ML17058B645
| ML17058B645 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 09/09/1991 |
| From: | NRC - INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17056C371 | List:
|
| References | |
| CON-IIT07-528A-91, CON-IIT07-528B-91, CON-IIT7-528A-91, CON-IIT7-528B-91 NUREG-1455, NUDOCS 9305070277 | |
| Download: ML17058B645 (60) | |
Text
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8A- 't t ORIG)MAL OFFICIAL OF PROCEEDINGS Agency U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Incident Investigation Team Tide:
Docket No.
Telephone Interview of:
Joseph Furia (Closed)
- Bethesda, Maryland
- Monday, September 9,
1991 PAG~ 1 12 ANNRILEY4 ASSOCIATES, LTD.
1612 KR, N.W, Su1te 300
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ERRATA SHEET ADDENDUM
~Pa e Line I8 Correction and Reason for Correction Date ~<<><I~<
Signature
'f
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM 7
Telephone Interview of:
8 Joseph Furia 9
[Closed]
10 14 15 16 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Conference Room 100 The Woodmont Building.
8120 Woodmont. Avenue
- Bethesda, Maryland 17 18
- Monday, September 9,
1991 19 The above-entitled telephone interview convened in 20 closed session at 9:08 o'lock a.m.
21 22 23 24
e
1 PARTICIPANTS JOHN KAUFFMAN, IIT Team Member WALTER JENSEN, IIT Team Member BILL VATTER, IIT Team Member JOSEPH FURIA, Interviewee LYNN ESTEP, Court Reporter 10 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
P R 0 C
E E
D I N
G S
[9:08 a.m.]
MR.
KAUFFMAN: It is September
- 9th, 1991. It' 4
about 9:08 in the morning.
We'e at the Woodmont Building 5
in Bethesda, Maryland, conducting an interview of Joseph 6
Furia concerning what he saw and his involvement in an event 7
at Nine Mill Point Two on August 13th, 1991.
I'm John Kauffman, the NRC headquarters AEOD.
MR. JENSEN:
I'm Walt Jensen, NRC headquarters 10 Event Assessment Branch.
MR. VATTER:
I'm Bill Vatter, INPO.
12 MR.
KAUFFMAN:
Okay.
- Joe, at this time, would you 13 tell us a little bit about the position you had and a little 14 bit about your background, and then go into what you saw on 15 August 13th.
16 MR. FURIA:
No problem.
My name is Joe Furia.
17 I'm a senior radiation specialist in Region I, Facilities 18 Radiation Protection Check Section, Facilities Radiation 19 Safeguards Branch, Division of Radiation Safety and 20 Safeguards.
21 I was at Nine Mile Point the week of August 12th 22 through the 16th to conduct a routine health physics 23 inspection as part of the core inspection program.
24 Basically, I arrived at the site on August the 25 13th at about 5:55 in the morning, came through the Unit 1
1 side security and went over to the NRC resident trailer.
I 2
have a key to get in there.
There was no one in the 3
resident trailer at the time.
At about five after six in the morning, I heard an 5
announcement that sounded to me like it came from the Unit 2
6 side of the paging system -- the paging system is not common 7
at Nine Mile -- saying that there was a site area emergency, 8
that there had been a loss of control room annunciators, and 9
that was about what, I recall hearing at that time.
10 About five minutes later -- this is about ten 11 after six in the morning -- there was a second announcement 12
-- this time I know for sure it was on the Unit 1 side as 13 well -- saying that there was a site area emergency, that 14 the Unit 2 control room had lost annunciators and power, and 15 that, all personnel were to report to their assembly areas.
16 About that time that that announcement was coming 17 over, I had located the home phone number for Rob Temps, who 18 is, or was at the time, one of the resident inspectors on 19 the site.
I called him at his house, told him that the 20 announcement had been made that there was a site area 21 emergency.
He gave me Rich Laura's home phone number 22 Rich is the other resident inspector up there -- and told me 23 to stay in the trailer until he got there.
I reached Laura 24 at his residence, told him about the site area emergency 25 announcement, told him I'd be staying in the trailer until
f
1 either he or Rob got there.
About 6:30, 6:40, sometime in that time frame, Rob 3
Temps got to the trailer.
We talked about what was going on 4
briefly, what announcements I had heard, what we should do, 5
and he decided that we should go over to the Unit 2 control 6
room and that there was a telephone line at one of the desks 7
behind some of the control panels that he felt we could use 8
to make a call down to the Incident Respondent Center at 9
headquarters.
10 We got over to the control room right around 6:40, 11 6:45.
Rob talked briefly with one gentleman who I 12 understand was the shift supervisor to get a quick briefing 13 on what was going on.
When we got to the control room, the 14 lights were on, the panels on the control panels appeared to 15 be all functioning.
16 There was a significant number of staff in front 17 of the various panels.
I was later told by Rob that the 18 event occurred right around a shift change, and so they had 19 both the night shift and the day shift operators in the Unit 20 2 control room when we got there.
21 We called down to headquarters about 6:50 in the 22 morning, contacted the Incident Response Center.
At that 23 point, I stayed on the phone line to allow Rob to interface 24 with the licensees, and basically I was on that phone line 25 until about 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> that evening.
That was about what I
5 MR.
JENSEN:
Okay.
What did you observe about the conduct in the control room?
Did you notice anyone making any specific control room manipulations of note that you could give a time for, an approximate time?
MR. FURIA:
No.
As I said, I was sitting on the 7
- phone, and where the phone was located I did not have a
clear view of the center consoles in the control room.
I 10 was behind one of the consoles.
Anything I can give you v
would be related back from what Rob Temps told me.
Having said that, Rob told me at the time that 14 15 16 17 there was some questioning about the positioning of, I believe it was six of the control rods, and so at the time we arrived and until sometime shortly after seven o'lock, the licensee was in its ATWS procedures.
Sometime after seven, they exited those procedures and went into another set of procedures to bring the unit 18 into cold shutdown.
The licensee related to Rob and I that, 19 20 under their emergency criteria, since they had gone through a site area emergency, they could not exit that emergency 21 until they were in cold shutdown.
So the licensee spent the 22 bulk of the morning and afternoon cooling down the reactor 23 24 far enough and depressurizing so the RHR System could be put into service.
MR.
JENSEN:
Well, Joe, you say you are relating
A
1 information to headquarters.
MR. FURIA:
Yes, sir.
MR.
JENSEN:
What type of information were you 4
relaying and what was your source of that information?
MR. FURIA:
Okay.
The information that I was 6
relaying -- by about 7:00, 7:05, headquarters had connected 7
the regional Incident Response Center on line and Paul 8
Harris was who I spent most of the morning talking with.
He 9
was on the phone here at Region I.
10 At about 9:30, 10:00 in the morning, the Tech 11 Support Center was brought on line, and that was Tom Dexter, 12 who is a security inspector from Region I who was also up at 13 Nine Mile doing a routine inspection that day, and he had 14 accompanied Rich Laura into the TSC.
15 Basically, we would periodically update whoever 16 cared to listen as to the pressure temperature readings that 17 were on the control panel.
Periodically, I would stand up, 18 walk around, see what they were.
If I didn't do it about 19 every 15 minutes or so, generally Paul Harris in the region 20 would ask me what that data was.
21 Paul and whoever he was communicating with in the 22 region periodically had some questions.
Early on, the 23 questions centered around what procedures that the licensee 24 was following, and the information that Rob Temps related 25 back to me was that the licensee was not -- did not have
1 specific procedures per se, but rather was in a plan that 2
allowed them to float through various manipulations.
3 Originally, the plan they were following was the ATWS, and 4
after that, it was just to bring them down into cold 5
shutdown.
Around 9:00 or so, there were some questions from 7
headquarters.
Tom McKenna, as I recall, was on the link 8
that we had, and there were some questions concerning 9
whether or not the off-site sirens had gone off, and when we 10 determined that they had not, Tom had some questions about 11 why not'.
12 Shortly thereafter,
- someone, and I don't recall 13 who, but it was
- someone, I believe, at headquarters, made 14 some decisions that those type of questions would wait, and 15 I did not hear any more emergency plan type questions for 16 the rest of the day.
17 By about 10:00 in the morning, the phone line that 18 we had established was pretty well -- maybe once every 20 19
- minutes, we would relay temperature and pressure of the 20
- core, but other than that, most of the questions had 21 stopped.
There really wasn't much going on.
The licensee 22 was just kind of powering down everything.
23 MR.
JENSEN:
Do you remember what instruments you 24 were using to get the temperature and pressure from?
MR. FURIA: It was a digital display, an LED type
1 display, that was on the center of the control -- or the 2
main control panel.
There were four displays there.
One 3
was time; one was reactor temperature; the other was reactor 4
- pressure, and I cannot offhand recall what the fourth 5
readout was.
MR.
JENSEN:
What estimate were you using to get 7
the time from?
What clock were you using?
MR.
FURIA:
There were four of these red-lettered 9
LED readouts, and one was the time, clock time.
10 MR. JENSEN:
This was on the main control board?
MR. FURIA:
That's as I recall; yes, sir.
12 MR.
13 those clocks, 14 of power?
JENSEN:
Okay.
Did you see anybody resetting because they might have gone out with the loss 15 MR.
FURIA:
I did not observe anybody resetting 16 them.
The clock time that was on there, I looked at it when 17 I first came in the control room, and the time on that clock 18 and the time on my watch was off by about a minute.
I don' 19 recall which one was running faster than the other.
But 20 that one-minute difference was consistent throughout the 21 day.
So I don't believe anybody would have been resetting 22 that clock after I entered the control room at about 6:45 23 that morning.
24 MR.
JENSEN:
Let's see, I guess you really weren' 25 watching the control operations too closely.
10 MR. FURIA:
I could not see them from where I was 2
sitting.
MR.
JENSEN:
Okay.
Can you make any comment about 4
the control of the shift supervisor over the operations in 5
the control room?
Did it seem to be well-ordered, and were 6
the procedures being MR.
FURIA:
Given my limited knowledge -- I'm not 8
a reactor engineer, and I don't normally go in the control 9
rooms very often -- it appeared to me that this was a well-10 organized effort going on and that the licensee appeared to 11 be working well together with the large staff that was in 12 the room and seemed to be -- maybe the word is "calm".
They 13 felt they had things under control.
14 But again, that's more of a layman's observation 15 than somebody who is experienced in control rooms.
16 MR.
JENSEN:
And the orders to perform operations, 17 did they seem to be coming from a single source?
18 MR. FURIA:
I could not tell from where I was 19 sitting who necessarily was giving out the orders for what 20 was going on.
Mr. Temps will be better able to answer that, 21 I'm sure.
22 MR.
KAUFFMAN:
There were some problems later in 23 the event with some waterhammers and shutdown cooling and 24 reactor water cleanup.
Do you recall hearing or observing 25 anything about that?
11 MR. FURIA:
I briefly heard a few things about 2
waterhammers and shutdown cooling, and I do recall that 3
there was some discussion about which systems were available 4
for shutdown cooling, and there was some discussion because 5
some of the systems were apparently tagged out for 6
maintenance.
But the exact specifics, I was really not 7
privy to.
MR. JENSEN:
Let's see, when you first, went to the 9
control room, do you recall if the licensee or could you 10 tell if the licensee was on the telephone with the NRC at 11 that time?
12 MR. FURIA:
They had two people sitting in front 13 of a bank of telephones.
Which particular lines were on or 14 not on, I wasn't sure at the time.
15 16
[Pause.]
MR.
KAUFFMAN: I think that about takes care of 17 our questions, Joe.
18 19 MR. FURIA:
Okay.
MR.
KAUFFMAN:
Is there anything else that you saw 20 or heard that you might think is important?
21 22 23 then.
THE WITNESS:
No, I don't believe so.
MR.
KAUFFMAN:
Okay, we'l go off the record, 24 I'd like to thank you for taking time out and 25 talking to us this morning.
12
[Whereupon,'t 9:24 o'lock, a.m.,
the interview 2
was concluded.]
10 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
REPORTER'8 CERTEPECATS This is to certify that the attached proceed-ings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:
NAME OF PROCEEDING Joseph Furia DOCKET NUMBER PLACE OF PROCEEDING:
- Bethesda, Maryland were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for tne file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court report-ing company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.
Official Reporter Ann Riley
& Associates, Ltd.
OF PROCEEDINGS U. S. Nuclear Reguiatory Commission Incident Investigation Team Tide:
Docket No.
Telephone Interview of:
Joseph Furia (Closed)
- Bethesda, Maryland
- Monday, September 9,
1991 P<G~ 1 12 ANNRIEEY4 ASSOCIATES, LTD.
1612 KSL K%, &dec 300 Qh~ p t.
~ C
~hlnyaa, D.C 20006 (m)~3m
f
ERRATA SHEET
~Pa e Line
)8 ADDENDUM Correction and Reason for Correction XWh "g p
Chic I(
~p
's
~s Date ~><l~'ignature
cr
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM 5
7 Telephone Interview of:
8 Joseph Furia 9
[Closed]
10 12 as 14 16 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Conference Room 100 The Woodmont Building.
8120 Woodmont Avenue
- Bethesda, Maryland 17 18
- Monday, September 9,
1991 19 The above-entitled telephone interview convened in 20 closed session at 9:08 o'lock a.m.
21 22 23 24 25
0
1 PARTICIPANTS:
JOHN KAUFFMAN, IIT Team Member t
WALTER'ENSEN, IIT Team Member BILL VATTER, IIT Team Member JOSEPH FURIA, Interviewee LYNN ESTEP, Court Reporter 10 12 i~
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
P R 0 C
E E
D I N G
S
[9:08 a.m.]
MR.
KAUFFMAN: It is September
- 9th, 1991. It' 4
about 9:08 in the morning.
We'e at the Woodmont Building 5
in Bethesda, Maryland, conducting an interview of Joseph 6
Furia concerning what he saw and his involvement in an event 7
at Nine Mill Point Two on August 13th, 1991.
I'm John Kauffman, the NRC headquarters AEOD.
MR. JENSEN:
I'm Walt Jensen, NRC headquarters 10 Event Assessment Branch.
MR. VATTER:
I'm Bill Vatter, INPO.
12 MR.
KAUFFMAN:
Okay.
- Joe, at this time, would you 13 tell us a little bit about the position you had and a little 14 bit about your background, and then go into what you saw on 15 August 13th.
16 MR. FURIA:
No problem.
My name is Joe Furia.
17 I'm a senior radiation specialist in Region I, Facilities 18 Radiation Protection Check Section, Facilities Radiation 19 Safeguards Branch, Division of Radiation Safety and 20 Safeguards.
21 I was at Nine Mile Point the week of August 12th 22 through the 16th to conduct a routine health physics 23 inspection as part of the core inspection program.
24 Basically, I arrived at the site on August the 25 13th at about 5:55 in the morning, came through the Unit 1
(
7 10 side security and went over to the NRC resident trailer.
I have a key to get in there.
There was no one in the resident trailer at the time.
At about five after six in the morning, I heard an announcement that sounded to me like it came from the Unit 2
side of the paging system -- the paging system is not common at Nine Mile -- saying that there was a site area emergency, that there had been a loss of control room annunciators, and that was about what I recall hearing at that time.
About five minutes later -- this is about ten after six in the morning -- there was a second announcement this time I know for sure it was on the Unit 1 side as 14 well -- saying that there was a site area emergency, that the Unit 2 control room had lost annunciators and power, and 15 that all personnel were to report to their assembly areas.
16 17 About that time that that announcement was coming over, I had located the home phone number for Rob Temps, who 18 is, or was at the time, one of the resident inspectors on 19 the site.
I called him at his house, told him that the 20 announcement had been made that there was a site area 21 22 23 emergency.
He gave me Rich Laura's home phone number Rich is the other resident inspector up there -- and told me to stay in the trailer until he got there.
I reached Laura at his residence, told him about the site area emergency announcement, told him I'd be staying in the trailer until
1 either he or Rob got there.
About 6:30, 6:40, sometime in that time frame, Rob 3
Temps got to the trailer.
We talked about what was going on 4
briefly, what announcements I had heard, what we should do, 5
and he decided that we should go over to the Unit' control 6
room and that there was a telephone line at one of the desks 7
behind some of the control panels that he felt we could use 8
to make a call down to the Incident Respondent Center at 9
headquarters.
10 We got over to the control room right around 6:40, 6:45.
Rob talked briefly with one gentleman who I understand was the shift supervisor to get a quick briefing on what was going on.
When we got to the control room, the 14 lights were on, the panels on the control panels appeared to 15 be all functioning.
16 There was a significant number of staff. in front 17 of the various panels.
I was later told by Rob that the 18 event occurred right around a shift change, and so they had 19 both the night shift and the day shift operators in the Unit 20 21 2 control room when we got there.
We called down to headquarters about 6:50 in the 22 morning, contacted the Incident Response Center.
At that 23 24 point, I stayed on the phone line to -allow Rob to interface with the licensees, and basically I was on that phone line until about 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> that evening.
That was about what I
MR. JENSEN:
Okay.
What did you observe about the 3
conduct in the control room?
Did you notice anyone making 4
any specific control room manipulations of note that you 5
could give a time for, an approximate time?
MR. FURIA:
No.
As I said, I was sitting on the 7
- phone, and where the phone was located I did not have a
8 clear view of the center consoles in the control room.
I 9
was behind one of the consoles.
Anything I can give you 10 would be related back from what Rob Temps told me.
Having said that, Rob told me at the time that 12 there was some questioning about the positioning of, I 13 believe it was six of the control rods, and so at the time 14 we arrived and until sometime shortly after seven o'lock, 15 the licensee was in its ATWS procedures.
16 Sometime after seven, they exited those procedures 17 and went into another set of procedures to bring the unit 18 into cold shutdown.
The licensee related to Rob and I that, 19 under their emergency criteria, since they had gone through 20 a site area emergency, they could not exit that emergency 21 until they were in cold shutdown.
So the licensee spent the 22 bulk of the morning and afternoon cooling down the reactor 23 far enough and depressurizing so the RHR System could be put 24 into service.
MR. JENSEN:
Well, Joe, you say you are relating
1 information to headquarters.
MR. FURIA:
Yes, sir.
MR. JENSEN:
What type of information were you 4
relaying and what was your source of that information?
MR. FURIA:'kay.
The information that I was 6
relaying -- by about 7:00, 7:05, headquarters had connected 7
the regional Incident Response Center on line and Paul 8
Harris was who I spent most of the morning talking with.
He 9
was on the phone here at Region I.
10 At about 9:30, 10:00 in the morning, the Tech 11 Support Center was brought on line, and that was Tom Dexter, 12 who is a security inspector from Region I who was also up at 13 Nine Mile doing a routine inspection that day, and he had 14 accompanied Rich Laura into the TSC.
15 Basically, we would periodically update whoever 16 cared to listen as to the pressure temperature readings that 17 were on the control panel.
Periodically, I would stand up, 18 walk around, see what they were.
If I didn't do it about 19 every 15 minutes or so, generally Paul Harris in the region 20 would ask me what that data was.
Paul and whoever he was communicating with in the 22 region periodically had some questions.
Early on, the 23 questions centered around what procedures that the licensee 24 was following, and the information that Rob Temps related 25 back to me was that the licensee was not -- did not have
1 specific procedures per se, but rather was in a plan that 2
allowed them to float through various manipulations.
3 Originally, the plan they were following was the ATWS, and 4
after that, it was just to bring them down into cold 5
shutdown.
Around 9:00 or so, there were some questions from 7
headquarters.
Tom McKenna, as I recall, was on the link 8
that we had, and there were some questions concerning 9
whether or not the off-site sirens had gone off, and when we 10 determined that they had not, Tom had some questions about 11 why not.
12 Shortly thereafter,
- someone, and I don't recall 13 who, but it was
- someone, I believe, at headquarters, made 14 some decisions that those type of questions would wait, and 15 I did not-hear any more emergency plan type questions for 16 the rest of the day.
17 By about 10:00 in the morning, the phone line that 18 we had established was pretty well -- maybe once every 20 19
- minutes, we would relay temperature and pressure of the 20 core, but other than that, most of the questions had 21 stopped.
There really wasn't much going on.
The licensee 22 was just kind of powering down everything.
23 MR. JENSEN:
Do you remember what instruments you 24 were using to get the temperature and pressure from?
MR. FURIA: It was a digital display, an LED type
1 display, that was on the center of the control -- or the 2
main control panel.
There were four displays there.
One 3
was time; one was reactor temperature; the other was reactor 4
- pressure, and I cannot offhand recall what the fourth 5
readout was.
6 MR. JENSEN:
7 the time from?
What What estimate were you using to get clock were you using?
MR. FURIA:
There were four of these re'd-lettered LED readouts, and one was the time, clock time.
10 MR.
JENSEN:
This was on the main control board?
MR. FURIA:
That's as I recall; yes, sir.
12 MR. JENSEN:
Okay.
Did you see anybody resetting 13 those clocks, because they might have gone out with the loss of power?
15 MR. FURIA:
I did not observe anybody resetting 16 them.
The clock time that was on there, I looked at it when 18 19 20 I first came in the control room, and the time on that clock and the time on my watch was off by about a minute.
I don' recall which one was running faster than the other.
But that one-minute difference was consistent throughout the 21 day.
So I don't believe anybody would have been resetting 22 that clock after I entered the control room at about 6:45 23 that morning.
24 MR. JENSEN:
Let's see, I guess you really weren' watching the control operations too closely.
10 MR. FURIA:
I could not see them from where I was 2
sitting.
MR. JENSEN:
Okay.
Can you make any comment about 4
the control of the shift supervisor over the operations in 5
the control room?
Did it seem to be well-ordered, and were 6
the procedures being MR. FURIA:
Given my limited knowledge -- I'm not 8
a reactor engineer, and I don't normally go in the control 9
rooms very often -- it appeared to me that this was a well-10 organized effort going on and that the licensee appeared to 11 be working well together with the large staff that was in 12
~3 14 the room and seemed to be -- maybe the word is "calm".
They felt they had things under control.
But again, that's more of a layman's observation 15 than somebody who is experienced in control rooms.
16 MR. JENSEN:
And the orders to perform operations, 17 did they seem to be coming from a single source?
18 MR. FURIA:
I could not tell from where I was 19 sitting who necessarily was giving out the orders for what 20 was going on.
Mr. Temps will be better able to answer that, 21 I'm sure.
22 MR.
KAUFFMAN:
There were some problems later in 23 the event with some waterhammers and shutdown cooling and 24 reactor water cleanup.
Do you recall hearing or observing 25 anything about that?
(4 MR. FURIA:
I briefly heard a few things about 2
waterhammers and shutdown cooling, and I do recall that I.
3 there was some discussion about which systems were available 4
for shutdown cooling, and there was some discussion because 5
some of the systems were apparently tagged out for 6
maintenance.
But the exact specifics, I was really not 7
privy to.
MR. JENSEN:
Let's see, when you first went to the 9
control room, do you recall if the licensee or could you 10 tell if the licensee was on the telephone with the NRC at 11 that time?
12 E4 is 14 MR. FURIA:
They had two people sitting in front of a bank of telephones.
Which particular lines were on or not on, I wasn't sure at the time.
15
[Pause.]
16 MR.
KAUFFMAN: I think that about takes care of 17 our questions, Joe.
18 19 MR. FURIA:
Okay.
MR.
KAUFFMAN:
Is there anything else that you saw 20 or heard that you might think is important?
21 22 23 then.
THE WITNESS:
No,, I don't believe so.
MR.
KAUFFMAN:
Okay, we'l go off the record, 24 I'd like to thank you for taking time out and 25 talking to us this morning.
!s4
(
12
[Whereupon, at 9:24 o'lock, a.m.,
the interview 2
was concluded.]
10 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
REPORTER'8 CERTIPLCATI This ie to certify that the attached proceed-ings before the United States Nuclear Regula tory Commis s ioe im the matter of:
NhME OF PROCEEDZNC!
Joseph Furia DOCKET NUNBER PLhCE OF PROCEEDINC
- Bethesda, Maryland vere held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for tne file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commiss Ion taken by me and thereaEter reduced to typevricing by me or under the direction of the court report-ing company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the Eoregoing proceedings.
Official Reporter Ann Riley
& Associates, '6.
C