LR-N17-0034, Salem Generating Station, Units 1 & 2, Revision 29 to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 9.5, Other Auxiliary Systems
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9.5 OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 9.5.1 Fire Protection 9.5.1.1 Fire Protection Program The Salem Generating Station Fire Protection Program has been established to prevent significant fires, to ensure the capability to shutdown the reactors and maintain them in a safe shutdown condition, and to minimize radioactive releases to the environment in the event of a significant fire. The fire Protection Program implements the philosophy of defense-in-depth protection against the hazards of fire and its associated affects on equipment important to safety by: 1. Preventing fires from starting. 2. Rapidly detecting, controlling, and promptly extinguishing those fires that do occur. 3. Providing protection for structures, systems, and components important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by the fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe shutdown of the plant. The Salem Generating Station Fire Protection Program consists of design features, equipment, personnel, and procedures that provide defense-in-depth protection of the public health and safety. is described in several documents: The Salem Fire Protection Program o A program description which establishes the basis for the fire protection program at the Salem Generating Station. The program description identifies and documents principal fire protection commitments made between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and PSEG through a narrative description of the Fire Protection Program. The report also provides a comparison to Appendix A of BTP APCSB 9.5-1. 9.5-1 SGS-UFSAR Revision 21 December 6, 2004 o A report which establishes the basis for demonstrating a capability to achieve and maintain post-fire safe shutdown in accordance with Appendix R to 10 CFR 50. This report also establishes the information and format of the information to be utilized for long-term compliance to Appendix R to 10 CFR 50. o A report which identifies the cables and the routing of the cables that were utilized in the assessment of post-fire safe shutdown. o A report which outlines the Fire Hazards Analysis performed for Salem Generating Station in accordance with USNRC Branch Technical Position BTP-APCSB 9. 5-1 Appendix A "Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants" and defines fire area boundaries. The information contained in these reports is summarized in the following sections. 9.5.1.1.1 Organization for Fire Protection The President & Chief Nuclear Officer is the upper level management position who has management responsibility for the formulation, implementation, and assessment of the effectiveness of the Fire Protection Program for the Nuclear Business Unit. The Director, Engineering Services is the management position who is responsible for formulating and implementing a program or programs to control and maintain the design aspects of the Fire Protection Program. 9.5-2 SGS-UFSAR Revision 29 January 30, 2017 The Director, Corporate Operations is the management position responsible for formulating and implementing a program or programs to control and maintain fire prevention aspects of the Fire Protection Program and the readiness to detect and suppress fires and safely shut down the plant. The Director, Corporate Operations correcting is also responsible Fire Protection for establishing a Program deficiencies; method of tracking and establishing program requirements for implementing the aspects of the Fire Protection Program relative to fire prevention and housekeeping, readiness to detect and suppress fires, and a trained fire brigade; and ensuring any required maintenance of fire protection systems is completed promptly and effectively. The fire brigade responds to the respective (plant) Shift Manager during plant emergencies. The Plant Manager is responsible for maintaining procedures for safely shutting down the plant in the event of a fire and providing trained operators in support of safe shutdown and fire brigade activities. The Plant Manager is responsible for ensuring that personnel designated to operate the plant are trained such that they can safely shut down the plant and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a fire. 9.5-3 SGS-UFSAR Revision 29 January 30, 2017 The Director-Nuclear Oversight (NOS) is responsible for defining a QA program for fire protection and for conducting independent verification and review for compliance with Fire Protection Program requirements.
9.5.1.1.2 Use of Combustible Materials
The use of combustible materials at the Salem Generating Station is controlled by station procedures. Administrative controls are established to minimize the quantity of combustibles 1) in safety related areas, 2) in areas that present an exposure to safety related equipment, and 3) in areas designated as
combustible control zones.
Procedures outline the methods to be used to ensure safe handling and limitations on the use of combustibles.
The use of ordinary combustibles such as paper, wood and plastic is minimized in the station. When wood is used for scaffolding, it is of the flame
retardant type.
The bulk storage of hydrogen is in a separate area, outside plant structures.
Additional hydrogen storage is in the Turbine Building and on the Auxiliary Building Roof. Signs are posted in the storage areas prohibiting smoking, open flames, and spark producing equipment.
Bulk Class A materials, such as charcoal filter medium, are not stored in safety related areas of the station.
Bulk quantities of flammable liquids are not stored at Salem. Combustible liquids stored in buildings containing safety related equipment are limited to
the Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Day Tanks.
Each Diesel Generator Day Tank is located in a concrete enclosure and is protected by a manual CO 2 flooding system. The tanks are vented to the outside and the vents are equipped with flame arresters.
Each diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tank is located in a separate room enclosed by fire barriers. The tanks are vented to the outside with provisions to prevent overpressurization. Each tank is located in an enclosure that is
designed to hold the entire volume of the tank.
9.5-4 SGS-UFSAR Revision 29 January 30, 2017
Chemicals are stored in the primary and secondary water chemistry laboratories. The quantities of chemicals stored in the labs are minimal, and are stored in metal cabinets. 9.5.1.1.3 Control of Ignition Sources Procedures are established to ensure safe operating practices whenever hot-work operations are performed. Hot-work permits and fire watches are required to protect safety related equipment from fire damage or loss resulting from work involving ignition sources, welding, cutting, grinding, and open flame type work. Procedures also prohibit the use of open flame or combustion smoke for ventilation leak testing that presents a potential ignition source. Smoking is prohibited in vital plant areas. 9.5.1.1.4 Testing and Maintenance of Fire Protection Systems The Salem Generating Station suppression and detection systems are periodically tested in accordance with station procedures to verify their operability. Systems that do not satisfy acceptance criteria are restored to operable condition in a timely fashion. As specified in Generic Letters 86-10 and 88-12, fire protection system requirements were removed from the Salem Technical Specifications after the FSAR was updated to incorporate the Fire Protection Program. The limiting Conditions for Operations and Surveillance Requirements formerly contained within Technical Specifications have been incorporated into Administrative and Surveillance Procedures respectively. 9.5.1.1.5 Quality Assurance Program for Fire Protection The Quality Assurance Program at Salem Generating Station assures that the requirements for design, procurement, installation, testing, and administrative controls for the fire protection program for safety related areas are satisfied. 9.5-5 SGS-UFSAR Revision 29 January 30, 2017 The QA program for fire protection is part of the overall station QA program and contains the following elements: DESIGN CONTROL AND PROCUREMENT DOCUMENT CONTROL Design control and procurement document control measures are established to assure that applicable NRC guidelines are included in design and procurement, and that design changes and deviations are adequately reviewed and approved. INSTRUCTIONS, PROCEDURES, AND DRAWINGS Instructions, procedures, and drawings govern the fire protection program of inspection, tests, administrative controls, fire drills, and training. CONTROL OF PURCHASED MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES Control of purchased material, equipment, and services are established to assure that these items conform to procurement documents. INSPECTIONS A program for the inspection of activities affecting fire protection is established to verify conformance to documented installation drawings and test procedures. TEST AND CONTROL A test program is established to ensure that testing is performed and verified by inspection and audit to demonstrate conformance with fire protection requirements. 9.5-6 SGS-UFSAR Revision 13 June 12, 1994 INSPECTION, TEST AND OPERATING STATUS Inspection, test, and operating status measures are established to provide for the identification of items that have satisfactorily passed required tests and inspections. NONCONFORMING ITEMS Measures are established to control items that do not conform to specified requirements to prevent inadvertent use in fire protection installations. CORRECTIVE ACTION Corrective action measures are established at the station to ensure that conditions adverse to fire protection such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective components, uncontrolled combustible materials, and non-conformances are promptly identified, reported, and corrected. RECORDS Records are prepared and maintained to furnish evidence that the QA program criteria are being met for those activities affecting the fire protection program. AUDITS Audits of activities affecting quality are performed by the Nuclear Oversight Department. 9.5-7 SGS-UFSAR Revision 22 May 5, 2006 9.5.1.1.6 Fire Brigade The Salem Fire Brigade consists of full time dedicated fire fighting personnel with a minimum of five trained fire fighting personnel onsite at all times with provisions for a 2-hour call out to cover emergency absences. At least three of the on-shift fire brigade members are knowledgeable in Salem's safety systems to understand the effects of fire and fire suppressants on safe shutdown capability. 9.5.1.1.7 Fire Brigade Training and Drills The fire brigade training program ensures that the capability to fight potential fires is established and maintained. The program consists of classroom training, fire fighting practice, and fire drills. The fire brigade training is provided by individuals who are knowledgeable and qualified by previous training, and experienced in the use of available equipment and in fighting the fires that could occur at the Salem Station. 9.5.1.1.8 Fire Drills Fire brigade drills are conducted quarterly for each fire brigade shift. The drills are conducted in areas where simulated fires of the type, size, and arrangement that could reasonably occur and develop during the response and organization time of the fire brigade. Drills are conducted so that each fire brigade member can participate in each drill, but must participate in at least two drills per year. At least one drill per year is held on the back shift. At least one drill per year is unannounced. An engineer who is qualified as Member Grade in the Society of Fire Protection Engineers and who is not an employee of PSEG, critiques a randomly scheduled unannounced drill. This drill is conducted at 3 year intervals as part of the Triennial Fire Protection Program audit and inspection. 9.5-8 SGS-UFSAR Revision 21 December 6, 2004 9.5.1.1.9 Fire Brigade Equipment The fire brigade is provided with complete personal protective gear, emergency communication equipment, portable lights, portable ventilation equipment, and self contained breathing units. 9.5.1.1.10 Off-Site Fire Department Training of the plant fire brigade is coordinated with the local fire department to ensure that the responsibilities and duties of the brigade and the offsite fire departments are delineated in advance of any fire. 9.5.1.2 Plant Construction Features 9.5.1.2.1 Fire Areas and Barriers Fire areas are established to separate redundant trains of safe shutdown equipment from each other, to isolate safety-related systems from fire hazards in non-safety related areas, to separate Salem Unit 1 from Salem Unit 2 and to limit the spread of fire through the station by compartmentalization. Fire area boundaries have been defined and evaluated as part of the Salem Fire Protection Program. Construction which does not meet specific rating criteria is either evaluated by an engineering evaluation in accordance with Generic Letter 86-10 or is included in an approved exemption request. 9.5.1.2.2 Penetration Seals At Salem Generating Station, openings through fire barriers for pipe, conduit, and cable trays which separate fire areas are sealed or closed to provide a fire resistance rating equal to that required of the barrier or have been evaluated and determined adequate to 9.5-9 SGS-UFSAR Revision 13 June 12, 1994 withstand the fire hazard in the area in accordance with Generic Letter 86-10. In some areas, exemption requests rather than engineering evaluations form the basis for approval of specific seals/openings. 9.5.1.2.3 Fire Doors Doors that are installed in fire area boundaries carry the UL label, with the exception of oversize doors, which cannot be tested. Fire area boundary doors, enclosing fire areas which are not normally locked, are either provided with a time delay alarm to indicate when the door has been left open, or are routinely inspected. Reliability of the fire doors are enhanced by inspections and administrative controls, which ensure the operability of the fire doors. PSE&G has been granted a generic exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Section III .G. 2 (a) which allows the use of 1-1/2 hour fire rated doors in 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barriers based on maintaining a limited combustible loading in the affected areas. 9.5.1.2.4 Fire Dampers At Salem Generating Station, 1-1/2 hour and 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated fire dampers are installed in locations where HVAC ducts pass through fire area boundaries. Most of the fire dampers installed at Salem Generating Station are located within the HVAC duct and are not within the plane of the penetrated fire barrier. PSE&G has either 1) been granted a generic exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Section III.G.2(a) which allows this installation as well as the use of 1 -1/2 hour fire rated dampers, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> rated ventilation ducts and ventilation duct penetration seals in 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barriers based on maintaining a limited combustible loading in the affected areas or 2) performed an engineering evaluation in accordance with Generic Letter 86-10 to demonstrate the installation is adequate for the hazard. 9.5-10 SGS-UFSAR Revision 21 December 6, 2004 9.5.1.2.5 Cable Wrap Cable wraps are used at Salem Generating Station to enclose redundant cabling. The cable wraps used at Salem are qualified as 1-hour electrical raceway fire barrier systems in accordance with the guidance of Supplement 1 to Generic Letter 86-10. 9.5.1.2.6 Partial Height, Partial Length Marinite Walls At Salem Generating Station, partial height, partial length marinite walls are used to separate equipment needed for safe shutdown in the Lower Electrical Penetration Area (Fire Areas 1&2FA-EP-78C). The technical justification for these partial walls separating safe shutdown equipment is provided in an approved exemption request. 9.5.1.2.7 Reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection System The Reactor Coolant Pump Bearing Lube Oil Lift Pumps are protected with fixed water fire suppression systems. The discharge from these systems is directed to four reactor coolant pump oil drain tanks that are designed to act as oil skimming tanks. These tanks retain the oil and allow the water to drain to the Containment Sumps. 9.5-11 SGS-UFSAR Revision 21 December 6, 2004 In addition, a Reactor Coolant Pump Lube Oil Collection System is provided. The oil collection system is engineered, designed and installed so that there is reasonable assurance that its failure will not lead to fire during normal or design basis accident conditions. The oil collection system consists of a series of collection pans and drainage piping that is capable of collecting lube oil from potential pressurized and unpressurized leakage points in the reactor coolant pump lube oil system. Oil leakage is drained and collected to vented closed containers. A flame arrester is provided in the vent system of the oil collection tanks. 9.5.1.2.8 Radiant Energy Shields Inside Containment, concentrations of electrical cables converge at the electrical penetration areas. Radiant energy shields are placed between the divisions so that radiant energy from a fire involving the cabling of one division would not damage cables of the other divisions. 9.5-12 SGS-UFSAR Revision 21 December 6, 2004 9.5.1.2.9 Electrical Cable Construction Tests have been performed to demonstrate the flame retardant properties of the cables used at Salem Generating Station in accordance with or equivalent to IEEE 383, or the UL single conductor test. Short sections of non-qualified cable may be used for lighting or communications circuits, or may be contained within vendor supplied panels or conduits. 9.5.1.3 Safe Shutdown Capability For the Salem units, the term "post-fire safe shutdown" refers both to the capability to achieve and maintain hot standby, as well as the capability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown. To demonstrate a post-fire safe shutdown capability, a number of discrete tasks were performed. For the first task, a safe shutdown methodology was established. The safe shutdown methodology essentially provides a scenario for shutting down the plant, i.e., the process by which reactivity is controlled and decay heat is removed. Utilizing the shutdown methodology, the systems (i.e., Auxiliary Feedwater) and components (pumps, valves, etc.) within the systems, necessary for safe shutdown, were identified for the second task. Concurrent with this task, the plant has been subdivided into "fire areas." The fire-rated boundaries provide reasonable assurance that a fire will be confined to the specific plant sections and will not spread beyond the boundaries. Because fire areas restrict the spread of fire, the overall task is reduced to demonstrating a post-fire shutdown capability for any one particular area at a time. 9.5-13 SGS-UFSAR Revision 21 December 6, 2004 Utilizing both the fire areas and the identified shutdown components, the next task was to identify circuits/ cables necessary to operate these components along with the conduit and raceway routing of the cables. The conduits and raceways were then identified as to which fire area they were located. With the shutdown methodology and fire area boundaries defined and the location of components and cables identified, the final task, the process of fire area assessments, was then performed. The fire area assessment evaluated the components and cables within a particular fire area to determine if the capability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown existed. The following compliance strategies were evaluated: 1. Compliance with III.G.1.a -One success path of hot shutdown equipment is free of fire damage from either the control room or an emergency control station (manual action) . 2. Compliance with III.G.1.b-Cold shutdown equipment could be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. 3. Compliance with III.G.2 Appropriate separation, fire enclosures, suppression and detection systems are provided in the area of concern. 4. Compliance with III.G.3-Alternative shutdown capability is provided. The results of these tasks are discussed in the sections below. 9.5.1.3.1 Development of the Safe Shutdown Model and Identification of Systems and Components The shutdown model provides the overall methodology for shutting down the plant in the event of a fire. In developing a shutdown scenario, the following assumptions and initial conditions were utilized as follows: a. At any give time, only one fire would occur (i.e., if a fire were to occur at Salem Unit 1, a fire is not postulated to occur simultaneously at Salem Unit 2). b. A fire could not occur concurrent with other plant accidents or severe natural occurrences (seismic events). 9.5-14 SGS-UFSAR Revision 21 December 6, 2004
- c. During the course of the post-fire shutdown, the plant would not experience an additional, random single active failure. These assumptions are consistent with the requirements of Appendix R. Further, the shutdown scenario considered that the units were operating at full power conditions and that offsite power may be available or unavailable for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. An evaluation was performed for the Salem plant to determine whether or not offsite power would be lost in each fire area. For fire areas that rely on equipment (for example eves cross-tie, HSD Panel cross-tie, Service Water cross-tie) from the opposite unit (non-fire unit) to support post-fire shutdown of the unit experiencing the fire, an accident on the non-fire unit is not assumed to occur. An orderly shutdown of the non-fire unit will be performed when accident mitigation equipment is utilized from the non-fire unit for a prolonged period of time to support the post-fire shutdown of the unit experiencing the fire. Appropriate technical specification actions for the non-fire unit are entered for the accident mitigation equipment that is utilized to support the fire affected unit. The shutdown model scenario addresses the Appendix R criteria for achieving and maintaining hot standby and cold shutdown conditions through the five basic performance goals delineated in Section III.L of Appendix R. The performance goals for post-fire shutdown are reactivity control, reactor coolant inventory control, decay heat removal, process monitoring and support functions. A sixth performance goal of reactor coolant system pressure control is inferred from the basic five performance goals. These performance goals are discussed in Programmatic Standard DE-PS. ZZ-0001-A3-SSA, "Salem Fire Protection Report Safe Shutdown Analysis". 9.5.1.3.2 Identification of Cables As part of the Appendix R safe shutdown analysis process, a cable identification methodology was established to identify any cable that would be required for operation of a safe shutdown component or whose fire-induced damage may result in spurious actuation of a safe shutdown component. These cables are referred to as 11 safe shutdown cables 11* The process for identification of safe shutdown cables is discussed in Programmatic Standard DE-PS.ZZ-0001-A4, "Salem Fire Protection Report -Safe Shutdown Cables". 9.5-15 SGS-UFSAR Revision 21 December 6, 2004 The cable routings are traced to their termination or to an isolation device that would prevent the feedback of faults or spurious signals. Power cables are traced back to the switchgear, MCC, or distribution panel. The switchgear, MCC, and distribution panels are considered as separate components and devices. The above process was utilized for all devices and fire areas, except for the Diesel Generator Rooms and for the Safeguards and Solid State Protection Signals. Numerous cables exist between the diesel generators and their control panels. For the most part, the wiring between the engine and generator and the control panels are contained within the respective fire areas. Therefore, only those cables which were routed outside the respective diesel generator and control panel areas were recorded on input forms and subsequently their routes traced throughout the plant. For devices associated with the Safeguards and Solid State Protection Signals, cabling was traced back to the cabinet or panel which provides the protective function. 9.5.1.3.3 Associated Circuits 9.5.1.3.3.1 Common Power Supply The post-fire safe shutdown equipment is powered from the various levels of the vi tal and non-vi tal power distribution system. Associated circuits with a common power source would, then, be limited to non-shutdown loads (loads which are not utilized for shutdown, such as containment spray pumps) from the vital buses. The non-vital buses are electrically separated from the vital buses. In general, electrical protection has been applied to all loads of the vi tal buses. Thus, the vital buses are electrically protected from the non-shutdown loads by coordinated breakers and fuses. In those instances where complete coordination has not been applied, the non-shutdown loads were considered equivalent to shutdown circuits and subjected to the separation/protection requirements of Section I I I. G of Appendix R. In some fire areas where non-vital loads are utilized for post-fire safe shutdown, the non-vital busses are electrically separated from these fire areas thus ensuring coordination from non-safe shutdown loads. 9.5-16 SGS-UFSAR Revision 21 December 6, 2004 9.5.1.3.3.2 Spurious Operations For the spurious operation case of associated circuits, it was necessary to demonstrate that fire induced spurious actuation of equipment would not adversely impact the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. The shutdown model identified for each shutdown function and flow path, those components whose spurious operation would adversely impact the particular function and/or flow path. These components were then treated as safe shutdown components. For example, if the spurious closure of a valve would block a service water flow path, then that valve was considered necessary for operation of that flow path. For each fire area, the unprotected spurious operation components were evaluated to Generic Letter 86-10 and 81-12 criteria. The cabling for these components was also evaluated with respect to the ability of fire-induced failures that could result in spurious actuations of the component. The cable failure modes considered included hot shorts, open circuits and shorts to ground. Power cables for motor-operated valves that do not have to be repositioned were not protected since loss of those cables cannot cause the valve to change position. Special consideration was given to the valves comprising high-low pressure interfaces. For the high-low pressure interfaces, five sets of interfaces were identified and evaluated, as follows: the pressurizer PORV and block valve lines, the reactor head vent lines, the residual heat removal suction lines, the letdown lines and the excess letdown lines. Further details of the high-low pressure interface valves is discussed in Programmatic Standard DE-PS. ZZ-0001-A3-SSA, "Salem Fire Protection Report -Safe Shutdown Analysis". 9.5-17 SGS-UFSAR Revision 21 December 6, 2004 9.5.1.3.3.3 Common Enclosure For the common enclosure case of associated circuits, it was necessary to demonstrate that fire-induced failure in non-shutdown cables would not electrically or physically propagate a fire to the shutdown cables. Design criteria provides for field routed cabling to meet IEEE-383 requirements. Essentially the cabling utilized will not result in propagation of a fire. As part of the safe shutdown cable identification process, cabling directly connected to the circuit of a safe shutdown component was considered part of the circuit unless it was separated by an isolation device. Thus, any non-electrically isolated circuit is considered part of the safe shutdown cables. In addition, the cable separation requirements for Salem eliminates a common enclosure concern related to cable installation. The vital channels, "A," "B," "C," and "D" are required to be routed in separate trays and conduits. The electrical divisions 460V, 230V, and 4kV power are also required to be routed in a separate tray or conduit. In addition, channels of non-vital cabling "H," "E," "F," and "G" are designated such that they are routed with only one particular vi tal channel. Further, the rating of the cables utilized in the Salem units are such that fire-induced shorting or grounding would result in a blown fuse or a tripped breaker before significant degradation of the cabling itself. 9.5.1.3.4 Alternate Shutdown Capability For the Salem units, alternate shutdown capability is utilized for the Control Room Complex, the Relay Rooms, the 460V Switchgear Rooms, the 4160V Switchgear Rooms, the Reactor Plant Auxiliary Equipment Areas ( 64' and 84' elevations), and the 11 and 21 Component Cooling Pump Rooms. The alternate shutdown capability is primarily procedural control of the same post-fire shutdown equipment utilized for the other plant areas with the exception of the eves cross-tie, ASDS inverter cross-tie, the Service Water cross-tie and the use of Main Feedwater. The CVCS system cross-tie is discussed in detail in Section 9. 3. 4. 9.5-18 SGS-UFSAR Revision 21 December 6, 2004 The Hot Shutdown Panel has the capability to transfer electric power from the unaffected unit to the unit experiencing the fire in the event that the normal AC power feed to the Hot Shutdown Panel is lost due to the fire. Operating procedures were developed to accomplish individual functions (pump start/stop operation, valve open/close operation, diesel operations, etc.) for use by the operator as necessary. The procedures can be accomplished utilizing onsite shift personnel, exclusive of the fire department personnel. The onsite shift personnel staffing for post-fire shutdown is controlled by administrative procedure. Emergency lighting is provided to implement the shutdown process. The manual actions performed to achieve Hot Standby are evaluated for feasibility (accessibility, habitability, emergency lighting). As discussed in detail in the following sections for each fire area, certain alternate shutdown areas require the utilization of equipment from the opposite unit to perform cold shutdown functions. These cold shutdown evolutions consist of either use of the installed service water cross-tie or running temporary power cables from the opposite unit to facilitate bringing the fire affected unit to cold shutdown. Prior to use of equipment from the non-fire unit to perform cold shutdown functions in the fire unit, the non-fire unit will commence an orderly shutdown and be placed in a mode where the equipment is not required for accident mitigation. 9.5.1.4.3.1 Control Room or Relay Room Scenarios A fire in either of these areas may require the evacuation of the Control Room. The ability to achieve and maintain Hot Standby and Cold Shutdown for these areas consists of the use of normal shutdown systems controlled from emergency control stations (Hot Shutdown Panel and local manual actions). 9.5.1.4.3.2 4160V and 460V Switchgear Room Scenarios A fire in either of these areas may require the evacuation of the Control Room. The ability to achieve and maintain Hot Standby and Cold Shutdown for these areas consists of the following: 9.5-19 SGS-UFSAR Revision 21 December 6, 2004
- Use of the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) cross-tie from the unaffected unit for seal injection, boration, and inventory control during the shutdown process.
- Use of the Service Water System header" aligned from the opposite unit to provide cooling to the CCW heat exchangers to support RHR system operation for Cold Shutdown.
- Use of a CCW and RHR pump powered from the opposite unit's switchgear (by a Cold Shutdown repair to route a power cable from the opposite unit's switchgear to the pump motors).
- Cross-connecting the ASDS power supply from the opposite unit to the HSD panel to support the shutdown process. 9.5.1.3.4.3 Reactor Plant Auxiliary Equipment Area, Elev. 84' Scenarios The ability to achieve and maintain Hot Standby from the Control Room for this area consists of the following:
- Use of the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) cross-tie from the unaffected unit for seal injection, boration, and inventory control during the shutdown process.
- Use of off-site power. The use of off-site power, in lieu of on-site emergency diesel generators, is considered an acceptable alternative to the requirements of Section III.L.3 of 10CFR50 Appendix R (See section 9.5.1.4.5.2.a).
- Use of the Main Feedwater system for decay heat removal.
- Use of the Service Water System as described below. Other than the CVCS cross-ties and the Main Feedwater system, Hot Standby will be achieved using normal shutdown systems. The service water system cabling for all six service water pumps is routed through this area. To ensure the availability of the service water for Hot Standby, an evaluation has been performed that demonstrates that at least two service water pumps would remain available due to a distance separation of over 75 horizontal feet with intervening combustible loads. This distance separation ensures that either the A-channel service water pumps or the B and C-channel service water pumps would remain available. 9.5-20 SGS-UFSAR Revision 21 December 6, 2004 9.5.1.3.4.4 11 and 21 Component Cooling Pump Area, Elev. 84' Scenarios The ability to achieve and maintain Hot Standby for this area consists of the use of alternate shutdown capability, independent of the fire area, in the form of the eves cross-tie from the unaffected unit for seal injection, boration, and inventory control during the shutdown process. Other than the eves cross-tie, Hot Standby will be achieved using normal shutdown systems. 9.5.1.3.4.5 Reactor Plant Auxiliary Equipment Area, Elev. 64' Scenarios The ability to achieve and maintain Hot Standby for this area consists of the following:
- Use of alternative shutdown capability, independent of the fire area, in the form of the eves cross-tie from the unaffected unit for seal injection, boration, and inventory control.
- Use of off-site power. The use of off-site power, in lieu of on-site emergency diesel generators, is considered an acceptable alternative to the requirements of Section III.L.3 of 10CFR50 Appendix R (See section 9.5.1.3.5.2.b). Other than the eves cross-tie, Hot Standby will be achieved using normal shutdown systems. The ability to achieve and maintain Cold Shutdown for this area includes repairs to restore power to CCW system components and alignment of the Service Water cross-tie. 9.5.1.3.5 10CFR50 Appendix R Exemption Requests and Deviations PSE&G has received NRC approval of exemptions and deviations from the applicable requirements of Appendix R. The exemptions and deviations which have been granted by the NRC are described in Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs) and summarized below: a. Generic Exemption Station Wide This exemption is from Section III.G.2a to the extent that 1-1/2 hour fire rated doors and dampers, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> fire-rated ventilation ducts and their penetration seals, and non-rated equipment hatches do not provide 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 9.5-21 SGS-UFSAR Revision 21 December 6, 2004 fire-rated barriers between areas containing redundant shutdown systems, equipment, cables and associated circuits.
Current Status:
Granted 7/20/89. Active.
Exemption no longer necessary in current revision to DE-PS.ZZ-0001(Q) SFPR-SSA for fire areas FA-DG-84F, FA-DG-84G and FA
-DG-84H b. Control Room Complex (Area 12 FA
-AB-122A)
This exemption is from Section III.G.3 of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 to the extent it requires a fixed fire suppression system for an area where alternate shutdown capability is provided. Specifically, the Salem Units 1 and 2 Control
Room Complex does not have a fixed fire suppression system.
Current Status:
Granted 7/20/89. Active.
- c. Reactor Plant Auxiliary Equipment Area - Elevation 100 ft. and 110 ft.
Upper Electrical Penetration Area (Areas 1 and 2 FA
-EP-100G) Inner Piping Penetration Area (Areas 1 and 2 FA
-PP-100H)
These exemptions are from the requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 in the above-referenced areas to the extent that it requires the separation of redundant safe shutdown cables and equipment by 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> fire-rated barriers plus automatic fire suppression and detection systems. Specifically, these locations are not protected by automatic fire suppression systems or area
-wide fire detection systems.
Current Status:
Exemption requests for Fire Areas 100G and 100H were withdrawn in 1998.
- d. Reactor Plant Auxiliary Building Elev. 64 ft. Areas 1 and 2 FA
-AB-64B This exemption/deviation is from the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.G.3 to the extent that a fixed suppression system is not installed for an area where alternative shutdown capability is provided.
Specifically, Fire Area 1 (2)
-FA-AB-64B, Reactor Plant Auxiliary Building In addition, an exemption/deviation from the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.L.3 to the extent that alternative shutdown capability must accommodate conditions where offsite power is not available for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Specifically, Fire Area 1 (2)
-FA-AB-64B, Reactor Plant Auxiliary Building alternative shutdown capability.
Current Status:
Unit 1 Exemption granted 6/24/03.
Unit 2 Deviation granted 1/7/04.
9.5-22 SGS-UFSAR Revision 29 January 30, 2017
- e. Mechanical Penetration Areas (Fire Areas 1 and 2 FA-MP-78I) This exemption is from Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10CFR50 to the extent it requires the separation of redundant cables and equipment by 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> rated fire barriers plus area-wide suppression and detection. Specifically, Fire Areas 1 and 2 FA-MP-781 are not protected by automatic suppression systems and area-wide detection capability. Current Status: Granted 7/20/89. Active Exemption no longer necessary in current revision to DE-PS.ZZ-0001 (Q) SFPR-SSA for Fire Area FA-MP-781. f. 460V Switchgear Room (Areas 1 and 2 FA-AB-84A) Lower Electrical Penetration Area (Areas 1 and 2 FA-EP-78C) 4160V Switchgear Room (Areas 1 and 2 FA-A8-64A) These exemptions are from the requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 in the above-referenced areas to the extent that it requires the separation of redundant safe shutdown equipment by 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> fire-rated barriers plus automatic suppression and detection systems. Specifically, redundant safe shutdown systems are not protected by complete, 1-hour fire barriers. In addition, the fire suppression system in the 4160V Switchgear Room is manually actuated. Current Status: Granted 7/20/89. Area FA-EP-78C) Active (remains in effect for Fire Exemptions are no longer necessary in current revision to DE-PS.ZZ-0001 (Q) SFPR-SSA for Fire Areas FA-AB-64A and FA-AB-84A. The fire suppression system in the 4160V Switchgear Room is automatically actuated. g. Reactor Plant Auxiliary Equipment Area -Elevation 84 ft. (Areas 1 and 2 FA-A8-848) This exemption/deviation is from the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.L.3 to the extent that alternative shutdown capability must accommodate post fire conditions where offsite power is not available for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Specifically, Fire Area 1 (2) FA-A8-848, Reactor Plant Auxiliary Equipment Area Elevation 84', relies upon offsite power for alternative shutdown capability. This area also relies on spatial separation for cables associated with the service water system to ensure post-fire operation of a minimum of two service water pumps. 9.5-23 SGS-UFSAR Revision 24 May 11, 2009 Current Status: Unit 1 Exemption granted 6/24/03. Unit 2 Deviation granted 1/7/04. h. Residual Heat Removal Pump and Heat Exchanger Areas (Areas 1 and 2 FA-AB-45A and B) This exemption is from the technical requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 to the extent that it requires the separation of redundant safe shutdown systems by complete 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire-rated barriers. Specifically, redundant cables in these areas are separated by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated walls with open penetrations. Current Status: Granted 7/20/89. Active i. Containment (Areas 1 and 2 FA-RC-78) This exemption is from the requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 to the extent that it requires that redundant cables and equipment within containment be separated by at least 2 0 feet of horizontal distance free of intervening combustibles or be separated by a radiant energy shield. Current Status: Granted 7/20/89. Active j. Pipe Tunnel-Elevation 84 feet (Area 12 FA-PT-84) This exemption is from the technical requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 to the extent that it requires that redundant shutdown systems be separated by at least 20 feet free of intervening combustibles and be protected by automatic fire detection and suppression systems. Specifically, redundant systems are separated by less than 20 feet and the tunnel is not protected by an automatic fire suppression system. Current Status: Granted 7/20/89. Active k. co2Equipment Room -Elevation 84 feet (Areas 1 and 2 FA-DG-84F) This exemption is from the technical requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 to the extent that it requires separation of redundant shutdown systems by 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> fire barriers and protection by automatic fire detection and suppression systems. Specifically, redundant shutdown cables are not protected by an automatic fire suppression system. 9.5-24 SGS-UFSAR Revision 21 December 6, 2004 Current Status: Granted 7/20/89. Active Exemption no longer necessary in current revision to DE-PS.ZZ-0001 (Q) SFPR-SSA for Fire Area FA-DG-84F. 1. Reactor Plant Auxiliary Equipment Area -Elevation 100 feet (Areas 1 and 2 FA-AB-100C) This exemption is from the technical requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10CFR50 to the extent that it requires separation of redundant shutdown systems by 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> fire barriers and protection by automatic fire detection and suppression systems. Specifically, redundant shutdown cables are not protected by an automatic fire suppression system. Current Status: Granted 7/20/89. Active Exemption no longer necessary in current revision to DE-PS.ZZ-0001 (Q) SFPR-SSA for Fire Area FA-AB-100C. m. 11 (21) Component cooling Pump Area -Elevation 84 ft. (Areas 1 and 2 FA-AB-84C) This exemption/deviation is from the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section I I I. G. 3 to the extent that a fixed suppression system is not installed for an area where alternative shutdown capability is provided. Specifically, Fire Area 1 (2)-FA-AB-84C, Component Cooling Water 11 (21) Pump and Heat Exchanger Area -Elevation 84', is not provided with a fixed suppression system. Current Status: 9.5.1.5 9.5.1.5.1 Unit 1 Exemption granted 6/24/03. Unit 2 Deviation granted 1/7/04. Support Equipment Emergency Lighting The lighting system at Salem Generating Station consists of normal lighting, emergency lighting, self-contained emergency battery lighting, and portable hand held lights. A description of the complete system is contained in Section 9.5.3.1 of the Salem UFSAR. 9.5-25 SGS-UFSAR Revision 21 December 6, 2004 The emergency lighting provided for Appendix R safe shutdown is a self-contained lighting system consisting of fixed and portable hand held lights. Each lighting unit consists of a battery, charger, lights and electronics and it is rated to supply 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of lighting. The fixed lighting units are energized automatically upon a loss of power and they are located in access routes to and within areas where shutdown functions must be performed. The portable hand held lighting units are located in the Appendix R locker and they are used as a supplement to the fixed lighting units and for exterior access and egress to operate safe shutdown equipment outside the power block. 9.5.1.5.2 Portable Radios A portable radio communication system as described in Section 9. 5. 2 of the Salem UFSAR is provided for use of the fire brigade as well as operations personnel involved in emergency activities. This system does not interfere with the communication equipment of the security force. For post fire safe shutdown, the operators will use portable hand held radios. The radio system including repeaters and power supplies has been designed to be available for a fire in any of the alternate shutdown areas. 9.5.1.5.3 Ventilation and Smoke Removal Ventilation systems for the station were not specifically designed to provide automatic smoke and heat venting. Natural convection type ventilation is not used at this station. The station ventilation systems provide forced-convection flows for specific areas. Smoke and corrosive gases from a fire may be discharged directly to the outdoors by nature of the once-through ventilation design applied throughout the station (with the exception of the Reactor Containment). Ventilation systems serving the safety related areas are controlled from the Control Room. A special part of the 9.5-26 SGS-UFSAR Revision 21 December 6, 2004 Control Area Air Conditioning System, designated Emergency Air Conditioning System (EACS) contains special equipment to ensure habitability of the Control Room under all operating conditions. 9.5.1.6 Fire Detection 9.5.1.6.1 Fire Detection and Alarm System The Salem Generating Station fire detection and alarm systems are designed and installed as a "Class B" supervised signaling system. The system is not a safety related system and is not designed to record system signals. The primary purpose of the proprietary protective signaling system is to detect fire during its early stages of development and initiate an alarm to minimize the adverse impact of fire on buildings, systems, and components. In addition, these signal systems provide release of selected extinguishing systems. Annunciation functions are displayed on the Fire Protection System Panel in each Control Room. The overhead annunciator in each Control Room indicates alarm and trouble signals, as well as loss of DC power. Several different types of fire detectors are used at Salem Generation Station. The majority of detectors are ionization chamber smoke detectors. The detection system also utilized other types of fire detectors such as rate of rise, fixed temperature heat detectors, photoelectric, and rate compensated detectors. The number and placement of fire detectors was determined by considering the configuration of the space protected. NFPA 72E, Automatic Fire Detectors, was used as a guideline for the placement of fire detectors except where alternative spacing was judged acceptable by a Member grade fire protection engineer. All of the fire detection systems are of the Class B supervised circuit type. 9.5-27 SGS-UFSAR Revision 24 May 11, 2009
- 9. 5 .1. 7 Fire Suppression Systems 9.5.1.7.1 Water Supply Fresh water for fire protection is stored in two independent fresh water storage tanks. Each tank has a capacity of 350,000 gallons; 300,000 gallons of which are reserved for fire protection use and 50,000 gallons available for domestic service. The largest system demand is 1544 gpm at 74 psig for a main power transformer. Each tank is therefore capable of supplying the greatest system demand plus an additional 500 gpm for hose streams for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, representing 100% redundant capacity. Two redundant diesel driven fire pumps are Station, each rated for 2500 gpm at 135 psig. provided at Salem Generating Each pump has its own driver with independent power supplies and controls mounted on a structural steel base and controlled by a combined manual and automatic panel. In addition, a pressure maintenance (jockey) pump provides system pressurization. The fire pump suction piping and valve arrangement allows either pump to take water from either or both fresh water storage tanks. Isolation valves have been provided in the supply headers. A separate discharge header from each fire pump connects to the underground yard fire main loop which encircles the station. The two fire pumps and their associated fuel oil day tanks are located in one room. The room is provided with a wet pipe sprinkler system. Floor drains are provided which would limit the spread of oil in the event of a leaking oil tank. Each fire pump is mounted on a 12-inch high concrete pedestal. These alternative fire protection provisions were found acceptable by the NRC in lieu of locating the fire pumps in separate fire areas. 9.5-28 SGS-UFSAR Revision 29 January 30, 2017 The pressure maintenance pump is used to supply water to makeup for minor system leaks, and to avoid frequent starting of the fire pumps from minor system fluctuations. Should the jockey pump be unable to maintain pressure, and the system pressure falls, the first fire pump automatically starts. Once this pump starts, it will continue to run until it is manually shut off at its control cabinet located in the Fire Pump House. Should the first fire pump fail to start or if there is a large demand for fire water, and the system pressure continues to fall, the second fire pump automatically starts to maintain system pressure. The second fire pump will also continue to pump until it is manually shut off at its control cabinet in the Fire Pump House. The fire pumps can only be stopped at the fire pump controller with the manual switch. Each of the fire pumps is equipped with operating alarms which appear on the fire pump Control Cabinet, and any one of these alarms will also sound the trouble alarm on the Unit 1 Control Room overhear annunciator. The fire pumps discharge into an underground main surrounding the plant. Fire hydrants, installed in the station yard areas, tie into the fire main loop. Each hydrant is equipped with two 2-1/2 inch hose connectors. The hydrants are located strategically within the protected area. Hoses and associated equipment are provided by mobile means such as trucks and/or hose carts. The quantity of mobile equipment is equivalent to the equipment that would be supplied by three hose houses per NFPA 24. A looped header located inside the plant buildings is also supplied from the underground loop. Connections from the underground distribution main enter the Turbine and Auxiliary Buildings to supply a header at the perimeter of the Turbine-Generator area, and another header through the center of the Auxiliary Building. The pipe is sectionalized by valves which permit the use of selected lengths in the event any section of piping is damaged. The indoor header supplies fire water to the various deluge water spray systems, sprinkler systems and standpipes located throughout the Auxiliary Building Containment, Turbine Generator area, Service Building, Administrative Building and main transformer area. 9.5-29 SGS-UFSAR Revision 13 June 12, 1994 Approved post indicator type valves or curb valves are provided in the yard main and in supply headers to the buildings to allow for isolating hydrants and portions of the piping system during maintenance and repair periods without shutting off the entire system. Each sprinkler, deluge and standpipe supply line is equipped with an approved gate valve. Valves in supply lines to fire water sprinkler systems, deluge system, and standpipe valves located inside buildings, are locked in the correct position and periodically checked by surveillance or periodic test procedures. Hose standpipe isolation valves and yard main post indicators are provided with locking devices. Supervision of key operated hydrant isolation valves (curb valves) which are not locked is maintained by strict control of the key wrenches which have been assigned to responsible station personnel. performed periodically. In addition, visual checks of all valves are 9.5.1.7.2 Sprinkler and Water Spray Systems Three types of water based suppression systems are utilized at Salem Generating Station: o Wet Pipe Sprinklers o Dry Pipe Sprinklers o Water Spray Systems All systems are provided with alarms in the Control Room which indicate system operation. The locations for each type of system are as follows: o Wet Pipe Sprinklers Closed head wet pipe sprinkler systems are installed in the following areas: SGS-UFSAR 9.5-30 Revision 13 June 12, 1994
- 1. Service Building -Elevations 88, 100, 113, and 127 2. Fire Pump House -Elevation 100 3. Heating Boiler House -Elevation 100 4. Turbine Perimeter-Elevations 88, 100, and 120 5. Auxiliary Building Drumming & Baling Storage Area, and Truck Bay 6. Auxiliary Building Resin Storage Area 7. Cable Vaults carrying cable between the Auxiliary Building and Turbine Building 8. Clean facilities building 0 Elevations 100, 119, and 132. 9. Auxiliary Building Charging and Safety Injection Pumps -Elevation 84 10. Deleted 11. Administration Building, Elevation 100 o Dry Pipe Sprinklers Two closed head dry pipe pre-action type sprinkler systems are provided for the protection of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps on Elevation 84'. One system is electrically actuated and the other is pneumatically actuated in order to provide redundant protection. Three closed dry pipe pre-action type sprinkler systems are provided for the protection of the 460V Switchgear Room (Areas 1FA-AB-84A and 2FA-AB-8 4A) , Lower Electrical Penetration Area (Areas 1FA-EP-7 8C and 2FA-EP-78C), and the 4160V Switchgear Room (Areas 1FA-AB-64A and 2FA-AB-64A). All three systems are electrically actuated on fire/smoke detection and concurrent loss of supervisory air. 9.5-31 SGS-UFSAR Revision 29 January 30, 2017 o Water Spray Systems Water spray systems consisting of open head deluge systems automatically released by either water (hydraulic), air (pneumatic), or electrical mechanisms are provided in the following locations: Water Release Water Spray Systems Water spray systems which are automatically actuated are provided for the following equipment: 1. Turbine lubricating oil makeup tank. 2. Turbine lubricating oil storage tanks. 3. Turbine lubricating oil reservoir, coolers, and conditioner. 4. Seal oil unit. 5. Feedwater pump turbine lubricating oil coolers and tank. 6. Station air compressors. Pneumatic Release Water Spray Systems Water spray systems actuated by pneumatic air-pilot line sprinklers are provided for the following equipment: 1. Generator main transformer banks. 2. Auxiliary power transformers. 3. Station power transformers. 9.5-32 SGS-UFSAR Revision 21 December 6, 2004
- 4. Heating boiler fuel oil pump and heater. 5. Reactor coolant pump lubricating oil lift pump and discharge lines. 6. Turbine and inboard generator bearing housings. Electrical Release Water Spray Systems Water spray systems actuated by continuous strip thermal detectors are provided for the following charcoal filter banks: 1. Control Room emergency air conditioning system. 2. Auxiliary Building exhaust -emergency filter bank. 3. Containment pressure-vacuum relief system. 4. Iodine removal system. 5. Fuel Handling Building Ventilation Unit Charcoal filters. Water spray systems activated by thermal detectors are provided for the: 1. Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Rooms 9.5.1.7.3 Hose and Standpipe Systems Hose stations at the Salem Station are provided for the Reactor Containments, Auxiliary Building, Service Building, Turbine Building and Administration Building. Each hose station is equipped with 1-1/2 inch fire hose and an adjustable fog nozzle. Electrically safe nozzles are provided at specified locations. locations. SGS-UFSAR Additional lengths of hose are stored on hose racks at specific 9.5-33 Revision 13 June 12, 1994 Hose stations are provided for all floors of these buildings, except on Elevation 4 5 ft. of the Auxiliary Building, and the Fuel Handling Building. These areas can be reached from existing hose stations in other areas. Hose stations are not provided in the Service Water Pump House. Since access to each of the pump rooms is from outside, a fire hydrant is provided in the yard near the building. All standpipes are 2-1/2 inch diameter. hose reel is 1-1/2 inch diameter. 9.5.1.7.4 Other Suppression Systems Foam System The individual branch supply to the At Salem Generating Station, a manually operated foam fire suppression system protects the Bulk Fuel Oil Storage Tank. This tank is a non-safety related facility, located above ground, outdoors, and approximately 400 feet south of the Turbine-Generator Building co2 Fire Suppression Systems Low pressure carbon dioxide fire protection systems are provided for the Diesel-Generator Rooms and associated control rooms, day tanks, fuel oil storage tanks and pumps. Each co2 tank contains a sufficient supply of carbon dioxide for at least two full discharges into the largest protected area. The largest area protected is the Diesel Generator and Control Room. There are three diesel-generator sets per unit at the Salem Generating Station. Each set is flooded by independent co2 actuation. Each Diesel-Generator Room and its associated control room and day tank area are actuated together. The two diesel fuel oil pump rooms for each unit are also actuated together. 9.5-34 SGS-UFSAR Revision 24 May 11, 2009 Carbon dioxide fire protection for the Generator Exciter Enclosure for each unit is supplied from a separate refrigerated storage tank located in the Turbine Area. Halon 1301 Fire Suppression Systems Halon 1301 fire extinguishing systems are provided for the Relay Rooms. Each Relay Room has an independent extinguishing system capable of total discharge of either main or reserve charges of fire extinguishing agent within approximately ten seconds of activation. The Halon systems are designed to be activated either automatically or manually. Automatic actuation occurs upon receipt of signals from both zones of a cross-zone Fire Detection System. Manual actuation is accomplished by using remote pull stations. A Halon 1301 system is also provided for the protection of the Dimension 2000 Telephone building. Portable Fire Extinguishers Portable fire extinguishers are provided at specific locations throughout the station. The selection and spacing of extinguishers at Salem is based upon NFPA 10 guidance for the type of hazard present. 9.5.2 Communications System The plant Communications Systems provide an effective means to coordinate activities during conditions of normal operation, maintenance and accidents. 9.5-35 SGS-UFSAR Revision 13 June 12, 1994 9.5.2.1 Page-Party System The Page-Party System is a completely transistorized voice communication system which is capable of operation in extreme environmental conditions such as dust, moisture, heat, and noise. The system consists of two separate and independently wired communication channels are provided for page and party. The page channel is connected to all plant loudspeakers with the exception of the Unit 1 and 2 Control Rooms and may be used to call personnel or issue plantwide instructions. Five (5) party lines are available with party line one (1) being dedicated to the Unit 1 Control Room and party line two (2) dedicated to the Unit 2 Control Room. Plant to plant conversations cannot be conducted on these two lines. Party lines one (1) and two (2) being direct connections to the respective control rooms do not require any paging. Party lines three (3), four (4) and five (5) are for plant conversations which can be heard by anyone picking up a handset and selecting the appropriate party line. While one of the party lines is in use, the page channel can be utilized to establish conversations on an unused party line, Simultaneous conversations can take place, one on each channel. Also, a multi-tone generator provides procedural and alarm signals which can be broadcast throughout the plant. Examples of such signals are start and stop whistles, lunch, fire, and radiation alert. The page channel can also be used for direct communication between individual personnel at separate handset locations; however, this conversation will be heard over all unsilenced speakers. Closed channel communication is provided between fuel loading areas (reactor containment, Fuel Handling Building and Control Room) by means of separately wired page and party lines connected between these locations for closed circuit communications. Power for the Communication System is 120 V ac, inverted from a de source. This is to insure the continuous availability of plant wide communications during a power failure and to provide uninterruptible communications with the Newark Load Dispatcher. vital bus. SGS-UFSAR If the inverter fails, power will be derived from a 230 V ac 9.5-36 Revision 14 December 29, 1995 9.5.2.2 Telephone System Ten telephones are located in each Control Room. One of them is a direct line to the Load Dispatcher; one is a direct line to the NRC; two are for use with the Centrex Instrument; two are for general purpose use; and four are for NETS. Direct lines are also provided in the Administration Building Conference Room and tie in directly to the New Jersey Bell Telephone Company. These lines are for emergency use and insure communications between the Conference Room and the Telephone Company. 9.5.2.3 Closed Circuit Television System A closed circuit television system provides intermittent television monitoring of equipment inside containment. Portable underwater television equipment is provided for the Fuel Handling Building and for scanning the inside of large vessels. Each Containment Building has three television cameras mounted on the containment liner, 120 degrees apart, at an elevation of approximately 205 feet. Each containment camera has a zoom lens and a pan and tilt control unit. A switch is located in the control room for turning the lights in the containment on and off. Underwater equipment consists of four underwater cameras each with its own zoom lens, pan and tilt unit and 9-inch monitor. Two sets of portable lights are provided for underwater illumination. Monitors and camera controls are mounted on a movable television table. Video tape recorders are provided with any of the television cameras. 9.5-37 SGS-UFSAR Revision 16 January 31, 1998 9.5.2.4 Radio Repeater System A system of portable transceivers and fixed repeaters is provided for the fire brigade. 9.5.3 Lighting System The Lighting System provides necessary illumination for day-to-day plant operation and adequate illumination for safe shutdown and personnel safety. 9.5.3.1 Emergency Lighting Power for emergency lighting within the plant is distributed by Lighting Distribution Panels (LDP) 1ELD and 1ELC (2ELD and 2ELC for Unit 2). Lighting Distribution Panels 1ELD (2ELD for Unit 2) contains two separate distribution buses. One bus within LDP 1ELD (2ELD) is supplied either from Lighting Inverter 11 (21) or from 230 V ac vital bus 1A (2A) through a lighting transformer (located inside the inverter enclosure). A bus transfer switch in the output of inverter 11 (21) automatically switches from the inverter output to ac vital bus 1A (2A) if a loss of inverter output power is sensed. Lighting Inverter 11 (21) is powered by battery 1A (2A). The second bus within LPD 1ELD (2ELD) is supplied in a similar manner from Lighting Inverter 12 (22), 230 V ac vital bus 18 (28), battery 18 (28), and a bus transfer switch. LDP 1ELC (2ELC) is powered from lighting inverter 13 (23) and 230 V ac vital bus 1C (2C) with automatic switchover accomplished by a bus transfer switch in the same way as described above. Lighting Distribution Panels, 1ELD-A, 1ELD-8, and 1ELC for Unit 1 are normally powered by 230V AC, 3 phase vital buses, 1SWGR1AY, 1SWGR18Y, and 1SWGR1CY through lighting transformers located within the inverter enclosure. The backup power for these LPD's are inverters 11, 12, and 13 which are fed from 125V DC sources, 1SWGR1ADC, 1SWGR18DC, and 1SWGR1CDC, respectively. Lighting Distribution Panels 2ELD-A, 2ELD-8, and 2ELC for Unit 2 are normally powered by 230V AC, 3 phase vital busses 2SWGR2AY, 2SWGR28Y, and 2SWGR2CY through transformers located within the inverter. The backup power for these LDPs are inverters 21, 22, and 23 which are fed from 125V DC sources 2SWGR2ADC, 2SWGR28DC, and 2SWGR2CDC, respectively. A bus transfer switch in the output of the inverter will automatically transfer to the inverter output upon the loss of the normal 230V AC vital bus supply. Areas of the plant requiring operator access for safe shutdown are provided with self-contained emergency lights. These units are battery powered and have an 8-hour capacity. Those self contained emergency light battery supports that are required to meet seismic integrity are designed to withstand seismic forces. 9.5-38 SGS-UFSAR Revision 17 October 16, 1998 9.5.3.2 Normal Lighting Power for normal lighting within the plant is distributed through 12 LDPs and 61 lighting panel boards. Normal lighting LDPs in the main plant receive power from 4 kV buses 1H and 1F (2H and 2F for Unit 2) and substations 1HL and 1FL (2HL and 2FL for Unit 2). One lighting panel board in the reactor area of each unit is cross fed from the opposite unit substation (1FL for Unit 2 and 2FL for Unit 1) Most of the lighting panel boards are fed from LDPs; however, LPs serving the following areas receive power from local motor control centers: service water intake area, circulating water intake area, Fire Pump House and Heating Boiler House. In most areas where mercury vapor or fluorescent lighting is used, such as in the Turbine Building and Auxiliary Building, lighting is switched directly from the LPs. However, in the Reactor Containments, fuel handling areas, Service Building, and Administration Building, special switching arrangements have been provided. Containment area lighting is controlled by lighting contactors located on Elevation 64 feet in the Auxiliary Building. These contactors can be switched from personnel hatches and from the Control Rooms. Remote switching is provided because of the inaccessibility of the containment areas while the reactors are in operation and the occasional need for closed circuit television surveillance. Lighting in fuel handling areas (which are normally unoccupied) is controlled from a panel located in the Electrical Equipment Room on Elevation 100 feet. Lighting for building access is controlled from switches located near the Equipment Room doors and at the door on Elevation 130 feet entering staircase No. 10 (No. 1 Unit) and staircase No. 11 (Unit 2). 9.5-39 SGS-UFSAR Revision 28 May 22, 2015 Conventional commercial building switching arrangements are employed in office and laboratory areas such as those located in the Administration and Service Buildings. 9.5.4 Diesel Generator Fuel Storage and Transfer System The Diesel Fuel Oil System stores and supplies the diesel generators with No. 2 fuel oil. The system flow diagram is shown on Plant Drawing 205249, and also includes other portions of the fuel oil system. system is Class I (seismic). The diesel generator fuel oil The two 30,000 gallon (nominal) fuel oil storage tanks per unit are the Seismic Class I source of fuel oil for the diesel generators. These tanks can be filled without disrupting diesel generator operation from the 20,000 barrel fuel oil storage tank or via the emergency fill connection located along the outside wall of the diesel generator rooms. The combined volume of both 30,000 gallon fuel oil storage tanks contains sufficient fuel oil at the Technical Specification minimum volume to supply two diesel generators, operating at the most limiting accident mitigation load profile for LOCA with loss of offsite power, for approximately 4 1/2 days. Operation of two diesel generators beyond this time requires that fuel oil be added to the 30, 000 gallon storage tanks from either the on-site 20,000 barrel storage tank or from an off-site source. Each diesel draws fuel from its own 550-gallon diesel day tank located above the engine on the 120-foot elevation of the Auxiliary Building. Day tanks are accessible only by ladder from the Diesel Engine Room. Two fuel oil transfer pumps per unit are used to transfer fuel oil to the diesel day tanks from four 30,000-gallon storage tanks located on the 84-foot level of the Auxiliary Building. Each of the fuel oil transfer pumps has a REGULAR-BACKUP selector switch and an OFF-AUTO-MAN selector switch. One of the fuel oil transfer pumps starts at the regular transfer pump start level. A fuel oil day tank level switch starts the back-up transfer pump and provides an alarm on low tank level. The low tank level setpoint is based on maintaining no less than a 60-minute fuel oil reserve at a level that fuel is automatically added. This is consistent with ANSI N195-1976. Should the pump fail to shut off when all tanks are full or should oil in all tanks reach the tank overflow, a level switch will stop the transfer pump and give a 9.5-40 SGS-UFSAR Revision 27 November 25, 2013 "FUEL OIL DAY TANK LEVEL HIGH" alarm. A gage glass also is installed on the side of each day tank. Each diesel fuel oil pump can be manually controlled from its respective 230-V control center in the event that a postulated fire in a diesel-generator control area results in the loss of both transfer pump control circuits. Fuel oil is supplied by gravity to the engine-mounted fuel oil booster pump by two parallel lines which join at the inlet to the primary duplex filter. The pump discharges 5 gpm at 40 to 45 psi and a relief valve on the discharge will bypass fuel to the inlet of the pump if pressure exceeds 7 5 psi a. From the pump the fuel is filtered again by the secondary duplex filter and is supplied to the individual fuel oil injection pumps. A pressure regulator maintains fuel oil pressure in the engine fuel oil header. the day tank if header pressure exceeds 45 psi. The regulator diverts oil to Local pressure gages are provided to read pressure drop across the primary and secondary filters, fuel oil header pressure, and both fuel transfer pump discharges. Measures have been taken to satisfy the intent of the fuel oil quality assurance requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.137, Position C.2.b. In addition to classifying diesel fuel as a safety-related material within the Salem quality assurance program, the following procedural requirements have been specified: 1. A fuel oil sample is taken from each truck delivering fuel oil to Salem, except when several trucks arrive at once, a minimum of one in four trucks is sampled. 2. All newly received fuel oil is pumped into the 20,000-barrel fuel SGS-UFSAR oil storage tank. every 30 days. Fuel oil in this tank is sampled at least once 9.5-41 Revision 16 January 31, 1998
- 3. Fuel oil in each of the four 30, 000-gallon diesel fuel oil storage tanks is sampled as required by the Salem Technical Specifications. 4. All fuel oil samples taken in items 1 through 3 above are sent to an independent laboratory within 4 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of the time the sample was taken. The analysis performed by the laboratory will be consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.137 and ASTM D975-77, and the analysis report is submitted to the Salem Station within 30 days of receipt of the sample at the laboratory. If reports indicate that fuel oil quality is not within acceptable limits, appropriate action will be taken to restore it to within acceptable limits. 5. Fuel oil deliveries, samples taken and related analysis reports will be logged at the station. 9.5.5 Diesel Generator Jacket Water Cooling System The Jacket Water Cooling System controls the operating temperature of the diesel engine by removing diesel engine heat. is Seismic Class I. The Jacket Cooling Water System The engine driven jacket water pump circulates cooling water through the engine manifold and turbocharger, to a three-way thermostatically controlled valve. The three-way valve is set to maintain engine water temperature at 1 70°F. If water temperature sensed at the suction to the jacket water pump is high, the valve automatically directs the system water through the jacket water heat exchanger where it is cooled by the Service Water System. If the water temperature is low, the valve automatically bypasses the jacket water heat exchanger. Temperature switches are provided at the manifold outlet to give a "Jacket Water High Temperature" alarm if water temperature exceeds 175°F and to trip the diesel if water temperature exceeds 195°F (unless a safeguard signal is present) . 9.5-42 SGS-UFSAR Revision 23 October 17, 2007 Makeup water to the Jacket Water Cooling System is supplied to the expansion tank from the station demineralized water system. The makeup water supply to the expansion tank is manually operated due to concerns of the tank overflow and spillage of hazardous water containing corrosion inhibitors. A gage glass and a level switch for an "EXPANSION TANK" and a level switch for an "EXPANSION TANK HI-LO LEVEL" alarm are provided. Immersion heaters are installed in the engine to maintain water temperature at standby conditions. The heaters are controlled by a temperature switch that energizes the heaters when water temperature decreases below setpoint and de-energizes the heaters when the temperature reaches the set point. An alarm annunciates low and high jacket water standby temperature. The Jacket Water System is also supplied with an after-cooler heater. Although not deemed necessary, this 2 kW thermostatically controlled heater provides additional freeze protection in the after-cooler when engines are not in operation. 9.5.6 Diesel Generator Starting Air System The Starting Air System supplies compressed air to the diesel engine air starting motors. The Starting Air System is Seismic Class I. The Starting Air System for each diesel generator consists of two motor-driven air compressors and two starting air receiver tanks. Each receiver is sized to hold sufficient air for three cold diesel starts. Compressors are designed for automatic unloading at startup and can operate either in the manual mode or in the automatic mode with unloading controlled by air pressure in the receiver tanks. In addition, the turbo-boost system is required to assist the rapid starting of the diesel to meet the acceptable time requirements for loading. A pressure switch located at the compressor discharge starts the compressor when receiver air pressure falls below 210 psig and stops the compressor when pressure reaches 245 psig. The discharge line is protected by a relief valve set at 300 psi and the receivers are protected by relief valves set at 275 psi. 9.5-43 SGS-UFSAR Revision 22 May 5, 2006 Each diesel generator is equipped with two pairs of start motors. Each pair is supplied by a single receiver. In addition, receivers are interconnected so that they can be filled by either or both compressors. If necessary, the diesel can be started by any one pair of air start motors. Air from the receivers is fed through regulator valves, which reduce pressure to 150 psig, to the air system solenoid valves. At the initiation of a start, the solenoid valves open, supplying air to the motors. The air supply is shut off after ignition has been sensed by pressure switches located on the discharge of the jacket water pump, or by engine speed increasing above determined setpoints. The air supply is also shut off after a pre-determined time delay to prevent excessive loss of starting air pressure. Testing provisions include the capability to test individually the air start solenoid valves and the turbo-boost solenoid valves. Low pressure in the air receivers is sensed by pressure switches mounted on the starting air header. This alarm provides time for operator action to investigate the cause for the low pressure in advance of reaching the minimum air receiver pressure for three cold starts. An additional pressure switch is located at the starting air motor inlet header and is set to indicate that the air header pressure is marginal for diesel start requirements. 9.5.7 Diesel Generator Lube Oil System The Lubricating Oil System circulates, cools and filters lubricating oil for each diesel generator engine. An engine-driven 1 ube oil pump takes suction from the lube oil sump tank in the engine and discharges through the lube oil filter to a three-way thermostatically controlled valve. The three-way valve is designed to maintain the lube oil temperature at about 130°F. If lube oil temperature is higher than 180°F, the valve automatically directs the lube oil through the lube oil heat exchanger where it is cooled by the Service Water System. If lube oil temperature is lower than 180°F, the valve automatically bypasses the lube oil cooler. A temperature switch, at the discharge of the engine driven lube oil pump, gives a "LUBE OIL HIGH TEMPERATURE" alarm if oil temperature exceeds 190°F and trips the engine if oil temperature exceeds 205°F (unless a safeguard signal is present) . 9.5-44 SGS-UFSAR Revision 23 October 17, 2007 From the three-way valve, lube oil passes through a duplex strainer before re-entering the engine and supercharger. Once the lube oil has completed its path through the engine, it is collected in the lube oil sump tank. A relief valve on the discharge of the main lube oil pump is designed to protect the pump in case of a line restriction by relieving oil to the engine if discharge pressure exceeds 130 psi. A pressure switch in the main engine lube oil inlet gives a low engine lube oil header pressure alarm. Additional pressure switches are provided to trip the diesel generator if lube oil pressure continues to drop. A motor-driven prelube pump is automatically started when the diesel generator is tripped and jacket water pressure reaches its low pressure set point. The purpose of the prelube pump is to keep the lube oil at near operating temperature and to keep moving parts lubricated, thereby reducing wear when the diesel generator is started. The prelube pump also provides some oil lubrication if the engine trips while at power. Normally load is removed from the engine and it is allowed to idle for several minutes before it is shut down. Idling the engine for several minutes permits the shaft-driven oil pump to circulate oil to the lube oil coolers and then back to the engine. Lube oil heaters are supplied to maintain lube oil temperature at 120°F for easier starting when engines are in standby condition. A temperature switch located at the inlet to the lube oil filter energizes the heater when lube oil temperature drops below 110°F and shuts off when lube oil temperature rises above 120°F. An SGS-UFSAR 9.5-45 Revision 16 January 31, 1998 additional temperature switch gives a "LUBE OIL HEATER FAILURE" alarm if lube oil temperature falls below 100°F or rises above 130°F. Two level switches provide an alarm when crankcase oil level falls to a low level or rises to a high level. 9.5-46 SGS-UFSAR Revision 16 January 31, 1998