ML17284A181

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U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST) - Response to Request for Additional Information on Preliminary Safety Analysis Report
ML17284A181
Person / Time
Site: National Bureau of Standards Reactor
Issue date: 10/05/2017
From: Newton T
US Dept of Commerce, National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST)
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CAC MF7235
Download: ML17284A181 (31)
v • d • e


Text

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899-October 5, 2017 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Response to Request for Additional Information on Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (CAC no. MF7235).

Dear Sirs/Madams:

On August 10, 2017, National Institute of Standards and Technologies Center for Neutron Research (NCNR) received a request for additional information (RAI) concerning the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report in support of conversion of the National Bureau of Standards Reactor (NBSR) to low-enriched uranium fuel. Attached is our response to that request.

Please contact me at (301) 975-6260 ifthere are any questions.

/j;iuJ Thomas H. Newton, Jr., Ph.D.

Deputy Director NIST Center for Neutron Research I certify under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct.

Cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Xiaosong Yin One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike, MIS 012D20 Rockville, MD 20852 NISI

RESPONSES TO U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL lNFORMATION REGARDING CONVERSIONPRELIMINARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FOR THE

/ NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY TEST REACTOR CNBSR)

By letter dated December 30, 2014 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML15028A135), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Center for Neutron Research submitted a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) for the conversion of the NIST test reactor (aka NBSR) from high-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is reviewing the PSAR regarding the technical adequacy of the document. After reviewing the PSAR, a letter was sent to NIST on April 25 ,

2016 asking for additional information and clarification (ADAMS Accession No. ML16103A140). NIST sent a response to the NRC July 21 , 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16211A064). During further review of the PSAR another set of requests for additional information was sentto NIST August 10, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17187B012). This document provides the responses to those requests for additional information (RAis).

RAI No.1:

Core Loading: The regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.34(b)(2) require that an application include a description and analysis of the structures, systems, and components of the facility. The information required shall be sufficient to permit understanding of the system designs and their relationship to safety evaluations.

Provide the following, or justify why additional information is not necessary:

a. PSAR Section 4.5 describes results of analyses without providing details of the HEU and LEU fuel loadings; describe how the core loading will transition from HEU to LEU and further, describe the limiting core configuration that envelops the transition and LEU cores.
b. The Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport (MCNP) model appears to represent the fuel plates as flat; since they are curvilinear identify the "cup" orientation and whether the true geometry can affect power peaking factors and hot channel factors .
c. Some of the parameters in the PSAR Table 4.4 do not match with values in Table 4.10; update as necessary.

Response to RAis on NBSR Conversion PSAR September 28, 2017

Response to RAJ No. 1:

a. Section 4.5 .1.2 in the PSAR describes the model used to obtain the core loadings for both the HEU and LEU equilibrium cores. Although several transition schemes to get from the current HEU core to an equilibrium LEU core have been considered, it very much depends on the adequacy of fuel supply at the time and thus, it is premature to discuss them. The answer to this RAI will, therefore, be deferred.
b. The location of the edge of the curved portion of the fuel plate changes by - 0.2" (- 4 mm) from the middle to the edge. The diffusion length in heavy water is - 170 cm (120 cm with 0.16% H20 impurity) and therefore, this difference in location is insignificant neutronically.

Furthermore, the east-west (or concave-convex) orientation of any bundle is not known and has never been needed to be tracked.

c. The incorrect parameter in both tables is the total moderator coefficient for HEU fuel at startup (SU). The components of the coefficient (for scattering kernel and density) are correct and the total reactivity coefficient should be -0.0312 %~k/k/°C .

RAJ No. 2:

Core Reactivity: The regulations in 10 CFR 50.9, require that all submissions shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. Your response to No. 6 of the previous RAis needs additional detail. For example, estimated critical positions (ECPs) are given, but, do not appear to be discussed in either the PSAR or the RAI response. The reactor described in the Bess paper uses TRIGA fuel (Fuel Life Improvement Program fuel and 30/20 fuel with erbium). This fuel has low burnup and a very significant calculated bias of 1,000 percent millirho is claimed. The eigenvalue spread appears to be too large to be a defendable bias and the paper focuses on library evaluations are not ECPs. This paper does not appear to be applicable to NBSR calculations.

Explain the acceptability of using this paper in the determination of ECPs, or provide NBSR ECP calculations and use them to establish the suitability of the models presented, or demonstrate why additional information is not necessary.

Response to RAJ No. 2:

NIST will withdraw the reference to the cited paper. The validity of the MCNP model was thoroughly addressed in the response to RAI No. 1, 2 and 5 in the original set of RAis.

RAJNo.3:

Burnup: The regulations in 10 CFR 50.34(b )(2) require that an application include a description and analysis of the structures, systems, and components of the facility. The information required shall be sufficient to permit understanding of the system designs and their relationship to safety evaluations. Provide the following, or justify why additional information is not necessary:

The MCNP model described in PSAR Section 4.5 uses 60 materials to describe the burnup distribution in 1,020 plates. The number of materials used seem rather small comparing to the Response to RA Is on NBSR Conversion PSAR 2 September 28, 2017

number of plates in fuel elements, provide a justification for the small number of unique fuel materials.

Response to RAI No. 3:

Although the number of compositions in the model is small compared to the number of fuel plates, the model has been validated (see RAis No . 1 and No. 2 in the original set of RAis).

Furthermore, as noted in the response to the earlier set of RAis, the model used successfully to renew the license of the NBSR in 2010, only had 30 different compositions.

RAI No. 4:

Thermal and Hydraulic (T&H) Objectives: The regulations in 10 CFR 50.34(b)(2) require that an application include a description and analysis of the structures, systems, and components of the facility. The information required shall be sufficient to permit understanding of the system designs and their relationship to safety evaluations. Provide the following, or justify why additional information is not necessary:

As stated in the PSAR Section 4.6.1 the licensee design objective is that "the heat transfer to the primary coolant shall not exceed critical heat flux ratio (CHFR)". This implies a departure from nucleate boiling ratio design limit of 1.0. The guidance in NUREG-1537 for engineered cooling systems is that the DNBR shall be greater than 2. Clarify what the DNBR is being used as the limiting design value for your T &H and safety analysis. The PSAR Tables 4.20 and 4.21 indicate a range of CHFR values as a function of probability levels, but it is unclear which of the probability levels are utilized when concluding that design analysis is acceptable and whether this is consistent with previous NRC guidance or approvals.

Response to RAI No. 4:

[The quote from Section 4.6.1 is incorrect. The correct quote is "shall not exceed critical heat flux (CHF) conditions, ... "]

The guidance in NUREG-1537 dates back to when thermal margin for a research or test reactor was calculated deterministically and having MCHFR < 2.0 was considered by NRC as a conservative criterion. However, NIST began using a statistical approach with the submission of its request for license renewal in 2004. In addition, NIST chose to include analysis of the minimum onset of flow instability ratio as added assurance of thermal margin .

Although the analysis in Chapter 13 of the PSAR shows that the MCHFR and MOFIR remain greater than 2.0 for all the reactivity insertion and loss of flow events, it is instructive to also understand the statistical context. The statistical analysis is explained in several reports (cf A.

Cuadra and L.-Y. Cheng, "Statistical Hot Channel Analysis for the NBSR," BNL-105288-2014-IR, Brookhaven National Laboratory, May 23 , 2014). Figure 1, based on that work and consistent with Tables 4.20 and 4.21 cited above, shows the probability of not exceeding CHF for a given CHF ratio. As can be seen, even MCHFR values as low as 1.4 assure that the probability of avoiding CHF is 95%.

Response to RAis on NBSR Conversion PSAR 3 September 28, 2017

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Figure 1 Thermal Margin in Terms of Probabilities The NRC does not have a requirement on this probability. In the NRC Safety Evaluation Report (June 2009) for the 2004 license renewal submittal, the MCHFR for the startup accident was quoted as being greater than 1.7 for the end-of-cycle core and 1.55 for the startup core (using different correlations than were used for the conversion PSAR). The NRC ' s conclusion was :

"Both MCHFRs provide ample margin to ensure that no fuel damage will result."

RAINo. 5:

Power Distribution: The regulations in 10 CFR 50.34(b)(2) require that an application include a description and analysis of the structures, systems, and components of the facility. The information required shall be sufficient to permit understanding of the system designs and their relationship to safety evaluations. Provide the following, or justify why additional information is not necessary:

It is not clear whether the peaking factors in PSAR Tables 4.23 and 4.24 are the limiting values from the limiting core configuration defined in the neutronics analysis. Provide the limiting val ues.

Response to RAI No. 5:

As explained in Section 4.6.2.4 of the PSAR, the tables are the limiting (highest value) conditions. The analysis was done for both the HEU and LEU equilibrium cores.

Response to RAis on NBSR Conversion PSAR 4 September 28, 2017

RAINo. 6:

Maximum Reactivity Insertion Event: The regulations *in 10 CFR 50.9, require that all submissions shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. Provide the following, or justify why additional information is not necessary:

a. Referring to PSAR Section 13.4.3.1 , the scram setting is on high flux level but not on power as stated in the text (TS 3.2.2). Update as needed.
b. The minimum critical heat flux ratio of 1.78 stated PSAR 13.4.3.2 in the text does not match the value in Table 13.7; the value of 1.83 stated in PSAR Section 13.4.3.2 does not match the value in Table 13.8. Correct these apparent inconsistencies as needed.
c. Referring to PSAR Section 13.4.3.1 , provide updated text that describes how the limiting single failure is determined and what effect it has on the consequences.

Response to RAI No. 6:

a. The flux signal is normalized to reactor power and hence, reactor trip on the signal can refer to either high flux or high power.
b. The value of MCHFR = 1.78 is not what is calculated for the transient. As stated in the text, having a MCHFR greater than 1.78 assures that the probability of not reaching CHF is greater than 99.9%. The explanation is the same for the MOFIR.
c. NUREG-1537 does not provide any guidance on assuming a limiting single failure.

However, Chapter 13 in the PSAR does discuss the many conservative assumptions used in the analysis.

RAINo. 7:

Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA): The regulations in 10 CFR 50.34(b)(2) require that an application include a description and analysis of the structures, systems, and components of the facility. The information required shall be sufficient to permit understanding of the system designs and their relationship to safety evaluations. The NRC staff understands in concept the contribution of the inner reserve tank (IRT), emergency cooling tank (ECT), sump return, and hold-up pan to the cooling of the fuel. However, the PSAR does not explain in any of the cases the sequence of events, listing the time when the IRT becomes empty, the ECT begins to operate, or when the sump return flow begins. Some of the cases describe the water level in the hold-up pan reaching the top lip in 10.9 seconds, but do not show and describe the consequences on the fuel, cladding, and coolant temperatures. Similarly, some cases indicate partial draining of the vessel but provide no dose estimates from direct shine. The volumes and performance attributes of some components are unclear. In addition, it is understood that the HEATING7.3 code is used to analyzed plate temperatures following loss of coolant, and subsequent cooling by flow of water through the distribution pan onto the fuel plates, but it is unclear how that code is Response to RAls on NBSR Conversion PSAR .5 September 28, 2017

interfaced to the TRACE analysis (e.g., initial and boundary conditions). Provide the following, or justify why additional information is not necessary:

RAINo. 7a:

For each case revise the sequence of events (SOE) to include the time when IRT flow is the only coolant supplied to the fuel , the time for ECT actuation, the time for recirculation flow from the pump to initiate and the point of discharge for recirculation flow. This should consider the manual actuation of the ECT and the time required for operators to diagnose the accident, decide whether to initiate bottom fill or top fill , and the time to accomplish this activity. In addition, consider the manual actuation of recirculation flow in the same manner.

Response to RAI No. 7a:

The sequence of events for the three guillotine break LOCA cases are discussed in Section 13.6 of the PSAR and are summarized in Tables 13.18 (Case 1), 13.19 (Case 2) and 13.20 (Case 3).

In the thermal analysis the time when IRT flow is the only coolant supplied to the fuel corresponds to the timing of the vessel water level reaching the upper entrance (upper end adaptor) to the fuel elements. That timing is 6. 7 s, 8.6 s and 12.7 s for Cases 1, 2 and 3 respectively.

The operation of the Emergency Cooling System is described in Section 6.1.1 of the 2004 SAR (NBSAR 14, submitted for license renewal) . Under conservative assumptions of no operator action, a minimum of28 minutes of coolant flow is always available to the core from the Inner Reserve Tank (IRT) located within the reactor vessel. Based on established procedures at the NBSR the operators are expected to diagnose a LOCA event within a few seconds from its inception. Although under normal makeup flow there is flow from the ECT to the IRT without operator intervention, without it the operator has the aforementioned 28 minutes before action must be taken to open the valves to drain from the ECT to the IRT. There is sufficient capacity in the ECT to provide 212 hours0.00245 days <br />0.0589 hours <br />3.505291e-4 weeks <br />8.0666e-5 months <br /> of cooling with no additional makeup.

The thermal analysis of the LOCA cases assumes the only source of emergency cooling water is from the IRT which is replenished by coolant gravity fed from the Emergency Cooling Tank (ECT) . The analysis did not consider pumping flow to recirculate flow through the fuel elements. Based on the thermal analyses, the peak cladding temperature for all three guillotine break cases occurs within the first 30 seconds of the accident. This should give the operators plenty of time to initiate ECT flow to the IRT.

RAI No. 7b:

For LOCA case 2, indicate when the vessel level reaches the top-of-fuel and what the level of the IRT is at that time (i.e., showing graphically, the IRT water level and discharge rate vs. time).

Indicate at what time the IRT is fully drained.

Response to RAis on NBSR Conversion PSAR 6 September 28, 2017 l

Response to RAI No. 7b:

For LOCA Case 2 the vessel water level reaches the top-of fuel at 8.6 s from the initiation of the LOCA event (see Table 13.19 in the PSAR).

The draining of the IRT has been evaluated previously and the results can be found in Appendix A to the 2004 SAR (NBSR 14, Appendix A). In the Appendix, Figure 4-10 shows the IRT water level as a function of time and Figure 5-6 gives the mass flow rate from the IRT as a function of time. Both figures are reproduced below. The results presented in the two figures are based on the assumption that the IRT is discharging into ambient air, i.e. the vessel water level has receded below the two nozzles in the IRT.

Using Figures 2 and 3 and conservatively assuming that the IRT started to drain into the fuel elements at time zero, at time = 8.6 s the IRT water level is in excess of 90% and the corresponding flow rate is on the order of 40 to 50 gpm. The IRT is estimated to be fully drained in 30 minutes if there is no addition of coolant from the ECT.

Draining of Inner Emergency Cooling Tank Normalized Water Level in the Tank 1.0 0.9 - - Level calcuated by RELAP51

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Figure 2 Predictions of the Draining of the Inner Reserve Tank Response to RAis on NBSR Conversion PSAR 7 September 28, 2017

Comparison of Boiloff and Flow from Inner Emergency Cooling Tank 5

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Figure 3 Comparison of Boiloff and Flow from the Inner Reserve Tank (IRT).

RAINo. 7c:

For each LOCA case indicate what the limiting single failure is and ensure that the consequences of this failure are reflected in the provided results for that case.

Response to RAI No. 7c:

There is no single failure assumed in the LOCA analysis. See also response to RAI No. 6c.

RAINo. 7d:

For all LOCA cases, provide the water level in the fuel and the maximum cladding temperature as a function of time using a time scale that fully covers the participation of all elements of the core cooling system used in the SOE.

Response to RAI No. 7d:

As stated earlier in response to RAJ 7a, the thermal analysis of the LOCA cases only assumed one source of emergency coolant and that is the flow from the IRT. There is no other element of the core cooling system involved in the SOE. Section 13.6 of the PSAR already contains the Response to RAis on NBSR Conversion PSAR 8 September 28, 2017

requested information, namely the water level in the fuel and the maximum cladding temperature as a function of time.

RAINo. 7e:

The supplied RELAP5 model input shows that the volume of the IRT is - 738 gallons and the volume of the upper plenum is - 1,053 gallons. Supply the total volume of the ECT, and the sump recirculation flow rate versus time for all LOCA cases.

Response to RAI No. 7e:

The total volume of the ECT is 3000 gallons. The LOCA cases did not assume any sump recirculation flow explicitly. The assumption in the LOCA cases is that the IRT will be replenished by flow from the ECT on the order of 40 gpm. The sump flow is rated at 40 gpm and can be directly connected to the ECT to supply a steady flow to the IRT. As noted in Section 6.1.1 of the 2004 SAR, the ECT has 2 Y2 hours of supply without makeup .

RAI No. 7f:

Chapter 5 of the PSAR anticipates no changes due to the HEU-LEU conversion and so it contains no technical information. However, to support our review of the LOCA analysis it became necessary to review Figure 5.2 in the 2004 SAR. This graphic shows the discharge from the sump pump going to the D20 storage tank, not directly to the ECT. Confirm the flow path used for recirculation flow and whether all powered components are on the emergency power bus.

Response to RAI No. 7f:

The entire system for purifying the D20 and returning it to the cooling system is discussed in the 2004 SAR, Section 5.4.2, Primary Coolant Purification System. The D20 Storage Tank is an integral part of this system, and its operation is discussed in Section 5.4.2.1 , while the pumps (DP-7 and DP-8) that return D20 to the cooling system via the ECT are discussed in Section 5.4.2.2. Thus, water returned to the D20 storage tank by the sump pumps is routed to the D20 Emergency Cooling Tank, which feeds the Inner Reserve Tank by gravity. Both pumps (only one is required) are powered by separate Emergency Power Motor Control Centers. The pumps are controlled from the control room.

RAINo. 7g:

PSAR 13.6.5 explains that HEATING7.3 is used to calculate the fuel temperatures in the "quiescent" water after the water has drained form the fuel. Explain in more detail where this quiescent water is located. Explain if the "quiescent" water is assumed to accumulate, exit the bottom of the fuel , or is it allowed to heat up and evaporate. Explain how the flow from the distribution pan into the fuel channels is modeled including how the water flow is distributed over the fuel assemblies, and if there is any allowance for liquid film flow over the plates.

Provide assumptions, and the boundary conditions used, including film flow rate, film thickness Response to RAls on NBSR Conversion PSAR 9 September 28, 2017

versus distance from top of fuel plate, specific representation of water film behavior on the fuel plates, etc. used in the analysis.

Response to RAI No. 7g:

In the context of the three guillotine break LOCA cases discussed in Section 13.6 of the PSAR the presence of "quiescent" water inside the reactor vessel represents the end-state of the LOCA event. The LOCA scenario considers two different end-states depending on the location of the break. For a break at the reactor vessel outlet pipe (Case 1) Figure 13.51 of the PSAR shows the presence of "quiescent" water in the IRT, inside of the fuel elements, and in the hold-up pan on the outside of the fuel elements. For Case 1 the decay power is removed by boiloff of coolant inside the fuel elements. Assuming there is continuous flow from the ECT to the IRT the flow from the IRT is more than enough to make up for the boi loff (see Figure 2 of Response to RAJ No. 7b). For the break at the inlet pipe to the outer plenum (Case 2) or inner plenum (Case 3)

Figure 13.55 of the PSAR shows the presence of "quiescent" water in the IRT and the reactor vessel on the outside of the fuel elements. For Cases 2 and 3 the coolant channels internal to the fuel elements are assumed to be drained because of the break below the fuel elements. However, there is a steady stream of flow from the IRT to the distribution pan which has dedicated nozzles to direct flow to each fuel element in the reactor.

As explained in Section 13 .3 of the PSAR, the water jet emerging from the distribution pan will hit the inside of the upper end adapter of each fuel element forming a liquid film and continue to flow down one of the side plates (see Figures 13.9 and 13 . l 0 of the PSAR). When the liquid film reaches the section where the fuel plates begin, it is first assumed that the water in the liquid film will distribute evenly among the 18 flow channels. The water flowing down each channel is in contact with three walls, a side plate and two fuel plates (or a fuel plate and an outside plate).

Assuming downward channel flow, the film thickness (measured from the inside surface of the side plate) is calculated by a force balance between the gravitational force and wall shear. The friction coefficient for the wall shear can be evaluated using the Blasius equation for open channel flow. The reference cited in Section 13 of the PSAR (Baek, 20 l 4a) discusses how the film thickness is calculated to be 0.12 cm with the concept of open channel flow when the film mass flowrate is 4.2 g/s in a flow channel. It is noted that the thermal analysis of the LOCA assumed a nominal film thickness of 0.1 cm. By reference to Figure 13 .11 of the PSAR the liquid film is in contact with solid regions R-9, R-4009, RIO and R-12 . The rest of the fuel plate surface is assumed to be insulated (i.e. no allowance for liquid film flow over the plates). In effect heat is removed by the liquid film only at one end of the fuel plate (R-9 and R-4049) that is adjoining a side plate (regions R-10, R-12 and R-13 in Figure 13.11 of the PSAR).

As discussed in Section 13.3.2.2 of the PSAR, the Wilke correlation for turbulent subcooled film flow is used to calculate the heat transfer coefficient (HTC) of the falling film on the inside of one side plate. In Cases 2 and 3 of the LOCA events discussed in Section 13.6 of the PSAR this HTC is applied conservatively to all surfaces contacting the liquid film . The HTC increases as liquid temperature increases and it was observed in a sensitivity study that the contacting surface temperature rarel y becomes high enough for nucleate boiling to occur. It is also conservatively assumed that heat is not transferred from the plates to gas regions of the flow channels. In addition, LOCA Cases 2 and 3 also assume that heat is transferred from the side plates (region R-Response to RAis on NBSR Conversion PSAR 10 September 28, 2017

13 and R-1 in Figure 13.11 of the PSAR) to the quiescent water on the outside of the fuel element. A heat flux boundary condition is applied to the outer surfaces of the side plates. The overall heat transfer model is summarized in Section 13 .3 .2.2 of the PSAR.

RAI No. 7h:

Provide the fuel meat, and cladding temperature as a function of time based on the HEATING? .3 calculations, for at least one of the large LOCA and one of the small LOCA scenarios.

Response to RAI No. 7h:

As a result of relatively good thermal conductivity of aluminum in the fuel meat for HEU fuel ,

the metal fuel meat for LEU fuel, and aluminum in the cladding, the temperature of the fuel meat and cladding are almost the same at all times in the LOCA scenarios. Graphs of peak clad temperatures are provided in Section 13.6.3 .2 in the PSAR for the large break LOCAs and as discussed in Section 13.6.3.3, these temperatures bound the results for small break LOCAs.

RAI No. 7i:

For cases where the fuel is partially or fully uncovered for any period of time, provide dose calculation to occupational workers and members of the public and indicate over what time interval these exposures apply. Relate these times to activities that are expected to be performed by operators who may be responding to events and compensating for them with operator actions such as opening values 32-35 .

Response to RAI No. 7i:

The situation with an LEU core will be identical to that with the present HEU core, with similar radiation levels. As discussed in the 1974 SAR, the top shield plug is adequate to allow work on the reactor top during refueling, when the vessel level is lowered to the bottom of the upper grid plate (measurements are all in the range of a few mR). It should also be noted that irrespective of any other event, the reactor is far below critical simply as a result of the lower level of D20.

Thus there is no effect on any necessary activity.

RAINo.8:

MHA: The regulations in 10 CFR 50.34(b)(2) require that an application include a description and analysis of the structures, systems, and components of the facility. The information required shall be sufficient to permit understanding of the system designs and their relationship to safety evaluations. Provide the following, or justify why additional information is not necessary:

RAINo. Sa:

PSAR Section 13.8 states that h is removed by the filters, however, there is no discussion of what fraction of iodine released is organic and how that affects the dose results. Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.183 is sometimes used by Research and Test Reactors licensees to provide Response to RAls on NBSR Conversion PSAR 11 September 28, 2017

guidance on the fraction of the iodide released that could be organic. In general, the organic fraction is considered to be unaffected by the carbon filter and will not be removed.

Response to RAI No. 8a:

RG 1.183 is a guide describing alternative source terms for use in evaluating design basis accidents at nuclear power reactors. As such, it is not strictly applicable to the NBSR, which is a test reactor with much different fuel design and geometry. However, for the very limited purpose of estimating the fraction of iodine released as "organic iodine," it may serve as a conservative estimate. Appendix A (and B) in the RG states that 0.15% is an acceptable value to use for both PWRs and BWRs. However, the analysis used in the conversion PSAR is based upon the much lower temperatures involved in the NBSR MHA, where only one element melts, not upon a full core melt, and this reduces the total iodine released to confinement. The lower temperature also reduces the amount of organic iodine released (temperatures will remain at outdoor air temperatures throughout the incident). Thus, the estimate given in the PSAR is justified; however, the use of the suggested values would have little to no effect on public or staff doses.

RAINo. 8b:

The model refers to the assumption of low wind speed, and high stable atmospheric conditions.

However, it does not specifically identify the wind speed and the atmospheric stability class.

Identify the wind speed and atmospheric stability class.

Response to RAI No. 8b:

After the postulated MHA event the emergency ventilation system keeps running and the fission products, leaking into the containment from the helium ventilation space are purged from the building through the 30 meter-high stack. The helium space leak rate and containment purge rate are given in Table 13.22a of the PSAR for three locations. The HOTSPOT model assumes that the wind is westerly, with Pasquill stability class F (moderately stable) and wind speed of 1 mis.

Fission source decay was also considered by adjusting the initial concentration to take into account an average of 1 and 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> radioactive decay in the first and second time intervals. In the 1-30 day period, a very conservative, four-day decay was considered instead of the medium time of 14.5 days, which would have resulted in a lower estimate since many significant fission products have decayed to negligible levels by that time.

The adjacent building structure is 27 meters high providing a potentially significant building wake effect. Even though the release is specified as an elevated release, the HOTSPOT model considers the turbulence caused by the building and the resulting dose increase near the building structure (see response to RAI No. 8c).

In order to provide a bounding dose estimate, the analysis was extended to determine the location with the maximal dose contribution and to also include the potential effect of using Pasquill

  • As found in the PSAR and discussed as being mislabeled in the response to the original RAJ No. 11.

Response to RAis on NBSR Conversion PSAR 12 September 28, 2017

stability class A (very unstable) in addition to the base case stability class F. The results are shown in Table 1 indicating that the maximum dose location is inside the site perimeter. The dose values are well within the limit of 100 mrem specified in 10 CFR Part 20.1301 for a member of the public.

Table 1 Dose (TEDE) to an Individual after MHA Dose (LEU Fuel)

Stability Location rmreml Class [meter]

0-2 hr 2-24 hr 1-30 days Total 400 0.7 9.0 9.7 19.4 F

21 O/max dose 1.0 12.0 13.0 26.0 400 0.2 2.1 2.3 4.6 A

55/max dose 2.0 24.0 26.0 52.0 RAINo. Sc:

The model uses the HOTSPOT code with an elevated release. However, the stack height is not 2.5 times the height of the adjacent solid structure or higher, as needed for the consideration of an elevated release under the guidance in RG 1.145. Revise the analysis to use ground release consistent with the cited guidance.

Response to RAI No. Sc:

The guidance in RG 1.145 refers to semi-empirical models based on theoretical and empirical correlations for elevated and non-elevated releases. As per RG 1.145, a release is elevated if the release point is 2.5 times above the adjacent structures and a theoretical formula is recommended (Eq. 4 in RG. 1.145) to calculate the corresponding x/Q values . For non-elevated releases, the guidance combines theoretical and empirical formulas to account for the effect of turbulence in building wakes (Eq. 1-3). HOTSPOT uses a Gaussian plume atmospheric dispersion model generating a normal distribution for air concentration in all downwind directions. The code also treats plume rise, if applicable due to stack emission velocity and temperature effects. Ground level release is modeled by setting the release height at zero.

Turbulence in building wakes are treated through a virtual source term incorporating the geometrical effect of the adjacent containment that accurately estimates the radiological effects in the proximity of the release point. The virtual source term is placed behind the actual release point at an effective distance that results in a realistic estimate of the lateral plume spread, cry and crz near the building. This approach has been shown to provide good agreement with measured data without using explicit semi-empirical formulas as in RG. 1.145.

The HOTSPOT results shown in Figure 4 (case: 2-24 hours release; F stability) clearly indicates the effect of turbulence on the plume centerline dose showing that without considering the building wake effects the dose would be unrealistically low near the release point (as shown in Figure 5).

Response to RAls on NBSR Conversion PSAR 13 September 28, 2017

lE- 01 --

~

11:- 02 lE- 03

~

r-.

lE- 04

~

. ~

11:- 0S

~

111:4'6

- - -= - - - ~- -  :=- ....

U:-01 1E-Q8 ,_ I - l 0.01 0.1 1 10 100 Im.

Figure 4 Plume Centerline Dose; Wake Effects BotSpot 9erai... 3.0.3 General Pl\11118 Sep 2S~ 2011 09 : 52,Jlll Pl\11118 C8Dterl1- TEllE (r-)

  • a11 a function OJ: DoWDW1Dd D:illtaDce lE- 02 I ..... ,,,_ I I

.lE- 03 I .,...

lE- 04 - + I - - --

.I r-........._ -

1E-OS L I l

- 'r--.,...

11:- 06

  • - - - - ~ ~~

lE-01 '

= -- -"'

- - - .,.. --~ -~ I'

~

-~

llt-01 '

lE-09 0.01 0.1 l 10 100 Im.

Figure 5 Plume Centerline Dose without Wake Effects Response to RA Is on NBSR Conversion PSAR 14 September 28, 2017

RAINo. 8d:

The HOTSPOT code is suitable for a short-term release. Using this code for a longer period of time, as in this case where 30-day doses are considered, may lead to inaccurate estimates of dose, because the weather condition cannot be assumed to remain constant over such a period of time.

Justify the use of HOTSPOT for such releases or revise the analysis.

Response to RAI No. 8d:

The HOTSPOT code can calculate dose distribution for radial distances in each of the 16 wind direction sectors based on historical meteorological data. The meteorological input data consist of hourly observed wind speed, direction, stability classification and uses sampling methodology to determine the percentile dose values in each direction sectors at specified radial distances.

The data set collected at the Baltimore/Washington International Airport (BWI) for the year 1990 was used as the historical meteorological data input to the analysis with the corresponding wind rose data shown on Figure 6. BWI is about 40 miles to the east of the NBSR facility and has similar geographical features with a predominantly west-to-east wind direction.

WRPLOTVlew File Edd Tools H.._,

@ Wino~

Stebmy Cllu Jl..tO.lnfQrmmlbn I 1 wnd Ohdbna: E3 0bKnots Whda..... 1111.. I ff'9qlWM;J~ F~QillrtllutiDA W"ndRoH ~

~""'

Otilnt.tkln t~ Di"edlon~w ln g fnHn)

Q flow Vector (blowing to)

~~--------------, (*

stati>f'I 193721 - BALTUORflBLT-WASHNGTN ffT'l. WO Datu: 111/1990

  • 00:00 ... 1213111990-23:00
            • T.iooTH *** ...... .
14. 1~ *:~~

17

..... -****r****** ... ....

. . T.

  • 1~:~"'

704~ \\ . *

          • -;********r*******r**';--1

. . . _ _ _.. / _ . ./

. . D

~~~;;;29

  • 7.211
  • 8.75 5.66 - 1.211

... .. _/ /

  • 4.12
  • 5.66 2.57-4.12 2.06
  • 2.57
' D 1.54-2.05 D o.51 - 1.54
                      • +*****

..........[~....... **

Calms: 5.26'11 Figure 6 BWI Wind Rose Data Response to RAis on NBSR Conversion PSAR 15 September 28, 2017

The analysis was modeled with a weather pattern that is reflective of historical data calculating the percentile doses in up to 16 wind direction sectors. The results of the calculations are shown in Figure 7 indicating the TEDE isopleths for the 1-30 days duration . The maximum dose values, 3.89 mrem (Stability A) and 16.2 mrem (Stability F), are in Sector 5 reflecting the predominantly West-to-East wind direction .

Stability F 1 1 Figure 7 Wind Sector Dose at 400 Meters RAINo. Se:

In the occupational dose calculations, the model refers to a specified leak rate (considered to be the helium leak rate containing noble gases, tritium gas, and iodine) into each room; however, the PSAR is not clear on what fraction of the released gases into the helium space (with a volume of 0.7 cubic meter) would enter each room the [sic] over the specified period. Clarify what fraction of the released gases would enter each room.

Response to RAI No. Se:

Table 13.22 of the PSAR lists the leak rate from the helium space into three, specific containment areas. It is assumed that the leak rate is constant through the 30-day period allowing all accumulated fission products to leak into the containment. The table also lists the purge rate from each containment volume. The combined leak and purge rates result in a fission source release rate over the specified intervals with the assumption that the total fission product releases are limited to the amounts listed in Table 13 .21 of the PSAR for a half-element.

RAI No. Sf:

After resolving the issues raised in the previous RAis 9.a through 9.e [sic] , provide a complete description of inventory distribution inside the building, as well as the re leased values to the environment along the assumptions on the various leakage components, weather conditions parameters, so that the results can be confirmed. (For the public dose calculations, a copy of the HOTSPOT outputs along with their associated user mix data, will provide the requested information.)

Response to RAis on NBSR Conversion PSAR 16 September 28, 2017

Response to RAI No. Sf:

Response to RAI 8e provides the inventory release and purge rates into the three containment areas. The fission source release amounts are obtained by the combination of the leak and purge rates by considering the respective volumes, average decay rates, and also that the total release is limited to the total amount of fission products released from one melted fuel element. The HOTSPOT fission source was derived from the data listed in Table 13.21 in the PSAR with the following adjustments:

  • Iodine - 3% released from the fuel, 0.15% released in organic form , air filters capture all inorganic iodine
  • 0-2 hours - average decay 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />
  • 2-22 hours - average decay 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br />
  • 1-30 days - average decay 4 days (to insure a minimal contribution), limited to the total available source Two samples of HOTSPOT outputs are attachments to these responses:
  • HOTSPOT_output_0_2_hrs.txt This gives dose estimates for the period 0-2 hours.
  • HOTSPOT_output_1_30_d_stab_F.txt This gives percentile dose estimates with historical meteorological data RAI No. 9:

External Events: The regulations in 10 CFR 50.34(b)(2) require that an application include a description and analysis of the structures, systems, and components of the facility. The information required shall be sufficient to permit understanding of the system designs and their relationship to safety evaluations. Provide the following, or justify why additional information is not necessary:

The discussion in PSAR Section 13.12 does not address the topic of how the change in fuel affects, or doesn't affect, external events. In PSAR Table 1.1 the LEU fuel plate is significantly more massive than the HEU fuel by a factor of more than 2. It can be expected that an external event, such as an earthquake, that has lateral displacement and acceleration will result in greater stress on LEU fuel. Consider this issue and revise this PSAR section.

Response to RAI No. 9:

The information in Table 1.1 shows that the fuel meat is approximately 1 kg heavier in the LEU fuel element. As stated in the response to the original RAI No. 12, the total fuel element weight increases from ~ 11 kg for the HEU element to ~ 13 kg for the LEU element; an insignificant amount in terms of earthquake response. With respect to each of the 34 individual fuel plates in a fuel element, the difference in weight of 32 gm also does not make a significant change in response to an earthquake.

Response to RAis on NBSR Conversion PSAR 17 September 28, 2017

RAJNo.10:

Fuel Storage: The regulations in 10 CFR 50.34(b)(2) require that an application include a description and analysis of the structures, systems, and components of the facility. The information required shall be sufficient to permit understanding of the system designs and their relationship to safety evaluations. Provide the following, or justify why additional information is not necessary:

PSAR Section 9 .2 does not address the subject of fuel storage. In the 2004 SAR Section 9 .2.2 it is stated that the fuel storage rack design prevents the fuel attaining a keff of 0.9. However, the SAR does not appear to reference or supply any analysis supporting this statement. In addition, the application does not address the relative reactivity of HEU and LEU fuel and so it is unclear as to how the fuel change affect fuel storage issues and how, or whether, the fuel design change will alter any issues or analyses previously submitted. Provide an analysis demonstrating that the fuel storage racks are capable of satisfying the reactivity requirements of LEU fuel.

Response to RAJ No. 10:

The analysis for the previous 2004 SAR has been updated and is referenced in two reports that are available upon request. b The reports describe a conservative analysis for HEU fuel that shows there is "no possibility of an inadvertent criticality ... if the elements and fuel pieces are secured properly . .. " Calculations are also presented showing the impact of loading spent LEU fuel and again the margin to criticality is large. This is not surprising as the LEU elements are designed to have reactivity almost the same as the HEU elements. For example, the excess reactivity of the equilibrium cores containing fuel elements ranging from fresh to burned for seven cycles is 6.7%D.k/k with HEU fuel and 6.3%D.k/k with LEU fuel; a relatively small difference.

RAI No.11:

Startup Plan: The regulations in 10 CFR 50.9, require that all submissions shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. Provide the following, or justify why additional information is not necessary:

Provide the startup plan, the issues to be examined, the success criteria required, and the approvals required before power ascension.

Response to RAJ No. 11:

Although a preliminary startup test plan is being studied, the actual transition scheme is dependent on the adequacy of fuel supply which will not be known until close to conversion. It is, therefore, premature to discuss the startup test plan and hence, the answer to this RAI will be deferred.

b R.E. Williams, "Criticality Safety Evaluation of the Fuel Storage Racks in the NBSR Spent Fuel Pool," Marchl5 ,

2009 and R.E. Williams, "Criticality Safety Evaluation of Storage Containers for the NBSR Spent Fuel Pool," June 29, 2009 .

Response to RAis on NBSR Conversion PSAR 18 September 28, 2017

ATTACHMENT Hotspot_output_0_2_hrs.txt HotSpot Version 3.0.3 General Plume Sep 26, 2017 01 :18 PM Source Term  : nist_ l .mix (Mixture Scale Factor = I .OOOOE+OO) iodine Vertical Width  : 2.70E+Ol m Horizontal Width  : 2.70E+Ol m Effective Release Height : 30 m Wind Speed (h=lO m)  : 1.00 mis Wind Speed (h=H-eft)  : 1.93 mis Stability Class (City) : F Receptor Height  : 1.5 m Inversion Layer Height : None Sample Time  : 10.000 min Breathing Rate  : 3.33E-04 m3 /sec Distance Coordinates  : All distances are on the Plume Centerline Maximum Dose Distance  : 0.21 km MAXIMUM TEDE  : 9.59E-04 rem Inner Contour Dose  : l .OOE-05 rem Middle Contour Dose  : 5.00E-06 rem Outer Contour Dose  : l .OOE-06 rem Exceeds Inner Dose Out To : 11 km Exceeds Middle Dose Out To : 17 km Exceeds Outer Dose Out To: 38 km RESPIRABLE DISTANCE TEDE TIME-INTEGRATED GROUND SURF ACE GROUND SHINE ARRIVAL AIR CONCENTRATION DEPOSITION DOSE RATE TIME km (rem) (Ci-sec )/m3 (uCi/m2) (rem/hr) (hour: min) 0.048 1.8E-04 I .5E-03 3.6E-04 6.6E-09 <00:01 0.100 6. IE-04 5.3E-03 l.3E-03 2.4E-08 <00:01 0.200 9.6E-04 8.3E-03 2.IE-03 3.8E-08 00:01 0.3 00 8.7E-04 7.6E-03 1.9E-03 3.5E-08 00:02 0.400 7.2E-04 6.3E-03 1.6E-03 2.9E-08 00 :03 0.500 5.9E-04 5.2E-03 l.3E-03 2.3E-08 00:04 0.600 4.9E-04 4.3E-03 I. IE-03 1.9E-08 00:05 0.700 4. IE-04 3.6E-03 9.0E-04 1.6E-08 00:06 0.800 3.5E-04 3.IE-03 7.6E-04 l .4E-08 00:06 0.900 3.0E-04 2.7E-03 6.6E-04 l .2E-08 00:07 1.000 2.6E-04 2.3E-03 5.8E-04 l.OE-08 00:08 2.000 l.IE-04 9.5E-04 2.3E-04 4. IE-09 . 00 :17 4.000 4.IE-05 3.8E-04 9.2E-05 I .6E-09 00:3 4 6.000 2.4E-05 2.3E-04 5.4E-05 8.8E-IO 00:51 8.000 l .6E-05 l.6E-04 3.7E-05 5.8E-10 01 :08 10.000 1.IE-05 l .2E-04 2.8E-05 4.2E-1 0 01:26 20.000 3.7E-06 4.8E-05 1. IE-05 1.5E-10 02:52 40.000 9.2E-07 l.9E-05 4.2E-06 4.9E-l l 05:44 60.000 3.3E-07 1. IE-05 2.3E-06 2.5E-l l 08 :37 80 .000 1.5E-07 8.0E-06 I .5E-06 l.5E-1 l I 1:29 Response to RAis on NBSR Conversion PSAR 19 September 28, 2017

Hotspot_output_1_30_d_stab_F.txt Hotspot Version 3.0.3 General Plume Sep 14, 2017 11:24 AM Met File:C:\Users\kohut\Documents\NIST\Hotspot\wind_data\nist_maccs_stab_6 . inp Meteorological Input file processed as MACCS2 - wind FROM sector Total meteorological observations : 8760 Source Term nist 3.mix (Mixture Scale Factor 1 . 0000E+OO) iodine Wind Speed Ref. Height 10.0 m Vertical Width 2.70E+Ol m Horizontal Width 2. 7 0E+Ol m Stability G Sigma Theta deg Receptor Height 1.5 m Inversion Layer Height None Sample Time 10 . 000 min Terrain City Breathing Rate 3.33E-04 m3/sec Wind Speed Groups Group Frequency Group 0: 0.10 <= u <= 0.50 5 . 27 %

Group 1: 0.50 < u <= 1. 00 0.00 %

Group 2: 1. 00 < u <= 2 . 00 6 . 52 %

Group 3: 2.00 < u <= 3.00 23.76 %

Group 4: 3.00 < u <= 4.00 21 . 61 %

Group 5: 4 . 00 < u <= 5 . 00 14.58 %

Group 6: 5 . 00 <= u <= 6.00 10.24 %

Group 7: 6.00 < u <= 8.00 13. 29 %

Group 8: u > 8.00 4.74 %

Total Sum: 100.00 %

Response to RAis on NBSR Conversion PSAR September 28, 2017

Compass Direction is the Direct i on the Wind/Plume is Moving Towards

[Sector Centerline Distance of 0.048 km]

  • Compass Compas s 50.0 90 . 0 95 . 0 99.0 99 . 5 S yctor Direction (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) 1 N 6.47E-04 8.07 E-04 1.16E-03 1.85E -03 l. 93E-03 2 NNE 5. 6 7E -04 8.12 E - 04 9.63 E-04 l.47E- 03 1. 53E-03 3 NE 5.70E-04 1.lO E -03 l.60 E- 03 2 .05E -03 2.lOE-03 4 ENE 6.48E-04 8.23E-04 1 .06 E-03 1 . 26E-03 l. 28E-03 5 E 7 . 7 8E-04 3.32E-03 3.95E-03 4.45E-03 4.52E~03 6 ESE 4. 32E-04 7.88E-04 8 . 90 E- 04 1 . 1 4 E -03 l.1 9E-03 7 SE 4.28E-04 7.27E-04 8.06 E-04 1.39E-03 1.59E- 03 8 SSE 4.58E-04 8 . 13 E -0 4 9 .49E- 04 l. 1 6E- 03 1. 23E-03 9 S 5.76E-04 8.32 E -04 8 . 93E-04 1 . 89E-03 2 . 03E-03 10 SSW 5.50E-04 9.61E-04 l.49E-03 1.92 E -03 1.97E-03 11 SW 5 .6 5E-04 9.49 E - 04 l.39E-03 l.88E-03 1. 94E-03 12 WSW 5 .60E-04 8.25 E -04 1. OlE- 03 l.40E -03 l. 45E-03 13 W 5 . 92E-04 9.25E-04 l.06E-03 l.46E - 03 1.51E-03 14 WNW 7.llE-04 l.21E-03 l.75E-03 2.17E-03 2.23E-03 15 NW 5.52E-04 8.62 E- 04 l.19E-03 1.58E -03 l.63E-03 16 NNW 5.97E-04 8.21 E-04 1.02E-03 l.33E-03 l. 3 7E- 03 1-16 ALL 6.37E-04 l.52E-03 2.40E-03 4.14E- 03 4.36E-03

[S ector Centerline Distance of 0.100 km]

Compass Compas s 50 .0 90 . 0 95.0 99 . 0 99.5 Sector Direction (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) 1 N 2.22E-03 2. 77E -03 3.9 7E - 03 6.33E-03 6.62E-03 2 NNE 1.94E-03 2.78E-03 3 . 30E-03 5.03E - 03 5.25E-03 3 NE 1.95E-03 3.77E-03 5.4 7E- 03 7. 02E-03 7 .21E -03 4 ENE 2.22E-03 2.82E-03 3.65E-03 4. 31E -03 4.39E-03 5 E 2 . 67E-03 1 . 14E-02 l.35E-02 1.53E-02 l.55E- 02 6 ESE l.48E-03 2.70 E- 03 3 . 0 5E -03 3.91E-03 4.07E-03 7 SE l.47E-03 2.49E-03 2.76 E -03 4.75E-03 5.44E-03 8 SSE l.5 7E -03 2.79E-03 3 . 25E-03 3.99E-03 4.22E-03 9 s 1 .9 7E -03 2.85E-03 3.06E-03 6.49E-03 6.96E-03 10 SSW 1 .88 E-03 3.29 E -03 5 .llE-0 3 6. 57E -03 6.7 5E- 03 11 SW l. 94E-03 3.25 E -03 4.7 7E - 03 6. 4 3E-03 6.63E-03 12 WSW 1 .92E -03 2.83E-03 3.4 7E -03 4.80E -03 4.96E-03 13 w 2.03E - 03 3.17E-03 3.64E-03 5 . 00E-03 5.17E-03 14 WNW 2.44E-03 4.14E -0 3 5.98 E -03 7 . 45E-03 7.63E-03 15 NW l.89E-03 2.95E-03 4 .08E-03 5 . 4 2 E -03 5.58E-03 16 NNW 2.05E-03 2.81E-03 3.49 E-0 3 4 . 56E -03 4.70E-03 1-16 ALL 2.18E-03 5 .2 1E-03 8 . 23E-03 1.4 2E-02 l.49E-02 Response to RAls on NBSR Conversion PSAR 2 September 28, 2017

[Sector Centerline Distance of 0.200 km)

Compass Compass 50.0 90.0 95.0 99.0 99.5 Sector Direction (rem) ( rem) (rem) (rem ) (rem) 1 N 3.50E - 03 4.36E-03 6.25E-03 9.97E-03 l.04E-02 2 NNE 3.06E-03 4.38E-03 5 . 20E-03 7.93E-03 8.27E-03 3 NE 3.07E-03 5.93E-03 8.61E-03 l.llE-02 l.14E-02 4 ENE 3.50E - 03 4.45E-03 5.75E-03 6.79E-03 6.92E-03 5 E 4.20E-03 l.79E-02 2.13E-02 2.40E-02 2 . 44E-02 6 ESE 2.33E-03 4.26E-03 4.81E-03 6.16E-03 6.41E-03 7 SE 2.31E-03 3.93E-03 4.35E - 03 7.48E-03 8 . 57E-03 8 SSE 2.47E-03 4 . 39E-03 5.12E-03 6.28E-03 6.65E-03 9 s 3.llE-03 4 . 49E-03 4.82E-03 l.02E-02 l.lOE-02 10 SSW 2.97E-03 5.19E-03 8.05E-03 l.03E-02 l.06E-02 11 SW 3.05E-03 5 . 12E-03 7.51E-03 l.OlE-02 l.04E-02 12 WSW 3.02E-03 4 . 45E-03 5.47E-03 7.56E-03 7.82E-03 13 w 3.19E-03 4.99E-03 5.73E-03 7.88E-03 8.15E-03 14 WNW 3.84E-03 6.52E-03 9.42E-03 l.17E-02 l.20E-02 15 NW 2.98E-03 4 . 65E-03 6.43E-03 8.53E - 03 8.80E-03 16 NNW 3.22E-03 4.43E-03 5.50E-03 7.19E-03 7.40E-03 1-16 ALL 3.44E-03 8.21E-03 l.30E-02 2.24E-02 2.35E-02

[Sector Centerline Distance of 0.300 km)

Compass Compass 50.0 90 . 0 95.0 99.0 99.5 Sector Direction (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) 1 N 3.20E-03 3.99E-03 5.72E-03 9 . 13E-03 9.56E-03 2 NNE 2.80E-03 4.0lE-03 4.76E-03 7.26E-03 7.57E-03 3 NE 2.82E-03 5.43E - 03 7.89E-03 l.OlE-02 l . 04E-02 4 ENE 3.21E-03 4.07E-03 5.26E-03 6.22E-03 6.34E-03 5 E 3.85E - 03 l.64E-02 l.95E-02 2.20E-02 2.23E-02 6 ESE 2 . 14E-03 3.90E - 03 4.40E-03 5 . 64E-03 5.87E-03 7 SE 2.12E-03 3.60E-03 3.98E-03 6.85E-03 7.85E-03 8 SSE 2.26E-03 4.02E-03 4 . 69E-03 5.75E-03 6.09E-03 9 s 2.85E-03 4. llE-03 4.42E-03 9.36E - 03 l.OOE-02 10 SSW 2.72E - 03 4.75E-03 7.37E-03 9.47E-03 9.74E-03 11 SW 2.79E-03 4.69E-03 6.88E-03 9.27E-03 9.57E-03 12 WSW 2.77E-03 4.08E-03 5.0lE-03 6.92E-03 7.16E-03 13 w 2.92E-03 4.57E-03 5 . 24E-03 7.21E-03 7.46E-03 14 WNW 3.52E-03 5.97E-03 8.63E-03 l . 07E - 02 l.lOE-02 15 NW 2.73E-03 4.26E-03 5.89E-03 7.81E-03 8.05E-03 16 NNW 2.95E-03 4.06E-03 5.04E-03 6.58E-03 6.78E-03 1-16 ALL 3.15E-03 7.52E-03 l.19E-02 2.05E-02 2.15E-02 Response to RAis on NBSR Conversion PSAR 3 September 28, 2017

[Sector Centerline Distance of 0.400 km]

Compass Compass 50.0 90.0 95.0 99.0 99.5 Sector Direction (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) 1 N 2.66E-03 3.31E-03 4.75E-03 7.58E-03 7 .93E-03 2 NNE 2.33E-03 3.33E-03 3.95E-03 6.03E-03 6.29E-03 3 NE 2 .3 4E-03 4 .51 E-03 6.55E-03 8.40E-03 8.63E-03 4 ENE 2.66E-03 3.38E-03 4 . 37E-03 5.16E-03 5.26E-03 5 E 3.19E-03 l . 36E-02 l.62E-02 l.83E-02 l.85E-02 6 ESE l . 77E-03 3.24E-03 3.65E-03 4.68E-03 4 . 87E-03 7 SE l.76E-03 2.99E-03 3 . 31E-03 5.69E-03 6.52E-03 8 SSE l.88E-03 3.34E-03 3.90E-03 4.78E-03 5.06E-03 9 s 2.36E-03 3.41E-03 3.67E-03 7 . 77E-03 8.33E-03 10 SSW 2.26E-03 3.94E-03 6.12E-03 7 . 87E-03 8.08E-03 11 SW 2.32E-03 3 . 90E-03 5.71E-03 7.70E-03 7 .9 4E-03 12 WSW 2.30E-03 3.39E-03 4.16E-03 5.75E-03 5.95E-03 13 w 2.43E-03 3.80E-03 4.35E-03 5.99E-03 6.19E-03 14 WNW 2.92E-03 4.96E-03 7 .1 6E-03 8.92E-03 9 . 14E-03 15 NW 2.27E-03 3.54E-03 4.89E-03 6.49E-03 6.69E-03 16 NNW 2.45E-03 3.37E-03 4.18E-03 5.47E-03 5.63E-03 1-16 ALL 2.62E-03 6.24E-03 9.85E-03 l.70E-02 l.79E-02

[Sector Centerline Distance of 0 . 500 km]

Compass Compas s 50.0 90.0 95.0 99.0 99 . 5 Sector Direction (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) 1 N 2.18E-03 2.72E-03 3.90E-03 6.23E-03 6.52E-03 2 NNE l.91E-03 2.74E-03 3.25E-03 4 .9 5E -03 5.17E-03 3 NE l .9 2E-03 3.71E-03 5 . 38E-03 6.90E-03 7 . 09E-03 4 ENE 2.19E-03 2 . 78E-03 3.59E-03 4.24E -03 4.32E-03 5 E 2.62E-03 l.12E-02 l.33E-02 l.50E-02 l.52E-02 6 ESE l.46E-03 2.66E-03 3.00E-03 3.85E-03 4.00E-03 7 SE l.44E-03 2.45E-03 2. 72E-03 4.67E-03 5.35E-03 8 SSE l . 54E-03 2.74E-03 3.20E-03 3 . 92E-03 4.16E-03 9 s l.94E-03 2.80E-03 3.0lE-03 6.38E-03 6 . 84E-03 10 SSW l.85E-03 3.24E-03 5.03E-03 6.46E-03 6.64E-03 11 SW l . 91E-03 3.20E-03 4.69E-03 6.32E-03 6.53E-03 12 WSW l . 89E-03 2.78E-03 3 . 42E-03 4. 7 2E-03 4.88E-03 13 w 2 . 00E-03 3.12E-03 3.58E-03 4.92E-03 5.09E-03 14 WNW 2.40E-03 4.0BE-03 5.88E-03 7.33E-03 7.51E-03 15 NW l.86E-03 2.91E-03 4.02E-03 5.33E-03 5.49E-03 16 NNW 2.0lE-03 2.77E-03 3.44E-03 4.49E-03 4.62E-03 1-16 ALL 2.15E-03 5.13E-03 8 . 09E-03 l.40E-02 l.47E -02 Response to RAls on NBSR Conversion PSAR 4 September 28, 2017

[Sector Cen terline Dis tance of 0.600 km ]

Compass Compass 50.0 90 . 0 95.0 99.0 99.5 Sector Direction (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) 1 N 1. 81E-03 2.26 E -03 3 . 24 E -03 5. 1 7 E -03 5.41E-03 2 NNE 1 . 59E-03 2.27E-03 2.70 E -03 4.ll E -03 4.29E-03 3 NE 1. 60E-03 3 . 08E-03 4.47E-03 5.73E-03 5.89E-03 4 ENE 1.82E-03 2 . 31E-03 2.98E-03 3.52E-03 3.59E-03 5 E 2.18E-03 9.30E-03 1.lOE-02 1.25E-02 1.26E-02 6 ESE l.21E-03 2. 21E-03 2.49E-03 3.19E-03 3.33E-03 7 SE 1.20E-03 2.04E-03 2.26E-03 3 . 88E-03 4.45E-03 8 SSE l.28E-03 2.28E-03 2.66E-03 3 . 26E-03 3.45E-03 9 S 1.6 1 E-03 2.33E-03 2.50E-03 5.30E-03 5.68E-03 10 SSW 1 . 54E-03 2.69E-03 4.18E-03 5.37E-03 5.51E-03 11 SW 1.58E-03 2 . 66E-03 3 . 89E-03 5.25E-03 5 . 42E-03 12 WSW 1.57E-03 2.31E-03 2.84E-03 3 . 92E-03 4.06E-03 13 W 1. 66E-03 2.59E-03 2.97E-03 4.09 E -03 4.23E-03 14 WNW 1 .99E-03 3.38E-03 4 . 89 E -03 6.09 E -03 6 . 24E-03 15 NW 1.55E-03 2.41E-03 3.33E-03 4.43 E -03 4.56E-03 16 NNW 1.67E-03 2.30E-03 2.85E-03 3.73E-03 3.84E-03 1-16 ALL 1.78E-03 4 . 26E-03 6.72E-03 1.16E-02 1.22E-02

[S ector Cent erl i ne Di s t ance of 0.700 k m]

Compass Compass 50 . 0 90 . 0 95.0 99.0 99.5 Sector Direction (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) 1 N l .53E-03 1 .91E-03 2 .7 3E -03 4.36E-03 4 . 56E-03 2 NNE 1 .34E-03 l . 92E-03 2.2 7E -03 3.4 7E -03 3.62 E -03 3 NE 1 . 35E-03 2.59E-03 3.77E-03 4.83E-03 4.96E-03 4 ENE l.53E-03 l.94E-03 2.SlE-03 2.97E-03 3.03E-03 5 E 1.84E-03 7 . 84E-03 9. 31E-03 1.05E-02 l . 06E-02 6 ESE 1 . 02E-03 1 . 86E-03 2.lOE-03 2.69E-03 2.80E-03 7 SE l. OlE-03 1.72E-03 1.90 E -03 3.2 7 E-03 3.75E-03 8 SS E l. 08E-03 1.92E-03 2.24E-03 2.75 E -03 2.91E-03 9 s 1. 36E-03 1 . 96E-03 2.llE-03 4.47E-03 4 .7 9E-03 10 SSW 1.30E-03 2.27E-03 3.52E-03 4.52E-03 4.65E-03 11 SW l . 33E-03 2.24E-03 3.28E-03 4.43E-03 4.57E-03 12 WSW 1.32E-03 l.95E-03 2.39E-03 3.31E-03 3 . 42E-03 13 w l.40E-03 2.19E-03 2.50E-03 3.45E-03 3.56E-03 14 WNW 1.68E-03 2.85E-03 4. 1 2E-03 5. 1 3 E -03 5.26E-03 15 NW 1.30E-03 2.04E-03 2.81E-03 3.73 E -03 3 . 85E-03 16 NNW 1.41E-03 l . 94E-03 2.41E-03 3.14E-03 3.24E-03 1-16 ALL 1.50E-03 3.59E-03 5.67E-03 9.77E-03 l . 03E-02 Response to RAis on NBSR Conversion PSAR 5 September 28, 2017

[Sector Centerline Distance of 0.800 km]

Compass Compass 50.0 90.0 95.0 99.0 99.5 Sector Direction (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) 1 N l.31E-03 l.63E-03 2.34E-03 3.73E -03 3 . 91E-03 2 NNE l .15E-03 l . 64E-03 l.95 E -03 2.97E-03 3.lOE-03 3 NE l .15E-03 2 . 22E-03 3 . 23E-03 4.14E-03 4.25E-03 4 ENE l.31E-03 l.66E-03 2 . 15E-03 2.54E-03 2.59E - 03 5 E l.57 E-03 6.71E - 03 7.9 7E -03 8 . 98E-03 9. llE-03 6 ESE 8.73E-04 l.59E-03 l.80E-03 2.3 1 E-03 2 . 40E-03 7 SE 8.65E-04 l.47E-03 l . 63E-03 2 . 80E-03 3 . 21E-03 8 SSE 9.26E-04 l.64E-03 l.92E-03 2.35E-03 2 . 49E-03 9 s l.16E-03 l.68E-03 l.81E-03 3 . 82E-03 4.lOE-03 10 SSW 1. llE- 03 l.94E-03 3.0lE -03 3.8 7 E-03 3.98E-03 11 SW l.14E-03 l .92 E-03 2.8 1E-0 3 3.79E-03 3.91E-03 12 WSW l . 13E-03 l.67E-03 2.05E-03 2 . 83E-03 2 . 93E - 03 13 w l.20E-03 l.87E-03 2.14 E- 03 2.95E-03 3 . 05E-03 14 WNW l.44E -03 2.44E-03 3.53 E -03 4.39E-03 4.50E-03 15 NW l.12E-03 l.74E-03 2.41E-03 3.19E-03 3.29E - 03 16 NNW l .21E-03 l.66E-03 2.06E-03 2.69E-03 2. 7 7E-03 1- 1 6 ALL l.29E-03 3.07E-03 4 . 85E-03 8.36 E- 03 8.80E-03

[Sector Centerline Distance of 0.900 km]

Compass Compass 50.0 90.0 95.0 99.0 99 .5 Sector Direction (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) 1 N l.14E-03 l.42E-03 2.03E-03 3.24E-03 3.39E-03 2 NNE 9.94E-04 l .43 E-03 l.69E -0 3 2.58E-03 2.69E-03 3 NE l.OOE-03 l.93E-03 2.80E-03 3.59E-03 3.69E-03 4 ENE l.14E-03 l.45E -03 l.87E-03 2.21E-03 2.25E-03 5 E 1. 37E-03 5.82E-03 6.92 E -03 7 .80 E -03 7 .91E-03 6 ESE 7 . 58E-04 l.38E -03 l . 56E-03 2.00E-03 2.08E-03 7 SE 7.51E-04 l.28E-03 l.41E-03 2 . 43 E -03 2.79E-03 8 SSE 8 . 04E-04 l.43E-03 l.67E-03 2.04 E -03 2.16E-03 9 s 1.0lE -03 l .46E-03 l.57E-03 3.32E-03 3.56E-03 10 SSW 9.65E-04 1 .69E-03 2.62 E-03 3 . 36E-03 3.45E-03 11 SW 9.92E-04 l.67E-03 2.44 E -03 3 . 29 E -03 3.39E-03 12 WSW 9.83E-04 1.45E-03 1 . 78E-03 2.46E-03 2.54E-03 13 w 1. 04E-03 l. 62E-03 1.86E-03 2 .5 6 E -03 2 . 65E-03 14 WNW l.25E-03 2.12E-03 3.06E-03 3.81E-03 3.91E-03 15 NW 9.69E-04 l. 51E-03 2.09E-03 2.7 7E -03 2.86E-03 16 NNW l.05E-03 l. 44E-03 l. 7 9E-03 2.34 E -03 2.41E-03 1-16 ALL 1.12E-03 2.67E-03 4.21E-03 7.26E-03 7 . 64E-03 Response to RAis on NBSR Conversion PSAR 6 September 28, 2017

[Sector Centerline Distance of 1.000 km)

Compass Compass 50.0 90.0 95.0 99 .0 99 .5 Sector Direction (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) 1 N 9.99E-04 l.24E-03 l.78E-03 2 . 85E-03 2.98E-03 2 NNE 8.74E-04 l.25E-03 l.49E-03 2.26E-03 2.36E-03 3 NE 8.79E-04 l.69E-03 2.46E-03 3.15E-03 3 .2 4E-03 4 ENE l.OOE-03 1. 27 E -03 l.64E-03 l.94E -03 l .98E-03 5 E l.20E-03 5.12E-03 6.0BE-03 6.85E-03 6 . 95E-03 6 ESE 6.66E-04 l .22 E-03 l.37E-03 l.76E-03 l.83E-03 7 SE 6.60E-04 l.12E-03 l.24E-03 2 . 14E-03 2.45E-03 8 SSE 7.06E-04 l.25E-03 l.46E-03 l.79E-03 l. 90E-03 9 s 8 . 89E-04 l.28E-03 l.38E- 03 2 .9 2E-03 3.13E-03 10 SSW 8.48E-04 1. 48E-03 2.30E-03 2.95E-03 3.04E-03 11 SW 8.72E-04 l.46E-03 2.14E-03 2.89E-03 2.98E-03 12 WSW 8.64E-04 l.27E-03 l.56E-03 2.16E-03 2.23E-03 13 w 9.12E-04 l.43E-03 l.64E-03 2 .25E -03 2.33E-03 14 WNW l.l OE-03 l.86E-03 2.69E-03 3.35E-03 3.43E-03 15 NW 8.52E-04 l.33E-03 l.84E-03 2.44E-03 2.51E-03 16 NNW 9.21E-04 l.27E-03 l.57E-03 2.05E-03 2.llE-03 1-16 ALL 9.83E-04 2.34 E -03 3.70E-03 6.37E-03 6.71E-03

[Sector Centerline Distance of 2.000 km)

Compass Compas s 50.0 90.0 95.0 99.0 99.5 Sector Direction (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) 1 N 4.16E-04 5.lBE-04 7.43E-04 l.lBE-03 l.24E-03 2 NNE 3.64E-04 5.21E-04 6.lBE-04 9.42E-04 9.83E-04 3 NE 3.66E-04 7 .0 5E-04 l.02E-03 l .31E-03 l.35E -03 4 ENE 4.16E-04 5.29E-04 6.83E-04 8 .0 7E-04 8.22E-04 5 E 4.99E-04 2 .13E -03 2 .53E- 03 2.85E-03 2.89E-03 6 ESE 2.77E-04 5.06E-04 5 .71E -04 7.32E-04 7 . 62E -0 4 7 SE 2.75E-04 4.67E-04 5.17 E -04 8.89E-04 l.02E-03 8 SSE 2.94E-04 5.22E-04 6 .09E-0 4 7.47E -0 4 7 .9 1E-04 9 s 3.70E-04 5.34E-04 5 .7 3E-04 l.21E-03 l.30E-03 10 SSW 3.53E-04 6.17E-04 9.57E-04 l.23E-03 l.26E-03 11 SW 3.63E-04 6.09E-04 8.92E-04 l.20E-03 l.24E-03 12 WSW 3.60E-04 5.29E-04 6.51E-04 8.98E-04 9.29E-04 13 w 3.BOE-04 5.94E-04 6.BlE-04 9.36E-04 9.68E-04 14 WNW 4.57E-04 7 . 75E-04 l.12E-03 l.39E-03 l.43E-03 15 NW 3.55E-04 5.53E-04 7.64E-04 1. OlE-03 l.05E-03 16 NNW 3.83E-04 5.27E-04 6 .54E -04 8.54E-04 8 . BOE-04 1-16 ALL 4.09E-04 9.76E-04 l.54E-03 2.65E-03 2.79E-03 Response to RAis on NBSR Conversion PSAR 7 September 28, 2017

[Sector Centerline Distance of 4.000 km ]

Compass Compass 50.0 90.0 95.0 99 . 0 99.5 Sector Direction (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) 1 N l.7 6E-04 2 . 20E-04 3. 14E -04 5.0lE-04 5. 25E-04 2 NNE l.54E-04 2 . 21E-04 2 .6 2E-04 3.~9E-04 4.16E-04 3 NE l.55E-04 2 . 99E-04 4.33E-04 5.55E-04 5.71E-04 4 ENE l.76E-04 2 . 24E-04 2 . 89E-04 3.42E-04 3.48E-04 5 E 2 .1 2E-04 8 . 98E-04 1.07E-03 'l.20E-03 1.22E-03 6 ESE 1.lBE -04 2.14E-04 2.42E-04 3 . lOE-04 3.23E-04 7 SE l.1 6E-04 1 .98 E-04 2 .1 9E-04 3 .7 6E-04 4.31E -04 8 SSE 1.25E -04 2.21E-04 2.58E-04 3 . 16E-04 3.35E-04 9 S 1.57E- 04 2 .26 E-04 2.43E-04 5 .14E- 04 5.51E-04 10 SSW 1 .50E-04 2.61E-04 4.05E-04 5.20E-04 5.34E-04 11 SW 1.54E-04 2.58E-04 3.78E-04 5.09E -04 5 .2 5E-04 12 WSW 1.52E-04 2.24E-04 2.76E-04 3 . BOE-04 3 .93 E-04 13 W 1.61E- 04 2.52E-04 2.BB E -04 3.96E-04 4.lOE-04 14 WNW 1.93E- 04 3.28E - 04 4. 7 3 E - 04 5 . 90E-04 6 . 04E-04 15 NW 1.50E-04 2.34E-04 3 . 24 E -04 4.29E -04 4. 4 2 E -04 16 NNW 1.62E-04 2.23E-04 2 .77E -04 3.62E -04 3 .7 2E-04 1-16 ALL 1 .7 3E-04 4 .13E-04 6.51E-04 1.12E-03 1.lBE-03

[S ector Cent erl ine Dis tance of 6 . 000 km]

Compass Compass 50. 0 90.0 95.0 99 . 0 99.5 Sector Direction (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) 1 N l.0 9E-04 1. 36 E-04 l.94E-04 3. l OE -04 3.24E -0 4 2 NNE 9.54E-05 1. 3 7E - 04 1.62E-04 2.47E-04 2.57E-04 3 NE 9.59E-05 1.85E-04 2.68E-04 3 .4 3E-04 3.53E-04 4 ENE l.09E-04 1.39E-04 l.79E -0 4 2.llE-04 2.15E-04 5 E 1.31E- 04 5.54E-04 6.58E-04 7 .42E-04 7.52E-04 6 ESE 7.28E-05 1.33E -0 4 1.50E-04 l.92E-04 2 . 00E-04 7 SE 7. 21E-05 l.22E-04 1.36E-04 2 . 33 E -04 2.67E-04 8 SSE 7.7 2E-05 l. 37E-04 1.60E-04 1. 96 E-04 2.07E-04 9 s 9.70E-05 l.4 0E-04 1.50E -0 4 3.lBE - 04 3.40E - 04 10 SSW 9.26E-05 l.62E-04 2.50E-04 3.22E-04 3 .3 0E-04 11 SW 9.52E-05 1.60E-04 2.34E-04 3.15E-04 3 . 25E-04 12 WSW 9 .44E -05 1.39E-04 1.71E-04 2.35E-04 2.43E-04 13 w 9.96E-05 1.56E-04 l . 78E-04 2.45E-04 2.53E-04 14 WNW 1.20E -04 2.03E-04 2.93 E -04 3.64E-04 3 .73E- 04 15 NW 9 .3 0E-05 1.45E -04 2.00E-04 2.65 E- 04 2 .74E- 0 4 16 NNW 1.0lE-04 1.38E-04 l.71E-04 2.24E-04 2.30E-04 1-16 ALL l.07E-04 2 .5 6E-04 4.02E-04 6.90E-04 7.2 6E - 04 Response to RAis on NBSR Conversion PSAR 8 September 28, 2017

[Sector Centerline Distance of 8.000 km]

Compass Compass 50.0 90.0 95.0 99.0 99.5 Sector Direction (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) 1 N 7.84E-05 9.7 7E-05 l.40E-04 2.23E-04 2.33E-04 2 NNE 6.86E-05 9.83E-05 l . 16E-04 l.77E-04 l.85E-04 3 NE 6.90E-05 l.33E-04 l.92E-04 2.47E-04 2.53E-04 4 ENE 7.85E-05 9.96E-05 l.29E-04 l.52E -04 l.55E-04 5 E 9.41E-05 3.98E-04 4.72E-04 5.32E-04 5.39E-04 6 ESE 5.23E-05 9.54E-05 l.08E-04 l.38E-04 l.43E-04 7 SE 5.19E-05 8.81E-05 9.75E-05 l.67E-04 l.92E-04 8 SSE 5.55E-05 9.84E-05 l.15E-04 l.41E-04 l.49E-04 9 s 6.98E-05 l.OlE-04 l.08E-04 2.28E-04 2.45E-04 10 SSW 6.66E-05 l.16E-04 l.80E-04 2.31E-04 2.37E-04 11 SW 6.85E-05 l.15E-04 l.68E-04 2.26E-04 2.33E-04 12 WSW 6.79E-05 9.98E-05 l.23E-04 l.69E-04 l.75E-04 13 w 7.16E-05 l.12E-04 l.28E-04 l.76E-04 l.82E-04 14 WNW 8.61E-05 l.46E-04 2.lOE-04 2.62E-04 2.68E-04 15 NW 6.69E-05 l.04E-04 1. 44E-04 l.91E-04 l.97E-04 16 NNW 7.23E -05 9.93E-05 l.23E-04 l.61E-04 l.66E-04 1-16 ALL 7 . 71E-05 l.84E-04 2.89E-04 4.95E-04 5.21E-04

[Sector Centerline Distance of 10.000 km]

Compass Compass 50.0 90.0 95.0 99.0 99 . 5 Sector Direction (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) 1 N 6.lOE-05 7.60E-05 l.09E-04 l.73E-04 l.81E-04 2 NNE 5.34E-05 7.65E-05 9.06E-05 l.38E -04 l.44E-04 3 NE 5.37E-05 l.03E-04 l.50E-04 l.92E-04 l.97E-04 4 ENE 6.llE-05 7.76E-05 l.OOE-04 l.18E -04 l. 20E-04 5 E 7.33E-05 3.09E-04 3.67E-04 4.13E-04 4.18E-04 6 ESE 4.07E-05 7.42E-05 8.38E-05 l.07E-04 l.12E-04 7 SE 4.04E-05 6.85E-05 7.59E-05 l.30E-04 l.49E-04 8 SSE 4.32E-05 7.66E -0 5 8.93E-05 l.09E-04 l.16E-04 9 s 5.43E-05 7.83E-05 8.4 1E -05 l.77E-04 l.90E-04 10 SSW 5.19E-05 9 . 04 E-05 l.40E-04 l.80E-04 l.85E-04 11 SW 5.33E -05 8.93E-05 l.31E-04 l.7 6 E-04 l.81E-04 12 WSW 5.28E-05 7.77E-05 9.54E-05 l.32E-04 l.36E-04 13 w 5.58E-05 8.71E-05 9.98E-05 l.37E-04 l.42E -04 14 WNW 6.70E-05 l.14E-04 l.64E-04 2.04E-04 2.09E-04 15 NW 5.21E-05 8.12E-05 l.12E-04 l.48E-04 l.53E-04 16 NNW 5.63E-05 7.73E -05 9 . 59E-05 l.25E-04 l.29E-04 1-16 ALL 6.00E-05 l .43E- 04 2.24E-04 3.84E-04 4.04E-04 Response to RAis on NBSR Conversion PSAR 9 September 28, 2017

[Sector Centerline Distance of 20.000 km ]

Compass Compass 50.0 90.0 95.0 99.0 99.5 Sector Direction (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) 1 N 2.87E-05 3.58E-05 5.lOE-05 8.llE-05 8.48E-05 2 NNE 2.51E-05 3.60E-05 4.26E-05 6.47E-05 6.75E-05 3 NE 2.53E-05 4.86E-05 7.02E-05 8.98E-05 9.22E-05 4 ENE 2.88E-05 3.65E-05 4.70E-05 5.55E-05 5.66E-05 5 E 3.45E-05 l.44E-04 l.70E-04 l.91E-04 l.94E-04 6 ESE l.92E -05 3 . 49E-05 3 . 94E-05 5.04E -05 5.24E-05 7 SE l.90E -05 3.22E-05 3.57E-05 6.lOE-05 6.98E-05 8 SSE 2.03E-05 3.60E-05 4.20E-05 5.14E-05 5.44E-05 9 s 2 .5 6E-05 3.68E-05 3.95E-05 8.30E-05 8 . 90E-05 10 SSW 2.44E-05 4.24E-05 6.56E-05 8.41E-05 8.64E-05 11 SW 2.51E-05 4.20E-05 6.12E-05 8.23E-05 8.50E-05 12 WSW 2.49E-05 3.65E -05 4.48E-05 6.17E-05 6.38E-05 13 w 2 . 62E-05 4.09E-05 4.69E-05 6.43E-05 6.65E-05 14 WNW 3.15E-05 5.33E-05 7.66E-05 9.52E-05 9.76E-05 15 NW 2.45E-05 3.82E-05 5.25E-05 6.96E-05 7.17E-05 16 NNW 2 . 65E-05 3.64E-05 4.50E-05 5.87E-05 6.04E-05 1-16 ALL 2.83E-05 6.70E-05 l.05E-04 l.78E-04 l . 88E-04

[Sector Centerline Distance of 40.000 km]

Compass Compass 50.0 90.0 95.0 99.0 99.5 Sector Direction (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) 1 N l.38E-05 l .72E-05 2.45E-05 3.87E - 05 4.05E -05 2 NNE l.21E-05 l.73E-05 2.05E-05 3.lOE-05 3.23E-05 3 NE l.22E-05 2.33E-05 3.36E-05 4.28E-05 4.40E-05 4 ENE l.39E-05 l.76E -05 2.26E-05 2 . 66E-05 2.71E - 05 5 E l.66E-05 6.76E-05 8.00E-05 8.99E-05 9. llE-05 6 ESE 9.26E-06 l.68E -05 l.90E-05 2.42E-05 2.52E-05 7 SE 9.18E-06 l.55E -05 1. 72E-05 2.92E-05 3.34E-05 8 SSE 9.82E-06 l.73E -05 2.02E-05 2.47E-05 2.61E-05 9 s l.23E-05 l.77E -05 l.90E-05 3.96E-05 4 . 25E-05 10 SSW l.18E-05 2.04E-05 3.14E-05 4.02E-05 4.13E-05 11 SW l.21E-05 2.02E-05 2.93E-05 3.93E-05 4.06E-05 12 WSW l.20E-05 l.76E-05 2.15E-05 2.96E-05 3.06E-05 13 w l.27E-05 l.97E-05 2.25E-05 3.08E-05 3.18E-05 14 WNW l.52E-05 2.56E-05 3 . 66E-05 4.54E-05 4.65E-05 15 NW l.18E-05 l.84E -05 2.52E-05 3.33E-05 3.43E-05 16 NNW l.28E-05 l.75E -05 2.16E-05 2.82E-05 2.90E-05 1-16 ALL l.36E-05 3.21E-05 4.99E-05 8.38E-05 8.81E-05 Response to RAis on NBSR Conversion PSAR 10 September 28, 2017

[Sector Centerline Distance of 60.000 km]

Compass Compass 50.0 90.0 95.0 99.0 99.5 Sector Direction (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) 1 N 9.08E-06 1.13E-05 l.60E-05 2.52E-05 2.64E-05 2 NNE 7.97E-06 l.14E-05 l.34E-05 2.02E-05 2.llE-05 3 NE 8.00E-06 1.53E-05 2.19E-05 2.78E-05 2.86E-05 4 ENE 9. lOE- *06 1.15E-05 1.48E-05 1.74E-05 1 .7 7E-05 5 E 1.09E-05 4.34E-05 5.12E-05 5.74E-05 5.82E-05 6 ESE 6.09E-06 l.lOE-05 1.24E-05 1.58E-05 1.65E-05 7 SE 6.03E-06 1.02E-05 1.13E-05 1.91E-05 2.18E-05 8 SSE 6.45E-06 1.14E-05 1.32E-05 1 .6 1E-05 1. 71E-05 9 s 8.lOE-06 l.16E-05 l.25E-05 2.58E-05 2.76E-05 10 SSW 7.73E-06 l.33E-05 2.04E-05 2.61E-05 2.68E-05 11 SW 7.95E-06 1.32E-05 1.91E-05 2.56E-05 2.64E-05 12 WSW 7.88E-06

  • 1.15E-05 l.41E-05 l.93E-05 2.00E-05 13 w 8. 31E-06 1.29E-05 1.47E-05 2.0lE-05 2 . 08E-05 14 WNW 9.97E-06 1.67E-05 2.38E-05 2.95E-05 3.02E-05 15 NW 7.77E-06 1.20E-05 1.65E-05 2.17E-05 2.24E-05 16 NNW 8.39E-06 1.15E-05 1.42E - 05 1.84E-05 1.89E-05 1-16 ALL 8.94E-06 2.09E-05 3.24E-05 5.36E-05 5 .63 E-05

[Sector Centerline Distance of 80.000 km]

Compass Compass 50.0 90.0 95.0 99.0 99.5 Sector Direction (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) 1 N 6.74E-06 8.37E-06 1.18E-05 1.85E-05 1.94E-05 2 NNE 5.92E-06 8.42E-06 9.92E-06 1.49E-05 1 . 56E-05 3 NE 5.94E-06 l.13E-05 l.61E-05 2.05E-05 2.lOE-05 4 ENE 6 . 76E-06 8.53E-06 1.09E-05 l.29E-05 l.31E-05 5 E 8.06E-06 3.15E-05 3.71E-05 4.15E-05 4.21E-05 6 ESE 4.53E-06 8.18E-06 9.21E-06 l.17E-05 l.22E-05 7 SE 4.49E-06 7.56E-06 8.36E-06 l.41E-05 l.61E-05 8 SSE 4.80E-06 8.43E-06 9.80E-06 l. 1 9E-05 1 . 26E-05 9 s 6.0lE-06 8.62E-06 9.24E-06 l.90E-05 2.03E-05 10 SSW 5.75E-06 9.87E-06 1.51E-05 1. 92E-05 1.97E -05 11 SW 5.90E-06 9.80E-06 1.41E-05 1.88E-05 1.94E-05 12 WSW 5.85E-06 8.55E-06 l.04E-05 1.43E-05 l.47E-05 13 w 6.17E-06 9.56E-06 1.09E-05 l.48E-05 l.53E-05 14 WNW 7.40E -06 1 .24 E-05 1.75E-05 2.17E-05 2.22E-05 15 NW 5.77E-06 8.93E-06 l.22E-05 1 . 60E-05 1.65E-05 16 NNW 6.23E-06 8. 51E-06 1.05E-05 l.36E-05 1. 40E-05 1-16 ALL 6.64E-06 l.55E-05 2.37E-05 3.88E-05 4.07E-05 Response to RAis on NBSR Conversion PSAR II September 28, 2017

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