ML17279A235

LER 87-003-00:on 870331,operations Shift Supervisor Notified That Two Spare Conduit Penetrations Between Reactor Bldg & Radwaste Bldg Open.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Operations Shift Supervisor.Caps replaced.W/870424 Ltr

ML17279A235
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	04/24/1987
From:	Powers C, Washington S WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
LER-87-003, LER-87-3, NUDOCS 8704300217
Download: ML17279A235 (7)

Text

P I REQ~TO INFORNATION DISTRIBU N TEN (RIDS)

I i ACCESSION NBR: 8704300217 DOC. DATC: 87/04/24 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET ¹ FACIL 50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Prospect> Unit 2> Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH. NANE AUTHOR AFFILIATION WASHINQTON> S L Washington Public Pouer Supply System POWERS> C. N. Washington Public Power Supply System REC IP. NANE RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 87-003-00: on 870331> operations shif t supervisor notified that two spare conduit penetrations between reactor bldg Sc radwaste bldg open. Caused bg inattention to detail bg operations shift supervisor. Caps replaced. W/870424 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIEB RECEIVED: LTR TITLE: 50. 73 Licensee Event Report (LER) Incident Rpt> etc L ENCL U SIZE:

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,NOTES:

REC I P I ENT COPIES RECIPIENT COP IES ID CODE/NANE LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NANE LTTR ENCI-PD5 LA 1 1 PD5 PD 1 BANWORTH. R 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRB NI CHELSON 1 ACRS NOELLER 1 AEOD/DOA 1 AEOD/DSP/RO*B 2 2 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 NR R /DEST/ ADE 1 -

0 NRR/DEST/ADB 0 NRR/DEBT/CEB 1 1 NRR/DEBT/ELB 1 NRR/DEBT/ I CSB 1 1 NRR/DEBT/NEB 1 'RR/DEST/NTB 1 NRR/DEST/P SB 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 1 1 NRR/DEBT/BQB 1 NRR/DLPG/HFB 1 NRR/DLPG/GAB 1 NRR /DOEA/EAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/EPB 1 ,NRR/DREP/RAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/RPB 2 ILRB 1

'NR R/P NAB/P TSB 1 FILE 02 1 1 REB SPEIS> T 1 RGN5 FI LE 01 1 EXTERNAL: EQ8(Q QROM> N H ST LOBBY WARD LPDR NRC PDR NSIC HARRIS> J NSIC NAYS> Q TOTAL NUNBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LT I R 41 ENCL 39

1 NAC Sentt 200 UA. NUCI.EAA AE4ULATOAYCOA0llSSION (002) APPAOVEO OMS HO. 2160M)0C KXPIRKL SI21/55 UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERI SACILITY NAME ill DOCKET NUMSCh l2) 0 5 0 0 0 1 OF Tl'TLE W EVENT DATE 161 LKR NUMSEA (Sl REPORT DATE (7l OTHER SACILITIKS INVOLVED D)l

gy> 5covceeTIAL MONTH OAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMSER(SI MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR ~'v% HUMSC tl 0 5 0 0 0 0 '5 0 0 0 THIS ACPOAT IS SUSMITI KD PURSUANT T0 THE hEDUIhCMEHTs os 10 cSR ('ll fCnocd one or moro of dto followfndf l11 OPS hATIN4 MOOC IS) 20A02(lt) 20AOS(cl 50.724) (2) (Ie) 757)(61 in((SII POOIER 20AOS( ~ l(1)(0 SOW(d(I) 50.724) (2) (c) 72.7)(cl LEVEL OTHE h ISpeclfy ln Aottroct 20A054) (Il(SI 50M(el(2) 50.72(cl(2)(rS)

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LICENSEE CONTACT FOA THIS LER (12)

NALIE TSLEPHONE NUMSER AREA CODE COMPLKTK ONE LINC SOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DCSCRISEO IN THIS REPORT (12)

MANUFAC. EPORTASLE e? . ~'XjyV MANUFAC. EPORTABL 4++i.,

CAUSK SYSTEM COMPONENT CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TURER TURER TO NPADS TO NPADS r w a~%:

M%I SUPP(.'CMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (IC)

EXPECTED MONTH NM%$

DAY YEAR SUSMISSION DATE (16)

YES flfyee, complete fXPECTfD SUdtfISSIOH DATE l NO ACCTRAOT f(.lmlt to Icpp tpecee, I e., epproximetely fifteen tinplecpece typewrttten lined (I ~ I At 1245 hours0.0144 days <br />0.346 hours <br />0.00206 weeks <br />4.737225e-4 months <br /> on March 31, 1987 contractor personnel notified an Operations Shift Supervisor that two spare conduit penetrations between the reactor building and the radwaste building were open. These conduits are part of the Secondary Containment boundary. The conduit caps were restored within one hour of the discovery.

It was determined tPat on March 27, 1987 an Operations Shift Supervisor erroneously approved a Fire Protection System impairment which allowed contractor craftsmen to remove the caps. The penetrations were used to route air hoses and power cables to a work area.

The cause of the event was inattention to detail by an operations shift supervisor.

No Safety Significance is attributed to this event in that Secondary Containment negative pressure was maintained throughout the event, and the Emergency Standby Gas Treatment System was operable.

8704300217 $0500037)7 70424 PDR ADOCK 8 PDR NRC Form SSS (003)

NRC Fovvn SSEA UA. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (9431 UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROYEO OMS NO. 9150&104 EXPIRES: 8131/ES FACILITY NAME Ill OOCKET NUMIER (ZI LER NUMEER ISI PACE ISI SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAR NUM SR NUM SR 0 5 0 0 0, OF TEXT III'ava apaaa N laaMYNF. uaa NNNfavW WIC %%dnll CSEA'al 1171 Plant Conditions a) Power Level 71%

b) Plant Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Event On March 27, 1987 an Operations Shift Supervisor erroneously approved a Fire Protection System impairment which allowed contractor electricians to remove caps from two spare conduits penetrating Secondary Containment. The Plant Technical Specifications require Secondary Containment integrity to be maintained while in Operational Condition 1, and permit exceptions for only four hours before commencing shutdown. The spare conduits were being used to route air hoses and power cables.to a work area.

At 1245 hours0.0144 days <br />0.346 hours <br />0.00206 weeks <br />4.737225e-4 months <br /> on March 31, 1987 the open conduits were discovered by contractor personnel and brought to the attention of an operations shift supervisor. The Action Statement of Technical Specification Section 3.6.5.1.2 was immediately entered and work begun to remove the air hose and power cables from the conduits and replacement of the penetration caps. This work was completed at 1313 hours0.0152 days <br />0.365 hours <br />0.00217 weeks <br />4.995965e-4 months <br /> and the-Technical Specification Action Statement exited. The conduit caps were removed for 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br />.

The root cause of the event was inattention to detail by an Operations Shift Supervisor. The Fire Protection System Impairment Checklist adequately described the penetrations to be opened but the supervisor did not link the

'penetrations to Secondary Containment.

A contributing cause was insufficient procedural direction in the reviews necessary to comply with both the Fire Barrier and Secondary Containment Technical Specifications.

Immediate Corrective Action The air hose and power cables were removed from the conduit and the penetration caps were replaced.

'urther Evaluation and Corrective Actions The Fire Protection System Impairment Checklist has a signoff for review of applicable plant technical specifications. The Operations Shift Supervisor reviewed the applicable fire protection technical specification, but did not consider or review other technical specifications. The Supervisor has been counseled on the importance of attention to detail when processing Fire Protection System Impairments.

The fire protection procedures will be revised to include a requirement for a specific check to ensure Secondary Containment integrity is'maintained as required for plant operational condition or plant activity.' list of Secondary Containment penetrations will be developed and provided to Operations.

HRC FORM SddA (94SI

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Safety Si nificance The event had no safety significance and posed no threat to Plant Personnel'or the Public. The Reactor Building (Secondary Containment Boundary) was continuously maintained at a negative .25" H20 pressure throughout the event by the Reactor Building Heating and Ventilation System. "'In a'ddition the Emergency Standby Gas Treatment System was operational during the event and was, by engineering calculation, capable of maintaining Secondary, Containment Pressure.

Similar Events None EIIS Information Text Reference 'V EIIS Reference System Component Reactor Building (Secondary Containment)

Standby Gas Treatment System BH Reactor Building Heating and Ventilation System VA Fire Protection System KP MAC FOAM 3444 (9 43(

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'ASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968 ~ 3000 George Washingion Way ~ Richland, Washington 99352 Docket No. 50-397 April 24, 1987 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Subject; NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO.87-003

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No.87-003 for WNP-2 Plant.

This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CfR50.73 and discusses the item of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

This is the follow-up report to the verbal notification given at 1342 hours0.0155 days <br />0.373 hours <br />0.00222 weeks <br />5.10631e-4 months <br /> on March 31, 1987.

Very truly yours, g/~<4.

C. M. Powers (H/D 927M)

WNP-'2 Plant Manager CMP:db

Enclosure:

Licensee, Event Report No.87-003 cc: Mr. John B. Hartin, NRC - Region V Hr. R. T. Dodds, NRC - Site (901A)

Ms. Dottie Sherman, ANI INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA Hr. C, R. Bryant, BPA (M/D 399) pr~