ML18025B868

Revision H to Acceptance Test Procedure IT 533 P/N 1801119

ML18025B868
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry, Sequoyah, 05000000
Issue date:	04/07/1977
From:	Levan H PACIFIC SCIENTIFIC
To:
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ML18025B853	List: ML18025B852 ML18025B854 ML18025B855 ML18025B856 ML18025B857 ML18025B858 ML18025B859 ML18025B860 ML18025B861 ML18025B862 ML18025B865 ML18025B867 ML18025B868 ML20063B420
References
IT-533, NUDOCS 8208250446
Download: ML18025B868 (138)

Text

REPORT NO.

TR 846 ENCLOSURE 1 ACCEPTANCE TEST PROCEDURE I.T. 533 P/N 1801119-11 82082S0~4~0SO002S+

g 820818 PDR PDQCK PDR p

PACIFIC SCIENTIFIC

~ KIN-TECH DIVISION 1346 S. State College Blvd.

Anaheim, Ca.

92603, (714) 774-5217

REPORT NO.

I.T. 533 DATE 2 anuar 1975 TR 846 ENCLOSURE 1 ACCEPTANCE TEST FOR 1801119 Shock Arrestor 1801128 (12-inch Stroke)

FROM PACIFIC SCIENTIFIC COMPANY AIRCRAFT PRODUCTS DIVISION PREPA D BY APPROVED B A.

n ineerin ro ect En ineer

REV, Re A

B DATE 1-29-75 5-8-75 12-15"75 5If28-76 BY HCL HCL HCL HCL APPD. BY PAH PAH PAH PAH PACES AFFECTED 2,4 5

Revised method of breakaway torque test.

Added Materials Traceability Tabulation.

Added parts to MTT.

PACIFIC SCIENTIFIC COMPANY Aircraft Products Division

I Report No.

IT->>>

PageMA of~

REV,.

DATE BY APPD. BY PAGES AFFECTED D

E F

G 8-10-76 8-23-76 10-14-76 3-7-77 H

4-7-77 HCL HCL HCL HCL HCL PAH PAH PAH PAH PAH 3

5a 2, 4 3,

4 3,

4 Upgraded shock arrestors.

Added to KCT list.

Increase breakaway force.

Changed Lost Motion from.060 to.040 Tighten tolexances Pacific Scientific Company AIRCRAFTPRODUCTS DIVSION 1saft s. state college Blvd.. Anaheim, calif. 92803/I7taI 77a-5217

~33 3 PAGE OF 1.0 PURPOSE 1.1 To assure compliance of production units of the Shock Arrestor Assembly with referenced drawings.

2.0 SCOPE I

2.1 This test establishes both visual and functional charac-teristics which could be expected to vary through dimen-sional variation or improper assembly and adjustment.

3.0 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS 3.1 PSCo Drawing 1801119 4.3 333U33 UZ 4.1 1801 TF-2 Universal Shock Arrestor Tester 4.2

.0001 Dial Indicator

5. 0 INDIVIDUALTESTS

5. 1 Examination of Product 5.1.1 Each unit shall be subjected to a dimensional exami'nation to determine compliance with appli-cable final assembly drawing.

5.1.2 Each unit shall be'isually inspected to assure completeness of assembly, freedom from burrs and sharp

edges, alignment of parts, security of fasteners, and dimensional integrity.

5.1.3 Units shall be visually, inspected for general appearance of plating, painting, freedom from nicks and damage of finishes.

5.1.4 Units shall be inspected to assure the accuracy and legibility of marking and identification.

6.0

'FINAL FUNCTIONAL TESTS OF 6.1 Breakawa Friction Force (1200 lbs.

max.)

QF OA OF 6.1. 1 The unit shall extend and retract when subjected to a maximum force of 1200 pounds.

Unit shall be installed in the 1801 TF-2 Test Fixture and the starting force in both the extension and retrac-tion modes measured at three places.

Measurements shall be taken at the approxi-mate mid position and approximately

.5 inch from both extreme positions.

Load measured shall not exceed 1200 pounds.

PAClRC ICIENTlFlC COMPANY Aircraft Products Dnttaion 1~ South State Colleoe Boulevard

~ Anaheim. Calilomla 92803

~ (711) 774-5217

ADDENDUM Final Inspection Check List PSCo 1801 aepoRT NO.

PAGE OF Rev.

8 Shock Arrestor Ref. paragraphs refer to paragraphs from this procedure, I.T. 533 Part No.

Serial No.

PSCo P.O.

No.

Date Shop Order No.

Customer I.

Visual Examination (para.

5.1)

(a) Dzmenszonal...;......................................

(b)

Workmanship.................

II.

Final Functional Tests

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OG (a)

Breakaway Friction Force (1200 lbs. max.)

(para. 6.1)........................Actual (b)

Lost Motion ( ~ 04o max.)(para. 6.2).........Actual (c)

Acceleration/Load Test (.59 sec. min.)(para. 6.3)....

Actual Time Extending Retracting Inspector Stamp Date PACIRC ICtKNTlFC COMITY AircraftProducta Diriaiort 1346 South State Cotfege Boulevard

~ Anaheim, California 92603

~ (7tH) 774-52t7

. ~333 PAGE~ OF~

Rev.

H ASME SECTION III, DIVISION I SUBSECTION NF MATERIALS TRACEABILITYTABULATION PSCO P/N Serial No.

Owner/Agent Date Part No.

1801406 1801407 1801415 1801416 1801021 1801422 1801423 1801428 1801430 1801432 1801434 1801437 1801507 1801543 1801418 1801418 1801420 Description Shell, Inertia Mass Hub, Inertia Mass Shell, Torque Carrier Hub, Torque Carrier Capstan Assy.

Flange Tube Housing Support, Cylinder Nut> End Cap Cylinder, Telescoping Ref.

1801545

Cap, End End Ca Assembl

,Nut, Adapter Adapter

Gear, Pinion

Gear, Planet

Gear, Ring Material Code Number 33 Stamp PACIFIC SCIENZIFIC COMPANY Aircraft Products Division

Rp N.~

page

>e of Rev.

H Part No.

Description Material Code Number S tamp 4801431 Key, Anti-Rotation 1801433 Key, Capston 1801636 Inertia Mass Pacific Sclentlflc Company AIRCRAFT PRODUCTS DIVSION 734((S. State Colleye Blvd., hnahsim, Calif. 92((03/{71i) 774-5217

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TR 846 Photograph 1

TR 846 Photograph 2

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General Electric San Jose C P BRAUN S CO PIPE SNUBBERS AND STRUTS TVA STRIDE Page 5

400-2 June 27, 197 fh

~'.0 SCOPE This document defines the functional and enginee~~ng requirements for the piping snubbers and struts for the Reactor Island portion of a Boiling Water Reactor facility.

The applicable portions of this specification, the referenced documents, and the Pipe Support Assembly drawings comprise the Design Specification required for NF components by subsubarticle NCA-3250 of ASME Code,Section III.

1.1 DESCRIPTION

Pipe snubbers and struts are used to protect the piping system from damage as a result of dynamic or shock loads such as those induced by seismic action or loading generated by quick-closing valves or water hammer.

Included are hydraulic or mechanical vibration

snubbers, rigid struts, and spring-loaded sway braces.

Variable spring supports, constant spring supports, pipe restraints and rigid hangers are not included in this specification.

Supports covered by this specification are listed in the procurement cover specification series 400-12X.

1.2 BUYER The Buyer of the pipe snubbers and struts defined by this specification is Tennessee Valley Authority, Knoxville, Tennessee.

1.3 SELLER The supplier who furnishes the pipe snubbers,

struts, and associated components is hereinafter referred to as the Seller.

1.4 ENGINEER Work und".r this specification shall be subject to the review and approval of General Electric Company, Nuclear Energy Division, San Jose, California, or their authorized agents hereinafter referred to as the Engineer.

1-4.1 REVIEW AND APPROVAL The Engineer shall review and approve all documents prepared by the Seller as indicated in this specification.

'The Engineer's review and approval shall not relieve the Seller of the full responsibility for the correctness of the documents furnished as they may be modified by the Engineer's

comments, and for conformance with the specification.

l.5 QUALITY ASSURANCE The Seller shall comp3;y with the quality assurance instructions in Appendix A.

The Buyer and/or his designated agent vill have access to the Seller's facilities to audit his quality assurance program at all times.

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R Koelscli'L G Smart General Electric San Jose C F BRAUN & CO PIPE SNUBBERS AND STRUTS TVA STRIDE Page 11 400-20 une 27, 1')75

4. 3. 6 PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS The rigid strut (RS) 'iall be used to provide a positive restraint in one direction and lim.ted f"eedom in a plane at 90 degrees.

The vibration snubber (SS) shall bv, used to resist rapidly applied or cyclic loads.

In contra't it shall affor relatively low resistance to sustained loadings or slow movements

.uch as those caused by thermal expansion.

The spring-loaded strut or sway brace (SB) shall be used where a predetermined resistance force to movement in tension or compression is desired.

It serves as a stay against-the loading while accommodating small thermal expansion movements.

In general, attachments to the pipe shall be provided with close fitting rigid pipe clamps and shall be able to sustain all normal,

upset, emergency and faulted loads within 15 der~rees of normal t.o the pipe without slippage.

For loads applied at angles greater than 15 degrees from normal, other additional attachments vill be provided for transfer of loads to the pipe.

Hydraulic cylinders shall be capable of operation for five or more years without maintenance, All other parts of the assemblies shall be capable of operation for 10 years without maintenance.

The design of the assemblies shall be concerned with compactness, ease of installation and adjustment.

After initial adjustment during installation, the assemblies shall perform, without further adjustment, throughout the range of loads and movements specified in the design data.

rigi ctural member, usually a pipe section with ball and socket joints or sp 'l bushings at each end.

Each joint shall be capable of a minimum of 1

ees angular movement and the length of the rigid strut between the joints be se" to minimize any undesirable arc effect throughout the travel.

ality Group D struts, the pipe size shall be determined using good st al practice or test data in choosing L/r ratios acceptable for the applie ds. 'he machined surfaces of the joints shall have a finish of 63 mic

'hes or better and shall have a permanent dry lube corrosion-resistance p

tion-The assemblies shall have free angular movement with no end or sx 4.3 '.2 VIBRATION SNUBBER The vibration snubber assembly may be designed using a hydraulic cylinder cr a mechanical design with no hydraulic damper.

The functional resistance to gradual movements caused by thermal expansion shall not exceed one percent of -the rated load.

The total lost motion '(dead band) including clearances; during cyclic loading of 3,0 to 33 Hertz shall not exceed 0.03 inch.

All snubber assemblies shall be designed for a life of 5000 cycles at rated Assemblies requiring a greater number of design cycles will be identified and the required number of cycles shown on the Pipe Support Assembly drawings.

R Koelsch I. G Smart General Electric San Jose C F SR*UN 8c CO PIPE SNUBBERS AND STRUTS TVA STRIDE Page 12 400-20 une 27, 1975 lily 4.3.6.2 VIBRATION SNUBBER Continued The Seller shall provide the design or test data that qualifii the selected snubber for the defined cycle loading.

The required minimum spring constants at 200oF for various snubber assembly rated loads re shown in Figure 1.

Snubbers used in pairs shall have matched spr.'ng rates within 5 percent.

For purposes of establishing spring constants, the snubber assembly is defined as the minimum pin to pin length snubber'no extension piece) for each load rating.

In some cases the use of a higher than necessary load rated snubber may be required to satisfy the minimum spring constant criteria.

The Seller shall submit a table giving the snubber spring constants for each rated load (refer t;o paragraph 6.2) and shall provide, as a separate item, spring constants for the wall brackets.

Pipe clamps are to have a stiffness 4 times that of the snubber attaching to them.

The end connections shall have ball type joints or spherical bushings that will allow angular motion of +

5 degrees.

Each snubber assembly shall provide a means of visually determining if the snubber is working properly and is not frozen in a locked position.

All snubbers shall perform as required by this specification in any spatial orientation.

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do le-acting hydraulic cylinders, fitted with fixed or adjustable orif s to control the velocity of the piston at a given resistive force.

e cylinders shall comply with Joint Industrial Conference Standards

'th hard chrome plated piston rods and seals selected for minimum leaka and long life.

Fluid reservoirs shall be integral with the snubber asse lg and shall have a means of visually indicating the level or reserve f d.

The seal material shall be subject to approval by the Engineer.

The ngth of stroke required is determined with the piston centered.

Howeve if it is desirable to utilize more of the stroke in one direction by sitioning the piston off center, a safety factor of 20 percent shall be lowed to prevent bottoming out the cylinder.

The bleedrate and loc rate (lockup rate defined as the pipe velocity that caused the snubb to lock) shall be set and recorded for each snubber.

The proper setting adjustment screws, if applicable, shall be marked on valves, an cans shall be provided to prevent tampering in the field.

Drag, blee te and lockup rate information for each snubber shall be provided the buyer as part of the permanent records.

Poppet valve snubbers sha allow unrestricted movement of the pipe up to a velocity of 6 inches pe inute with a drag force not exceeding one percent of rated load.

Th lockup velocity shall be between 6 and 25 inches per minute and the bleed te shall be between 1 and 6 inches per minute, Fixed orifice snubbers s

1 limit the pipe velocity at rated load of 6 to 10 inches per minute.

e drag load limit during thermal expansion at one percent of rated load s

not apply to fixed orifice snubbers.

Performance requirements shall BG

.l

R Koelschi '

Smart General Electric San Jose 400-20 June 27, 19 6, i'A9 PIPE SNUBBERS AND STRUTS TVA STRIDE C F BRAUN & CO Page 13 Pro'ect 4840-P S ecification The ecification of the fluid used in all hydraulic snubocrs

.all have t following characteristics.

The Kin atic Viscosity at 77 F shall be 175 Centistokes minim b

Pour Point s ll be minus 30 F or below c

Compressibility -

ulk Modules of 190 Ksi or morc Corrosion Protection -

e hydraulic fluid must have the canacity to retard rust and corros n normally causeii by minute quantitie.

of moisture and air present 'ny hydraulic system.

Stability The hydraulic fluid m t retain constant properties without oxidation, aeration, foamin or demulsibility under all circumstances specified herein.

Material Compatibility - The hydraulic flui must be compatible with all seals, materials, assembly parts, coa

'ngs and paint under all circumstances specified herein.

Fire Resistance

- Flash Point 5

F or above Fire Point 650 or above Spontaneous Ignition Temperature 860 F

above h

Radiation Life - The hydraulic fluid shall have resistance to "

4.3.6.2.2 MECHANICAL SNUBBER The fully mechanical type of snubber shall control pipe movement by limiting acceleration or by,limiting velocity.

The acceleration limiting snubbers shall restrict the relative pipe acceleration to.02g for any load up to the rated lo;d.

Break-away load shall not exceed 5 lbs or one percent of rated load, which ever is greater, The velocity limiting mechanical snubber shall allow unrestricted movement of the pipe up to a maximum acceleration of 0.08g while not excerting a force greater that one percent of rated load on the pipe.

The slip rate (velocity of pipe after snubber activation) shall be between 1 to 12 inch per minute at all loads up to rated load.

The mechanical snubber performance shall be met at 75 F

and 200 F in both tension and compression.

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hristiansen R Keoloch C F SRAUN Ck CO Page 18 San Jose PIPE SNUBBERS AND STRUTS TVA STRIDE 400-70 June 27, li75 0~

g ll test data shall be obtained from production units rani.omly s

cted.

Pins shall be installed to manufacturer's standard tole ces.

h The Selle hall test two snubbers of each size as outlined above.'oth shall be ested at 75o and 200oF.

All results shall be included in the mitted report.

Prior test results on identical1 units are acceptabl 6.3 HYDRAULIC SNUBBER TEST R

RT Certification shall be submitted in a test report for hydraulic snu ers to insure that the following i" satisfied.

a The seals function properly after te

'ng per paragraph 6,1.

b The snubber. unit shall not have lost motio in excess of that allowed by paragraph 4.3.6.2 for the load con tion indicated.

~ c The snubber unit continues to offer rated restrai until the input motion/force ceases or reverses direction.

d The criteria for drag, lockup rate and bleedrate are met.

e The spring constant is determined and reported as required by 6.4 MECHANICAL SNUP9ER ASSEMBLIES Certified test data shall be submitted to demonstrate that the mechanical snubbers perform as required by paragraph 4.3.6.2.

The test shall include the following procedures.

a The snubber shall be subjected to either force or displacement that varies approximately as the sine wave.

b The frequency (Hz) of the input motion or force shall be verified at increments of 5 Hz within the range 3

Hz to 33 Hz.

All tests shall be conducted for a minimum of 10 seconds at each test frequency.

c The resulting maximum relative displacements across the snubber shall be recorded at 75op.

The effective spring rate shall be determined as described and defined in paragraph 6.2.c.

d The Seller shall test the snubbers for break-away load and acceleration limits at 75oF.

Velocity limiting mechanical snubbers shall be tested for break-away load, acceleration limits, and slip rate.

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ENCLOSURE Sections 2.2 and 2.3" Responses to NRC Request for Additional Information on Control~'of "Heavy.~Loads for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

A

4 I

SECTION 2.2 Specific Requirements for Overhead Handling System Operating in the Vicinity of Fuel Stoiage Pools

2. 2-1.

The following is a list of overhead handling systems capable of carrying loads over spent fuel in the storage pool or in the reactor vessel:

Handling Device Number Unit No.

Name Drawing No.

6 Mark No.

1-3 125-ton Reactor Bldg.

44N220-223 Crane 59 1/4-ton Plain Trolley 44N234 and Channel Handling Tool 59 1/4-ton Plain Trolley 44N234 and Channel Handling Tool 1/4-ton Plain Trolley 44N234 and Channel Handling Tool 70 Refueling Platform -

GE 761E738 Monorail

., 70 Refueling Platform GE 761E738 Monorail 70 Refueling Platform GE 761E738 Monorail 71 Refueling Platform Auxiliary Hoist (1/2 ton)

GE 761E738 71 Refueling Platform Auxiliary Hoist (1/2 ton)

GE 761E738 71 Refueling Platform Auxilary Hoist (l/2 ton)

GE 761E738 2 ~ 2 2

Of the handling devices listed in Section 2.2-1, device Nos.

59, 70, and 71 are excluded from consideration because they handle loads which weigh less than the combined weight of a fuel assembly and its handling device.

2 ~ 2 3

The Browns Ferry reactor building crane (handling device No.

6) has been evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood for a load drop extremely small (see Attachment

1) ~

A heavy load/impact area matrix is provided for this crane.'in Attachment 2.

7 bg

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SECTION 2. 3 Specific Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems Operating in Plant Areas Containing Equipment Required for Reactor

Shutdown, Core Decay Removal, or Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 2 ~ 3 1 None of the cranes or hoists listed in 2. 1-1, which fall into the category of Section 2.3, have sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop'xtremely small.

2.3-2 The mobile crane (device No.

24) and the chain hoists (device Nos.

47B and 47C) listed in 2.1-1 have been presented in matrix format in Attachment 2 as requested.

0'I'

ATTACHMENT 1 SECTION 2.2-3

Response

on Browne Ferry Reactor Building Crane

Sheet' og Zl BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT NUREG 0612 Section 2.2.3 The following is a detailed evaluation of the 125-ton reactor building.

crane with respect to the featuxes of design, fabrication, inspection,

testing, and operation as delineated in NUREG 0554 and supplemented by the identified alternatives specified in NUREG 0612, appendix C and proposed alternatives which demonstrate their equivalency.

This crane has previously been evaluated with respect to NRC Regulatory Guide 1.104 and Branch Technical Position-APCSB9-1.

This evaluation is a consolidation of the following letters with supplemental information:

Letter'from L. M. Mills to NRC's T. A. Ippolito dated February 10, 1981, with enclosure.

Letter from H. G. Parxis to NRC's A. Schwencer dated June 30, 1976, with enclosure; To facilitate the evaluation of the building crane as having sufficient of a load drop extremely small, the failure-proof cranes")

were grouped Bxowns Ferry Nuclear Plant reactor design features to make the likelihood guidelines of NUREG 0554 {"single>>

in the following categories:

A.

Specification, design criteria, and installation instructions.

B.

Drivers and controls, bxidge and trolley travel, hoisting machinery, and safety features.

C.

Testing, preventive*maintenance, operating manual and quality assurance.

This grouping provides for a point-by-point comparison for each section of NUREG 0554 while eliminating the'zedundancy inherent in such a comparison.

for components perfoxming int'errelated functions.

The reactor building crane was manufactured by Ederer, Incorporated.

It is a single-trolley, overhead electric traveling-type with a 125-ton main hoist and a 5-ton auxiliary hoist.

This crane serves three reactor units, and handles the spent fuel casks and equipment shipped ox received thxough the equipment-access lock.

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A.

Specification, design criteria, and installation instructions.

This crane was used during the plant construction phase and is presently in service as permanent plant equipment.

The performance specifications for construction and permanent plant use are identical.

No changes were made to the crane for the transition from construction to operating plant service.

The reliability of the crane is based on conservatively applied design principles and compliance with accepted industry standards such as CMAA Specification No. 70 and ANSI B30.2-1976.

Maximum loads are considered to be simultaneously applied static and dynamic loads.

The allowable 'stresses used in the design of this crane for structural'nd mechanical portions do not exceed 0.9 of the material yield

- strength for the most severeload combinations.

The degree to which actual design stresses comply with the allowable stresses given in CMAA 70-1975 are shown below for critical structural portions which were fabricated using A-36 steel.

Box Girder:

Maximum Actual Sires's

~ksi ChfAA Allowable Stress ksi Tension Compression Shear 12.2 11.6 2.6 17.6 17.6 13.2 End Trucks:

Tension Compression Shear 7.8 7.8 3.2 14.4 14.4 10.8 Trolley Frame:

Tension Compression Shear 13.5 13.5 1.9 14.4 14.4 10.8 Structural components are subject to cyclic loading, whereas rotating parts are subject to reverse cyclic loading.

Using a conservative 40 percent of material tensile strength aa the endurance limit, the structural and rotating parts were designed for infinite life.

This can be verified by comparing the maximum actual stress for the structural portions listed in the table above with 40 percent of the tensile strength of A-36 steel

(.4 x 58.0, ksi).

The critical load bearing rotating parts listed below can likewise be verified by using the tensile strength of their respective metals..

l

Part Maximum Endurance Material Stress

~Limit kml)

Drum Drum shaft Ring gear Pinion Pinion gear shaft A-36 4140 4140 4340 C1140

10. 9

22. 0

20. 0

29. 5

21. 0

23. 2

44. 0

44. 0

72. 0

44. 8 The crane was designed for a maximum load. of 125 tons.

This design rated load (DRL) is displayed on the crane.

The maximum critical load (MCL) imposed on the crane is the reactor vessel head which, with its lifting device, weights 105 tons.

The crane will be maintained for the DRL, which is.l6 percent greater than the MCL.

This should compensate for component degradation because of wear and exposure.

The MCL is not displayed on the crane.

The auxiliary hoist was designed for a DRL of 5 tons to which it will be maintained.

The MCL handled by the auxiliary hoist is limited to 1/2 ton by Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant technical specifications for loads over spent fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool.

The DRL of the auxiliary hoist is displayed on the crane.

The crane was designed to withstand a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) by maintaining its structural integrity while retaining control of and holding the load.

Bridge, trolley, and hoist holding brakes are applied when the drive motors are deenergized.

Trolley wheels are prevented from leaving the runway by the use of safety blocks with holddown lugs.

Each bridge and trolley truck is equipped with a drop bar which limits the drop of 1/2 inch in event of failure of any part of the wheel assembly.

A seismic anlaysis of the reactor building crane was performed by idealizing the crane as a lumped-mass mathematical model.

The stiffness of the model was the stiffness of the crane girders.

The trolley was assumed to be rigid and was idealized in the mathematical model as rigid links connecting the crane girders.

The trolley was assumed to be pinned to the crane girders in order to maximize the inertial effects of the trolley.

The maximum load on the crane during a seismic event was assumed to be 150 kips, which is 60 percent of the DRL.

A modal analysis was performed for motion transverse to the crane girders.

The analysis considered two cases of trolley position; one case for th'e trolley at the center of the girders and one'for the trolley at the end.

Seismic responses were calculated for each case by use of the response spectrum method of analysis.

Acceleration response spectra at the elevation of the crane runway was taken from the seismic analysis of the reactor building and was used as input to the mathematical model.

A damping value of 1 percent of critical damping was used in the response analysis for both the operating base earthquake (OBE) and SEE events.

1

Xn both the longitudinal and vertical directions, the crane was designed for pseudostatic seismic loads caused by the zero period acceleration (ZPA) of the acceleration response spectrum at the elevation of the bridge runway.

The seismi.c loads were combined on an absolute basis with other loads in the appropri,ate loading combinations.

Seismic loads from only one horiz-ontal direction at a time were considered to occur simultaneously with the vertical direction.

The criteria fox establishing a minimum operating temperature with respect to material fracture toughness was not met nox was a minimum operating temperature specified.

The actual temperature on the refuel floor periodically drops to. 40-45 F when the auxiliary boilers are not available for building heat during, extremely cold weather.'he lowest expected operating temperatures were 0

F during construction and 65 F as permanent plant equipment.

Considering the conservative levels of stress in the crane at.the DRL, a coldpxoof test followed by an examination of critical welds would be sufficient demonstration of material toughness.

Due to the location of the crane in a nonpressure confining paxt of the reactor building, the girders were of a sealed design with no need for venting and drain provisions.

The possibility of surface condensation due to excessive humidity was provided for by cleaning, priming, and painting all structural surfaces in an approved manner; using nonhygxoscopic electrical insulation; plating critical mechanical parts and terminals of electrical devices; and installing motor space heaters.

All welding and weldox qualification was in accordance with the "Standard Code for Welding in Building Construction" of the American Welding Society.

Visual inspections were made at the contractors'lants to assure that the crane was fabricated 'in accordance with the specification requirements.

There has been no nondestructive examination (NDE) of welds.

Preheating and postweld heat treatment to relive imparted tensile stresses due to welding was not done during fabrication.

A review of actual fabrication drawings indicates that structural and welding details were used which

'would neither be expected to cause nox be vulnerable to lamellar tearing.

The design is such that tee and corner welded connnections in the main structural members are loaded primarily. in shear ox compression and are

made wit. fillet welds of 5/16 inch or smaller.

There is no evidence or

,suggestion in available technical literature to indicate that welds of this size would induce sufficient shrinkage stress to create lamellar tearing.

B.

Driver's and controls

, bridge and trolley travel, hoisting machinery, and safety features.

All drives axe G.E. stepless D.C. adjustble vo'ltage drive systems consisting of operator's master switch, HG set power conversion unit, D.C. drive motor, brakes and protective contxol circuitry.

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Hotox horsepower rating for the hoist drive is identical to the calculated requirement for the main hoist and is 1.1 percent great'er than the calculated requirement for the auxiliary hoist.

The drive motor provides rated hoisting speed at rated load and increasing hoisting speeds with lighter loads up to 275 percent of rated speed at no load.

The maximum torque available is limited to 200 percent, pxeventing mechanical damage from severe overloads.

The stepless drive systems ensure smooth acceleration and deceleration regardless of the operator's movement of the controls.

The major features involved in this. acceleration contxol px'oces's are:

(a) Timed acceleration - The rate of change of the speed reference voltage is limited through a resistor-capacitor network.

This softens any abrupt control movement by the operator.

(b) Armature voltage sensing When a stop is made by.xeturning the contxo1 to the "off" position, an axmature voltage relay will prevent the,brake from. setting until the motor back EMF and

~

hence speed drops to a present level.

Initial slowing is provided by the much smoother regenerative braking feature whereby the kinetic energy of the moving parts is convexted to electrical energy and is diverted back into the electrical system.

(c) Torque proving relay The hoist holding brakes will release only when the, motor is energized and providing sufficient torque to prevent shtick produced. by load sag on initiation of the hoisting motion.

This is accomplished through a torque proving xelay which senses armature loop current and delays release of the brakes.

A system to allow the operator to directly limit the load on the crane is in the process of procurement at this time.

The system consists of a load coll load detector with digital readouts and adjustble trip points.

With this system a tr'ip point may be selected slightly above the load to be lifted which, if exceeded, would stop the motor and set the holding brakes.

This system will effectively limit the stress experienced by the hoisting syst'm components and protect the load from load hangup conditions.

Protective devices integral to the electric control circuits which limit the hoist motor torque and thus the load on mechanical components are:

(a) 'Inverse time delay overload relay on MG set A.C. motor This relay is set at 150 percent of full load current and'limits sustained ovex-Zoads

~

.(b) 'Poist motor current limit circuit - This electronic torque limit is set at 200 percent of full load current and represents the upper limit of.torque production of the motox.

This is accomplished with an SCR voltage regulator.

<<5

I

~ I h

(c) Xnstantaneous, overcurrent relay This relay is set to trip at 250 percent of full load current fox the hoist motor and serves as a backup to the limit cixcuit described in (b).

(d) Overspeed switch This mechanical switch is directly coupled to each hoist drive and causes an emergency stop if the drive exceeds 125 percent of rated top.speed in either dixection.

.(e) Operational check circuit This is a backup circuit to the operator whereby should the operator command a stop or reversal of the drive and the drive does got react in a present length of time,'he drive will be automatically stopped.

A procedure was performed during the preopexational testing to establish the ability of each hoist backup br'ake to independently stop a rated load at full lowering speed.

Data from the test indicated that the load was stopped in a distance of l/2 inch fox both the main and auxiliary hoist.

During this test the regenerative braking system was operable while the emergency dynamic braking was disabled.

Protective limit switches prevent overtravel on all crane motions.

Each hoist is provided with both. rotating and counterweight operated limit switches to prevent over hoisting and two-blocking.

The rotating limit switch also prevents overlowering.

No -shock absorbing device is included in the hoisting system.

The bridge and trolley are provided with a set of limit switches which are actuated before reaching the maximum. travel limit switches.

Actuation of these switches automatically limits the speed reference voltage to 25 percent of its full.value.

This provides an automatic slowdown feature which limits deceleration by actuation of maximum'travel limit switches or contact of bumpers with their stnps.

The bridge mounted cab has'complete operating and emergency controls.

A duplicat'e set of controls for all functions except the main hoist is provided on a bridge mounted xetractable pendant.

Selector switches are provided to select either "cab" or "pendant" operation.

Operation from the cab is prevented until the pendant station is raised to the stored position.

An emergency stop switch is provided at both stations.

This activates a

manual-magnetic main power supply contactor that controls the power supply for all motions.'

second and separate contactor, or cixcuit breaker, is provided in the power supply to the main crane feed rails which can be operated by three emergency stop pushbuttons on the operating floor (elevation 664.0).

These pushbuttons are located on column line "P" near each reactor.

Un'.sxvoltage protection ia provided on all drives to sense low,, or loss of control voltage and causes the driven equipment to stop.

Hinimum motor shunt field.protection monit'ors the loss of motox'ield current and stops the respective drive if the motor loses field current.

A monitor is prov'ded to sense phase xevers~lor loss of'one phase of the A.C. power

>>6-

0

supply. If either of these conditions occur, the drive cannot be started, if it is stopped and the drive will be stopped if running.

Hoist motor

" temperature is monitored and an indicating light is located in the cab.

All the crane controls are spring-returned to the "off" position.

. This crane does no't handle individual spent fuel elements and therefore

-does not require motion interlocks.

Incremental movement of hoist, bridge and trolley drives while avoiding

-abrupt changes in motion is provided by. static xeversing.

This is accomplished through static SCR voltage regulators which effect a smooth voltage reversal instead of the'brupt reversal found in magnetic contactox controls.

This eliminates the possibility of plugging and jogging in the usual sense of applying full power (forward or reverse) to promote limited movement.

Each hoist is provided with a load float feature actuated from a thumb switch on the master switch control.

Operation of this switch holds the brake off independent of the hoist or lower switch and limits the speed reference voltage to 25 percent of its full value.

This allows.a load to be accurately positioned (up and/or down) without the shock producing effect of the brakes setting and releasing as the load is maneuvered.

The bridge and trolley are provided with a drift point feature which operates essentially the same as the load float feature described above.

All crine motion drives are equipped with both electrical and mechanical braking systems.

Regenerative braking for normal contxol converts kinetic energy of moving parts into electrical energy which is'diverted back into the electrical system.

Automatic emergency dynamic braking provides

- controlled lowering of the load under conditions of simultaneous failure of ac. power and the mechanical holding.brakes.

Actuation of the emergency stop pushbutton, which opens the main line disconnect switch, will-not deenergize the A.C. motor of the HG set so that regenerative braking for stopping the 'drive will be provided.

The mechanical brakes axe spring-set and electrically released only when the drive motor is energized.

It is possible to release the brakes on the bridge and trolley drives by actuating the drift point switch with the motox'eenergized.

This is not regarded as a safety hazard since.no move-ment of the load is involved in the brake release.

These mechanical brakes have adjustable torque settings and have provision for manual operation; Each drive system has two mechanical brakes with the backup brake being tjmed to set only after the drive motor has stopped.

No drag brakes axe used,and none of these brakes are foot operated.

C Both hoist systems are equipped with two separate gearing

systems, each having a,mechanica'1 brake on the high speed shaft.

Each'bxake is sized and adjusted for 150 percent of the full load motor torque at the poi'nt of application.

The bridge drive consists of one motor and one brake on each girder.

The brake on the'.west girder is set at 50 percent and the one on the east girder is set at 100 percent of the full-load torque of their respective drive motors.

Each trolley drive brake is set at 75 percent of the full-load torqu'e of the drive motor.

t I

I

,0

The maximum full load hoisting speeds are 5.33 FPM for the main hoist and 22.6 FPM for the auxiliary hoist.

The maximum bridge speed is 54.1 FPM and the maximum trolley speed is 30.35 FPM.

The bridge and trolley are equipped with double flange wheels which axe machined to a tolerance of

.010 inch of each'other.

The bridge and trolley drives are not equipped with overspeed detectors but do-have deceleration limit switches and maximum travel limit switches which deenergize the drive motors.

Wheel

stops, spring-type bumpers, and tie-down devices are provided on both the bridge and trolley.

The wire rope reeving system for the main hoist consists of a gxooved hoist drum,.upper and lower sheave blocks, dual wire ropes, and a hydraulic equalizing cylinder.

The auxiliary hoisting system has two part direct or whip style reeving to the grooved drum which requires no lower or upper block..

The two independent auxiliary hoist wire ropes terminate at a crosshead at the hook.

Both drums are provided with catch plates that

'imit drum movement in.the horizontal or vertical direction to 1/4 inch and prevent disengagement from thi bx'aking system should.the drum, shaft, or bearings fail.

Each drum is equipped with guards to prevent the ropes, from leaving the grooves.

The maximum fleet angle from drum to lead sheave is 2.86 degrees.

In the high hook position, the maximum fleet angle between sheaves is 4.18 degrees.

This angle decreases to 3-1/2 degrees within 5 feet'6-1/2 inches of hook travel.

A minimum amount of handling is done near the high hook position.

Componenet alignment was checked using the contractor's design drawings and computations.

Shear bars and/or tapered dowels are used to secure mechanical components and insure proper align-ment.

/

The main hoist wire rope is 1-1/4 inches in diameter and is made of extra improved plow steel.

The construction of this rope is 6 by 37 with an independent wire rope core.

The breaking strength of this rope as published by the manufacturer is-152,000 pounds.

If this is reduced by 15 percent to allow for degradation due to wear'nd exposure,'he maximum hook load which produces a rope load of 10 percent of this reduced rating is 57.7 tons.

This considers parts of line, xeeving efficiency, weight of rope and lower block and allows 15 percent of hook load for dynamic (impact) effects.

Na reverse bends are used in this reeving system.

The ratio of wire rope diameter to lead sheave, intermediate sheave,'qualizing

sheave, and hoist drum diameter is 27.3, 24.1, 20.1, and 49.6 respectively.

The equalizing device is 'a double ended, double acting hydraulic cylinder having a 30-inch stroke with an internal control valve.

This is a modified beam-type equalizer with internal damping; The equalization rate is limited to 6 inches per minute by a velocity fuse arrangement.

The reeving and equalizing systems are designed such that the load shift, caused by a rope failure. is adequately cushioned by the rope elasticity and the equalizing cylinder'.

The vertical alignment shifts so that the load center of gravity 'is under the center of support of. the remaining rope system.

Th'e induced stresses remain well below ultimate values as concluded by testing and analysis by the University of Tennessee Mechanical Engineering Department under contract from TVA (see attached ASME papers

I

No. 76-DE-21 and 76-WA/DE-6).

The result of these tests indicate that, based on handling a 70-ton fuel cask and having one rope to fail in the highest hook position with a fixed equalizing cylinder, the resulting maximum line load would not exceed 43,300 pounds.

Based on the proof loading and conservative design stresses of the wire rope, yield strength and ultimate strength ratio of the wire rope is adequate and will provide the desired margin of rope strength.

Both the head and load blocks have physically separate sheave systems for the two ropes.

Both blocks are equipped with guards to prevent ropes from leaving the sheaves under all operating conditions.

There are two load attachment.points on the load block.

The spent fuel cask is the only load for which the dual attaching points on the load block are used.

The attachment points are 'the sister hook and trunnion.

Each attachment point is capable of supporting three times the maximum critical load.

The auxiliary hoist is not provided with dual load attachment points.

The'hook will support three times its maximum critical load.

Both the, sister hook and auxiliary hoist hook were proof tested to 200 percent of their rated capacity. with subsequent'magnetic particle examination of the main hook and liquid penetrent/radiograph inspection of the auxiliary hook.

The load block was not nondestructively examined by surface or volumetric techniques.

All individual components of both hoisting, systems are capable of supporting a static load of.200 percent of their maximum critical loads.

(For analysis of lifting devices, see response to section 2.1.3.d.)

Trolley and bridge structure are designed for 200 percent and 275 percent of full load motor torque at stall, respectively.

Mechanical components have a design ratio of 5:1 based on the ultimate strength of the material.

With this strength and the electrical control limited torque which can be produced by the hoist drive, resistance to failure of the hoisting. system should a load hangup occur is considered to be adequate.

Emergency repair's can be made in-place due to an extensive inventory of parts,'maintenance manuals furnished by the crane manufacturer, and established maintenance procedures.

Manual operation of the holding brakes on all crane motions will allow for the safe transfer of the load to an appropriate location.

C.. Testing, preventive maintenance, operating manual, and quality assurance.

Extensive acceptance and preoperational testing of the crane after install'ation, along with component tests by the manufacturer',

established the ability of the crane to perform as designed.

Pre-operational tests, No. TVA-21 and No. TVA-21A, describe the procedures and record the results of these tests.

Procedures were provided by the drives and controls subcontractor for testing the instantaneous over-current relays, hoist overspeed

switches, and operational check relays.

mechanical and electrical check list was verified as part of the pre-operational testing along with a set of construction records.

The crane was tested at 100 percent and 125 percent of the design rated

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.load.

Each travel motion was tested with the main hook loaded with the above loads for smooth acceleration and braking, for maximum speeds of all crane motions, and'for minimum movement of all crane motions.

All limit switches and limiting devices were tested for proper functio'ning.

All braking torque values were adjusted to those previously stated and were verified to stop a rated load during a manual load lowering pre-operational test.

Tests not performed were manual movement of bridge and trolley and load hangup.

Frequent 'and periodic inspection requirements have been imposed through TVA NVC PR division procedures manual N74M15 and N78S2.

This crane is continuously maintained at 125-ton main hoist capacity and 5-ton auxiliary hoist capacity which is above the MCL for both.

The crane manufacturer provided electrical and mechanical maintenance manuals specifying lubrication, inspection, and preventive maintenance requirements;

however, an operating manual as described in item 9.0 of NUREG 0554 was not provided.

This crane is listed as a

CSSC item in appendix A of Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Operational Quality Assurance Manual.

Therefore, all inspection, testing, and operational requirements, as listed in the TVA NUC PR division procedures manuals N74M15 and N78S2, are auditable by'UC PR Quality Assurance Staff. '5217 5.04

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'Releosed.for'Oenerol pubiicotion vpo<i'proven)o)ion..

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Mem. ASMa r

Failure Analysis of a Redundant Reeving Hoist

'P v

.r Introduction, The handling of radioactive materials always necessitates spe.

cial safety measures, especially when large quantities ofsuch mate-rials nre involved. The information presented here is the result of the analysis of a redundant reeving system in usc as the main hoisting mechanism ofTcnnessed Valley Authority's reactor build-ing cranes [1l,'lthough the analysis is easily modified for varia-tinns of the basic design. Tho redundant system is intended to pro-vide fall-safe protection of the hoisting system, which at times handles large casks of reactor fuel cle)nenta The rated capacity of tho hoksting system is 125 tons (r>3.5 metric tons). The fail-safe mechanism of this crane is being studied, considering no actual testing of the prototype has been undertaken, and as yet the pri-mary hoisting, mechanism has not failed, leaving the alternative mechanism free from actual duty.

Thc safety feature of this crane )nechanism is the usage ofdou-hle noncrosscd rccving through a fixed crown assembly and a trav-eling lower sheave assembly. The system, shown in Fig. 1, can be visualized as two ii)dividual rope and block assemblies which have been rigidly combined, side by side, such that each rope system carries one. half of the load being hois'ted in normal operations.

The reeving systeln is composed of twelve wire rope lines, six of which will lose load-carrying capacity in the event of failure (t>>eekage) oi'ny one linc. In the event of such a rope failure in this particular syster>, there will be a sudden motion of the lower

'heave assembly plul the connected fuel cask. Tlic intentions ofthe r<<lundrnt systtcn <l<<sign are the cap>)city tn transmit the dynamic

'h);)ds developed, nnd the ability to continue hoisting operations I

) Yumbcls in bra<'bets <Iasignalo References nt end of paper.

"< nlribulcd hy lhe Design Rezh<ce)i<>X f)ivision fov presentation al the I676 l)volga Rngioe< ring Show, Chicago, Aprilf>-8, 1476, of THIIAhIRIII~

AN SOCII;"I'YOF hIRCHANICAI.RIgtilaIRRIIS. htaousctfpt receive<I at o"hl': Iles<I<)<'>a<le)a J)nua<y 6, 1976. 1>e)>er No. 76 DR.21.

C<;>les willbe avoilah)e ue)II Deceml>cr. 1976.

with six working lines.

The method of study undertaken herc is the solution of the dif-forential equations governing the motion of the system in the event of a single component failure. The differential equations arc obtained from the fundamental laws of dynamics. A numerical so lution of the resulting differentiul equations is obtained which yields information concerning the loads in the remaining lines as well as the motion of the traveling block and fuel cask The formu.

Iation of the analysis is of a general nat<ire such that the effects of design changes can be evaluated..

Method ofAnalysis During normal hoisting operations, a 2n-part line symmetrically reeved through the crown and traveling blocks carries the fuel cask and traveling block load. In the event of a single component fail-ure, the total load is shifted from thc 2n lines to n lines; this shift-ing constitutes the fail safe feature of tha system. Although a vari-ety of failure modes is conceivable, it is anticipated that thc most seve're conditions imposed upon the fail-safe components will occur ns a result of an instantaneous failure of a single line. The traveling block will then drop and rotate due to the n remaining lines carrying the load in an unsymmetrical manner. It is desired 1hat the forces in the remaining lines be predicted and that the motion of the traveling block and fuel cask be given.

The description of the geometry is shown in Fig. 2. In this figure, half of thi. symmetrical system is shown in a position subsequent to failure. The fuel cask is attached to the travehng block through a yoke that does not permit movement of the cask relative to tho traveling block in 8-'V plane. tvhcn failure occurs, the motion of.

the system can be drsscribed by noting the position of the traveling block. A reference point on the traveling block in a typical dis-placement is denoted by the parametcn< h, s, nnd 8. Thc remaining'ines have different inclinations and their loacls are difi'eront I'rom these prior to fnilure.

'I'lieequations of)notion can be obtained by applying the laws of dynnn)ice. In thc vertical dircrtion An analysis fs presented of a reeuing arrangement suitable for the hoisting of critical materials requiring fail-safe criteria. The system consists of two independent wire ropes symmetrically threaded through the crown and lover blocks and reeved by o single take-up dnsm. The analysis prouides forthe Iood ir. each line of the luire rope remaining after failure of one rope occurs. The motion of the lower block and load are also prouided %r the uoriety offailure conditions considered. The analysis is use/ul to predict the effect of unrious design parameters on fhe integrity ofsystem in the euent ofa single compone>t t failure.

Discussion o>> this paper will bc acccptcf[ at ASME ETcadqtiartci s 'until lvfay 10, 1976

1

~.

rh t

a e Pal>>>

OISf'rgl t PVPfr(1 j>sITs L

>Oft>>ra c3~

I trrr ">> TftXZ

, ~a'MBgpcf

~ S>>f[rr Ps Pl PS 5

l

PLI, I

C Tf>JL>

l>fG e>'L Flg. 1 Twelve l>ne redundant reeving syslem V

Fig. 2 Typical posl>lon of traveling block and cask mg } Pr cos Tr ~ ma,r" f~>

where the P's are the actual line loads, T's are the angles ofinclina-tion with the vertical of tho lines, m is the mass in motion, nnd a,s" is thc vertical component of the acceleration of the center of gravity. For the horizontal motion g Pf sin Tf ~ ma,s (2) i~1 1'or rotation about the center ofgiavity, the equation is n l n-l (Pr cos Tr + Pr+l cos T;+l) (b~+'cos 0 L sin 8) +

f~rpp 2

'ealN'Pr sinTT+ Pl+i sin Tier) (L cos8+ byt sin0) ~'Isb (3)

. The acceleration of the center of gravity ol the system can be writ tcn in general as a,r a+Lb+I,bz (4)

Tho components in the horizontal and vertical directions are then written ns.

a,a

~ l + I.b cos 0- Lbz sin 0 and a,r" h -I.b sin 0- I,bz cos0 The wire rope can be considered ns n linear spring [2] since the equivalent area and modulus are known. The method of analysis describes the motion from the equilibrium position in which 2n lines support the load equally. It is then convenient to consider thc changes in thc line loads as a result of the subsequent motion due to failure. The line loads at any time can then be expressed as Pr w P+ SPY

. i ~ 1,..., n

>vhere P ~ W/2n and 1V is the total weight being hoistef1.

The load in the wire rope can be written, in general, os P~

>YA where fl ~ uniform tensile stress A w equivalent cross-sectional area (7)

The, relation can be rewritten ifHooke's law, using an equivalent modulus ofelasticity, is applied as bLPA fl>s

~

(3)

L where 8 is tho elongation due tn tho load P and I is the lenglh oi'he rope. For a change in the load due to n change in elongation, the relation Noaroaolarare A

eaaiealeoe crore.eeeeioaal area of <ce to traveling block sheave c ~ distnnro between hcisting drum nnd err>wn block d

f distance bclwccn crown 1>lock nml Ifr>Ve:e>ng 41OCaa I

w equivalent modulus of elasticity of wire rope c ~ distance between crown block and idle sheave

.h

~ vertical disploceinent of traveling block F ~ frictional moment

.1. w distnnco lo renter of moss m w total n>ass w 'number of rcrvcd.line>> in foil safo mechanism P; w lineload r; ~ sheave radius s ~ horizontal displacement of traveling block x ~ piston displacement yr ~ line anglo 8 ~ rotation of traveling block ss; ~ shcavo rotation

. Transactions of the ASME

J I

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Whee% t3 e'r'I c

~

FA hP ~ (hd)

L (9) hfe; ~ hi((~l en h d + l(z sin 0 i ~ 1, 3, 5...;n - I (10)

No'v taking into consideration the rotation of the sheaves as the li<e< ~ elongate, the resulting changes heconle hb(

h -b/sin 0+r( lp( l r(p/

Iodd i even where ro ~ 'radius ofhoisting drum r( ~ radiiofsheaves,i ~ 1 through n

<(o ~ angular rotation OF drum 4; ~ angular rotations ofsheaves,i ~ 1 through n Also from the geometry of Fig. 2, the lengths of the lines between sheaves can be written as c

L,(~(c+d'+h-b/sin0)/cosy(

i~ 1,...,n-l i+I l Odd 2

L~ (d e+ h bn(z sin 0)/cos yn j~ '/2 i even (12) nnd tho angles ofthe line inclination as s+ bl con 0- ao tony( ~

, c+d+h-blsin0 i~2,...,n-l i+1 iodd

~+e ccce ec-tan y( ~

j en d+h d/sin0 i/2.

I even i-1 iodd s+ b/2 cos0-a(2 2

tan yn en h ec..

(13) d C+h - bn(zain 0 i/2 i oven cnn he written.

It is nccessnry to describe thc change in elongation of each line, due to the faiiure, consistent with the rotation of the sheaves in the syrtcm. Th'e elongation changes nre not independent of each other because of the sheave rotation. Considering first the geometry of Fi. 2, which does not illustrate sheave rotation, the change in eh>ngation ofeach line can be written ns P

n (cos y(+ cos y;c l) (d;+l cos

<( L sin ss)

Icz ~ l(l>>

2

+ (sin y(+ sin y(c.l) (b~t sin <ll+ I. cos 4e) 2, AEh n-l (cos y(

cos yl+ls

~

+Z

~

+

') b~(+ cos0-Lsin0)

Ics IrlPP Le Ie(+l jsin y(

sin y(~(i AEsin0

+ (

+

)

ben l Sin 0+ L COS 0)

L(

L(+l Ics cos yl cos ylylw Z

I ds+)'

+ d(c l

') (b(+Icos 0- L sin 0)

( lsp 2

L(

2 Ie(c.l

(

sin yl sin yt+is

+ (di~c.

+bet

) (b;etsin0+Lcos0)

(16)

L(+l 2

~

'n addition to these three differential equations which lnust be solve<i si<nult<u<e<eusly, there are six differential equations oF m<e tion pertaining to the six sheaves which nre free to rotate. For a typical sheave the dynamics nre given by I(A re(P( -P(+l) -F(

i l,...,n (17)

Pnel ~ Cz (20) where C ~ viscous damping k ~ piston velocity This can be rewritten such that where I; n massmomentofinertia r( ~ radius ofsheave F( ~ bearing friction torque Utilizingequations (6), the governing equation for each sheave can be written as r(

F(

4~(hP;-hP(<l)---

l ~ l,...,n (18)

I(

I(

The quantity hPn+l represents the change ofload in the line be-tween the idle sheave (No. n) nnd the equalizing cylinder. The subsequent analysis considers two conditions of operation.of the equalizing cylinder. The first is that in which the cylinder is not free to move. In this case hPn+l is sct equal to hPn which in es-sence is the same as dead. ending the wire rope at sheave No. nl hPn+l hPn

(19)

This should represent the most severe condition on the remaining lines since it removes a length of line that in reality absorbs a por-tion of the energy released at failure. The other condition of the cylinder is obtained when it is free to move and the motion is re-sisted by a force proportional to the piston velocity:

AEsin nb I -g -t sm y(

j~

nl (rl lc(

With theso values of hi(, L, A, nnd E, the change in the line loads can bo obtained from equation (9).

The governing differential equations of motion can then be ob-tained From equations (1)-(3) as r

P "

AFh n cosy; h M I.0 sin 0+ Lbz cos 0-P cos y(.

nl (rl m (r(

L(

i+1 I odd AE sin 0 b;

2

+

s cosy; j ~.,

(14) m

( (L(

'/2 'i even P

n..AEh n sin y(

'I.o cos04 I.e)zsin0- Q siny( p-m( l m;l L(

i+1 i odd 2

(15) i/2 i even hPnc l ~ P(zl<erc 1.0)

(21) where Vc is the piston velocity as (( result of n load P. The actual load in the line is probably somewhere Iri between the values ob-tained from these two cases. Even in this later case, the piston is frco to move only a limited distanco at which time the conttition oi'quation (19) is obtained as the piston bottoms out.

The three equations (14)-(16), representing the gross movement of the trnveling block nnd fuel.cask, along with the six equations (18) of the sheaves de'scribe a system of nine degrees of freedom.

These nine second-otder dlfferentinl equations must be solved si-mul(nncously. Ordinarily, this is no easy task. Howevnr, the system of equations hns been programmed utilizing an IBM developed program designated ns System/360 Continuous System Modeling Pl<<gram (CSMI'). 'I'his progrnm conveniently accomplishes the si.

multaneo<is integration of the describing coupled differential equations, and hence various geometrical chnnges can bo ma<le during tho design of the hoist to investigate tho effect of such pa-rameters.

1

.I<st (<","(I of Engineering for Industry

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eee ~ (It)

>et (515 IKZie Ie ~I (e ~I (4ell I.'Io 4>>n I.l. It.l

~.Oe II.I Iay

).14

).41 II.~

I.~

I<<(Ill)eot Iv,tot I',ovt

<<4.

Ie (l454)

Iy,)04

).,450

<<I. helh (II~ )

I'I,tlt I).440 hill (545

~I,ooe

>I.uo SW I.ll

4. ~

I.l c<<v<<tlto oteene

>teen (t.ot'Ilglth x (cleu(I~I lw>><<h ttei ~ lee litt>(yl.

ltee Cyl.

Nllh ee<<h

~t tv I

>M litt> Cyl, n<<CII Ie, )50 I>,000 I.OI 4.54 il.l 1>.y v

~I,>>xe

~). ~ 50

~ 5,4vXI I.II

).44 0.0 4,4

~I'0

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~ e ~

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"t> 'll)

>ve (llv fn4I (le)

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(le(I

)>,404 I.O>

O.II II.I I ~.I Example Problems The first example is a degenerate case tn cnmpare the results of tile m(thod of analy>>is with a known solution to a simple problem.

Considering a simply supported beam (assumed to be a long slen-der rnd), the reaction at one en(l becomes one. fourth of the weight of the beam an instant after the other support fails<<This problem can be apprnximated in the analysis by setting. the distances to all the sheaves equal, L equal to zero, and writingthe mass moment of inertia as that of a slender rod. The results of the proposed analy-sis yield a reaction of0.30 mg, which is in good agreement. The dif-ference is'attributed primarily to the freedom of the simulated beam to move horizontally as failure occurs while the simply sup-ported beam cannot.

The next example represents the geometry of the fuel handling crane designed by TVAfor use in its nuclear power plants. A typi-cal load of 75 tnns (68 metric tons) is comprised of a loaded fuel cask weighing 70 tons (63.5 metric tons) along. with the 5-ton (4.5 metric ton) traveling block. The reeving arrangement is a twelve-pnrt line. During nor)nal operation the traveling block moves through a distance of approximately 100 ft (30.5 m). In the high hook position, the distance between the crown block and the trav-eling block (d in Fig. 2) is 56 in. (1.4 m). This distance in.the low hook position is 1319 in. (33.6 m).

Results haec been obtained for a ftictionless system and a fixed equalizing cylinder. These are shown in Table 1 for several hook positions ofthe hoist.

The condition of failure represented herc is a stationary failuy

~

i.c., the load is stationary and Eailure ofa single component occurs, shifting the total lnad fo the six remaining lines. Since the kinetfc c>>orgy associated with the hoisting operation is small in cumpari.

son'o the energy released at failure, the stationary failure is a very good approximation of the maximum loads to be expected. The value of 12,500 lb (5676 kg)'s the nnminal twelve.part line load prie 0 tn failure. Of course, n doubling of the line load would be ex.

pcct(vi'as a result nf having half the original number of lines carry-ing the tntal load. The actual increase set)ns to be approaching the cnn(iitinns ofn double ln)ul heing suddenly oppli0(l to a slender bai fixed at one end.

11, is cl>>at that the drop of the traveling block and ca>>k is nnt() lif)ear function of the line length (honk position).

A third example utilizing the same geometry as before incorpo-rates the free movemcnt at thc equalizing cylinder into the re-sponse due to a single cnmponent failure. Here a total weight of70 tons (63.5 metric tons) is stationary at the instant of failure. The results are shown in'Table 2 along with those for a fixed cylinder CM<<tel<< (<<ttl<<<<ltn ~ (0.0ne)(lo)I'1

'(4 ~ le)(l1) v conditio'n. Thc action of the c(fualizing cylinder (liminishes the value of the maximum load, as would be expected since it absorbs a portion of the released energy. Included in the drop of the block, for the free cylinder condition, is a distance nl'2.50 in. (6.4 cm) due to the 15 in. (0.38m) free travel ofthe cylinder.

'omparing the maximum line load for the lixed equalizing cyl ~

inder conditions in Tables 1 and 2 indicates that it is proportional to the hoisted weight. The frequencies of coupled motions are also available from the results, of the analysis. Three predominate modes are the vertical and the twn pendulns modes assnciated'with the double pendulum compri))ed of the long lines and the traveling block and the Euel cask. The two pendulu>> mode are characterized by a short period for tbe rotation oE the block, 0, and n long period associated with the y's sweeping through their range ofvalues. The vertical mode is closely approximated by the simple spring-mass system of the six wire ropes and total mass combination.

Conctus)ona The results of this effort indicate that a method of analysis util-izing the basic Eundamental>> of dynamics and the CSMP program has been developed to permit the response of a fail.safe hoist de.

sign to be predicted. Clearly the method of analysis can be use(1 lo facilitate the design of such a hoist as the effect of each parameter is investigated.

A subsequent paper will present the results of an experimental program which correlates with'the results of analysis prcsentcd here.

Acknowieilgment This work was'completed under Contract No. TV-41303A be-tween Tennessee Valley Authority and the University of Tenne>>-

see, Knoxville.

Iteferences 1

Pdmcl)d<<en, A.J., Melee(0, R. A.~ "Ansfyof~ >Iud MwlclTesting nf a lhe ~

(fondant Reeving Syx(0m for f(OOC(or Fuel Hen(fling Cranes," lb port hfAR.

6628 1 ~ Depsytmont uf hfechaniesl e))d Ae(ohpace El)gineeying, The Univey.

sity ofTennessee.

Knoxville,Tenn., Aug. 1976.

2 Sam(as, R. K., Skop, R. A., and.hfilbu(n, D. A.~ "An Analysis of Cou.

pled Extensional-Torsional O)elffa(fons in 1Vi(e ftope,<<JOURNAL OP EN-GINFER1NG FOR lNDUSTRY.TRANS. AShfE, Series 8, Vof. 96, No. 4, Nov. 1974, pp.'130-1136.

f'if>>(Odin (l. S. A.

v

'Transactions of the ASME

e r.

u.

, $3.00'PER COPY

$1.50 TO ASME MEMBERS I

I r

I v

y The Society shall nol be responsible tor statements or opinion,

" advanced In papers or In discussion at meetings ol thu Society or ol iu, Divisions or Sections, or printed in its publications. Discussionis prints <<

onlyillhe paper is published in on ASMEjournal or Proceedings.

Released tor general publication upon presentation.

Full credit should be given to ASME. the Technical Division,.and th~

author(s).

Dynamic Testing of a Redundant Reeving. Hoist A. J. EDMONDSON Associate Professor, Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tenn.

Mem. ASME R. A. MOORE Design EngIneer, VlnylexCorporation, Knoxville,Tenn.

Controlled failures in a redundant reeved hoist are caused in one ol two independent wire ropes symmetrically threaded through the crown and lower blocks. The forces in tlu

~

remaining lines are recorded by transducers integral to the lines. The line loads and motion subsequent to the failure are compared with those predicted by theoretical analysis. Failutr.

is caused during a variety of operating modes.

Contributed by the Design Engineering Division of The American Society of Mechanical Engineers for presentation at the IViuter Annual Meeting, New York, N; Y., December 5, 1976. Manuscript received ut ASME Headquarters July 6, 1976.

Copies wiltbe available until September 1, 1977.

I

.".i"MICAH SOCIETY OF MECHANICALENGINEERS, UNITED ENGINFERING CENTER, 345 EAST 47th STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 1GOIT

i 0

1

I GQAB97llc TesCIAg Gf 8 RBdUAdGAi A88vilAQ HGlsi A. J. EDMONDSON R. A. MOORE INTRODUCTION The.handling of radioact1ve materials always necessitates special safety measures,,especially when large quantities of such materials are in-volved.

The information presented here is the result of the study of a redundant reeving system 1n use as the main hoisting mechanism" of Tennes-see Valley Author1ty~s reactor building cranes p, although the results are easily modif1ed for vari-ations of the bas1c design.

The redundant system 1s intended to provide fail-safe protection of the hoisting system which, at times, handles largo casks of reactor fuel elements.

The rated capacity of the hoisting system is l25 tons (1.112 MN).

The fa11-safe mechan1sm of this crane is being studied, considering no actual testing of the prototype has been undertaken

and,

's yet, the primary ho1sting mechanism has not failed, leaving the alternative mechan1sm free from actual duty.

Thc safety 'feature of this crane mechanism 1s the usage of double noncrossed reeving through a fixed crown assembly and a travel1ng lower sheave assembly.

The system, shown in Pig. l, can be v1sualized as two individual rope and block assemblies which have been rigidly com-bined, side by side, such that each rope system carries one-half of. the load being hoisted in normal operations.

The reeving system is com-posed of twelve wire rope lines, six of which w111 lose load carryin'g capacity in the event of fail-ure (b'reakage) of any one line.

In the event of such a rope failure in th1s particular system, hi rc will be a sudden motion of the lower sheave assembly and the connected fuel cask.

The inten-tions nf the redundant system design are the ca-pac1ty to tran:mit the dynamic loads developed, and the ab111 y to continue hoisting operations Edmondson, A ~ J,,

and Moore, R, A,,

'ua ysis and Model Testing of a Redundant Reev1ng

t.':m for Reactor Pucl 'Handling Cranes,"

Report

-6628-1,"Department, of Mechanical and Aexo-

,, " ':. Enginecring, Thc Universigy of Tennessee,

~13.1e, Tenn.,

Aug..1975.

~

~,

with six working lines.

The study undertaken was comprised of two parts.

The first part consisting of the theoret-1cal analysis was reported earlier.

This paper relates to the experimental program, its results and comps'risons with the theoretical predictions of the earlier reported work.

The effort waS directed toward determining the line loads and motions of the moving mass.

The system is illus-trated in the failed condition in Pig. 2. It J

should be noted Chat parameters of the motion, h, s, and 0, are referenced at the intersection of the traveling block sheave axis and the verti-cal center-line of the symmetrical reeving sys-tem.

Also, the fuel cask is attached to the trav-eling block through a yoke that does not permit movement of the cask relative to the traveling block 1n the H-V plane EXPERIMENTAI PROGRAM The experimental program for testing the hoisting system by controlled single component failure began by us1ng the prototype design.

The prototype crane has two individual wire rope sys-tems composing a l2-line hoisting block.

The ho1st drum takes up the 11ne from each half of the system when operating.

.At thc dead end of each wire rope, a double acting, hydraulic equal-1zing cylinder provides for equal line loads in both sides of'he system under normal operating conditions.

The prototype wire ropes are l 1/4 in. (3.17 cm) dia, 6 x 37, extra improved plow

steel, IWRC.

The sheaves of the crown and trav-eling blocks are forged steel and have pitch d1-amctcrs of 30 lpga in. (0.76 m) and 30 l/8 in.

(0.86 m) ~

The maximum travel distance of the lower block is 130 ft (39.62 m).

Edmondson, A. J., "Pailure Analysis of a Redundant Reeving Hoist,"

ASME Paper No. 76-DE-2l, April 1976, (To.be published in Transaction of the ASME, Journal of Engineering f'r Industry).

I L

'l

Sheet Y7&'I 0 RQI)lP)YSkN Nltl llOlST DRUi1 liolST lWG C5(SIIIG~

CRORi'l BLOCK TCNIt:P PG Pl P3 5

L Fakes" S

C: TRAV 1 lG Bk)

Fig.

1 Twelve line redundant reeving system Y

Fig.

2 Typical position of'raveling block and cask Vslng the foregoing inf'ormation and consid-ering thc availability of components portinent to th>> systnn, a scale factor of one-fifth was so-lectcd for the model design.

Exact scaling could not always be achieved without excessive costs for-exactly scaled components, yet little devia-tion was actually 1nvolved.

The resulting model is illustrated in Fig. 3.

The block assemblies werc functionally and dimens1onally similar to the p ototypc design.

The ma/or dev1at1on fran thc prototype design was the omission of bronze bushings. in the model sheaves.

More friction was chercfozc inherent, on a percentage basis to the model asscmbllcs.

Pire rope of the model system

as a'pga in. (0.63 cm) dia, 6 x 3'f, improved ow steel, 1WHC compos1tion, which is the same

..-.Cructlon as the prototype.

This resulted 1n

~

'. cozrclation of the flexibilitybetween the and prototypi:.

'"ho location of the hoitt was such that a

".ai travel di"tance of 18 ft (5.48 m) was

,'ale.. Thc des1red scale distance would bc

(.92 m).

The high hook position of the

":pe is such that d'tance between the cen-

'I tezlincs of thc crown and traveling blocks is 56 in. (1.42 m).

This position during the tests was modeled at 23.5 in. (0.59 rp) which would cor-respond to 117.5 in. (2.98 m) on the prototype.

The distance between block centerlines for the low hook'osition of the prototype 1s 1319 in.

(33.5 m).

The model was tested in a low'ook po-sition of 206 in. (5.23 m) which would correspond to a prototype distance of 1030 in.

( 26.16 m).

Thus, the actual testing was conducted at posi-.

tions within the prototype high and low hook, positions.

An Xngersoll-Hand tiodel C aiz powered ho'1st

, was modified to accommodate two 11ncs component of the system.

The unmodified hoist was rated at a capacity of 2000 lb (8896 N) for a double line reev1ng arrangement, resulting in nominal line loads of 1000 lb (4448 N).

Since,the model tosts were conducted with nom1nal 11nc loads of ap-proximately 100 lb (444.8 N), thc braking mecha-nism of the hoist was deemed adequate to produce an abrupt halt to the hoist1ng opezation when test conditions nec'essitated it.

~)

0

l,ONER BlOCK ASSMLY 6-9/16 Itt. (16.7 CIO

, RIGID LltlK

. 6-1/16 ll. (15.4 Ql)

IIAR'IESS-Q-V2 It ~ (29.2 CH) ling r le Fig. 4 Transient line loads 36 Itt. (91.4 00 FUEL CASK t

Fig. 3 Lower block.with harness, safety links, and fuel cask

cession, the remaining strands fail.

The most severe case would be expected in the event of a complete instantaneous failure of all strands simultaneously.

This type failure would result ln a more suddenly applied load to the remaining six lines of the reeving syst'em and, hence, great-er dynamic loads.

A quick disconnect hydraulic coupling provided the mechanism by which instan-taneous line separations were achieved.

The coupling was easily integrated into the failure side of thc reeving system by using spelter sockets.

The coupling vas placed in the reeving system ln the line to the. hoist drum opposite a

load cell ln the redundant hoist line.

'he scaled load cylinder, or model fuel

cask, was fabricated from a 13-in., ( 0.33-m) inner diameter steel pipe, 36 in. (0.91 rn) long.

The ends of the pipe were capped with 3/8 ln. (0.95 cm) steel plate, and a harness vas welded-to the pipe.

The harness was a rigid steel channel as-sembly.

The tvo rigid bar connect'ing the travel-ing block and the fuel cask harness on each side restrain the fuel cask from any motion relative to the lower block in the plane containing the axis of.the sheaves

.and the vertical axis of the fuel cask..

The rigid links are redundant safety

'I corrrrections as a protection in the event of a hook fa/lure.

Por the model testing, the niodel fuel ca..k vas loaded'with lead and steel.

Loads used for testing vere 1000 lb (4448 N) and 1361 lb (6054 !I).

Por controlled failure tooting, a single component failure raust occur at'command; The de-

'I;ormination of maximum linc loads vao 'thy prime

~ blcctlvc of. the testing.

Pailure of a:stranded aire rope lo usually a gradual breakage.

One

~ r:rwrd o('ireo vill onap, and then in rapid suc-Xnstrumentation

~ Of primary concern was a technique to meas-ure the dynamic loads in the wire ropes after a failure of one-half of the redundant system.

Load cells made of 2014-T6 aluminum vere developed such that a cell could bc inserted. into various positions along the wire rope length.

The hollow aluminum tube was instrumented with four foil strain gages in a full Wheatotone Bridge, to pro-vide temperature compensation and sensitivity to axial loads only.

Spelter sockets were developed to accommodate the broomed out cnd of the 1/4-1n.

wire rope so that the load cell', as well as the disconnect coupling, could be inscrtod into the line.

The broomed-out end of the wire rope was held in the spelter socket with a 90/10 zinc/tin compound poured at approximately 300 F.

Considering the six remaining lines and the oscillation following a single component failure, the n!aximum load at any instant would be either ln the hoisting line, at the inside of the reeving system, or ln tho opposite end of the rope, the equalizing cylinder line at the outside of the

I 0

ll

I c

r Table 1

Experimental Line.Loads in Pounds Lov Hook Position; t(eight ~ 1000 Pounds Table 2

Experimental Line Loads 1n Pounds High Hook Pos1tion; Height 1000 Pounds Iojotrnd Ctvc'llrln4 Crrrndcr I

I ltvclltlod Cylinder po rane rona 6

intr, rect.

Salt.

rccx.

Iolotral Ktvoltcrat Crrrnror roacttoncl Staarittol Crrrndcr not rvacttonol

$6 24 lait

rect, lait

rtcx, lolt.

Kc~,

lait rtox nova Stop lt~tla Vp Coot

$5 40 40 75 40 I'1 SO 74 IS

$0 100 95 251 251 2I4 19$

264 241 150 210

$0 21$

IS 210 40 20$

4$

20$

75 1$0 70 1$ 5 170 70 110 17570 11S

'210 95

.2$5 ll1 95110 121 10S 211 70 210 95 70 20$

95 70 700 95 250 25$

260 IS 750

$0

$ 5 25$

.40 7$

20$

60 170 Srs 11$

90

" 260 75

$ 5 261 7$

90 26545 210 110 20$

75 215 100 250 IS 212 90 265 7S 140 100 "240 Stalin

~ 5 Cp Coot 105 Stop 110 Oovn Cont 75 IO Oova Stop 7$

40 1$$

1$5 21$

701 210 22$

250 100 215 10S 212

$0 190 100 110 100 200 40 10$

214 105 10$

2$$

90

'19$

IS 90 7$

IS 211100 10l 225100 10$

12c 95 200 22$

.95 '00 75 195 110 105 22570 200 70 200 75195 105 225 40 Vp Stop 100

'00 265 26$

7$

110 7$

210 9$

2SI 70 95 252 71 100 261 70 212 272 212 Coarororoa Sottoror rr v (6 ~ 464) (Sji)

Coavoroloa lactorot rt o (6 664) (2'bv) reeving system.

Zn view of this ~ only two load cells were deemed necessary for the entire system to determine the max1mum dynamic loads in ten-sion.

Thc tvo load transducers vere cal1brated and showed sensitivities of 9.15 and 9.24 micro-inch/in. pcr 10 lb (44.48 N) axial load, respec<<

tively.

Hach transducer was connected to a Honey-well 'Accudata 238 Bridge Amplif1err such that the bridge output could, be recorded on a Model 2106 oscillograph equ1pped vith M1650 fluid damped g.".lvanometers.

~ The test1ng of the system was by controlled

.,tlure.

por an accurate

record, an indication o." the time of rope failure vas recorded on the oscillograph record.

The timing mark vas made from a third galvanometer

trace, which responded to a s1nglc from a dry cell battery in series with a switch fixed to the quick disconnect mecha-

nism, Switching was also developed to sense when

,the. equalizing cylinder bottomed out at the end of its free movement.

The Model 2106 oscillograph prodides an accurate internal timing system to record reference timel1nes across the paper width at predet;ermined invervals.

Prior to testing, the timing circuits were calibrated using appro-

~ iat: t:imcrcountcrs.

Timing intervals of 1/lO

ec werc used.

~r'roceduI't 7<<v:xp rim:ntai testing of t;he model sys-

." Si "prcific fuel cask load and elevation

.!v.".aken for fi;e d1ffercnt hoist1ng condi-

~ c'. c"lch (if two modes of operat1on of thc equalizing cylinder.

The cylinder was controlled to either float freely or rema1n stationary.

The hoist1ng conditions were:

1 Upward travel init1ally with continued travel during and after rope failure 2

Upward travel 1nitially and immediate stop at the instant of rope failure No vcx'tical travel 4

Downward travel initiallywith continued travel during and after rope failure 5

Downward travel 1nitially and immediate stop at the 1nstant'f rope failure.

The 1mmediate stop of vertical travel was an op-erator response

and, 1n general, occurred within 1 sec after the rope failure.

Ho1sting velocities were measured, by stopwatch and meterst1ck as 0.95 1n./sec

(?.4 cm/sec) traveling dovn, and 0.83 1n./scc (2.1 cm/sec) travel1ng up.

RESULTS AND COMPARISONS The dynam1c 11ne loads of the model system were recorded by the oscillography for each fail-ure condit;ion.

The hoist line, Pl, and the equal-izing cylinder line load, P6, were monitored.

A typical record is shovn in Pig. 4.

The initial and average maximum loads indicated by the oscil-lograph traces have been tabulated in Tables 1

and 2.

The variat1on from the average 1s normal-ly less than 10 percent.

The presence of fric-tion in thc model is not;iccable, as well as the tight and loose side characteristics of frict,ional power transmission.

Upon hoisting up, the ho1st linc lcprescnts the tight.'ide where the equal-izing cylirtder linc 1s t'ight upon hoisting dovn.

~ p

Sheet 20 o4')

Table 5

Axial Linc Loads Comparison with Theoretical Values Weight

<o 1000 pounds Lov Rooc 705rtloh Table rr Axial Line Loads Fixed and Free Equal-izing Cyl1ndcr lOV RIOR tOSITlON Rolstlna ln ac tea x

>>>>i>>>>

toll, a<ax Max.

Rol ~tlol Rtosllalst Cyrtrnrcc toncttsnst I

lnlt a<ax>>

mat ~

rr>>a Stoslrarnc Cytlncst r<ot conc tonal i

lace.

rc>>x.

loca.

rc>>x 70 2OI 95 rla IS 245 74$

Oo>><o Cont>>

~

41 1IS

~ 74 270 70 205 94 254 Stationary Op Coat Ct Scop 7S 11597 154 45244 Sll 41, 270 I$

115 4$

1l5 2lS 91 241 71 204 41 2452\\5 97 2$ 7 71 215 CS lty 747 271 44 212 41 1$0 2ll 7$

15$

91, 241 Stationary 41 4$

225 71 20il Coat 94.

Op SCop 100 245 75 210 97 157 7l ill Oo>><a SCop 74 215 100 211 7$

1iS 97 2$4 lCR RIOR tOSlclOR

Conc, 50 190 100 250 I$

754 14l IO 1OS 10$

2$$

IS

$04

$04 ll 11595 20l 5$

254 244 Cont 10$

21$

IO 14$

l$

144 254 104 224 71200 5$

$04

$0l Stop r ~tronsay p 5aop Ssr>>arras tal Tncoratccal t

lo) tl lal tl rl Rolotlnl lace ~

less.

~ at test>>

laic>>

"ox>>

i<ax Coat ~

Scop cstlonsrt p Cont ~

Scop

'RICO 'ROOX tOS TTOR Rtoarrarot Cyllalst to<>>c cons f>>toaltarna Cylra>>roc Noc t>>>>nctlona lotC.

l'ox.

lott.

tt>>x 40 190 100 2$0 IO '05 10$

25$

~ 4 225 ll 201 74 1I5 107 214 7I 114 105209 IS 270 10$

21S 110 250 90 195 75 1'75105 21S 40 14$

7$

195 104 274 75200 conxacoron lactacac rc (4'44) (SI>>)

Conxocolon raccocaa N o (4>>44 ~)

(1 ~ >>)

t should be noted that the failure from a sta-greater percentage of the energy released at tionaly.pos1tion represents a very good approxi- 'ailure, thus requir1ng the lines to absorb less mation of response, during moving failures, since energy in the high hook posit1on.

the kinct1c energy of the moving mass, prior to'fthe five failure cond1tions 1llustrated, failure, is small in compar1son to the energy re-the down continuous, stationary, and thc up con-lrascd during failure of a single, wire rope.

tinuous are all theoretically cqulvalent.

The For a comparison with the theoretical val-two stopped condit1ons xepresent a slightly high-ucs, the average of the maximum loads in each ex energy level and, hence, greater line loads.

l1ne for a spec1flc fa1lure mode, cqualls1ng cyl-Since the k1net1c energy of the moving wc1ght, is irldcr fixed, has been tabulated along with the small in comparison with thc energy released upon

~

theoretical values in Table 3.

Th1s was the'most failure, it is hardly noticeable 1n the cxperi-sevcre failure cond1tion and the maximum line mental line loads.

loads that werc obseryed in all of the tests.

'able r) illustrates the comparison between Thc difference between the theoretical values of the two conditions of fixed and free equal1zing pl and P6 is very slight, and is a result of the cylinder conditions. It would be expected that:

assumptions of a frictionless system in the analy>>>>

the line loads 1n t;he free cylinder condition six, as well as sheaves w1th small moments of in>>>>

would be less than those for a fixed cylinder

<<7 tea.

An averag<

of the experimental values of condition.

,This is because the equalizing cyl1n-

, l land P6'ives a value less than the predicted der 1s an energy absorber.

From the comparisons

~

value, and is 1n very good agreement with the this 1s 'generally borne out.

However, even though pra;dict;cd values of the low hook pos1tion.. In thc loads are generally lower, they are not s1g-che rase of thc high hook position> the predicted niflcantly so..The free cylinder traveled ap-

a.'..1.S aro Signifceantly higher tlSan thOSe aCtu-prOXimately ) 1/8 in. (7.9)

Cm) befOre it bOttOmed a.t.ty

<! ".'crmincd in the tests.

It appears that out.

r

~

~

~

rr,ion is

.= more significant. factor 1n 'the high When tests were conduct;cd at a total weight

. ~, Fn itton t;han irl thc low'hook position.

For of 1361 lb (605rr ll), the results indicated that

>.utt:rant va)uc of friction, it rcprcscnts a

the linc loads arc a linear function of tlat t,'otal

Shmt Zl o+ (-I weight.

The average value of 'Pl and P6 for the fixed cylinder, stationary failure mode was 512 lb (1588 N), compared wi,th the value of 228 lb (1014 N) for thc 1000 lb (4448 N) weight.

Prom the information plesented in Tables 3

and 4, it can be concluded that thc line loads con be predicted; duc to a single 'component fail-ure, by the previously reported method of analy-

sis, and that. the action of the equalizing cylin-der does not significantly affect the maximum lin(t loads developed.

Xn addition to the line loads, the periods of several oscillations of the system were identi-fied from the oscillograph records.

These modes of vibration are the vertical and the double-pendulum.

The Vertical mode is associated with the stif'fness of the wire ropes and the suspended

)nasa.

The period of this. motion for the low hook position is 0.151 sec

~

The theoretical analysis predicts a value of 0.107 sec.

The double pendu-lus motion is-a result of the suspended cask at the cnd of a long line.

The period of the lower pendulum is 0.689 sec, compared with a value of 0.597 sec from the theoretical analysis predicts a value of 4.64 sec.

One mode of vibration which was observed to occur that was not predicted by the theoreti-cal analysis was a rotation of the cask about the vortical axis.

This mode is that of a hexa-filar pendulum that is.activated when the load is no longer symmetrically sttpported by twelve lines.

CONCLUSIONS Nook roattton Table 5

Ltna Load Ltoa Load nax I

h a

d tn tn da )

too (t)ld tn)

Sl 000

5) ~ 000

~ 06 6 dl lS 1

14.5 aad.

Sou (1010) 5)al00 Sraloo 1.5) 6.04 15.5 1).l

~ad ~ htth (lid) 1 ~,600 Sd ~ 600 5.16 1,60 11 d

t,d tch (Sd) 45,%00 45.d00 '

Stadt 1

%1 0 d 1

Convaraton tacrorat narara (0.0154)(tn)t N

(4 440)(lh)

ACKNONLEDOHENT This work was completed under Contract No.

TV-41503A between Tennessee Valley Autholity and the University-of Tennessee, Yuoxville.

dicate that the theoretical analysis is valid in predicting the maximum line loads in the event of a single component failure'.

The program has been used to predict the loads in the prototype design for a variety of conditions The most significant are present here.

Using a weight of 10,000 lb (44.48 kN) for the traveling block, and a weight of 140,000 lb (622.7 kN) for the caska the maximum line loads, the average line load and the motion of the sys-tem, for a fixed equalizing cylinder, are given in Table 5.

The nominal 12 line load is 12,500 lb (55a6 kN).

The results presented in the foregoing in-

ATTACHMENT 2 Heavy Load/impact Area Matrix

T.IPTING DEVICE:

125 TON 0 CRANE SHEET 1

OP 28 LOCATION REACTOR BUILDING IMPACT AREA REFUELING FLOOR LOADS

.COL R.

8 R4, Rll, AND R18 ELEVATION SAPETX RELATED HAZARD'LIM.

~ EQUXPHCNT ATEGORY(NOTE 1 ELEVATION'APETY RELATED EQUIPMENT HAZARD ELIM.

CATEGORY (NOTE1)

REACTOR MELL SHIELD. BLOCKS (99. 5 'TONS)

.664.0 DRYICELL HEAD DRYMELL HEAD (65 TONS) 635.0'EACTOR

'RESSURE VESSEL HEAD

LOCATION

- LIFTING.DEVICE'25 TON EAD CRANE SHEET 2 OF 28 IMPACT AREA REFUELING FLOOR LOADS COL R 8 R4, Rll, AND R18 ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED HAZARD ELIM.

EQUIPMENT ATEGORY(NOTE1 ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT HAZARD ELIM.

CATEGORY (NOTE1)

REACTOR PRESSURE V.ESSEL HEAD (105 TONS) 664.O' STEAM DRYER

. ASSEMBLY 664.0'EACTOR VESSEL INTERNALS STEAM DRYER

~ASSEMBLY (45 TONS) 664.0'EACTOR VESSEL INTERNALS

LOCATION LIFTING DEVICE'25 TON 0 AD CRANE REACTOR BUILDING SHEET 3 OF 28 LOADS IMPACT AREA REFUELING FLOOR COL R 8 R10, R5, HAND. R17 ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT HAZARD HLIM.

ATEGORY(NOTEl ELEVATION SAFETY. RELATED EQUIPMENT HAZARD ELIM.

CATEGORY(NOTEl)

REFUELING SLOT SHIELD PLUGS (5-1/2 TONS) 664.0' REACTOR

'.:'VESSEL INTERNALS 664.0'PENT FUEL IN POOL REFUELING CANAL SHIELD (12 TONS) 664.0'.

REACTOR VESSEL INTERNALS.

~

664.0'PENT FUEL IN POOL

0 LOCATION

.LXFTXNG DEVICE:

125 TO HEAD CRANE REACTOR BUILDING SHEET 4

OF 28 LOADS IMPACT AREA REFUELING FLOOR COL R (t R4, Rll, AND R18 MOISTURE SEPARATER ASSEMBLY (70 TONS)

ELEVATION 664.0'AFETY RELATED.

EQUIPMENT REACTOR VESSEL INTERNALS HAZARD ELIM.

ATEGORY(NOTEl ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT HAZARD ELIM.

CATEGORY(NOTEl)

REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL HEAD INSULATION PACKAGE (4 TONS)'64.0'EACTOR VESSEL INTERNALS D

ll y,

~ ~

i 1

I

LIFTXNG DEVICE:

125 TON EAD CRANE SHEET 5 OF 28 LOCATION REACTOR 3UILDXNG IMPACT AREA REFUELING FLOOR R 8 R4, Rll, AND R18 LOADS ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED

.EQUIPMENT HAZARD ELIM.

ATEGORY (NOTE1 ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED HAZARD ELIM.

EQUIPMENT CATEGORY(NOTE1)

STUD TENSIONER CAROUSEL 664.0'PV HEAD SPENT FUEL IN POOL RPV SERVICE PLATFORM AND SUPPORT (7 TONS) 664.0 I REACTOR VESSEL XNTERNALS D

1 j

4 4

LOCATION LIFTING DEVICE:

125-TON EAD CRANE REACTOR BUILDING SHEET 6 OF 28 IMPACT AREA REFUELING FLOOR R 8 R9, R6, AND R16 LOADS ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT HAZARD ELIM.

ATEGORY(NOTE 1 ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT HAZARD ELIM.

CATEGORY(NOTE1)

SPENT FUEL CASK (67 TONS) 664.0'PENT FUEL IN POOL D'ORTABLE JIB CRANE 664.0'PENT FUEL IN POOL

LIFTXNG DEVICE:

125 TON.0 AD CRANE SHEET 7

OF 28 LOCATION REACTOR BUILDING IMPACT AREA REFUELING FLOOR col R 8 R4; Rll, AND R18 REFUELING FLOOR COL R 8 R4, Rll AND R18 LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD ELIM.

ELEVATION -

.EQUIPMENT ATEGORY(NOTEl ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT HAZARD ELIM.

CATEGORY(NOTEl)

NEN FUEL ASSEMBLY.

(1000 LBS) 664.0'EACTOR

. VESSEL

'NTERNALS FUEL POOL GATES (2 TONS) 664.0'PENT FUEL IN POOL

'I

~

g

0 LOCATION LIFTING DEVICE 125 TON P REACTOR BUILDING SHEET 8 OF 28 IMPACT AREA

'REFUELING FLOOR COL R 8 R6, R9$

R16 LOADS NEW FUEL STORAGE VAULT COVER (8500 LBS.)

ELEVATION

=

664.0'AFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT SPENT FUEL IN POOL HAZARD ELIM."

ATEGORY (NOTE 1 ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT HAZARD ELIM.

CATEGORY (NOTE1)

I I,

~

s 0

LIFTING DE>ICE:

TWO-OPE SELF PROPELLED TRUCKCRANE SHEET 9

OF LOCATION 4

LMPACT AREA DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING ROOF (UNITS 1

6 2)

DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING ROOF (UNIT 3)

LOADS ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED HAZARD ELIM.

EQUIPMENT ATEGORY(NOTE1 ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT HAZARD ELIM.

CATEGORY(NOTE1)

REACTOR BUILDING EXHAUST FAN MOTORS (1700 LBS) 595;0'95.0'95.0'G AIR INTAKE

. DG AIR EXHAUST DG AIR INTAKE FILTER B

(SEE NOTE 2)

B (SEE NOTE 2)

B (SEE NOTE 2) 595.0'95 0

595.0'G AIR INTAKE DG AIR EXHAUST DG AIR INTAKE FILTER B

"(SEE NOTE 2).

.B (SEE NOTE 2)

(SEE NOTE 2)

r, I

"I

LOCATION LIFTING DEVICE:

TWO OPE SELF PROPELLED TRUCK CRANE I '

YARD SHEET 10 8

IMPACT AREA DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING ROOF (UNIT 3)

LOADS ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT HAZARD ELIM.

ATEGORY(NOTE1 ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED HAZARD ELIM.

EQUIPMENT CATEGORY(NOTE1)

REACTOR BUILDING EXHAUST FAN

>jOTORS (1700 LBS) 595.0 DG A/C CHILLED WATER PANEL NO.

25-284B DG A/C 595.0HILLED WATER

PANEL'O.

25.-2844 (SEE NOTE 3)

B (SEE NOTE 3) 595 Os DG A/C CHILLED WATER PANEL NO.

25-284C (SEE NOTE 3)

REACTOR BUILDING EXHAUST FAN

MOTORS, (1700 LBS) 595.0'G A/C CHILLED WATER PANEL NO.

250284 D

(SEE NOTE 3)

.LOCATION

. LIFTING DEVICE:

TWO OPE SELP PROPELLED TRUCK CRANE

YARD, l

SHEET ll 8

IMPACT AREA

.. INTAKE PUMPING STATION LOADS CONDENSER CIRCULATING WATER PUMPS, (CCW)

(40,700 LBS)

ELEVATION 565.0'APETY RELATED

. EQUIPMENT RHRSW PUMPS HAZARD ELIM.

ATEGORY(NOTE 1 B

(SEE NOTE 4)

ELEVATION SAPETY RELATED EQUIPMFNT HAZARD ELIH.

CATEGORY(NOTEl)

CCW PUMP MOTORS (48,700 LBS) 565.0'HRSW PUMPS B

SEE NOTE 4)

LIFTING DFVICE:

TWO-OPE SELF PROPELLED TRUCK C SHEET l2 0 LOCATION IMPACT AREA INTAKE PUMPING STATION DECK LOADS ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT HAZARD ELIM.

ATEGORY(NOTE 1 ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT HAZARD ELIM CATEGORY(NOTEl)

FIRE PUMPS (2530 LBS) 565.0

~

RHRSW

~ PUMPS B

(SEE NOTE 4)

RHRSW PUMP (3400 LBS) 565 0 RHRSW PUMPS C

(SEE NOTE 5)

0 5

LIFTING DEVICE' TON HO E CHAIN IIOIST SHEET 13 OF LOCATION REACTOR BUILDING - UNIT 1:

IMPACT AREA CORE SPRAY (CS)

ROOM COL N 8 R2 CORE SPRAY (CS)

ROOM COL N 8 R2 LOADS ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED HAZARD ELIM.

.EQUIPMENT ATEGORY(NOTE1 ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT HAZARD ELIM.

CATEGORY(NOTE1)

CORE SPRAY PUMP.. MOTOR (5200 LBS) 519.0'19:0

'19.0

'.S.

PUMP.

lA POMER

- SUPPLY

'CABLE C.S.

PUMP

'A CONTROL CABLES C.S.

PUMP ',

>> 1C POMER SUPPLY CABLE B

(SEE NOTE 6)

B (SEE NOTE 6)

B (SEE NOTE 6).

519.0'19.0'19.0'4" C.S., PIPING TO REACTOR VESSEL C. S.

PUMP 1A PIPING

'C.S.

PUMP 1C PIPING B

(SEE NOTE 6)

B (SEE NOTE 6)

B (SEE NOTE-6)

P CORE SPRAY PUMP MOTOR (5200.LBS) 519..0 C.S.

PUMP 1C CONTROL CABLES

,(SEE NOTE 6)

-519.0 519.0 FCV 75-11 ELECTRICAL CABLaS FCV. 75-12 ELECTRICAL CABLES (SEE NOTE 6 )

(SEE NOTE 6)

I

0 LOCATION LIFTING DEVICE:

.'4 TON HOO

" CIIAIN IlOIST REACTOR BUILDING UNIT 1 SHEET 14 OF 2S LOADS IMPACT AREA CORE SPRAY (CS)

ROOM COL N (I R2 Pt" CORE SPRAY (CS)

ROOM ECOL N 8 R2 CRD.PUMP MOTORS (2500 LBS)

ELEVATION 519.0'.

S.

PUMP

, 1A POWER

.;SUPPLY

'ABLE B

(SEE NOTE 6)

SAFETY RELATED HAZARD ELIM.

EQUIPMENT ATEGORY(NOTE1 ELEVATION 519 0

SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT 14" C.S

~ PIPING TO REACTOR VESSEL HAZARD ELIM.

CATEGORY(NOTE1)

(SEE NOTE 6) 519:0'19.0'.S.

P.lJMP

'1A CONTROL CABi;ES C.S.

PUMP 1C POWER SUPPLY CABLE (SEE NOTE 6)

B (SEE NOTE 6) 519.0 519 0

C. S.

PUMP 1A PIPING C.S.

PUMP 1C PIPING (SEE NOTE 6)

(SEE NOTE 6)

CRD PUMP MOTORS (2500 LBS) 519.0 C.S.

PUMP 1C CONTROL CABLES (SEE NOTE 6) 519. 0 519.0

.FCV 75-11 ELECTRICAL CABLE.'S FOV 75-12 ELECTRICAL CABLES (SEE NOTE 6 )

(SE~

NOTE 6)

I tI 0

1

LIrTING DEVICE:

4 TON uo E CHAIN llOIST SHEET 15 OF 28 LOCATION REACTOR BUILDING UNIT 1 IMPACT AREA CORE SPRAY (CS)

ROOM COL N 8 R2 CORE SPRAY (CS)

ROOM COL N 9 R2 LOADS ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED ZgUIPMl:NT HAZARD ELIM.

ATEGORY(NOTEl ELEVATION SAI'ETY RELATED

'HAZARD ELIM.

EQUIPMENT CATEGORY(NOTE1)

HATCH SHIELD BLOCKS (1500 LBS) 519.0'19;0'.S.

PUMP

. 1A POWER

,SUPPLY

-"CABLE C.S.

PUMP

.1A CONTROL CABLES (SEE NOTE 6)

(SEE NOTE 6) 14" C.S.

1'IPING'19.0

'O REACTOR VESSEL C.S.

PUMP 519.0' lA. PIPING (SEE NOTE 6)'

(SEE NOTE 6) 519,0 0

C.S.

PUMP 1C POWER SUPPLY CABLE

.(SEE NOTE 6) 519. 0 I C.S.

PUMP 1C PIPING (SEE NOTE 6)

HATCH SHIELD BLOCKS

'(1500 LBS) 519.0 C.S.

PlJMP 1C CONTROL CABLES (SEE NOTE 6) 519.0 1CV /5-11 ELECTRICAL CABLES (SEE NOTE 6) 519.G FCV,75-12 ELECTRICAL CABLES (SEE NOTE 6)

I 1

0 LOCATION LIPTXNG DEVICE:

4 TON 1100K 'HAXN IIOIST RLACTOR BUILDING UNIT 1 SHEET 16 OP 28

~

XMPACT AREA CORE SPRAY (CS)

ROOM COL N 9 R2 CORE SPRAY (CS)

ROOM

'COL N 8 R2 LOADS ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED IQ,ZARD ELIM.

EQUIPMENT ATEGORY(NOTE 1

- ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED EQUXPMENT HAZARD ELIM.

CATEGORY(NOTEl)

~CRD PUIfP MOTORS (2500 LBS) 519.0'19;0'.

C. S.

PUMP

-'$A POWER PURPLY CABLE C.S.

PUMP 1A CONTROL CABi.ES (Sr.E NOTE 6)

(SEE NOTE 6) 519.0

'19.O'4" C.S.

PIPING TO REACTOR vrssrL C.S.

PUMP 1A PIPING (SEE NOTE 6)

(SEE NOTE 6) 519.0';S.

PUMP 1C POMER

.SUPPLY CABLE (SEE NOTE 6) 519.0'.S.

PUMP 1C PXPXNG (SEE. NOTE 6)

CRD PUMP MOTORS (2500 LBS) 519.0 C.S.

PUMP iC CONTROL CABLES

{SiE NOTE 6) 519. 0 519.0 ECV 75-11

~ ELECTRICAL CABLES PCV. 75-12 ELECTRICAL CAIILES

{SEE NOTE 6)

~

I

0 LOCATION LI1'TING DavIca' Tov 1100 E cHAIN HoIsT.

REACTOR BUILDING UNXT 2

SHEET 17 OF 28

~

~

IMPACT AREA CORE SPRAY (CS)

ROOM COL N 8 R14 CORE SPRAY (CS)

ROOM COL N (l R2 LOADS CRD PUMP MOTOR (2500 LBS)

ELEVATION 519.0'19:0'19.0'APETX RELATED EQUXPMENT C. S.

PUMP'.A POMER

"SUPPLY CABLE C.S.

PUMP 2C CONTROL CABLES T

C.S.

PUMP 2A 'POWER SUPPLY CABLE HAZARD ELIM.

ATEGORY(NOTE1 (saa NoTE 6)

'saa N0TE 6)

B (saa N0TE 6)

ELEVATXON 519 0 519.0'19.0'AFETY RELATED rl}UIPMENT 14" C.S.

PIPING TO REACTOR VESSEL C: S.

PlJMP 1A PIPXNG C.S.'UMP 1C PIPXNG 11AZARD ELIM.

CATEGORY(NOTal)

(SEE VOTE 6)

(sar. NoTa 6)

(srr. NoTE 6)

CRD PUMP MOTOR (2500 LBS) 519.0 C.S.

PUMP 2C CONTROL CABLES (SEE NOTE 6) 519. 0 rCV 75-:2 ELECTRICAL CABLES

~ (sar; NoTa 6) 519.0 1CV 75-K1 ELECTRICAL P

B

I I

~ ~

~

~

~

I

~

~

~

~

~

o

~

~

~ )

a a

s 0

C~

LIFTING DEVICE:

4 TON HO PE CHAIN HOIST SHEET 19.OF 28

- LOCATION,.

REACTOR BUXLDING UNIT 3 IMPACT AREA CORE SPRAY (CS)

PUMP ROOM COL N 8 R15 CORE SPRAY (CS)

PUMP ROOM COL N 8 R15 LOADS ELEVATXON SAFETY RELATED HAZARD ELIM.

EQUIPMENT A'GREGORY (NOTE1 ELEVATION SAFETY.RELATED

- HAZARD ELIM.

EQUIPMENT CATEGORY(NOTE1)

CORE SPRAY PUMP MOTOR (5200 LBS) 519.0'ORE SPRAY

PUMP 3D POWER SUPPLY B

(SEE NOTE 6) 519 0

.CORE SPRAY PUMP 3D PIPING B

(SEE NOTE')

519.0'.

S.

PUMP 3B PIPING'.

B (SEE NOTE 6)

CRD PUMP

MOTOR, (2500 LBS) 519.0'19 Os CORE SPRAY PUMP 3D POWER SUPPLY CABLE C. S.

PUMP 3D PIPING o

(SEE NOTE 6)

B (SEE NOTE 6) 519'.

S.

PUMP 3B PXPING B

(SEE NOTE 6) 519.0'4I

~

PIPING TO THE REACTOR y "..SSEL (SEE NOTE 6)

~I

~

r I

V

LIFTING DEVICE:

4 TON TYPE CHAIN HOIST SHEFT 20 OF

~

~

LOCATION REACTOR BUILDING UNIT 3 IMPACT AREA CORE SPRAY (CS)

PUMP ROOM COL N 8 R15 LOADS ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED'AZARD ELIM.

EQUIPMENT ATEGORY(NOTE 1, ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT HAZARD ELIM.

CATEGORY(NOTE1) 1QTCH SHIELD BLOCKS (1500 LBS),

519. 0'g 519'0 I C. S.

PUMP 3D POWER

'SUPPLY CABLE C. S.

PUMP 3D PIPING (SEE NOTE 6)

B (SEE NOTE 6)'19,0'4" C. S.

PIPNG.

TO REACTOR VESSE B

(SEE NOTE 6) 519.0'.

S.

PUMP 3B PIPING.-;

B

.(SEE NOTZ 6)

II

~

1 4

~

I L

LOCATION LIFTING DEVICE:

4 TON HO E CHAIN HOIST'EACTOR BUILDING UNIT 1 SHEET'1 OF 28, IMPACT AREA CORE SPRAY (CS)

PUMP ROOM COL N 8 R7.

CORE SPARY (CS)

PUMP ROOM COL N 8 R7 LOADS ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED HAZARD ELIM.

EQUIPMENT ATEGORY(NOTE1 ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED HAZARD ELIM.

EQUIPMENT CATEGORY (NOTE1)

CORE SPRAY PUMP MOTOR (5200 LBS) 519 0

C. S.

PUMP 1B POWER SUPPLY CABLE B

(SEE NOTE 6) 519 0

14" CS PIPING LINE TO REACTOR VESSEL B

(SEE NOTE 6) 519.0':

C. S.

PUMP 1B CONTROL CABLE (SEE NOTE 6).

519 0

C. S.

PUMP 1B PIPING (SEE NOTE 6) 519. 0'.

S.

PUMP lD POWER SUPPLY CABLE B

{SEE NOTE 6) 519.0'.

S.

PUMP 1D PIPING B

{SEE NOTE 6)

CORE SPRAY PmP MOTOR (5200 LBS) 519. 0 C. S.

PUMP B

1D CONTROL'SEE NOTE 6)

CABLE 519.0'19 0

FCV 75-30 ELECTRICAL CABLES FCV-75-39 ELECTRICAL CABL'ES B

(SEE NOTE 6)

B (SEE NOTE 6)

I

~

i

LXFTING DEVICE:

4 TON H PH CHAIN HOIST SHEET 22 OF 28 LOCATION REACTOR BUILDING - UNIT 1 IMPACT AREA CORE SPRAY (CS)

PUMP ROOM

'OL N 8 R7.

CORE SPARY (CS)

PUMP ROOM COL N 8 R7 LOADS

- CRD PUMP MOTOR (2500 LBS)

ELEVATION 19 0 519. 0 SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMHNT C. S.

PUMP lg POWER

'SUPPLY CABLE C.. S.

PUMP IB CONTROL CABLE HAZARD HLIM.

ATHGORY(NOTEl B

(SHE NOTE 6)

(SEE NOTE 6)

ELEVATION 519.0'19.0'AFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT 14" CS PIPXNG LINE TO REACTOR VESSEL C.

S.

PUMP 1B PIPING HAZARD HLXM,.

CATEGORY(NOTE1)

(SEE NOTE 6)

,B (SHE NOTE 6) 519.0'.

S.

PmlP 1D POWER SUPPLY CABL'E (SEE NOTE 6) 519.0'.

S.

PUMP.

lD PIPING (SEE NOTE 6)

CRD PUMP MOTOR (2500 LBS) 519, 0 519.0'.

S.

PUMP 1D CONTROL CABLE FCV 75-30 ELECTRICAL CABLES B

(SEE NOTE 6)

(SEE NOTE 6) 519.0'CV-75-39 ELECTRICAL CABLES (SEE NOTE 6)

~

y

~

I I

~ 1

LOCATION LI1'TING DHVXCE:

4 TON HO H CHAIN HOIST'EACTOR BUILDING'- UNXT 1'HEET 23 OF 28 I

o

~

IMPACT AREA CORE SPRAY (CS)

PUMP ROOM:

COL N 8 R7.

CORE SPARY (CS)

PUMP ROOM COLN 8 R7 HATCH SHIELD BLOCKS (1500 LBS)

ELEVATION 519.0'19.0i SAFETY RELATED I:QUIPMHNT C.

S.

PUMP'.1B POWER

",SljPPLY CABLE C.. S.

PUMP 1B CONTROL CABLL'AZARD HLIM.

ATEGORY(NOTE1 B

(SHE NOTE 6)

B (SEE NOTE 6)

HLHVATXON 519.0' 519 0'AFETY RELATED EQUXPMENT 14" CS PIPING LXNE TO REACTOR VESSEL C.

S.

PUMP 1B PIPXNG llAZARD HLIM.

CATEGORY(NOTHl)

(SEE NOTE 6)

,,B (SHE NOTE 6) 519.0'.

S.

PUMP 1D POWER SUPPLY CABL'E B

(SHH NOTL'. 6) 519.0 C. S.

'PUMP.

1D PIPING'SEE NOTE 6)

HATCH SHIELD BLOCKS (1500 LBS) 519. 0 519.0'.

S.

PUMP 1D CONTROL CABLE FCV 75-30 ELECTRICAL CABLES.

B (SEE NOTE.6)

B (SEE NOTE 6) 19 0 FCV-75-39 ELECTRICAL CABLES B

(SEE 'NOTE 6)

~

p I

~ ~

LIFTING DEVXCE:

4 TON H YPE CHAIN HOIST SHEET 24 OF 2S LOCATION

'REACTOR BUILDING UNIT 2 IMPACT AREA CORE SPRAY (CS)

PUMP ROOM COL N 8 R8 CORE SPRAY (CS)

PUMP ROOM COL N 8 RS LOADS ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT HAZARD ELIM.-

ATEGORY(NOTE1 ELEVATXON SAFETY RELATED HAZARD ELIM.

EQUIPMENT CATEGORY(NOTE1)

CORE SPRAY PUMP.

MOTOR (5200 LBS):

519.0'19.0'.

S.

PUMP 2D POWER SUPPLY CABLE C.

S.

PUMP 2B PIPING B

(SEE NOTE 6)

(SEE NOTE.6) 519.0'19.0'"C.S.

PIPING 0 REACTOR VESSEL

.CV 75-30 LECTRXCAL CABLES B

(SEE NOTE 6)

B (SEE 'NOTE 6) 519.0'.

S.

PUMP 2D PIPING (SEE NOTE 6).

519.0'CV 75-39 ELECTRICAL CABLES B

(SEE NOTE 6)

CRD PUMP MOTOR (2500 LBS) 519.05 519.0'19.0'.

S.

PUMP 2D POWER SUPPLY CABLE C.

S.

PUMP 2B PIPING C.

S.

PUMP 2D PIPING

.B (SEE NOTE 6)

B (SEE NOTE 6)

(SEE NOTE 6) 519.0.'519.0'19.0'CV 75-30 ELECTRICAL CABLES FCV 75-30 ELECTRICALCABLES FCV 75-30 ELECTRICAL CABLES (SEE NOTE 6)

~

(SEE NOTE 6)

(SEE NOTE 6)

i Qlf jt I C

0 LIFTING DEVICE' TON HO E CHAIN HOIST SHEET 25 OF 28 LOCATION REACTOR BUILDING UNIT 2 IMPACT AREA

.CORE SPRAY (CS)

PUMP ROOM COL N 8 RS

.LOADS HATCH SHIELD BLOCKS (1500 LBS)

ELEVATION 519.0'

~

C(

SAFETY RELATED HAZARD ELIM.

.EQUIPMENT ATEGORY(NOTE1 t

C.

S..PUMP 2D B

POMER SUPPLY (SEE NOTE 6)

CABLE ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED HAZARD ELIM.

EQUIPMENT

'ATEGORY(NOTE 1) 519:0'.

S.

PUMP 2B PIPING B

(SEE NOTE 6) 519.0'.

S.

PUMP 2D PIPING B

(SEE NOTE 6)

HATCH SHIELD BLOCKS (1500 LBS) 519.0

'19.0'19.0'4" C. S.

PIPING TO REACTOR VESSEL FCV 75-30 ELECTRICAL CABLES FCV '75-39 ELECTRICAL CABLES B

(SEh NOTE 6)

B (SEE NOTE 6)

B (SEL.

NOTE 6)

s 4

- ~

LOCATION LIFTING DEVICE:

4 TON HOO CHAIN HOIST REACTOR BUILDING UNIT 3 SHEET 26 OF 28 IMPACT AREA CORE SPRAY (CS)

PUMP, ROOM COL N 8 R21 CORE SPRAY (CS)

PUMP. ROOM COL N 8 R21 LOADS ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED HAZARD HLIM.

EQUIPMENT ATHGORY(NOTE1 ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED HAZARD ELIM.

EQUIPMENT CATEGORY(NOTH1)

. CORE. SPRAY PUMP MOTOR (5200 LBS) 519 0

C. S.

PUMP 3A CONTROL

.'- '-CABLES B

(SEE NOTE 6) 19 0

.-C.

S.

PUMP 3A PIPING B

(SEE NOTE 6) 519.0'C.

S.

PUMP

'3C CONTROL CABLES B

(SEE NOTE 6) 519 01 C.

S.

PUMP 3C PIPING B

(SEE NOTE 6) 519.0'.

S.

PUMP '

3C POWER

~.

SUPPLY CABLE B

(SHE NOTE 6) 519. 0'4" C.

S.

TO PIPING TO RHACTO VESSEL (SHE NOTE 6)

~

CRD PUMP MOTOR (2500 LBS) 519.0'19.0'.

S.

PUMP 3A CONTROL CABLES C.

S.

PUMP

'3C CONTROL CABLES B

(SEE NOTE.6)

B (SEE NOTE 6) 519 0

519 0

C.

S.

PUMP 3A PIPING C. S.

PUMP 3C PIPING B

(SEE NOTE 6)

B (SEE NOTE 6) 519.0'.

S.

PUMP 3C. POWER SUPPLY CABLE (SEE NOTE 6) 519.0'4" C. S. PIPING TO REACTOR VESSEL B

(SEE NOTE 6)

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LOCATION LIFTING DEVICE: '

TON H

PE C11AIN HOIST REACTOR BUILDING UNIT 3 SHEET 27 OF 28 I'I IMPACT AREA CORE SPRAY (CS)

PUMP ROOM COL N 8 R21 CORE SPRAY (CS)

PUMP ROOM COL N CJ R21 LOADS ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED HAZARD ELIM.

EQUIPMENT ATEGORY(NOTE1 ELEVATION SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT HAZARD ELIM.

CATEGORY(NOTE1)

HATCH.SHIELD

-BLOCKS (1500 LBS) 519.0'.

S.

PUMP 3A CONTROL CABLES (SEE NOTE 6) 519.0'.

S.

PUMP 3A PIPING (SEE NOTE 6) 519.0'.

S.

P.UMP 3C CONTROL'ABLES B

(SEE NOTE 6) 519.0'.

S.

PUMP 3C PIPING B

(SEE NOTE 6)

'19.

0'.

S.

PUMP 3C POWER SUPPLY CABLE (SEE NOTE 6) 519.0'4" C. S.

PIPING TO REACTOR VESSE (SEE NOTE 6)

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