ML17313A534
| ML17313A534 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 08/10/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17313A532 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-98-05, 50-528-98-5, 50-529-98-05, 50-529-98-5, 50-530-98-05, 50-530-98-5, NUDOCS 9808180187 | |
| Download: ML17313A534 (39) | |
See also: IR 05000528/1998005
Text
ENCLOSURE 2
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket Nos.:
License Nos.:
50-528
50-529
50-530
NPF-51
Report No.:
50-528/98-05
50-529/98-05
50-530/98-05
Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
e
Dates:
Inspectors:
Arizona Public Se'rvice Company
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3
5951 S. Wintersburg Road
Tonopah, Arizona
May 31 through July 11, 1998
J. Moorman, III, Senior Resident Inspector
N. Salgado, Resident Inspector
D. Carter, Resident Inspector
V. Gaddy, Resident Inspector
Accompanied By:
M. Kotzalas, Accompanying Inspector
Approved By:
Attachment:
P. Harrell, Chief, Projects Branch D
Supplemental Information
'P808i80187
9808%0
ADGCK 05000528
6
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3
NRC Inspection Report 50-528/98-05; 50-529/98-05; 50-530/98-05
~Oeratione
Effective licensee decision making was demonstrated
by the evaluation performed when
uncertainty was identified in the ability to test trip functions associated
with the four core
protection calculators channels of local power density.
Operations department
performance was good as demonstrated
by use of.three-way communications during
power changes, management oversight and direction, and development of an action
plan to address operability issues (Section 01.1).
The lock was missing on a normally-locked valve in the Unit 1 chemical and volume
control system and was not documented,
as required by procedure.
The failure to
document the removal of a locking device resulted in a loss of configuration control and
is a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a.
This is a repeat violation from a June
1997 inspection (Section 02.1).
proce
Maintenance
Operations personnel conducted effective prejob briefs and demonstrated
good
communication practices during the testing of the Unit 2 steam-driven auxiliary
feedwater pump. Auxiliaryoperators demonstrated
good attention to detail during the
test as demonstrated
by the identification of minor material deficiencies and errors in
dure drawings (Section 04.1).
Knowledgeable technicians used approved procedures to perform routine maintenance
activities. Good work and foreign material control practices were observed
(Section M1.1).
Knowledgeable technicians used approved procedures to conduct surveillance activities
in an acceptable manner (Section M1.2).
Observed material condition of the three units was satisfactory (Section M2.1).
Performance of surveillance tests during the Unit 1 outage was good, as determined by
a review of 20 surveillance test packages.
The tracking of interval-based surveillance
tests effectively scheduled tests, which prevented exceeding the expiration date, as
determined by a review of the surveillance tracking database
(Section M3.1).
Electrical maintenance performed good troubleshooting activities on Startup
Transformer NAN-X02. During the restoration of the startup transformer, good
communications, and management
oversight were noted. Work control tagging was
properly administered throughout all phases of the troubleshooting activities
(Section M4.1).
5
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Encnineerinq
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Licensee actions to identify deficiencies and initiate corrective actions associated
with a
plant modification, which installed flow meters in the spent fuel pool cooling system were
good. The licensee identified that incorrect material had been used to install the flow
meters; however, the use-as-is evaluation provided appropriate justification based on
testing and material type (Section E2.1).
Plant Su
ort
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Radiological protection postings of observed radiation, high radiation, and locked high
radiation areas were accurate for existing conditions.
Radiological housekeeping
practices in observed contaminated areas were adequate.
Decontamination
activities'nd
subsequent
surveys of the letdown heat exchanger valve gallery after a letdown line
break in the room were satisfactory
(Section R1.1) ~
~
Good radiological practices were followed during performance of surveillances to
measure chemistry and specific activity of the reactor coolant system.
The chemistry
technician was knowledgeable of the procedures and of the usage of the test
instrumentation (Section R4.1).
t
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The posting of regulatory notices to workers conformed to 10 CFR 19.11 requirements
and the implementing procedure.
Postings were located in highly-visible and
well-traveled areas (Section R8.1).
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Re ort Details
Summa
of Plant Status
Units 1 and 2 operated at essentially 100 percent power during this inspection period.
Unit 3 began this inspection period at 100 percent power. On July 1, 1998, power was reduced
to approximately 75 percent when the unit entered Technical Specification 3.0.3, after declaring
the local power density channels on all core protection calculators inoperable.
The unit was
returned to 100 percent power on July 2 and remained at that power level for the duration of
this inspection period.
I. 0 erations
01
Conduct of Operations
01.1
Power Reduction After Declarin
AIICore Protection Calculators
Ino erable
Unit 3
Ins ection Sco
e 71707
On July 1, 1998, the inspectors were notified that Unit 3 entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 when the four local power density (LPD) channels of the CPCs were
declared inoperable.
The inspectors responded to the control room and observed as
operators reduced reactor power. The inspectors observed operator actions, reviewed
unit logs, and licensee notifications of the event.
The inspectors also attended licensee
management
meetings concerning the operability, testing, and recalibration of the
LPD channels.
b.
Observations and Findin s
On June 27, the unit received Plant Protection System B trip and pretrip alarms for
Hl LPD and LO departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR). The licensee declared
CPC B inoperable and bypassed the channel, as allowed by the Technical Specification.
Condition Report/Disposition Request (CRDR) 3-8-0141 and Work Request 945549
were initiated to address the condition. The licensee conducted troubleshooting
activities from June 28 through July 1 on CPC B.
On July 1, the licensee entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 at 11:10 a.m. (MST) after
declaring the LPD trips on all CPCs inoperable.
The licensee reviewed previous
surveillance test Technical Specification for all four LPD channels and determined that
The licensee believed that the current problem with CPC B
was a testing issue for the late-in-life core conditions and not an operability issue.
Prior to restart from the last refueling outage, the excore neutron detectors were
calibrated such that they would be able to detect the lower leakage from the current
low-leakage core design. To accomplish this, the nuclear detector amplifier gains were
set relatively high by instrumentation and control (l&C) personnel to compensate
for low
core leakage and flux changes.
The l&C technicians performed the adjustment
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Technical Specification in accordance
with Procedure 36ST-9SE03, "Excore Safety
Liner Channel Quarterly Calibration," Revision 11. As the core aged and leakage
increased,
the magnitude of the excore detector signal increased.
On a routine basis,
operators compared the nuclear instrument signal to the secondary calorimetric power
and adjusted the signals as necessary,
using Procedure 40ST-9NI01, "Adjustable
Power Signal Calibrations," Revision 16.
In the CPC, this adjustment is accomplished
by chan'ging the value of an addressable
constant called KCAL. The expected trend
during an operating cycle is for the raw power signal to increase and the value of KCAL
to decrease.
With Unit 3 late in the operating cycle, the signal strength increased and
KCALwas lowered to a point that the potentiometer gains used by l&C personnel for
testing could not add a sufficient signal to generate LPD pretrip and trip signals, as
required by the surveillance test procedure.
At 12:10 p.m., operators commenced the power reduction within the required 1-hour
period allowed by Technical Specification and made the 1-hour emergency notification
to the NRC. The inspectors observed control room operators decrease
reactor power
from approximately 85 to 75 percent in accordance with Procedure 40OP-9ZZ05,
"Power Operations," Revision 20. The operators were given specific instructions as to
the rate of power decrease
and a specific time when the unit was to be in Mode 3 to
meet Technical Specification 3.0.3 requirements.
Operators stabilized reactor power at
approximately 75 percent and verified CPC B would perform its LPD trip function in
accordance with Procedure 77ST-3SB08, "CPC Channel B Functional Test," Revision 7.
The licensee exited Technical Specification 3.0.3 after CPC B and the other three
CPCs were believed to be fullyfunctional. However, CPC B was left in bypass because
the DNBR portion of the surveillance test could not be performed at 75 percent power.
At this reduced power level, the DNBR margin was so high that the DNBR setpoints
could not be tested.
Operators raised reactor power to 86 percent to test the
DNBR portion of the surveillance.
At 6:27 p.m., the licensee declared the LPD and
DNBR trip functions of CPC B operable and removed the channel from bypass.
The
licensee initiated CRDR 3-8-0145 to determine the root cause of the inadequate
surveillance methodology.
During the observed power changes, the control room operators demonstrated
good
three-way communications.
Control room operators plotted the rate of power increase
and closely followed the data to prevent exceeding the limits stated in
Procedure 40OP-9ZZ05.
The shift manager and control room supervisor briefed the
crew several times on the status of the unit and the actions planned.
The shift technical
advisors from the other units assisted the Unit 3 shift technical advisor by performing
routine shift activities, which allowed the Unit 3 shift technical advisor to focus on the
issue of testing and recalibration of the excore detectors.
Licensee managers conducted meetings to discuss the significance of the
CPC channels being considered inoperable and the actions n'ceded to test and return
the CPC channels to operation.
The licensee developed an action plan to address
these issues and discuss the transportability of this problem to the other units. The
licensee concluded that no immediate transportability issue existed for the other units
based on the current gain settings for the excore instrumentation.
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Conclusions
Effective licensee decision making was demonstrated
by the evaluation performed when
uncertainty was identified in the ability to test trip functions associated with the four core
protection calculators channels of local power density.
Operations department
performance was good as demonstrated
by use of three-way communications during
power changes, management
oversight and direction, and development of an action
plan to address operability issues.
02
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
02.1
Failure to Pro erl
Track a Locked Valve Unit 1
Ins ection Sco
e 71707
The inspectors toured portions of rooms containing safety-related equipment in all units
Specification and observed the status of several locked valves.
Observations and Findin s
On June 29, 1998, the inspectors walked down portions of the chemical and volume
control system and identified that Valve CHE-PV-201 Q, letdown backpressure
control,
did not have a secured locking device installed. The inspectors questioned the control
room supervisor as to the status of Valve CHE-PV-201Q and determined that the valve
was isolated and under Active Clearance 98-00464 for mechanical maintenance.
Procedure 40AC-OZZ06, "Locked Val've, Breaker, and Component Control,"
Revision 19, described the controls for valve locking devices.
The position of
components controlled by Procedure 40AC-OZZ06 were tracked in accordance with
Procedure 40DP-9OP19, "Locked Valve, Breaker, and Component Tracking,"
Revision 46. From review of Procedure 40DP-9OP19, Appendix C, "Individual
Valve/Breaker/Component Change Records," located in the control room, the inspectors
determined that Valve CHE-PV-201Q was not being controlled in accordance with this
procedure.
Procedure 40DP-9OP19, Step 3.2, required that the component
description, locked position, position changed to, control room supervisor approval, and
reason for change be entered on an Appendix C tracking sheet.
The licensee stated that, at some point during the maintenance
activity, personnel
removed the valve locking device. After removing the locking device, personnel failed to
make the required entries into the Procedure 40DP-9OP19, Appendix C tracking sheet.
The failure to document the removal of the locking device for Valve CHE-PV-210Q
resulted in a loss of configuration control of the system.
A similar violation was
documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-528;529;530/97-06,
issued June 27, 1997.
The failure to follow Procedure 40DP-90P19 is a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 (50-528/9805-01).
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The licensee immediately documented the status of Valve CHE-PV-201Q in
Procedure 40DP-9OP19,
Appendix C, and generated CRDR.1-8-0376 to document this
issue and determine what long-term corrective actions would be implemented.
C.
Conclusions
A lock was missing on a normally locked valve in the Unit 1 chemical.and volume control
system and was not documented,
as required by procedure.
The failure to document
the removal of a locking device resulted in a loss of configuration control and is a
violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a.
This is a repeat violation from a June 1997
inspection.
04
Operator Knowledge and Performance
04.1
Steam-Driven Auxilia
Feedwater S stem
AFW Pum
Testin
Unit 2
Ins ection Sco
e 71707
On June 9, 1998, the inspectors observed the licensee perform Procedure 73ST-9AF02,
"AFA-PO1 - Inservice Test," Revision 8.
Observation and Findin s
The inspectors observed control room operators conduct a briefing with personnel
involved with the test. The inspectors verified that maintenance and test equipment
required for the testing was in accordance with the procedure and that calibration
stickers were current.
Control room operators and personnel in the field demonstrated
good three-way communications.
The auxiliary operators (AO) demonstrated
good
attention to details while performing a walkdown of the AFW system, as noted by the
identification of minor packing leakage from Valves AFA-V067 (AFW Pump A discharge
line vent) and SGA-V266 (SG-2 main steam supply to AFW Pump A drain valve). The
leakage did not effect the operability of the system.
The AOs initiated Work
Orders (WO) 944740 and 944765 to have the valves repaired.
The inspectors observed the AOs manually actuate and reset the turbine overspeed trip
device as part of the surveillance.
The AOs identified minor errors in Appendix D
drawings of the surveillance procedure that described the physical layout of the trip
linkage in an untripped condition. The minor errors showed the incorrect position of the
trip valve limitswitches in the reset position. The licensee issued Instruction Change
Request 70536 to correct these discrepancies.
The inspectors also observed maintenance technicians draw an oil sample from the
turbine inboard bearing.
The technicians performed the work activities in accordance
with the work package.
After the AFW pump had operated for 30 minutes, the vibration
technician took the required readings.
On review of the vibration data, the outboard
bearing reading was 0.3289 in/sec, which was in the alert range (>0.325 to
<0.700 in/sec).
Previous vibration readings of this bearing were below the alert range.
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This elevated reading was well within the pump operability limit of 0.700 in/sec.
The
licensee issued CRDR 2-8-0174 to evaluate the elevated reading.
Conclusions
Operations personnel conducted effective prejob briefs and demonstrated
good
communication practices during the testing of the Unit 2 steam-driven auxiliary
feedwater pump. Auxiliaryoperators demonstrated
good attention to detail during the
test as demonstrated
by'the identification of minor material deficiencies and errors in
procedure drawings.
08
Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901)
08.1
Closed
Violation VIO 50-528 529/9617-01:
Failure.to followprocedures.
In the first example of this violation, operations personnel failed to manually input a
safety equipment status system alarm when a low pressure safety injection pump was
taken out of service.
In the second example, mechanical maintenance
installed a
restraining device on a reactor coolant pump (RCP), which was not described by work
instructions and was not adequately covered under an equipment clearance.
The third
example involved a change in scope to work being performed on a RCP without
submitting the change to a work planner to amend the work instructions.
This violation
resulted from personnel errors.
Licensee corrective action for the first example included coaching of operating crew
supervisors on the procedural requirements for initiating manual safety equipment status
system alarms.
Corrective action for the second and third examples included
counseling
responsible mechanical engineering personnel on the need to fullyevaluate
current plant condition against previous evaluations when determining the actions to be
taken in the field and counseling maintenance
personnel on the need to properly sign
WOs onto the proper clearance.
These corrective actions were adequate to prevent
recurrence.
08.2
Closed
Ins ector Followu
Item
IFI 528/9616-04:
Potential for a nonsafety-related
nuclear cooling water leak into RCP oil collection system.
This item was opened pending a licensee review of a leak in nonsafety-related
nuclear
cooling water piping located near the RCP oil collection system.
The inspectors
expressed
concern that the oil collection tank could fillwith water and go unnoticed and
not provide the necessary capacity for the collection of RCP oil. The licensee initiated
CRDR 9-6;1247 to evaluate the possible methods of water intrusion into the oil
collection tank. The inspectors reviewed the CRDR, the associated
engineering
analysis, and the corrective actions to address the above concerns and found them to
be acceptable.
08.3
Closed
Licensee Event Re ort LER 50-528530/96-004-00:
Reactor trips following a
grid disturbance.
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On August 10, 1996, Units 1 and 3 were operating at 100 percent power when both
reactors tripped on low DNBR following a major electrical grid perturbation.
The reactor
trips resulted from reactor power exceeding the variable over power trip setpoint when
steam bypass control system valves opened in response
to turbine load fluctuations
induced by the grid perturbations.
Required plant equipment and safety systems
responded to the trip as designed.
Allthree units responded similarly to the load
rejection; however, Unit 2 did not trip because the moderator temperature coefficient of
reactivity was less negative than was for Units 1 and 3. The closer the units were to
end-of-core life, the more rapid the power increase and the higher probability of,
reaching variable over power trip setpoint with a decrease
temperature.
The inspectors performed a review of this LER and CRDR 1-6-0160, which documented
the reactor trip investigation.
The reactor trip investigation addressed
the followup
review of plant and system response to the event, including secondary actions to be
completed.
The inspectors considered these actions to be acceptable.
08.4
Closed
IFI 50-530/9802-02:
Assessment
of unplanned loading of the Unit 3 Vital
Battery A.
On January 21, 1998; the AC supply breaker to Vital Battery Charger A opened, leaving
Battery A supplying 125-Vdc Bus PKA-M41 for 35 minutes.
This item was opened to
evaluate the licensee assessment
of how the unplanned loading of the battery affected
battery operation.
The licensee concluded that approximately 100 to 120 amps
discharged, the inadvertent discharge did not affect operability of the battery, and a
battery recharge was not necessary.
The inspectors found no problems with the
licensee's evaluation.
08.5
Lo kee
in
Issues
Units1
2 and 3
On July 10, 1998, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty was
issued as a result of the falsification of a surveillance test record (See NRC Investigation
Reports 4-97-022S and 4-1998-014).
The following items are being opened in this
inspection report for administrative purposes to provide tracking numbers for the
violations:
VIO 50-528,529,530/9805-02
Failure to demonstrate operability of offsite
power circuits.
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VIO 50-528,529,530/9805-03
Required record was not complete and
accurate.
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VIO 50-528,529,530/9805-04
Failure to submit a LER for a condition
prohibited by Technical Specification.
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II. Maintenance
M1
Conduct of Maintenance
M1.1
General Comments on Maintenance Activities Units 1
2 and 3
a.
Ins ection Sco
e 62707
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following activities performed in
accordance with the following WOs:
835036
"Inspect and Lubricate Valve Stems Valve SIBHV679"
835037
832057
t
788800
"Inspect and Lubricate Valve Stems Valve SIBHV689"
"Calibrate Containment Spray Pump "B" Discharge Flow
Loop 3JSIBFT0348"
"Replace Motor Pinion and Worm Shaft Clutch Gears"
834458
"Perform Inspect/Test iaw 39MT-9ZZ02 of SMB-000H1BC"
b.
Observations and Findin s
The inspectors found the work performed under these activities to be properly
performed.
AIIwork observed was performed with the work package present and in
active use. Work and foreign material exclusion practices observed were good.
Technicians were experienced and knowledgeable of their assigned tasks.
c.
Conclusions
Knowledgeable technicians used approved procedures to perform routine maintenance
activities. Good work and foreign material control practices were observed.
M1.2
General Comments on Surveillance Activities Units 1
2 and 3
a.
Ins ection Sco
e 61726
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following surveillance activities:
"PPS Functional Test - RPS/ESFAS Logic," Revision 12
"Containment Spray Pumps and Check Valves - Inservice Test,"
Revision 4
(
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"S/8 ¹1 Containment Isolation and Valve Inservice Testing," Revision 15
"Train A LPSI and HP Check Valves - Inservice Test," Revision 3
"ESFAS Train A Subgroup Relay Functional Test," Revision 19
b.
Observations and Findin s
The inspectors found that knowledgeable personnel performed these surveillances
satisfactorily, as specified by applicable procedures.
c.
Conclusions
Knowledgeable technicians used approved procedures to conduct surveillance activities
in an acceptable manner.
M2
Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment
M2.1
Review of Material Condition Durin
Plant Tours
Units 1
2 and 3
a.
Ins ection Sco
e 62707
During this inspection period, routine tours of all units were conducted to evaluate plant
material condition.
b.
Observations and Findin s
On June 18, 1998,
the inspectors observed electrical technicians performing
Procedure 39MT-9ZZ02, "PM/EQPM Inspection of the GL 89-10 Limitorque SMB/SB
Valve Motor Operators," Revision 8, on Valve 3JCTAHV0001 (AFW Pump N suction).
The inspectors noted that the valve switchpack was clean and had no indication of
corrosion.
The inspectors observed the technicians take a sample of the gear box
grease.
The grease was in good condition.
Inspectors'bservation
of plant material condition during this inspection period identified
no major observable material condition deficiencies.
Minor deficiencies brought to the
attention of the licensee were documented with work requests.
Conclusions
Observable material condition of the three units was satisfactory.
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M3
Maintenance Procedures and Documentation
M3.1
Outa
e Surveillances
Unit 1
Ins ection Sco
e 61726
Inspectors evaluated the system used to track interval-based surveillance requirements
and reviewed 20 surveillance test packages and the associated WOs for surveillances
completed during the Unit 1 seventh refueling outage.
The inspectors evaluated the
following surveillance test packages:
"Excore Linear Monthly Calibration," Revision 10
"Molded Case Circuit Breaker Surveillance Test," Revision 13
"CEA Operability Checks," Revision 0
"CEAC 2 Calibration," Revision 10
73 ST-9ZZ21
73 ST-9ZZ21
"Snubber Visual Examination," Revision 4
"Snubber Visual Examination," Revision 5
"Containment Isolation Check Valves-Inservice Test," Revision 2
"Diesel Generator 'B'ir Receiver Inlet Check Valves-Inservice Test,"
Revision 2
"SG N2 Containment Isolation Valves-Inservice Test," Revision 14
"18-Month Containment Penetration Conductor Low Voltage Overcurrent
Protection (SST)," Revision 4
"18-Month Cleaning, Inspection, and Testing of the Class 1E Diesel
Generator," Revision
1
"Hydrogen Monitoring Subsystem Leakage Monitoring," Revision
1
"AuxiliaryFeedwater Pump AFN-P01 Monthly Valve Alignment,"
Revision 2
"ESF Pump Room Air Exhaust Cleanup System Operability Test 4.7.8a,"
Revision 4
"Locked Valve Monthly Surveillance," Revision 4
"18-Month Surveillance Test of Station Batteries," Revision 14
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"Weekly Shutdown Electrical Distribution Checks," Revision 13
"Pressure Instrumentation Calibration," Revision 3
"Class 1E Diesel Generator and Integrated Safeguards
Surveillance
Test-Train A," Revision 9
"Class 1E Diesel Generator and Integrated Safeguards
Surveillance
Test - Train B," Revision 9
b.
Observations and Findin s
The inspectors evaluated STAT, the database
used to track interval-based surveillance
requirements.
The licensee maintained the database
by inputting test data on a daily
basis.
The date, time, and whether the test satisfied the requirements was manually
'ntered
into STAT. This information was double checked upon receipt of the hard copy
of the work package.
The licensee used STAT to generate reports that listed tests that
exceeded the scheduled date or were past 100 percent of the allowed time interval.
This system effectively alerted the licensee to surveillance intervals approaching
expiration.
The licensee used the STAT database
to generate a generic list of outage surveillances.
Necessary signatures of operations personnel were obtained prior to commencement of
the surveillances and all data met acceptance
criteria. The inspectors determined, from
interviews with 18 C technicians, that they were knowledgeable of the surveillance
procedures and use of the measuring and test equipment.
c.
Conclusions
Performance of surveillance tests during the Unit 1 outage was good, as determined by
a review of 20 completed surveillance test packages.
The tracking. of interval-based
surveillance tests effectively scheduled tests, which prevented exceeding the expiration
date, as determined by a review of the surveillance tracking database.
M4
Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance
M4.1
Troubleshootin
Activities on Startu
Transformer NAN-X02 Unit 1
a.
Ins ection Sco
e 62707
On June 3, 1998, inspectors observed electrical technicians perform troubleshooting
activities on Startup Transformer NAN-X02. The transformer gas detector had
experienced spurious alarms.
The inspectors reviewed WO 837480, the
troubleshooting action plan, and active clearances.
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Observations and Findin s
The technicians followed the troubleshooting instructions and documented the findings,
as required.
Proper occupational safety and health administration practices for high
elevations were used while working'on top of the transformer.
The system engineer,
technicians, and operators demonstrated
good communication practices, such as repeat
backS.
The inspectors verified work control tags were properly installed on all electrical
sources to the transformer and that all electrical phases were properly grounded.
During troubleshooting activities, no other work was allowed to be conducted within the
switchyard and testing of the emergency diesel generators and gas turbine generators
was suspended.
Troubleshooting activities did not identify a single problem attributed to the gas detector
alarms; however, several loose mechanical connections were discovered and corrected.
Since Startup Transformer NAN-X02was placed back into service, no further alarms
have occurred.
On completion of the troubleshooting activities, the inspectors observed the removal of
grounding straps from the transformer.
The Unit 1 Shift Manager monitored the removal
of the grounding straps and movement of a bucketed crane within the switchyard.
Operations conducted a briefing prior to the transformer work emphasizing caution
during this high risk evolution in the switchyard. Operations oversight of this evolution
was good. The inspectors also observed the AOs remove the clearance and rack-in five
13.8-kV breakers in accordance
with Procedure 41OP-1AN01, "13.8 KV Electrical
System (NA)," Revision 23.
Conclusions
Electrical maintenance performed good troubleshooting activities on Startup
Transformer NAN-X02. During the restoration of the startup transformer, good
communications and management
oversight were noted. Work control tagging was
properly administered throughout all phases of the troubleshooting activities.
III. En ineerin
E2
Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment
E2.1
S ent Fuel Pool Coolin
S stem Modification Evaluations
Units 1 2 and 3
Ins ection Sco
e 37551
The inspectors reviewed the circumstances
of a nonconformance condition that existed
in the spent fuel pool cooling system in all three units (Trains A and B) except Unit 1
Train B. The inspectors reviewed associated WOs, evaluations, and held discussions
with design engineering personnel.
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b.
Observations and Findin s
The modification provided for the installation of an Annubar-style flow meter in the
PC system discharge piping. During the final review of the implementation plant change
work orders (PCWO), the licensee identified a problem with the installation of the
modifications. The design modification specified piping material classification HCCA,
which required the use of ASME,Section II, Class 3 material. The implementing PCWO
specified commercial-grade material. The modification included installation of a 1-inch
stainless steel, socket-welded piping cap.
However, the PCWOs specified American
Society for Testing and Materials commercial-grade material for this component.
The inspectors reviewed the deficiency work order that provided a conditional release
disposition to leave the pipe cap, as installed, and rework with the correct material at a
later date.
The licensee based the use-as-is conditional release on the following:
The pipe caps were the same material (A182/SA182 Type-304 stainless steel)
specified for the application; therefore, the material was compatible for the
system pressure ratings and allowable stress.
The pipe caps were installed and welded by certified welding personnel using
qualified w'eld procedures.
I
The welding process required liquid penetrant examinations of the final weld
passes.
These nondestructive examination tests'were satisfactorily completed.
The modification successfully passed the inservice leak test.
Visual examinations were successful.
Maintenance engineering recommended replacement of the pipe caps with the correct
grade of material during the next 12-week schedule.
The inspectors verified'that the
licensee initiated deficiency work requests to rework the pipe caps on all affected trains.
The licensee initiated CRDR 9-8-0998 to evaluate how the wrong material was
translated from the design modification into the individual PCWOs.
Review of the
licensee's evaluation willbe tracked as an IFI (50-528,529,539/9805-05).
Conclusions
Licensee actions to identify deficiencies and initiate corrective actions associated
with a
plant modification, which installed flow meters in the spent fuel pool cooling system were
good. The licensee identified that incorrect material had been used to install the flow
meters; however, the use-as-is evaluation provided appropriate justification based on
testing and material type.
,'l
1
-13-
IV. Plant Su
ort
Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls
General Comments on Radiation Protection
Controls
Units 1
2 and 3
Ins ection Sco
e 71750
The inspectors toured the radiological controlled area of all units and observed RP
postings of radiation, high radiation, locked high radiation, and contaminated areas.
Observations and Findin s
On June 29, 1998, the inspectors observed numerous contaminated areas where loose
materials (e.g., station pole, lead shielding, floor drain cover, rags, and poly bags) were
left unattended.
These deficiencies were brought to the attention of RP management
and were quickly corrected.
Upon exiting the radiological controlled area, an inspector alarmed the personnel
contamination monitor. While performing a required postcontamination monitor frisk, a
discrete particle was detected on the front of the inspector's clothing. The RP technician
performed a detailed survey and decontaminated
the inspector's clothing with adhesive
tape.
The particle had an activity of 6,000 dpm. The RP technician appropriately
questioned the inspector as to the locations that had been entered.
The inspector
stated that he had not entered any contaminated areas.
RP technicians conducted surveys of the areas the inspector had traveled.
An
additional particIe with an activity of 10,000 dpm was found while performing large area
wipe-downs in the letdown heat exchanger valve gallery, outside a posted contamination
area.
This area had been sprayed with reactor coolant from a recent letdown line break
that occurred on May 24. The majority of the valve gallery was subsequently
decontaminated
and released.
The inspectors reviewed licensee contamination surveys
of the letdown heat exchanger valve gallery after the letdown line break and found them
to be acceptable.
The licensee reposted the letdown heat exchanger valve gallery as a
contaminated area pending further decontamination.
On June 30, the inspectors conducted a tour of the Unit 3 auxiliary and radwaste
buildings with a member of RP management.
The inspectors and the licensee identified
several contamination control devices (drip basins) that may not have performed their
intended function of containing minor valve stem leakage and boron crystals.
The
licensee also found a drip basin device that was mounted to a remote valve actuator,
which had been operated and caused the drip basin to turn upside down. The inspector
noted that the basin did not affect the operability of the valve. The licensee performed a
survey of the area and found no contamination and corrected the placement of the drip
basin.
RP management
directed the RP decontamination crew to evaluate the
condition of all basins in each unit. The decontamination crew inspected all basins and
corrected the small number of basins found to be inadequate
-14-
Allobserved radiation areas, high radiation areas, locked high radiation areas, and
contaminated areas were adequately posted with signs appropriate for existing
conditions.
c.
Conclusions
Radiological protection postings of observed radiation, high radiation, and locked high
radiation areas were accurate for existing conditions.
Radiological housekeeping
practices in observed contaminated areas were adequate.
Decontamination activities
and subsequent
surveys of the letdown heat exchanger valve gallery after a letdown line
break in the room were satisfactory.
R4
Staff Knowledge and Performance
R4.1
Chemist
Sam
lin of the Reactor Coolant S stem
Unit 3
a.
Ins ection Sco
e 71750
Inspectors observed the performance of two surveillance tests associated
with the
chemistry and specific activity of the RCS. The following procedures were used during
performance of the surveillances and were reviewed by inspectors:
"Reactor Coolant System Chemistry Surveillance Test," Revision 5
74OP-9SS01
"Reactor Coolant System Specific ActivitySurveillance Test," Revision 6
"Primary Sampling Instructions," Revision 12
74CH-9XC80 "Basic Chemistry Analysis," Revision 0
"Operation and Calibration of the lon Chromatograph," Revision 9
74CH-9XC40 "Operation and Calibration of the Hewlett-Packard Gas Chromatograph,"
Revision 4
"Boron Autotitrator Operation and Calibration," Revision 19
74CH-9XC50 "Operation and Calibration of the Gamma Spectrometry System,"
Revision 7
"RCS Gross ActivityDetermination," Revision
1
"Iodine-131 Dose Equivalent Determination," Revision 5
74CH-9XC58 "Data Correlation, Evaluation and Review," Revision 4
"LAC Performance," Revision 2
-15-
"Systems Chemistry Specifications," Revision 4
b.
Observations and Findin s
The inspectors observed the performance of the surveillance tests for measuring the
amount of dissolved oxygen, chlorides, fluorides, and specific activity of the RCS and
~
noted that all of the surveillance requirements were met. The chemistry technician
complied with the applicable procedures and followed good radiological practices.
These practices included keeping the tygon tube, used for RCS flow to the sampling
sink, in the sink drain when not in use; rinsing the sink with demineralized water after
preparing the RCS sample; and implementing an effective system of glove layering to
maintain noncontaminated
hands.
In addition, the chemistry technician was
knowledgeable of the procedures and usage of the test instrumentation.
c.
Conclusions
Good radiological practices were followed during performance of surveillances to
measure the chemistry and specific activity of the reactor coolant system.
The
chemistry technician was knowledgeable of the procedures and of the usage of the test
instrumentation.
R8
Miscellaneous RP &Chemistry Issues
R8.1
Postin
of Notices to Workers
Units 1
2 and 3
. a.
Ins ection Sco
e 71750
I
The inspectors verified the licensee's posting of notices to workers, as required by
10 CFR 19.11 and Procedure 93DP-OLC05, "Regulatory Interaction and
Correspondence
Control," Revision 1.
b.
Observations and Findin s
Five bulletin boards containing the required information were located in conspicuous
areas throughout the site. This included the entrance to the protected area, bottom
floors of Buildings A and B, pedestrian exit of the parking lot in front of Building E, and
pedestrian exit to the parking lot in front of the warehouse.
Conclusions
The posting of regulatory notices to workers conformed to 10 CFR 19.11 requirements
and the implementing procedure.
Postings were located in-highly-visible and
well-traveled areas.
'1
J
.
E.
-16-
V. Mana ement Meetin s
X1
Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at
the conclusion of the inspection on July 15, 1998. The licensee acknowledged the
findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any material examined during the inspection
should be considered proprietary.
No proprietary information was identified.
h
I
i
ATTACHMENT
PARTIALLIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
D. Carnes, Unit 1 Department Leader, Operations
D. Fan, Acting Department Leader, System Engineering
R. Fullmer, Director, Nuclear Assurance
R. Henry, Site Representative,
Salt River Project
W. Ide, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering
D. Kanitz, Engineer, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
A. Krainik, Department Leader, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
J. Levine, Senior Vice President, Nuclear
D. Mauldin, Director, Maintenance
D. Marks, Section Leader, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
G. Overbeck, Vice President, Nuclear Production
F. Riedel, Department Leader, Operations Standards
J. Scott, Director, Site Chemistry
M. Shea, Director, Radiation Protection
D. Smith, Director, Operations
B. Thiele, Section Leader, Reactor Engineering
T. Trieckef, Department Leader, Outage and Planning
e
IP 61726:
IP 62707:
IP 71707:
IP 71750:
IP 92901:
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
Onsite Engineering
Surveillance Observations
Maintenance Observations
Plant Operations
Plant Support Activities
Plant Operations Followup
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
~Oened
50-528/9805-01
Failure to document valve configuration change.
50-528,529,530/9805-02
Failure to demonstrate operability of offsite power circuits.
50-528,529,530/9805-03
Required record was not complete and accurate.
50-528,529,530/9805-04
50-528,529,530/9805-05
Failure to submit an LER for a condition prohibited by
Technical Specification.
IFI
DM Piping Material Information incorrectly translated into
PCWOs.
l .
-2-
Closed
50-528,529/9617-01
50-528/9616-04
Failure to followprocedures by operators with three
different examples.
IFI
Potential for a nonsafety-related
NCW leak into RCP oil
collection system.
50-528,530/96-004-00
50-530/9802-02
LER
Reactor trips due to grid disturbance
IFI
Assessment
of unplanned loading of Unit 3 Vital Battery A.
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
CFR
CRDR
LPD
NRC
PCWO
auxiliary operator
Code of Federal Regulations
core protection calculator
condition report/disposition request
departure from nucleate boiling
disintegrations per minute
instrumentation and control
inspector followup item
licensee event report
local power density
mountain standard time
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
spent fuel pool
plant change work order
reactor coolant pump
public document room
radiation protection
violation
work order