ML17212A914
| ML17212A914 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 07/31/2017 |
| From: | Scott(Ois) Morris NRC Region 4 |
| To: | Reddemann M Energy Northwest |
| References | |
| EA-17-085 IR 2016009 | |
| Download: ML17212A914 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000397/2016009
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
1600 E. LAMAR BLVD.
ARLINGTON, TX 76011-4511
July 31, 2017
Mr. Mark E. Reddemann
Chief Executive Officer
Energy Northwest
P.O. Box 968 (Mail Drop 1023)
Richland, WA 99352-0968
SUBJECT: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION - RESPONSE TO DISPUTED NON-CITED
VIOLATIONS AND FINDING IN NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000397/2016009
Dear Mr. Reddemann:
On April 10, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Inspection
Report 05000397/2016009 (Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS)
Accession ML17100A499). In the inspection report, the NRC documented a preliminary White
finding and apparent violation, a Green finding, and seven non-cited violations (NCVs). These
findings and violations were identified during a special inspection of an improperly packaged
and manifested radwaste shipment sent from Columbia Generating Station to US Ecology on
November 9, 2016.
On May 9, 2017, Energy Northwest provided a response (ADAMS Accession ML17129A627)
that contested the Green finding and three NCVs documented in the April 10, 2017, inspection
report. Specifically, Energy Northwest contested: (1) an NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) 20.1904 for the failure to ensure that each container of licensed material in
the spent fuel pool bore a label or had documentation providing sufficient information to permit
individuals handling the licensed material to minimize exposure; (2) an NCV of 10 CFR 50.71(e)
for the failure to periodically provide the NRC a final safety analysis report update with all
changes made in the facility or procedures; (3) a Green finding for the failure to follow the
requirements of Procedure SWP-CAP-06, Condition Report Review, when determining the type
of cause evaluation required to assess the causes of the higher than expected dose rates on a
radwaste container; and (4) an NCV of 10 CFR 61.56(b)(3) for the failure to assure that void
spaces within waste packages were reduced to the extent practicable.
In the May 9, 2017, letter, Energy Northwest also requested that the NRC consider combining
the preliminary White finding and apparent violation with three other NCVs into one violation. In
a letter dated July 6, 2017, Columbia Generating Station - Final Significance Determination of a
White Finding, Notice of Violation, Follow up Assessment Letter, and NRC Inspection Report 05000397/2017009 (ADAMS Accession ML17187A364), the NRC documented its conclusion
that the violations would not be combined.
M. Reddemann 2
In a letter dated May 22, 2017 (ADAMS Accession ML17142A219), the NRC acknowledged
receipt of the Energy Northwest letter and informed you that we would review the basis for
contesting the NCVs and finding, and provide the results of our evaluation by written response.
The NRC conducted a detailed review of your response and the applicable regulatory
requirements, in accordance with Part I, Section 2.2.7 of the NRC Enforcement Manual. Various
NRC staff who were not involved with the original inspection effort performed this review. After
careful consideration of the bases for your contention, the NRC has concluded that two of the
NCVs and the Green finding will be upheld. Specifically, the NCV of 10 CFR 61.56(b)(3) and the
finding associated with the failure to follow the requirements of Procedure SWP-CAP-06 will be
upheld. The NCV of 10 CFR 20.1904 will also be upheld but we will revise NRC Inspection
Report 05000397/2016009 to clearly articulate why the exemptions of 10 CFR 20.1905 were not
met. The resolution of the contested NCV associated with 10 CFR 50.71(e) is being held in
abeyance pending further review. The details of our conclusions are documented in the
enclosure.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact Heather Gepford, Chief, Plant Support
Branch 2, Division of Reactor Safety, at 817-200-1156.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice and Procedure, a copy of
this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC
Public Document Room or from the NRCs ADAMS, accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Scott A. Morris
Deputy Regional Administrator
Docket No.: 50-397
License No.: NPF-21
Enclosure:
NRC Evaluation of Licensee Response
to Three Non-Cited Violations and One
Finding
cc w/encl.
(electronic distribution)
M. Reddemann 3
COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION - RESPONSE TO DISPUTED NON-CITED VIOLATIONS
AND FINDING; NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000397/2016009 DATED JULY 31, 2017
Distribution
RidsOeMailCenter Resource; NRREnforcement.Resource; RidsNrrDirsEnforcement Resource;
RidsSecyMailCenter Resource; RidsOcaMailCenter Resource; RidsOgcMailCenter Resource;
RidsEdoMailCenter Resource; EDO_Managers; RidsOigMailCenter Resource;
RidsOiMailCenter Resource; RidsRgn1MailCenter Resource; RidsRgn2MailCenter Resource;
RidsRgn3MailCenter Resource; RidsOcfoMailCenter Resource; R4DRP-BC;
R4ACES; R4DRS-BC; R4_DRS_AA;
KKennedy, RA BMaier, ORA PHolahan, OE
SMorris, DRA GKolcum, DRP FPeduzzi, OE
AVegel, DRS LBrandt, DRP DFurst, OE
JClark, DRS MHaire, DRP RCarpenter, OE
TPruett, DRP KFuller, ORA GGulla, OE
RLantz, DRP LCasey, NRR GFigueroa, OE
VDricks, ORA NHilton, OE JPeralta, OE
MHerrera, DRMA RArrighi, OE RFretz, OE
JBowen, OEDO JWeil, CA AMoreno, CA
S:\RAS\ACES\ENFORCEMENT\_EA CASES - OPEN\CGS_EA-17-085_Disputed _Vio\DISPUTED_EA-17-
085_CGS.docx
ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: ML17212A914
SUNSI Review: ADAMS: Non-Publicly Available Non-Sensitive Keyword:
By: CCA Yes No Publicly Available Sensitive RGN4-001
OFFICE ES:ACES C:PSB2 PBA TL:ACES D:DRS DRA
NAME CCAlldredge HJGepford MSHaire MCHay AVegel SAMorris
SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ E /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/
DATE 07/24/17 07/24/17 07/25/17 07/24/17 7/27/17 7/31/17
OFFICAL RECORD COPY
NRC EVALUATION OF LICENSEE RESPONSE TO
THREE NON-CITED VIOLATIONS AND ONE FINDING
Summary of NRC Conclusions
In a letter to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), dated May 9, 2017, Energy
Northwest (licensee) contested three violations and one finding issued in NRC Inspection
Report 05000397/2016009. The licensees letter can be found, in its entirety, in the NRCs
Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession ML17129A627.
Consistent with the guidance provided in the NRC Enforcement Manual, NRC staff performed
an independent review of the documentation associated with these findings. The conclusions
from this review are provided below, followed by a summary of the evaluation of each finding.
(1) A Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 20.1904 for the failure to ensure that each
container of licensed material in the spent fuel pool bore a label or had documentation
providing sufficient information to permit individuals handling the licensed material to
minimize exposure.
The NRC concludes that the NCV documented as NCV 05000397/2016-009-03, Failure
to Label or Provide Written Information for Items Stored in the Spent Fuel Pool, is
upheld, but NRC Inspection Report 05000397/2016009 will be revised to clearly
articulate why the exemptions of 10 CFR 20.1905 were not met.
(2) A Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.71(e) for the failure to periodically provide the
NRC a final safety analysis report update with all changes made in the facility or
procedures. Specifically, the licensee changed its radwaste management strategy for the
spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system and material being stored in the spent fuel
pool.
The NRC concludes that the NCV documented as NCV 05000397/2016-009-06, Failure
to Update the Final Safety Analysis Report with Changes to Radioactive Waste
Processing, requires additional review and resolution is being held in abeyance.
(3) A Green finding for the failure to follow the requirements of Procedure SWP-CAP-06,
Condition Report Review, when determining the type of cause evaluation required to
assess the causes of the higher than expected dose rates on a radwaste container.
Specifically, Procedure SWP-CAP-06 required that if an event has high risk and high
uncertainty, the level of evaluation required is a root cause evaluation.
The NRC concludes that the finding documented as FIN 05000397/2016-009-07,
Failure to Follow Procedure and Perform a Root Cause Evaluation to Assess the
Causes of a Radwaste Shipping Event, is upheld.
(4) A Green NCV of 10 CFR 61.56(b)(3) for the failure to assure that void spaces within
waste packages were reduced to the extent practicable.
The NRC concludes that the NCV documented as NCV 05000397/2016-009-09, Failure
to Minimize Void Spaces in a Radioactive Waste Package, is upheld.
Enclosure
Evaluation of NCV 05000397/2016009-03
The NRC special inspection team chartered to review the November 9, 2016, radwaste shipping
incident identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 20.1904 for the licensees failure to
ensure that each container of licensed material in the spent fuel pool bore a label or had
documentation providing sufficient information to permit individuals handling the licensed
material to minimize exposure.
Summary of the Licensees Response
The licensee noted that on December 4, 2007, Federal Register Notice (FRN) 68043
documented an exemption amended to 10 CFR 20.1905 for containers holding licensed
materials at nuclear power plants. The exemption states, in part, that licensees are not required
to label containers if they are located in an area posted under 10 CFR 20.1902, Posting
Requirements, if the containers are conspicuously marked commensurate with the radiological
hazard, and are accessible only to individuals who have sufficient instruction to minimize
radiation exposure while handling or working in the vicinity of the containers.
The licensee stated that items tied off the side of the spent fuel pool were not considered to be
in a container and specified that filters, socks, and their receptacles are not attached to the
surface of the spent fuel pool by ropes or chains and cannot be inadvertently pulled to the
surface. The licensee noted that the spent fuel pool is located in an area posted in accordance
with 10 CFR 20.1902. The licensee also stated that an inventory of materials and mapping
information were kept and that only authorized and knowledgeable individuals have access to
the material through a radiation work permit.
The licensee concluded that they met the exemption in 10 CFR 20.1905 because the materials
stored in the spent fuel pool were within a posted area and were accessible only to individuals
who had sufficient instruction to minimize radiation exposures and met the labelling
requirements of 10 CFR 20.1904 when materials were removed from the radiologically posted
area.
NRC Evaluation
In preparation for the Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup Campaign, approximately 70 Tri-Nuclear
(Tri-Nuke) filters were staged in the spent fuel pool for disposal. These filters were not labeled
or marked commensurate with their radiological hazard, nor was there a readily available written
record that adequately provided personnel sufficient information such that proper precautions
could be taken to minimize personnel exposures. On October 13, 2016, while licensee
personnel were transferring the filters from the spent fuel pool to a shipping cask liner, higher
than anticipated radiological conditions were experienced, resulting in unnecessary exposure to
the radiation workers.
The licensees position is that the exemption described in FRN 68043 is applicable in this
situation. The FRN states, in part, that the third amendment revised 10 CFR 20.1905 by adding
an exemption for containers holding licensed material within nuclear power facilities licensed
under 10 CFR Part 50, providing certain conditions are met. The licensee contended that it met
the exemption provision of 10 CFR 20.1905.
2
The NRC concluded that the information provided in FRN 68043 is applicable to this situation,
but that the licensee did not meet the exemption criteria in 10 CFR 20.1905. Specifically,
10 CFR 20.1905(e) and 10 CFR 20.1905(g) are applicable to the situation described in the
inspection report.
10 CFR 20.1905(e) states, in part, that a licensee is not required to label containers that
are accessible only to individuals authorized to handle or use them, or to work in the
vicinity of the containers, if the contents are identified to these individuals by a readily
available written record (examples of containers of this type are containers in locations
such as water-filled canals, storage vaults, or hot cells).
10 CFR 20.1905(g) states, in part, that a licensee is not required to label containers
holding licensed material at a facility licensed under 10 CFR Part 50 that are within an
area posted under the requirements in 10 CFR 20.1902 if the containers are
conspicuously marked (such as by providing a system of color coding of containers)
commensurate with their radiological hazard.
The licensee did not meet either of these applicable exemptions to labeling requirements.
Although the licensees letter stated that an inventory of licensed materials and mapping
information were kept, during the inspection the licensee was unable to provide adequate
documentation. Therefore, the NRC concluded that there was no readily available written
record identifying the contents. Additionally, while the containers holding the filters were
located in an area posted under 10 CFR 20.1902, neither the containers, nor the filters (once
they were removed from the containers), were conspicuously marked commensurate with the
radiological hazard. This lack of a readily available written record or conspicuous marking of the
containers contributed to the unexpected radiological conditions during the loading of the
shipping container.
NRC Conclusion
The NRC concludes that the NCV documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000397/2016009
as NCV 05000397/2016-009-03, Failure to Label or Provide Written Information for
Items Stored in the Spent Fuel Pool, is upheld, but will be revised to clearly articulate that the
exemptions of 10 CFR 20.1905(e) and 10 CFR 20.1905(g) were not met.
Evaluation of NCV 05000397/2016009-06
The special inspection team identified a Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.71(e) for the
failure of the licensee to periodically provide the NRC a Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)
update with all changes made to the facility or procedures. Specifically, the licensee changed
its radwaste management strategy for the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system and
material being stored in the spent fuel pool. However, the licensee had not changed its process
control program or updated the FSAR to reflect the impact on waste streams from processing
items stored in the spent fuel pool including activated metals, Tri-Nuke filters, filter socks, and
demineralizer filter resins.
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Summary of the Licensees Response
The licensee noted that the fuel pool filter demineralizer waste stream is not included as an
individual waste stream because, as stated in FSAR Section 11.4.2.4, this waste stream is
backwashed to the waste sludge phase separator tank together with other waste streams. The
licensee does not consider the spent fuel pool filter demineralizer waste stream a major system
producing waste, and therefore it is not listed in the FSAR. The licensee contended that since it
is not considered a major system producing waste, describing the spent fuel pool filter
demineralizer waste stream in the detail described in the NCV is a level of detail beyond that
which is required to be in the FSAR.
The licensee stated that the FSAR adequately describes the current radioactive waste practices
of backwashing waste streams, such as from fuel pool filter demineralizers, floor drains, and
waste collector filter demineralizers. This process is also adequately described in plant
procedures. Therefore, the licensees position is that the FSAR adequately reflects current
processes.
Regarding the issue that the FSAR does not specifically mention Tri-Nuke or sock filters in the
dry active waste or dry solid waste system, the licensee contended that the FSAR
Section 11.4.2.7 description of dry active waste consisting of other similar materials is
inclusive of the Tri-Nuke and sock filters. Tri-Nuke filters are underwater filters and are similar
in design to air filtration media, which is specifically listed in FSAR Section 11.4.2.7.
The licensee noted that Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 98-03, Guidelines for Updating Final
Safety Analysis Reports, Revision 1, June 1999, discusses simplifying the FSAR to improve
focus, clarity, and maintainability. Specifically, by not specifying brands of filters used in the
spent fuel pool, the FSAR maintains required detail for a description of the types of items used
yet allows for brand changes without a requirement to update the FSAR.
The licensee contended that the NRC Enforcement Policy states that a failure to update the
FSAR that does not have a material impact on safety or licensed activities is considered a minor
violation of 10 CFR 50.71(e). The licensee concluded that the failure to include the spent fuel
pool system filter demineralizers as an individual waste stream or to specify underwater filters
as a type of dry active waste did not impact safety or licensed activities. Finally, the licensee
concluded that the lack of detail in the FSAR is not a violation nor does it have an impact on
how the licensee safely handles and disposes of the radiological material or the radiological
safety of the plant workers or the public.
NRC Conclusion
The NRC determined that the technical information required to evaluate licensees contentions
regarding the NCV documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000397/2016009 as
NCV 05000397/2016-009-06, Failure to Update the Final Safety Analysis Report with Changes
to Radioactive Waste Processing, cannot be effectively reviewed from the office. In order to
perform an effective review and fully characterize the issue, additional on-site inspection is
required. Therefore, an independent review of the finding and associated technical concerns
will be conducted during the upcoming NRC baseline inspection using NRC Inspection
Procedure 71124.08, Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling,
Storage, and Transportation. The staffs evaluation and response to this issue will be
4
documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000397/2017010. As such, the resolution to this issue
is being held in abeyance pending this further review.
Evaluation of FIN 05000397/2016009-07
The special inspection team identified a finding associated with the failure to follow the
requirements of Procedure SWP-CAP-06, Condition Report Review, when determining the
type of licensee evaluation required to assess the causes of the higher-than-expected dose
rates on a radwaste container. Specifically, Procedure SWP-CAP-06 required, in part, that if an
event has high risk and high uncertainty, the level of evaluation required is a root-cause
evaluation (RCE). However, the licensee failed to adequately assess the uncertainty associated
with the causes of the event and performed an apparent-cause evaluation (ACE) rather than an
RCE. By performing an ACE instead of an RCE, the licensee remained vulnerable to future
radioactive waste processing and transportation errors of significance.
Summary of the Licensees Response
The licensee asserted that the requirements of Procedure SWP-CAP-06 were followed when it
determined that an ACE was the correct level of evaluation.
On November 10, 2016, the licensees Condition Review Group deemed the uncertainty
assessment of the event, documented in Action Request 357593, as Medium based on their
determination that the causes and corrective actions were both partially known. The unofficial
cause was stated to be improper verification/validation, because it was a known issue that the
dose rates would be a challenge for the cask.
The licensee also stated that it disagreed that an RCE would have provided extra insights or
changed the cause determined in the ACE because of guidance documented in
Procedure CDM-01, Cause Determination Manual. The licensee posited that if an RCE had
been performed instead of an ACE, the station would not have been required to use more than
the barrier analysis and change analysis techniques used in the ACE. The licensee further
stated that the causes identified in the ACE met the validation of the root-cause test in
accordance with Procedure CDM-01, so the root cause of the event was identified.
The licensee also noted that on January 13, 2017, once the dose rates were confirmed to have
exceeded the U.S. Department of Transportation limits, a new condition report was written and
graded a significant condition adverse to quality; as a result, an RCE was performed.
NRC Evaluation
On November 9, 2016, a radwaste shipment from Columbia Generating Station arrived at the
US Ecology low-level radioactive waste disposal facility with dose rates that significantly
exceeded those documented on the shipment manifest. Specifically, the manifest documented
on-contact liner dose rates of 11.8 rem/hr and the actual dose rates measured at the disposal
facility were approximately 90 rem/hr. The disposal facility rejected the waste shipment and
informed the Washington State Department of Health. The Washington State Department of
Health notified the licensee that its disposal use permit privileges were suspended until they
approved a written plan containing corrective actions and performed an onsite inspection. One
day following this event, the licensees Condition Review Group determined this was not a
significant condition adverse to quality, as defined by the procedure, and an ACE would be
performed.
5
Station Procedure SWP-CAP-06, Condition Report Review, Attachment 8.2, CAQ Risk
Evaluation Level Guidance, requires, in part, that the level of cause evaluation required
depends on the two factors: uncertainty and risk. If both the uncertainty and risk are
characterized as High, an RCE is required. The uncertainty is determined by using the results
of two questions and applying them to the uncertainty table contained in the procedure. The
two questions are: Are the causes known? and Are the corrective actions known?
Procedure SWP-CAP-06, Attachment 8.2, CAQ Risk and Evaluation Level Guidance, states,
Determine how much is known about the cause of the event or condition. Partial can be used
when direct causes are known and verified. If underlying causes are not known, consider no. If
underlying causes are simple, known and verified, consider yes. The uncertainty table in the
procedure states that if the cause is not known, the uncertainty is High.
As stated in the licensees letter dated May 9, 2017, the licensees unofficial cause was
improper verification/validation because it was a known issue that the dose rates would be a
challenge for the cask. While the NRC agrees that there was improper verification/validation of
the cask before it was shipped, this fact alone leading to a Partial response in Procedure
SWP-CAP-06 does not address the fact that the underlying causes were unknown. The
procedure states, If underlying causes are not known, consider no. If underlying causes are
simple, known, and verified, consider yes. In this case, the underlying causes were not
known, verified, or simple.
The NRC notes that, prior to the shipment to US Ecology, the licensee staff were aware that the
dose rates would be a challenge for the cask. After the liner was loaded with spent fuel pool
cleanup filters that had unexpectedly high dose rates, the licensee spent approximately 2 weeks
developing a formal plan to reduce dose rates down to a level acceptable for shipment.
Following the recovery plan approved by the ALARA committee, the licensee removed material
from the shipping container to lower dose rates so that it could be shipped. With that level of
planning and oversight, dose rates on the final shipment had presumably been resolved and
should not have been a challenge.
Based on the level of coordination and work that went into preparing the cask for shipment, and
the fact that dose rates were significant enough to warrant US Ecology returning the package,
there was clearly a more complex underlying cause than simply failing to verify or validate the
dose rates. Additionally, the licensee decided not to verify or validate the dose rates of the liner
or the characterization of its contents prior to shipment. Lastly, the shipment was made even
after some licensee staff voiced concerns about the shipment not meeting transportation
requirements. Therefore, when performing the Uncertainty Assessment, the answer to the
question Are the causes known? should have been No because the underlying causes were
not known, simple, or verified.
The licensee stated additional insights would not have been provided had they conducted an
RCE because this event was classified as a non-significant condition adverse to quality, and
therefore, additional analysis techniques were not required for conducting an RCE or an ACE by
procedural guidance. The NRC agreed that many of the aspects of an RCE and an ACE were
the same. However, not all of the requirements were identical. One example is the requirement
to perform an effectiveness review to validate the effectiveness of corrective actions to minimize
the likelihood of recurrence. Effectiveness reviews are not required for an ACE but are highly
recommended for RCEs. By performing an ACE instead of an RCE, the licensee was under no
obligation to evaluate the effectiveness of its corrective actions and remained vulnerable to
future radioactive waste processing and transportation errors of significance.
6
It is also worth noting that at the Regulatory Conference held on May 2, 2017, at the Region IV
office, the licensee stated that the root cause was station procedures to implement clean-up
activities and the associated radioactive waste surveys, processing, and shipping activities were
not sufficient to ensure compliance with all requirements. The root cause identified in the RCE
was different than that determined by the ACE, and additional insights into the event were in
fact gained from the subsequent RCE.
Finally, in view of the fact that this event resulted in suspension of the licensees permit to ship
radioactive waste to the disposal facility and violations from the Washington State Department
of Health, and there had been other recent shipping events at Columbia Generating Station, the
NRC concluded that an RCE would have been more consistent with the intent of the licensees
corrective action program.
NRC Staff Conclusion
The NRC concludes that the finding documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000397/2016009
as FIN 05000397/2016-009-07, Failure to Follow Procedure and Perform a Root
Cause Evaluation to Assess the Causes of a Radwaste Shipping Event, is upheld.
Evaluation of NCV 05000397/2016009-09
The team reviewed a self-revealed NCV of 10 CFR 61.56(a)(3) for the licensees failure to
assure that void spaces within a waste package were reduced to the extent practicable.
Specifically, a shipment of dry active waste sent to US Ecology in May 2016 arrived at the
disposal facility with voids in excess of 15 percent of the total waste volume, contrary to License
Condition No. 23 of US Ecologys Radioactive Material License WN-I019-2.
Summary of the Licensees Response
The licensee stated that void spaces were reduced to the extent practicable. The licensee also
noted US Ecologys license condition regarding voiding is License Condition 24, not 23 as
written in the NCV.
The licensee stated that the ACE determined that material settled while the package was
waiting for shipment. Personnel involved provided statements that the container was
100 percent full and difficult to close, which indicated that the void spaces were limited to the
extent practicable. The licensee also pointed out that the 15 percent void license condition is
subjective. US Ecology did not take exact measurements, and pictures show the container as
being mostly full. Finally, the licensee noted that this was an isolated incident.
The licensee concluded by stating that its position was that there was not a violation because
US Ecology did not perform a physical confirmation to quantify the volume of the void space and
the shipment was ultimately accepted for burial. The licensee also stated that if the NRC
upholds the violation, it should be of minor significance.
NRC Evaluation
The licensee was correct in noting that US Ecologys license condition regarding voiding is
License Condition No. 24, not License Condition No. 23, as written in the NCV. However, the
NRC notes that the violation was not written against US Ecologys license or for causing US
7
Ecology to be out of compliance with its license conditions. The reference to US Ecologys
license in the violation was intended to give context to the phrase to the extent practicable in
10 CFR 61.56(a)(3) and describe the self-revealing nature of the violation.
The container in question was loaded between May 25 and 26, 2016, by reactor maintenance,
vendor, and health physics technicians using Procedure PPM 11.2.23.4, Packaging
Radioactive Material and Waste. At the completion of the loading, a health physics technician
verified that the box was 100 percent full, to the extent that it was difficult to close. The
container was shipped July 13, 2016. The fact that the waste settled to the extent shown in the
photographs is evidence that void spaces had not been reduced to the extent practicable, a
requirement intended to ensure structural stability of the waste for burial.
The licensee determined that the apparent cause of the void spaces in the shipment was that
Procedure PPM 11.2.23.4 did not provide for verification that the box was full prior to being
shipped. The licensee concluded that if the container had been opened and its contents
verified, the potential issue of the bags containing radioactive material having settled would
have been corrected prior to shipping. As corrective action, the licensee revised
Procedure PPM 11.2.23.4 to require a radwaste transportation specialist or radioactive material
controls supervisor to perform an evaluation of non-compactible boxes to be direct shipped to
the disposal facility and to repackage, compact, or add waste, as appropriate.
The NRC noted that the licensees evaluation stated that US Ecology performed a random
inspection of Container 10056, implying that containers are not checked 100 percent of the
time. If, as concluded by the ACE, the shipping procedure had a weakness regarding proper
verification techniques prior to shipping and US Ecology does not check every container
received, the NRC cannot conclude that this was an isolated occurrence of excessive void
spaces in a radwaste container.
The NRC determined that void spaces within the waste package were not reduced to the extent
practicable. Regardless of the actual volume of contents that had settled to produce voids, the
fact that the contents had visibly settled indicates the contents had not been packaged in a way
to prevent the development of voids. Consistent with the licensees ACE, the NRC concluded
that the container had been waiting for shipment long enough for the materials inside to settle,
but licensee staff did not open the container to verify the contents had not settled prior to
shipment.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the NRCs
Reactor Oversight Process Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone objective to ensure adequate
protection of public health and safety from the exposure to radioactive materials released to the
public domain. Specifically, the failure to ensure that void spaces were removed in the
radwaste container subjected the disposal facility to the possibility of improper disposal of the
waste.
NRC Conclusion
The NRC concludes that the NCV documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000397/2016009
as NCV 05000397/2016-009-09, Failure to Minimize Void Spaces in a Radioactive Waste
Package, is upheld.
8