ML17306A179

Calculation 13-NC-SQ-200, Sample Line Plateout.

ML17306A179
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	12/07/1990
From:	ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:
Shared Package
ML17306A178	List: ML17306A177 ML17306A179
References
13-NC-SQ-200, NUDOCS 9110040136
Download: ML17306A179 (164)

Text

/ rW't r i av I I t I".)Ij  : '" i(I""ItIIItIt'llt (It II Palo Vertte Nuclear Generating Station CALCULATIONREVISION/TITLESHEET CALCULATlON NO REV. CLASS: AFFECIED SHEET NO(S) 13-NC-SQ-200 2 qmjgAG Q NqRP All CALCULAT1ON TITLE Sample Line Plateout AFFECTED CHANGES REFERENCE(S) UN1TS AFFECrED Qx UNIT 1 N/A MNCR 90-SQ-10 PxUNIT2 x UNIT3 Q COMMON REASON FOR CHANGE

1. Requirements to incorporate plateout calculations for post accident monitors

2. Make corrections for actual sample line length and expected iodine isotopic distribution

3. Provide justification for fixed mode sampling DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE Calculation was completely revised.

l' N/> N/tt r/'f/rt Nlrt 1 o 1-j0 Mech. Civil rt ice Ihc ceh ical Review Other (Specify Orgt)

Other (S peel fy Orft) RS Date Date Date Date CROSS DISCIPLINE REVIEW Proeootfttro 6t DPACCO4 9110040136 cp10ct/0 PDR ADOCK 05000528 PDR

+I I eA 0

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~ ENGINEERING SKETCH F hZ/6jHO SUBJECT'ample Line Plateout SHSS'1 NOJ JOB 2

Rev.

f30 NO'3-NC-SQ-200 2

Table of Contents

.I Purpose 1

3 '

~ 1

'ummary Criteria and Assumptions

'I

. Xnput Data h

'I 5.

" h Calculation and Results

. Ref erences 30 I

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/J.W~ Sample Line Plateout 30 HECIIE BY OAT E JOB NO l~ ~ 9a 13-NC-SQ-200

~ =~ I - ~

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PURPOSE the sample line of this calculation is to. estimate iodine--sampling-.i-:

The purpose

'ransmission I

factors- for particulates- and i

..I associated with radiation monitors RU-1, RU-8,,'= RU-14,.'- RU-141, RU-142; RU-143, RU-144, RU-145, and RU-146. The'purpose of this revision is to 1) Add monitors RU-142, RU-144,:--and- RU-146;

2) Incorporate the actual flow rates used; 3) Incorporate, the actual'easured - particle size distribution; 4),Incorporate the

iodine

chemical species ratio from EPRI Report:NP-939;(Ref.5);--;-;*

5) Demonstrate .the preferability of operating the monitors in a i fixed sample flow rate mode as opposed to automatic proportional i RAW ~ ~ I I 1 I

J i

SUMMARY

I

~ ~

I

-.'he actual sample line losses for any given sample line under any

, conditions cannot be known. The purpose of this calculation is to provide a'reasonable estimate of the line losses based on

,'projected .,values of relative humidity, particle

~

size distribution,'hemical form, and

~ ~ ~

particle shape and density,

'radioactivity -transport method;

~ ~

sampling system operation.

Based. on the assumptions of this calculation, the sample lines

~

are calculated to have the following transmission factors.

Particulate Iodine Monitor Transmission Transmission 13-J-SQB-001 0.963 0.748 13-J-SQN-008 0.917 0. 718 13-J-SQN-014 0.970 0.856 13-J-SQN-141 0.989 0.862 13-J-SQN-143 0.973 0.855 13-J-SQN-145 0.902 0.705 13-J-SQN-142 0.796 , 0. 040

~ 13-J-SQN-144 0.810 0; 040 13-J-SQN-146 0.829 0. 040

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~ ENGINEERING SKETCH P SUBJECT SHEET NO Rev. 2 P Q~< Sample Line Plateout 4 o(30 JOB NO 13-NC-SQ-200 I

'I I ICRITERIA'AND ASSUMPTIONS ratio of chemical species of the iodines for V V

=The assumed

'onaccident 'onitors 'is in accordance with EPRI'eport NP-939 v

.'(Ref.5) (i.e. 24 particulate. iodine, 274 . elemental iodine,. 40.

'OI,'nd 31% organic iodides). The ratios used for post, accident

monitors are taken from Regulatory Guide 1.4 (Ref.5) (i.e., 914 elemental. iodine, 54 particulate iodine, 44 organic iodides).

,Relative humidity for 'iodine sampling is assumed to be 974. V 1

'I

~

Tubing used for sample lines is not chemically cleaned.

I

.The,,Kabat,model,'(Ref.2) is used for .estimating. iodine 1

'transmission factors. ~

Losses within the sample. nozzle.. assembly are, considered Inegligible.

The particle. size. distributions used for all monitors with. the distribution of the effluent ----

~

exception of RU-1 are a composite

'monitors-taken from pages '4-15-"through 4-33 of. the SAIC Report (Ref . 3).. '. The distribution used for RU-1 is a composite taken from pages 4-7 through 4-13 of this same report.

All particles are assumed to be spherical with a particle density of 2.0 g/cm V The .methods of ANSI N13.1-1969 (Ref.1) are used for estimating particulate losses.

Radioactivity is .assumed..to be proportional. to the surface area ...

of the particles. Hence, transmission factors for particles are calculated in terms of the fraction of particle surface area transmitted.

Monitors RU-1, RU-8, and RU-14 operate at 'their design value of CFM. Monitors RU-141, RU-143, and RU-145 operate at.2.0,CFM..

'.0 Monitors RU-142, RU-144, and RU-146 operate at 1000 cc/min.

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~ ENGINEER1NG SKETCH P

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Rev. 2

"-> /~ 4'o SUBJECT Sample Line Plateout SHEET NO,'

f30 JOB NO 13-NC-SQ-200 o

'NPUT DATA

Sample Flow Rate> = 2;0 ft /min or 943.9 cm /sec (60 sec/min)

. Sample Flow, Rate> = 3.

1 0 ft /min or 1416 cm /sec (60 sec/min)

Tubing = 3/8 in. O.D. x 0.065 in. wall stainless steel Pipe = 1" schedule 40 (1.049" X.D.)

RU-1 Sample. Line. Length = 61.7'otal, 37.7'orizontal (Ref.7,8)

RU-8 Sample Line Length = 91.8'otal, 75.2'orizontal (Ref.8)

. RU-14 Sample Line Length = 20.6'otal, 19.'6'orizontal (Ref.10)

RU-141 Sample Line Length = 12.9'otal, 11.9'orizontal (Ref.9)

~ I I t

RU-143-Sample Line Length = 14.0'otal, 11.5'orizontal (Ref.9)

RU-145 Sample Line Length = 76.3'otal. 66.4'orizontal(Ref.11)

RU-142 Sample Line Length = 29.0'otal, 24.5'..Horizontal RU-144 Sample Line Length = 22.0'otal, 20.0'orizontal RU-146 Sample Line Length = 14.0'otal, 11.0'orizontal CALCULATION AND RESULTS The methodology employed in the calculation is common between the all .of..the Radiation Monitors. This consists of:

1) Calculate the iodine and particulate sample line characteristics common to all the sample lines.

2) Calculate the iodine sample line transmission for each of the iodine species.

3) Calculate the weighted average gaseous iodine transmission factor using the assumed chemical species ratio..

4) Calculate the percentage'f" the total'-surface-'area associated with each particle size group.

e 5)

Calculate 'he" transmission group..:...

1 factor for each 'article' size 6)Calculate the weightedaverage 'transmission factor, in terms of surface area, for all particles.

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ENGINEERING SKETCH PS Rev. 2 SUBJECT SHEET NO Sample Line Plateout 6 f30 0 IIT JOB NO E'Z. 13-NC-SQ-200 CkahIiI 7 9o

~~ 6 Common Sample Line Parameters

, ~Tubin I

~ ~ 6 Sample Line I. D. Radius = (0.375 in./2) 0.065 in = 0.1225 in

'ample Line I. D. Radius in cm = 0.1225 in x 2.54 cm/in = 0.311 cm Sample Line I.D. Cross Section Area =

'0. 311 cm) x PI = 0. 304 cm I

Sample Line Internal Surface Area per cm =

(0.311 cm x 2). x 1 cm/cm x PI = 1.95 cm /cm Sample 'Line Internal Volume per cm =

6 0.304 cm x 1 cm/cm = 0.304 cm /cm Velocity = (16.67 cm /sec)/0.304 cm = 54.84 cm/sec Residence Time = 1/54.84 cm/sec = 0.0182 sec/cm

~Pi e Sample Line .I.D. Radius = (1.049 in./2) = 0.524 in Sample Line I.D. Radius in cm = 0.524 in x 2.54 cm/in = 1.331 cm Sample Line I.D. Cross Section Area =

(1. 331 cm) x PI = 5. 566 cm Sample Line Internal Surface Area per cm =

(1.331 cm x 2) x 1 cm/cm x PI = 8.363 cm /cm Sample Line Internal Volume per cm =

5.566 cm2 x 1 cm/cm = 5.566 cm /cm t Velocity>. (943.9 cm /sec)/5.566 Residence. Time> = 1/169.58 cm/sec = 0.00590 sec/cm Velocity> = (1416 cm /sec) /5.566 Residence Time> = 1/254.40 cm/sec = 0.00393 sec/cm cm cm

=.169.58 cm/sec

= 254.40 cm/sec 4IOANIIIIn 62%$ OIJI KOIOOI66$ 6$ 0

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Rev. 2 SUBJECT SHEET NO,I Sample Line Plateout 7 i30 CI C EOOT OATS JOO NO l~ 13-NC-SQ-200 7 QO h

Iodine Parameters "h

From KabatTs model:

Du = (Vg x Au x Ru)/Vu Where; Du = Iodine Deposition per Unit Length Vg = Deposition Velocity for the Iodine Specie

Au =. Internal Surface Area per Unit Length

. R = Residence Time per Unit Length

.Vu =. Internal Volume per Unit Length

'In this particular case;

~

V (I2) 2 =. = 1. 6 x 10 cm/sec (Ref . 2) g Vg (HOI) = = 1.8 x 10 cm/sec (Ref.2)

V (CH3I2) = = 8. 0 x 10 cm/sec (Ref . 2) g Au (pipe) = 8. 363 cm /cm Au(tubing) = 1.95 cm /cm Ru(pipe)2 = 0.00590 sec/cm Ru(pipe)3 = 0.00393 sec/cm Ru(tubing) = 0.0182 sec/cm Vu(pipe) = 5.566 cm /cm Vu(tubing) = 0.304 cm /cm Du(E2) (pipe)2 ~ (1.6E-1 cm/sec x 8.363 cm 2 /cm x O.pp59p sec/cm)/5.566 cm 3 /cm =

1.42E-3 cm

" Du(Z2) (pipe)'3'"(1:6E-l cm/sec x 8.363 cm 2

/cm x O'QQ393 sec/cm)/5.566 cm 3 /cm =

9.45E-4 cm

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'+ENGINEERING SKETCH PO Rev. 2 P

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<EOBY SUBJECT Sample Line Plateout SHEET NO JOB NO 8 f30 E BATE'~7

&o 13-NC-SQ-200 3

'u(I2) (tube) = (1.6E-1 cm/sec x 1.95 cm 2

/cm x 0.0182 sec/cm)/0.304 cm /cm =

1.86E-2 cm Du(HOI)(pipe)2= (1.8E-3 cm/sec x 8.363 cm 2 /cm x 0.00590 sec/cm)/5.566 cm 3 /cm ~

1.60E-5 cm Du(HOI)(pipe)3= (1.8E-3 cm/sec x 8.363 cm 2

/cm x 0.00590 sec/cm)/5.566 cm 3 /cm ~

1.06E-5 cm 2 3 Du(HOI) (tube) = (1.8E-3 cm/sec x 1.95 cm /cm x 0.0182 sec/cm)/0.304 cm /cm =

2.10E-4 cm 2

Ik Du(CH3I2) (pipe)2=(S.OE-6 cm/sec x 8.363 cm /cm x 0.00590 sec/cm)/5.566 cm /cm=

3'.09E-S cm Du(CH3I2)(pipe)3=(S.OE-6 cm/sec x 8.363 cm 2

/cm x 0.00393 sec/cm)/5.566 cm 3 /cm=

4.72E-S cm 2 3 Du(CH3I2) (tube)=(S.OE-6 cm/sec x 1.95 cm /cm x 0.0182 sec/cm)/0.304 cm /cm =

9.34E-7 cm Additionally from Kabat, the total .transmission is determined by; TL e-DUe x L (2)

Where.;

TL = Total Transmission Fraction L = Sample Line Length JIO.OOVNn 1? 8$ 6?'1 %0iIY? PO?0

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OENGINEER)NG SKETCH PJO Rev. 2 SUBJECT SHEET NO

/2 4 '7d Sample Line Plateout 9 <30 CI CKEO BT PATE JOB NO t27 D 13-NC-SQ-200

" Particulate-parameters Reynold's Number. is determined by;

~ =- I - ~

I ~ ~

Re = D x V x Ro / Mu (3)

Where; . 'e

= Reynold's Number

, D = Pipe or Tubing Inside Diameter I

... V = Velocity 5

Ro = Density of Air t .

Mu =

(pipe)

D(tubing)

Viscosity of Air In this. case; .. 2

= 2. 664 cm

= 0.622 cm V(pipe)2 = 169.58 cm/sec V(pipe)3 = 254.40 cm/sec V(tubing) = 54.84 cm/sec Ro = 1.2E-3 g/cm (Ref.1)

Mu = 1;8E-4 g/cm-sec (Ref.1)

Re (pipe)2 = 2.664 cm x 169.58 cm/sec x 1.2E-3 g/cm 3 /1.8E-4g/cm-sec = 3011e7 2.664 cm x 254.40 cm/sec x 1.28-3 g/cm 3 /1.8E-4g/cm-sec = 4518.1 R (pipe)3 R (tube) = 0.622 cm x 54.84 cm/sec x 1.28-3 g/cm 3 /1.88-4g/cm-sec' 227.4 If Re > 2100; Flow is Turbulent (Ref.1)

If Re ( 2100; Flow 'is 'Laminar (Ref;1) 410 O)V BEY IP ES 074I 900I00PP'4A

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Ir ENGlNEERlNQ SKETCH POD Rev. 2 SUBJECT. SHEET NOJ Sample Line Plateout 10 f 30 PATE' JOB NO 13-NC-SQ-200 r

From" ANSI-'N13.1-1969 'Ref.l), the primary particle loss P I

)

)

mechanisms to be, considered under the calculated flow conditions

are Gravity Deposition and Turbulent Deposition for the pipe sample lines and Gravity Deposition for the tubing lines.-

I L100

~

Gravity Deposition Losses are determined by; SrV/3ut , (4)

,I

'here; i

L100 = Length for 1004 deposition

r. = radius of the tube

)

' = average velocity P ut'= terminal settling velocity P

.Also;, . r L50 0 354 L100

~ (5)

Where L50 is 'the 50> deposition line length To determine ut,.

~-

ut = (g) (dp) (Rop Rog) (K ) /18(Mu) (6)

Where; g = gravitational constant dp = diameter of the particle Ro = density of the particle p

Ro = density of air Mu = viscosity of air K '

Cunningham correction for'slip" (Ref.1) e d d

= . 2 pm, Km = 1.075 5 pm K' '1.032 p

dp = 10 pm, K = 1.016

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~ ENGINEERING SKETCH f4)

~

s Rev. 2 OAT E SUBJECT, SHEET HO

/z4 5o Sample Line Plateout 11 of 30 JOB NO 13-NC-SQ-200

~ In this case; g = 980 cm/sec d 0 ~ 15 g 0 ~ 22 g 0 ~ 34 I 0 ~ 52 I 0 ~ 74 ~ 1 ~ 02 g 1 ~ 34 I 1 ~ 72 T 2 ~ 14 g 2 ~ 62 3.14, 3.72, 4.34, 5.02, 5.74, 7.20 (x 10 cm) (Ref.3)

Ro = 2.0 g/cm P

Ro = 1. 2E-3 g/cm (Ref . 1) 9 Mu = 1.8E-4 g/cm-sec (Ref.1)

K =. 1.075 for dp < 2 pm K = [(1.075 1.032)((5-d )/3)]+1.032 for 2 pm < dp < 5.pm K = [(1.032 1.016)((10-dp)/5)]+1.016 for 5 pm < dp < 10 pm The following are the Calculational Results for 2.0 CFM, 1" Pipe; Particle Size (pm) Ut 100 (cm) L50 (cm) 0.15 1.075 1.46E-04 4116044.20 1457079. 65 0.22 1.075 3.15E-04 1913450.30 677361.41 0.34 1.075 7.51E-04 801133.17 283601.14 0.52 1.075 1.76E-03 342496.28 121243.68 0.74 1. 075 3.56E-03 169121.61 59869.05 1.02 1. 075 6.76E-03 89014.80 31511.24 1.34 , . 1.075 1.17E-02 51576.63 18258-13 1.72 1. 075 1.92E-02 31304.42 11081.76 2.14 1. 073 2.97E-02 20260.33 7172;16

'.62 1.066 4.42E-02 13603. 95, 4815.80 3.14 1.059 6.31E-02 9537.95 3376.44 3.72 1.050 8.79E-02 6849.40 2424.69 4.34 1.041 1.19E-01 5075.15 1796.60 5.02 1.032 1.57E-01 3828.34 1355.23 5.74 1.030 2.05E-01 2934.71 1038.89 7.20. 1.025 3.21E-01 1873.70 . 663.29 ciO.OOVAcv 1T OS O al OOOIDOPO'SO

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~ ENGINEERING SKETCH P%

SUBJECT; SHEET NO 0 Rev. 2

/2 4/lo Sample Line Plateout 12 oi 30 JOO NO 13-NC-SQ-200 I

a following are the Calculational Results for 3. 0 1" Pipe; I

, The CFM, I

", Particle

.: Size(pm)... I Km 100 (cm L50 (cm) 0.15 ' 1.075 1.46E-04 6174794.46 2185877

0. 22.',',, 1. 075 3.15E-04 2870513-96 425451.88

'4

'4'016161

0. 34 1. 075 7.51E-04 1201841.48

0. 52 "

1. 075 1.76E-03 513805-01 181886.97"

0. 74 .. 1. 075 3.56E-03 253712.34 89814.17

.1. 02 1. 075 6.76E-03 133537.94 47272.43 1.34 '1.075 1. 17E-02 "

77374.07 . 27390.42

.. 1.72 ....1.075. 1.92E-02 46962.17 16624.61 2.14 .1.073 '7E-02 30394.07 10759-50 2;62

..'3. 14;,:.... 1. 059

'.066 2 4 '2E-02 6.31E-02 20408.33

'4308.62

-= 7224.55 5065.25 3.72 I '1.050 8.79E-02 10275.31 3637.46 4.34;"'.041'.02, 1.19E-01 7613.62 2695.22 1.032 1.57E-01 5743.19 2033.09 5.74 7.20

'.030

1.025 2.05E-01 3.21E-01 4402.58 2810.88 1558.51 995.05 The following are the Calculational Results for 1000 cc/min, 3/8" Tubing; Particle Size(pm) Llpp (cm) (cm)

't

0. 15 0.22 1.075 1.075 1.46E-04 3.15E-04 311017 '5 144584.70 110100.28 51182.98 0.34 1.075 7.51E-04 60535.46 21429.55 0.52 1.075 1.76E-03 "25879.81 9161.45'523.84 0.74 1.075 3.56E-03 12779.22 1.02 1.075 6.76E-03 6726.16 2381.06 1.34 1.075 1.17E-02 3897.25 1379.63 1 '2

2. 14 1.075 1.073 2.97E-02

'.92E-02 2365.43 1530.92 837.36 541.94

2. 62 1. 066 4.42E-02 1027.95 363.89'55.13

3. 14. 1.059 720.71 141.58'50"135:76

'.31E-02 3.72 ~

1. 050 8.79E-02 517.56 183.21

'4. 34 1. 041 1.'9E-01 383.49

5. 02., , 1.032 1.57E-01. 289.28 ..:....102.40 .,

5.74 '

7.20 ';025 1.030 2.05E-01 3.21E-01 221.75 78.50

"50.'12

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Il ENGINEERING SKETCH P%I Rev. 2 SUBJECT SHEET NO Sample Line Plateout 13 t 30 C ECK OBY OAT E JOB NO 13-NC-SQ-200

'article Size Distribution

Particle Surface Area;

'I A=4 PIr (7)

Where;

' = Surface area of a spherical particle r = 1/2 the particle diameter Group Area = Particle Area x Count '(8)

Area Fraction = Group Area / Z Group Area (9)

'Summarizing the results of the SAIC Report (Ref.3), pages 4-15 through 4-33, in terms of size and surface area distribution; Size Size Particle Group Area Range Average Count Areg Arey Fraction (pm) (pm) (pm ) (pm )

0. 12-0. 17 0. 15 380189977 0. 071 26874045 0. 122

0. 17-0. 27 0.22 294896809 0. 152 44839969 0.203 0.27-0.42 0.42-0.62 0

0.52

'4 109505059 24305816 0.363 0.849 39768745 20647466 0.180 0.093

'0.62-0.87 0.74 12151954 1.720 20905445 0.095 0.87-1.17 1.02 4739421 3.269 15490859 0.070 1.17-1.52

'.52-1.92 1

1-72

'4 2023135 828373 5.641 9.294 11412593 7698971 0.052 0.035.

1.92-2.37 2. 14 384324 14.387 5529360 0.025 2.37-2.87 2. 62 196118 21.565 4229313 0.019 2.87-3.42 3. 14 112738 30.975 3492042 0.016 3.42-4.02 3.72 63610 43.475 2765420 0.013 4.02-4.67 4.34 38297 59.174 2266178 0.010

4. 67-5. 37" 5.02 26862 79.169 2126648 0 010- "-'-

5. 37-6. 12 5.74 16172. 103.508 1673930 0.008

> 6.12 7.20 69783 162.860 11364870 0 '51 TOTAL 829548448 221085860

'a

~ I

~ ENGINEERING SKETCH SUBJECT SHEET NOJ Rev. 2

/2/C/in Sample Line P 1 ateout 14 30 DATE JOB NO 1 3-NC-SQ-2 00 For RU-1,'ummarizing the results of the SAIC Report (Re f . 3 )

I pages 4-7 through 4- 13, in terms of size and surface area distribution; i.

'I Size , Size Particle Group Area Range; Average Count Are~ Areg ~

Fraction (pm )

(pm) (pm) (pm )

0 ~ 1 2-0 ~ 17 0 ~ 15 859833 159 0 ~ 07 1 60778025 0 ~ 1 65 0 ~ 17-0 ~ 27 0 ~ 22 520359444 0 ~ 1 52 79 122258 0 ~ 2 15 0 ~ 27-0 ~ 4 2 0 ~ 34 44028 1904 0 ~ 3 63 159896347 0 ~ 435 0 ~ 4 2-0 ~ 62 0 ~ 52 17838963 0 ~ 84 9 15153961 0 ~ 04 1 0 ~ 62-0 ~ 87 0 ~ 74 4523625 1 ~ 720 7782 156 0 ~ 02 1 0 ~ 87-1 ~ 17 1. 02 15357 19 3 ~ 269 5019518 0 ~ 0 14 1 ~ 17-1 ~ 52~ 1 34

~ 668384 5 ~ 64 1 3770383 ~

~

0~ 010 1 ~ 52- 1 ~ 92 ~ 1 72

~ 325 190 9 ~ 294 3022344 0~ 008 1 ~ 92-2 ~ 37 2 14

~ 1 673 00 1 4 ~ 3 87 2406985 0~ 007 2 ~ 37-2 ~ 87 2 62

~ 1 0754 6 2 1 ~ 565 23 19245 0~ 006 2 ~ 87-3 ~ 42 3. 14 7594 1 3 0 ~ 975 235226 1 0 ~ 006 3 ~ 42-4 ~ 02 3 72

~ 484 04 4 3 ~ 475 2 104345 0 ~ 006

4. 02-4.67 4 34

~ 3 6028 59 ~ 174 2 13 19 13 0 ~ 006 4 67-5 3 7

~ ~ 5 02

~ 3 0025 79 ~ 1 69 2377 06 1 0 ~ 006 5 ~,37-6 ~ 1 2 5 ~ 74 21 155 1 03 ~ 508 2 1 897 1 0 0 ~ 006 6 ~ 12 7 20

~ 103306 162 ~ 860 16824432 0 ~ 046 TOTAL 1845956093 3 6725094 5 41040V llew lp $5 Q1J I flfgll(gPOD)

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~ ENGINEERING SKETCH PO SUBJECT SHEET NO Rev. 2 IZ/g vIo Sample Line Plateout 15 of 30 HEC OB JOB NO

'*i'Q~sc 13-NC-SQ-200

'stransmission l

I will-'e fraction t

calculated on'he following pages I

for each size can estimated by the pipe the. formula;

=: '10) 1 TF = e ( ' 50)( h) i I

. Where; TF p

= Pi p e Transmission Fraction for the size group

-. Lh = Length of the horizontal sections of the sample line

~, ~

Turbulent Deposition Losses Turbulent-deposition losses of the larger particles (greater than .--

1.0 pm) is evaluated using Table B3 of ANSI N13.1-1969 .(Ref.1).

'orf the pipe portion, turbulent. losses, the Reynolds numbers are 3011.7 and=4518.1. The first value is below the minimum value of Table B3 indicating that turbulent losses are small. The second

. ~

value is only about half of the Table B3 value of 8000 for 2 cm tubing" indicating that'urbulent- losses- are- again small.

this reason, only Gravity Deposition Losses are considered.

For Total- Sample Line Transmission- is;-

TF = Z (TF x TFt x SAF) p Where; TF = Total Transmission Factor SAF = Surface area fraction 41'OV Rev 12 85 OTll400>OOPOi'v0

v ~' ~

k gl 0

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~ ENGINEERING SKETCH P SUBJECT SHEET NO Rev. 2 jJ /z/4 j9c'AT Sample Line Plateout 16 30 C> E KEO BY E JOB NO 13-NC-SQ-200 7 O

~Containment Atmosphere Calculation (RU-1)

IIodine Calculations ft x 30.48 cm/ft il I T,I T e-9.45E-4/cm x 61.7 0 169 T IHpIT e-1 06E-5/cm x 61. 7 ft x 30. 48 cm/ ft p 98p 4 72E 8/cm x 61.7 ft x 30.48 cm/ft 1 pp Total Transmission Factor (0.169 x 0.27) + (0.980 x 0.40) + (1.00 x 0.31) = 0.748 Particulate Calculations = ~,

Lh = 37.7 ft x 30.48 cm/ft

, ~

= 1149 cm Size Transmission Transmission Range Factor Fraction (pm) TFp TFT 0.12-0.17 1. 000 0. 165

0. 17-0. 27 0.999 0. 215 0.27-0.42 0.998 0. 435 0.42-0.62 0.996 0. 041 0.62-0.87 0.991 0. 021 0.87-1.17 0.983 0. 013 1.17-1.52 0.971 0.010 1.52-1.92 0.953 0.008 1.92-2.37 0.929 0.006 2.37-2.87 0.896 0.006 2 '7-3 '2 0.855 0.005 3.42-4.02 0.803 0.005 4.02-4.67 0.744 0.004 4.67-5.37 0.676 0.004 5.37-6.12 0.600 0.004

> 6.12 0.449 0.021 Total Transmission 0. 963

~ >O.OOV Aei >2 OS OT'H9OO>OOTiOigl

~ W<

1 ~

r~

't4

~ g

~ ENG(NEERING'SKETCH P)

SUBJECT'ample SHEET NOJ Rev. 2 12 ( 9O Line Plateout 17 1 30 E 4ECKE BY DATE JOB NO;

'l 4)D 13-NC-SQ-200 Auxiliary, Building Calculfation (RU<<8) t I

)Iodine Calculations,

' 'I ' e 9.45E-4/cm x 91.8 ft x 30. 48 cm/ft p p71 L (HpI) e-1.06E-5/cm x 91 ~ 8 ft x 30 .48 cm/ft 0 971 TL (CH I ) = e 4.72E-8/cm x 91.8 ft' 30 ~ 48 'cm/ft ' pp t

Total Transmission Factor *

(0.071 X 0.27) + (0.971 X 0.40) + (1.00 X 0.31) = 0.718 Particulate Calculations I

L~ =-75.2 ft x 30.48 cm/ft = 2292 cm Size Transmission Transmission Range Factor Fraction (pm) TF TFT

0. 12-0. 17 0.999 0.121

0. 17-0. 27 0.998 0.203 0.27-0.42 0.996 0.179 0.42-0.62 0.991 0.093 0.62-0.87 0.982 0.093 0.87-1.17 0.967 0.068 1.17-1.52 0.944 0.049 1.52-1.92 0.909 0.032 1.92-2.37 0.863 0.022 2.37-2.87 0.803 0.015..

2.87-3.42 0.731 0.012 3.42-4.02 0.646 0.008 4.02-4.67 0.555 0.006 4.67-5.37 0.458 0.004 5.37-6.12 0.361 0.003

> 6.12 '.203 0.010 Total Transmission = 0. 917

~ l0-00V Hev 12.0$ 074) 900 IOO PO'$0

tt t

It I

<r 1

~ ENGINEERING SKETCH Pa Rev. 2 4 /Ji~c DATE (z/6/0 SUBJECT Sample Line Plateout S11EET NO,',

JOB NO 18 30 13-NC-SQ-200 I

I Radwaste Building Calculation (RU-14)

I Iodine calculations I

1 e-9.45E-4/cm x 20.6 ft x 30.48 cm/ft T 'HOI' e TL<HOI) 1.06E-5/cm x 20.6 ft x 30.48 cm/ft 0 993 T ~CH I ' e 4.72E-8/cm x 20.6 ft x 30.48 cm/ft 1 pp

. Total Transmission Factor (0.552 x 0.27) + (0.993 x 0.40) + (1.00 x 0.31) = 0.856

, Particulate Calculations L> = 19.6 ft x 30.48 cm/ft = 597.4 cm Size Transmission Transmission Range Factor Fraction (pm) TFp TFT

0. 12-0. 17 1.000 0. 122 0.17-0.27 1.000 0.203 0.27-0.42 0.999 0.180 0.42-0.62 0.998 0.093 0.62-0.87 0.995 0.094 0.87-1.17 0.991 0.069 1.17-1.52 0.985 0.051 1.52-1.92 0.975 0.034 1.92-2.37 0.962 0.024 2.37-2.87 0.944 0.018 2.87-3.42 0.922 0.015 3.42-4.02 0.892 0.011 4.02-4.67 '.858 0.009 4.67-5.37 0.816 0.008 5.37-6.12 0.767 0.006

> 6.12 0.660 0.034 Total Transmission = 0.970 r10.00V R9v 17.05 0701 ~100 ROr50

f At w gyp

~ '

f A

~ ENGINEERING SKETCH PO

~

Rev. 2

• SUBJECT SHEET NO,;

/2./C /0o Sample Line Plateout 19 pf 30 JOB NO gz 13-N.C-SQ-200 Condenser Air Exhaust Calculation (RU-141)

'odine Calculations

~ ~

e-1.42E-3/cm x 12.9 ft x 30.48 cm/ft 0 572 (HO1) e-1.60E-5/cm x 12.9 ft x 30.48 cm/ft 0 994 TL(,(CH I '= e 7.09E-8/cm x 12.9 ft' 30.48 cm/ft 1.00 Total Transmission Factor (0.572 x 0.27) + (0.994 x 0.40) + (1.00 x 0.31) 0. 862 Particulate Calculations

. Lh =. 11.9. ft x 30.48 cm/ft = 362.7 cm Size'ange Transmission Transmission Factor Fraction (pm) TFp TFT

0. 12-0. 17 1. 000 0. 122

0. 17-0. 27 1. 000 0. 203 0.27-0.42 1. 000 0.180 0.42-0.62 0.999 0.093 0.62-0.87 0.999 0.094 0.87-1.17 0.997 0.070 1.17-1.52 0.995 0.051 1.52-1.92 0.992 0.035 1.92-2.37 0.988 0.025 2.37-2.87 0.982 0.019 2.87-3.42 0.974 0.015 3.42-4.02 0.964 0.012 4.02-4.67 0.952 0.010 4.67-5.37 0.936 0.009 5.37-6.12 0.918 0.007 6.12 0.874 0. 045 Total Transmission 0. 989 JIB (YIVfftr 1? PS IIIJI KAlOOPD'SO

r 4 c I'

II I 0

ENGlNEERlNG SKETCH P Rev. 2 p jJ+~ OATE I2/0/io SUBJECT Sample Line Plateout SHEET NO JOB NO 20 )

30 13-NC-SQ-200 o

W

-, Plant Vent Calculation (RU-143)

Iodine Calculations e-1.42E-3/cm x 14.0 ft x 30.48 cm/ft 0 546 (Hpg) e-1.60E-5/cm x 14.0 ft x 30.48 cm/ft Q 993 e-7.09E-8/cm x 14.0 ft x 30.48 cm/ft 1 QQ-L( 3 2)

'otal Transmission Factor (0.546 x 0.27) + (0.993 x 0.40) + (1.00 x 0.31) 0.855 t

'articulate .Calculations I \

L> =, 11.5 ft x 30.48 cm/ft = 350.5 cm Size Transmission Transmission Range Factor Fraction (pm) TFp TFT

0. 12-0. 17 1.000 0.122 0.17-0.27 1.000 0.203 0.27-0.42 0.999 0.180 0.42-0.62 0.998 0.093 0.62-0.87 0.996 0.094 0.87-1.17 0.992 0.070 1.17-1.52 0.987 0.051 1.52-1.92 0.978 0.034 1.92-2.37 0.967 0.

2.37-2.87 0.951 024'.018 2.87-3.42 0.931 0.015 3.42-4.02 0.905 0.011 4.02-4.67 0.874 0.009 4.67-5.37 0.836 0 '08 5.37-6.12 0.792 0.006

) 6.12 0.693 0.036 Total Transmission 0. 973 0

4l0.00V Atv l2 0S 02>l 00010000 A

s

~'

gr 1'

i I

.gy/P~dL: '2 ENGINEERIN'G SKETCH C/9n SUBJECT Sample Line P'ev.

Plateout SHEE'T NO 0 21 p) 30 2

<'ECKEO BY DATE JOB NO go 13-NC-SQ-200 7

I Fuel Building Calculation (RU-145) r

'odine Calculations r

T (Z 1 42E 3/cm x 76. 3 ft x 30. 48 cm/ft p p37 IHO1$ e TL qHOl) 1 60E 5/cm x 76.

~ 3 ft x 30. 48 cm/ft p 963 e-7.09E-8/cm x 76.3 ft x 30.48 cm/ft. 1 pp'"'.

Total Transmission Factor (0.037 x 0.27) + (0.963 x 0.40) + (1.00 x 0.31) 0.705 Particulate Calcul'ations L> = 66.4..ft x30.48 cm/ft = 2024 cm Size Transmission Transmission Range Factor Fraction (pm) TFp TFT 0.12-0.17 0.999 0. 121 0.17-0.27 0.998 0. 202 0.27-0.42 0.995 0. 179 0.42-0.62 0.988 0. 092 0.62-0.87 0.977 0.092 0.87-1;17 0.956 0.067 1.17-1.52 0.926 0.048

1. 52-1; 92 0.881 0.031 1.92-2.37 0.822 0.021 2.37-2.87 0.747 0.014 2.87-3.42 0. 660 0.010

3. 42-4; 02 0. 561 0.007 4.02-4.67 0. 458 0.005 4.67-5.37 0. 355 0.003 5.37-6.12 0. 259 0.002

6. 12 0. 121 0.006 Total Transmission 0.902

~ 10KOV iicv 12 5$ 07@i 000i00 PP'$0

g

.I C

l klg

~ ENGINEER{NG SKETCH Pl) Rev. 2 SUBJECT SHEET NO

'P)J'Jp~~ I2/S/TO Sample Line Plateout 22 30

~

i OAT E JOB NOJ l ~90 13-NC-SQ-200

'ondenser Air Exhaust Post Accident Calculation (RU-142)

N Iodine Calculations

~

T

~

TL(~2)(Z ), 1 ~ 86E 2/cm x 29. 0 ft x 30. 48 cm/ft p ppp T 'CH I ' e 9 34E-7/cm x 29.0 ft x 30.48 cm/ft 0 999 Total Transmission Factor

{0.000 x 0.572 x 0.91) + {0.999 x 1.00 x 0.04) = 0.040 Particulate Calculations L> = 24.5 ft x 30.48 cm/ft = 746.8 cm 5

Size 'Anisokinetic Transmission Transmission Range Sampling Factor Fraction

'pm)- Error TFp TFT 0.12-0.17 1.000 0.995 0. 121 0.17-0 0.27-0.42

'7 1.000 1.000 0.990

0. 976 0.201

0. 176 0.42-0.62 1.000 0.945 0.088 0.62-0.87 1.000 0.892 0.084 0.87-1-17 1.000 0.805 0.056 1.17-1.52 1.000 0.687 0.035 1.52-1.92 1.000 0.539 0.019

~

1;92-2.37 0.993 0.385 0.009 2.37-2.87 0.969 0.241 0.004 2.87-3.42 0.943 0.132 0.002 3.42-4.02 0.914 0.059 0.001 4.02-4.67 0.889 0.022 0.000 4.67-5.37 0.868 0.006 0.000 5.37-6.12 0. 846 0.001 0.000

) 6.12 0.800 0.000 0.000 Total Transmission = 0.796 4I0.0W AI'v 12-95 074l 900I000D!0

h 0 g r

bl q y gt 0

~ ENGINEERING SKETCH f4)

SUBJECT SHEET NO; Rev. 2 IZ- 6/gd Sample Lane Plateout 3 ot 30 DATE JOB NO 13-NC-SQ-200

-3 Plant Vent Post Accident Calculation (RU-144)

Iodine Calculations 1 86E 2/cm x 22. 0 ft x 30. 48 cm/ft r

gI T ~

p ppp T ICH I e 9 34E 7/cm x 22 0 ft x 30 48 cm/ft

~ T ~ ~ ~

p 999 Total Transmission Factor r

~

(0.000 x 0.546 x 0.91) + (0.999 x 1.00 x 0.04) = 0.040,

,'articulate'Calculations L+ = 20.0 ft x 30.48 cm/ft 609.6 cm Size ~

Anisokinetic Transmission Transmission Range Sampling Factor Fraction'FT (pm) Error TFp

'. 12-0. 17 1. 000 1; 000 0.996 0.992

0. 121

0. 201 0.17-0.27'.27-0.42,r 1.000 0.980 0. 176 0.42-0.62 1.000 0.955 0.089 0.62-0.87 '.000 0.911 0: 086 0.87-1.17 1.000 0.837 0.058 1.17-1.52 1.000 0.736 0.038 1.52-1 92 ~ 1.000 0.604 0.021 1.92-2.37 0.993 0.459 0.011 2.37-2.87 0.969 0. 313 0.006

'.87-3 '2 0.943 0. 191 0.003 3.42-4.02 0.914 0.100 '.001 4.02-4.67 0.889 0.045 0.000 4.67-5.37 0.868 0.016 '0. 000 5.37-6.12 0.846 0.005 0.000 6.12 0.800 0.000 0.000 Total Transmission 0. 810

~ IOOQVIhv 1200 OTJI KOI001%'00

0 P I

~ ENGINEERING SKETCH PO SUBJECT( SHEET NO Rev. 2

/2 j$ /gD Sample Line Plateout 24 (

30 C> CK QBY JOB NOJ 13-NC-SQ-200

'uel'uilding Post Accident Calculation (RU-146) t

'Xodine Calculations J

Iy 4

1 e 1 86E 2/cm X 14 0

~ ~ ft X 30 48 cm/ft 000

~

0 T 'CH I ' e 9 34E-7/cm > 14.0 ft X 30. 48 cm/ft = 1.00 Total Transmission Factor (0. 000 x 0. 037 x 0. 91) + (1. 00 x 1. 00 x 0. 04) = 0. 040 Particulate Calculations Lg = 11.0 ft x 30.48 cm/ft = 335.3 cm Size) Anisokinetic Transmission Transmission Range Sampling Factor Fraction (pm) Error TFp TFT

' 0.12-0.17 0;17-0.27 0.27-0.42

1. 000

'.000 1.000 0.998 0.995

0. 989 0.121 0.201'.177 0-42-0.62 1.000 0.975 0.090 0.62-0.87 1.000 0.950 0.088 0.87-1.17 .1.000 0.907 0.061 1.17-1.52 1.000 0.845 0.040 1.52-1.92 1. 000 0.758 0. 023 1.92-2.37 . 0.993 0.651 0. 013 2.37-2.87 0. 969 0.528 0. 007 2.87-3.42 0.943 0.402 ~ 0.004 3.42-4.02 0.914 0.281 0.002 4.02-4.67 0.889 0.181 0.001 4.67-5.37 0.868 0.103 0.000" 5.37-6.12 0.846 0. 052 0.000

6. 12 0.800 0. 010 0.000 Total Transmission = 0.829 4IO.OOVRev 39 dd 0741,900IOOPQrSO

a<

0' P

~ ENGINEERING SKETCH P%I Rev. 2 g P7~

CHI TKEO BY SUBJECT Sample Line Plateout SHEET NO,"

JOB NO 25,f 30 DATE'2 7 13-NC-SQ-200 I

I I

Justification II H

~ Fixed Flow Rate C

,The sampling of radioactive particulates and iodines from process

gas streams involves considerations of sampling errors associated with:.anisokinetic sampling, sample line losses of particulates, and sample line losses of iodines. The overall design for a

~

radioactive sampling system has to consider all three- effects and -.

.properly balance one against the other to obtain the most representative sample.'o this end, ANSI 13.1-1969 was written

• in order to provide principles and methods to be used" in .

radioactive gas sampling.

I

.The;first type of error, anisokinetic sampling error, is introduced due to the tendency of large particles to resist

"'or this reason that the sampling system should be. operated Itat isa-changes in air flow direction because of their inertia.

velocity that is. approximately equal to the. sampled process.

Nonconservative errors are introduced when the sampling system is operated at velocities greater than the sampled process. In this case, referred to as super-isokinetic sampling, small particles continue to be extracted from the process stream proportionally to 'the'oncentration '-in the process. However, large particles

are sampled at., a reduced proportion due to their tendency to follow their origin line of flight and not the bending flow lines into"the sample nozzle.

Generally speaking, anisokinetic sampling errors are of little

(

concern when compared to other sampling errors. Most particles found in process. ducts are less than 5 pm and hence can be treated as a gas for all practical purposes.

The second type of error is the loss of particulates during their transit through the sample line. Like anisokinetic sample errors, the sample line loss errors are a factor when sampling large particles and are not significant in small particles.

Sample line losses increase with line length.

reason that this calculation has selected the two shortest sample "

It is for this lines as its bounding condition. As this calculation demonstrates, these errors are generally greater than the errors associated with anisokinetic sampling and hence 'should receive more weight in the overall design.

The third type of error is the loss of radioiodines'n their

transit of,.the sample lines. This loss is due. to the. chemical bonding of the iodine, primarily elemental iodine species, to the sample line walls." This error is the most important error to be considered,.in .the, design because. unlike .the large particulates, ...

elemental iodine forms a significant portion of the radioactivity

'to "be sampled zand -is'the most. significant ..contributor'o'ose.

Iodine line loss also increases with sample line, length.

~ fn-OOV ffY~ f?.SS OTZf ffOOfOOPO 50

~ . 'J

{

0 9

~rA' 4

ENGINEERING SKETCH l4) Rev. 2

,g (EC(ISO BT p~~ '"'z/~/;o SUBJECT" Sample Line Plateout SHEET JOB HO NO.'6 30 l2.1 + 13-NC-SQ-200

"; To demonstrate the order of correction required for the different

,! types of exror, an evaluation was performed for the the shortest

( sample,'ines (and hence the most conservative) for the normal

range -and=-post accident -monitors.

~

The- radiation monitors

,'onsidered, RU-143 and RU-146, were evaluated for 4 pm and 7.2 pm (particles as this is, the bounding paxticle sizes from the SAIC Report .(Ref.3). The following comparisons relate operating the radiation monitor sample flow rates in an automatic "isokinetic" flow rate control versus fixed flow rate control. The tables assume that isokinetic velocity conditions are met at 2.0 CFM for

'the normal range monitors and 1000 cc/min for the high range monitors.. In 'actuality, 2.0 CFM was selected for the flow rate it of the effluent monitors because is somewhat sub-isokinetic at

... normal process flow rates and thus introduces: a degree of conservatism. ~

1000 cc/min was selected for the post accident

'onitors as .the highest-practical flow rate based on source term.

,'ven though this . flow rate is about two,times isokinetic velocity," sample line'osses so outflank anisokinetic sampling losses. as to make operation at this super-isokinetic flow rate .

justified.

0 .

The"'-following- table compares the losses of 4 pm particles and elemental iodine to anisokinetic sampling, errors for the RU-143 sample:line.

.. Flow. Anisokinetic Pax ticulate Particulate Iodine Iodine Rate Sampling Transmission Loss Transmission Loss (CFM) Error Factor Error Factor Error 0.2 0. 31 -0.65 0.00 -1. 00 0.4 0. 55 -0.38 0. 05 -0.91 0.6 0. 67 -0.24 0. 13 -0.76 0.8 0 ~ 74 -0.16 0. 22 -0.60 1.0 -0. 14 0.79 -0.11 0. 29 -0.46 1.2 -0.06 0.82 -0.08 0. 36 -0.33 1.4 -0.03 0.84 -0.05 0.42 -0.23 1.6 1.8

-0 '2

-0.01 0.86 0.88

-0.03

-0.01 0.47 0.51

-0.14

-0.07 2.0 0.00 0.89 0.00 0.54 0.00 2.2 0. 00 0.90 0. 01 0.57 0.06 2.4 0.01 0.91 0. 02 0.60 0.11 2.6 0. 01 0-91 0. 03 0. 63 0.15 2.8 0.02 0.92 0. 03 0. 65 0.19 3.0 0.02 0.92 0. 04 0. 67 0.23 3.2 0.03

0. 03 0 '3 0.93 0.05 0.05 0.68 0.70 0.26 0.29 3.4'.6 3.8

0. 04

0. 05 0.94 0.94

0. 05.

0. 06 0 '1 0.73

0. 31 0.34 4.0 0. 06 0 '4 0. 06 0.74 0.36 41((40V 4lV lt tS CZZl.KOI(NPO

I l '

ll 4 P

~ ENGINEERING SKETCH PO SUBJECT SHEET NO Rev. 2 I2 d/fc Sample Line Plateout 27 I 30 OATS JOB NO l~v yo 13-NC-SQ-200 I

To use

the table, select a flow rate in the leftmost column and

'ead- the transmission and error values in that row. For example,

~

if the sampler flow isokinetically, rate should. be 1.2 CFM to match velocities the error induced by not lowering the flow rate

'o 1.2 CFM.'is -0.06 (-6%) and error caused by-0.11 increased sample

=line loss if .the flow rate is lowered is (-11%) for particulates and -0.33 (-33%) for iodine.

,As can be .seen in the table, the: loss errors associated particulate sample line loss are almost always greater than anisokinetic sampling error. However, errors for iodine sampling

increase dramatically as sample flow rate changes.

C

.As the particle size increases, the sample line losses further

outflankthe anisokinetic sampling errors as shown below for 7.2 pm particles.

I I

'low Anisokinetic Particulate Particulate Rate Sampling Transmission Loss (CFM) Error Factor, Error 0.2 0. 03 -0.96 0.4 0. 16 -0.77 0.6 0. 30 -0.57 0.8 0. 40 -0.42 1.0 -0.26 0. 48 -0.31 1~2 1.4

-0 '1

-0.05 0.54 0.59

-0.22

-0.15 1.6 -0.02 0 ~ 63 -0.09 1~8 -0.01 0. 67 -0.04 2.0 0.00 0. 69 0.00 2.2 0.00 0.72 0.03 2.4 0.01 0.74 0.06 2.6 0.01 0.75 0.09 2.8 0. 02 0.77 0.11 3.0 0. 03 0.78 0. 13 3 ' 0. 04 0.80 0. 15 3.4 0. 05 0.81 0.16 3.6 0. 07 0.82 0.18 3.8 0. 08 0.82 0. 19 4.0 0. 09 0.83 0.20 t For high range monitors,'hanges in flow rate have 'very effect on the, amount of elemental . iodine surviving the sample

.line transit as all of the elemental iodine is lost in any case.

-This is due- to the necessarily -low flow *rates" associated with post accident monitors. On the other. hand, particulate sampling.

at low flow rates is still meaningful. This is mostly due to the distribution of the particle sizes =toward,.small, particles; " It must be considered that the sizes of particles encountered under post accident conditions is largely unknown. The following table JN 02Vffer t2 llS 02JI 000tOODO'$0 little

0 ep p,lf II

ENGINEERING SKETCH POD Rev. 2

'*" SUBJECT" SHEET NO (z/o/To Sample Line Plateout 28 of, 30 CT CKEO BY OATS JOB NO 9c 13-NC-SQ-200

'I demonstrates the advantages of a fixed sample flow rate under post accident conditions for the RU-146 sample lines and 4 pm particles.

Flow Anisokinetic Particulate Particulate Rate Sampling Transmission Loss (cc/min) Error Factor Error 100. 0 0. 00 -1.00-200.0 0.00 -1. 00 300.0 0.01 -0.97 400.0 0.02- -0.90 500.0 -0. 14 0. 04 -0.79 600.0 -0.06 0. 07 -0.65 700.0 -0.03 0 ~ 11 "-0.49 800. 0 0. 14 -0.32 900.0

-0.02'0.01

0. 18 -0.16 1000.0 '.00

0. 21 0.00 1100.0 0.00 0. 24 0. 15 1200.0 0.01 0.27 0. 30 1300.0 '0.01'.02 0.30 0.43 1400.0 0.33 0.56 1500.0 0.02 0.35 0.68 1600. 0 '.03 0.38 0.79 0.90

. 1700. 0 . 0.03 0.40 1800.0 0. 04 0. 42 1. 00 1900.0 0. 05 0. 44 1. 09 2000.0 0.06 0.46 1. 18 As can'e seen in this table, the errors associated with anisokinetic sampling are very small compared to the errors that would be induced by changing sample flow rates. In the final following table, considering the same sample line of for 7.2 pm particles, sample flow it rate can be becomes seen much that this worse.

disadvantages varying

0 ~,I ~ ) e lS~

~

E vp ~

ENGINEERING SKETCH P% Rev. 2 SUBJECT. SHEET NO Sample Line Plateout 29 Of 30 Ct ECKEO BY OAT E JOB NO:

13-NC-SQ-200 Flow Anisokinetic Particulate Particulate

'ate":- Sampling Transmission Factor Loss Error (cc/min) Error, 100.0 0. 00 -1.00 200. 0 0. 00 -1.00 300. 0 0.00 -1.00 400.0 0.00 -1 00-

~

500.0 . -0. 26 0. 00 -0 99

~

600.0 -0. 11 0.00 -0. 96 700. 0 '"

-0. 05 0.00 -0 87

~

800.0 -0. 02 0. 00 -0.70 900.0 -0. 01 0. 00 -0.42 1000.0 0.00 0.01 0. 00-.

1100.0 0.00 0.01 0.55 1200 ' 0.01 0.02 1. 24 1300.0 0.01 0.02 2.05 1400.0 0.02 0. 03 2.98 1500.0 0.03 0. 04 4.01 1600.0"'700.0

'0 04 0.05 5.13

0. 05 0.06 6.32 1800.0 0. 07 0. 07 7.58 1900.0 0. 08 0.08 8.88 2000.0 0. 09 0.09 10.22 In conclusion,'"the preceding analysis has demonstrated the advantages of operating the radiation monitors in a fixed sample flow rate mode as opposed to an "automatic" isokinetic mode.

This'ethod of operation provides for the most representative sample and minimizes the loss of radioiodines. It is therefore concluded that the fixed flow rate mode of operation be used on all" radiation monitoring sample" equipment because complies with the principles and methods of ANSI N13.1-1969.

it best J1O.OOV Hyr )P OS OT4l OrN)OOPO'SO

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11

~ ENGlNEERING SKETCH POD Rev. 2 SUBJECT SHEET NO" IZ/4/Vcr Sample Line Plateout 30 Of CI ECKEO B> DATE JOB NO'3-NC-SQ-200 t 9D 8

EFERENCES

'1..ANSX N13.1-1969,'Guide to Sampling Airborne Radioactive I

IMaterials in Nuclear Facilities", February, 1969.

2. Kabat, M. J., "Deposition of Airborne Radioiodine'Species on

~

Surfaces of Metals and Plastics", 17th DOE Nuclear. Air Cleaning Conference.

3. N9978-1-2, Science Applications Xnternational Corporation, "Airborne Particulate Monitor. Sampling Line Plateout "

=Measurement Results for Palo Verde Nuclear'ower .Plant

'Unit 1", October 1986.

4.

EPRX NP-939, ,"Sources of Radioiodine Reactors",- November 1978.

at Pressurized Water '"

5. Regulatory Guide 1.4, "Assumptions Used for Evaluating 'the Potential Radiological Consequences of a= Loss of Coolant Accident for .Pressurized Water Reactors", Revision 2, June 1974.

6. NUREG-0737, "Clarif'ication of TMI Action Plan Requirements".

7. 13-P-HCF-168, Rev. 10, Containment Building Xsometric.

Radiation & Pressure Monitoring System

8. 13-P-HAF-201,- Rev. 10, Auxiliary Building Isometric Aux.

Bldg Rad. Monitoring Vents to HVAC Ducts

9. 13-P-ARF-402, Rev. 13, Turbine Building Isometric Condenser Air Removal System 10;- 13-P-HRF-601, Rev. 12, Radwaste Building Isometric Radiation Monitoring System

11. 13-P-HFF-501, Rev. 11, Fuel Building Isometric Radiation Monitoring System

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ENCLOSURE D

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" U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V Reports 50-528/91-13, 50-529/91-13, and 50-530/91-13 Licenses NPF-41, NPF-51, and NPF-74 Licensee: Arizona Public Service Company P. O. Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-3999 Facility: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Inspection location: Wintersburg, Arizona Inspection duration: Mar 25 " 91 Inspected by:

L. L o 1 tz, Radia on Specialist Date Signed Approved, by:

G. P. Yu a, Chief Date Signed Reactor R diological Protection Branch

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Areas Ins ected: Routine, unannounced inspection of occupational exposure during extended outages, followup items, followup of written reports of nonroutine events, in-office review of periodic reports, and liquids and liquid wastes.'he inspector used inspection procedures 83729, 92701, 92700, 90713, and 84723.

Results: The licensee's programs for control of occupational exposure during periods of extended outage appeared adequate in meeting the licensee's safety objectives. Review of maintenance work orders associated with radioactive gaseous effluent monitors revealed several potentially unaddressed causes contributing to monitor inoperability. No violations of NRC requirements were identified.

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The inspector noted that Inspection Report (IR) 50-528/90-28 addressed the licensee's apparent reluctance to clearly characterize all causal factors in LERs to NRC. This IR reviewed Item 50-528/90-08-LO, which identified procedural inadequacy, as the cause of a main steam isolation.

The licensee's internal investigation of this event identified inappropriate operator action, and outlined corrective actions to correct personnel performance; however, the licensee had omitted this information from the LER.

The inspector discussed the SRs delineated above with members of the licensee's compliance group. The Manager, Compliance stated that an internal investigation would be performed to determine adequacy of the SRs described above. The licensee's investigation will be examined during a future inspection (50-529/91-13-01).

4. Fo 1 1 owu 92701 Item 50-528/90-43-04 Closed : This item concerned the post-accident high range monitors RU-142 (condenser vacuum pump/gland seal monitor),

RU-144, and RU-146. The licensee's- Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR),

Section 11. 5, describes the monitors as having isokinetic sampling flow, and the licensee had submitted an update to the FSAR to amend this description. The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluation of sampler configuration and sample line design. The inspector noted the following items:

@ Licensee calculations addressed sample line losses based on projected values of relative humidity, particle size distribution, chemical form, particle shape and density, radioactive transport method, and sampling system operation. Assumptions included in the calculations appeared reasonable.

Licensee justification of fixed flow rate addressed not only anisokinetic sampling errors, but also errors associated with plateout of particulates and iodines. Licensee calculations demonstrated that errors associated with plateout (particularly iodine plateout) were more significant than errors due to anisokinetic sampling, and'herefore should be given more weight in designing the samplers.

The licensee's evaluation concluded that operating the monitors in a fixed sample flowrate mode was actually preferable to operating in an automatic proportional (isokinetic) mode.

The inspector had no further questions in this matter.

Revi ew of .Peri odi c Re or ts 90713 The inspector conducted an in-office review of the timely Semi-Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report (SARERR) for July - December 1990.

The inspector noted that average Lower Limits of Detection (LLDs) for gaseous effluents given in Table Al were the same as those given in the SARERR for January " June 1990.

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KXKRCISK KVALVATIONREPORT 9ii23i0119 9ii202 CF ADOCK 05000528 CF 4e

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g Off-Site Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station April 24, 1991 FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENTAGENCY, REGION IX IIuiiding 108, Prcsidio San Francisco, CA 94129

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REPORT CREDITS Document Preparation Elizabeth Scott and Graphics FEMA Region IX Document Research Richard Echavarria and Editing FEMA Region IX Technical Editor Susan Thraen and Consultant Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Chief Editor Joseph D. Dominguez, Chair Regional Assistance Committee Region IX

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OFF-SITE EXERCISE EVALUATIONREPORT PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE APRIL 24, 1991 ITE AND EXER I E PARTI IPANT Facility Palo "Verde Nuclear Generating Station Licensee Arizona Nuclear Power Project Location City of Wintersburg County of Maricopa State of Arizona Date of Exercise Report Draft- June 24, 1991 Final August 19, 1991 Date of Exercise April 24, 1991 Participants State of Arizona Maricopa County.

Arizona Radiation Regulator Agency American Red Cross Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services Outdoor Emergency and Education Bureau (Limited)

Church of the Brethren (Limited)

Arizona Wings Civil Air Patrol Good Samaritan Hospital (Limited)

Tolleson Union High School (Limited)

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OFF-SITE EXERCISE EVALUATIONREPORT PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE April 24, 1991 TABLE F NTENTS e 'cri tion Paae Report Credits Site and Exercise Participants Table of Contents List of Acronyms 1v Exercise Detail o Exercise Background 2 o Emergency Operations Facility 3 o State Emergency Operations Center 4 Direction and Control 4 Operations 5 o Technical Operations Center 7 REAT-Forward 12 Field Monitoring Teams 14 o Joint Emergency. News Center 16 o Maricopa County Emergency Operations Center 19 o Maricopa County On-Scene Command Post 22 o Alert and Notification/Communications 24 o Reception and Care 25 o Evacuation/Transportation 26 o Medical Services ,

27 Exercise Findings Synopsis 30 Attachments:

A - Evaluator Roster 33 B - Exercise Objectives 34 C - Exercise Scenario Summary- 42 D - Emergency Classifications Level Timeline 46 E - Protective Action Decision Timeline 47 F - State Comments on Draft Report 48

A R NYMS USED ARC American Red Cross ARCA Area Requiring Corrective Action ARFI Area Recommended for Improvement ARRA Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency AZ-DPS Arizona Department of Public Safety ADES ~

Arizona Division of Emergency Services CAP Civil Air Patrol cfnl cubic feet per minute DOE Department of Energy EBS Emergency Broadcast System ECL Emergency Classification System EEM Exercise Evaluation Methodology EOD Emergency Operations Director(EOF)

EOF Emergency Operations Facility ETC Emergency Trauma Center EW emergency worker EPZ Emergency Planning Zone FAX facsimile machine FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FMT Monitoring Team 'ield GE General Emergency ECL GM Geiger-Muller Meter HTS hard-copy technical system JENC Joint Emergency News Center KDT Keyboard Display Terminal KI potassium iodide MCEOC Maricopa County Emergency Operations Center MCHD Maricopa County Highway Department MCOSCP Maricopa County On-Scene Command Post MCSO Maricopa County Sheriff's Office NAN Notification and Alert Network NMT Nuclear Medicine Technologist NOUE Notification of Unusual Event ECL NR News Release NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NWS National Weather Service OEEB Outdoor and Emergency Education Bureau PAD Protective Action Decision PAR Protective Action Recommendations PIO Public Information Officer PVNGS Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station R Roentgen RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services R&C Reception and Care Center

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RAC Regional Assistance Committee REAT Radiological Emergency Assessment Team rem roentgen equivalent mammal RMT Radiation Medical Technologist RPT Radiation Protection Technologist SAE Site Alert Emergency ECL

, SEOC State Emergency Operations Center SOP standard operating procedure SRD self-reading dosimeter STSC Satellite Technical Support Center TCP Traffic Control Point TLD Thermo-luminescent Dosimeter TOC Technical Operations Center TOD Technical Operations Director TSC Technical Support Center

t OFF-SITE EXERCISE EVALUATIONREPORT PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE APRIL 24, 1991 EXER I E DETAIL The Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) 1991 Biennial Emergency Prepared-ness Exercise was conducted on April 24, 1991. Durin'g the exercise, FEMA and the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), Region IX, evaluated the radiological emergency response plans and preparedness measures of the off-site jurisdictions. This report summarizes the evaluator's observations and Qndings during that exercise. Attachment A lists the names of the 25 evaluators representing FEMA Region IX and the RAC.

The Exercise Evaluation Team observed and evaluated off-site participation in the exercise on the basis of established regulatory criteria (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1).

FEMA uses an exercise evaluation methodology for the purpose of exercise assessment.

FEMA classifies observed exercise inadequacies as DeQciencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Actions (ARCA). Deficiencies are inadequacies which indicate that off-site preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that off-site jurisdictions can take appropriate measures to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant in the event of a radiological emergency. FEMA requires off-site jurisdictions to correct deficiencies promptly through appropriate actions, including remedial exercises, drills, or other actions, because of the potential impact of deQciencies on emergency preparedness and public health and safety. ARCAs are inadequacies of state and local government performance that, by themselves, do not adversely impact public health and safety. FEMA requires their correction prior to the next regularly scheduled biennial exercise. There were no deQciencies and 6 ARCAs identiQed. A synopsis of the exercise findings appears on page 30 of this report.

In addition to DeQciencies and ARCAs, FEMA identifies Areas Recommended for Improvement (ARFI). These are areas observed during an exercise that are not considered to adversely impact public health and safety. FEMA believes their implementation will enhance the organization's level of preparedness. FEMA makes these recommendations only for the consideration of the off-site jurisdictions. There is no requirement for any type of response by State or local governments as a result of these suggested areas of improvement. There were 15 ARFIs identiQed.

FEMA Guidance Memorandum EX-3 identiQes thirty six (36) objectives divided into three groups. The State of Arizona and Maricopa County selected twenty Qve (25) of these objectives for demonstration, Qfteen in Group A, nine in Group B, and one in Group C.

Attachment B contains a list of these objectives.

There were no outstanding ARCAs carried over from the 1989 biennial exercise.

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Three weeks prior to the exercise, members of the evaluation team received an evaluation packet. The evaluator packet included individual evaluator assignments, an exercise activity schedule, maps depicting the location of emergency facilities, a list of the objectives (See Attachment C), the extent of play, a scenario summary, a projected exercise event timeline, and excerpts from the State of Arizona plan.

FEMA Region IX staff gave the evaluators an orientation and briefing on the day prior to the exercise. The brie6ng included the delineation of exercise evaluation procedures and timeframes. The particulars in the use of the Exercise Evaluation Methodology (EEM)

(Interim Use Document - May 25, 1988) and the process and formats for reporting observations and recommendations were discussed in detail. Several members of the evaluation team had lead, roles in the coordination and preparation of consolidated reports on specific exercise elements. Complete copies of the State of Arizona and Maricopa County plans were available. In addition, complete copies of all 37 sections of the EEMs were available.

On the same day, representatives from the State of Arizona, Maricopa County and the Arizona Nuclear Power Project briefed the evaluators on the demonstrations they would observe during the exercise. The session was highly productive in clearing up questions regarding extent of play, including which elements of the exercise would be simulated. In addition, the session provided evaluators an opportunity to coordinate meeting times and locations with the exercise controllers.

The exercise evaluators convened on the day following the exercise to discuss their observations, write their reports, and to assist in the preparation of materials for presentation at the exercise participants debrie6ng.

FEMA conducted the exercise debriefing in the Russell Auditorium, Of6ce of the Arizona Department of Emergency Services (ADES), on April 26, 1991. Representatives of the Evaluation Team presented the preliminary exercise evaluation observations to the participants. The debrie6ng included a general response to the observations by William Lockwood, the Director of Emergency Services for the State of Arizona.

Radio Station KTAR, the primary Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) station, the American Red Cross (ARC), the Church of the Brethren, the Radio'Amateur Civil Emergency Services (RACES), Civil Air Patrol (CAP), and the Obtdoor an'd Emergency Education Bureau (OEEB) participated in the exercise and provided excellent support to the County. In addition, the students and faculty of Tolleson Union High School participated and made substantive contributions to the exercise.

o XER I EBA K R ND The full-participation Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station biennial Exercise was held on April 24, 1991. The evaluation team observed the following functions and facilities:

t State of Arizona cili Fine i n ~c'i~in Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) On-site .

'State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) Phoenix Technical Operations Center (TOC) Phoenix Radiological Emergency Assessment Buckeye Airfield Team Forward (REAT-FORWARD)

Field Radiological Monitoring Teams (FMT) Field Reception and Care Center Monitoring Teams Tolleson Union High School Joint Emergency News Center (JENC) Phoenix Arizona Air National Guard (Tucson) Tolleson Union High School Maricopa County Facili Func i n ~cation Maricopa County Emergency Operations Phoenix Center (MCEOC)

Reception and Care Center (R & C) Tolleson Union High School Maricopa County Sheriff's On-Scene Palo Verde School Command Post (MCOSCP)

Evacuation Field In addition, evaluators observed communications and medical services functions. A Federal evaluator at the on-site Emergency Operation Facility observed off-site/on-site interfacing.

The Plant is located some 50 miles west of Phoenix in Wintersburg, Arizona.

The exercise started when the Utility declared a Notice Of An Unusual Event (NOUE)

Emergency Classification Level (ECL) at 0805, followed by an Alert ECL at 0852, a Site Area Emergency (SAE) ECL at 0925, and a General Emergency (GE) ECL at 1113. The exercise was terminated at 1445. Attachment D displays the ECL Timeline.

o MER EN Y PERATI N FA ILITY There were six objectives established for demonstration, observation, and evaluation at the EOF (Objectives Numbers 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, and 11). All six objectives were successfully met.

The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), located at the Palo Verde nuclear plant site, is a utility-owned and-operated facility. The senior utility official directing EOC activities was the Emergency Operations Director (EOD).

EOF staKng commenced upon declaration of an Alert at approximately 0852. By 0929 the EOF was fully staffed and declared operational, Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency (ARRA) technical staff were dispatched to the SEOC and assigned, among other activities,

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to control field monitoring teams. They were located adjacent to utility field team controllers which enabled close coordination of their respective teams.

The EOF staf'f, including the ARRA representatives, maintained an excellent awareness of plant conditions and projected trends as well as potential consequences. The implications of plant conditions as related to. protective actions were thoroughly discussed, evaluated and communicated by the EOD to the appropriate State authorities at the SEOC.

Using Plant status information and dose projection assessments, the EOD utilized pre-established procedures and criteria to make protective action recommendations. to State authorities, These recommendations, along with changes in emergency class, and other appropriate follow-up information were provided to off-site officials in a timely manner.

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Dir i n n nr1 Protective Action Decisions (PAD), made to protect the public health and safety, are the responsibility 'of the Governor or the Governor's Representative, the Director of the Arizona Department of Emergency Services (ADES) under the State plan. The ADES Director was the Director of Operations at the SEOC during the exercise. The Director of ADES made PADs after considering the utility's protective action recommendations (PAR), and in consultation with the Radiological Technical Directorate (Director, ARRA).

This procedure is consistent with the State plan and provides for technical recommendations, based on data provided by the utility (both Geld and plant status), and the data collected by the State, to be brought to.the attention of the State's decision-makers for consideration. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requires that the utilityprovide ECLs and PARs to the off-site authorities in an emergency situation. There is a direct, dedicated phone line between the Director of Operations office and the Utility Emergency Director at the site. This provides for any necessary coordination of protective actions taken on-site and of'f-site. The Director of Operations made and ordered the implementation of seven PADs which af'fected the public during the exercise (Attachment E). The Director, the Technical Director and the other Senior members of the decision-making group evaluated critical factors reasonably and made PADs in a timely manner.

The Director of Operations provided sound direction and control throughout the exercise and demonstrated a thorough awareness and understanding of the emergency operations process. He and his staff understood the type and source of information needed, when it should or would be provided, and requested clarification or amplification when necessary.

The Director and his staf'f also demonstrated an in-depth awareness of the geographical area, the schools, special populations, roads and highways, distances and proximities, etc.

A series of briefings were conducted in the operations area of the SEOC throughout the exercise to both gather and share information with the emergency support staff and managers.

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4 The utility reported Emergency Classification Levels and Protective Action Recommenda-tion to the State and County promptly.'ll of the PADs made by the State met the 15 minute broadcast time requirement. We commend the State's decision-making group and resource'and support staffs for their enthusiastic and exemplaiy demonstiation.

Qpera~ti n There were 13 objectives established for demonstration, observation, and evaluation at the State's Emergency Operations Center. (Objective Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 12, 13, 15, 18, 19, 20, and 26). All objectives were fully met.

The SEOC demonstrated the ability to make timely decisions and to manage emergency response activities for the PVNGS exposure pathway EPZ during the exercise. Monitoring, understanding and use of emergency classification levels were consistent with the State Radiological Emergency Response plan. Functions described in the plan that are associated with each classification level were conducted in an appropriate and timely fashion.

Resources and personnel were in place to adequately carry out the State's deQned role in the emergency situation at the time of the Site Area Emergency declaration by the utility.

Therefore, the protective action decisions reached by the Director of Operations and provided to the EOC staff could be fully supported by resources in the Qeld.

Because the exercise started during normal ADES operating hours, regular staff were already present at the SEOC when alerting and mobilization began in accordance with the plan. The alerting, mobilization and activation of personnel f'rom other State and Maricopa County agencies with operations and support roles in the SEOC was fully demonstrated.

The Alert ECL notification was received &om the utilityat 0857. NotiQcation to designated SEOC staf'f began at 0901. NotiQcation included a call to the FEMA RIX Regional Director. The call list used was up-to-date.

The Director of Operations was effectively in charge of the States decision-making role throughout the exercise, while the Deputy Director managed operations in the SEOC for the operation and support group. Full, formal brieQngs of SEOC staff were conducted at 1005, 1103, 1327 and 1435. The exercise terminated at 1445. The SEOC public address system worked well, provided f'requent updates of changing plant and meteorological conditions, and reported the initiation and completion of emergency actions. Responsible staff were fully involved in decision-making caucuses with the Direc'd'or. Copies of the plan were available for reference. Message preparation, tracking, and logging occurred in an accurate and timely manner. Adequate copies of messages were available. PADs were reached through a process involving full coordination of all appropriate organizations.

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All of the communications capabilities, e.g. radio, telephone, facsimile equipment, etc., that are identified in the State plan as available at the State EOC were in place and operating throughout the exercise. The NotiQcation and Alert Network (NAN) experienced one malfunction (not part of the scenario). However, the radio and telephone backup system functioned very well and there were no adverse effects. The malfunction was corrected within one hour. There were no difQculties in communications operations observed within the SEOC. The number of telephone hand-sets and lines available were fully adequate for

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exercise play. In an emergency, arrangements are in place with the telephone company to "drop" an additional 100 lines. RACES personnel provided backup communications support.

Federal assistance was requested from the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Support f'rom the NRC and the Arizona National Guard was also requested. The DOE was asked to provide a "Qy-over" of the affected area in order to provide a radiological map of the area. The FAA was requested to provide a restricted air zone around the facility. The NRC was asked to provide technical assistance to the Technical Operations Director. The National Guard was requested to provide aircraft and personnel to the ARRA lab. In summary, an adequate amount of Federal assistance was requested and provided.

The SEOC is a well-planned, well-laid-out facility with an exceptionally good selection of large information display boards that can be readily seen and read by all staff. SEOC staff consistently posted data accurately and promptly on status boards during the exercise. This data included field resources (aircraft, truck, portable showers, communications vans) that were placed on standby and capable of deployment on notice. As Arizona National Guard and Civil Air Patrol support personnel in the SEOC obtained confirmation of these resources, they were displayed with location and readiness status. Ifactually deployed, their destination(s) and estimated times of arrival were also'posted. This display provided vital data to SEOC staff who coordinate and provide .assistance for Maricopa County implementation tasks. In addition, Emergency Planning Zone EPZ maps were labeled with appropriate planning areas, relocation centers and monitoring points.

There is adequate space to move about to confer with operations and support staff of other agencies, as needed. Furnishings, lighting, and ventilation were all good. Food service and restroom facilities were available in the SEOC building, as were document copying facilities.

The State Decision-Making Group sent PADs directly to the SEOC. This group convenes in the Director of Operations office which is immediately adjacent to the SEOC. They made decisions and immediately passed them to the Shift Manager in the Operations area.

The PAD's were p'osted and implementation was initiated through Maricopa County Liaison Representative stationed at the SEOC. The decisions were reached in a timely manner, and provided the County adequate lead time to implement the action.

I The Maricopa County liaison officers verbally (via phone) transmitted information to MCEOC regarding protective actions and updates on the status of operations promptly and accurately. However, they did not provide a hardcopy of the protective action discussions transmitted by voice, as stated in the "Procedures for the Activation and Functioning of the State Emergency Operations Center." Also, they did not maintain a log of incoming or outgoing phone messages.

The County liaison officers received EBS messages via the FAX machine, and promptly'ade them available to the staff.

~ P A Public Inquiry Center was established in a suite of adjacent offices in the SEOC. The Center functioned with a volunteer staff from the OEEB. The Public Inquiry staff included

'elephone operators, a runner and a supervisor. The Public Inquiry staff used information that was coordinated and gathered from the Public Information staff, SEOC brieQngs, news releases and status boards in an accurate and timely manner.

The supervisor periodically briefed the phone staff on how to respond and present information to the public. In some instances, the phone staff was particularly effective in assuring the public that certain measures being taken were precautional in nature and that there was no need for alarm. They also consistently advised the public to tune in to specific radio stations (EBS) for additional emergency information.

In general, the Public Inquiry staff handled calls received on the five inquiry lines in an efficient and expeditious manner. Inquiries requiring f'urther information, referral, or callback were completed and properly logged.

The execution of assignments in the areas of the SEOC decision-making process, operations, Public Inquiry reQected a well-established familiarity with roles, relationships and

'nd procedures.

Area Re uirin rrective Action

1. Hardcopy of PAD statements

1. Descnption. The MarIcopa County liaison officers used only verbal communication to provide the MCEOC with statements on protective actions. They did not transmit this information in hardcopy. SEOC 'operations procedures call for hardcopy transmission of this information.

2. 'ecommendation: Train appropriate staf'f in procedures for County liaison officers.

a Rec mmended f r Im vement A. Log of Telephone Calls

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Description:

The Maricopa County liaison officers did hot maintain a log of incoming and outgoing calls.

2. Recommendation: Establish and maintain a log of telephone calls made and received by the Maricopa County liaison officer(s). The log will ensure a continuity of actions and information record for use by second shift personnel and others.

o TE HNI AL PERATI NS ENTER There were 11 objectives established for demonstration, observation, and evaluation at the Technical Operations Center (Objective Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 16, and 26). All objectives were fully met in the TOC, except for Objective 16, which was only partially met.

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The Radiological Technical Director provides the direction and control for the State Technical Operations Center (TOC). The State TOC gathers, analyzes, and develops PARs for use in making PADs. The TOC is immediately adjacent to the SEOC operations area.

The TOC staff includes the following ARRA personnel: Technical Operations Director (TOD), TOC Supervisor, Assessment Team Leader, Assistant Assessment Team Leader, Two Communicators, and Two Status Board Monitors.

In addition, the utility provides an Off-site Technical Representative to the TOC. This Tech Rep has a dedicated line to the site's Technical Support Center or other operational area. The Tech Rep provides the TOC with plant status information regarding both existing conditions and projections and what the present conditions may mean as trends or potential problems.. This individual provides a most necessary and critical function.

ARRA also provides assistance to a SEOC Public Information OfGcer (PIO) who prepares information releases. The TOC and the Director of Site Operations review and approve these releases and then send them to the Joint Emergency News Center.

The ECL notifications to the TOC were timely arid promptly posted (see Attachment D, ECL Timeline), and the staff were aware of the appropriate actions that should be occurring. Notifications came over the NAN system and were veriGed by telephone. The NAN system failed during the exercise and backup systems were demonstrated adequately.

ARRA/TOC staff received notiGcation of the Alert ECL at the ARRA OfGces (REAT-Center) at 0811. The TOC was operational at 0942. Equipment present included four status boards for Geld monitoring data, projected dose calculations, ECL status, and weather data. Dose calculations were done with a COMPAC laptop computer using ARRA Dose Assessment Software. The TOC staff included nine persons and the TOD. The TOC staff effectively demonstrated the ability to fully alert, mobilize and activate personnel for emergency functions. The arriv'al of staff and set up of the TOC facility went smoothly.

Direction and control in the TOC was adequately demonstrated. The TOC Director provided timely brieGngs to his staK When he was away from the TOC, he delegated his responsibilities to the TOC Shift Supervisor.

The TOC Director, Shift Supervisor and staff discussed events and data and promptly formulated recommendations. Field monitoring staff were kept informed by radio and hardcopy was provided via the FAX machine. The Shift Supervisor demonstrated his ability to control overall work, to recognize the need for and to provide assistance to speciGc functions in the TOC, to correct inaccuracies, and to clarify information.

We commend the TOC Shift Supervisor and TOC Staff for their professional handling of some potentially contaminated Iodine cartridges which the Civil Air Patrol (CAP) inadvertently delivered to the TOC. They determined the samples to be uncontaminated and within 10 minutes contacted the ARRA lab to come and take the samples back to the ARRA laborato~.

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There was some confusion during the exercise on proper wind direction. The TOC obtains wind direction from more than one source. Possibly due to the scenario, at one point in the exercise the wind direction was plotted from one source but the staff used a different wind direction in their dose projection calculations. It may be advantageous to obtain one wind direction, possibly &om the National Weather Service (NWS),,already located in the SEOC/TOC. NWS should. be linked to the Palo Verde meteorological tower so that ARRA at the TOC can receive meteorological data.

According to the plan, the TOC maintains communications with the plant site (EOF, Technical Support Center (TSC), Satellite Technical Support Center (STSC)); the RE-AT-FORWARD; the SEOC; and Federal Radiological Assistance organizations. They implemented and fully demonstrated these communication lines. Backup communications are not available in the TOC to all the other emergency response facilities, but they are available in the adjacent SEOC areas.

The limited number of operational commercial phone lines occasionally hampered exercise play. However, emergency arrangements are in effect with the local phone company, and an additional 100 lines are available for emergency situations. Dedicated operators and phone lines would be made available in the event of an accident.

The TOC has very good communications capability. The major communication systems used were three direct-link lines to PVNGS, voice-radio, a Motorola KDT, and a FAX.

The Motorola KDT unit performed well. The FAX machine proved to be more valuable for communications between REAT-FORWARD and the TOC than the KDT.

Maps, dose projection data and other pertinent information transmitted via FAX had few errors and provided a better understanding for the organizations involved. This is a de6nite advantage and improvement. Although the FAX did begin to work intermittently, there was no real loss of communication. When a battery failure caused the FAX machine at REAT-FORWARD to fail, there was an overload on the three available commercial phone lines for approximately 21 minutes. AIBAshould consider a backup power supply for the FAX network.

The actual space provided for the TOC is marginally adequate. The furnishings are adequate, but space is tight. All appropriate status boards and maps were available but were not effectively utilized as a tool because of the layout of the facility. The status boards were updated rather slowly when new information was available. Data that was posted was generally accurate.

The TOC staff had Qlm badges. Although REAT-FORWARD is operationally responsible for emergency worker exposure control, only the TOC Director can give permission to exceed 0.5R. There were no conditions requiring such a request during this exercise.

The EOF sent plume dose projections for the Site Boundary, and for the 2 mile, 5 mile, and 10 mile radii &om the site. The TOC dose assessment team then calculated projected exposures using a PC laptop computer. Although dose projections were accomplished and done in a timely manner, the projections were usually a factor of two

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lower than the measured field data and no effort was made to compare or determine why this dichotomy existed. Also, the TOC staff made only one calculation using FMT data The TOC should obtain release rates from the TSC early on and perform contingent dose calculations.

A backup system of dose projection using a calculator and algorithm was also available.

The projected dose included whole body and child thyroid doses. (The TOC and Plant site calculations maintained the same proportion throughout the exercise, i.e., they differed by approximately a factor of two.) There were no apparent problems. The TOC Shift Supervisor and the TOC Director viewed these projections. A release to the atmosphere did not occur until 1110. Consequently, the initial PARs the TOC Director provided to the State Decision-Making Group were, for the most part, based solely on plant conditions and not dose projections. This is in accordance with the plan but is conservative. The TOC Director should consider using actual data, if available, in making value judgements.

TOC staff provided information on the status boards and discussed this information with the PIO staff. This and other information from the EOC was used for news release purposes. The TOC Director and the Director of ADES signed the prepared information sheets. At times, the volume of information requested by the PIO appeared to hamper the dose assessment and protective action recommendation process.

The. Technical Director ordered emergency workers (EW) in the 10 mile EPZ to take potassium iodide (KI) at 1158. Implementation occurred immediately by directive to the field monitoring teams through REAT-FORWARD at 1159. The TOC provided this directive to the EOC but not to the Maricopa County liaison officer. Thus, with one exception, only Geld monitoring teams took KI; neither Sheriff's Department nor the County Highway Department emergency workers ever received instructions to take KI.

The exception involved a call from the MCEOC to the SEOC inquiring about EW protection. This occurred before a group of SherifFs deputies were to enter a potentially "hot" area in the EPZ. TOC staff correctly and completely answered this inquiry.

The TOC staff made a decision at 1015 to request federal resources from the Department of Energy to remain on Alert Standby for aerial measurement support. At 1022 the DOE, Albuquerque, NM office was alerted and reported an estimated time of arrival of approximately four hours.

R irin tive Ac i n 4

2. KI for Emergency Workers

1.

Description:

The decision to require emergency workers to take KI was made but was not transmitted to the MCEOC Liaison. Thus, certain emergency workers within the 10 mile EPZ did not receive the instruction to take KI. ARRA does not have written procedures for contact of the MCEOC when ordering emergency workers to take KI.

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2. Recommendation: Write specific procedures for the instructions to EW on KI and provide training to ensure that the MCEOC receives all appropriate decisions.

Area Recommended for Im rov ment B. TOC facility

1.

Description:

The TOC facility was overcrowded. The TOC Director frequently had to interrupt activities to receive status updates even though status boards were displayed. TOC staff did not use these status boards effectively due to the TOC present layout.

2. Recommendation: Consider expansion or rearranging the layout of the TOC.

Also, consider a change in the mode of status board displays.

C. SEOC/TOC Interface

1.

Description:

SEOC staff appeared to overly, and perhaps unnecessarily, tax TOC staff with requests for information.

2. Recommendation: Review procedures to impose a reasonable discipline in the request of information from TOC staff.

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D. Discrepancy in dose projections

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1.

Description:

TOC staff did not try to resolve the dichotomy between the dose projections and measured Geld data, which differed by a factor of two. This dichotomy did not adversely impact the PARs.

2. Recommendation: Resolve discrepancies and validate data in order to produce best possible dose projection.

E. Dose Calculations

1.

Description:

The TOC staff did not conduct contingency dose calculations.

I

2. Recommendation:, Request release rate data from the STSC through the EOC as early as available, and conduct contingent dose calculations, assuming time, resources, and priorities allow. Include these calculations, as appropriate, as a part of the basis for PARs.

F. Meteorological data

1.

Description:

There was confusion about wind direction during the exercise. TOC staff obtained their meteorological data directly from the EOF, which is linked to the meteorological tower at the plant. SEOC staff used data from the NWS staff 11

I' person located in the SEOC. The difference in wind direction was the result of a scenario problem and did not impact the PARs from the TOC.

2. Recommendation: Link the meteorological tower at the plant directly to the EOC. The FAA and CAP can make signiQcant use.of the data f'rom the tower.

The NWS can use the data.to support and reinforce their forecasts. And the link can serve as a backup system to the present link between the EOF and the TOC.

RHHAT.F RWARD There were 8 objectives established for demonstration, observation, and evaluation at the REAT-FORWARD (Objectives Numbers 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 16, and 25). All objectives were fully met at the REAT-FORWARD and mobile lab.

The REAT-FORWARD staff and Qeld monitoring teams arrived at the Buckeye AirQeld at 0930. The REAT-FORWARD staff included the Captain, two direction and control assistants, and two "hot line" control monitors.

The "hot line" was set. up quickly and correctly and the REAT-FORWARD was operational at 1017.

The REAT-FORWARD Captain briefed the four Qeld monitoring teams. They completed radio checkouts and the teams were dispatched. An additional team went to the Reception and Care Center at Tolleson Union High School.

The REAT-FORWARD personnel include volunteers from both Maricopa County and State of Arizona agencies. Consequently, there are only a few full-time personnel. The full-time personnel are responsible for directing the operation of the facility, i.e., are responsible for the actions and activities of the volunteer personnel. Clearly, the demonstration showed considerable time and effort in training the volunteer personnel for their respective responsibilities. The REAT-FORWARD Captain demonstrated the ability to direct, control, and coordinate the emergency worker activities at the REAT-FORWARD.

Considerable communications capability exists at the REAT-FORWARD. In addition to the communication systems in the ARRA communications van,'he State of Arizona operates a second communications van. Also, there were Maricopa County Sheriffs and local Qre district Qre departments communication systems available. In addition, there are communication systems at the Buckeye Airport which include telephones and radio networks. The primary communication links are between REAT-FORWARD and the Field Monitoring Teams (FMT), and the TOC.

SufQcient supplies are either at or are brought to the REAT-FORWARD to support emergency operations. An airplane hanger with two restrooms, sufQcient space for the decontamination "hot line", ample parking for vehicles and water for the portable decontamination showers were available for use.

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Emergency workers at REAT-FORWARD received proper dosimetry. Dosimetry included one TLD, a 0-200mR self-reading dosimeter (SRD), and a 0-5R SRD. Prior to departure from REAT-FORWARD, the Geld team personnel received instructions to notify the REAT-FORWARD Captain for instructions should their SRD exceed 500mR.

The SRDs are charged at the REAT-FORWARD. There are no chargers included in the Geld team kits. We suggest that dosimeter chargers be provided to the Geld monitoring teams. Thus, if a SRD goes off-scale, FMTs can recharge it and record the dose without having to return to REAT-FORWARD.

The decontamination team at the "hot line" at REAT-FORWARD had the proper hand-held equipment for the monitoring of personnel, equipment, and vehicles. The "hot line" controls were quite good and the decontamination personnel were knowledgeable about their responsibilities.

Field monitoring teams were directed to take air samples which included the particulate Qlter and the iodine sampler cartridge. Consequently, particulate Glters were available for delivery to a radiological lab for analysis. The Geld team delivered its samples to a pickup point where a courier from REAT-FORWARD received the air samples and delivered them to the mobile lab at REAT-FORWARD for analysis. The samples were received and correctly monitored and double-bagged before allowing the sample in the mobile lab. The mobile lab is fully capable of analyzing the samples and transmitting the data to the TOC. Upon completion of the sample analysis at the mobile lab, which met all the objective requirements, the REAT-FORWARD Captain decided to transport the samples to the main radiation lab at ARRA using the CAP. The REAT-FORWARD Captain failed to notify the ARRA lab of the transport and thus a runner was not provided to transport the sample from the CAP heliport to the ARRA lab. The CAP delivered the samples into the SEOC/TOC.

Players use charcoal cartridges for exercise purposes, but in a real situation would use silver zeolite cartridges, which are located at the ARRA lab. There are approximately 100 cartridges, and each cartridge is hermetically sealed. There are no silver zeolite cartridges in the Geld team kits during the exercise. In a real event,'he cartridges would be delivered to REAT-FORWARD with the remainder of the air sampling equipment.

AT 1158 the REAT-FORWARD received a message from the TOC to advise the FMTs to take KI. REAT-FORWARD immediately relayed the recommendation to the FMTs and each of the four teams acknowledged the message. The bottles of KI tablets have an expiration date of October 1990; however, there is on Qle a letter Rom Wallace Labs (the KI vendor) dated 3uly 11, 1988 that extends the KI expiration date to October 1991.

A battery failure caused the FAX machine to fail. This caused an overload on the three available phone lines between REAT-Forward and the TOC for approximately 21 minutes.

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The Buckeye Airport has sufficient space and parking for contaminated personnel and vehicles. They established a "hot line" with stands and plastic chains and lined the floor with paper and "tack pads." Also available were trash cans and hand-written instructions on where to stand. The scan rates and distances for monitoring were good. The decontamination personnel . knew the decontamination procedure and the decontamination limits. Ther'e is airport water available for the portable showers.

There were Qre trucks present as an alternate source of water and for vehicle decontamination. There was adequate "clothing" available for the showered emergency workers. The decontamination personnel wore booties and gloves. There was adequate manning of the decontamination area.

R mmnd frIm vmnt G. Dosimeter chargers for Geld teams

1.

Description:

Field team kits do not include dosimeter chargers. FMTs must return to REAT-FORWARD, a distance of up to 20 miles, to recharge their dosimeters if they go off-scale.

2. Recommendation: Include dosimeter chargers in Geld team kits. FMTs can then recharge their own dosimeters, as well as those of other emergency workers, without having to return to REAT-FORWARD.

H. Backup power for FAX

1.

Description:

A battery failure caused the FAX machine at REAT-FORWARD to fail. This caused an overload on the 3 available phone lines between REAT-FORWARD and the TOC.

2. Recommendation: Provide a backup power source for the FAX system.

o LD IN TEAM There were 7 objectives established for demonstration, observation, and evaluation for the FMTs (Objectives Numbers 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 16 and 25). All ob]ectives were fully met for the FMTs.

Upon noti6cation of the Alert ECL, the ARRA Team Captain activates his team members by a phone recall system. Since this exercise occurred during normal working hours, the ARRA team members were already at REAT-Center. Other Maricopa County members, upon recall, pick up a vehicle and proceed to the Buckeye Air6eld.

The ARIM members load equipment into the ARRA vans and proceed to the REAT-FORWARD at the Buckeye Airfield.

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The FMT performed a communications check at REAT-FORWARD at 1030. Two-channel G.E. Portable radios in'he field vehicles communicated readily with REAT-FORWARD. A delay of approximately 10 minutes occurred because "B" FMT had its two-way radio switched to the wrong channel. Upon correcting this error, communications were satisfactory for the balance of the exercise.

FMTs radioed initial dosimeter readings to REAT-FORWARD prior to deploying to the Geld. A pre-deployment brieQng at REAT-FORWARD instructed FMTs to read dosimeters every 15 minutes. However, FMTs checked their dosimetry approximately every 25 minutes. FMTs were to notify REAT-FORWARD for further instructions if their dosimeter reached 500 mR. One team member noticed her pocket dosimeter had drifted 10 mR in 10 minutes. She properly exchanged it for a "working" dosimeter prior to deployment to the Geld.

FMTs demonstrated the appropriate equipment and procedures for determining Geld radiation measurements. FMTs used a Ludlum Model 14C Beta/Gamma instrument when taking open and closed probe shield readings at 3 ft. and 3 in. above the ground surface. They used a pancake probe to make a 30 second count of the radioiodine sample cartridge. A Ludlum Model 17 with a range up to 500 R/hr was also available.

All instruments were within the one year calibration period. Standard operating procedures (SOP) were attached to the back of the FMTs clipboards.

REAT-FORWARD directed the FMTs to specific locations where the plume was expected to pass. They collected data and tracked the plume. The air pump operated off the vehicle's battery. A charcoal cartridge and Glter was used to demonstrate air sampling. After obtaining an air sample, the FMT moved out of the plume to a location having background radiation levels, purged the sample, and counted it in a Gxed geometry counting apparatus. They radioed the count rate back to REAT-FORWARD.

One team experienced trouble obtaining a proper sample. FMT "B" started their air sampler and the Qow rate was > 6 cfm. They shut off the air sampler, adjusted and then restarted it. The Qow rate was still ) 6 cfm. They shut off the air sampler again, adjusted and restarted it. The Qow rate was then 4 cfm. The team. member properly adjusted the Qow rate to 2 cfm. The FMT clock for sample time ran from the time the air sampler was turned on and not from the time the correct Qow rate was established, so 45 seconds of a 5 minute sample had-been lost in adjusting the Qow rate. Therefore, the sample volume for this sample was not the required 5 minute sample volume. In the future the air samplers should be operationally checked prior to FMT deployment or adjusted to the flow rate with the air sampler operating to ensure an adequate volume is obtained.

The FMT obtained a particulate sample and properly bagged and labeled it. A runner rendezvoused with the team to collect the sample and transport it to the mobile laboratoiy at REAT-FORWARD.

15

The FMTs received instructions to take KI at 1158. Team members simulated taking KI. Team members knew the proper dosage of Kl. The expiration date on the KI was October 1990 but the team members were aware that REAT-FORWARD had a letter extending the expiration date to October 1991.

R mm n f r Im vement I. Air sampler Qow rate

1.

Description:

There was 45 seconds of sample time lost due to the air sampler being shut off to adjust Qow rate.

2. Recommendation: Check Qow rate on air samplers prior to deployment or adjust the flow rate with the air sampler turned on.

o INT EMER E Y W E R There were 5 objectives established for demonstration, observation, and evaluation at the JENC (Objective Numbers 1, 2, 4, 5, and 14). All objectives were fully met, except for Objective Number 14, which was only partially met.

The JENC is located about 100 yards from the SEOC on the Papago Military Reservation. The JENC has been established so that the Utility, the State, the County, and Federal Government can coordinate brieQngs and press releases and can provide them to the media at one location. The facility is located on a State Military Reservation and the National Guard has successfully demonstrated security during previous exercises.

The JENC staff mobilized at the Alert ECL The Qrst staf'f members arrived at 0910, and the JENC was operational at 0945.

The JENC building is divided into a media brieQng area and a media. production area.

Space, lighting, and ventilation are adequate. Both areas contained adequate displays and maps. They demonstrated effective use of a status board to show the current news releases and EBS messages.

The JENC staff produced 17 news releases (NR) and conducted 5 media brieQngs; The staf'f gathered information on PADs from the SEOC, on PAD implementation from the MCEOC, and on plant status from the EOF to produce the news releases. They sent draft NRs, via the FAX machine, to the EOF for approval; the JENC Manager gave Qnal approval to the NRs. They posted NRs at several locations in the JENC, sent copies to both EOCs via the FAX machine, and distributed. them to the press corps in the JENC.

The JENC did not produce NRs in a timely fashion relative to developments in the scenario and the PADs. For example, the Qrst NR to mention any protective actions (NR 811) appeared 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after the same information appeared in EBS message P1 16

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and P2. Also, there were no NRs which contained information on the last 3 PADs.

However, copies of the EBS messages were'vailable to the press soon after the release.

Also, News Release 818, in draft form. at the termination of the exercise, would have contained more information on the PADs (but would not have been timely).

News releases included accurate information about PADs in effect, but they were incomplete in other ways. For example, NR P7 informed people to listen to EBS for possible protective actions, but it did not mention either the call letters or the frequency of the EBS station. Also, NRs which mentioned school children, e.g., NRs 811 and

@12, did not include any information for parents on how and when to pick up their children. And although NRs gave the public inquiry number, they did not mention the public information brochure/calendar which the public could use to help understand protective action instructions.

TABLE I EN NEW R ELBA 1* Alert (0857) 2 SAE (0943) 0950 1030 3 SAE- 1110 1112 4 SAE 1015 1115 5 SAE 1016 1035 6 GE (1124) 1020 1139 7 GE 1049 1215 8 GE 1107 1227 9 GE 1102 1227 10 11 12 GE GE GE

'147 1130 1155 1210 1211 1257 13 GE 1227 1303 14 GE 1243 1336 15 GE 1317 1340 16 GE 1335 1425 17 GE 1342 1445 18 GE 1355 19 GE 1430 released f'rom PVNGS Communications Dept.

exercise ended before release The problems with the untimely release of NRs was not solely the fault of the JENC staff. They worked diligently to produce timely NRs. Rather, one problem was in the approval process at the SEOC. There was confusion at the EOF regarding who had the 17

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authority to approve draft NRs. NRC RV was playing in the exercise with the State for the Qrst time, and had a role in the news release process. There was a misunderstanding regarding NRCs review of news releases prior to their issuance by the State. Consequently, a large number of news releases were held up until the matter was resolved.

Another problem was the breakdown of the printer at the JENC. It was down for 20 minutes before someone solved the problem.

JENC staf'f conducted the media brieQngs in a professional and timely manner. The speakers from the State, County, and Utility all appeared knowledgeable and conQdent.

All speakers remained near the podium to hear what the other speakers said; this kept contradictory information to a minimum. A University Advisor to the State was on hand to present the health risks of radiation to the non-technical audience. He did an excellent job. The audience consisted of journalism students from the University of Arizona.

DIA TABLE II DIA BRIEFIN TIM Media Briefin Time g1 1014 g2 1056 g3 1157 g4 1304 85 1438 In general, JENC staf'f rapidly relayed information on protective actions to the press in the brieQngs. During brieQng P4, the JENC manager interrupted the speaker to inform the press of a newly issued PAD. None of the brieQngs mentioned PADs P6 or P7.

While it is reasonable to assume no brieQng could have covered PAD P7 (issued 20 minutes before the exercise ended), brieQng 85 should have included PAD P6.

The JENC staff effectively conducted brieQng P4 at Russell Auditorium, the alternate site. The players demonstrated the ability to provide an audio feed to the main JENC facility. However, the use of displays, e.g,, the EPZ map, would have made the brieQngs more effective.

At all of the brieQngs, the speakers presented the new or most important information Qrst. The less important or "sidebar" information followed.

Though most of the equipment in the JENC is adequate, the word processing equipment (a WANG word processor and printer) used to produce press releases is obsolete. The copy staff do not use this type of equipment on a daily basis, and there was no backup 18

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equipment. The printer broke down for 20 minutes and the problem was not readily apparent. The printer is also very noisy, and it may need a muffling box" to reduce the noise level in the JENC.

R irin rrec ive Ac ion

3. News Releases 1,

Description:

Some News Releases contained incomplete information. which is important to the public.

2. Recommendation: Train staff to include information regarding the call letters and frequency of the EBS station, where parents can pick up their children, and references to the Information Brochure. This could be in the form of "boiler plate" information to speed NR production.

4. Media BrieQngs 1,

Description:

Media briefmgs did not cover the last two PADs. Although PAD P7 was issued near the end of the exercise, media brieGng 85 should have included PAD P6.

2. Recommendation: Review procedures and train staff to announce new PADs and other important information at media briefings.

R mm nde f r Im rovement J. Word Processing Equipment

1.

Description:

The word processing equipment at the JENC is not the type that the operators use on a daily basis.

2. Recommendation: Provide training to JENC staff on word processing equipment.

K. Review process for news releases

1.

Description:

A misunderstanding of the federal participation in the review and approval process caused many news releases to be untimely.

2. Recommendation: Review and clarify the review and approval process for news releases.

o RI P NTY EMER EN Y PERA N E R There were 13 objectives established for demonstration, observation, and evaluation at the MCEOC. (Objective Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22). All objectives were fully met at the facility.

19

I The MCEOC staff members are well-trained and function together as a very smooth emergency response organization. The MCEOC facility is always ready for operation.

Therefore, it requires a minimum of activation time.

The MCEOC staff were aware of all the ECLs. Changes in ECL status came via a dedicated phone line from the SEOC. As ECLs changed, the operations chief verbally announced the changes, and staff posted the changes on the status board and input the changes into the computer-generated status board and map. Each workstation (e.g operations chief, communications, highway, etc.) had checklists with specifications they would carry out at each ECL, After the completion of all the items on the checklist, this data was input into the computer.

The MCEOC received the Alert ECL notiGcation at 0857. Most of the staff work in the EOC building and the equipment is already in place. Calls went out to the Sheriff's oKce, the ARC, and the County Health and Highway Departments. The Director declared the EOC operational at 0940, when all the staff had arrived.

The Operations Chief demonstrated very effective direction and control in the MCEOC.

He briefed the staff immediately after receiving new PADs or ECLs from the SEOC, and gave each operations group an opportunity to present their information. He also periodically checked with each group to make sure there were no problems.

MCEOC staff maintained message logs at each work station for all incoming and all internal messages. The central location for copies of these messages were clipboards mounted on one of the walls. In addition, the computer operators input the messages and logs into the computer system. A complete printout of all work station logs and a chronological list of messages was available at the end of the exercise. However, only the computer operators can instantly access these messages and logs.

MCEOC personnel demonstrated the ability to communicate with other organizations involved in the emergency response. Communication with the SEOC was successful in all instances. This is particularly important since the MCEOC receives directions to implement Protective Actions &om the State.

MCEOC personnel were responsible for contacting other organizations to'implement protective actions when directed to do so by the State. Communications with EBS Station KTAR, the JENC, schools, Department of Highways, SherifFs and Health Department personnel were successful. They were able to implement all actions in an effective and timely manner.

All equipment at the MCEOC Facility is operational and in-place. Consequently, there is no need to set up communications equipment, The MCEOC was fully equipped to handle this exercise and to house all participants.

Space and furnishing at the MCEOC were adequate to house a total of 45 people within 3 rooms. Cots, restrooms, and kitchen facilities are available. Space and lighting is very 20

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adequate, a 100 kilowatt generator provides backup power, and there is a 20,000 gallon supply of filtered water.

The County used a computer-generated map to display current information about the EPZ; e.g., wind speed and directions, traffic control points; evacuated areas,,relocation sites, etc. They also used a conventional wall map as a backup in case of a computer malfunction, which did occur during the course of the exercise. Though the displays used were adequate, there is room for improvement. The computer map could not depict the current degree of evacuation, i.e., the percentage evacuated in a given sector.

Also, the computer basically wiped out (blacked out) the sectors evacuated, eliminating all map features for that sector. The computer map was small and therefore somewhat dif6cult to read, especially for detailed information. The evaluators did not observe much use of the maps by the players.

The MCEOC is responsible for implementing emergency worker protective actions decisions for County emergency workers within the 10 mile EPZ. However, the TOC never did inform the MCEOC of the order for all emergency workers to take KI.

(See ARCA P2, p.10)

MCEOC personnel demonstrated the ability to develop and disseminate an EBS message to the public within the 15 minute time limit speci6ed in the plan. They issued seven EBS messages to the public. In all cases, the elapsed time from the decision being made at the SEOC to the transmission of an EBS message met the 15 minute requirement.

The County has identified the EPZ population, including special populations needing assistance. There are no public parks in the EPZ where transients or visitors unfamiliar with emergency procedures could visit.

The County uses pre-scripted EBS messages with Zone Designator instead of geographical names or boundaries because they are more effective. There are very few geographical boundaries or landmarks in the EPZ, and the population has received public information details which clearly describe their speci6c sectors. EBS Station KTAR was told to rebroadcast messages at 10 minute and then 15 minute intervals.

The County coordinates the timing of all EBS messages to assure that the sirens sounded prior to the EBS message broadcast.

The County did utilize assistance and resources from non-Federal organizations such as the Red Cross, Civil Air Patrol, and RACES. Each of these non-Federal assistance sources responded in a timely manner.

R mmen f rIm vm n L. Computer-generated Maps

1.

Description:

The computer-generated maps were dif6cult to read and had limited utility.

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2. Recommendation: Improve the utility of computer-generated maps by including status of task(s) completed. Also; improve readability of map, i.e., increase size and clarity of map and map data. ~

o I PA NE MMANDP T-E There were 12 objectives established for demonstration, observation, and evaluation at the MCOSCP (Objective Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12, 16, 18, 19, 20, and 25). All objectives were fully met in this facility, except for Objectives 6 and 16, which were only partially met.

The MCOSCP is staffed by the Maricopa County SherifFs Office (MCSO) and by the Arizona Department of Public Safety (AZ-DPS). Law enforcement personnel provide the manpower for Traffic Control Points (TCPs), security for evacuated areas, assistance in evacuation, supplemental warning in case of siren failure, and other emergency response functions as needed.

The MCOSCP has excellent displays, maps, and communications equipment. 'Although the ECLs were not prominently posted, classifications were logged and personnel received verbal status information on a regular basis. Wind shifts were noted and tracked on the map, the TCPs were displayed, and evacuation routes highlighted.

The MCSO received the NOUE ECL at 0822 at the Avondale Substation and the Alert ECL at 0905. The Advance Command Post received the Alert ECL and responded to Palo Verde School immediately. The Command Post communications vehicle was operational by 0930. The MCOSCP equipment and personnel assembled at the Avondale substation after notification of Alert via pager or radio and were en route to Palo Verde School by 1000. From 0930 to 1100 the Advance Command Post operated effectively from the Palo Verde School. Deputies were dispatched to TCPs promptly.

At 1100 command and control shifted f'rom the Advance Command Post to the MCOSCP. The response by the MCSO and DPS was excellent. Mobilization was completed promptly. The MCOSCP commander provided direction and control. He and the MCOSCP coordinator worked together effectively.

The MCSO equipment is more than adequate. Equipment included three motor homes, two trailers, a mobile antenna rig, and multiple four-wheel drive vehicles for the MCOSCP. AZDPS responded to the MCOSCP with a command van and two'patrol vehicles. 'ultiple radio systems and cellular telephones provided adequate communications.

The ability to continuously monitor and control all emergency worker exposure was not fully demonstrated during the exercise. MCSO and AZDPS personnel were given one 0-5R SRD for exposure control. Other EWs in the 10 mile EPZ were issued a TLD and a 0-200mR SRD in addition to the 0-5R SRD. Maricopa County Highway Department (MCHD) personnel, who deliver roadblock barricades to TCPs in the 10 mile EPZ, were not given dosimetry, nor were they knowledgeable in its use. The plan only identifies the EWs at the ROC and the FMTs as specifically requiring two SRDs and a 22

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TLD. The plan does not discuss dosimetry needs for the MCOSCP. NUREG 0654, Item K3.a, speciQcally requires all EWs to have a perma'nent record dosimeter such as a TLD or film badge.

Also, the process of decision-making,'distribution and administration of KI was not demonstrated at. the MCOSCP during'the exercise. The MCOSCP personnel did not have KI in their possession and were not instructed to take KI. (ARRA FMTs were notified by 1159.) The only mention of KI at the MCOSCP was at 1345 when the deputies were to go into an evacuated area to "rescue" a person. The MCOSCP called the MCEOC which called the TOC for instructions. The deputies were instructed to go to REAT-FORWARD to pick up KI, appropriate dosimetry, and respirator masks and take KI before entering EPZ to perform the evacuation assistance. Also, MCOSCP personnel were not instructed to go to EW decontamination after exiting the BPZ for monitoring and possible decontamination. The plan does not reference what the proper procedure is for the MCOSCP personnel with respect to KI and dosimetry.

In summary, the overall performance of the MCOSCP, except for dosimetry and KI, was excellent and we commend the personnel involved. The fact that the MCSO questioned the use of KI before sending a deputy back into the EPZ to perform rescue efforts is also commendable.

The State has made very substantive progress in correcting the two 1989 ARCAs dealing with adequate dosimetiy, the availability of KI, and training for all emergency workers in their purpose and use. However, additional work in this area is necessary to fully correct these ARCAs.

The State has trained more than 100 emergency workers from the MCSO and the MCHD in dosimetiy and IG procedures since the 1989 biennial exercise. In addition, the State purchased 200 0-SR SRDs for use by emergency workers from MCSO and MCHD. Following the April 24, 1991 biennial exercise, the State has initiated actions to relocate 200 TLDs for the use of BWS dispatched from the MCOSCP. The State is presently in the process of caching TLDs, SRDs, and KI in "caves" at the Avondale Primary Care Center for distribution to and use by these specific emergency workers.

R irin tiv A i n

5. Dosimetry and KI for emergency workers

1. Description; Although the emergency workers at the MCOSCP demonstrated a sound understanding of the use and purpose of dosime and KI, they received no KI and only one SRD. Highway Department personnel were an exception to.the above: they neither received dosimetiy or KI nor did they demonstrate adequate knowledge of dosimetry and KI. Also, none of the EWS at the'MCOSCP received instructions regarding radiological monitoring and decontamination procedures for emergency workers,

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2. Recommendation: Provide all emergency workers with dosimetry, including TLDs or film badges, and train them in its purpose and use. Also, instruct all EW regarding radiological monitoring and decontamination procedures.

6. References to dosimetry in State Plan

1.

Description:

The State Plan includes references to the requirements for dosimetry for 6eld monitoring pool personnel, but not for all emergency workers.

2. Recommendation: Review and revise State plan and procedures to ensure all emergency workers receive the appropriate dosimetry. Ensure all emergency workers receive training in the use and purpose of dosimetry.

I A N M ATI There were 3 objectives established for demonstration, observation, and evaluation for communications/alert and noti6cation (Objective Numbers 4, 12, and 13). All objectives were fully met.

The primary communication link between the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) and primary Arizona emergency operations is the Noti6cation and Alert Network (NAN). This is a dedicated phone system, with 6ve drops. The NAN system at the SEOC broke down for about an hour at the beginning of the exercise. The radio and telephone backups functioned with no delays or adverse effects, Commercial phone lines (Dedicated Interface Communications System) served as the principle communications link between the State EOC/TOC and the MCEOC and the JENC. A hardcopy facsimile machine (Tech hard-copy System - HTS) connecting these three locations was used extensively and successfully during the exercises.

The MCEOC has VHF, UHF and cellular radio systems. They also can link with the TOC-FMT-REAT radio system, with the EBS Station, and with. the mobile command post. The MCSO and AZ-DPS also have their own communications equipment (see MCOSCP Section for details).

• The communications of6cer in the MCEOC put EBS station (KTAR) on standby status af'ter the Alert ECL noti6cation. He tested both the landline and radio links to the station, and also checked the siren system and put it on standby. The initial noti6cation of the public occurred at 1011, when KTAR began the simulated broadcast of the 6rst EBS message, two minutes after the simulation of the sounding of the sirens. The simulated broadcast of this message, and all the subsequent EBS messages, occurred within 15 minutes of the PAD by the State (see Attachment E).

KTAR had updated instructions and trained personnel. Their logs were current and included the appropriate authentication codes. The communications of6cer in MCEOC did an excellent job. He was well-prepared and accomplished his tasks in a minimum amount of time.

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Personnel used exercise authentication codes at the EOCs and between Maricopa County and Radio Station KTAR.

o E EPTI N AND ARE NTER There were 3 objectives established for demonstration, observation, and evaluation at the Reception 8c Care Center (Objective Numbers 4, 21 and 22). All three objectives were fully met.

This demonstration was not in sequence with the exercise; therefore, personnel were setting up at 0900 and the facility was ready for operation at about 0945. Fifty high school senior students from Tolleson Union High School played the roles of evacuees.

A Sheriffs Department vehicle was used for the demonstration of vehicle monitoring.

Vehicle decontamination was simulated. Adequate parking was available for arriving evacuees'ehicles. A Gre truck was on standby for vehicle decontamination.

Eighty-Qve "evacuees" were monitored at the personnel monitoring station in= one hour.

Monitoring times ranged f'rom 1 min. 45 sec. to 2 min. 15 sec. with an average of 2 min.

per evacuee. Based on the rate of 2 minutes per person and on the six monitors, the requirement to process 20% of the EPZ population (300 out of 1500) was met. Good monitoring techniques were used, which attests to adequate training. Contaminated and non-contaminated persons were adequately separated following monitoring.

Contaminated articles and personal effects were adequately handled. Decontamination procedures were explained, but not actually demonstrated, and were suKcient. Paper clothing was available until the Red Cross could provide permanent clothing.

The American Red Cross handled registration as well as congregate care. All activities related to congregate care were adequately demonstrated. The school gynmasium serves as the congregate care shelter. The capacity is 320 evacuees. The EPZ contains 1500 people of which 300 are expected to arrive at the reception and care center. ARC personnel included 3 registrars, 7 nurses (one a psychiatric nurse); 5 personnel for setup and the shelter manager. There was a person from the Church of. th'e Brethren in charge of child care and.an RACES operator was also present. A number of the ARC personnel were fluent in Spanish as well as English.

Although swipe materials were available in the kits at the personnel monitoring station, they were not available at the vehicle monitoring station when needed for use. Use of checklists to ensure that all materials, equipment, and procedures are available at the stations where needed would alleviate discrepancies, R mmended f r Im r v m n M. Swipe Materials

1.

Description:

Swipe materials were not available at the vehicle monitoring station.

Monitoring personnel had to obtain them from the personnel monitoring station.

25

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2. Recommendation: Use checklists to ensure that all materials, equipment, and procedures are available at monitoring stations.

o V ATI N TRAN P RTATI N There were 6 objectives established for demonstration, observation, and evaluation for evacuation and transportation (Objective Numbers 2, 4, 6, 18, 19, and 20). All objectives were fully met, except for Objective 6, which was only partially met (See MCOSCP section for details regarding EW dosimetry and KI).

The MCOSCP mobilized promptly. Deputies and Sheriffs received instructions via pager or radio to assemble at the Avondale Substation. Command Post vehicles and personnel arrived and had the MCOSCP set up by 1100. From 0930 to 1100 the "Advance Command Post" operated effectively from the Palo Verde School. Deputies assigned to the TCPs were dispatched promptly. There appeared to be no coordination between the MCOSCP and the MCHD personnel supplying the barricades.

The scenario included a siren malfunction which required emergency workers to provide supplemental warning. Also, the scenario required emergency workers to provide transportation for the evacuation of transit-dependent members of the public including those with special needs. Backup route-alerting was requested of MCSO at 1143 to provide supplemental noti6cation after siren 17/230 failed to sound. A MCSO patrol vehicle and a helicopter were dispatched and adequately demonstrated route-alerting.

Upon receiving phone calls from members of the public for transportation, the Sheriffs Department dispatched Deputies to those locations within the EPZ to transport the evacuees to the Reception and Care Center.

The evacuation of school students was simulated for the Palo Verde School at 1147.

School oKcials, through interviews, demonstrated an adequate knowledge of the procedures involved in the evacuation process.

Radios in the sheriffs vehicles provided communications for players during the exercise.

They were m constant contact with the MCOSCP and the MCSO Communications Center. Players had the required vehicles, radios, and correct maps of the area to support emergency operations in order to provide any necessary route-alerting and transportation for transportation-dependent members of the public. Th'ey also used cellular phones. The evacuation of the transit-dependent population was excellent.-

mmn dfrIm vmn N. Coordination between MCOSCP and MCHD personnel

1.

Description:

There was a lack of coordination between the MCOSCP and the MCHD personnel who set up the barricades. The MCOSCP had no idea when MCHD personnel would arrive at the TCPs. Therefore, the MCOSCP could not eKciently and ef'fectively use the deputies dispatched to the TCPs.

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2. Recommendation: Place a liaison from the MCHD at the MCOSCP to coordinate arrival times to the TCPs.

o MEDI AL ERVI There were 2 objectives established for demonstration, observation, and evaluation for medical services (Objectives Numbers 23 and 24). Both objectives were fully met.

Good Samaritan Hospital is located at 1111 East McDowell Road, in Phoenix, Arizona.

The hospital utilizes the Trauma Bay in their Emergency Trauma Center (ETC) to receive, treat, and decontaminate an injured patient who has been contaminated with radioactive. material. The hospital staff can isolate this area so that non-contaminated patients can simultaneously be treated in the Trauma Bay. There are entrances and exits to the Trauma Bay from both the helipad and ambulance access.

The ETC staff are well-trained and knowledgeable in the procedures for the receipt, handling, and decontamination of patients contaminated with radioactive material.

Personnel from Ancillary Services are also well-trained in their'particular response roles during such an event.

t Personnel from Radiation Management Consultants, under contract with the Utility, conduct training for staff and ancillary services personnel twice each year, usually in the spring and fall. The most recent training session was on April 23, 1991. Attendance is mandatory, and the hospital has documented the training. In addition to this training, physicians have the opportunity to attend a physician-to-physician training program that Radiation Management Consultants conducts each year.

Training of these staff members and ancillary personnel is on-going as part of their orientation to the overall Hospital Disaster Plan. Whenever possible, new personnel participate in the exercise. There are enough trained personnel to insure the presence of trained staf'f on each shift. A copy of a videotape, "Hospital Emergency Response to Radiation Accidents," provided by the Oak Ridge Associated Universities, was available in the ETC for review at anytime.

Available in the ETC was the procedure EPD 2-018, External Disaster Plan, Radiation Component." This procedure is part of the overall "External Disaster Plan." The ETC staff and ancillary personnel review the procedure on an annual basis, and revise it as appropriate. Hospital documents show the most recent review was in March, 1991.

At 0851, the hospital received a call from the utility with information concerning an injured and contaminated victim. The hospital used a form, "Information and Checklist for Radioactively Contaminated Patients," to record the patient's information. After a call back to the plant to verify the information, staff members received their notiQcation and the preparation of the ETC began. Personnel brought the supplies and equipment to the area and prepared the room, zeroed, logged and distributed the personnel monitoring equipment, and donned their protective clothing in a timely and efficient manner. Everything was ready by 0930 - well ahead of the-patient's arrival.

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Equipment in the ETC included two regular and two shielded GM pancake detectors with the associated electronics. There were also two dose-rate measuring instruments.

with a range f'rom 1 pR/hr to 999 mR/hr. All the instruments were operational and had been calibrated. Additional equipment was available from the Nuclear Medicine and Radiation Oncology Department.

Supplies included plastic bags containing one complete set of anti-contamination clothing, with the instructions for donning the clothing. Taped to each protective clothing package was a packet containing the following: a TLD for whole-body monitoring; two TLD rings for extremity monitoring; a 0-200mR SRD and a log card.

At 1006, the Samaritan AIREVAC helicopter arrived at the helipad with the patient.

The hospital Radiation Safety OKcer and a Radiation Therapy Technician, together with a Security OKcer, discussed the contamination status of the patient and the helicopter crew with the on-board Radiation Protection Technologists (RPT) from PVNGS. The Security Officer and the nurse from the helicopter then transferred the patient from the helicopter to the "penthouse," and onto a gurney. An ETC staff nurse also assisted. (All were wearing the appropriate protective clothing). The two nurses and the RPT transported the patient in an elevator down to the ETC. Finally, the remaining hospital staff members surveyed the helicopter and the helicopter crew using the appropriate equipment and following the Policy 2.21, "An Evac Response to Radiation Incidents."

The ETC personnel demonstrated a thorough knowledge of.contamination control after the patient arrived. The RPT frequently monitored the patient and the staff. The staff changed gloves as necessary. A Nuclear Medicine Technologist (NMT) demonstrated the monitoring of personnel who left the controlled area. During the decontamination of the patient, a small amount of potentially contaminated water spilled on the Qoor, but the RPT quickly contained it. Sta8 successfuHy demonstrated the procedures for returning the controlled area to normal use and detailed the procedure for waste

disposal, During the monitoring of personnel leaving the controlled area, the NMT did not have the volume on for her instrument, and was not observing the meter dial. Therefore, she could not see or hear any increase in the count rate.

The participants'pproach to the exercise was commendable. They were very enthusiastic, and they all played as if it was a real event.

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Area Recommended for Im rovement O. Use of Monitoring Equipment a

Description:

The NMT monitoring personnel leaving the controlled area did not have the audio for her instrument on, and was not observing the meter for any increase in count rate. An observer corrected the procedure by turning on the audio. The NMT then demonstrated the correct technique.

b. Recommendation: Provide additional training in the use of monitoring equipment.

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PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION BIENNIALEXERCISE APRIL 24, 1991 EVALUATOR ROSTER

~AILITY EYVAL AT IR Emergency Operations Facility Dean Kunihiro, RAC/NRC RV Arizona Emergency Operations Joe Dominguez, FEMA RIX Center Susan Thraen, INEL O.C. Payne, FEMA Elizabeth Scott, FEMA RIX Technical Operations Center Dawn Skinner, RAC/DOE Steve Dean, RAC/EPA Wayne Scoggins, DOE RVI Field Monitoring Teams Wayne Freeby, INEL Bob Nicol, RAC/FDA Gerald Jacobson, ANL C. Lee Knoell, DOE RVI Radiological Emergency Bill Serrano, INEL Assessment Team Forward/

Mobile Lab On-Scene Command Post Jacques Mitrani, ANL Joint Emergency News Center Richard Converse, ANL Maricopa County Emergency Nancy Darte, FEMA RIX Operations Center Bill Van Pelt, RAC/FDA Reception and Care Carl Hunckler, ANL Lyle Slagle, INEL Manley Wu, FEMA RIX Richard Echavarria, FEMA RIX Transportation/Evacuation Ed Henry, RAC/DOT Communications Terry Knight, ANL Barbara Kambouris, FEMA RIX Medical Frank Bold, ANL AYTA HMENT A 33

2.0 Objectives And Extent Of Play 2.1 ~Ob ectives The following objectives have been chosen to be demonstrated during this years Annual Exerase. They correlate with and have been chosen from a six year plan maintamed by the PVNGS Emergency Planning Department that identifies when specific objectives have to be accomplished. The criteria in which to evaluate the accomplishment of these objectives can be found in Section 4.4 of this manual.

2.1.1 Arizona Public Service (APS)/Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station {PVNGS)

A. General Objectives I. Demonstrate the ability to assess plant conditions.

2. Demonstrate the ability to classify the event per EPIP-02.

3. Demonstrate the ability to identify projected trends and potential consequences.

4. Demonstrate the ability to alert and notify the PVNGS emergency response persormel in a timely manner.

5 . DemonstmtetheaMitytomoMize the PVNGS erne engrreslmnsepersonnelvrithinthetime frames ed m the Emergency Plan.

6. Demonstrate the abBity of PVNGS to notify State and county agencies within 15 minutes of emergency 1eclaratron.

7. Demonstr~theab0ityto determine actua1 or potential ofBite radiologicalhazards.

. 8. Demonstrate the abBityto make thnelyprotective action recommendations to o agencies.

9. Demonstzate the ability to track plume passage.

10. Demonstrate the per use of radiation monitoring instruments and dosimetry.

11. Demonstrate the proper use of sampling equipment and contamination control techniques.

12. Demonstrate the ability to draw and analyze a PASS sample during simulated adverse radiological conditions.

APS/PV14GS 2 1 Ql/25/93 3??J hnnu:i) I,=.XC<<'ib

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2.1 Ob ectives Cont

3. Control Room/Satellite Technical Support Center (CR/STSC)

a. Demonstrate the adequacy of the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures both in terms oE management control and workability of the procedures for the CR/STSC.

b. Demonstrate the adequacy of communication between the OSC, EOF, inplant response teams, and the CR/STSC.

c. Demonstrate the effectiveness and availability of appropriate emergency equipment and supphes.

d. Demonstrate activation and staffing of the STSC in a timely fashion.

e. Demonstrate the functional adequacy of the STSC.

4. Operations Support Center (OSC) a Demonstrate the ad cy of the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan lementing Procedures both in terms of management control and workabBity of the procedures for the OSC.

1.33emonstrate the adequacy of communication links between%plant thams, the TSQSTSC and the OSC

c. Demonstmte the effectiveness and availability of appropriate emergency equipment and supphes.

d. Demonstrate activation and staGing of the OSCin a timely &chion.

e. Demonstr'W the functional adequacy of the OSC.

5. Joint HmergencyNews Center (JENC)

H

a. Demonstrate the adequacy of the Emergency Plan and the Joint PublicInformation Pro ures both in terms of management control and workabiTity of the procedures for the JENC.

b. Demonstrate the adequacy of communication links between government emergency facilities, the utility's emergency facilities and the JENC.

APS/PVHGS 2 3 01/25/'ol

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2. ~OI' C Field Radiological Monitoring - Ambient Radiation Monitoring

7. Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for determining Geld radiation measurements.

Field Radiological Monitoring - Airborne Iodine Monitoring

8. Demonstrate the appropriate equiyment and procedures for the measurement of airborne radioiodine concentrations as low as 10 ~ microcurie per cc in the presence of noble gasses.

Field Radiological Monitoring - Particulate Activity

9. Demonstrate the ability to obtain samples of particulate activity in the airborne plume and promptly analyses.

perform'aboratory Plume Dose Projection 1 0. Demonstrate the ability, within the plume exposure athway, to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, ased onplant and Ge1d data.

Plume Protective Action Decisionmaking 1L Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate protective action decisions, bas onprojected or a dosage, HPA PAGs, avaBabihtyof@QequiW shelter, evacuation time esthmites and other relevant factors.

Alert, NotiGcationAnd EmergencyInformation Demonstrate the ability to mitiaHy alert thepublicwithin the 10-mile EPZand dissemination of aninstructional messagevriQdn1S 'of adecisionbyappropziate State and/oriocal'ofBcial(s).

the aMityto coordinate the formulation and

'emonstarte

-dissemination of accurate information and instructions to thepublic in a timely fashion after the initial alert and notdication has occurred.

14. Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in an accurate, coordinated and timely manner.

15. Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated and timely fashion.

APS/PVNGS . 5 01/25/91 3 PJ I Alll)lllllEXl.'I CIA('

2.1 Ob ectives Cont Medical Services - Facilities

24. Demonstrate the adequacy of medical facilities, equipment, procedures and personnel for handling contaminated, mjured or exposed individuals.

Decontamination

25. Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, supplies, procedures and personnel for decontamirmtton of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles and for waste disposal.

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'upplementary Assistance (FederaVOther)

26. Demonstrate the ability to identify the need for and call upon Federal and other outside support agencies'ssistance.

2.19 Joint Objectives (APSIPVNGS, State of Arizona and County of Maricopa)

1. Demonstrate timely coordination and release of information to the media through coordinated action by State, county, and utilityelements.

2. Demonstrate that emergency response org'mizations can activate and staff directron and control RcBities in a timely fashion.

3. Demonstrate the functional adequacy of emergency facilities.

4. Demonstrate the adequacy of communication links between government emergency facBities, Geld teams, and the utility's emergency factlities.

5. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate protective actions in the plume exposure pathway EFL

6. Demonstrate the adequacy of communications with the public via the news media

7. Demonstrate the adequacy of communications with the public via the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS).

APS/PVNGS 2 7 01/25/91

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u h CONFrDEmur. FOR coNIRoX,r,ER USE oNLV

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3.0 Scenario 3.1 Initial Conditions Unit 1 is in Mode 1 (operating at power). For the past six months, it has been running at reactor power levels greater than 90%.

Currently it is at 100% power.

Unit 2 is also operating at fullpower. Unit 3 is in the 38th day of a refueling outage.

The following Unit 1 plant conditions exist:

~ Allprimary-related systems are operating normaOy. There are no pressure boundary leaks, however, there is a 5 GPM identiEed leak from a pram ~ sample valve stem.

~ Reactor coolant system chemistry is within Technical Speci6cation limits with no abnormal trending conditions take place.

~ Plant ventBation is in a normal line-up. Containment purge is not in.progress. A

~ Opezationalproblems exist with the "A"Coolant Charging Pump related.to the pump'i ondampers. The pump is operational, however, a ven or tech rep is scheduled to check it out.

The following Unit 1 equiyme~n6gurations exist:

~ The "B"Train 4.16 KVBus (PBB404) is off-line due to a bus fault. Maintenance is currentlJJ in the process of replacing a section of the buswork This job cannot be co leted for another4homs. ForthisIimiting Condition for tion(LCO),'tis currently hour 1 of an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> action statement. Openttionsveuld normally'shut the plant down in this condition, however, the Load Dispatcher has requested that the plant xemain on line as long as potable to prevent large power outages I

in California.

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~ The'S" Diesel Generator is down for maintenance to the generator brushes. SurveBlance requirement 4.8.1.1.1a is due to be performed again on the operable Diesel Generator in three hours.

~ The circuit breaker for the "B"AuxiliaryFeed Pump is tagged out for maintenance/parts replacement. For this LCO, it is currently hour two of the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> action statement.

A thermography check of the Isophase Bus is in progress.

A PS/ PV1w~GS 1 04/02/91

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CONFmEmr~I, FOn. eONI'non,m UsE oNj.V 3.2 Narrative Summa Cont Unknown to the Operators and because of a manufacturing defect in the impeller of tIie "2A"RCP, sharp metal fragments break off of the impeller and are released to be circulated through the primary coolant. The fragments are so small the KCP Vibration Momtor doesn't register it, however, the Loose Parts Monitor System alarms.

Aa electrician, in preparation to perform a maintenance

.. iaspection of the breaker for this same pump, attempts to open the breaker's door when to his dismay it hangs up on a latching mechanism.

This causes him to use additional force in tzying to open it. Suddealy the latch releases the door, throwing him off balance. He can't help but to let the door slip out of his hands. It swings open rapidly, bangs against the breaker panel, aad trips the breaker.- He immediately recloses the breaker thinking this would be the safe thing to do. This situation causes several things to happen, including, a reactor trip,

. excessive vibration to the "2A"RCP causing additional impellei failure and damage to its shaft seals. The current suzge also causes the wiring in the containment penetration to the RCP to short out aad suffer severe damage. Two Control Rods inserting during the reactor trip encounter metal fragments in the chanaels and become lodged in place rior to fullinsertion. In addition, some larger impeller fragments lock coolant Qow to some of the fuel channels in the core.

Smoke &om the burnout of the RCP electrical penetration causes afire alarm to go offand a resultant response from the Fire Team. By the time they get to the area, however, ao Gre is found.

Metal ents @at had Seeabl Qow Rom the failed RCPsealsudd y ewayaadcausea 150 Mlossef coolant accideat ). of the onpzablemwith the "A" Coolant aqjag, its'seaIs to 1eak.- This causes activity levels in the Auxziiazy uildiag to rise leading to indications of a low level release to the environment on the Phd Vent monitors.

The LOCAis identiGed as being both gz'eater than 44 GPM and eater than the capacity of the Charging System to keep upwith it.

e Emergency Coozdmator dechres a Site Area Emergency. State and County emergency response facilities are fullyactivated.

'. AH>6n~atial persoanel are eiracuated from the site to an offsite assembly area (simulated by a group of 20-30 individuals).

The LOCA causes Containment pressure to slowly increase.

RFATs are dispatched to monitor for the plume, however, levels are too low for it to be seen at this time.

Within the next few seconds, primary system pressure drops to the SIAS and CIAS set point. The "A" Containment Spray Pump fails to start and becomes a response effort of the OSC. With the addition of the "A" HPSI Pump, primary system pressure is maintained for the present.

I 1'. PS/ PV j'GS 3- 3 02/l5/91

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rMERGENCY CLASSIFICA I'ION DECISION TIhiELINE

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I II ALERT II SITE AREA I GENERAL Eh1ERGENCY Il Il II II II Ii II II II II I I I! UTILITY DECLARED I 0852. II 0925 II 11'13 Il I

I I

II II II ll I

I .I I II ll li STATE EOC RECEIVED II 0857 II 0943 II 1124 I:.

II II II II II Il II I I. II I i h1AR ICOPA COUNTY II II II LOC RECEIVED 0857 II 0943 II I I l I I I II II ll ATTACHMENT 0

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PROTECTIVE ACTI ECISION TIhlELINE ACTION TIME OF DECISION SIREN SOUNDED EBS BROADCAST II I I ll il PAD One II II  ; I I

'lil Evacuate to 2 360 degrees 0959 II II 1009 II II 1011 I I II il miles'AD II II II

~ I II II il I I Two II II ' II II

! I r:vacuat;. Sectors A, B, & R II II I II I to 10 miles; evacuate II 1027 II 1030 II 1039 Ruth Fisher school. II II II

'1i II II II

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I I II II II PAD Three II II ll

'.vacuate Sectors C, Di 0 II 1122 II 1135 II 1136 I I I:o 10 miles) evacuate II II II II Ai lington schools II II II II

I II II II I II II II PAD Four II II II

.I evacuate Palo Verde school, 1144 II 1,1 55 II 1157 II II II II ll I PAD Five II II II II i l Evacuate Sectors E 8 F 1308 ~

II 1322 II 1

to 10 miles - II II II II II II II .

II II II PAD Si x I II II Evacuate 360 degrees 1340 1352 I-I 1354 I I to 5 II II II miles'AD II II II II ll II Seven II II II Fvacuate 360 degt ees 1413 II 1420 II 1422 II to 10 miles, II II II II II II ATTACHhlENT E

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Department ofEmergency And MilitaryA+airs 5636 EAST McDOWELL ROAD PHOENIX, ARIZONA85008 %7 TELEPHONE (602) 2674700 Ov i4'f Df+

AVTOVON653 2700 THE ADJUTANTGENERAL F FE SYMINGTON MG DONALDL OWENS GOVERNOR DIRECTOR July 22, 1991 Mr. William M. Medigovich, Director Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IX Building 105 Presidio of San Francisco, CA 94129 ATTN. MR. JOSEPH D. DOMINGUEZ, NTH CHAIR, REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE

SUBJECT:

RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS BIENNIAL EXERCISE GOVERNMENT/PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION OFFSITE DRAFT EXERCISE EVALUATION REPORT t

Dear Mr. Med' Enclosed is the State of Arizona's summary review of. the ARCA's reflected in the subject exercise evaluation report, dated June 24, 1991.

Also enclosed are copies of marked-up pages of the report for your review.

If you have any question, p'ease contact Mr. Harry Border at your convenience.

Sincerely, t vv I I W IAM OD Director Arizona Division of Emergency Services WDL:HB:ps Enclosure 48 ATTACHMENT F

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STATE OF ARIZONA EXERCISE S Y REVIEW (A3REAS REQUIIUNG CORRECTIVE ACTION)

AR AN I:

The Maricopa County Liaison Staff did not transmit a hardcopy of information on PA's to the Maricopa County EOC. Agree! This action has never been done in any of the exercises previously conducted, but was and is a required action of the " rocedures for the Act'vation and unctionin of the State er enc 0 erat'ons Center". The county personnel assigned to the State EOC must be familiar with the contents of the State EOC procedure. This will be accomplished by providing each county person in the State ROC staff with a copy of the document and through training during the year prior to each years REP exercise. Hardcopy transmissions should not delay the voice process nor jeopardize the 15 minute Emergency Broadcast System activation requirement.

CONCLUSION: Even though the State EOC procedures call for hardcopy transmission, this variance appears to be more of an individual problem calling for additional training than. an ARCA. Suggest ARCA No. 1 be a ARFI.

ARCAN .

There was a breakdown 2'gree!

in communication between the TOC and Directorate of Operations. When the TOC Director and DO makes a decision to recommend KI for emergency workers, it will be handled just as any Protective Action Decision. All EOC representatives of agencies who have personnel in/near the 10 mi'le radius will be informed of the decision. There representatives utilize the appropriate communications mode to notify their emergency workers in the field to take KI. The TOC procedures and the TOC checklist will be revised to specifically reflect notification all agency liaison staff to the State EOC that emergency workersofare to take KI. This information will also be included in the Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency in-house instructional training.

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ARCA NO. 3:

The TOC dose projections with those calculated by the utility. compares To do so, the meteorological data for a particular release rate at a particular time must be the same as that used by the utility. This information is best provided by the utility radiation protection personnel or ARRA representatives at the EOF, not the NWS. While it is true that there were occasional differences in the met data posted by the NWS and that used/posted in the TOC, the TOC data from the EOF was the more current. for dose projections and comparisons. The NWS is used for other purposes and is usually updated every 15-30 minutes. Dose projections calculated between updates may very well use more current data from needs.

the EOF which may differ from the NWS posting. Thus, there could well be "apparent" discrepancies between the two sources.

• "J! The This is an exercise scenario problem involving timing of meteorological updates at all exercise participating locations.

CONCLUSION: This variance is a scenario problem which will be resolved in future exercises. Suggest ARCA No. 3 be a ARFI.

AN .4:

We take exception to the recommendation to include information regarding: 1) the call letters and frequency of the EBS station on the EBS Message itself (under the EBS agreement, KTAR will give the EBS message to all other subscriber stations radio and television so that no matter what station a person tunes, the information will be available)g 2) where parents can pick up their (this was included in the EBS messages); and 3) referenceschildren to the Information Brochure (which is available to all residents in and around the 10-mile zone, but not available to the general public).

Parents of all the children in the schools in/net the 10 mile zone have received letters explaining how their children will be evacuated and where they can be picked up. Respective school district procedures will be followed in releasing children to their parents from their location.

COECZUSTOE: The Pri~arE EBS Station will be listed on all information brochures. "Boilerplate" news releases will be reviewed to include additional information. Primary EBS Station with call letters and Frequency-will be included in news releases.

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The County Spokesperson insists that only the last Protective Action Decision was not briefed. It was received at the JENC a couple of minutes prior to exercise termination.

A check of the times for each of the EBS messages according to the EOC log determined that, while at Russell Auditorium, the spokesperson briefed PAD g4, and before leaving the stage was given a new EBS message (PAD g5) and briefed it also. The FEMA evaluator did comment on the .fact that the spokesperson was interrupted and given a new PAD to brief, but somehow lost sight of that and did not give credit in the final re-cap.

CONCLUSION: A recommendation to exercise participants that major exercise inputs/outputs be completed prior to individual exercise termination will be stressed during training seminars.= 'uggest ARCA No. 5 be a ARFI.

AR AN .6:

This ARCA is not completely accurate. Maricopa County Sheriff's personnel (players) were issued dosimeters and simulated KI.

Maricopa County Highway personnel were not issued dosimeters or KI.

None of the county emergency workers were issued TLD's.

Post exercise decisions task the Maricopa County Sheriff's personnel with issuing all county highway emergency workers with dosimeters and simulated KI, prior to being dispatched into the 10 mile radius. A storage "CAVE" and 200 TLD's will be housed at a yet to be determined location for issue of TLD's to all county emergency workers. A revision of the county checklists and dosimetry recpxirements for emergency workers will be expounded in the State/County REP Plan.

70 See ARCA No. 6.

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EXERCISE EVALUATIONREPORT

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Off-'Site Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station April 24, 1991 FEDERAL EMERGENCY MA8hGEMENThGENCY, REGION IX Building 105, Presidio San Francisco, CA 94129

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