ML17209A335

Proposed Tech Spec Change Re TMI Lessons Learned

ML17209A335
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	10/31/1980
From:	FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17209A334	List: ML17209A333 ML17209A335
References
NUDOCS 8011100491
Download: ML17209A335 (26)

Text

ATTACHMENT Re: St. Lucie Unit 1 Docket No. 50-335 Proposed Tech Spec Amendment TMI Lessons Learned Pa es 3/4 3-10 3-11 5 3-13 SIAS and AUXILIARY FEEDWATER functional 'units are added to Table 3.3-3 (ESF Actuation System Instrumentation).

Pa es 3/4 3-14,8 3-15 SIAS and AUXILIARY FEEDWATER functional units are added to Table 3.3-4 (ESF Actuation System Instrumentation Tri p Values).

Pa e 3/4 3-17 The AUXILIARY FEEDWATER function is added to Table 3.3-5 (ESF Response Times).

Pa es 3/4 3-18 8 3-19 SIAS and AUXILIARY FEEDWATER functional units are added to Table 4.3-2 (ESF Actuation System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements).

~/4 -4 ~44 New Specification 3/4.3.3.8 is added to establish Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements for ACCIDENT,MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION.

Pa e 3/4 4-4 The capability of supplying pressurizer heaters with emergency power is added to Specification 3.4-4.

Pa es 3/4 4-58 New Specification 3/4.4. 12 is added to establish Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements for the PORV BLOCK VALVES.

Pa e 3/4 7-5 Surveillance of the Auxiliary Feedwater automatic start function is added to Specification 4.7.1.2.b.

Pa e B 3/4 3-1 A paragraph on SIAS is added to the Bases section on ESF Instrumentation.

~3/4 New Bases Section B3/4.3.3.8 is added to discuss ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION.

Pa e B 3/4 4-2 The capability of supplying pressurizer heaters with emergency power is discussed in Bases Section 83/4.4.4.

Pa e B 3/4 4-14 New Bases Section B3/4.4.12 is added to discuss PORV BLOCK VALVES.

~/4 A sentence is added to Bases Section B3/4.6.3 to indicate that the contairment purge inlet and outlet valves are considered containment isolation valves.

~a'cae 6-6 Table 6.2-1 (Minimum Shift Crew Composition) is revised to include the Shift Technical Advi sor.

~Pa e 6-5 The minimum qualifications for the Shift Technical Advisor position are added to Specification 6.3.1.

PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMEN~TS Continued

3. Verifying that each pump operates for at lest 15 minutes.

4. Cycling each testable power operated or automatic valve in the, flow path through at least one complete cycle of full travel.

5. Verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

b. At least once per 18 months during shutdownby cycling each power operated valve in the flow path that is not testable during plant operation, through-at least one complete cycle of full travel, and

1. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flowpath actuates to its correct position upon receipt of the Auto Start actuation signal.

2. Verifying that each auxiliary feedwater pump starts automatically as designed upon receipt of the Auto Start actuation signal.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 1 3/4 7-5 10-31-80

TABLE 3.3-3 ENGINEfRED SAFETEY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION I

C) MINIMUM m TOTAI NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE 'ODES ACTION

1. f SAFf TY IN J CTION (S IAS)

a. Manual (Trip Buttons) 1, 2, 3, 4

b. Containment Pressure-High 1, 2, 3

c. Pressurizer Presssure-Low 1, 2, 3(a)

2. CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CSAS)

a. Manual (Trip Buttons) 1, 2, 3, 4

b. Containment Pressure High High 2(b) 1, 2, 3 10

3. CONTAINMfNT ISOLATION (CIS)

a. Manual (Trip Buttons) 1, 2, 3, 4

b. Containment Pressure-High 1,2,3

c. Containment Radiation-High 2 3 1, 2, 3, 4 98

d. SIAS (See Functional Unit 1 above)-

4. MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION (MSIS)

a. Manual (Trip Buttons) 2/steam 1/steam 2/operating 1, 2, 3, 4 generator generator steam C) generator I b. Steam Generator 4/steam 2/steam 3/steam 1, 2, 3(c)

I Pressure - Low generator generator generator CO C)

TABLE 3.3-3 Continued I ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION n

Pl MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODE ACTION

5. CONTAINMENT SUMP RECIRCULATION (RAS)

a. Manual RAS (Trip Buttons) 1, 2, 3, 4

b. Refueling Water Tank-Low 1, 2, 3

6. LOSS OF POWER

4. 16 kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Under-voltage relays) 1/Bus 1/Bus 1/Bus 1,2,3

7. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER AUTOMATIC START Steam Generator (SG)

Level Instruments 4/SG 2/SG 2/SG 1, 2, 3 CD I

I 00 CD

TABLE 3. 3-3 Continued TABLE NOTATION ACTION 10- With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed condition and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is demonstrated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />; one additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.1.

ACTION 11- Instrument operability requirements are contained in the Reactor Protection System requirements for Reactor Trip on Steam Generator Level. If an Automatic Start channel is inoperable, operation may continue provided that the affected pump is verified to be OPERABLE per Specification 4.7.1.2.a within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.and at least once per 7 days thereafter; and the Automatic Start channel shall be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days or the reactor shall be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

- 10-31-80 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 3/4 3-13

TABLE 3.3-4 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP VALUES ALLOWABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP SETPOINT VALUES

1. SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS)

a. Manual (Trip Buttons) Not Applicable Not Applicable

b. Containment Presssure High < 5 psig < 5 psig

c. Pressurizer Pressure - Low 1600 psia > l600 psia

2. CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CSAS)

a. Manual (Trip Buttons) Not Appicable Not Applicable

b. Containment Pressure - High-High < 10 psig < 10 psig 3- CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (CIS)

a. Manual (Trip Buttons) Not Applicable Not Applicable

b. Containment Pressure - High < 5 psig < 5 psig

c. Containment Radiation - High < 10 R/hr < 10 R/hr

d. SIAS - -(See FUNCTIONAL UNIT 1 above) -

4- MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION (MSIS)

a. Manual (Trip Buttons) Not Applicable Not Applicable b- Steam Generator Pressure - Low > 485 psig > 485 psig C)

I

5. CONTAINMENT SUMP RECIRCULATION (RAS)

I 00 a. Manual RAS (Trip Buttons) Not Applicable Not Appl i cable

b. Refueling Water Tank - Low 48 inches above 48 inches above tank bottom tank bottom

TABLE 3.3.-4 Continued ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP VALUES ALLOWABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP VALUE VALUES

6. LOSS OF POWER 4.16 kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Undervoltage relays) > 3307 volts > 3307 volts

7. AUXILILARY FEEDWATER > 30$ level > 30K level

TABLE 3.3-5 Continued ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS 3~ Containment Pressure-Hi h a ~ Safety Injection (ECCS) < 30.0"/19.5**

b. Containment Isolation < 30.5*/20.5**

C. Shield Building Ventilation System < 30.0*/14.0**

d. Containment Fan Coolers < 30.0*/17.0**

Feedwater Isolation < 60.0 r

4. Containment Pressure--Hi h

a. Containment Spray < 30.0*/18.5**

5. Containment Radiation-Hi h

a. Containment I sol ation < 30.5*/20.5**

b. Shield Building Ventilation System < 30.0*/14.0**

6. Steam Generator Pressure-Low

a. Main Steam Isolation < 6.9

b. Feedwater Isolation < 60.0

a. Containment Sump Recirculation < 91 ~ 5

8. Steam Generator Level

a. Auxiliary Feedwater TABLE NOTATION

• Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included.

• • Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays not included. Offsite power available-r ST. LUCIE - UNIT 1 3/4 3-17 10-31-80

TABLE 4.3-2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST ~EII III

1. SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS)

a. Manual (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A N.A.

b. Containment Pressure - High S R 'l, 2, 3

c. .Pressurizer Pressure - Low S R M 1,2 3

d. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N. A. M(1) 1, 2, 3

2. CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CSAS)

a. Manual (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. N.A.

b. Containment Pressure High - High S R 1,2,3

c. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A N-A. M(1) 1, 2, 3 3- CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (CIS)

a. Manual (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. R N. A.

b. Containment Pressure - High S R M 1, 2, 3,

c. Containment Radiation - High S R M 1, 2, 3, 4

d. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. M(1) 1, 2, 3

e. SIAS N.A. N.A. R 1',2',3

4. MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION (MSIS)

a. Manual (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. R N.A.

b. Steam Generator Pressure - Low S R N.A.

c. Automatic Actuation Logic N. A- N.A. M(1) 1,2,3

TABLE 4~3-2 Conti~nued ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMfNT SURVEILLANCf REQUIREMENTS I

n CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH Pl CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTINAL SURRE ILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST R~EU IRED

5. CONTAINMENT SUMP RECIRCULATION {RAS)

a. Manual RAS (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. N.A.

b. Refueling Water Storage Tank - Low S R M 'l, 2, 3

c. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. M(1) 1,2,3

6. LOSS OF POWER 4.16 kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Undervolatage relays) 1, 2, 3

7. AUXILILARY Ff EDWATER

a. Auto Start -- -(See Surveil lance 4.7.1.2. b)-

b. Steam Generator - --(See RPS Table 4.3-1)- --

I I

CO

INSTRUMENTATION ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3-3.3.8 The accident monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-11 shall be OPERABLE APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than the MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3-11, either restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at last HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

b. The Provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.3.3.8 Each accident monitoring instrumentation channel shal 1 be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-7.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 1 3/4 3-41 10 0

TABLE 3.3-1l I ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION m

MIN IMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS INSTRUMENT OF CHANNELS OPERABLE ACTION

1. Pressurizer Mater Level 3 1

2. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate 1/pump 1/pump

3. RCS Subcooling Margin Monitor

4. PORV Position Indicator (Primary Detector) 1/val ve 1/val ve

5. PORV Block Valve Position Indicator 1/valve 1/val ve

6. Safety Value Position Indicator 1/valve 1/val ve CD I

GJ I

CO CD

TABLE 3.3-11 Continued ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1- With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by Table 3.3-11, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 30 days.

ACTION 2- With the subcooling margin monitor inoperable manually compute subcooling margin daily until the monitor is returned to OPERABLE status.

ACTION 3- With any individual channel inoperable for more than 30 days, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 (in lieu of a report per Specification 6.9. 1) outlining corrective action taken or planned.

ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 3/4 3-43 10-31-80,

TABLE 4.3-7 I

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS n

m CHANNEL CHANNEL INSTRUMENT CHECK CAL I BRAT ION 1- Pressurizer Water Level

2. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate

3. Reactor Coolant System. Subcooli ng Margin Monitor

4. PORV Position Indicator

5. PORV Block Valve Position Indicator

6. Safety Valve Position Indicatior C)

I VJ I

CO C)

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURIZER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.4 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with a steam bubble, and with at least 150 kw of pressurizer heaters capable of being supplied by emergency power.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

With the pressurizer inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY with the reactor trip breakers open within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.4.4 In accordance with 4.8.1.1.

ST. LUG IE - UNIT 1 3/4 4-4 10-31-80

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PORV BLOCK VALUES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.12 Each Power Operator Relief Valve (PORV) Block Valve shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

With one or more block valve(s) inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> either restore the block valve(s) to OPERABLE status or close the block valve(s) and remove power from the block valve(s); otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDO>N within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.4.12 Each block valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at 1'east once per 92 days by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travels ST. LUCIE - UNIT 1 3/4 4-58 10-31-80

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3. 1 and 3/4.3.2 PROTECTIVE AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ESF INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the protective and ESF instrumentation systems and bypasses ensure that 1) the associated ESF action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its setpoint, 2) the specific coincidence logic is maintained, 3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available for protective and ESF purposes from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

The surveillance'equrements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assur ance that the protective and ESF action function associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the accident analyses.

No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable.

Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, over-lapping or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or 2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.

The Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) provides direct actuation of the Containment Isolation Signal (CIS) to ensure containment isolation in the event of a small break LOCA.

3/4. 3. 3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION 3/4. 3. 3. 1 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring channels ensures that 1) the radiation levels are continually measured in the areas served ST. LUCI E - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-1 10-31-80

INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.3. 6 CHLORINE DETECTION SYSTEMS The operability of the chlorine detection systems ensures that an accidental chlorine release will be detected promptly and the necessary protective actions will be automatically initiated to provide protection for control room personnel. Upon detection of a high concentration of chlorine, the control room emergency ventialation system wi 11 automatical ly isolate the control room and initiate its operation in the recirculation mode of operation to provide the required protection. The chlorine detection systems required by this specification are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.95, "Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Rocm Operators Against an Accidental Chlorine Release", February 1975.

3/4.3.3.7 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION OPERABILITY of the fire detection instrumentation ensures that adequate warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires. This capability is required in order to detect and locate fires in their early stages. Prompt detection of fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility fire protection program.

In the event that a portion of the fire detection instrumentation is inoperable, the establishment of frequent fire patrols in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is restored to OPERABILITY.

3/4.3.3;8 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables during and following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommmendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light-Mater-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1975 and NUREG-0578, "THI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Tenn Recommendations." '

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 'l 8 3/4 3-3 10-31-80

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES SAFETY VALVES QContinu~ed Demonstration of the safety valves'ift settings wll occur only during shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1974 Edition.

3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER A steam bubble in the pressurizer ensue es that the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system and is capable of accommodating pressure surges during operation. The steam bubble also protects the pressurizer code safety valves and power operated relief valve against water relief. The power operated relief valve and steam bubble function to relieve RCS pressure during all design transients. Operation of the power operated relief valve in conjunction with a reactor trip on a Pressurizer-Pressure-High signal, minimizes the undesirable open'i ng of the spring-loaded pressurizer code safety valves. The required pressurizer heater capacity is capable of maintaining natural circulation subcooling. Operability of the heaters, which are powered by a diesel generator bus, ensures ability to maintain pressure control even with loss of offsite power.

3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS One OPERABLE steam generator provides sufficient heat removal capability to remove decay heat after a reactor shutdown. The requirement for two steam generators capable of removing decay heat, ccmbi ned with the requirements of Specificiations 3. 7. 1. 1, 3. 7. 1. 2 and 3. 7. 1.3 ensures adequate decay heat removal capabilities for RCS temperatures greater than 325', if one steam generator becomes inoperable due to single failure considerations. Below 325',

decay heat is removed by the shutdown cooling system.

The Surveillance Requirements for inspection of the steam generator tubes ensure that the structural integrity of this portion of the RCS will be maintained. The program for inservice inspection of steam generator tubes is based on a modification of Regulatory Guide 1.83, Revision l. Inservice inspection of steam generator tubing is essential in order to maintain surveillance of the conditions of the tubes in the event that there is evidence of mechancial damage or progressive degradation due to design, manufacturing errors, or inservice conditions that lead to corrosion.

Inservice inpection of steam generator tubing als'o provides a means of characterizing the nature and cause of any tube degradation so that corrective measures can be taken.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-2 10-31-80

RE'ACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES 3/4.4. 12 PORV BLOCK VALVES The opening of the Power Operated Relief Valves fulfills no safety related function. The electronic controls of the PORVs must be maintained OPERABLE to ensure satisfaction of Specifications 4.5.1.d. 1 and 4.5.2.d.l.

Since it is impractical and undesirable to actually open. the PORVs to demonstrate reclosing, it becomes necessary to verify operability of the PORV Block Valves to ensure the capability to isolate a malfunctioning PORV.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT l B 3/4 4-14 10-31-80

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.2.2 SPRAY AOOITIVE SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the spray additive system ensures that sufficient NaOH is added to the containment spray in the event of a LOCA. The limits on NaOH volume and concentration ensure a pH value of between 8.5 and 11.0 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics. These assumptions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the accident analyses.

3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the containment cooling system ensures that 1) the containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, and 2) adequate heat remov'al capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the containment spray systems during post-LOCA conditions.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of 'a release of radioactive material to the contairment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment. Containment isolation within the time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA. This includes the containment purge inlet and outlet valves.  !

3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within contairment below its flammable limit during post-.LOCA conditions- Either recombiner unit is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with 1) zi rconium-water reactions, 2) radiolytic decomposition of water and 3) corrosion of metals within containment.

The containment fan coolers are used in a secondary function to ensure adequate mixing of the containment atmosphere following a LOCA. This mixing action will prevent localized accumulations of hydrogen from exceeding the flammable limit.

ST. LUC I E - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-3 10-31-80

TABLE 6.2-1 MINIMUM SHIFT CREW COMPOSITION ~

LICENSE APPLICABLE MODES CATEGORY 1, 2, , 5 4 5 & 6 SOL OL Non-Licensed

'Shift Technical Advisor

• Does not include the licensed Senior Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator Limited to Fuel Handling, supervising CORE ALTERATIONS after the initial fuel loading.

dShift crew. composition may be less than the minimum requirements for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in order to accomodate unexpected absence of on duty shift crew members provided immediate action is taken to restore the shift crew composition to within the minimum requirements of Table 6.2-1.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 1 6-4 10-31-80

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 6.3 FACILITY STAFF QUALIFICATIONS 6.3.1 Each member of the facility staff shall meet or exceed the minimum qualifications of ANSI N18.1-1971 for comparable positions, except for (1) the Radiation Protection Manager who shall meet or exceed the qualifications of Regulatory Guide 1.8, September 1975, and (2) the Shift Technical Advisor who shall have a bachelor's degree or equivalent in a scientific or engineering discipline wth specific training in plant design and in the response and analysis of the plant for transients and accidents.

6.4 TRAINING 6.4.1 A retraining and relacement training program for the facility staff shall be maintained under the direction of the Training Supervisor and shall meeting or exceed the requirements and reccmmendations of Section 5.5 of ANSI N18.1-1971 and Appendix "A" of 10 CFR Part 55.

6.4.2 A training program for the Fire Brigade shall be maintained under the direction of the Fire Protection Administrator and shall meet or exceed the requirements of Section 27 of the NFPA Code-1975, excpet for Fire Brigade training sessions which shall be held at least quarterly.

6. 5 REVIEW AND AUDIT

6. 5.1 FACILITY REVIEW GROUP FRG FUNCTION 6.5.11L The Facility Review Group shall function to advise the Plant Manager on all matters related to nuclear safety.

COMPOSITION 6.5.1.1 The Facility Review Group shall be ccmposed of the:

Member: Plant Manager Member: Operations Superintendent Member: Operations Supervisor Member: Maintenance Superintendent Member: Instrument 8 Control Supervisor Member: Reactor Supervisor Member: Health Physics Supervisor

-Member: Technical Supervisor Member: Chemistry Supervisor Member: Quality Control Supervisor Member: Assistant Plant Supt. Mechanical Member: Assistant Plant Supt. Electrical The FRG Chairman shall be designat'ed in writing.

ST. LUCIE-UNIT 1 6-5 IO-31-80