ML21133A266

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Us Dept. of Commerce, National Institute of Standards & Technology, Follow-Up to Event Report
ML21133A266
Person / Time
Site: National Bureau of Standards Reactor
Issue date: 05/13/2021
From: Newton T
US Dept of Commerce, National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST)
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
55120
Download: ML21133A266 (2)


Text

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a UNITEDSTATES National institute DEPARTMENT ofStandards OFCOMMERCE andTechnology b4TIS 9/

OS Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899-May 13,2021 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington,DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Follow-up toevent report Ref: NRCEvent Report #55120, Docket 50-184, Facility License TR-5 Sirs andMadams:

OnMarch 5,2021, the NCNR(NIST Center for Neutron Research)submitted a report of exceeding a safety limitonthe event ofFebruary 3, 2021 (original Event Report #55094).

Inresponse tothe event, we instituted aninvestigation into the rootcauses andhave uncovered evidence tosuggest that there wasanunlatched element inthe core prior to reactor startup onFebruary 3.Theinvestigation hasidentified inadequacies inthe implementation ofadministrative andprocedural controls.Specifically, these inadequacies areasfollows:

1)t raining andproficiencies infuel latching,

2) procedures infuel movements andlatching,
3) enforcement of procedural compliance 4)implementation oflatch verification methods, and 5)management oversight of refueling staffing Accordingly, we reported this bytelephone tothe NRCHeadquarters Operation Center onMay6,2021 andaresubmitting this 14-day report inaccordance withNBSR Technical Specification 6.7.2(1)(g).

Inaddition, inaccordance with reporting requirements inNBSRTechnical Specification 6.7.2(1)(d) we have i dentifiedthat the i ntentof the f ollowing Limiting Conditions for Operation wasnotmet:

  • TS3.1.3 Thereactor shall notoperate unless all gridpositions arefilledwith fuel length fuel elements or thimbles, except during and subcritical critical startup testing with natural convections flow.

Eventhough itwasbelieved that thisspecification wasmetonFebruary 3,2021 priorreactor to startup, subsequent investigation found that an elementin position J-7 wasoutofthe lower grid plate. Itisnow presumed that thiselement wasout ofposition prior toreactor startup.

e TS3.9.2.1. "Following handling offitelwithin the reactorvessel, thereactor shall notbeoperated until all fuel elements that have been handled areinspected

todetermine that theyarelocked intheir proper inthe positions grid core structure. This beaccomplished shall byoneof following the methods:

(1) Elevation check ofthe fuelelement with mainpumpflow.

(2) Rotational check ofthe elementhead inthelatching direction only.

(3)Visual inspection of thefuelelement headorlatching "

bar.

After therefueling onJanuary the 4,2021, required rotational checks were completedand signed off. However, investigation the the following February 3

event showedthat these checks weredone incorrectly, andthusdid notmeetthe intent ofTS3.9.2.1.

feel Please free tocontact meif you haveanyquestions.

Respeclly subitted,

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Thomas Newton DeputyDirector andChief ofReactor Operations andEngineering NISTCenter for Neutron Research