ML17165A297

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Submittal of University of New Mexico AGN-201M Facility Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Amendment to Facility Operating License No. R-102 for the University of New Mexico Aerojet General Nucleonics AGN-201M Reactor
ML17165A297
Person / Time
Site: University of New Mexico
Issue date: 05/22/2017
From: Busch R
Univ of New Mexico
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TAC MF5583
Download: ML17165A297 (11)


Text

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SCHOOL of ENGINEERING

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Depar.tmenf ~INuclea; Engineering *

'May 22,' 2017 AT1N: Document Control Desk u~s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject:

Docket No. 50-252, Facility License R-102 Submittal of University of New Mexico AGN-201M Facility Response to Request for Additional Information regarding Amendment to Facility Operating License No~ R-102 for tbe University of New Mexico Aerojet General Nucleonics. AGN-20iM Reactor (TAC No .. MF55S3).

Transmitted herewith is our formal response to your Request for Additional Information (RAI),

dated April 25, 2017, regarding an amendment to the AGN-201M facility license. The enclosure contains the responses to the two items.

lfthere are any questions or concerns with this response please contact me at (505) 277-8027, at}dL~r.e-.wail 11?-e,~t busch@unm.edu

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  • I declare ~der pe~alty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on May 22nd, 2017.

Respectfully Submitted

~~

Robert D. Busch, Ph.D, P.E.

Chi~f,~e~c,tor.Supervlsoi;,,UNM

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  • The University 9fNe.w Mexico>\MSCOI- 1120,* I University of New M~xico
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. Phone 505:277.5431*Fax505.277.5433

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Response to Request for Additional Information From The University of New Mexico AGN-201M Reactor Docket 50-252 RAI responses on UNM Facility Operating License No. R-102 (TAC No. MF5583)

1. The requested change to the Technical Specifications regarding the definition of Explosive Material is hereby withdrawn. We will keep the current definition as below:

1.1.9 Explosive Material - Explosive material is any solid or liquid which is given an Identification of Reactivity (Stability) index of 2, 3, or 4 by the National Fire Protection Association in its 704 Diamond, Hazard Rating-System.

2. Because there are multiple labels used throughout the Safety Analysis Report to refer to the Room where the reactor is housed, we are requesting that the single identifier, reactor room, be used in both the Technical Specifications and the Safety Analysis Report. The request for these changes in the Technical Specifications has been previously submitted. The following changes are requested in the SAR, (current wording identified in italics, requested changes identified in Bold).

Table of Contents, It was noticed that the page numbers in the TOC for Item IV, Reactor Building, IV .A Laboratory Building, and IV .B Reactor Laboratory were incorrect in the existing SAR and should be changed to match the actual numbers.

Also, the label on Item IV.B. be changed from Reactor Laboratory to Reactor Room Page 14 - Paragraph D.3 - Radiation Monitoring Equipment would be changed from:

Radiation monitoring instrumentation available to the reactor operators includes console-mounted meters and a portable survey meter. These and other such instruments available within the reactor laboratory are calibrated periodically by the Radiation Safety Department of the University.

to:

Radiatiop monitoring instrumentation available to the reactor operators includes console-mounted meters and a portable survey meter. These and other such instruments available within the Reactor Room are calibrated periodically by the Radiation Safety Department of the University.

Page 28 - Reactor Building, A. Laboratory Building In the paragraph describing the laboratory, the fifth sentence will be chapg~d from: - *.

The roof of the building over the Reactor Laboratory is three feet of earth between five inch thick concrete slabs .

.to;*

The roof of the building over the Reactor Room is three feet of earth between five inch thick concrete slabs.

Page 31 - Will be changed from:

B. Reactor Laboratory The Reactor Laboratory is located in the southeast corner of the Laboratory Building in a room 20 x 24 fe~t. This room has two access doors: (1) a personnel door in the north.wall of the room, and (2) a double door for equipment and persorirtd access in the west' wall. of the room. In addition to having six feet of earth between one foot thick concrete slabs, the . south wall of the Reactor Laboratory is entirely below grade level. The east wall is essentially below grade level because of the exterior concrete stairs that go from the floor elevation up to the street level.

to: 1 B. Reactor Room The Reactor Room 065 in Figure 17, (20 x 24 feet) is located in the southeast corner of the Laboratory Building. This room has two access doors: (1) a personiieI*dd6r in'::the nortli wall of the room, and (2) a double door for equipment and persoruiel accessiµ tht'. westwfill.ofthe rool)l.

<In addition to having six feet of earth between one foot thick concrete slabs; the south *wa.11 of the Reactor Room is entirely below grade level. The east wall is essentially. below grade level

. because of the exterior concrete stairs that go from the.fl6or elevation up to the ~treet level.

The facility layout has not changed; the only change requested is to standardize the label,

  • Reactor Room," to apply to room 065 where the reactor and control panel are located. This change is to minimize confusion between the Laboratory Building, a stand-alone structure containing a number of room and the Reactor Room, a single room housing the reactor.and control panel. **

The affected pages of the current SAR are provided in Appendix A with inked corrections identified. Appendix B provides the same pages with the proposed changes inserted in the document at locations indicated by vertical change bars.

CvrrtA? f. S A-R A. I

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TABLE OF =CONTENTS  ;*.

PAGE

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i.

I. Introduction 1 II. The AGN-201M Reactor System

  • l' A. Reactor Description 1
  • 1 B. Standard Loading 8 I C. Reactor.Control, .;. *, ., 9 D. Instrumentation ~nd Safety Syste.~s  ; *1~'.***

III. Rea'ctor Location * * *  :'-.i ' .. '"ii:( '.

Reactor. Site * ,

B. Meteorology 16

c. Geology & Hydrology 20 D. Seismology 25

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  • A.~ L~boi~tory Buil~ing ~. 248 B. Roaotor Laheratory ~ 3l
v. Rea.ct<:n;- ,.S<!!::f:ety Evaluation 31*

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A. Maximum Credible Accident

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c) Channel 3: Boron Lined Ionization Chamber

,, . '* . , Proper c;>pera~imi, of Channel J :_is' a license requirement* It provides IOg,.'picoamm.eter

  • * :r~sponse~* The detf'.ctor ~on~ists ofa positively-biased ( 600 VDC) boron~iiried~ gas filled foruzation chamber. The log picoammeter is used to assure operation within power

. . x licensed-full limitations (1.2 ~ . power per T..S.2.2.a). * . *

, -- : d}AuXiliary

~ ' .. . .

Channel: Bprop-Lined Ionization Chamber Similar to Channel 2 and '3; detectors, this channel is an auxiliary monitor, which can be used* for highly accurate reactivity insertion measurements or data acquisition. This process is accomplished by adding a series current source (from the installed current supply) to cancel the detector signal. This highly accurate differential measurement

' . . -?llqws cw:r~nt c}?.anges to ,qe re~orded With- two orders of magnitud,e better* re~ofotion

. i '.* '~_!b@'.fr9m. the; .dete_c.to:i; .alo~e.;. It .also:-records the -current--nieasurements every'*b:25

'.... . .,_,, *-' se'con<ls'and wntes it to a fiie on a computer in ascii format for easy retrieval.- :.. '

2) Safety Interlocks There are three safety interlocks included in the reactor ~enµttiqn. If any one of

' > : *t;he three is~ tripped; a light is -activated on the* c6ntrol pane( ~d magnet ciitreni to t4e rod

. : .dtjves is: deactivated (scrammed conditibn}. Those i:htedocks .

a're'*as follows:

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... ,- :*. *.~) Shi~ld ~ater le~el monitor. 'Float-type inonitor trips If water 1evel. i~ mor¢ 'tli~"l.8 .c~

.below the highest point 'mi the reactor shield tank manhole: openjrig'. rrs.~ .2.gj ,* ;. < _ ** -

  • b) Shield tank temperature.'*Thermostat trips if sh,ield water t~Il'.l.perattlfe -drops_ .below

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.* c) Earthquake <*switch. A small stainless ste'el *ball i*s. di~iocated,. hy . heavy,,v~1Jrati9~

causing a horizontal displacement of D.16 cm or greater breaking 'the continuity of the 1---- electrical circuit and carisfug a fupp<.fil 6'ondition. [T.S.3.2.i]

3) Radiation Monitoring Equipment Radiation monitoring instrumentation available to the reactor operators includes console-mounted meters and a portable survey meter. These and other such instruments available within the r@aeier lae0Faiery are calibrated periodically by the Radiation Safety Department of the University. There are remote area monitors with automatic alarms installed to monitor gamma levels at the reactor console, check point three (on the south side of the reactor), reactor top, and in the general lab area (near the east door). All of this instrumentation is listed in Table 2 below:

14

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Demography

. . , ., .. . . . . ,The .populatjon densities around the Nuclear Engineering Laboratory li'sfed below in table

,,. ".S we:fe.cal6ul.ated.froni2000 Census Blocks.obtained form the 'City' of Albuquerqtle.

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. Table 5 --:-. Population in the Reactor Vicinity

  • Radial Distance Population Area Population Density (miles) . ' : .(sq; mi.) ' ' * * (per sq. *nii.)
1 < 16,808. *. 3.14 . . *5352'.9 5 . 244,51-8 ' . .: *78.53 3113;7'*

Jhe Univ~rsity.()fN~w Mexico.has*about27,b00 students thatattertd tlie niai1i'~ampus. The

. -number of pepp~e. on. c;:,ampµ~_during the work week is significantly higher than th:~' residential

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  • IV. Reactor Building ...

A. Laboratory Building

'" . :. .* . " The. laborafory is a one st~cy ~*qncrete s:tructur~ with six 'feet of earth between one foot
-'thickc'oncrete *walls 'cm the south and.west sides. The north, and:east walls are poured *cc>ncrete approximately one foofthick. A floor plan is shown in Figure 17. The only outside windows in th~ l;milding are in the entrance door& . .Ther~ are four_ entran.ce doors :into .the: building: (1) a
  • .Persomief door on the e~sfsiQe, (2)a persoruiei door (3) a doul:>le-width equipment door on the north side(ceriter), and (4)'a personnel door on the north side (west end) which is bolted and not n~rmally used. The roof of the building oyer the R.@aetgr I;.aeera~ry is three*feet of earth
  • bet-ween' five:* inch thick concrete slabs. A portion: of the roof is five feet of earth between five inch thick concrete slabs to provide additional shielding for the Cobalt-60 facility that was located in the laboratory. The laboratory building is located on the southwest comer of the campus. The location of the building can be ..seen on the campus Il)ap inFigurel8. It is building

~2,i !ocate~,~~ se~~ion i2.

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. Ret0e~ <J<ogm B. Reaetef Laeonrto1y

. Redt lo... R"D111 The Reag.t~r Lae01atory is IOcated in the southeast comer of the Laboratory Building in a room 20 x 24 feet. This room has two access doors: (1) a personnel door inthe riorth wall of.th~ r6om, and (2) a double door*.for equipment and personnel access in the west wall of the room. In addition to having six feet of earth between one foot thick concrete slabs, the south wall of the R.eag.ter Laeeftlieey is entirely below grade level. The east wall is essentially below grade level

. because of the exterior concrete stairs that go from the floor elevation up to the street level.

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V. Safety of the AGN-201 Reactor Facility A. Maximum Credible Accident

- . ~ . . ..

The total excess reactivity of the reactor is given by the manufacturer as 0.5%. For the purposes of a hazards analysis, however, it is assumed that an.instantaneous insertion of2% in reactivity occurs. Because of its inherently low excess reactivity, the system could never acquire this reactivity in the course of normal operation. It could only occur if improper materiais were introduced into the reactor. Strict administrative controls discussed in the next section will normally make this impossible. the placing, for instance, of significant positive reactivity in the glory hole will be strictly forbidden. In this sense, the assumed 2% in reactivity bounds the

  • higliest reactivity (about 0.92%) that would be created ifthe glory hole was* completely filled With nominal 20% enriched fuel. This analysis demonstrates the fact that the reactor does not

"~away" following a sudden increase in reactivity.

The analysis of this maximum credible accident is given in Appendix A. It is shown there that this accident leads to a power excursion that is self-limiting in about 300 milliseconds. The maximum temperature of the core never rises above 100 °C. Ho.wever, tests p~rfonned by the manufacturer indicate that the core material, polyethylene, does not melt below 200 °C. It can be expected therefore that such an accident would not d~~ge, the core. . . *' ....

As previously noted, various scram circuits would be activated as the .result of sudden increase ,in the flux in the system. However, if for some reason these. circuits' fail tO operate, the reactor would be shutdown by the melting of the fuse. This fuse is loaded with tvvice the density of uranium as the remainder of the core and would reach substantialiy higher temperatures than the core during an excursion. In addition, the fuse is made of polysryrene r?ther th~ .. . .,

polye¢.y~ene and melts at about 100 °C. Following the disintegration dfthe fuse, the core .falls apart, which decreases the reactivity of the system by from 5% to 10% according to the manufac~er. * ** ' * *'

It: is shown in Appendix A that this accident would give a r~iation *dose of1ess thah 1.1 rem to a person standing immediately next to the concrete shield. This dose, while far from desirable; is well below levels that lead to detectable med~cal injury;_:

B. Shielding Requirements for 5-watt operation ' :.:~ . ....

As detailed in the amendment for 5-watt operation for Aerojet-Gener8:1 Nt1:cleonics, *dated February 11, 1957, and on file with the commission in.Docket 50-32, an 18 inch additional concrete shield wall is sufficient to maintain sub-tolerance radiation levels external to the shield 31

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T~BLE bF CONTENTS**

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, ..- I' I. Introduction 1 II. The AGN-201M Reactor System

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A *... Rea~.tor Descr*ipt'ion. *,

( .,  ;*: ,**:* . *. .'.\ -.. \:

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B. Standard Loading* ":;" *-.:. ri

..'*a C. R~actor' Contro]_i * ", :'9* '"

, p., Instrumentati.on* and Safety Syste:ids *

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III. Reactor Location Reactor 'Site** '*

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B*~  ;- ., Meteorology

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c. Geology & Hyd.roio<.;6 .<

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... D. *. se+/-~m01ogy

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IV ... Reactor ..~4.fJ,9J.ng:; *: " ... , - '; ... .28, A. i~bora~ory Building a.* Reactor.Room

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v. Reactor Safety Evaluatlon 31 Appendices
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  • Maximum* credible.Ac\:ident . ...  : :;  : ... : )' .:~ . .

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2

Proper operation of Channel 3 is a license requirement. It provides lo.g picoammeter response. The detector consists of a positively-biased ( 600 VDC) boron-imed, gas filled I

-.

  • ignization cJ;iamper..The_ log picoammeter is 11sed to .assur~ operation within power

\ -.-

'limitation8 (l.2 x 'license.dfull power per . .

T.S.2.2.a)'..

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d) Auxiliary Channel: .Boron~Lined Jonization Chamber

  • . Sirriilar to Channel 2 and 3 detectors, this channel is an auxiliary monitor, which can be used .for highly accurate reactivity insertion measurements or data acquisition. This process is accomplished by adding a series current source (from the installed current supply) to cancel the detector signal. This highly accurate differential measurement allows current changes to be recorded with two orders of magnitude better resolution than from the detector alone. It also records the current measurements every 0.25 seconds and writes it to a file on a computer in ascii format for easy retrieval .

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2) Safety Interlocks There are three safety interlocks included in the reactor instrumentation. If any one of the three .is tripped, a light is activated on the control panel and magnet current to the rod drives is deactivated (scrammed condition). Those interlocks are as*follows:-

. . a) Shield'. water level monitor. Float-type monitor trips if water level is more than 18 cm

below the highest -point on the reactOr shield tank-manhole opening. [T ,s .3 .2.g} *-*,, ,

f .:

_ b) Shield tank temperature. Thermostat* trips if shield water temperature -drops below 18°C. -- * .-

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  • c) Earthquake switch. A ~small stainless- steel .*ball* is dislOcated by -heavy vibration

. causing a horizontal*displacement of 0.16 cm or greater breakihgthe continuity* of the

    • electrical.circuit and causing:a tripped condition;:[T.S.32.i]" * * * : ** ** ,,, * , * ***' "' * : '.

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3) Radiation Monitoring Equipment Radiation monitoring instrumentation available to the reactor operators includes console-mounted meters and a portable survey meter. These and other such instruments available within the Reactor Room are calibrated periodically by the Radiation Safety Department of the University. There are remote area monitors with automatic alarms installed to monitor gamma levels at the reactor console, check point three (on the south side of the reactor), reactor top, and in the general lab area (near the east door). All of this instrumentation is listed in Table 2 below:
.*., 14

Demogtaphy

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  • - _ The population densities around the Nuclear Engineering Laboratbry Hsted below in table 5 were calculated from 2000 Census* Blocks obtained for.iii the city of Albuquerque:'*

Table 5 - Population in the Reactor V'icimty * * '

Radial Distance Population Area Population Density (miles) . . (sq. mL) *.:(per sq. mi.}_

l .. **16,808 .: : 3*.14 . *.* 5352.9 .

5 244,518*: 78.53 . 3113.1 ' -

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The University of New Mexico has about 27,000 students that attend the main campus. The number of people on campus during the work week is significantly higher than the residential population.

IV. **Reactor Building.

A. Laboratory Building ...

Th.e laboratory is a one story *concrete structure with six feet of earth between one foot thick concrete walls,on the south and west sides~ The north and east walls are*poured concrete approximately one foot thick. A floor plan is shown in Figure 17. The only outside windows in the*building.are. in-the entrance doors; Ther~ are.four entrance doors into the building: (1) a personnel door on the east side, (2) a personnel door (3) a double-width equipment door on the north side (center), and (4) a personnel door on the north side (west end) which is. bolted and not normally used. The roof of the building over the Reactor Room is three feet of earth between five inch thick concrete slaps.A:portion'oftheroof is five feet* of earth.between five inch thick concrete slabs to proviQ.e additional shielding for the Cobalt-60 facility that was located in the laboratory. The laboratory bµilding is located on.the southwest comer of the campus~ The location of the building can be seen ori the campus map in Figure 18. It is building 121 located in section I2.

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28

B. Reactor Room The Reactor Room 065 in Figure 17, (20 x 24 feet) is located in the southeast comer of the Laboratory Building. This room has two access doors: (1) a personnel door in the north wall of the rocim, and (2) a double door for equipment and personnel access in the west wall of the room.

In addition to having six feet of earth between one foot thick concrete slabs, the south wall of the Reactor Room is entirely below grade level. The east wall is essentially below grade level because of the exterior concrete stairs that go from the floor elevation up to the street level.

V. Safety of the AGN-201 Reactor Facility A. Maximum Credible Accident The total excess reactivity of the reactor is given by the manufacturer as 0.5%. For the purposes of a hazards analysis, however, it is assumed that an instantaneous insertion of 2% in reactivity occurs. Because of its inherently low excess reactivity, the system could never acquire this reactivity in the course of normal operation. It could only occur if improper materials were introduced into the reactor. Strict administrative controls discussed in the next section will normally make this impossible. The placing, for instance, of significant positive reactivity in the glory hole will be strictly forbidden. In this sense, the assumed 2% in reactivity bounds the highest reactivity (about 0.92%) that would be created ifthe glory hole was completely filled with nominal 20% enriched fuel. This analysis demonstrates the fact that the reactor does not "runaway" following a sudden increase in reactivity.

The analysis of this maximum credible accident is given in Appendix A. It is shown there that this accident leads to a power excursion that is self-limiting in about 300 milliseconds. The maximum temperature of the core never rises above 100 °C. However, tests performed by the manufacturer indicate that the core material, polyethylene, does not melt below 200 °C. It can be expected therefore that such an accident would not damage the core.

As previously noted, various scram circuits would be activated as the result of sudden increase in the flux in the system. However, if for some reason these circuits fail to operate, the reactor would be shuidown by the melting of the fuse. This fuse is loaded with twice the density of uranium as the remainder of the core and would reach substantially higher temperatures than the core during an excursion. In addition, the fuse is made of polystyrene rather than polyethylene and melts at about 100 °C. Following the disintegration of the fuse, the core falls apart, which decreases the reactivity of the system by from 5% to 10% according Jo t4e,<.\*:(:;,\~

manufacturer. ,., ' ' ' ' ' , "~ .*;

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  • It is shown in Appendix A that this accident would give a radiation dose of less than 1.1 rem to a person standing immediately next to the concrete shield. This dose, whileJar'froni * *'
  • d~sirable,,is:yvell below levels that lead to detectable medical injury.

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