ML18005A385
| ML18005A385 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 04/01/1988 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Maxwell G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18005A383 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-88-06, 50-400-88-6, NUDOCS 8804120087 | |
| Download: ML18005A385 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000400/1988006
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report No.:
50-400/88-06
Licensee:
Carolina
Power and Light Company
P. 0.
Box 1551
Raleigh,
NC
27602
Docket No.:
50-400
Facility Name:
Harris
1
License No.:
'nspection
Conducted:
February
20
March 20,
1988
Inspector:
G.
F.
axwell
Approved by:
6
-Ql+
P.
E.
edri ckson,
Section Chief
Division of Reactor Projects
silas
Date Signed
~ 1)SS
Date Signed
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine,
announced
inspection
involved inspection
in the areas
of
Licensee Action on Previous
Enforcement Matters,
On-Site Follow-up of Events
and Subsequent
tltritten Reports of Nonroutine Events,
Operational
Safety Verifi-
cation, Monthly Surveillance Observation,
and Monthly Maintenance
Observation.
Results:
In the areas
inspected,
one violation was identified, "Failure to
Require
EOPs to be Consistent with the
FSAR" - Paragraph
3.b.
8804120087
SS0401
ADOCK 05000400
9
REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
J.
M.
G.
L.
J.
L.
C.
S.
D. L.
R.
B.
R. A.
Collins, Manager,
Operations
Forehand,
Director,
QA/QC
Harness,
Plant General
Manager
Hinnant,
Manager of Maintenance
Tibbitts, Director, Regulatory
Compliance
Van Metre, Manager,
Harris Plant Technical
Support
Watson,
Vice President,
Harris Nuclear Project
Other
licensee
employees
contacted
included
technicians,
operators,
mechanics,
security
force
members,
engineering
personnel
and office
personnel.
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection
scope
and findings were
summarized
on March 21,
1988, with
the Plant
General
Manager,
Operations.
The inspector described
the areas
inspected
and discussed
in detail
the inspection
findings listed below.
Dissenting
comments
were
not received
from the
licensee.
Proprietary
information is not contained in this report.
Note:
A list of abbreviations
used
in this report
is contained
in
Paragraph
8.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous
Enforcement Matters (92701)
a
0
(Closed)
Unresolved
Item" 50-400/88-03-01,
ESW Seal
Water.
The
licensee
reported
and
documented
a condition
on
LER 88-006
concerning
both
emergency
service
water
systems
potentially
being
due to isolation
valve failures
and
a design deficiency.
The initial NRC notification identified only the inoperability of the
seal
water
booster
pump
isolation
and
check
valves.
However,
subsequent
licensee
evaluation of the design
of the
ESW seal
water
booster
pumps revealed
the following:
Both
seal
water
booster
pumps
are
nonsafety-related
and
nonseismically designed..
"Unresolved
items are matters
about which more information is required to
determine
whether they are acceptable
or may involve violations or deviations'
Those
sections
of the
ESW seal
water booster
pump system which
are
nonsafety
and
nonseismic
include
the
pump
casings,
the
piping
between
the
pump
suction
and
the
suction
isolation
valves,
and
the
piping
between
the
pump
discharge
and
the
discharge isolation check valves.
The field initiated design
changes
which ultimately authorized
the installation of the
ESW seal
water booster
pump system.
The
design
included
a
cross
connect
piping which
was installed
between
the manually-operated
pump discharge
isolation valves
and the
solenoid-operated
isolation
valves.
This cross
connect
piping did
not have
an isolation valve, therefore
both of the safety train
seal
water piping
systems
could
have
been
affected
by
a
single
passive
failure because
the emergency'safety)
supplied
seal
water
trains
were
connected
to
each
other
through this
cross
connect
piping.
The licensee
reported
preceding
supplemental
information to the
NRC
Outy Officer on February
25,
1988,
and has included it as
a part of
its evaluation
concerning
the event
which was initially reported
on
February
8.
The
resident
inspector
discussed
the
above
design
configuration with NRC RII and
NRR management
and concluded that the
licensee's
assessment
as described
in
LER 88-006 is acceptable,
.that
is, their conclusion that the potential for a passive failure in the
ESW seal
water system is improbable
and unrealistic.
The licensee
has
made design
changes
to remove both of the nonsafety
and
nonseismic
seal
water
booster
pumps
from the
seal
water
system.
The
inspector will monitor the
progress
of the
changes
which are
planned for this system.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Unresolved
Item
50-400/88-03-02,
Emergency
Operating
Procedures.
The inspector
evaluated
the information contained
in
LER 88-001
and
interviewed
site
technical
support
personnel
and
other
licensee
representatives
who were familiar with the details of this
LER.
As a
result
the
inspector
determined
that
on
September
24,
1986
the
licensee
revised
Table
6.3.2-6
of the
FSAR,
per advice
from site
technical
support
personnel.
The
was
revised
to
require
isolating
one
of the
two
low pressure
safety
injection
containment
valves
1SI-340 or 1SI-341, if the plant had experienced
a
LOCA and the
RHR system
was taking
a suction
on the containment
and discharging into the reactor coolant cold legs
and
was simulta-
neously
supplying
the
high
head
safety injection
pumps.
The
revision
was
recommended
after
site
technical
support
personnel
calculated
the
pumping capabilities
of
a
single
pump.
They
determined that one
pump
may not
be capable
of supplying sufficient
flow to both cold legs
and two SI pumps.
The calculations
show that
the
RHR pump curves
run out at about
4500
gpm, for a single
RHR pump.
The most conservative
calculations
reveal
that the flow rate
needed
to be approximately
5000
gpm with the valve configuration
allowing both
and
to
be
open
and
both
pumps
running.
After the
FSAR was revised to include the
new val've configuration
(closing
the affected site
procedure
EOP-EPP-
010, titled, "Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation",
was then required
to be revised also,
to be consistent with the
FSAR.
On December
22,
1986 the
EOP was revised.
The procedure
remained
unchanged,
leaving both
and
open with two SI
pumps
running with each of the
pumps
and
valves
being
supplied'y
a
single
pump.
The
licensee
failed
to
recognize
that the
had not
been
properly
revised
until
about
December
3,
1987.
The potential
significance of the error
was
not
realized until
ONS followed-up on
an
INPO notification and found that
this deficiency existed in the
EOP.
On December
10,
1987
an Advanced
Change
was
made to the
EOP consistent with the September
1986 require-
ments of the
FSAR, Table 6.3.2-6,
The inspector
reviewed site Administrative Procedure
AP-006,
Rev. 7,
titled "Procedure
Review
and Approval".
Section
5.7 requires
that
the "procedures
must
be technically accurate
to safely perform the
intended activity".
Failure to require
to be consistent with the
FSAR for
the time between
September
24,
1986 until December
10,
1987, could
have resulted
in the plant's safety injection system
being in a
valve
configuration
which
may
have
resulted
in
an
unsafe
plant
condition without operator
action.
Unresolved
Item 50-400/88-03-02
and its associated
LER 88-001
are closed,
and
a violation will be
issued,
Failure
to
Require
to
be
Consistent
with the
FSAR,
50-400/88-06-01.
4.
On-Site
Follow-up of Events
and
Subsequent
Written Reports of Nonroutine
Events
(92700,
93702)
The inspector
evaluated
the following LERs to determine if the details
complied
with
licensee
requirements,
adequately
described
the
event,
identified the root cause
of the event,
described
appropriate
corrective
action,
and
addressed
any potentially generic
implications.
When
the
licensee
identified violations,
those
LERs
were
reviewed
in accordance
with the
a.
(Closed)
LER 87-034,
LER 87-52
and
LER 87-55,
T.S.
Violation
Containment
Personnel
Air Lock.
The conditions
which
caused
these
LERs
have
been
documented
and
identified
as
violations
in
Inspection
Reports
50-400/87-21
and
50-400/87-40.
These
LERs are
considered
closed
and will be tracked
as Violations 50-400/87-21-01
and 50-400/87-40-01.
(Closed)
LER 87-041,
Plant Trip Due to Loss of Instrument Air Caused
by Improperly Prepared
Valve Restoration
Lineup; Personnel
Error.
This
Event
was
documented
and identified
as
a violation in RII
Inspection
Report 50-400/87-31.
This
LER is considered.
closed
and
will now be tracked
as Violation 50-400/87-31-01.
(Closed)
LER 87-042,
Reactor Trip Incorrect
Fuse Pulled;
Personnel
Error.
This
Event
was
documented
and identified
as
a violation in RII
Inspection
Report 50-400/87-26.
This
LER is considered
closed
and
will be tracked
as Violation 50-400/87-26-02.
(Closed)
LER 87-045,
Personnel
Error
Caused
Injection of Safety
Injection Accumulators During Plant Cooldown and Depressurization.
This
LER has
been
upgraded
to
a violation and is documented
in RII
Inspection
Report 50-400/87-26.
This
LER is considered
closed
and
will now be tracked through
as
a Violation 50-400/87-26-01.
(Closed)
LER 87-053,
Plant Operating
in
Due
to a Failed
Open
Blowdown Isolation Valve.
This Event involved
blowdown valve being inoperable
(stuck open) for at least
29 days while the plant was at power.
The
Event was documented
and identified as
a Violation in RII Inspection
Report
50-400/87-34.
This
LER is closed
and will be
tracked
as
Violation 50-400/87-34-01
(Closed)
LER 87-058,
Reduction
in Reactor
Coolant
Inventory
Due to
Valve Failure in the
RCS Head Vent System During Testing.
This Event was documented
in two RII Inspection
Reports,
50-400/87-37
and 50-400/87-40.
The specific violations which identified the valve
failures are
50-400/87-37-01
and
50-400/87-40-,03.
Therefore,
this
LER is considered
closed.
(Closed)
LER 87-062
and
LER 87-063.
Both
of
these
Events
involved
either
operator s
not
following
procedures
or not having
an adequate
procedure.
They were documented
and identified in RII Inspection
Report
50-400/87-40.
This
LER is
closed
and will be tracked
as Violation 50-400/87-40-02,
Failure to
Follow Operations
Procedures.
h.
(Cl osed)
LER 88-001,
Emergency
Operating
Pr ocedure
Deficiency
for
Switchover to Recirculation After a Loss of Coolant Accident.
The details for the closure of this
LER are
contained
in Paragraph
3.b, of this report and will be tracked
as Violation 50-400/88-06-01.
5,
Operational
Safety Verification (71707,
71710)
Plant Tours
The inspector
conducted
routine plant tours during this inspection
period to verify that the
licensee's
requirements
and
commitments
were
being
implemented.
These
tours
were
performed to verify that
systems,
valves
and breakers
required for safe plant operations
were
in their correct position; fire protection equipment,
spare
equipment
and materials
were
being
maintained
and
stored
properly;
plant
operators
were
aware of the current plant status;
plant operations
personnel
were
documenting
the status
of out-of-service
equipment;
security
and
health
physics
controls
were
being
implemented
as
required
by procedures;
there
were
no
undocumented
cases
of unusual
fluid leaks,
piping vibration,
abnormal
hanger
or seismic restraint
movements;
and all
reviewed
equipment
requiring
calibration
was
.currents
Tours
of
the
plant
included
review of site
documentation
and
interviews with plant personnel.
The inspector
reviewed
the shift
foreman's
log, control
room operator's
log, clearance
center tag out
logs,
system
status
logs,
and control
status
board.
During these
tours the inspector
noted that the operators
appeared
to be alert and
aware of changing plant conditions.
The inspector evaluated
operations shift turnovers
and attended shift
briefings.
These briefings
and turnovers
provided sufficient detail
for the next shift crew.
The
inspector verified that various
plant
spaces
were
not in
a
condition
which would
degrade
the
performance
capabilities
of any
required
system or component.
Site security
was evaluated
by, observing
personnel
in the protected
and vital areas
to ensure that these
persons
had the proper authori-
zation
to
be
in
the
respective
areas.
The
security
personnel
appeared
to be alert and attentive to their duties
and those officers
performing
personnel
and
vehicular
searches
were
thorough
and
systematic.
Responses
to security
alarm conditions
appeared
to
be
prompt and adequate.
b.
Main Feedwater
Regulating
Yalve
On March 9,
1988, while operating
at
100 percent
power, the reactor
tripped.
The licensee
reported the event to the
NRC Duty Officer as
required
by 10 CFR 50.72.
The cause of the event
was attributed to
a
loose
cap
on
one of the replaceable
fuses
which protects
the
"B"
feedwater regulating valve's modulating circuit.
The
loose
fuse
cap
demonstrated
the
same
symptoms
as
an
open circuit
would have,
in that the modulating circuit lost power which allowed
the
regulating
valve
to fail shut.
When
the
valve failed shut,
was lost for the "B" steam generator,
resulting in low "B"
steam
generator
level.
The reactor protective circuits reacted
to
protect the plant from the
steam flow-feed flow mismatch conditions.
As
a result,
a reactor, trip signal
was generated,
causing
a reactor
trip.
When the event occurred,
all of the
required
plant
safety
equipment
started
and
performed
as
expected.
The
plant
was
stabilized
and held in hot standby
(Mode 3) until the
cause
of the
event
was discovered
and corrected.
The
licensee
replaced
all of the
"replaceable"
fuses
which were
installed in the
main feedwater
regulating circuits.
The
new fuses
have
fixed
end
caps
which
should
prevent
this
condition
from
occurring again.
The licensee is evaluating
a program to replace all
of the "replaceable"
fuses
located in the plant with fuses which have
fixed end caps.
On March
10,
1988,
the plant
was returned
to power
and
was
placed
back
on the
CPKL electrical
power grid.
6.
Monthly Surveillance
Observation
(61726,
61700)
The inspector
witnessed
the licensee
conducting
maintenance
surveillance
test activities
on safety-related
systems
and
components
to verify that
the licensee
performed the activities in accordance
with licensee
requirements.
These observations
included witnessing
selected
portions of
each
surveillance,
review of the surveillance
procedure
to
ensure
that
administrative
controls
were
in force,
determining
that
approval
was
obtained prior to conducting
the surveillance
test
and
the
individuals
conducting
the
test
were qualified in accordance
with plant-approved
procedures.
Other observations
included ascertaining
that test instrumen-
tation
used
was
calibrated,
data
collected
was within the
specified
requirements
of Technical
Specifications,
any identified discrepancies
were properly
noted,
and
the
systems
were correctly returned to service.
The following specific activities were observed:
OST-1104
was conducted
on the "C" steam generator
blowdown isolation
valve
1BD-.39.
The test
was
conducted
to assure
operability
of the
valve upon completion of valve repairs.
The test verified that the
valve could
be stroked
in less
than the
60 seconds
specified
by the
OST.
The actual
stroke time was less
than
35 seconds.
This
OST is
a
part of the
ISI valve
inspection
program
required
by
Rev.
0,
Reactor
Coolant
System
Cold Over Pressurization
Instrument
(P-0440)
Operational
Test
was
conducted.
The
test
verified satisfactory
compliance with TS Section 4.4.9.4. 1.a.
The
primary purpose of the test
was to determine that the instrumentation
loop for the cold reactor
coolant over pressure
protection
system
was
Loop Calibration Procedure
Rev.
0, titled Loop Calibration
of Charging
Pump Safety Injection
Flow to Boron Injection Tank was
completed.
The test verified complianqe
with
FSAR Section 9.3.4;
Specifically,
the test verified that
the
instrumentation
for the
boron injection tank was operable
and accurate.
7.
Monthly Maintenance
Observation
(62703,
62700)
The inspector
reviewed
the licensee's
maintenance
activities during this
inspection
period to verify the following:
maintenance
personnel
were
obtaining
the
appropriate
tag
out
and
clearance
approvals
prior to
commencing
work activities, correct'ocumentation
was available
for all
requested
parts
and material prior to use,
procedures
were available
and
adequate
for the work being
conducted,
maintenance
personnel
performing
work activities
were qualified to accomplish
these tasks,
no maintenance
activities reviewed
wet e violating any limiting conditions for operation
during the specific evolutions;
the required
QA/gC reviews
and
gC hold
points
were
implemented;
post-maintenance
testing
activities
were
completed,
and
equipment
was
properly
returned
to service
after
the
completion of work activities.
The
following activity
was
evaluated
during
the
inspector's
routine
monthly maintenance
observation:
Maintenance
personnel
changed
one
of
the
neutron
flux incore
detectors.
The detector's
output signal
was not consistent
with the
signals
from the
remaining
four incore detectors.
The
work was
authorized
by
88-ACGB1
and,
required
removing
the
"E" incore
detector
from service
and replacing it with
a
new detector.
After
completing the replacement
the
new detector
was tested
and
found to
be acceptable
and placed into service.
8.
List of Abbreviations
CPS(L
Carolina
Power
and Light Company
Emergency Operating
Procedures
Emergency Service Water
Final Safety Analysis Report
0
GPM
LER
NRC
OST
RII
TS
Gallons
Per Minute
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
Inservice Inspection
Licensee
Event Report
Loss of Coolant Accident
Maintenance
Surveillance
Test
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Onsite Nuclear Safety
Review Group
Operational
Surveillance
Test
Residual
Heat
Removal
Region II
Safety Injection
Technical Specifications
Work Request
P'~
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