ML17290A439

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LER 93-008-01:on 930211,determined That Logic Sys Functional Test Requirements for Emergency Bus Undervoltage Logic Not Fully Implemented.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.New Procedures developed.W/930611 Ltr
ML17290A439
Person / Time
Site: Columbia Energy Northwest icon.png
Issue date: 06/11/1993
From: Fies C, Parrish J
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
GO2-93-153, LER-93-008, LER-93-8, NUDOCS 9306170347
Download: ML17290A439 (7)
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Text

ACCELE14+ED DOCUIUIENT DIS7IBUTION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS) 1

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I'CCESSION NBR:9306170347 DOC.DATE: 93/06/11 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Projecti Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION FIESRC.L. Washington Public Power Supply System PARRISH,J.V. Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 93-008-01:on 930211,determined that logic sys 'D functional test requirements for emergency bus undervoltage logic not fully implemented. Caused by inadequate procedures. New procedures developed.W/930611 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL Q SIZE: &

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES D ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PDV LA 1 1 PDV PD 1 1 CLIFFORD,J 1 D

1 INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 ACRS 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 NRR/DE/EELB 1 1

,NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 NRR/DRIL/RPEB 1 1 NRR/DRPW/OEAB 1 1 NRR/DRSS/PRPB 2 2 N R/pQSSA/ PLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 REG FILE 02 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN5 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EG&G BRYCEEJ.H 2 2 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MURPHYtG A 1 1 NSIC POOREEW. 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 D

D NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 504-2065) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISCI'RIBUTION LINIS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 32 ENCL 32

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968 ~ 3000 George Washington Way ~ Richland, Washington 99352 June ll, 1993 G02-93-153 Docket No. 50-397 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

NUCLEAR PLANT lVNP-2, OPERATING LICENSE NPF-21 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 93-008-01 Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 93-008-01 for the WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and incorporates only minor administrative changes.

Sincerely, J. V. Parrish (Mail Drop 1023)

Assistant Managing Director, Operations J VP/CLF/jd Enclosure CC: Mr. B. H. Faulkenberry, NRC - Region V Mr. R. Barr, NRC Resident Inspector (Mail Drop 901A, 2 Copies)

INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA Mr. D. L. Williams, BPA (Mail Drop 399)

L503.O+

9306170347 93061i PDR ADOCK 05000397 S PDR ZgP~

LICENSEE NT REPORT (LER)

AGILITY NAME (I) DOCKET NUMB R ( ) PAGE (3)

Mashin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 O S O O O 3 9 7 10F5 ITLE (4)

LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONALTEST REQUIREMENTS FOR EMERGENCY BUS UNDERVOLTAGE LOGIC NOT FULLY IMPLEMENTED DUE TO INADEQUATEPROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT EVENT DATE 5 LER NUHBER 6 REPORT DATE (7 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 8 HONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL EVI SION HONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAHES CKE NUHB R (5)

NUMBER (a UHBER 5 0 0 0 0 2 I I 9 3 9 3 0 0 8 0 I 0 6 9 3 5000 PERATING HIS REPORT IS SUBHITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Ch eck one or more of the following) (11 ODE (9)

OWER LEVEL 0.402(b) 0.405(C) 0.73(a)(2)(iv) 7.71(b)

(iO) O.4OS(a)(i)(i) 0.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 3.73(c) 0.405(a)(1)(ii) 0.36(c)(2) 0.73(a)(2)(vii) THER (Specify in Abstract 0.405(a)(1)(iii) X 0.73(a)(2)(i) 0.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) clew and in Text. NRC 0.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 0.73(a)(2)(viii)(8) orm 366A) 0.405(a)(1)(v) 0.73(a)(2)(iii) 0.73(a)(2)(x)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12 TELEPHONE NUMBER REA CODE C. L. Fies, Licensing Engineer 0 9 7 7 - 4 1 4 5 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COHPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEH COHPONENT HANUFACTURER EPORTABLE j>ip::@ CAUSE SYSTEH COMPONENT MANUFACTURER EPORTABLE 0 HPRDS, <<Yi$$) 0 NPROS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) XPECTED SUBMISSION HONTN DAY YEAR ATE (15)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBHISSION DATE) NO TMcl neI At approximately 1054 hours0.0122 days <br />0.293 hours <br />0.00174 weeks <br />4.01047e-4 months <br /> on February 11, 1993, it was determined the method used to demonstrate operability for Division 1, 2, & 3 emergency power bus primary undervoltage protection logic circuits was not fully adequate to satisfy Technical Specification requirements. Operability of these circuits must be demonstrated periodically by performance of a Logic System Functional Test (LSFT). LSFT requirements were not fully implemented for portions of the primary undervoltage logic due to inadequacies in the existing test method.

The root cause of this deficiency was inadequate provisions for review and evaluation of surveillance procedure suitability during initial development of the Technical Specification Surveillance Testing Program. As corrective action procedures were established to satisfy the primary undervoltage logic LSFT requirement, and functional testing of the undervoltage logic was performed. Additionally, a project to improve Technical Specification Surveillance Program implementation is in progress.

Operability of those portions of the primary undervoltage logic that were not adequately verified previously has been demonstrated by testing. Consequently, the condition described in this report did not have an adverse effect on safe operation of the plant, or the health and safety of plant personnel or the general public.

LICENSEE EVENT REPO (LER)

Tel CONTINUATION AGILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) AGE 3 Year umber ev. No.

Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 3 008 I 2 F 5 ITLE (4)

LOGIC SYSTEH FUNCTIONAL TEST REQUIREHENTS FOR EHERGENCY BUS UNDERVOLTAGE LOGIC NOT FULLY IHPLEHENTED DUE TO INADEQUATE PROCEDURE DEVELOPHENT Pl n ii n Power Level - 0%

Plant. Mode - 3 (Hot Shutdown)

Even De ri i n At approximately 1054 hours0.0122 days <br />0.293 hours <br />0.00174 weeks <br />4.01047e-4 months <br /> on February 11, 1993, it was determined the method used to demonstrate operability for Division 1, 2, & 3 emergency power bus primary undervoltage protection (loss of voltage) logic circuits did not fully satisfy Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements. In accordance with Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.3.3.2, operability of these circuits must be demonstrated periodically by performance of a Logic System Functional Test (LSFT). LSFT testing requirements were not fully implemented for portions of the emergency power bus primary undervoltage logic due to inadequacies in the existing test method.

V Imm i rrec iv Ac i n As immediate corrective action, efforts were initiated to develop and approve test procedures necessary to fully demonstrate operability of the emergency power bus primary undervoltage protection logic. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> outage provision of Technical Specification 4.0.3 was utilized to develop these procedures and perform necessary testing.

Further Evaluation R t Cause and Corrective Action A. F rther Evaluation The condition described in this report is reportable pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as an operation or condition that is prohibited by the plant Technical Specifications. Operability of the emergency power bus primary undervoltage protection logic was not fully demonstrated during prior plant operations when it was required. This condition resulted from LSFT requirements that were not adequately implemented within surveillance procedures.

2. Failure to fully implement LSFT requirements in surveillance procedures was identified and documented by an NSA (Nuclear Safety Assurance) engineer on February 11, 1993, during review of an Operating Experience (OE) report received via the INPO Network. The OE described a condition identified at another plant involving failure to fully demonstrate

UCENSEE EVENT REPO (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION AGILITY NAME (1) OOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) AGE (3)

Year umber ev. No.

Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 3 008 01 3 F 5 ITLE (4)

LOGIC SYSTEH FUNCTIONAL TEST RE(UIREHENTS FOR EHERGENCY BUS UNDERVOLTAGE LOGIC NOT FULLY IHPLEHENTED DUE TO INADEQUATE PROCEDURE DEVELOPHENT operability of undervoltage relays due to a surveillance testing method deficiency. Although undervoltage logic testing deficiencies at WNP-2 were identified during the OE review, the condition described in the OE was not directly related to the condition described in this report.

The OE review examined WNP-2 surveillance procedures used to test the emergency power bus undervoltage protection logic, and determined the test method used to perform functional testing of the emergency power bus primary undervoltage logic did not fully satisfy Technical Specification requirements. The OE review did not identify any deficiencies within the method used to test the emergency power bus secondary (degraded voltage) undervoltage protection logic.

Consistent with the Technical Specification definition of an LSFT, which allows testing to'be performed in a series of overlapping and sequential steps, testing of primary undervoltage protection logic located in the field, and testing of undervoltage relays, were provided in separate procedures. Primary undervoltage relay operation was demonstrated by performance of a bench check within the relay calibration procedure. A test voltage input was applied to the relay, and each of the output signal contacts was checked for proper operation. This test method adequately verified relay operation.

Demonstration of operability for the undervoltage logic was provided within the HPCS and standby diesel generator surveillance procedures for Loss of Offsite Power (PPM 7.4.8.1.1.2.6 and PPM 7,4.1.1.8.2.5B/C). These procedures verify that an undervoltage condition on the input side of the primary undervoltage relays results in appropriate overall logic system response, The primary undervoltage logic for each emergency power bus utilizes output contacts from a pair of undervoltage relays configured in parallel to provide a 1 of 2 actuation logic. Consequently, because these relays must close to perform their safety function, this test method only provides yositive functional verification of relay contacts and wiring necessary to accomplish the minimum actuation logic, which is one relay output contact per emergency bus. Failure of a set of contacts or its associated wiring might not have been detected by this test method.

3. Two new test procedures were developed and approved on February 11, 1993, in order to fully implement LSFT requirements for the emergency power bus primary undervoltage logic. Undervoltage logic for Division 1 and 2 emergency power busses was subsequently tested satisfactorily and declared operable at 2250 hours0.026 days <br />0.625 hours <br />0.00372 weeks <br />8.56125e-4 months <br /> (12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after discovery) on February 11, 1993, and undervoltage logic for the Division 3 emergency power bus was tested satisfactorily and declared operable at 2345 hours0.0271 days <br />0.651 hours <br />0.00388 weeks <br />8.922725e-4 months <br /> (13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> after discovery).

LICENSEE EVENT REPO (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION OOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) AGE 3 ACILiTY NAME (1)

Year umber ev. No.

Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 3 08 1 4 F 5 ITLE (4)

LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST REQUIREMENTS FOR EMERGENCY BUS UNDERVOLTAGE LOGIC NOT FULLY IMPLEMENTED DUE TO INADEQUATE PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT B. R~~gg~e The condition described in this report resulted from failure to fully incorporate surveillance requirements into plant procedures. The root cause of this deficiency was inadequate provisions for review and evaluation of surveillance procedure suitability during initial development of the Technical Specification Surveillance Testing Program. Programmatic aspects of this deficiency have been previously identified, and are being addressed by the project described in Item 4 of the Further Corrective Action section of this report.

C. hr rr iveA in The following corrective actions either have been, or will be taken:

The following procedures were developed to satisfy LSFT requirements for the emergency power bus undervoltage protection logic:

a) PPM 7.4.3.3.1.85, SM-4 Loss of Voltage Relays-CFT, was developed to test undervoltage logic for the Division 3 emergency power bus.

b) PPM 8.3.278, "SM-7 and SM-8 Primary Under Voltage Logic Test", was developed to test undervoltage logic for Division 1 and 2 emergency power busses.

2. Previously untested portions of the emergency power bus undervoltage protection logic were demonstrated to be operable by successful performance of procedures, PPM 7.4.3.3.1.85 and PPM 8.3.

LSFT requirements currently satisfied by PPM 8.3 will be permanently integrated into surveillance procedures, PPM 7.4.1.1.8.2.5B and PPM 7.4.8.1.1.2.5C. Completion of this action is scheduled for June 4, 1993.

4. As a corrective action for previous events, a project team is performing a technical and.

compliance review of the Technical Specification Surveillance Program. This review will ensure that procedures used to satisfy Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements are technically accurate, and that each Surveillance Requirement is satisfied within plant procedures.

LICENSEE EVENT REPO (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION AGILITY NAHE (1) DOCKET NUHBER (2) LER NUHSER (8) AGE (3) ear umber ev. No.

Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 3 0 0 8 0 1 5 F 5 ITLE (4)

LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST REQUIREMENTS FOR EMERGENCY BUS UNDERVOLTAGE LOGIC NOT FULLY IMPLEMENTED DUE TO INADEQUATE PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT f i nifi n Recent testing has demonstrated that those portions of the emergency power bus primary undervoltage protection logic that were not adequately verified previously were capable of performing their safety function during prior plant operations. Additionally, functions provided by these portions of undervoltage protection logic a'r e also provided by redundant undervoltage relay contacts and wiring. Consequently, the condition described in this report did not have an adverse effect on safe operation of the plant, or the health and safety of plant personnel or the general public.

imil r Ev n Previous instances involving procedures that were not adequate to satisfy Surveillance Requirements have recently been reported in LERs91-013, 018, 019, 028, 036,92-002, and 92-035. A corrective action to perform a technical and compliance review of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement implementation has been initiated in response to these previous events.

E~El TxRf n EIIRf R

$ g~tem Q~m~nen Emergency Power Bus EA BU Primary Undervoltage Relay EA 27 High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS) BG Standby Diesel Generator EK DG HPCS Diesel Generator EK, BG DG

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