ML17059C048
| ML17059C048 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 05/28/1998 |
| From: | Doerflein L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Mueller J NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9806030427 | |
| Download: ML17059C048 (38) | |
Text
0 CATEGORY 20 REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9806030427 DOC.DATE: 98/05/28 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET ¹ FACIL:50-220 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Niagara Powe 05000220 50-410 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Niagara Moha 05000410 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION DOERFLEZN,L.T.
Region 1 (Post 820201)
RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION MUELLER,J.H.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.
SUBJECT:
Advises of planned insp effort resulting from plant, Units 1
& 2 plant performance review, completed on 980428.Details of insp plan for next 6 months encl.
Q/i DISTRIBUTION CODE:
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/ 0 TITLE: Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) Report NOTES:
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May 28, 1998 Mr. John H. Mueller Chief Nuclear Officer Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Operations Building, 2nd Floor P.O. Box 63 Lycoming, NY 13093
Dear Mr. Mueller:
SUBJECT:
PLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW (PPR) - NINE MILE POINT UNITS 1 AND 2 On April 281998, the NRC staff completed the semiannual Plant Performance Review (PPR) of Nine Mile Point (NMP). The staff conducts these reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to develop an integrated understanding of safety performance.
The results are used by NRC management to facilitate planning and allocation of inspection resources.
The PPR for NMP involved. the participation of all technical divisions in evaluating inspection'results and safety performance information for the period October 1997 to April 1998.
PPRs provide NRC management with a current summary of licensee performance and serve as inputs to the NRC Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) and senior management meeting (SMM) reviews.
Enclosure 1 contains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant Issues Matrix (PIM), that were considered during this PPR process to arrive at an integrated view of licensee performance trends.
The PIM includes only items from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation.
The PPR may also have considered some predecisional and draft material that does not appear in the attached PIM, including observations from events and inspections that had occurred since the last NRC inspection report was issued, but had not yet received full review and consideration.
This material will be placed in the PDR as part of the normal issuance of NRC inspection reports and other correspondence.
This letter advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the NMP PPR review.
lt is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite. details our inspection plan for the next 6 months.
Resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.
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9806030427 980S28 PDR ADOCK OS000220 PDR OFFyCyAL RECORD CO "
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I
John H. Mueller We willinform you of any changes to the inspection plan.
If you have any questions, please contact me at (610) 337-5378.
Sincerely, Original Signed by:
Lawrence T. Doerflein, Chief Projects Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.
50-220 50-410
Enclosures:
- 1. Plant Issues Matrix
- 2. Inspection Pla'n cc w/encls:
G. Wilson, Senior Attorney M. Wetterhahn, Winston and Strawn J. Rettberg, New York State Electric and Gas Corporation P. Eddy, Electric Division, Department of Public Service, State of New York
'C. Donaldson, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, New York Department of Law J. Vinquist, MATS, Inc.
F. Valentino, President, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority J. Spath, Program Director, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority
John H. Mueller Distribution w/encls:
H. Miller, RA/W. Axelson, DRA (1)
Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
PUBLIC NRC Resident Inspector C. Hehl, DRP
J. Wiggins, DRS J. Crlenjak, DRP L. Nicholson, DRS DRS Branch Chiefs R. Ragland/L. Eckert, DRS L. Cheung, DRS E. King, DRS D. Silk, DRS L. Doerflein, DRP B. Cook, DRP M. Oprendek, DRP R. Junod, DRP Distribution w/encls:
(VIAE-MAIL)
B. McCabe, Rl EDO Coordinator B. Norris - Nine Mile Point S. Bajwa, NRR D. Hood, NRR M. Campion, Rl Inspection Program Branch (IPAS)
DOCDCSK 3
DOCUMENT NAME: G:iBRANCH1iNMPPPR.I TR To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy OFFICE NAME DATE RI/DRP BCook 05/Zt /9 RI/DRP LDoerflein~
05/~98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
ENCLOSURE 1
mrna mn.a
~ a. a j.nun rssvas m radix Date TYpe Source ID SFA Code Item Description 2/14/98 713 Negative IR 98-01 N
1-OPS 2B 5A The quarterly reviews of extended markups at Unit 1 were weak in that the reviewers failed to identify numerous markup discrepancies that were later identified by the inspectors.
Unit 1 management was aware of the weaknesses, and proposed corrective actions appeared appropriate.
2/14/98 712 2/14/98 711 NCV IR 98-01 Negative NCV 98-01-02 NCV IR 98-01 Negative NCV 98-01-01 N
1-OPS 5A 1C N
1-OPS 3A 5A Most catch containments installed in Unit 1 were adequately installed and maintained.
However, many designated as "permanent" did not have an engineering evaluation to determine if a plant change or modification was required.
The most recent semi-annual catch containment review lacked depth, in that NMPC failed to fully evaluate whether catch containments should be removed or that those designated as "permanent" had the required engineering evaluation.
This minor procedure violation was not cited.
During an inspection in the Unit 2 residual heat removal pump rooms, the inspectors identified inadequate separation between conduits for safety-related temperature elements of different divisions. A breakdown in communications between an Assistant Station Shift Supervisor and a system engineer resulted in a one week delay in recognizing the impact that inadequate. conduit separation had on the operability of safety-related plant equipment.
This minor 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, violation was not cited.
2/14/98 710 2/14/98 709 1/23/98 696 Positive Positive NCV
.Positive IR 9841 IR 98-01 LER 98-01 IR 97-12 LER 97-11 NCV 97-12-03 N
1-OPS 4B 5A N
1-OPS 1A L
1-OPS 1A 3B Routine monitoring of the Unit 2 refuel reliability index allowed NMPC to identify a reactor fuel leak early, before it degraded any further. The flux tilting and power suppression evolution was methodical and well~ntrolled due, in part, to good communication and coordination among all involved organizations.
NMPC took aggressiv'e actions to prevent further leak degradation.
Unit 2 operators responded appropriately to the failure of the Division II containment atmosphere gaseous/particulate radiation monitor that occurred while the Division I monitor was inoperable for maintenance.
Station Operations Review Committee members maintained the proper safety focus during the meeting to discuss the basis for requesting enforcement discretion.
A Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) was issued to preclude a unit shutdown while working to restore the Division I radiation monitor to an-operable status.
The Unit 1 operations and reactor engineering staffs'nitiative to perform a procedure review prior to an infrequently performed evolution, (reactor shutdown by full control rod insertion),
was appropriate.
This review was good in that it identified the need for some procedural enhancements.
The review also identified that, in the past, on several occasions the mode switch was placed in REFUEL contrary to the TS. This licensee identified and corrected violation was not cited.
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 4/30/98 Page 1 of 14 28 May 1998
Date T)fpe Source ID SFA Code Item Description 1/23/98 695 NCV IR 97-12 Negative NCV 97-12-02 N
1-OPS 3A 1A 1C Unit 2 licensed control room operators were not aware that the posted surveillance test data for standby liquid control was out of date and that the surveillance was potentially overdue.
A chemistry technician failed to post the surveillance summary sheet'after completion of the surveillance, as required by procedure.
1/23/98 694 Positive IR 97-12 N
1-OPS 2B 3A 1A The Unit 1 shutdown safety verification procedure was considered a valuable aid for the control room operators to assist in monitoring plant conditions and assuring that safety functions were sufficiently available during shutdown conditions.
Periodic briefings of safety function status during work control meetings and shift turnover was good, in that, it ensured personnel awareness of system status and allowed for feedback of any current or potential deviations.
1/23/98 693 1/23/98 692 Negative IR 97-12 Negative IR 97-12 N
1-OPS N
1-OPS 2A 4A 3C 5C 4B Following the inspectors'dentification of the Unit 1 hydrogen/oxygen analyzer cabinet doors being improperly secured, the licensee completed a technically sound and extensive analysis to determine that operation in this condition did not adversely impact the equipment operability.
However, past operations with the cabinet doors improperly secured indicated a poor questioning attitude on part of the Unit 1 operators, in that they failed to recognize the potential safety concern associated with the condition.
Upon identification that the SRV position indication at the Unit 2 remote shutdown panel (RSP) was unreliable during a control room fire due to a portion of the cabling and components being contained with the control room fire-zone, NMPC engineering staff recommended the incorporation of a caution in the RSP procedure regarding the potential unavailability of the indication.
Since the loss of SRV position indication could have been confusing to the operators during a plant shutdown from the RSP, the inspectors considered the time to the scheduled procedure revision date to be excessive, and the licensee promptly incorporated the caution statement.
1/23/98 691 NCV Positive IR 97-12
~
NCV 97-12-01 L
1-OPS 4A 5B NMPC identified that the Unit 2 condensate storage tank building temperatures were not being maintained in accordance with the UFSAR, and took appropriate corrective action to change the temperature control switches to the proper set point. Additionally, NMPC identified that the capacity of the building heaters needed upgrading to maintain desired temperature; this was appropriately evaluated and adequate compensatory actions were established.
This licensee identified and corrected violation was not cited.
FROM: 10/1/97 T.O: 4/30/98 Page 2 of14 28 May 1998
g
Date 1/23/98 690 ape Positive Source IR 97-12 N
1-OPS 1A 3A ID SFA Code Item Description The shift brief for the newly-installed emergency cooling condenser keepfull modification was synergistic and provided sufficient detail on the system hardware and operation.
The conduct of control room activities during the Unit 1 plant startup following repairs to the.
condensers was good and improved compared to previous startups.
The overall reactor
,startup appeared to run smoother than previous startups due to the improvement in control rod drive performance.
1/23/98 689 1/23/98 688 1/23/98 687 Positive IR 98-03 N
1-OPS
. 3B Negative IR 98-03 N
~ 1-OPS Negative IR 98-03 N
1-OPS The inspectors determined the Unit 1 applicants were well prepared for the examination and met all regulatory eligibility requirements.
3B 3C NRC IR 97-08(OL) documented significant areas of difficulty identified by NRC of an NMP-2 initial license written examination.
There was apparent ineffective corrective actions to improve the quality of subsequent initial examination submittals.
3B An assessment of the initial examination submittal consisting of the written, job performance 3C measures and operating tests found that the submittal was inadequate.
A revised examination did not require additional modification.
11/8/97
- 679, 11/8/97 677 Positive IR 97-11 Negative IR 97-11 L
1-OPS L
1-OPS 5B 4B 2A 3C NMP1 operations staff operability evaluation for the'channel 12 GEMAC, though reasonable, did not probe deep enough into all potential reference leg leakage paths.
An NMP2 SSS's oversight & questioning attitude was good & identified improper APRM gain setting adjustments.
11/8/97 661 10/4/97 628 10/4/97 627 Positive Positive Positive IR 97-11 IR 97%7 N
1-OPS N
1-OPS IR 97-07 N
1-OPS 1A 3C 2A 3A 1A 3B 3A Control room activities during an NMP2 shutdown were well-coordinated, with good supervisory command & control.
System walkdowns & performance history reviews indicated that the material condition of NMP2 SLCS was good, and that the system has demonstrated a high level of reliability.
The knowledge level of the technicians and operators observed during the performance of a test was good.
Some minor poor work practices were observed.
Special simulator training resulted in good operating crew performance during the 9/15/97 manual reactor shutdown at NMP1.
During the unit shudown, CROs'se of alarm response procedures, 3-part communications,
& self/peer checking were noticeably improved.
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 4/30/98 Page 3 of 14 28 May 1998
ewe mr.z > a. a pLun ISSUES m Tmx Date 2/14/98 715 2/1'4/98 714 1/23/98 700 1/23/98 699 1/23/98 698 1/23/98 697 TYpe VIO Source IR 98-01 VIO-98-01-03 Positive IR 98-01 Positive IR 97-12 LER 97-14 Positive IR 97-12 Positive IR 97-12 Negative IR 97-12 ID SFA Code N
2-,2B MAINT 5A N
2-5B MAINT N
2-5B MAINT S
2-3A MAINT 2B N
2-3A MAINT 1C N
2-2B MAINT 3A 1C Item Description Based upon the NRC inspector's questions, NMPC management declared the Unit 1 liquid poison system inoperable.
Portions of the system piping had not been periodically flow tested and NMPC was unable to readily ascertain whether the piping from the liquid poison tank to the pump suction valves was obstructed.
NMPC's decision to declare the liquid poison system Inoperable and commence a shutdown was conservative, and the actions taken to test the system were appropriate.
The special evolution brief was thorough.
Although the previous Unit 1 liquid poison system surveillance testing met TS, the testing was inadequate to verify system operability.
This was a violation of 10CFR50, App B, Crit XI.
NMPC appropriately evaluated the impact of a leaking fuel delivery valve on the operability of the Unit 2 emergency diesel generator.
Licensee's actions were appropriate in response to an unexpected isolation of the Unit 1 vent and purge system that occurred during radiation monitor troubleshooting.
The licensee's root cause of the event was reasonable and the Station Operating Review Committee's review of the event maintained the proper safety focus.
Due to inattention during a surveillance test, a Unit 2 technician inadvertently inserted a circuit card extender upside down, causing a reactor protection system half-scram signal.
In addition, the surveillance test procedure did not contain a precautionary note which could have warned the technician of the potential plant impact if the card were incorrectly inserted.
Pre-evolution briefs for the Unit 1 emergency cooling condenser capacity test were detailed and safety-focused.
Operators demonstrated a questioning attitude and the briefs were synergistic.
The control room environment was very good and clear and formal three-part communications were consistently used.
A Unit 1 emergency cooling condenser hydrostatic test pre-evolution brief was adequate.
Communications during the test were good, in that formal three-way communications were consistently used.
Operations and inservice testing supervision provided good oversight and assistance, which resulted in a well-coordinated evolution.
11/8/97 673 Negative IR 97-11 IR 97-06 VIO 97-06-01 N
2-3A MAINT 3C 2B 5C An l8C technician incorrectly performed a step in a calibration procedure and this was not identified during supervisory review. A 1995 NMP1 main steam break instrument trip channel calibration procedure change was in error and received an inadequate review.
In addition, the wrong APRM was adjusted during an NMP2 reactor shutdown. These violations were additional examples of the violations cited in IR 97-06.
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 4/30/98 Page 4 of 14 28 May 1998
t
Date 11/8/97 670 11/8/97 669 11/8/97 662 10/4/97 640 Type Positive Positive Positive VIO Source IR 97-11 IR 97-11 IR 97-11 IR 97-07 VIO 97-07-03 LER 97-07 ID SFA Code Item Description N
2-MAINT N
2-MAINT 3C 2A 2B 3C N
2-MAINT L
2-MAINT NMP2 SW system surveillance tests were performed in a controlled manner.
ASSS effectively coordinated testing activities 8 provided a detailed brief. Operators 8 technicians used clear three-part communications 8 adhered to the test procedures.
NMP1 forced outage work scope was adequately managed 8 appropriately safety-focused.
Material condition of the NMP1 CRD housing support 8 MSL flow restdctor piping and instrumentation was very good.
2B 'he discovery by the NMP2 l8C technician of the missed calibration of NMP2 H2 3A recombiner system components was good, however, the failure to perform TS 4.6.6.1.b.1 was a violation.
10/4/97 634 Negative 'R 97-07 N
2-MAINT 1C During a NMP1 EC condenser pipe cutting evolution, a poor safety & radiological work practice was identified, in that, maintenance personnel were using a rubber-gloved hand to remove metal shavings.
10/4/97 633 2/14/98 722 2/14/98 721 Positive Positive Positive IR 97-07 IR 98-01 Part 21 IR 98-01 N.
2-MAINT N
3-ENG N
3-ENG 3A 5A 2B 2A 4B 3C 5A 4B 3A During NMP1 EC condenser repair activities, maintenance personnel adhered to work order requirements
& all associated procedures 8 documentation were readily available-8 the revision current.
QA oversight of activities was appropriate.
FME controls were appropriately maintained.
Material accountability 8 system cleanliness were well controlled.
NMPC responded quickly and appropriately to a vendor notification related to a possible failure of spring-return switches used in the emergency cooling and containment spray systems at Unit 1.
Control room operators were aware of the potential failure mode; however, the associated operating procedures were not revised to include a precautionary note related to the concern.
The licensee's actions at both units to address an industry concern with potentially defective emergency diesel. generator air start solenoid valves was timely and technically sound.
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 4/30/98 Page 5 of 14 28 May 1998
Date 2/14/98 720 ape Source NCV IR 98-01 Negative NCV 08-01-09 LER 97-16 ID SFA Code L
3 ENG 2B Item Description NMPC identified that a portion of the Unit 2 testing for the recirculation pump trip in response to an ATWS was not completed in accordance with the TS.
Specifically, the logic system functional testing failed to include the high reactor pressure trip of the low frequency motor generator.
In addition, the failure to specify an acceptability range for the lower frequency motor generator time delay in the subsequent procedure change procedure indicated weaknesses in the procedure and in the review of the associated procedure change.
Furthermore, in December 1996, NMPC missed an opportunity to identify the inadequate surveillance test due to a non-conservative interpretation of the UFSAR. This licensee identified and corrected violation was not cited.
2/14/98 719 NCV IR 98-01 Negative NCV 98-01-07 NCV 98-01-08 LER 97-13 L
3-ENG 5B 3C Prior to April 30, 1992, Unit 2 operated with circuit breakers in the racked out position, and failed to recognize the adverse impact on switchgear seismic qualification and, therefore, switchgear operability.
Although NMPC took appropriate actions in 1992 to preclude future operations with'breakers in the racked out position, they failed to recognize that they were in an unanalyzed condition, and that the condition was reportable.
This licensee identified and corrected violation was not cited.
2/14/98 VIO 718 IR 98-01 VIO 98-01-06 N
3ENG 5B 3C 2A The inspectors identified that the temperature control valve for the Unit 1 control room emergency ventilation system had been inoperable since 1983.
The administrative controls to disposition the failed valve had not been properly implemented; i.e., the controlled drawings did not indicate the inoperable valve, nor was an engineering evaluation performed, as required by procedures, to determine if continued operation with the degraded condition was acceptable.
This was a violation of TS 6.8.1.
1/23/98 717 2/14/98 716 1/23/98 706 NCV IR 98-01 Negative NCV 98-01-05 NCV IR 98-01 Positive NCV 98-01-04 Positive IR 97-12 Part 21 Notification N
3-ENG L
3-ENG N
3-ENG 5A 3C 3A 28 4B 48 5B The inspectors identified that NMPC failed to perform a design change for permanently installed scaffolding. This minor procedural violation was not cited.
As a result of a good questioning attitude by a system engineer, NMPC identified that maintenance on the Unit 1 SW drag valve in the reactor building violated secondary containment integrity.
Past maintenance on the valve exceeded the allowable LCO outage time, and a reactor shutdown had not been initiated in accordance with TS. This licensee identified and corrected violation was not cited.
The licensee's review of an industry concern regarding possible communication between the drywell and the wetwell was appropriate, and their evaluation of other possible evolutions which created a diywell-to-wetwell flow path was good.
Actions taken at both units to address identified discrepancies were adequate.
'ROM:
10/1/97 TO: 4/30/98 Page 6 of 14 28 May 1998
Date Type 1/23/98 VIO 705 IR 97-12 L
VIO 97-12-07 LER 97-12 3-ENG 48 5A Source ID SFA Code Item Description The 1997 engineering review of the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis and Fire Protection Engineering Evaluation documents was good, in that it disclosed previous engineering deficiencies, particularly that emergency lighting required to support alternate shutdown of the plant was missing.
However, earlier reviews of these documents were weak in that they failed to identify these deficiencies.
This was a violation of 10CFR50, Appendix R.
1/28/98 704 NCV IR 97-12 L
Negative LER 97-12 NCV 97-12-06 3-ENG 5A 48 58 Prior to September 1996, NMPC failed to monitor the Unit 2 relay room temperature, as required by TS.
Furthermore, when the licensee identified this issue in 1996, they incorrectly dispositioned it, resulting in a failure to recognize that the condition was reportable, and missed an opportunity to identify other subsequently identified concerns related to the UFSAR description of the control room envelope.
This licensee identified and corrected violation was not cited.
1/23/98 VIO 703 IR 97-12 L
VIO 97-1245 LER 97-14 3-ENG 3A 48 5A A Unit 2 reactor operator demonstrated a good questioning attitude in identifying that a TS required surveillance test for the rod sequence control system was inadequate.
This was a violation of TS4.1.4.2.b.1.
1/23/98 702 1/23/98 701 3-ENG Positive IR 97-12 N
3-ENG NCV IR 97-12 L
Negative LER 97-15 NCV 97-12-04 5A 5C 48 4A 48 At Unit 2, NMPC's identification of a breach between an equipment qualification classified harsh environment area and a mild environment area, an original construction deficiency, was considered good.
Particularly noteworthy was the recognition that in the event of a high energy line break, the breach could result in the potential loss of several safety-related systems.
Once identified, the licensee took appropriate actions to repair the breach and to verify no other similar openings.
This licensee identified and corrected violation was not cited.
The Unit 1 modification of the EC keepfull system was well designed.
The modification was installed according to the drawings, and adequately tested.
-0 11/8/97 680 11/8/97 678 Positive NCV IR 97-11 L
NCV 97-11-05 3-ENG IR 97-11 L
3-ENG 48 4A 28 An engineering safety analysis identified a NMP1 GEMAC level instrument reference leg leakage path which was appropriately resolved within the TS allowed outage time.
APRM gain setting adjustments at both units were not performed in accordance with the respective TSs.
This licensee identified violation of TS was not cited.
11/8/97 676 11/8/97 675i VIO VIO IR 97-11
=
L VIO 97-11-04 IR 97-11 L
VIO 97-1 1-05 LER 97-11 3-ENG 3-ENG 28 4A 48 28 A design review team identified that the positive pressure surveillance test for the NMP2 control room envelope did not include the relay room. This was a violation of TS 4.7.3.e.2 The discovery by NMP2 system engineers of missed surviellance testing of APRMs indicated a good questioning attitude; however, the failure to perform these surveillance tests was a cited violation of TS 4.3.1.2.
e FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 4/30/98 Page 7 of 14 28 May 1998
Date
.11/8/97 674 10/4/97 643 10/4/97 641 Positive IR 97-11 N
3-ENG 5A NCV IR 97-07 NCV 97-07-05 LER 97-07 L
3-ENG 2B 4A 5A 2A NCV IR 97-07 Negative NCV 97-07-04 N
3-ENG 4C Type Source ID SFA Code Item Description NMPC's self-assessment of procurement activities was critical 8 in-depth.
The interface between NMP1 smoke purge system and CREVS was inadequately evaluated during modifications in the early 1980s.
NMP1 operator's questioning attitude of the control room smoke purge system was very good 8 resulted in an engineerin'g operability evaluation of the impact on control room emergency ventilation system operability.
Review in 1996 of the calculations to support the modification to bring the NMP1 blowout panels within the design basis identified minor calculational errors 8 corrective actions in early 1996 related to the NMP1 blowout panels design control concern had not been fully effective.
This violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion III was not cited.
10/4/97 638 Positive IR 97-07 N
3-ENG 4B NMP2 PRA associated with de-energizing one of the two offsite 115 kV supplies for planned maintenance accurately accounted for all equip out of service at the time of maint, 8 provided a thorough evaluation justifying the conclusion.
10/4/97 NCV IR 97-07 631.
'egative NCV 97-07-01 N
~
3-ENG 2B 3A NMP2 ops considered a catch containment used to collect oil leaking from a RCIC pump gear box to be a permanent installation; however, contrary to NMPC procedure, a plant change request had not been initiated.
This minor procedural violation was not cited.
4/21/98 731 Positive IR 98-08 N
4 PS 1C 2A The licensee was conducting security and safeguards activities in a manner that protected public health and safety in the areas of'access authorization, alarm stations, communications, and protected area access control of personnel and packages.
This portion of the piogram, as implemented, met the licensee's commitments and NRC requirements.
4/21/98 Positive 730 IR 98-08 N
4 PS 2A 2B The licensee's security facilities and equipment in the areas of protected area assessment aids and personnel search equipment were determined to be well maintained and reliable and were able to meet the licensee's commitments and NRC requirements.
4/21/98 729 Positive IR 98-08 N
4-PS 3A 3B The security force members (SFMs) adequately demonstrated that they have the requisite knowledge necessary to effectively implement the duties and responsibilities associated with their position. Security force personnel were being trained in accordance with the requirements of the Plan and training documentation was properly maintained and accurate.
4/21/98 728 Positive IR 98-08 N
4-PS 1A 1C The level of management support, in general, was adequate to ensure effective implementation of the security program, and was evidenced by adequate staffing levels and the allocations of resources to support programmatic needs.
FROM:. 10/1/97 TO: 4/30/98 Page8 of14 28 May 1998
Date 4/21/98 727 4/21/98 726 Type EEI Source IR 98-08 EEI 98-08-01 EEI 98-08-02 NCV IR 98-08 Negative NCV 98-08-03 ID SFA Code N
4 PS 1C 5A N
4-PS 5A 5C Item Description The effectiveness of licensee management controls relative to the administration of the security program was a weakness.
Management's less than aggressive actions to address and resolve the issues associated with the improper control and storage of SGI resulted in two apparent violations of NRC requirements.
The first apparent violation was as a result of the licensee's failure to properly control,.store, and classify safeguards information (SGI) and the second apparent violation was as a result of the licensee's failure to properly report the violation in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.21.
In 1996 and 1997, the licensee failed to conduct unannounced drug qnd alcohol testing at an annual rate equal to at least 50% of the work force as required by 10 CFR 26.24(a)(2).
However, the NRC has determined to exercise discretion and refrain from issuing a violation but will issue an NCV.
3/13/98 VIO 725 IR 98-04 VIO 98-04-02 S
4-PS 1C 3C One violation of transportation regulations (10CFR71.5) was identified involving the release of vehicle (flat-bed trailer) for unrestricted use, that exceeded the radiation limits specified in 49CFR173.443.
3/13/98 724 Positive 1/23/98 723 Negative IR 98-01 N
4 PS 1C 3A 5A 1/23/98 VIO 708 IR 97-12 VIO 97-12-09 LER 97-13 S
4-PS 3A 1C IR 98-04 N
4-PS 1C A generally effective program for the collection, processing and return to the plant of liquid wastes, and for the collection, processing, storage and transportation of radwaste was established.
Control room and fire brigade personnel appropriately responsed to numerous Unit 1 fire alarm actuations, and the investigation efforts appeared adequately coordinated.
- However, the failure to fully investigate and resolve previous similar false fire protection system actuations was a weakness and likely contributed to the recent event.
Although Unit 1 fire suppression system operability did not appear to be affected by degraded components, the impact of the deficiencies could hinder plant personnel responding to an in-plant fire due to potential multiple false alarms.
An inadvertent automatic isolation of the Unit 1 drywell vent and purge lines, occurred due to personnel inattention-todetaii, particularly a failure to follow procedure.
This was a violation of TS 6.8.1.
1/23/98 707 Positive IR 97-12 N
4-PS 2A 1C An inspection of normally inacce'ssible areas of the Unit 2 reactor water cleanup system found the material condition of the equipment to be satisfactory, witli the condition of the equipment in the valve aisle to be particularly good.
Housekeeping in the areas inspected was acceptable, and appropriate radiological controls were established.
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 4/30/98 Page 9 of 14 28.May 1998
Date 11/8/97 685 Type Negative Source IR 97-11 URI 97-11-08 ID SFA Code N
4-PS 2A 4C Item Description NMP2 radwaste facility fire4oor removed for over 3 years without being evaluated as a permanent modification. This was considered a weakness in the licensee's breach permit program to have allowed this permit to remain open.
This issue was left unresolved pending further NRC review.
11/8/97 684 11/8/97 681 Positive IR 97-11 NCV IR 97-11 Negative NCV 97-11-07 N
4 PS 1C L
4-PS 3A 1C A QA audit of the security program was comprehensive in scope 8 depth.
NMPC security 8 safeguards programs were effective 8 received management support.
Inattentiveness to postings within the RCA resulted in an NMP2 employee & three visitors entering a posted HRA without authorization.
This licensee identified and corrected violation was not cited.
11/8/97 666 11/8/97 663 Positive Positive IR 97-11 N
4 PS 3A IR 97-11 N
4-PS 3B 3C NMP2 operator performance during examinations was generally good, although communications 8 command/control were noted weaknesses.
NMP2 licensed operator requalification training program was effective 8 the remedial training program remained strong.
During NMP2 LORT event recognition & diagnosis, understanding 8 interpreting alarms, board manipulations, TS usage, event classification performance were good.
Facility evaluator's assessments were objective & thorough.
10/4/97 658 10/4/97 656 10/4/97 655 10/4/97 654 Positive Positive SL-III Negative IR 97-07 IR 97-07 IR 97-07 EA 97-530 IR 97-07 EA 97-530 N
4 PS 1C 3C N
4 PS 1C 1B S
4-PS SA 3A 3C N
4-PS 5A Plant personnel were'trained 8 equipped to combat a control room fire.
NMP security personnel response to a "suspicious looking" package was acceptable.
Declaration of an UE by the NMP2 SSS was appropriate 8 in accordance with the NMP2 Emergency Plan.
On three different occasions, NMPC inadequately controlled shipments of radiological material to facilities offsite.
- 1) shipment shifted during transport 8 caused radiation levels in occupied space of truck to exceed limits; 2) a wrong liner of low-level radwaste was shipped
, offsite for disposal; 3) a sample was shipped to an unlicensed facility - a similar occurrence happened in 1995.
All of the examples appeared to be due to a lack of procedures describing radwaste operator activities, inattention-to-detail, 8 a lack of supervisory oversight.
(Escalated Enforcement docketed per NRC letter dated 1/22/98, Violations 97-530-1013, 1023, 1033, and 1034 issued.
EEls 97-07-07, 09, and 10 closed.)
A number of required audits of vendors providing shipping casks were not performed, indicative of a lack of attention by management oversight.
(EEls 97-07-12 and13 withdrawn, 1/22/97)
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 4/30/98 Page 10 of 14 28 May 1998
II
Date 10/4/97 653 ape Negative Source IR 97-07 EA 97-530 ID SFA Code
/tern Description N
4-PS 5C QA program failed to identify the defects within the unit specific PCPs, & in one instance 1C failed to ensure that corrective actions were taken to address an identified defect, indicative of a lack of attention by management.
(EEI 97-07-11 withdrawn, 1/22/97) 10/4/97 652 10/4/97 651 10/4/97 650 10/4/97 649 10/4/97 648 10/4/97 644 10/4/97 637 10/4/97 635 10/4/97 625 Positive IR 97-07 Negative Negatle Positive Positive Positive VIO Positive Positive N
4-PS 2A At NMP2, plant conditions were generally very good relative to radiological housekeeping in
. radwaste.
IR 97-07 IR 97-07 EA 97-530 N
4-PS 3C 2A N
4-PS 5A 3A 3C The lay-up of the NMP1 111 waste concentrates tank was questionable.
Indicative of lack of attention by management.
The Process Control Programs and associated procedures have not been properly maintained.
Indicative of a lack of attention by management.
(EEI 97-07-06 withdrawn, 1/22/97)
~
At both units, good programs have been'established for the processing of liquid 8 solid radwaste.
IR 97-07 N
4-PS 1C 5A QA oversight of the RP, ALARA,contamination control, 8 external dosimetry programs was well implemented; audits 8 self-assessments were of appropriate scope 8 technical depth.
IR 97-07 N
4 PS IR 97-07 N
4-PS 1C RP program area was being well-implemented at both units.
L 'PS NMP1 RP staff inattention-todetail 8 failure to'self-check a completed surveillance test data sheet resulted in the failure to perform a ventilation radiation monitor instrument channel calibration within the required frequency.
This was a violation of TS 4.6.2.a.
Radiological controls during NMP1 EC condenser repair activities were satisfactory.
IR 97-07 VIO 97-07-02 3A IR 97-07 N
4-PS 1C IR 97-07 N
4 PS 1C Questioning attitude of NMP1 chemistry tech 8 heightened sensitivity of NMP1 staff to the 5A possibility of an EC condenser tube leak were good.
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 4/30/98 Page 11 of 14 28 May 1998
ABBREVIATIONSUSED IN PIN TABLE ALARA APRM CFR CRD CREVS EC FME H2 HRA IS.C NMPC NRC PRA SLCS SSS UE ATWS TS LCO SW SRV As Low as Reasonably Achievable Average Power Range Monitor Code of Federal Regulations Control Rod Drive Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Emergency Cooling Foreign Material Exclusion Hydrogen High Radiation Area Instrumentation 5 Control Nine Mile Power Corporation Nuclear Regulatory Commission Probabalistic Risk Assessment Quality Assurance Standby Liquid Control System Senior Shift Supervisor Unusual Event Anticipated transient without scram Technical Specifications Limiting Condition for Operation Service Water Safety Relief Valve FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 4/30/98 Page 12 of 14 28 May 1998
RSP CST CRO UFSAR Remote Shutdown Panel Condensate Storage Tank Control Room Operator Updated Final Safety Analysis Report FROM." 10/1/97 TO: 4/30/98 Page 13 of 14 28 May 1998
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PIM TABLECOLUMNS Date Tripe Source ID SFA Code Item Description The actual date of an event or significant issue forthose items that have a clear date ofoccurrence (mainly LERs), the date the source of the information was issued (such as for EALs), or the last date of the inspection period (for IRs).
The categorization ofthe item or finding - see the Type/Findings Type Code table, below.
The document that describes the findings: LER for Licensee Event Reports, EALfor Enforcement Action Letters, or IR for NRC Inspection Reports.
Identification ofwho discovered issue: N for NRC; L for Licensee; or $ for Self Identifying (events).
SALP Functional Area Codes: OPS for Operations; MAINTfor Maintenance; ENG for Engineering; and PS for Plant Support.
Template Code - see table below.
Details of NRC findings on LERs that have safety significance (as stated in IRs), findings described in IR Executive Summaries, and amplifying information contained in EALs.
TYPE/FINDINGS CODES TEMPLATECODES ED Strength Weakness NCV DEV Positive Negative LER URI" Licensing MISC Enforcement Discretion - No CivilPenalty Overall Strong Licensee Performance Overall Weak Licensee Performance Escalated Enforcement Item - Waiting Final NRC Action Violation Level I, II, III,or IV-Non-Cited Violation Deviation from Licensee Commitment to NRC Individual Good Inspection Finding Individual Poor Inspection Finding Licensee Event Report to the NRC Unresolved Item from inspection Report Licensing Issue from NRR Miscellaneous - Emergency Preparedness Finding (EP),
DecIared Emergency, Nonconformance Issue, etc. The type of all MISC findings are to be put in the Item Description column.
Operational Performance: A-Normal Operations; B - Operations During Transients; and C - Programs and Processes Material Condition: A-Equipment Condition or B - Programs and Processes Human Performance: A-Work Performance; B - Knowledge, Skills, and AbilitiesI Training; C - Work Environment Engineering/Design: A-Design; B - Engineering Support; C - Programs and Processes Problem Identification and Resolution: A-Identification; B - Analysis; and C - Resolution NOTES:
EEIs are apparent violations of NRC requirements that are being considered for
. escalated enforcement action in accordance viith the General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600.
However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identified by the EEls and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are made.
Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, the licensee willbe provided viith an opportunity to either (1) respond to the apparent violation or (2) request a predecisional enforcement conference.
URls are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 4/30/98 Page 14 of 14 28 May 1998
4 Nine IVlile Point Planned NRC Inspections May 25, 1998-December 31, 1998 IP-Inspection Procedure Core-minimum NRC Inspection Program (mandatory all plants)
Core Resident Activities Not Included INSPECTION PROCEDURE IP 84750 IP 92903 IP 73753 IP 62706 IP 92903 IP 93802 IP 37550 IP 93809 TI 2515/137 IP 81810 IP 83750 IP 82701 TITLE/PROGRAM AREA Effluent Monitoring Followup - Engineering Inservice Inspection Maintenance Rule Program Followup - Engineering Operational Safety Team Inspection Engineering Safety System Engineering Inspection Medium Voltage and Low Voltage Power Circuit Breakers Followup - SGI Control Occupational Radiation Exposure Emergency Preparedness Program PLANNED DATES 6/1/98 6/8/98 6/8/98 6/1 5/98 6/29/98 7/20/98 8/3/98 8/3/98 9/21/98 9/28/98 10/1 2/98 11/2/98 INSPECTION.
COMMENTS Core Regional Initiative Core OA Regional Initiative Regional Initiative Regional Initiative Regional Initiative Safety Issue Inspection Regional Initiative Core Core