh)I142 stftn.tufa) steel member aS yOu enter weSt door, hanger base plate ~elded to the floor extends luVer* an Expansion jbint between the base p)ate and the wall (approx. 3/8") is insufficient to allow 'designed'ovement."
)SR)
Skjhujss indicates safety related, noi safety related. ur saruiy signilicant per determ)Oat)un criteria in the Eclo program manua) and app) )ed by TVA before eva)uuations.
0 CUHCEKH ELEHENT NUHSEK ATTACHMENT A EHPLUTLL CUHCERNS FOK SUBCATEGORY 22)UU PLANT APPL ICAUILI TY LOCA) IUN
~N WuH 8
N SLH CUNCIKH UESCRIPTIOHa REVISION NUHBER:
4 PAGE A-3 OF 3 221. b IN-uJ-305-OUI 22).l XX-85-)02-N)3 Z21.8 IH-85-/12-WZ 22).9 IN-85-941-007 221.10 SqN-86-UUI-OUZ KSH SFN NBH SqN X
X X
"uver a period of time the bending of ears on small 8001 support clamps will cause the A-36 material to yield beyond its yield point.
C)amps are installed in both units.
(NBNP)."
(SR)
"NKC identified the following concern from revie~ of IITC files.
'Pipe hangerS are routinely found damaged during ISI inspections.
Hay be indicative of inadequate pipe support design.'"
(SR)
"Hanger, on relief valve vent line room control room chiller 8, is overdesigned at least
)0 times.
This hanger, 8 x 8 tube steel, is for supporting relief valve vent line vapor pressure.
Location:
A13 and U line elev. l37'ux. bldg Unit 2 side.
Control room chiller B.
Cl has no further information.
NUi Power Uepartment concern."
(No)
Hanger 2-63-209 (elevation lzU, Unit 2 containment) is designed with too little clearance between its sharp edges and the I" to l-l/2" stainless steel line that runs through it.
Uuring plant operation, vioration and/or snock loading could cause the hanger to damage the sta>n)ess pipe.
Construction dept.
concern.
CI has no further information."
(SK)
"uur>ng the exit >nterview, the Cl stated that tne Upper Head Injection System vertical riser just outside reactor vessel (Units I add 2) require a rigid support, but instead a snubber was used."
(SS) 221.11 8NP-UCP-IU.35-8-33 SLN BNP-IICP-IU.ao-ZZ SLN 22'I. IZ 221.13 ULLL IEU UELI. IEU CI was concerned about actual specifications used on heavy MUV supports.
Specific concern was on a KC system hanger holding an MUV which was attached to a 3-inch pipe located on the ceiling, north side of RBI, elevation o22.
Marking on ISO of MOV supports were not addressed by UE, and discussions with UE indicated that retrufit prOOably ~Ould take plaCe.
Cl felt thiS prOblem COuld CauSe failure uf HUv as a resu)t of water hamxer or other stress fatigue.
(sR)
Valves INL-.IFCV-Uo4H, -06ZH, etc will not be properly supported once tne temporary supports are removed.
(SK)
SR/HU/SS indicates safety related, not saiuty related, or safety signit leant per determination criteria In the ECIG Program manual and applied by TVA befOre evaluatiunS.
28)10-6 (12/UU/81)
0 0
ik
~
~ ~
E
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS
,SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER: 4 Page B-l of 34 iy-ATTACHMENT B
SUMMARY
OF
- ISSUES, FINDINGS, ANO CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SUBCATEGORY 22100 Attachment 8 contains a summary of the element-level evaluations.
Each issue is listed, by element number and plant, opposite its corresponding findings and corrective actions.
The reader may trace a concern from Attachment A to an issue in Attachment 8 by using the element number and applicable plant.
The reader may relate a corrective action description in Attachment B to causes and significance in Table 3 by using the CATO number that appears in Attachment B.
The, term "Peripheral finding" in the issue column refers to a finding that occurred during the course of evaluating a concern but did not stem directly from an employee concern.
These are classified as "E" in Tables 1
and 2 of this report.
0107A-R64
( 12/08/87)
issues ATTACHHENT 8 SUHHARY uF
- ISSUES, FINUIHGS, AHU CURKECTIVE ACTlOHS FOR SUBCATEuURY 2210u Findings REVISION NUHBER:
4 PAGE 8-2 OF )5 Corrective Actions auajauauuuu*uauau
~
E)ement 221. I
- Uesign Adequacy of Pipe SupporL Anchors and Retention ot Permanent Hecords aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa S1IN INot tn be eva)uatedI HBN a.
Oesign caicuiations for pipe supports that were prepared by uergen-Paterson and EOS have been destroyed and are no lonnel in TvAIs pnssession Therefore, it <<ill not be possible tO IIlunttfu rc ta
~ I I Fcl I..
~ J pucCII ~ ~ 0 ~
~ u ~
~ Ul Cs in the designs unless the calculations urC
~ e 9 eri CraliC4 c
- a. Contrary to tne statoaent of concern, design, calculations preOareu bv Bergen-PaterSOA haue AOI been sacr O
d However, design calculations prepared by kUS were Aiiuurtcul\\
~Inc ~
a Il...c I-
~ A
~ u ~ cuuc Iy uucu ~ uycu ~ aa 4 Ial Uaacu In auuca iegory RepOrtS 21200 (HdN element 212.)) and 20500 (HUH elemcnli 2US.i j.
TVA demonstrated the design adequacy uf the affected EUS designs by regenerating a salaple of the destr'oyed calculations.
The evaluation team selected etght oes!gns from that sample and verified that the supports were adILInuate fnr tlla deSIgn Iocdc Thc NHC concul I cd wlln I vh
's I,one Ius IUA that the extent of the sampling program was sufficient to demonstrate the adequacy of ali EOS designs; Nevertheless, the HRc directed TVA tO regenerate all affected calculations by tne date of first refueling ior Hatts Bar Unit I, and by the daLe of initial fuel )oad for watts Uar unit 2 ivA's coataitment to regenerate tnese calculatiuns is Out 1 jned in itc AOAI'Onferaanre Ie Orl FurHI Wuul'Fuua I u R) and Significant Condition Report (SCR)
MHHCE88631.
Rl ~
TVA PlaAS Lo COAP)ete ihiS aCt lou fOr eaCh unit prior to the unit's fuel load.
S4N HBN a.
Honconformance Report HBNCE88418 Rl addrcSSLd the ULSlluycd EUS~ ca ICUIaiIOAS for both units.
This NCR action was completed by November 3U,
)984 (memorandum froa R. 0. Barrett to J.
C.
Standifer, CEH 841130 003) and determined tnat all unit 2 supports will be reviewed by TVA as a part of that unit's design PrnceSS ihuS. arrl ntabilitu nf thcSI supports will be ensured.
Significant Condition Report SCRRBNCE8853)
Rl was issued on January 14,
)986 to take corrective action for aii missing pipe supports, in addition to the destroyed EOS calculations. for unit 1.
This corrective action is as follows:
1 Auutuu a11 I atrI ~1>IInnc fnr hccle completeness.
- 2. Ensure that all calculations are In tne Records and information Nanagement System (RIHS).
- 3. Prepare.
- issue, and document calcu)ations for a)l iaissing and IAMlan)ete ralculatIOA paekaueS those not meeting requirements of I.
und 2, aboVC ~
The above correciive action wiii be ialpleamnted by the tlanger and Analysis UpIiate Program and will be colaP)eted prior to unit I fuel )oad.
f~
24
( 12/UB/8 1 )
I
issues ATTACIVd.NT U SUNMAKY UF
- ISSUES, FINUINGS, ANU CUKKEC[IVE ACTIUHS FUK SUUCATtGUKY 2CIUU Findings RE VISION NUNBER:
4 PAGE B-3 OF 15 Corrective Actions Element 221.1 - MBN (Continued)
The above TYA coeaitment is per its corrective action plan (TCAU-2I2, 02/25/Ul) for CATU 212 01 HIIN 01.
RUTE:
Ho further corrective action is required beyond responding to above corrective action for CATO 212 Ol HBN 01.
b.
The rated load capacities of assemblies have not been properly
~
evaluated against tne actual loads (being addressed by Construction in Subcategory I04UO).
BFN Note:
Similar issues are also
'aaaressed in Subcategory Reports 212UU (NBH element 212.1. titled ketention of Calculation Records),
and 20500 (KBN element 205. I, titled Control of Oesign Calculations).
- u. TYA's Subcategory Keport 104UU is the main document that addresses all items related to base plates and anchor bOlts in full detail.
Ho~ever, TVA's commitment to the NRC's IE dulletin /9-Uc base plate program will ensure that all pipe support designs tnat include baSe plates attached to the building structure with concrete expansion bolts will be reassuSSed to incorporate all necessary requirements.
BFN b.
Corrective action. is addressed by Construction Subcategory Report 104UO.
(Hot to be evaluated)
BLN (Not to be evaluated) uLN 24610- I3 (12/UU/U1)
issues ATTACtlNEHT 8 SUNHANY UF ISSUES, FINUINGS, AHU CONNECTIVE.ACTIONS FUN SUUCATEGuRY 22luu Findings REVISION NUHUER:
4 PAGE 8-4 OF IS.
Corrective Actions 1o**01*10tcca11111 Element 221.2
- Evaluation of Uifference in Analyzed Design LoadS for Pipe Supports ISiIN)
'"""""a"""- Hajor Difference In Analyzed Uesign Loads for Similar IUnit I vs Unit 2)
Pipe Supports (MSN)
SiIN StIN a.
In certain oipino conf igurationsi Zero Period Acceleration (2PA) loads frequency seismic excitation loads.
a.
The concern that YPA was not addresseo at SUN is not valid based on, the results of sample independent studies and roviowc norfnrned tn ovaliiato tho effort nf 1PA nn the piping systems.
a, No corrective action is reouired, b.
Hanagement does not want to discuss the 2PA issue as it may delay the startup.
- b. There is no evidence that TVA management did not want to b;
Ho corrective action is required.
dISCuSS the 2PA issue.
On the contrary, they coautissioned the studies and reviews discussed above.
c.
Peripheral findina.
- c. A final closure of this 2PA issue is reouired.
c In its Cnrreetiue aotion nlan (TCAU 004 II/07/86) for CATU 221 02 Si)H Ol, TVA Cnonijtc tO finaliZo nroliminaru
~ ouiouc and studies for lPA.
This CAP will
~ 4i nisi aueiiiiotu uuutooenuai, Iuil cu
~ Iusc the issue of LPA.
24~ ( l2/Ob/8/]
0 issues ATTACHHLMT U
SUMMARY
UF iSSUES, FlMUIHuS, AMU CUHHECTlVE ACTlUNS FUH SUHCAlEGUHY 22IUU Findings REylSION HUHHERz PAGE 6-5 OF 15 Corrective Actions Element 221.2 - HSH a.
Analyzed pipe support design loads on Unit 2 are significantly nigher than the the analyzed loads of similar pipe supports on Unit l.
BFH NN a.
The evaluation tu~ examined a sample of ll analyses performed oy TVA on fairly similar Unit 1
and Unit 2 piping systems.
A comparison of the pipe Support loads resulting from these analyses shows that only 1 percent Of the Unit 2 pipe SuppOrtS haVe lOadS that are greater than 8 timeS the COrreSpOnding Unit 1 SuppOrt 1OadS.
The evaluation team determined that tne reasons for these load increases result from differences in support configuration, difference in flexibility, etc., of Unit 1
and 2 piping systems.
These load increases do not constitute any safety concern as the supports were designed for tne analyzed loads.
NFN NN a.
No corrective action is required.
UFM (Not to be evaluated)
SLN (Not to be evaluated)
ULN BLN Ooai11011111i11001 Element 221.3
- Hissing or Uninstalled Pipe supports
~ $44ttiONA110401E1 St}N (Hot to be evaluated)
SilN 24619-13 (12/UU/u/)
ATTAClbiENT d SUNNAKY UF ISSUES, FINUINuS, HNU CUKKECTIVE ACTIONS FUK SUBCATEGiURY 221UO REVISION NUNBER:
4 PAGE B-b UF 15
'ssues Findings Coirective Actions Element 221J3 - NBN a.
An unsupported 40-foot span of piping is an indication of a missing hanger aue to doclnn orrnr that Itav i'J>>co an over-stressed condition in JL I
JIIC II ~ IICI Note:
ThiS iSSue is limited to gravity supports on nonseismic pipe.
a.
Tne aforementioned review of randomly selected piping systems indicated that four out of six cases were within ANSI B31. I code-suggested spans and that the remaining tvn racec otroodod the cunnectod cncnc hast voro qualified by lVA using rigorous analysis.
If the pipin~ mentioned in the statement of concern was a.
nOnSafety-related system with a nominal diameter greater than or equal to 3U inches, then a 40-foot span of straight run pipe is acceptable.
In addition, the concerned individual eight have observed this 40-foot span on a piping system that has not yet been finalized with rnsonct to banner installation.
a.
No corrective action is required.
h Tua ~ c nlnnl JQ rnl tilrcinn
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team verified that the supports listed on the Piping Analysts Probiem Review fotes (npp. A, b.a) were also listed in TVA's Hanger Tracking Progrtla rePort.
Thus, a.
design drawing exists for each support listed in the scope as defined by tne Piping analysis Problem Review form.
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Note:
This issue covers the concern Jc It mlv
~ olato tO ceiamli n'Ill'Inn and spans.
ln addition to these procedural controls, TYA's IE
~I I lot tn iu lo Ih lco I I co il Ioicn~.ccl o 4
C"hilt Vu Ilet Iu I g
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~ ~ ~ QUVl Q ~ CvVIy Report 2120U) requires a walkdown inspection of all saiety ielaiid piping systems that will Ideniiify aniy missing or uninstalled supports.
2 (12/UB/dl)
'ATTACIINENT 8 SUNtIARY UF ISSUES, FltluitlOS, ANO CURRLCTIVE ACTIONS FUN SUUCATEuURY 22IOU RE VISIUN NUIIBERI 4
PAGE 8-7 OF 15 V
Issues Findings Corrective Actions Element 22l;3 - UFN (Not to be evaluated)
BLN (Not to be evaluated) 0*41iioiA*i11i1*is Element 221.4
- Ueletion of Supports 141Iiii1>AiaaAINNA UFN ULN UFN ULN SIIM (Not to be evaluated)
SIIN a.
The piping system is undersupported over a longer span because hangers were deleted.
b.
The only hanger left, which is attached to the ceiling, is deficient because the hanger's
'kickers were removed.
Note:
A "kicker" is a brace Supporting a column or a beam.
a.
The evaluation team reviewed the piping stress analysis of the IIV'uct ( I2-inch pipe).
Some nangers, including the three hangers stated in the employee concern, were deleted in this computer analysis.
This analysis snows that the system is qualified to meet the requirements of ASNE Code and satisfies the design span i28 feet).
I
- b. Ihe evaluatiun team examined the subject hanger detail dra~ing (41AgkU-44-lo) and determined that the original SuppOrt deSign did nOt COntain any kiCkerS."
The subject hanger was qualified (without kicker) for the computed loads derived from the piping stress analysis.
NUN a.
No corrective action is required.
b.
No corrective action is required.
24blO-13 (I2/OU/Ul)
HTTACNNENT B SUNDRY UF ISSUES, Fshu!N4S, ssNU COkkECTIVE ACTIONS FUR SUBCATEGORY 2i.'IUU REVISION NUHBEk:
4 PAGE B-B OF 15 Issues Findings Corrective Actions Element 221.4 - BFN (Not to be evaluated)
BFN dLh BLN (Not.to be evaluated) 0000000000001001
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valve room is installed over the expansion joint between tne floor and the containment wall.
The gap between base plate and the contain-ment wall is insufficient and will interfere with the seismic displace-
-ment af the COntainment (Shield Building) wall.
b.
Peripheral finding.
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0i
~ ~lc 0UUU0 ~ VCP0 Uc ~0'ccl ~
~IIc 0I ~ ~ c lv lS0 ~ ~ 044 VlUUISU00c plate of pipe support I-UJA-56V are larger tnan tiie maximum comoined SSE dlsplacesscnt of the Shieid Buiiding and the north valve room.
- b. Ine existence of the expansion joint between tne shield ssass arsd the rIOrth VasVe room iS not outed on the pipe support I-03A-569 drawing.
A.walkdo<<n in units I and 2 to inspect floor-mounted baSe
- plates, in the vicinity of expansion Joints, did not identify any other base olates that extended over the expansion Joints.
U
~ I ~
l I I
~
4 0 ~
~IV I VI ~ CI 0 ~ VC 01 C ~ VI~
~ 0 I Ce4
~ I C4 ~
o.
In its corrective action plan (CAP), for CAIU 22s O5 wuls Os
( ICAB-22V' 2/2I/Bl) ~
TVA coeaits to revise the drawing, for the unit I pipe support I-U3A-Sog during the implementation of the hanger and analysis update program for unit 1.
The Bechtel and TVA plant waikdowns nf units I and 2
in the vicinity of building expansion JOiints ~
ihiaive demoristI ated tlhiat il,isis was an isolated case.
2
( 12/UB/d/)
issues ATTHLNNENT B SUNDRY UF lSSULS, FlhulNGS, nNU CURWECTlVE ACTIUNS FUN SUuCATEubkY 22IUU F indings REVl5lUN NUNBER:
4 PAGE B-g UF l5 Corrective Actions Element 22l.5 -
WBN (Continued)
BFN (Not to be evaluated)
BLN BFN dLN BFN BLN To avoid a recurrence of this problem, Watts Bar pipe support designers will be made aware of this problem by memorandum.
(Not to be evaluated)
OAAAONOOStk4840kkk Element 22l.b
- Ubserved dending of Pipe Clamp Ears
~t1*IIIA1A1a1111tk Si)N a.
Excessive torque on bolts caused bending of clamp ears.
SEJN
- a. There could be no bendi brancn line clamps becau tur their installation w
SUN in its corrective action plan (TCAB-UU2, There would be bending o because an excessive tor installation.
'This exce over-stressing and fai lu ue valu specified jet ir sive to could also~
eof cl performe o
t y a eval at BOOI type sup t
t ay h r
to ec ampbo s.
b.
Clamps were modified to prevent this bending but the clamp manufacturer's concurrence was not obtained.
b.
SUN oid nut modity pipe clamps tu prevent them from bending.
b.
No corrective action is required.
245)0-l3
( l2IUU/U1)
Issues ATTACINEHt 8 SUHONY OF ISSUES ~ FltlUIIIGS~ ANU CORRECTIVE AClIUNS FUR'SUBCATEGORY 22)UU Findings REVISION NUHBER:
4 PAGE 8-lU OF )5 Corrective Actions Element 221.6 - Ni)N a.
Excessive torque on bolts caused bending of c)amp ears.
b.
C)amps were modified to prevent this bending but the clamp manufactiirpr's concurrence was not obtained.
(Hot to be evaluated)
BL)i a.
Excessive toraue on bolts caused bending of c)amp ears.
b.
Clamps were modified to prevent this bending out the clamp manufacturer's concurrence was not obtained.
- a. Ears of the sma))-bore pipe brancn line clamps would not be bent, because the torque values specified for their installation were reasonable.
Ears of the run line clamps ~ould ae bent beCauSe the torque value specified for their installation >>as excessive.
This excessive toraue could also cause overstressina and failure of C lamp bO) tS.
- b. lo prevent the pipe clamp ears from bending, guSSetS were welded to them ait Matts Bar.
Ihe pipe clamp manufacturer's approval for this modification was not
- obtained, Hs a resu)t, the manufacturer would not honor the original iiarranty for this product.
Watts Bar did not qualify the modified pipe c)ampi either by analysis ar by testtng.
BF)i BLH a.
Ine BUOl-type clamps are uniquely designed with an analysis performed oy Ill brinne)) to qualify each assemb ly.
lhe analysis performed spec ifical ly qiual ifles the c)amp for the pretorque forces applied to the bolts.
b.
No modifications have been aiada to these clamps to prevent wending.
a..in its CAP for CAlO 221 U6 NBN 01 (TCAB-003-NBN) and subsequent TVA/Bechtel telecon
( IUH b59, U2/18/87),
'TYA comxits to perform a field'walkdown on units 1
and 2 to identify all 478001 type suunorts with bent clamn ears and/or deformed bolts.
the deficiencies found in tPlc vilkdn~n wia) be corrected Urawing 478001-10 <<ill be revised to ii s tk r ti ~ ~ r o
~ xi a ilva v ~
1 ~
'IIIVIIJC lIIC pl 48$lll,Iy J jlCI I ~
~ Cll IW
~ l
~ V (minimum) torque value to appropriate torque'values.
These revised torque values will be based on the pipe size, bolt preload, any tests performed, etc.
This corrective action will be initiated and tracked by Problem Identification Reports PIR NBN CE88693 for'nit I and P)k-MBHCE88698 for unit 2.
b.
In its CAP for CATO 22) 06 NBH 01 (TCAB-O03-NBH), TVA coiaiiits to qualify the clamps (that were modified by welding gusset plates) and associated bolts.
thiS COrreCtive aCtion will be initiated and tracked by Prob)em Identification Re'ports PIN NBH CEBB&3 for untt I and PIR WBH CE88698 for unit 2.
BLN a
None reauired b.
Hone required.
~3
( )2/UB/87)
Issues ATTACHMENT U SUHHAHY UF ISSUES, FINUINGS, ANU CUKRLCTIVE ACTIONS FUk SUUCATEGURY 221Uu Findings REVISION NUHBER:
4 PAGE B-II OF 15 Corrective Actions 11411111L1104411
~ a Element 22l.l
- Uamaged Pipe Supports aaaaoaAa111a>Aat40 SqN (Not to be evaluated)
NBN SqN (Not to be evaluated)
BFN BFN BFH a.
Oamaged pipe supports found during inservice inspections may indicate inadequate pipe support design.
a.
The evaluation team's revie~ of reportable occurrence a.
No corrective action is required.
reports (to the NRc) for damageu pipe supports revealed tnat the supports were subjected to unanticipated loading of the system.
From the evaluation team's review of design documents for pipe supports from an ISI repair suaaaary report, it was determined that support modifications were required due tO pipe StreSS reanalySiS and inStallatiOn diffiCultie'S.
The evaluation team's review uf HOls revealed that the pfpe supports required repair of loosened parts (normal maintenance for an operating plant) and rework of an Inadequately performed weld.
Ihere was no evidence that pipe supports required repair because of inadequate design.
UFN has various programs in place to identify and provide maintenance or repair of pipe supports.
Tnese include reportable occurrence reports, inservice inspection, NUls, the 19-14/79-u2 prograa, and uks.
BLII ULN ULN (Not to be evaluated) 24blO-13
( I2/UU/Ul)
A)TAClikENT d Sueeun OF ISSUES, FlkulkGS.
ANU CORRECT)VE ACTIONS FUN SUUCATEGUKY 22)00 NEVIS)ON NUHSER:
4 PAGE 8-12 OF 15 issues Findings Corrective Actions 40111I ~1J$ 11 10114 Element 22).8
- Relief Valve Vent Line Oeae1aoeitei
~ 41NOO Hanger 54N (Hot to be evaluated)
Silk a.
A pipe support on the relief valve vent line of chiller 8 is over-designed by at least a factor of )U.U.
SFN a.
The member stress design margin was tound to be approximate)y 3 for pipe support SYS-k-b3-174-)g84 and 2 for cable tray support
)V< 42u.
Un the oasis of a review of the structural analvsis calculations for both the aforementioned support frames, the'abhor tt ~ ace Aocinn ssensnc nf 'l >rA I
W bI f btI
'l0 J V ~ v ~ t VI 4 U I'0 h VI ~
reasonable.
Particularly from tne standpoint of member Size selection, there is no evidence that either of the supports reviewed was overdesigned.
UFN a.
ko corrective action is required.
8FH (Hot M be. eve)uated)
SL)f-(kot to be eva)uatedf
~tl LI LH u Ca<
uf o 2
()2/UO/81)
~
~
Issues HTTHCINEHT U SINr4ARY OF
- ISSUES, FINUIHGS, hHU C(NRECIIVE ACTIOHS FUR SUUCATEGORT 22IUU Findings AEV IS !OH HUHBER:
4 PAGE B-,I3 OF 15 Corrective Actions iowaw1a10 ~ a1aAOLL4 Element 221.g
- Sharp Edge of Hanger Steel Clearance with Pipe Running
- >>~'*>>'*"**""
Through the Hanger Steel Frame SIIH (Hot to be evaluated) a.
If the stainless steel pipe that runs thraugh tne hanger mOVeS and COntaCtS the hanger's sharp edge,'n additional unanticipated component of stres's may develop in the pipe.
This phenomenon could damage the pipe, especially if it were to accelerate towards the sharp edge, as a result of operational vibration or shock (seismic) loading.
'here is only one edge.
a.
The so-called snarp edge consists of a round corner of a square structural tube utilized as a shim.
The round corner of the structural tube cannot be considered a
"sharp edge" in the context of the stated concern.
Hagnitudes and directions of all analyzed thermal and seismic pipe movements at the location of the subject support reveal the following:
o Ihe 'pipe will actually move away from the shim as it travels from its cold to hot position.
o Ihe exiSting I/8-inch gap between the pipe in its cold position and the shim is greater than the seismic displacement (U.U243-inch) for the "worst case" safe snutoown earthquake analysis.
O ReStraintS (SnubberS)
IOCated On OOth SideS Of the support in question will limit the amplitude of horizontal vioratiun auring operation, thus providing added assurance that the pipe will not make contact with tne shim.
a.
Ho corrective action is required.
246)U-13 (12/Od/Ul)
Issues nrrnCUNEHr h SUtHANY UF ISSUESI F INOINUSI ANU CURNECtIVE ACIIONS FUN SUUCATEI UNY 22IOI)
Findings RE V IS I UN NUNUERI 4
PAiiE d-14 OF 15 Corrective Actions Element 221.9 - UFH
.(Not to be evaluated)
SLN (Not to be evaluated) 1111111111111111
~ 1 Element 221.10
- Use of Snubber BFH ULN SIIH a.
Upper head injection system vertical riser has a snubber type support instead of a rigid type support as
~'choir>>d (Not to be evaluated)
(Hot to he evaluatedl
- a. A snubber type support instead of the rigid shhldn nn tne dl atIIhh beset c nh th>> vdrt Ical Upper Head Injection System on both units.
L>>>>>> I>>>>
~ Idt>>>>
I Tudl
~
LI II 1 IU
~ 1>>
heel ~
~ Ut.~IL ~ ~ ILll
~ I~
~ 1h d
~ LtlolL>>Lh >>IIII I.LU type support
~ Ic>>l hf th>>
~
~ >>L l
~ l This has also I LIL IIUI >>l n (1CAB-OU9I III Tud VI ~
~ Wh r and install' OC4t lob nt.
v ot pla dT I
CIIU
~ll
~
>>ltl~
ve /been be I1PO I I I 'S rtM %he pla 4
NUN BFH a.
In its orrecti I I /ed Iu I vh>> I'
~ I ~ '7/ ll
~ ill L>>l coats its 0 remo 4 \\ Iglu pe su before t ry~
tNOt tO be eyaluatedj
>>I U UL11 or II Mg 24QO-12IOUjd/)
0 Issues ATTACINEHT 8 SIVgudtY UF ISSUES, FIHUIH4S, nMU CORRECTIVE ACTIUMS FOK SUBCATE4UKY 22IUO Findings REVISION NUMBER:
4 PAGE B-15 OF 15 Corrective Actions iI*0*AiILOIi1140i
~
Element 22l.ll - Heavy HOV Supports
~ti$0411iil>At>i11
~ SABIN (Hot to be evaluated)
NBN (Hot to be evaluated)
(Not to be evaluated)
BLN a.
Valves are undersupported due to lack of adequate permanent supports.
Un the basis of tne results of the stress
- analyses, the existing permanent support configuration is adequate to support the valves.
SJM BFH BLH Mone required.
b.
The hangers supporting the heavy motor operated valves (HOVs) are not adequately designed.
c.
The supports for the HUVs are not marked on the isometric drawings.
b.
No HOV supports in the KC system match the description pruvided by the concerned individual.
The design review of HUV supports in the KC ana other systems indicates that the supports are designed adequately.
- c. All reviewed HOV supports are shown and marked appropriately on the isometric drawingS.
b.
Mone required.
c Hone required 246lO-l3
( l2/Ud/87)
1l 0
P
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER:
4 Page C-1 of ll ATTACHMENT C REFERENCES 1.
Calculations and design drawings for the following WBN.pipe supports, which were taken from the sample of regenerated calculations originally prepared by EOS:
Support Rev.
1-03A-586, R901 1-62A-328, Rl 47A435-10-21, R3 1-63-320, R2 1-68-131, R904 1-70-005, Rl 1-70-867, R901 1-87-068, R906 Calculation RIMS Number WBP 841109 006 WBP 841114 115 WBP 841123 001 WBP 841108 005 WBP 841109 025 WBP 841029 403 WBP 841123 002 WBP 840725 019 2.
Calculations and design dr awings for the following WBN pipe supports, which are attached to common framing with the supports listed above in 1:
- Support, Rev.
1-70-034, Rl 1-68-132, R901 1-68>>135, RO 47A435-17-13A, Rl 47A435-17-13B, R 1 1-87-069, R905 Calculation RIMS Number WBP 841029 405 WBP 841123 023 WBP 841123 025 WBP 840719 048 WBP 840719 048 WBP 841128 049 3.
Microfilms of calculations prepared by Bergen-Paterson for the followinq WBN pipe supports:
- Support, Rev.
74-1RHR-R164, R 1 67-1ERCW-R198, RO 70-1CC-R155, R3 62-1LCV-R214, Rl Ca 1 cu1 ation R IMS Number WBP 830421 053 WBP 830506 023 WBP 830513 021 WBP 830421 050 4.
Problem Identification Report (PIR)
WBN CEB8521
[841 850816 021]
5.
Nonconformance Report (NCR)
WBN CEB8418, Rl
[CEB 841130 004]
3824D-R4
( 12/08/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBIER:
22100 REVISION NUI4IBER:
4 i'age C',-2 of ll 47W401-2ll 1/IRS 478 401-406/IR2 478401'-407/IR2 4i'W401-226/R'I 4i'8401-454/RO 4 i'8401-455/RO o
Calculations 200-04-09 (unit 1) and 250-04-09. (unit 2) 6.
TVA, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant dlesign isometric drawings of rigorously analyzed piping systems (copies contr"ol'Ied on 06/2'5/86):
47K400-,50 thr'ough 47K'.406-137 47K427-50 thr'ough 47K'.450<<59 47K450-~60 through 47K464-59 47K464-60 through 47K:46!5-50 47K465-51 through 47K55!5-62 47K555-63 through 47K1110-13 7.
U.S.
NRC Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 3.7,.2, (07/81) 8.
NRC (formerly U.S. Atomic Energy Commissio'n) Regulatory Guide 1.60., Rl, (12/73)
~
I 9.
Memo from R. 0. Barnett to C.
N. Johnson, i"Potential Generic Condition Evaluation - PIIE WBN CEIL 8553,"
IB41 85I121 028/24], (ll/21/85) 10.
ZPA calculations on SQN by Bechtel, calculation P0-221.2SQN-01,
'RO'(09/16/86) ll.
Load Tables and,isometrics for the identifiedl WBN pipinq stress calcul at ions.",
o Calculations 200-02-04 (unit 1) and 250-02-04 (unit 2) 0 200-04-09/R908 478464-64? 9/IRO 478464-631/IRO 478464-630/IRO 478464-'633/IR1 478464-6:34/IR1 4i'W464-251/RO 4i'8464-809/RO 47B464-810/RO 4i'8464-812/RO 478464-813/RO 4i'8464-814/RO o
Calculations 2'00.'08-18 (unit 1) and 250-08-'IB (unit 2) 06002CIO-08-18/R906 478406-591/IR1 478406-592/IR1 478406-495/R2 47W406-l371/R 1 478406-868/RO 478406-869/RO 4i'8406-506/R'I 38240-R4
( 12/08/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER:
4 Page C-3 of ll o
Calculations 200-09-02 (unit 47W435-220/R5 47W435-222/R2 478435-484/Rl 478435-485/R3 478435-486/R2 478435-487/Rl 478435-488/Rl
~
478435-489/R2 478435-491/R2 478435-492/R2 478435-494/R3 478435-652/Rl o
Calculations 200-13-10 (unit 47W465-219/R4 478465-389/Rl 478465-390/Rl 478465-391/Rl 47W465-218/Rl and 250-09-02 (unit 2) 47W435-267/R2 47W435-273/R2 478435-653/Rl 478435-654/Rl 478435-655/R 1
478435-656/Rl 478435>>657/Rl 478435-658/Rl'7B435-659/Rl 478435-662/Rl 478435-663/R 1
478435-665/Rl and 250-13-10 (unit 2) 478465'-429/RO 478465-438/RO 478465-439/RO 478465-440/RO 478465-397/R3 o
Ca lculations N3-3-3A 47W427-200/R 1
478427-466/RO 478427-46'7/RO 478427-465/RO 478427-373/R4 478427-374/R3 478427-380/R4 478427-382/R4 (unit 1) and N3-3-15A (unit 2) 47W427-208/R5 478427-407/R2 478427-412/R5 478427-462/R2 478427-463/R2 478427-464/R2 478427-,489/Rl 478427-491/RO o
Calculations N3-3-llA (unit 1) 47W427-202/Rl 1
47W427-215/R4 478427-471/R2 478427-472/RO 478427-473/R2 478427-474/R2 478427-377/R7 478427-383/R6 and N3-3-18A 47W427-216/R6 47W427-217/R5 478427-453/R2 478427-454/Rl 478427-455/Rl 478427-456/Rl 478427-417/R4 478427-451/R 1
(unit 2) 38240-R4 (12/08/87)
,'L ~ ~
TVA IEMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPIECIAL PROGRAM ftEPORT NUMBER 22100 REVISION NUMBER:
4 Page C-4 of 11 o
Calculations N3-62-12A (unit ll) and N3+62-18A (unit 2) 47W!555-207/ft 8 478!555-379/f12 478!555-385/R3 478!555-464/RO 47W555-208/R2 478555-409/R3
'78555-386/R3
'78555-381/R3 o
Calculati,ons N3-62-'l4A (unit 1) and N3-62-19A (unit 2) 47W555-207/R8 478!555-380/f<2 478555-384/f11 478!555-368/R3 478555-465/RO
'7W555-208/Rll2 478555-382/R2 478555-387'/R2 4785!55-421/R2 478555-466/R'I o
Calculatiions N3-70-:31A (unit 1) aind N3-70-39A (unit 2) 47W464-225/R7 478464<<456/R5 47W464-227/R4 478464-462/R3 o
Calculations N3-70-:32A (unit 1) and N3-70-38A (unit 2) 47W 464-225/R 7 478 464-459/1%2 47W464-227/R4 478464-461/R2 12.
Bechtel Ca lcul ation f'0-221-03, RO, (06/02/86) 13.
TVA T-Pipe analysis f:or WBN Piping Stress Analyses N3-62-19A,,(08/10/76),,
and N3-62-14A, Lno Rj:MS number],
(08/12/76)
Bechtel Calculation f'0-221-04, RO,
((15/:30/86) 14.
WBN Piping Analysis. Problem Review forms (scoping documents) for'he following piping system calculations:
N3-70-31A
[CEB 850114 '905], (01/15/85)
N3-70-32A LCEB 850114 905], (01/15'/85)
N3-62-12A
[WBP 84C1816 041],
('06/13'/84)
N3-62-14A
{'WBP. 84C1816 041], l,06/13/84)
N3-3-15A ['84'I 851211 951],
( 12/12/85) 0 38240-R4
( 12/08/87) il
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER:
4 Page C-5 of ll 15.
MBN Piping Analysis Isometrics:
47W400-222/R2 47W401-211/R5 47W400-232/R 1
47W427-202/R 1 1 47W427-217/R5 47W400-208/R7 16.
Bechtel Calculation P0-221-06, RO, (06/10/86) 17.
EN DES-SEP 82-13, "Program for NRC-OIE Bulletin 79-14, Phase I Inspection at Watts. Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1," [CEB 831222 010],
R4, (12/22/83) 18.
MBN Hanger Tracking Program Report for Units 1
and 2, (03/06/86),
response to request for information (RFI) 020 19.
ANSI/ASME 831. 1, 1983 Edition, "Design of Pipe Supporting-,Elements" 20.
TVA, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, HVAC system drawing 47M920-44, Rll, (04/18/86) 21.
TVA, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, simplified analysis N3-31-A52A, Isometric sheet 1 of 2, Rl, (07/11/85) 22.
TVA, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, simplified analysis N3-31-A52A, Isometric Sheet 2 of 2, R2, (09/26/85) 23.
TVA, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, simplified analysis N3-31-A52A, RO (Page 10 of 14), Isometric sketch, (12/16/82) 24.
TVA, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, design calculation N3-31-A51A, RO (Page 10 of 14), Isometric sketch, (12/16/82) 25.
TVA, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant design calculation N3-31-A52A, Rl (Computer output)., (07/ll/85) 26.
TVA, Matts Bar Nuclear Plant support design detail drawing 47A920-44-10, RO, (04/26/85) 27.
TVA, Matts Bar Nuclear Plant support design detail drawing 47A920-44-10, Rl, (04/26/85) 3824D-R4 (12/08/87)
TVA EI4IPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL. PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER:
4 Page C-6 of ll 28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
TVA, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant support, desi'gn'detai'1 drawing 47A920'-44-10,
'2, (08/14/85)
Bechtel design-check calculation for W'BN'support 47A920-44-10, PD-221-'i2, RO, (07/10/86)
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant,
Response
from TVA on employee concern EX-85-151-002, Ellement 221.4,
Response
to RFI 019 CEB-75-8"Dynamic Earthquake ancl Static Wind - Tornado Analysis of the Shield Building," Cover Sheet and Figure 8-2,
[B41 860411 009],
R2, (04/14/86),
RO, (03/10/7.i)
CEB-75-23,. "Dynamic Earthquake Analysis of the North Valve Room a'hd
Response
Spectra for Attached Equipment,"
Cover Sheet and Figure,A-2',,
[CEB 830812 077], Rl, (08/12/83),
RO, '(07/14/75)
'EB-80-26, "Dynamic Earthquake Analysis of the Interior Concrete Structure and Response Spec'tra for Attached Equipment,"'over Sheet and Figure B-l, [B41 851216 001], Rl, ('l2/16/85),
RO, (01/30/74)
Drawing f'r WBN Pipe Support 1-03A-569,
- R903,
( 10/20/83) 35.
For WBN Pipe Support 1-03A-!~69:
Calculat',ion Cover
- Sheet, RO and Rl
[MBP 830922 023],
(08/31/83)
Calculation Summary Sheets 1 through 5 for r'evision 903 of the support,,
(09/07/83)
Calculation Summary Sheet 1 for revision '0 Of 'the support,
-(ll/22I/81~)
Field Changie Request reply memorandum for FCR H-6885,
.[MBN 820119 320],
(01/04/Bl?)
Field Changie Request reply memorandum for'CR H-6555,
[MBN 811214'0'1],'
11/23/81) 0 36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
Drawing f'r Pipe Support 47A401-9-6, Rl (03/05/84)
Sketch of'ase Plate/Grout for WBN Pipe Support 1-03A-569, (06/07/86)
FCR H-7049,
[WBN 820203 323j, (01/18/82)
FCR H-7100,
[MBN 820209 3'51], (01/28/82)
Bechtel c;alculation PD-221-01, RO, (04/28/86) - includes MBN walkdown information (gap measurements) for.Support 1-03A-569 38240 R4
( 1 2/08/87) il~
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER:
4 Page C-7 of ll 41.
42.
43.
44.
CES-77-42, "Static Pipe Support Tests and Oevelopment, Sequoyah Nuclear Plants 1
and 2," [CEB 801030 012],
RO, (10/25/77) l CEB-75-18, "Small Line Attachment Oetails to Class 2 and 3 Piping Equal to or Larger than. 2-1/2-inch Oiameter,"
[CEB 840522 001],
R3, (05/22/84);
Rl (07/01/77)
WBN Orawing 478001-10, "Mechanical Branch Valve Connection Seismic Support,"
RO, (ll/09/77); RB, (07/06/84)
MBN Orawing 478001-13, "Mechanical Branch Valve Conn.
Seismic Support,"
RO, (10/13/79);
R3, (11/13/85) 45.
Bechtel Calculation P0-221-14, RO, (09/04/86) 46.
SQN 478001 series drawings "Mechanical Branch Support.
Seismic Cl ass I Structures" Valve Connection Seismic Orawing 478001-1 478001-2 478001-3 478001-4 478001-5 478001-6 478001-7 478001-8 478001 -9 478001-9A 478001-98 Rev Orawing 478001-10 478001-11 478001 -1 2 478001-13 478001-13A 478001-14 478001-14A 478001-15 478001-1 6 478001-17 Rev 1
4 5
4 3
1 2
0 1
47.
4R.
49, 50.
51.
Memo, A. K. Jeffries, TVA, to A. Peters,
- Bechtel, in response to Request for Information (RFI) BLN-1705, (06/18/87)
Memo, A. K. Jeffries, TVA, to A. Peters,
- Bechtel, in response to RFI BLN-1699, (06/18/87)
ITT Grinnell calculations SA-3236-11 Rev.
A and SA-3236-13 Rev.
A for pipe supports ISM-MPGH-0453 and ISM-MPGH-0461, (06/28/87)
BFN Site Oirector Standard Practice SDSP
- 3. 1, "Corrective Action Program,"
RO, (04/30/85),
R7 (12/04/86)
BFN Procedure BFNP SI4.6.G, "Inservice Inspection Program,"
RO, (12/23/86) 38240-R4 (12/08/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONIXRlNS SPECIAL PROCIRAN REPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER;.
4 Page C-8 of ll 52.
53.
54, 55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
BFN Notif'ication of Indication (NOI) Reports:
NOI U2/C5iB-I?0, (10/08/'B6)
NOI U2/C58-(?2, (10/08/86)
NOI U2/C5iB-24, (ll/18/86)
NOI U2/C5B-29, (12/31/'S6)
NOI U2/C58-39, (12/31/86)
NOI U2/C5iB-61, (01/12/87)
"OE Conditions Adverse to Quality (CAQ) Data Base Frequency Report Browns Ferry - By Identifier s," [no RIMS number ], (04/02/87)
TVA WBN Design Calculation 47A920-38-3, Rl,
[WBP 831216 003], (12/30/83)
TVA WBN Design Calculation H-53-174-1984, sheets 1 through 9, RO,
[WBP 841 026 904],
(10/29/84)
TVA WBN Design Calculation MK420, Rl [841 860106 956], (12/20/85)
Bechtel Calculation PO-221-15, RO, 06/25/87 FDS Nuclear Inc.,
W(3N Pipe Support Drawing 2-6,3-209, R902 Photograph of Watts Bar support 2-63-209 taken by the evaluation tea'm dn
'4/16/86, during a visit to the plant Thermal and -SSE Seismic Oisplacemerit Problem 0600250-09-06, Node 25, computed by R. Singh,
[no RIMS. number],
(04/17/86),
response to Rl; I WBN-025 61.
Pi pe suppor't detail drawings of SQN'Probl'em'0600104-15-01, Unit li:
~Dw
. No.
1-H45-18 1-H45-1,9 1-H45-22 1-H45-23 Rev.
906 909 907 907 1-I{45-'4l 1-H45-42 1-H45-45 1-H45-46 Rev.
908 908 908 906 Dwcl I~Io ~
1-Il45-32 1-H45-33 1-H45-9 1-H45-10 1-II45-1 1 Rev.
902 902 2
902 9I02 62.
Pipe support detail drawings of SQN Problem 0600154-15-01, Unit 2i:
~Dw
. No.
2-H45-18 2.-H45-19 2-H45-22 2-H45-23 Rev.
3 904 905 3
2-H45-41 2-H45-42 2-H45-45 2-H45-46 Rev.
908 908 907 910 Owe!.
No.
2-H45-9 2-H45-10 2-H45-11 2-H45-32 2-H45-33 Rev.
38240-R4 (12/08/87)
III
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER:
22100 REVISION NUMBER:
4 Page C-9 of ll 63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69 70.
71.
EDS Nuclear Inc., piping analysis calculation 0600104-15-01, R6, Unit 1,
[no RIMS number],
response to RFI SQN-625 I
EDS Nuclear Inc., piping analysis calculation 0600154-15-01, R5, Unit 2,
[no RIMS number],
response to RFI SQN-625-I TVA, Summary of Analysis of SQN Problem 0600104-15-01, R7, Unit 1,
[B25 860716 803]
TVA Bellefonte Nuclear Plant piping analysis design calculation N4-1NL-A, RZ,
[B21 850531 201], (05/31/85)
TVA, Bellefonte Nuclear Plant piping analysis design calculation
. N4-1NL-B, R2,
[821 850619 208], (06/14/85)
TVA, Bellefonte Nuclear Plant design support detail drawings:
Date SK-1NL-MPHG-0093 RZ 10/26/83 SK-1NL-MPHG-0094 R2 10/26/83 SK-1NL-MPHG-0105 Rl 12/15/83 SK-1NL-MPHG-0106 R2 12/15/83 TVA, Bellefonte Nuclear Plant design calculation for pipe supports, 2-inch diameter and under, calculation 4B>>X0-166A, Rl,,
[BLP 841003 401],
(10/04/84)
TVA, Bellefonte Nuclear Plant pipe support design calculation, Support 1KC-MPHG-0884 for MOV 1KC-IFCV-185, RO,
[821 870403 200], (04/03/87)
TVA, Bellefonte Nuclear Plant isometric drawings:
1RW1456<<KC-Gl 1RW1456-KC-G2 lRW1456-KC-G3 1RW1456-KC-Hl 1RW1456-KC-H2 1RW1456-KC-H3 R6 R7 R7 R5 RS R4 12/08/77 12/08/77 12/08/77 01/11/78 01/11/78 01/11/78 72.
73.
74.
TVA, Bellefonte Nuclear Plant support design detail drawing 1KC-MPHG-0482 for MOV 1KC-IFCV-207B, R3, (12/17/80)
TVA, Bellefonte Nuclear Plant, code analysis load combinations of the piping analysis problem N4-1KC-G, Rl, (04/08/85) 0 Memo from C. N. Johnson, SQN, to R. 0.. Barnett, TVA, "Reply to Potential Generic Evaluation - PIR WBNCEB8553 [B41 851121 028/24] for SQN,"
[B25 851216 300], (12/16/85) 38240-R4 (12/08/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT NUMBER: '2100',
REVISION NUMBER.;
4 Page C-10 of 11 75.
Letter from R.
Dunham, Bechtel,, to R. 0. Barnett, TVA, '"Review of
'mplementation of ZPA Effects in Watts Bar 's Piping Analysis," [no RIMS number],
(03/26/86) 76.
Results of Bechtel walkdown at BLN to verify existence of temporary, supports in vicinity of valves 1NL-IFCV-062N and
-064N, IOM 2051,,
(05/18/87) 77.
Results of Bechtel walkdown at BLN to identify supports on MOVs, IOM 2049, (05/',29/87) 78.
Quality Technology Company (QTC) Employee
Response
Team (ERT)
Investigation Report for Concern IN 85~305-001 (WBN), (03/26/86)
>R4 (12/08/87)
n~
~O II il