ML17284A412

LER 88-014-00:on 880512,RWCU Sys Resin Tank Spill Occurred. Caused by Open RWCU Sample Line Isolation Valves RWCU-V-442 & 443.RWCU-V-442 & 443 Tagged Shut & de-energized & Radwaste Control Room Operator Involved counseled.W/880628 Ltr

ML17284A412
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	06/28/1988
From:	Arbuckle J, Powers C WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
LER-88-014, LER-88-14, NUDOCS 8807060451
Download: ML17284A412 (12)

Text

AC CELE RATED IH. BUTION DE MONSTERII ON SYF1'EM REGULATO Y INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

(> ACCESSION NBR:8807060451 DOC.DATE: 88/06/28 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ARBUCKLE,J.D. Washington Public Power Supply System POWERS,C.M. Washington Public Power Supply System RECZP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 88-014-00:on 880512,voluntary rept of RWCU sys resin tank spill due to RWCU valves being open.

W/8 DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR / ENCL TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

/ SIZE:

NOTES:

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ZD CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 1 'PD5 PD 1 1 SAMWORTH,R 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 AEOD/DSP/NAS 1 1 AEOD/DSP/ROAB 2 2 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 ARM/DCTS/DAB 1 1 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DFST/ADS 7E 1 0 NRR/DEST/CEB 8H 1 1 NRR/DEST/ESB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 8E 1 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 8D 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 1 1 NRR/DREP/RAB 10 1 1 NRR/DREP/RPB 10 2 2

/SZB 9A 1 1 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1 1 REG FIL@ 02 1 1 RES TELFORDgJ 1 1 RE DX7EIB 1 1 RES/DRPS DEPY 1 1 RGN5 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL'G&G WZLLIAMSiS 4 4 FORD BLDG HOY g A 1 1 H ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC HARRZSiJ 1 1 NSIC MAYS iG 1 1 h

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 45 ENCL 44

NRC Form 355 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (0 83)

APPROVED OMB NO, 3150-010l EXPIRES: BI3(I88

, LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER)

FACILITY NAME (II DOCKET NUMBER (2) pAGE 13) t-U 0 5 0 0 0 3 ioF08

""oluntary Report of Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Resin Tank Spill Due To RWCU Val Bein 0 en - Cause Unknown EVENT DATE ISI LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7I OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

MONTH OAY YEAR YEAR SEOUENTIAL ro.6 REVISK>N MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NVMBERISI rien NUMBER C.i NUMBER 0 5 0 0 0 51 28 888 0 14 000 6 2 8 THIS AEPOAT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T 0 THE REOVIREMENTS OF 10 cFA 8 8 ICnrcir onr or morr of tnr Iorlovvinp) Ill 0 5 0 0 0 (J:

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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS AEPORT (13)

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On May 12, 1988 at approximately 1700 hours0.0197 days <br />0.472 hours <br />0.00281 weeks <br />6.4685e-4 months <br />, a Plant Radwaste Control Room Operator (RWO) discovered that a Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System resin spill had occurred during recirculation of RWCU Phase Separator Tank RWCU-TK-104B. The tank was being recirculated in preparation for transfer of resin to a shipping container. Recirculation of the tank was started at 1445 hours0.0167 days <br />0.401 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.498225e-4 months <br />, and tank level reading was noted by the RWO to be 50%. At 1615 hours0.0187 days <br />0.449 hours <br />0.00267 weeks <br />6.145075e-4 months <br />, while taking log readings, the RWO noted that tank level was 34%. Contrary to procedural requirements, immediate investigation of the level change was not performed because the RWO thought (erroneously) the change was due to a defective level gauge. The RWO rechecked tank level again at 1645 hours0.019 days <br />0.457 hours <br />0.00272 weeks <br />6.259225e-4 months <br /> and noted it was still decreasing. The RWO then proceeded to the tank location, discovered resin being discharged into Floor Drain FDR-SUMP-W2 and noted that approximately two cubic feet of resin slurry had splashed onto the floor around the drain. At 1715 hours0.0198 days <br />0.476 hours <br />0.00284 weeks <br />6.525575e-4 months <br />, the RWO secured the recirculation pump (RWCU-P-28) and closed the tank suction and discharge valves.

Further investigation revealed that RWCU Sample Line Isolation Valves RWCU-V-442/443 had been open which created a flow path which resulted in the spill. The cause of the valves being open is indeterminate. At 1750 hours0.0203 days <br />0.486 hours <br />0.00289 weeks <br />6.65875e-4 months <br /> the valves were closed by means of the control switches and, at 1800 hours0.0208 days <br />0.5 hours <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.849e-4 months <br />, the RWO confirmed that the drainage had stopped.

Upon recommendation of the Plant Manager, the Shift Manager. declared an "Unusual- Event" at 1903 hours0.022 days <br />0.529 hours <br />0.00315 weeks <br />7.240915e-4 months <br />. At 2025 hours0.0234 days <br />0.563 hours <br />0.00335 weeks <br />7.705125e-4 months <br />, Health Physi cs had completed clean up of the immediate area and contained the resin in FDR-SUMP-W2. At this time, the Shift Manager terminated the "Unusual Event" classification.

Further corrective actions include 1) tagging shut and de-energizing RWCU-V-442/443, 2) counseling the RWO involved on the importance of monitoring the status of operational tasks, 3) performing a review of other similar (e.g. infrequently used) Radwaste Syste Valves, and 4) providing additional training on "High" and "High-High" Radiation Areas.

This LER is submitted as a voluntary report. BFIp70(E,ppgl 8gpgpB PDR ADOCI(; 05000397

NRC Fons 35$ A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (943)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150M)Os EXPIRESIB/31/BB FACILITYNAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (5) PACE (3)

SEOUENTIAL REVISION YEAR;~g NUMSER NUM ER Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 TEKT /I/ mors e>>cs /I I/o/oisrE Irss ~ HRC Fons R5l 9/ ((7) o s o o o 3 9 7 8 8 014 0 0 0 2 or- 08 Plant Conditions a) Power Level - 0%

b) Plant Mode - 5 (Refueling)

Event Descri tion On May 12, 1988 at approximately 1700 hours0.0197 days <br />0.472 hours <br />0.00281 weeks <br />6.4685e-4 months <br />, a Plant Radwaste Control Room Operator (RWO) discovered that a Reactor Mater Cleanup (RMCU) System resin spill had occurred during recirculation of RMCU Phase Separator Tank RWCU-TK-1 04B. The tank was being recirculated in preparation for transfer of resin slurry to a shipping container.

At '1445 hours0.0167 days <br />0.401 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.498225e-4 months <br />, the RWO began the recirculation of RWCU-TK-104B in accordance with Plant Procedure (PPM) 2.11.1, "Solid Waste Processing System." Tank level reading was noted by the RMO to be 50'X. The RMO then proceeded to perform his normal duties and at 1615 hours0.0187 days <br />0.449 hours <br />0.00267 weeks <br />6.145075e-4 months <br />, while taking log readings, he noted that the tank level was 34"..

Immediate investigation of the level change was not performed because the RWO thought (erroneously) the change was due to a defective level gauge. (The RWO had remembered a recent level gauge problem on an equipment drain tank and thought this situation was similar.) He also did not investigate any further due to the many activi ties in progress in the Radwaste Control Room at this time. However, not investigating the level change was contrary to a caution statement in PPM 2.11.1 which directs the operator to monitor tank level and, resin sludge is likely leaking out.

if it drops, isolate the tank immediately because At 1645 hours0.019 days <br />0.457 hours <br />0.00272 weeks <br />6.259225e-4 months <br />, the RWO checked tank level again and noted it was still decreasing.

The RWO then proceeded to the RWCU-TK-104B location (Radwaste Building - Elevation 437' and discovered resin being discharged down a scupper into a Floor Drain (FDR-SUMP-W2). He also noted that approximately two cubic feet of resin slurry had splashed onto the floor around the drain. The RWO immediately left the area, returned to the Radwaste Control Room and, at 1715 hours0.0198 days <br />0.476 hours <br />0.00284 weeks <br />6.525575e-4 months <br />, secured the recirculation pump (RWCU-P-28) and closed the RWCU-TK-104B suction and discharge valves. He then informed the Shift Support Supervisor (SSS) of the situation, who in turn notified the Shift Manager and Health Phyics personnel. At 1725 hours0.02 days <br />0.479 hours <br />0.00285 weeks <br />6.563625e-4 months <br />, the SSS, RWO and Health Physics personnel arrived at the area of the spill. Health Physics personnel immediately monitored the area and found that their readings indicated 2-3 R/hr at one inch, with no airborne activity present. The area was posted "NO ENTRY" by Health Physics personnel at 1735 hours0.0201 days <br />0.482 hours <br />0.00287 weeks <br />6.601675e-4 months <br />.

At this time the Shift Manager, SSS and RWO went to the Radwaste Control Room -to review System Flow Diagrams in an attempt to identify the drain path. After reviewing the flow diagrams, they suspected that the, drain path was through a sample line on the RWCU-P-28 discharge. Although the flow diagrams show'ed a shut-off switch for Sample Line Isolation Valve RWCU-V-442, the location of the switch was (However, the location of valve position indication for Sample Line not'dentified.

Isolation Valve RWCU-V-443 was identified in PPM 2.11.1). Unable to locate the switches, the SSS contacted an off-duty SSS who informed him that they were in the "AU Concentrator Room (Radwaste Building - Elevation 467').

NRC FORM SOEA s U.S.G/rO:19BBDd24 538/ESS (943)

NRC For RI SSSA U.S, NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION ITS I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMS NO. O'ISOMI04 EXPIRES: SISI/88 FACILITY NAME III OOCKET NUMSER ISI LER NUM8ER (SI ~ AOE IS)

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. were both in the open position, but the indicating lights were not functional (subsequent investigation revealed that the red Lopen] lights had been removed and the green Lclosed] lights were burned out). The 'SSS then placed the control switches for both valves in the "close" position, and heard the air actuation (both valves are air-operated and are in series).

The SSS dispatched the RWO to the area of the spill and, at 1800 hours, the RWO confirmed that drainage had stopped. It was also noted at that time that RWCU-TK-104B level was 265.

At 1820 hours, the Shift Manager returned to the Control Room and was informed that an Area Radiation Monitor (ARM-29: Radwaste Building - Elevation 437') had alarmed and was fluctuating between 80 and 100 MR/hr. Being aware of the spill, the Shift Manager contacted Health Physics personnel for information on radiation levels. He was informed that readings at the scene were 2-3 R/hr at 18 inches; however, actual readings logged on the survey map indicated readings of 2-3 R/hr at one inch.

Proceeding with followup management notifications, the Shift Manager contacted the Assistant Operations Manager and the Plant Manager to brief them on the incident.

Upon the recommendation of the Plant Manager, an 'Unusual Event" was declared at 1903 hours0.022 days <br />0.529 hours <br />0.00315 weeks <br />7.240915e-4 months <br />. The Shift Manager, utilizing the CRASH Network, notified the State, County, Department of Energy, and the Supply System Security Communications Center. In addition, PA announcements were made and the NRC was notified by means of the ENS Line.

At 2025 hours0.0234 days <br />0.563 hours <br />0.00335 weeks <br />7.705125e-4 months <br />, Health Physics personnel had completed clean up of the immediate area and contained the resin in Floor Drain Sump FDR-SUMP-W2. At this time, the Shift Manager terminated the "Unusual Event" classification.

This LER is submitted as a Voluntary Report.

Immediate Corrective Action Recirculation pump RWCU-P-28 was secured, Sample Line Isolation Valves RWCU-V-442/443 were closed, the area of the spill was cleaned up, the resin was contained in FDR-SUMP-W2, and the NUnusual Event" classification terminated.

Further Evaluation and Corrective Action A. Futher Evaluation

l. The immediate cause of this event was valves RWCU-V-,442 'and RWCU-V-443 being open. The root cause for the valves being open is indeterminate. As shown in Figure 1, this configuration created the following unknown leakage paths:

o RWCU-V-442 and RWCU-V-443 Open (Resin Leakage Path)

NRC FORM SSS* +U.S.OPOI1055442$ SSSIE55 ISSSI

NRC form SSSA U.S, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMS NO. 3150-010E EXPIRES: 8/31/88 DOCKET NUMSER 12) LER NUMSER LS) PAGE 13)

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With both valves open, and the start of RWCU-P-28, RWCU resin slurry was pumped through the valves to the drain system. As a result of RWCU-TK-104B level changes, it is estimated that 1,000 gallons was inadvertently drained from the tank. This equates to a resin loss of approximately 25-30 cubic feet. The bulk of the resin was contained in the liquid radwaste processing system.

o RWCU-V-442 Open (Condensate Leakage Path)

Condensate water was supplied through COND-V-325, down a 1/2N pipe and through RWCU-V-442 to the drain. It is estimated that the leakage through this flow path was 3.4 gpm.

2. An investigation was ,,performed in an attempt to determine when valves RWCU-V-442 and 443 had been opened. It was discerned that the valves were opened by means of the control switches around 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> on April 28, 1988, because an abrupt increase in FDR-SUMP-W2 run time also occurred at that time. At least two attempts were made to identify the leakage; however, the actual source into the sump (a scupper drain port) was not checked because was identified as an Equipment Drain (EDR) on Plant drawings instead of an it FDR. Upon closing RWCU-V-442 and 443 on May 12, 1988, FDR-SUMP-W2 run time returned to historical values.

3. At the request of the Plant Manager, a Plant Security investigation was conducted to determine the circumstances surrounding the incident. There was no evidence or suspicion to conclude that the opening of RWCU-V-442 and 443 was a deliberate act.

4. A review of was noted PPM that 2.11.1, "Solid Waste Processing System," was performed and RWCU-V-442 is not listed on the valve checklist, and neither it RWCU-V-442 nor 443 are mentioned in Section B,N Reactor Water Cleanup Phase Separators Operation (RWCU-TK-104A/B).N

5. The locations and setpoints of the Area Radiation Monitors (ARMS) in the spill area were reviewed and are as follows:

o ARM-28 is located approximately 90 feet from the geometric center of the spill area. The setpoint for this ARM is 50 mR/hr.

o ARM-29 is located approximately 18 feet from the geometric center of the spill area. The setpoint for this ARM is 100 mR/hr. The setpoint was changed from 75 mR/hr on February 29, '1988 to reduce the frequency of alarm conditions due to increased background radiation levels (75 mR/hr) associated with the RWCU recirculate and transfer line which is located approximately 12 feet from the detector. The alarm conditions were masking other alarms coming in on Main Control Room annunciators from Radwaste Area Radiation Monitors. There was not a problem by increasing the setpoint because the monitor would continue to alert personnel to changes in area radiation levels.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMS NO. 3(50-0(CO EXPIRES: 8/3'I/88 FACILITYNAME (11 DOCKET NUMBER Il) LER NUMSER (8) ~ AOE (3)

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Green Scale = all others), all recorder pens contained black ink. As a result, it was impossible to differentiate the recordings and verify if ARM-28 alarmed. However, it is unlikely that ARM-28 alarmed dur ing the event due to the distance of the monitor from, and activity levels of, the spill.

6. The area of the spill had been previously identified as a "High-High" Radiation Area by use of a yellow flashing light (identifies exposures in excess of lR/hr). Prior to entry into this area, Health Physics must be notified and the proper dosimetry obtained. Although the RWO left the area immediately upon discovering the spill, he had entered the area without the required dosimetry, and did not understand the meaning of the yellow flashing light in relation to anticipated exposure levels.

7. A review of PPMS 11.2.7.1, "Area Posting", and 11.2.7.3, "Entry Into and Egress from High Radiation Areas", was performed .to determine adequacy with proper posting requirements and consistency with the Plant Technical Specifications. For areas greater than 1,000 mR/hr, where no enclosure exists for the purpose of locking, and where no enclosure can be reasonably constructed around the individual .areas, PPM 11.2.7.3 requires that such areas be barricaded, posted and flashing light activated as a warning device. This direction is consistent with the wording in the Technical Specifications.

For areas greater than 1,000 mR/hr, PPM 11.2.7. 1'equires that such areas either be locked or, if no enclosure exists for the purpose of locking, the areas shall be barricaded, posted and a flashing light activated as a warning device. Although the wording is not entirely consistent with that of the Technical Specifications, the intent of the procedure is to lock access to such areas where possible.

As a result, either the shield doors at the entrance to the spill area should have been closed and locked, or an enclosure should have been constructed at that location.

B. Further Corrective Action

1. RWCU-V-442 and 443 were tagged shut and de-energized.

2. PPM 2.11.1 was deviated to include RWCU-'-442 on the valve checklist. The required condition for both RWCU-442 and 443 on the valve checklist is "closed."

3. The RWO involved in this event was counseled on the importance of monitoring the status of operational tasks, including procedural compliance and believing Plant instrumentation unless proven otherwise.

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4. The Shi ft Support Supervi sor' sensi tivity was increased to the manpower needs in the Radwaste Control Room during heavy work periods.

5. A review of the Radwaste System will be performed for the purpose of identifying any similar valves (e.g. infrequently used) such as RWCU-V-442 and 443.

6. The Plant drawing (M607, Sheet 3) which incorrectly identified the FDR scupper drain port as an EDR source will be revised.

7. The Area Radiation Monitor recorder pen colors were restored to the correct design configuration (red and green). In addition, an evaluation will be performed to determine if the current design of the recorder can be changed to better differentiate between ARM recordings.

8. The shield doors at the entrance to the spill area were closed and locked.

9. A Plant equality Assurance survey was conducted to provide an indication of the level of knowledge of Plant personnel regarding radiation barriers. The results of the survey indicated that many of the survey population did not have a clear understanding of "High" Radiation Areas, "High-High" Radiation Areas and ARMS. Accordingly, additional training will be provided to Plant personnel to enhance understanding of "High" and NHigh-High'adiation Areas with respect to proper dosimetry and actions required prior to entering such areas during normal and abnormal Plant conditions.

10. Plant procedure 11.2.7.1 is in . the process of being revised to make consistent with the wording in the Plant Technical Specifications it and PPM 11.2.7.3.

Simliar Events Hone Safety Si nificance There is no safety significance associated with this event in relation to the general public. However, Plant personnel either were, or could have been, impacted as follows:

l. Although the RWO immediately left the spill area upon discovery, that he could have exceeded the Supply System daily administrative exposure limit it is possible (300 mrem) by not recognizing the significance of the yellow flashing light in relation to anticipated exposure levels.

2. The decontamination crew (consisting of three individuals) accumulated a total collective dose equivalent of 0.195 man-rem during recovery operations. The RWO involved received 70 mrem during his shift on the day of the spill.

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The spilled resin slurry was contained in FDR-SUMP-W2. The location of the sump is a low traffic area and is protected by the use of radiological postings. In addition, the shield doors at the entrance to the spill area have since been closed and locked.

It should also be noted that the spill area configuration is such that emptying the entire resin tank could not have resulted in a release of radioactive material.

EIIS Information Text Reference EIIS Reference System Component Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System CE RWC U-TK-1 04B CE TK F D R-SUMP-'II'2 DRN RWC U-P-28 CE p RhrCU V 442/443 CE ISY ARM-28/29 IL 45 COND-V-325 SD V NRC FORM SSSO *U.S.GPO.(98M&24 S3S/4dd (983)

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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968 ~ 3000 George Washington Way ~

Richland, Washington 99352 Docket No. 50-397 June 28, 1988 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO.88-014

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No.88-014 for the WNP-2 Plant.

This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

Very truly yours, C. Powers (M/D 927M)

WNP-2 Plant Manager CMP:lg

Enclosure:

Licensee Event Report No.88-014 cc: Mr. John B. Martin, NRC - Region V Mr. C.J . Bosted, NRC Site (M/D 901A)

INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA Ms. Dottie Sherman, ANI Mr. D.L. Williams, BPA (M/D 399)