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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARCNL-24-074, Tennessee Valley Authority - Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revisions2024-10-23023 October 2024 Tennessee Valley Authority - Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revisions IR 05000390/20243012024-10-17017 October 2024 Operator Licensing Examination Approval 05000390/2024301 and 05000391/2024301 ML24282B0412024-10-15015 October 2024 Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 and Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 IR 05000341/20245012024-10-0808 October 2024 – Emergency Preparedness Inspection Report 05000341/2024501 ML24260A1682024-10-0404 October 2024 Regulatory Audit Summary Related to Request to Add and Revise Notes Related to Technical Specification Table 3.3.2-1, Function 5 ML24261C0062024-10-0404 October 2024 Correction to Amendment No. 134 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 and Amendment No. 38 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-96 ML24276A2032024-10-0303 October 2024 FEMA Level 1 Finding Transmittal Letter ML24268A0992024-10-0101 October 2024 Power Plant – Audit Summary for License Amendment Request and Regulatory Exemptions for a Risk Informed Approach to Address ECCS Strainer Performance IR 05000341/20240132024-09-30030 September 2024 Phase 2 Post Approval License Renewal Report 05000341/2024013 ML24284A1072024-09-26026 September 2024 Affidavit for Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, and Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 CNL-24-047, Decommitment of Flood Mode Mitigation Improvement Systems2024-09-24024 September 2024 Decommitment of Flood Mode Mitigation Improvement Systems CNL-24-060, Supplement to Request for Approval of the Tennessee Valley Authority Nuclear Quality Assurance Program Description2024-09-24024 September 2024 Supplement to Request for Approval of the Tennessee Valley Authority Nuclear Quality Assurance Program Description ML24262A0602024-09-23023 September 2024 Summary of August 19, 2024, Meeting with Tennessee Valley Authority Regarding a Proposed Supplement to the Tennessee Valley Authority Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan CNL-24-065, Tennessee Valley Authority – Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revisions2024-09-18018 September 2024 Tennessee Valley Authority – Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revisions ML24240A1692024-09-18018 September 2024 Cy 2023 Summary of Decommissioning Trust Fund Status ML24257A1652024-09-13013 September 2024 FEMA Region 5 Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant Level 1 Finding September 2024 ML24254A3562024-09-0909 September 2024 FEMA Level 1 Finding for Fermi 2024 Biennial Exercise 05000390/LER-2024-002, Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Generator Protection Relay Actuation2024-09-0505 September 2024 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Generator Protection Relay Actuation IR 05000390/20240052024-08-28028 August 2024 Updated Inspection Plan and Assessment Follow-Up Letter for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Report 05000390-2024005 and 05000391-2024005 ML24218A1442024-08-27027 August 2024 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 169 and 75 Regarding Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.9.5.1 to Reduce the Residual Heat Removal Flow Rate ML24240A3532024-08-27027 August 2024 Inservice Testing (IST) Program for the Fourth 10-Year Inspection Interval Update IR 05000341/20240052024-08-22022 August 2024 Updated Inspection Plan for Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2 (Report 05000341/2024005) IR 05000390/20244022024-08-20020 August 2024 – Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000390-2024402 and 05000391/2024402 - Public CNL-24-061, Supplement to Application to Revise Function 5 of Technical Specification Table 3.3.2-1, ‘Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation,’ for the Sequoyah and Watts Bar (SQN-TS-23-02 and WBN-TS-23-08),2024-08-19019 August 2024 Supplement to Application to Revise Function 5 of Technical Specification Table 3.3.2-1, ‘Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation,’ for the Sequoyah and Watts Bar (SQN-TS-23-02 and WBN-TS-23-08), IR 05000341/20240022024-08-14014 August 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000341/2024002 ML24219A0262024-08-12012 August 2024 Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure IR 05000390/20240022024-08-0707 August 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000390/2024002 and 05000391/2024002 Rev ML24204A2652024-07-25025 July 2024 Regulatory Audit Summary Related to Request to Revise Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.9.5.1 to Reduce the Residual Heat Removal Flow Rate ML24199A2182024-07-25025 July 2024 Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 1 - NRC Position on Continuation of Possession-Only License No. DPR-9 Past the Current Expiration Date (Docket No. 50-016) ML24199A0012024-07-22022 July 2024 Clarification and Correction to Exemption from Requirement of 10 CFR 37.11(c)(2) ML24169A4092024-07-18018 July 2024 Relief Request RR-A25, Alternative to Reactor Vessel Circumferential Shell Weld Examination ML24172A1342024-07-15015 July 2024 Exemptions from 10 CFR 37.11(C)(2) (EPID L-2023-LLE-0024) - Letter ML24170A8002024-07-15015 July 2024 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 168 and 74 Regarding Revision to Technical Specification Table 1.1-1 for Required Number of Fully Tensioned Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Closure Bolts IR 05000390/20244402024-07-12012 July 2024 95001 Supplemental Inspection Supplemental Report 05000390-2024440 and 05000391-2024440 and Follow-Up Assessment Letter 05000391/LER-2024-003, Inoperability of Both Trains of Unit 2 Low Head Safety Injection2024-07-11011 July 2024 Inoperability of Both Trains of Unit 2 Low Head Safety Injection IR 05000341/20243022024-07-0909 July 2024 NRC Initial License Reexamination Report 05000341/2024302 ML24131A0012024-07-0202 July 2024 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 167 and 73 Regarding Adoption of Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-427-A, Revision 2 CNL-24-052, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Application to Modify the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.9.5.1 (WBN-TS-21-14)2024-06-27027 June 2024 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Application to Modify the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.9.5.1 (WBN-TS-21-14) CNL-24-018, License Amendment Request for Adoption of Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-276-A, Revision 2, Regarding TS 3.8.1 AC Sources – Operating to Clarify Requirements for Diesel Generator Testing (WBN-TS2024-06-25025 June 2024 License Amendment Request for Adoption of Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF-276-A, Revision 2, Regarding TS 3.8.1 AC Sources – Operating to Clarify Requirements for Diesel Generator Testing (WBN-TS ML24089A1152024-06-21021 June 2024 Transmittal Letter, Environmental Assessments and Findings of No Significant Impact Related to Exemption Requests from 10 CFR 37.11(c)(2) ML24173A1012024-06-14014 June 2024 Retake Exam Post-Exam Cover Letter & Comments ML24155A0852024-06-11011 June 2024 Operator Licensing Reexamination Approval Letter - Fermi Power Plant, June 2024 ML24151A6482024-06-0303 June 2024 Changes in Reactor Decommissioning Branch Project Management Assignments for Some Decommissioning Facilities IR 05000341/20244022024-05-30030 May 2024 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000341/2024402 ML24143A1852024-05-29029 May 2024 – Regulatory Audit in Support of LAR to Adopt TSTF-505, Rev. 2, TSTF-439, Rev. 2, and TSTF-591, Rev. 0 ML24141A2072024-05-20020 May 2024 Plant—Information Request to Support the NRC Annual Baseline Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes Inspection ML24141A0482024-05-17017 May 2024 EN 56958_1 Ametek Solidstate Controls, Inc ML24100A7642024-05-16016 May 2024 Issuance of Amendment No. 166 Regarding Revision to Technical Specification 3.8.2, AC Sources-Shutdown, to Remove Reference to C-S Diesel Generator (CNL-23-062) 05000341/LER-2024-002, Primary Containment Isolation Valve Declared Inoperable for a Period Prohibited by Technical Specifications2024-05-16016 May 2024 Primary Containment Isolation Valve Declared Inoperable for a Period Prohibited by Technical Specifications 05000341/LER-2024-001, Automatic RPS Scram on High RPV Pressure While Attempting to Lower Generator Output During RF-222024-05-15015 May 2024 Automatic RPS Scram on High RPV Pressure While Attempting to Lower Generator Output During RF-22 2024-09-09
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-001 January 29, 2018 Mikel T Macomb County Juvenile Justice Center 400 North Rose Street Mt. Clemens, MI 48043 Hello Mikel:
Thanks for your letter to Chairman Svinicki regarding your thoughts on nuclear power and the proposed new nuclear power plant next to the existing Fermi reactor near Monroe. The NRCs mission is to ensure the publics health and safety and protect the environment during the U.S. civilian use of radioactive materials.
Companies pursuing approval of their reactor technologies do so of their own volition, sometimes with support from the Department of Energy. U.S. utilities such as DTE make their own decisions on whether to pursue nuclear power plants as an option. The utilities also have entire control over the reactor technology they wish to pursue. The NRC can only approve or reject applications to approve reactor designs or to license new reactors, the agency cannot change an applications reactor technology.
The NRCs only role is examining whether a reactor design meets the relevant NRC requirements to ensure the public remains safe. To this point, all current U.S. reactors, including Watts Bar Unit 2 in Tennessee, are based on cooling the core with water. The agency concludes the public will be safe if these designs are used. The NRC is currently aware of several companies that are interested in pursuing reactor technology using something other than water to cool the core. One company, Oklo, has indicated it is examining a sodium-cooled design. Other companies are considering designs using molten salts or inert gases to cool the core. If these companies apply for design approval the NRC will carry out its reviews accordingly.
With regards to the proposed new Fermi reactor, the NRC reviewed DTEs application from September 2008 through February 2015. This thorough review covered both the safety and environmental aspects of building and operating the proposed reactor. In issuing the license for the Fermi new reactor, the NRC has concluded the public will remain safe if the reactor is built and operated.
The NRC approved the proposed design for the new Fermi reactor, the Economic Simplified Boiling-Water Reactor, in 2014. The design includes several safety features that would operate without the need for electricity, meaning the reactor would be able to safely withstand the sort of events that occurred before the 2011 Fukushima accident.
When the NRC decided to issue the Fermi new reactor license, the agency imposed conditions on the proposed reactor to account for the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident.
In 2007, the Tennessee Valley Authority told the NRC it was resuming construction of Watts Bar Unit 2, where work had been halted in 1985. The NRC updated its safety and environmental reviews over the next few years, and concluded it was appropriate to give Watts Bar Unit 2 an operating license in October 2015. The reactor was also required to meet post-Fukushima safety enhancements.
The available evidence shows U.S. nuclear power plants have operated safely for more than 50 years. The radioactive material from the 1979 partial meltdown at Three Mile Island had no measurable effect on public health. Apart from Three Mile Island, U.S.
nuclear power plants have safely withstood severe events such as tornadoes, floods, and hurricanes including Andrew and Katrina with no impact to the public. In the years following the Fukushima accident, the NRC imposed additional requirements on operating U.S. reactors to enhance their ability to remain safe.
NRC research over the past decade has examined the potential consequences of a U.S. reactor accident. These detailed analyses of accident scenarios show that post-Fukushima enhancements can stop an accident before it can affect the public. Even if an accident cannot be stopped, the research shows the effects are much less than earlier thought. The potential radioactive material reaching the environment would only be enough to slightly increase cancer risk in the affected population.
Ive included additional information on the NRCs overall operations and the agencys response to the Fukushima accident. Please feel free to e-mail me at Scott.Burnell@nrc.gov if you have any other questions.
Scott Burnell
/RA/
Office of Public Affairs Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2