ML17285A334

LER 88-036-01:on 881118,inconsistency Noted Between Channel Functional Test Surveillance Procedure & Tech Specs for Div 1 4.16 Kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage Degraded Voltage.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Tech Spec revised.W/890314 Ltr

ML17285A334
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	03/14/1989
From:	Davison W, Powers C WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-88-036, LER-88-36, NUDOCS 8903230301
Download: ML17285A334 (7)

Text

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ACCESSION NBR:8903230301 DOC.DATE: 89/03/14 NOTARXZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION DAVISON,W.S. Washington Public Power Supply System POWERS,C.M. Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 88-036-01:on 881118,failure to perform Div 1 4.16 kV emergency bus undervoltage degraded voltage protection TSS.

W/8 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEXVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 1 PD5 PD 1 1 SAMWORTH, R 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 ACRS WYLIE 1 1 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DS P/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 ARM/DCTS/DAB 1 1 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DEST/ADE 8H 1 1 NRR/DEST/ADS 7E 1 0 NRR/DEST/CEB 8H 1 1 NRR/DEST/ESB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 8E 1 1 NRR/DE ST/SGB 8D 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 1 1 NRR/DREP/RAB 10 1 1 NRR/DREP/RPB 10 2 2 NRRt'DRI IB 9A 1 1 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1 1 XLE 02 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RES/'D /PRAB 1 1 RGN5 FILE 01 1 1 R EXTERNAL: EG&G WILLIAMS,S 4 4 FORD BLDG HOY,A 1 1 1

I H ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MAYS,G 1 1 NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 h

NOIX 'IO ALL "RIDS" RECXPXENIS:

PLEASE HELP US 10 REDUCE WASTE! CONZACr 'IHE DOCUMENI'XNZROL DESK ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) KO ELIMINATE %SR NAME FKR DIPHCEOTZQN LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DGNiT NEZDt TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 45 ENCL 44

NRC form 355 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (8 83) APPROVED OMB NO, 31504104 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) fXPIRES'I31l88 fACILITYNAME Ili DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE I3I Washin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 1 oF 0 5

'"""'Failure To Perform Division One 4.16 KV Emergency Bus ndervoltage Degraded Volta e Protection Technical Specification Surveillance Due to Inade uate Procedure EVENT DATE ISI LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) 5 E 0 U 6 N 7 I A I. REYG~ DAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBER(S)

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NUMBER MONTH 0 5 0 0 0 888 8 0 36 01 031 4 8 9 0 5 0 0 0 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR g: (Cnece one or mori Of tni foffowrnff (lll OPERATING MODE (0) 20,402 (5'I 20 405(cl 50.73( ~ ) (2) Bv) 73.71(BI 1

POWER 20.405 (~ ) I I )(r) 50.35(cl(ll 50,73(e) (2) lv) 73.71(c)

LEvEL 1 0 0 20 405( ~ ) II I (rr) 50. 35(c) (2) 50.7 3(e I (2) I v ii) OTHER (SpicrI'y rn Abslrect below end rn Terr( NRC Form 20.405 N) I'I )(nr) X 60,73( ~ )(2) lil 60.73( ~ ) (2)( viii)(Al JEEA) 20 405(sill)(w) 60,73(e)(2)(rr) 50.73( ~ ) (2)(viiil(BI 20,405( ~ I(l )(v I 50,73(e)12) (iii) 60.73 ( ~ ) (2) (a I LICENSEE CONTAC'T FOR THIS LER (12I

'NAVE TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE W.S. Davi son Com 1 i ance En ineer 509 377 -2 501 COMPLFTE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) EXT ~

MANUfAC- REPORTABLE MANUFAC CAUSE SYSTEM COMPOIIE rvv TURER TO NPRDS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TURER SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) DAY YEAR EXPECTED(15'ONTH SUB M I 5S I 0 N DATE YES llf yes comprel ~ EJcPECTED sv84lfsSION DA TEI X No ABsTRAcT fLimrs so f400 specef re ipproarmelery frfseen smffre spice lypewrriien lrnnl (16)

On November 18, 1988, a self initiated Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI) being performed by the Supply System Engineering Assurance Organization revealed a potential inconsi stency between the Channel Functional Test Surveil lance Procedure and the Technical Speci fi ca ti on requirement for the Di vi si on One 4.16 KV Emergency Bus Undervoltage Degraded Voltage (Second Level Undervoltage) protection circuitry. A Nonconformance Report was written to document this condition and initiate further evaluation. On November 21, 1988, further evaluation of this condition resulted in the determination that the Channel Calibration for the Division One Second Level Undervoltage 3 second time delay relay (E-RLY-27/S7/UV) had not been performed within the 18 month frequency required by Plant Technical Specification Table 4.3.3.1-1 Section D.2.

After evaluation and direction by Plant Management, the circuitry was declared inoperable Technical Specification Section 3.0.3 was entered, an Unusual Event declared, the instruments calibration confirmed and then returned to service. Root causes were identified as being Personnel Performance Error (Management Direction Less Than Adequate) and Personnel Performance Error (Work Practices Less Than Adequate). Corrective actions consisted of modification of the Technical Specification surveillance procedures to include the Division One and Two 3 second time delay relays, and submittal of an emergency Technical Specification change to clarify testing requirements. This event posed no threat to the safety of Plant personnel or the public.

C(';) 323030 050(g039",'903i4 FrL)R +DoCK po,~

NRC Form 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (8.83)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO, 3160-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEOVENTIAL REVISION YEAR $ 1 NUMBER I.rdRd NUMBER Washin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 o3 97 8 03 6 1 0 2 OF 0 TEXT /I/ mors sosssis rsqvirsd, vss sdChvorhs/ NRC Form 36SA'4) (17)

Plant Conditions a) Power Level 100/

b) Plant Mode - 1 (Power Operation)

Event Descri tion On November 18, 1988, a sel f initiated Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI) being performed by the Supply System Engineering Assurance Organization revealed a potential inconsistency between the Channel Functional Test Surveillance Procedure and the Technical Specification requirement for the Division One 4.16 KV Emergency 8us Undervol tage Degraded Voltage (Second Level Undervoltage) protection circuitry.

A Nonconformance Report was written to document this condition and initiate further evaluation. On November 21, 1988, further evaluation of this condition resulted in the determination that the Channel Calibration for the Division One Second Level Undervoltage 3 second time delay relay (E-RLY-27/S7/UV) had not been performed within the 18 month frequency required by Plant Technical Specification Table 4.3.3.1-1 Section D.2.

Immediate Corrective Action For the purposes of this LER, the reportable event occurred at 1400 hours when Technical Specification Section 3.0.3 was entered.

NRC Region V issued Notice of Violation 88-40 to the Supply System for not entering Technical Specification Section 3.0.3 in a timely manner.

On November 21, 1988, after evaluation and direction by Plant Management, the following actions were taken by WNP-2 .Plant Staff:

1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br /> - Division One Second Level Undervoltage System was declared inoperable 1 1 1 ll'1 1 L.d.d. 1 3 3.3.3 . 3 Emergency Classification of Unusual Event was declared.

1459 hours0.0169 days <br />0.405 hours <br />0.00241 weeks <br />5.551495e-4 months <br /> - With initial plant power level at 100 percent, plant operators began power reduction in preparation to shut down the plant in accordance with the requirements of the WNP-2 Technical Specifications.

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1510 hours0.0175 days <br />0.419 hours <br />0.0025 weeks <br />5.74555e-4 months <br /> - The channel calibration for the Division One Second Level Undervoltage 1755 hours0.0203 days <br />0.488 hours <br />0.0029 weeks <br />6.677775e-4 months <br /> - The Division One channel calibration was completed satisfactorily.

1800 hours0.0208 days <br />0.5 hours <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.849e-4 months <br /> - The Division One 4.16 KV Second Level Undervoltage circuit was declared operable. The plant power reduction was halted at 89K.

1925 hours0.0223 days <br />0.535 hours <br />0.00318 weeks <br />7.324625e-4 months <br /> - Technical Specification Action Statement 3. 0.3 was exited and the 3 3 1 lf1 1 fll

NRC Form 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (9-83)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150&104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PACE (3) st SEQUENTIAL o~'+: REVISION NUMSSR NUMSSR Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 o s o o o 9 7 8 036 0 1 0 3 oFO 5 TEXT /l/ more spode IS reoo/red, ose eddi)r'one/ ///IC Form 366A's/ (17)

Further Evaluation and Corrective Action Further Evaluation

l. This event is being reported as a "condition prohibited by the plants Technical Speci fication" per the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a) (2)(i ) (B) .

2. The immediate cause of the event was procedur al inadequacy in that the Technical Specification surveillance procedure did not include the calibration of the. 3 second time delay relays associated with Division One and Division Two Second Level Undervol tage Protection circuitry.

A formal root cause investigation resulted in identification of the following causes:

1) Personnel Performance Error - (Management Programs-Management Direction Less Than Adeuquate) - At the time WNP-2 Technical Specifications were approved, the management system to clarify Technical Specifications and/or document interpretations was not adequate. During the startup phase of plant operation, it was recognized that the specification required interpretation to conclude that the 3 second time delay relays were not part of the channel. The specifications were not changed to clarify the requirement nor was the interpretation documented. At that time, no interpretation procedure existed. The current Technical Specification interpretation procedure was implemented March 3, 1984.

2) Personnel Performance Error - (Management Programs-Work Practices Less Than Adequate) During initial surveillance procedure preparation and review, there was inadequate verification of Technical Specifications requirements. The surveillance procedures did note the 8 second requirement and stated that 5 seconds of it was covered. Insufficient cross check was done to ensure that the remaining 3 seconds was specifically covered elsewhere.

3. Both the Division One and Division Two Second Level Undervoltage 3 Second Time Delay Relay Calibrations have been previously controlled via the plants non-Technical Specification Surveillance Testing Program at two year required intervals. The Division Two Second Level Undervoltage 3 Second Time Delay Relays did not require calibration because they had been calibrated during the 1987 annual refueling outage via the non-Technical Specification Testing Program. The Division One Surveillance was scheduled for the 1988 annual outage but was deferred for performance during the 1989 outage. Prior to the performance on November 21, 1988, the Division One Second Level Undervoltage 3 second time delay relay had not been calibrated since initial plant startup.

'U.S. CP0r )966 620 S69'00090

NRC Form 366A V.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (943)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO. 3160&104 EXPIRES: 8/3)/BB FACILITY NAME (I) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) sgs6 SEOVENTIAL I'P~ REvrsroN 4'5 NUMBER <<rpS NUM88rr Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 s 0 0 0 3 978 8 036 01 04 oFO 5 TEXT //! more s/reseis rer/rr/sed, rrse eddrriorre////I C Form 386A's/ (17)

4. The Di vi si on One (and Di vi si on Two) Second Level Undervol tage pr otecti on consists of three ITE static type definite time undervoltage relays and three secondary time delay (3 second) relays. The undervoltage relays monitor the three phases of the 4160 volt emergency busses. These three relays each provide two contacts which contribute to a two out of three logic array. The relays are set to actuate at approximately 87.3% of nominal bus voltage and will change the state of their contacts following a 5 second time delay.

Actuation (contact closure) of two of these relays wi 11 energize two of three secondary time delay (3 second) relays. These 3 second time delay relays contribute to the total eight second time delay referenced in the WNP-2 FSAR and the Technical Specification. They are the end-point relays which actuate circuit breaker movement, alarms and other functions.

5. On December 2, 1988, during subsequent evaluation of the Division One 4.16 KV Emergency Bus Second Level Undervoltage event, a possible inconsistency was discovered concerning the Technical Specification surveillance requirements for the Division Three 4. 16 KV Emergency Bus Second Level Undervoltage circuitry.

The Division Three circuitry is not specifically called out in Technical Specification Table 3.3.3-1, ECCS Minimum Channels Required, nor listed in Table 4.3.3-1, ECCS Surveillance Requirements. Its setpoint is, however, listed in Table 3.3.3-2, ECCS Actuation Setpoints.

On December 2, 1988, during a plant outage, the Division 3 Second Level Undervoltage Channel Calibration Test was successfully performed per the requirements of the WNP-2 Technical Specifications.

Further Corrective Action Discussion with NRR and NRC Region Five Staff resulted in submittal of an emergency Technical Specification amendment with a Safety Analysis to clarify the testing requirements. Included in this submittal was the exclusion of the Division Three circuitry from the Channel Functional Test requirement due to the inability to test this circuit during power operation without loss of the ci rcuit protective function and without the use of jumpers to place the logic in a tripped condition. The emergency Technical Specification change addressed the Division One, Two and Three Technical Specification surveillance requi rements. The emergency Technical Specification change was issued to WNP-2 by NRR on January 6, 1989,

2. Channel Calibration Technical Specification Surveillance procedures have been revised to include the Division One and Division Two 3 second time delay relays.

au.8. CI'or (888-820 889/00070

NRC Form 386A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (9.83)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO, 3(50W104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR SEGUENTIAL REvrsroN NUMSEra NLE NUMEEra W

TEXT /I/ nate lear Plant-Unit form 355A'sl (12) 2 0 0 97 88 036 0 0 5 OF 4 peso/S reorrkrd, arse edditlorre/ NRC Safet Si nificance Upon notification by NRC Region Five staff that the Supply System was in non-compliance with Technical Specification Table 4.3.3. -1 Section D.2, a plant 1

shutdown was initiated. The Division One Second Level Undervoltage circuitry was declared inoperable and appropriate action was taken to place the plant in the condition specified by the Technical Specifications. The Division Two Second Level Undervoltage circuitry was operable during this entire period of time, therefore the redundant Division Two 4.16 KV Emergency Bus was capable of performing all of the functions required to establish safe shutdown during accident conditions. Also, Normal Onsite and Offsite electrical power distribution systems were operable during this event. This event posed no threat to the safety of Plant personnel or the public.

Similar Events Mone EIIS Information Text Reference EIIS Reference System Component Division One/Two/Three 4.16 KV Emergency Bus Undervoltage EA 27 Degraded Vol tage Protection Ci rcui try E-RLY-27/S7/UV EA 27 3 Second Time Delay Relay EA

~ Ur.8. CPOr 1988 520-589 00010

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968 ~ 3000 George 11'ashinglon N'ay ~ Richland, Washington 99352 Docket No. 50-397 triarch 14, 1989 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

NUCLEAR PLANT WO. 2 LICENSEE EVEti T REPORT NO. 88-036-01

Dear Sir:

Transmi tted herewi th i s Licensee Event Report No. 88-036-01 for the WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

Very truly yours, C.N. lowers (N/0 927l<)

WNP-2 Plant thanager Ct>IP:1 g

Enclosure:

Licensee Event Report No. 88-036-01 cc: Mr. John B. Martin, NRC - Region V Mr. C.J. Bosted, NRC Site (M/D 901A )

INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA Ms. Dottie Sherman, ANI Mr. D.L. Williams, BPA (M/D 399)

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