ML16342C083
| ML16342C083 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 12/29/1998 |
| From: | Laura Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Rueger G PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9901120063 | |
| Download: ML16342C083 (50) | |
Text
CATEGORY REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTIO SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9901120063 DOC.DATE: 98/12/29 NOTARIZED: NO FACIL:50-275 Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Pacific Ga 50-323 Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, Pacific Ga TRUTH NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SMITH,L.J.
Region 4 (Post 820201)
REC IP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION RUEGER,G.M.
Pacific Gas
&, Electric Co.
DOCKET ¹ 05000275 05000323
SUBJECT:
Advises of planned insp effort resulting from DCNPP Insp Planning Review held on 981202.Historical listing of plant issues, general description of PIM table labels 5 insp plan for next eight months encl.
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1*4 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 61 I RYAN PLAZAORIVE. SUITE 400 ARLINGTON,TEXAS 760'I I 6064
'c," 29 I sB, Gregory M. Rueger, Senior Vice President and General Manager Nuclear Power Generation Bus. Unit
'acific Gas and Electric Company Nuclear Power Generation, B32 77 Beale Street, 32nd Floor P.O. Box 770000 San Francisco, California 94177
SUBJECT:
INSPFCTION PLANNING REVIEW (IPR) - DIABLOCANYON POWER PLANT(DC)
Dear Mr. Rueger:
On December 2, 1998, the NRC staff completed a unique Inspection Planning Review (IPR) of DC. The staff normally conducts Semiannual Plant Performance Reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to develop an integrated understanding of safety performance and adjust inspection resources.
However, because of the suspension of the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance process, we implemented an abbreviated IPR for plant issues and to develop inspection plans.
The IPR for DC involved the participation of both Reactor Projects and Safety divisions in evaluating inspection results and safety performance trends for the period April23 to October 28, 1998.
Based on the results of this review, inspection resources have been scheduled as listed in the inspection plan. The review resulted in no increase in inspection resources beyond, the core program.
Enclosure 1 contains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant Issues Matrix (PIM), that was considered during this IPR process to arrive at an integrated view of licensee performance trends.
The PIM includes only items from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and Pacific Gas & Electric Company.
The IPR may also have considered some predecisional and draft material that does not appear in the attached PIM, including observations from events and inspections that had occurred since the last NRC inspection report was issued, but had not yet received full review and consideration. is a general description of the PIM table labels. This material willbe placed in the PDR as part of the normal issuance of NRC inspection reports and other correspondence.
This letter also advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the DC IPR review. It is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite.
details our inspection plan for the next 8 months. The rationale or basis for each inspection outside the core inspection program is provided so that you are aware of the reason for
'II9011200bG 98122'7 PDR ADOCK 05000275 8
Pacific Gas and Electric Company emphasis in these program areas.
Resident inspections are not listed because of their ongoing and continuous nature.
We will inform you of any changes to the inspection plan.
If you have any questions, please contact me at 817-860-8137.
Sincerely, L. J. Smith, ting Chief Project Branch E Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.:
50-275 50-323 License Nos.: DPR-80 DPR-82
Enclosures:
- 1. Plant Issues Matrix
- 2. General Description of PIM Table Labels
- 3. Inspection Plan cc w/enclosures:
Dr. Richaid Ferguson Energy Chair Sierra Club California 1100 lith Street, Suite 311 Sacramento, California 95814 Ms. Nancy Culver San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace P.O. Box 164 Pismo Beach, California 93448 Chairman San Luis Obispo County Board of Supervisors Room 370 County Government Center San Luis Obispo, California 93408 Mr. Truman BurnshMr. Robert Kinosian California Public Utilities Commission 505 Van Ness, Rm. 4102 San Francisco, California 94102
Pacific Gas and Electric Company Robert R. Wellington, Esq.
Legal Counsel Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee 857 Cass Street, Suite D Monterey, California 93940 Mr. Steve Hsu Radiologic Health Branch State Department of Health Services P.O. Box 942732 Sacramento, California 94234 Christopher J. Warner, Esq.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company P.O. Box 7442 San Francisco, California 94120 David H. Oatley, Vice President Diablo Canyon Operations and Plant Manager Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant P.O. Box 3 Avila Beach, California 93424 Managing Editor Telegram-Tribune 1321 Johnson Avenue P.O. Box 112 San Luis Obispo, California 93406
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Pacific Gas and Electric Company E-Mail report to T. Frye (TJF)
E-Mail report to D. Lange (DJL)
E-Mail report to NRR Event Tracking System (IPAS)
E-Mail report to Document Control Desk (DOCDESK)
E-Mail report to Richard Correia (RPC)
E-Mail report to Frank Talbot (FXT) bcc to DCD (IE01) bcc distrib. by RIV:
Regional Administrator DRP Director Branch Chief (DRP/E, WCFO)
Senior Project Inspector (DRP/E, WCFO)
Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)
WCFO File The Chairman (MS: 16-G-15)
Deputy Regional Administrator Commissioner Dicus Commissioner Diaz Commissioner McGaffigan Commissioner Merrifield W. D. Travers, EDO (MS: 17-G-21)
Associate Dir. for Projects, NRR Associate Dir. for Insp., and Tech. Assmt, NRR SALP Program Manager, NRR/ILPB (2 copies)
W. Bateman, NRR Project Director (MS: 13-E-17)
S. Bloom, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13-E-16),
Resident Inspector DRS-PSB MIS System RIV File Carol Gordon C. A. Hackney Records Center, INPO B. Murray, DRS/PSB B. Henderson, PAO SRls at all RIV sites DOCUMENT NAME: S:'tPPRLTRtPPR98-01ESPPRLTR.DC To receive co of document, indicate in ox: C" ~ Co without enclosures "E" ~ Co with en osures "N"~ No co RIV:AC:DRP/E D:D DD:DRP D:DRP GAPick;df ATHow II KE ckman TPG nn 12/17/98,~! '",l-.> 12/
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/98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Pacific Gas and Electric Company DE" 29 loo8 E-Mail report to T. Frye (TJF)
E-Mail report to D. Lange (DJL)
E-Mail report to NRR Event Tracking System (IPAS)
E-Mail report to Document Control Desk (DOCDESK)
E-Mail report to Richard Correia (RPC)
E-Mail report to Frank Talbot (FXT) bcc to DCD (IE01) bcc distrib. by RIV:
Regional Administrator DRP Director Branch Chief (DRP/E, WCFO)
Senior Project Inspector (DRP/E, WCFO)
. Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)
WCFO File The Chairman (MS: 16-G-15)
Deputy Regional Administrator Commissioner Dicus Commissioner Diaz Commissioner McGaffigan Commissioner Merrifield W. D. Travers, EDO (MS: 17-G-21)
Associate Dir. for Projects, NRR Associate Dir. for lnsp., and Tech. Assmt, NRR SALP Program Manager, NRR/ILPB (2 copies)
W. Bateman, NRR Project, Director (MS: 13-E-17)
S. Bloom, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13-E-16)
Resident Inspector DRS-PSB MIS System RIV File Carol Gordon C. A. Hackney Records Center, INPO B. Murray, DRS/PSB B. Henderson, PAO SRls at all RIV sites DOCUMENT NAME: S."tPPRLTRtPPR98-01ttSPPRLTR.DC
'ro receive co of document, Indicate In ox: C" ~ Co without enclosures E"
Co with en osures N
No co RIV:AC:DRP/E F
D:D DD:DRP D:DRP GAPick;df QS ATHo II KE ckman TPG nn 12/17/98
<~ N ao 12/
8
/98 12/
/98
,OFFICIALRECORD COPY
ENCLOSURE 1 PLANTISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE ITEM DESCRIPTION 09/12/98 POS IR 98-14 NRC OPS 1A 09/12/98 NCV IR 98-14 LIC OPS 1A 3B 08/01/98 POS IR 98-13 NRC OPS 1A 1C 05/28/98 NEG IR 98-11 NRC OPS 5B 5C 08/01/98 POS IR 98-13 NRC OPS 1A 1C Operator training (class room and simulator) on the effects of a loss of offsite power and unit trip during the startup transformer cold wash was good. Training personnel, Operations management, shift supervision, and operators provided valuable insights into the expected plant response and suggested more etfective methods to combat a potential event.
A noncited violation was identified for failure to maintain procedures that controlled the positions allowed to maintain an active operator license consistent with the requirements specified in 10 CFR 55.53. Specifically, the licensee allowed credit for the work control shift foreman, as adequate to meet minimum on-shift hours to maintain a license active, although this position required a minimal amount of time directing or supervising licensed reactor operators.
Also, the licensee inappropriately reactivated the licenses ot two individuals using this provision during the past year; however, no operator certifications were currently invalid since personnel had stood the required number of proficiency watches Operator response to a high risk activity (work on 4 Kv panels for Bus G) was cautious and preparations were thorough. The repair activitywas well planned to prevent inadvertent loss of power to the vital bus.
The inspectors noted several minor errors in a sampling of two months of control operator and shift foreman's logs. The amount of information entered in the logs have improved compared to previous reviews.
The corrective actions for this December 15, 1997, event were not prompt in that: (1) while the need for a Quality Evaluation (QE) was immediately identified, a QE was not formalized until December 30, 1997, and no action was initiated to resolve the QE until February 13, 1998; and (2) written communication to operations personnel of management's expectations with regard to ~
this event was not accomplished until February 17, 1998.
In addition, failure to take corrective action to add to existing instructions of the man-on-line tag resolution of Action Request A0411400, may have contributed to the event.
The NRC has determined that a minor violation ot NRC requirements occurred during the steam leak repair on December 15, 1997, in that the modification of the work order was not documented as required by procedure, prior to conducting the repair. This failure constitutes a violation of minor significance and is not subject to tormal enforcement action. Further, the NRC concluded that the individuals involved in the activity intended to complete the repair in a manner allowed by procedures but inadvertently did not. Thus, the NRC determined that there was no willfulness associated with this violation. Finally, the NRC has concluded that, given the significance of the actual violation that occurred, your corrective actions were prompt and there were no violations of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.
October 28, 1998 DIABLOCANYON
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE 05/15/98 POS IR 98-301 NRC OPS 3B ITEM DESCRIPTION Overall good licensed operator applicant performance was observed during the initial license examinations.
Effective communications and good peer checks were observed in the dynamic simulator scenarios.
Allapplicants passed the examination.
03/28/98 VIO SL IV 03/28/98 WK IR 98-07 NRC OPS 1A 1C IR 98-07 NRC OPS 1A 1C A violation was identified tor failure to restore the "High Flux at Shutdown" annunciator when the required number of fuel assemblies was installed in the core. The responsibility to perform the actions was not clearly assigned prior to the evolution.
The control of refueling activities indicated unclear procedural guidance and management expectations.
The lack of procedural guidance for performing signal to noise ratio calculation, the lack ot acceptance criteria in the procedure for fuel assembly clearances, and the confusing procedure format contributed to these concerns.
The method used to calculate inverse count rate ratio and the method used to perform the post core load verification was inconsistent with the methods described in the procedure.
The lack of separate signatures in the controlled copy of the procedure for verifying that the signal to noise ratio was greater than 2 was an example of poor documentation of procedurally required activities 03/28/98 VIO IR 98-07 LIC OPS 4A 4B SL IV 03/28/98 NCV IR 98-07 SELF OPS 1A 1C 03/28/98 VIO IR 98-07 LIC OPS 1C SL IV A violation was identified for failure to translate the design of the reactor vessel refueling level indication system into abnormal operating procedures.
The licensee exhibited good attention to detail in identifying this issue during simulator training. Documented corrective actions at the end ot the inspection period for this violation failed to address deficiencies in the procedure preparation and approval process.
A noncited violation, per Section VII.B.Iot the NRC Enforcement Policy, was identified for failure to provide a procedure appropriate to the circumstances for switching of power supplies between the units. The switching of the power supply without clearly understanding the outcome resulted in unexpected alarms, loss ot power to equipment required by Technical Specifications, and unnecessary disruption in both control rooms. The immediate response of the Unit 1 control room operators was very good, with timely and appropriate response to each alarm A violation was identified for several examples of failure to properly implement the clearance procedure.
Several significant errors were not found or prevented by the clearance process and resulted in the potential for work to be performed without the required isolation from sources of energy to allow safe work. However, the number and significance of clearance errors in 2R8 was less than the number of errors in the previous outage.
October 28, 1998 DIABLOCANYON
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE 03/28/98 POS IR 98-07 NRC OPS 1A 03/28/98 POS IR 98-07 NRC OPS 3B 03/20/98 STR IR 98-04 NRC OPS 5B 03/20/98 STR IR 98-04 NRC OPS 1C ITEM DESCRIPTION Several significant operator evolutions were performed well. Shutdown and startup evolutions were conducted well, in a professional manner, in accordance with procedures, and with a focus on safety.
Licensee preparations, including the operations pre-evolution briefings for hot mid-loop operations were conservative and reflected a focus on safety. The reflood of the emergency core cooling systems evolution was well coordinated and controlled The training provided for Unit 2 outage preparation was implemented well and provided valuable tessons learned and necessary procedural changes.
The inspectors noted, in particular, that the simulator training was professional, well executed, and Identified a vulnerability in the abnormal operating procedures.
Plant staff review committee was effective in performing its required functions. The nuclear safety oversight committee was composed of highly qualified individuals and provided good oversight of Diablo Canyon Power Plant activities..
Control room deficiencies and operator work-arounds were well managed, based on the decreasing number and character ot the deficiencies.
03/20/98 STR IR 98-04 NRC OPS 5A 5B 5C The quality assurance audits that were reviewed provided meaningful results, and presented conclusions that were consistent with observations.
03/20/98 03/20/98 STR IR 98-04 NRC OPS STR IR 98-04 NRC OPS 5A 5A 5B 5C Nuclear quality services performed good oversight ot the corrective action process.
The Operations department performed good assessments that generally resulted in effective corrective actions.
03/20/98 STR IR 98-04 NRC OPS 1C 5A 5C Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant had a good corrective action program and condition reporting~
process.
In general, conditions adverse to quality were being effectively identified, resolved, and ~
corrected.
03/20/98 NCV IR 98-04 LIC OPS 1A 03/20/98 NCV IR 94-04
'IC OPS 1A 03/20/98 STR IR 98-04 NRC OPS 5A 5C The licensee-identified failure to perform a conditional otfsite power verification within one hour of declaring Emergency Diesel Generator 2-3, as required by Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 Action b, and reported by Licensee Event Report 50-323/97-01, Revision 0, was identified as a non-cited violation consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-323/9804-01).
The licensee-identified unplanned start and loading of Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1 (engineered safety feature actuation) due to personnel error and inadequate work control reported by Licensee Event Report 50-275/97-09, Revision 0, was identified as a non-cited violation consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV50-275/9804-01).
Operations department personnel had a good understanding of the corrective action process and used the process to etfectively identify and obtain corrections to deficient plant conditions.
October 28, 1998 DIABLOCANYON
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE ITEM DESCRIPTION 02/25/98 POS 02/14/98 VIO SL IV 02/14/98 STR 02/14/98 STR IR 98-11 NRC OPS 5B 5C IR 98-02 NRC OPS 3A 3B IR 98-02 NRC OPS 3C IR 98-02 NRC OPS 1B The formal root cause analysis, provided in Quality Evaluation Q0011991 on February 25, 1998, was self-critical and effectively identified the primary causes.
The inspectors also concluded that the licensee's subsequent corrective actions to date have been extensive.
Several examples of failure to implement the sealed valve program. The widespread examples of failure to seal safety-related valves properly indicated weaknesses in training of nonlicensed operators.
The operations department displayed good sensitivity to the potential impact of control room modifications. The modifications were well planned and had a minimal impact on safety.
The licensee took conservative action in response to adverse weather conditions by reducing power when high swells were noted.
In addition, the licensee provided continuous management coverage and extra operators to ensure emergency response capability was not degraded when severe weather conditions existed.
02/14/98 WK IR 98-02 NRC OPS 3A 01/03/98 NCV IR 97-23 LIC OPS 1A 2A LER 1-96-009 01/03/98 WK IR 97-23 NRC OPS 12/15/97 EEI IR 98-11 LIC OPS 3A 1C 12/15/97 NEG IR 98-11 LIC OPS 3A 1C An operator was not aware that he was expected to closely monitor reactor coolant Pump 2-2 parameters, and if flowwas greater than 6 gallons per minute to take action, including tripping the reactor. This was indicative of a poor turnover of information between operators in that the operator was not aware of the applicable limitfor seal leakoff flow.
Turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump was inoperable due to blockage of a ventilation flow path.
Event occurred in May 1996.
Work planning for control room painting warranted fmprovement because the configuration of the control room ventilation, the location of the compressor, and the effects of the painting on the control room charcoal filters were not formally preplanned or analyzed.
Operators took prudent and conservative action to minimize distractions and mitigate the effects of fumes in the control room during the painting.
Actions and decisions of the Shift Foreman, Shift Supervisor, Senior Reactor Operator, and maintenance personnel in Unit 2 on December 15, 1997, to perform the work using personnel standing by equipment, plus a caution tag, instead of the clearance package described by the work order, without modifying the work order, were contrary.to the requirements of licensee procedures IDAP AD2.ID1, OP2.ID2, and AD7.ID1, and Technical Specification 6.8.1 Quality Evaluation Q0011991 determined that the Shift Foreman and Shift Supervisor deviated from program documents (despite knowing that they had no authority to do so.
October 28, 1998 DIABLOCANYON
PLANTISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE ITEM DESCRIPTION 11/22/97 STR IR 97-19 NRC OPS 2B 11/22/97 -
STR IR 97-19 NRC OPS 1B 5B 11/22/97 STR IR 97-19 NRC OPS 1B 3A LER 2-97-005 11/22/97 STR IR 97-19 NRC OPS 1A 3A The operation of the reactor trip bypass breaker was performed well in that the activity was conducted in accordance with the procedure; the operator was knowledgeable and cautious; and good self-checking practices were demonstrated.
The licensee performed an excellent root cause analysis of the reactor trip and safety injection event.
Operators performed well in response to a Unit 2 reactor trip and safety injection event. Actions were well coordinated, and plant equipment responded as expected.
The operating crew took timely and effective actions to terminate safety injection and control the plant to prevent the pressurizer from going solid.
The shift foreman maintained excellent command and control with frequent, informative shift briefings.
Operators demonstrated conservative decision making by decreasing reactor power when the moisture separator reheaters were isolated.
The operators manipulated the plant well while power was lowered.
10/1 1/97 WK IR 97-16 NRC OPS 1A 3A Observations were made which were indicative of a lack of attention to detail in log keeping in the control room. Operation logs in some instances lacked sufficient information, did not document why an action was taken or the outcome of the action, and clerical errors were found.
10/11/97 STR IR 97-16 NRC OPS 1A 3A 10/1 1/97 STR IR 97-16 NRC OPS 1A 3A In general, operations were conducted in a conscientious, competent, and professional manner, with focus on safety and procedural compliance.
Operators were knowledgeable of plant conditions and activities, and responded quickly and properly to annunciators Operators demonstrated good performance in the October 3 decrease in Unit 1 turbine load from 50 percent to 38 percent to repair a steam leak. The down power was well coordinated, with continuous and diligent monitoring of the plant conditions, and timely response to alarms and indications. The shift foreman was clearly in control of the evolution and constantly aware of plant conditions.
October 28, 1998 DIABLOCANYON
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE 10/11/97 STR SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE IR 97-16 LIC OPS 5A 5B ITEM DESCRIPTION Quality assessments of operations during the Unit 1 refueling were effective. Improvements in control room formality were noted and the continuing problems with ciearances were documented.
Areas for improvements were identified, including performance of risk assessments, and operators understanding of the Maintenance Rule. These assessments were consistent with the findings of the NRC Maintenance Rule inspection.
10/11/97 STR IR 97-16 NRC OPS 2A 2B 09/12/98 POS IR 98-14 NRC MAINT 3A 08/01/98 POS IR 98-13 NRC MAINT 1A 3A 08/01/98 NEG IR 98-13 NRC MAINT 1C 09/12/98 NEG IR 98-14 NRC MAINT 2B 4B Operations was effective in maintaining appropriate configuration control of the six emergency diesel generators and their subsystems and supporting systems.
The systems were correctly aligned and in compliance with the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Technical Specifications (TS) ~ and applicable plant procedures.
The material condition of the equipment was good with only a few minor equipment problems, which were documented in Action Requests (AR).
Based on review of licensee planning documentation; and observation of training, briefings, and the actual work; the inspectors considered that Unit 1 AuxiliarySalt Water (ASW) traveling screen replacement was a well planned and performed maintenance activity on an important safety system.
Although the licensee's risk analysis was acceptable to indicated only a slight increase in risk for doing the work on-line, the risk comparison between on-line and shutdown was not meaningful for the on-line replacement of the Unit 1 traveling screen.
3C The licensee provided good oversight and controls for testing of main steam safety valves. The augmented testing of the MSSVs was scheduled and performed at the frequency specified in surveillance test Procedure STP M-77B, Appendix 7.1. The procedures governing the surveillance tests were technically adequate and personnel performing the surveillance demonstrated an adequate level of knowledge. The inspectors noted that test results indicated that the MSSVs liftpoints meet the TS 3.7.1.1 requirements.
The effectiveness of the reorganization of Maintenance Services into asset teams is too recent to be evaluated.
The inspectors noted the implementation of oversight controls in that coaches and technical specialists have been assigned to assist and monitor the implementation of the new organization. Both positive'and negative aspects of the new methods have been identified by the licensee, including a negative trend in performance.
October 28, 1998 DIABLOCANYON
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 05/25/98 NEG IR 98-08 NRC MAINT 3A 3B 05/25/98 URI IR 98-08 NRC MAINT 2B 05/14/98 VIO SL IV IR 98-10 LIC MAINT 2B 3A DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE 08/01/98 NEG IR 98-13 NRC MAINT, 3A ITEM DESCRIPTION Maintenance personnel demonstrated poor work practices in inadvertently leaving a check valve in a test gauge line. Although its installation did not impact the operability of the safety injection pump, it did raise concerns about the validityof the subsequent surveillance tests.'he check valve interfered with the measurement of a significant parameter used to determine pump operability, and could have masked actual degradation of the pump. The licensee's evaluation of the data logically led to the inspection of the suction pressure connection, which ultimately determined the cause, but the delay in review of the surveillance data from the April27 test was a~
missed opportunity to correct the problem earlier.
During surveillance testing of a safety injection pump, an operator error was identified in recording data from the wrong gauge, which was indicative of a lack familiaritywith the procedure and a lack of knowledge of the basis for the measurement being taken. This error was recognized by other licensee personnel independent of the inspectors'bservation:
Otherwise, this and other surveillances observed were performed satisfactorily.
The licensee's justification for deferral of inservice testing for several post accident sampling system valves during plant operation from quarterly to cold shutdowns was inappropriate in that the basis for deferral failed to recognize that the applicable valves were exercised during sampling during plant operations.
Maintenance personnel demonstrated poor self verification which, combined with an inadequate briefing and self imposed time pressure, resulted in a violation of TS 6.8.1.a for failure to implement instructions for performing maintenance, ln that two auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps were simultaneously rendered inoperable because oil was drained from the wrong pump.
In addition, licensee personnel failed to take adequate immediate corrective actions in that they: (1) failed to notifythe control room in a timely manner; (2) continued to work on the wrong component without work authorization or a clearance; (3) failed to make timely log entries in the control operator's log; and (4) could have decided to perform a post-maintenance test in a more timely manner.
The safety significance of this event was mitigated by the relatively short period of time with two AFW pumps inoperable.
05/14/98 P OS 03/28/98 NEG IR 98-10 NRC MAINT 3B 4B, IR 98-07 SELF MAINT 3A The maintenance mechanics demonstrated good maintenance practices in replacing the shuttle valves on the main feedwater Pump 1-1 stop valves. Engineering provided good on site assistance and assisted in determining the proper wiring of the new shuttle valves.
Performance of the functional test confirmed proper operation prior to returning the main feedwater pump to service.
Maintenance personnel did not exercise appropriate care during penetration seal work and stepped on a valve, that when repositioned, challenged operators by causing a leak in the chemical and volume control system.
October 28, 1998 DIABLOCANYON
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA'EMPLATE CODE ITEM DESCRIPTION
. 03/28/98 NCV IR 98-07 SELF MAINT 1C A noncited violation was identified for failure to provide a procedure appropriate to the circumstances for ground buggy installation. The improper ground buggy installation had the potential to have caused Significant damage to safety-related equipment and injure two workers.
03/28/98 POS IR 98-07 NRC MAINT 1A A number of maintenance activities were observed and were performed in accordance with the procedural requirements. Good coordination between technical maintenance, mechanical maintenance and radiation protection was observed in performing several maintenance tasks concurrently.
03/20/98 WK IR 98-04'RC MAINT 5C Licensee personnel involved in maintenance activities had an adequate understanding of the corrective action process and generally used action requests and nonconformance reports effectively. However, previous corrective actions implemented in the areas of material control, rework, work clearance errors, and procedure adherence, had not completely resolved those
'roblems.
02/14/98 STR IR 98-02 NRC MAINT 2A Improved design and maintenance of intake structure components contributed to good response of the plant to high ocean swells.
02/14/98 WK IR 98-02 NRC MAINT 3A Technical maintenance personnel did not reflect a questioning attitude in dealing with a problem during Solid State Protection System.
02/14/98 NCV IR 98-02 NRC MAINT 3A 3B 01/03/98 WK IR 97-23 NRC MAINT 2B 01/03/98 NCV LER LER LER IR 97-23 1-96-002, 1-96-004 1-85-043 LIC MAINT 1A 2B 01/03/98 STR IR 97-23 NRC MAINT 2A 11/22/97 WK IR 97-19 NRC MAINT 1A 3A LE R 2-97-005 Failure to properly implement the clearance tagging procedure by hanging a red danger tag on the wrong component.
This item was indicative of the continuing weakness in the licensee's implementation of the clearance process.
Auxiliarysalt water vault check valve maintenance procedures did not include a post maintenance test to demonstrate that the valve was properly installed.
3A Failure to meet surveillance requirements due to personnel errors and inadequate procedures.
Three events occurring in January and February1996.
Plant material condition was generally good and continued to improve during this inspection period. Minor leaks and concerns were noted such as leaking centrifugal charging pumps, leaking electrohydraulic control fluid on Unit 1, and degraded Unit 2 turbine end seals.
Personnel removing scaffolding did not exercise sufficient caution when working near the main steam isolation valves and caused a reactor trip and safety injection. In addition, a procedure weakness was identified in that the personnel were not cautioned on the equipment before performing their work.
October 28, 1998 DIABLOCANYON
PLANTISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE ITEM DESCRIPTION 11/22/97 NCV LER IR 97-19 1-97-017 LIC MAINT 2B Failure to vent the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) high points and pump casings.
11/22/97 STR IR 97-19 NRC MAINT 2A 2B Overall material condition of the plant was good and was improved over the past year. The licensee has been aggressive in reducing the number of open corrective maintenance items and control room deticiencies by 50 percent over the past year.
11/22/97 NCV IR 97-19 LIC MAINT 2B LER 1-97-016 11/22/97 WK IR 97-19 NRC MAINT 1A 2B Failure to properly test the solid state protection system.
Initial preparations for the Unit 2 startup transformer replacement became adequate after NRC.
discussions; the plans did not provide for supplemental operator training. Replacement of the transformer was performed in a conservative manner and in accordance with licensee procedures.
Management's decision tb defer the second transformer outage because of weather conditions was prudent.
10/11/97 STR 10/11/97 STR 10/11/97 STR 08/01/98 NEG IR 97-16 NRC MAINT 2A IR 97-16 NRC, MAINT 3A 3B IR 97-16 NRC MAINT 1A 2B IR 98-13 LIC ENG 4B 4C The plant equipment was well maintained, with an appropriate focus on deficient conditions.
Existing equipment problems were identified by AR tags and new problems were reviewed daily and priorities set to ensure quick response to those problems that could degrade safety-related equipment.
The priorities were generally based on sound conservative judgemenl.
Maintenance personnel were effective in the performance of maintenance activities. Personnel were knowledgeable of the equipment, procedure, and tasks to be performed, the work documents and procedures were in use at the work site, and required clearance tags were hung.
A special surveillance test was conducted in a high quality manner.
Procedure Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) M-75, 4KV Vital Bus Undervoltage Relay Calibration, previously performed only during shutdown, was performed at power. The management briefing covered management's expectations, such as the need to exercise caution and conservatism.
The procedure had been thoroughly reviewed to ensure the test had no unexpected impact on the plant.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee's operability evaluation (OE) for the Unit 1 containment fan cooler units (CFCUs) was adequate, pending a root cause of failure determination for CFCU 1-2.
However, the inspectors considered that there was a potential tor the failure of CFCU 1-2 to be due to a common cause not yet recognized; therefore, the inspectors considered that it was prudent to reniove CFCU 1-2 at the earliest opportunity, to verity that the suspected root cause was valid.
October 28, 1998 DIABLOCANYON
PLANTISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE 07/21/98 NCV IR 98-09 NRC ENG
. 4B VII.B.6 EA 98-364 ITEM DESCRIPTION The procedural change to not split the auxiliary saltwater and component cooling water systems into their respective trains following a loss-of-coolant accident was determined to be a nonsubstantial unreviewed safety question and willnot be cited as provided by Section VII.B.6of the NRC Enforcement Policy 07/21/98 VIO SL IV IR 98-09 NRC ENG 4B A violation of 10 CFR 50.59 was identified for failing to obtain NRC approval prior to siting a segment of the Unit 1 auxiliary saltwater bypass line on ground not considered bedrock as specified in the Final Safety Analysis Report Update, which was determined by the NRC to involve an unreviewed safety question.
07/21/98 POS IR 98-09 NRC ENG 4B 4C 07/21/98 VIO SL IV IR 98-09 NRC ENG 4B 07/16/98 POS IR 98-201 NRC ENG SA 07/21/98 NEG IR 98-09 NRC ENG 4B 4C 5C The licensee initiated specific steps to strengthen the 10 CFR 50.59 process including the principle focus being through the regulatory services group; established an open dialogue with the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation regarding 10 CFR 50.59 issues; and implemented a management review committee, consisting of management personnel cognizant of the 10 CFR 50.59 process, to review specific safety evaluations.
However, The licensee initiated specific steps to strengthen the 10 CFR 50.59 process including the principle focus being through the regulatory services group; established an open dialogue with the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation regarding 10 CFR 50.59 issues; and implemented a management review committee, consisting of management personnel cognizant of the 10 CFR 50.59 process, to review specific safety evaluations A violation of 10 CFR 50.59 was identified, with two examples, for changes to the component cooling water system and a procedural revision for the operation of the residual heat removal system during containment recirculation, which involved inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 reviews. The licensee failed to identify that the modification and procedure change involved a change to the technical specifications incorporated in the license The 10 CFR 50.59 program was not effectively utilized to determine whether proposed design or procedural changes represented potential unreviewed safety questions or affected the technical specifications.
Design and procedural changes utilized the 10 CFR 50.59 process as a means of validating design and procedural changes but did not correctly provide a licensing basis determination.
The self-assessment of replacement part evaluation activities was thorough, insightful, and candid. The planned corrective actions addressed the identified concerns.
October 28, 1998 10 DIABLOCANYON
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE 07/16/98 POS IR 98-201 NRC ENG 4A 07/16/98 POS IR 98-201 NRC ENG 4C ITEM DESCRIPTION Review of the technical evaluation and quality assurance aspects of a 1994 circuit board replacement (for which Region IV had cited the licensee for failure to perform a prompt operability determination after the licensee's discovery of the problem in 1996) revealed deficiencies in the original safety classification, procurement process, review for suitability of application, and verification that all board components met the design requirement.
The inspectors determined that the licensee had resolved the technical issues satisfactorily and independently verified that the correct configurations of the circuit boards in question were installed in all six emergency diesel generator exciter-regulator cabinets.
The program for dedicating and upgrading commercial-grade, warehouse material not originally purchased with the intent of dedication for safety-related service was generally technically sound and incorporated adequate quality assurance controls.
05/25/98 NEG IR 98-08 LIC ENG 4A 5B 5C The determination that the lack of the proper seismic gap for the turbine pedestal represented a
lack of conformance to the design and licensing basis was not timely. This issue was identified October 1997, but the operability issues were not thoroughly addressed until May 1998. The conclusions of the operability evaluation and prompt operability assessment were reasonable based on the information available.
03/28/98 POS IR 98-07.
NRC ENG 4A 4B 4C The inspectors concluded that the design change package and associated safety evaluation for replacement of the Unit 2 recirculation sump screens was comprehensive, and the conclusions were reasonable.
The design change was effective in improving the containment sump's ability to screen out debris that could block safety injection flowpaths.
02/27/98 URI IR 98-05 NRC ENG 4A 02/14/98 NCV LER IR 98-02 1-94-021 NRC ENG 4B 02/27/98 URI IR 98-05 NRC ENG 4A The discovery of a design vulnerability that could result in loss of containment spray during the recirculation phase (of a loss of coolant accident recovery) appeared to constitute an unreviewed ~
safety question.
This unresolved item was left open pending additional review by the NRC.
The deletion of procedural steps to separate trains of the auxiliary saltwater and component cooling water systems, when transferring to hot leg injection during a loss of coolant accident recovery appeared to constitute an unreviewed safety question.
This unresolved item was left open pending additional review by the NRC.
Failure to provide a 10 CFR 50.72 report for identifying that greater than 1 percent of the steam generator tubes in Unit 1 were defective.
02/14/98 STR IR 98-02 NRC ENG 1A 4B The operability assessment associated with a decrease in the limiton component cooling water temperature was timely and technically sound.
01/03/98 STR IR 97-23 LIC ENG 4A 4B Engineering personnel provided a timely and technically sound response to concerns with the design basis of the plant's response to a spurious safety injection signal.
October 28, 1998 DIABLOCANYON
0
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE 01/03/98
'TR IR 97-23 LIC ENG 1A 4B 11/22/97 STR IR 97-19 NRC ENG 4A 4B 11/22/97 WK IR 97-19 NRC 'NG 4A LER 1-97-018 10/11/97 WK IR 97-16 NRC ENG 4C ITEM DESCRIPTION The operabiTity evaluation associated with containment fan cooler unit motor cracked welds was technically sound and had good engineering basis.
The licensee properly translated the design basis of the safety related accumulators into the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, TS, and applicable procedures.
The licensee did not fullyrecognize the impact of the improper setpoints for the anticipated transient without scram mitigation system actuating circuitry (AMSAC) system until questioned by the NRC. However, the licensee's review of AMSAC design information which led to this discovery was considered a strength.
The Engineering backlog continued to be a challenge for the licensee.
Although the licensee's efforts had not reduced the number of open items as much as desired, there was increased confidence that quality issues had been identified and a clearer understanding of the priority of the individual issues.
09/12/98 NCV 09/12/98 VIO SL IV IR 98-14 LIC PS 1C IR 98-14 NRC PS 1C An NCV was identified for failure to establish procedures implementing portions of the fire protection program.
A violation was identified for failure to maintain fire protection procedures, in that the fire impairment procedure defined a continuous fire watch as a 15 minute roving fire patrol. The licensee intended its use in only limited applications, but did not communicate their expectations properly, therefore, the licensee used this provision on several occasions inappropriately.
03/28/98 POS IR 98-07 LIC PS 1A 3B 3C 05/15/98 POS IR 98-301 NRC PS 2A Housekeeping and condition of external panels observed coincident with plant walkthroughs was good.
Licensee management's efforts to keep exposures as low as reasonably achievable during refueling outage 2R8 appeared to be successful in that total outage exposure was improved from previous outages.
The licensee's cleanup of the reactor coolant system followingshutdown of Unit 2, and the use of mock-up training for several outage tasks contributed to the lower exposure.
03/20/98 WK IR 98-06 NRC PS 3A A concern was identified regarding changes made in the deployment of response officers that was different from that observed during the 1996 operational safeguards response evaluation.
Specifically, on occasions, officers were assigned security duties which brought in to question their ability to respond to the external design basis threat.
October 28, 1998 12 DIABLOCANYON
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE ITEM DESCRIPTION 03/20/98 NCV 03/20/98 STR 02/14/98 WK IR 98-06 LIC PS 5A IR 98-06 NRC PS 3A IR 98-02 NRC PS 1C A noncited violation was identified involving the failure to implement compensatory measures for five vital area doors during the loss of the security computer.
This licensee identified violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Performance in the physical security area remained at a high performance level. Strong senior management support for the security organization was evident by providing excellent security facilities. Athorough program for searching personnel and packages was maintained.
Organization of the central and secondary alarm stations was excellent. Assessment aids provided effective assessment of the perimeter detection zones.
A comprehensive security event reporting program was in place.
The inspectors identified three examples of failure to properly log out of the radiologically controlled area, which was indicative of inattention to detail on the part of plant personnel.
Errors in logging into the radiologically controlled area had been previously identified.
01/09/98 STR IR 98-01 NRC PS 1C 01/09/98 STR IR 98-03 NRC PS 1C 3B 01/09/98 STR IR 98-03 NRC PS 2A 01/09/98 STR IR 98-03 NRC PS 1C 01/09/98 STR IR 98-01 NRC PS 1C 01/09/98 STR IR 98-01 NRC PS 1C 01/09/98 STR IR 98-01 NRC PS 3B Most external exposure controls were implemented properly. Proper neutron instrument calibration and neutron dosimetry programs were implemented.
Radiation dose from neutrons was not significant.
The radiation protection department was adequately staffed with knowledgeable and experienced personnel.
Personnel involved in the transfer, packaging, and transport of radioactive materials and wastes were properly trained and qualified. A proper organization and staff were maintained which effectively implemented the radioactive waste management and transportation programs.
Good facilities were maintained for the storage and management of solid radioactive wastes and transportation activities.
The licensee implemented a strong management oversight program for the solid radioactive waste management and transportation programs.
An effective ALARAprogram produced good results. The licensee's 3-year average person-rem totals continued to decline. Although the 1995 and 1996 3-year averages were above the national PWR averages, it appeared that the 1997 3-year average willbe near or below the national average.
Very good solid radioactive waste management and radioactive materials transportation programs were implemented.
The generation of dry active wastes had been reduced.
The licensee had a highly qualified professional staff.
October 28, 1998 13 DIABLOCANYON
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE ITEM DESCRIPTION 01/09/98 VIO SL IV IR 98-01 LIC.
PS 3A An effective ALARAprogram produced good results.
The licensee's 3-year average person-rem totals continued to decline. Although the 1995 and 1996 3-year averages were above the national PWR averages, it appeared that the 1997 3-year average willbe near or below the national average.
01/09/98 STR 01/09/98 STR'R 98-03 IR 98-01 NRC PS 3A NRC PS 1C 3B Housekeeping in the radioactive waste storage areas was good.
Radiation protection technicians had good, basic knowledge of health physics practices and procedures.
The licensee had a highly qualified professional staff and a good continuing training program tor supervisors, professionals, and radiation protection technicians.
The licensee was moderately successful in promoting professional advancement ot radiation protection technicians.
Staffing of the radiation protection organization was appropriate to erisure radiation safety.
01/09/98 VIO SL IV IR 98-01 NRC PS 1C 3A Individuals entered the radiological controlled area without operable alarming dosimeters.
01/09/98 STR IR 98-03 NRC PS 1C 01/09/98 STR IR 98-01 NRC PS 1C 01/09/98 STR IR 98-01 N
PS 01/09/98 STR IR 98-03 NRC PS 3B 01/09/98 STR IR 98-01'RC PS 5A 5B A very good solid radioactive waste management program was implemented.
The generation of dry active wastes had been reduced.
A very good transportation program for radioactive materials and radioactive waste was maintained.
Good facilities were maintained for the storage and management of solid radioactive wastes and transportation activities. Housekeeping in the radioactive waste storage areas was good. Procedures established to implement tbe solid radioactive waste and transportation programs provided good guidance.
The licensee implemented a strong management oversight program toi the solid radioactive waste management and transportation programs.
An effective ALARAprogram produced good results.
The licensee's 3-year average person-rem totals continued to decline. Although the 1995 and 1996 3-year averages were above the national PWR averages, it appeared that the 1997 3-year average willbe near or below the national average.
5C Nuclear Quality Services provided good oversight of the radiation protection program. The radiation protection program was proactive in reviewing its activities through selt-assessments and identifying and correcting problems within the program Nuclear Quality Services provided good oversight of the radiation protection program. The radiation protection program was proactive in reviewing its activities through self-assessments and identifying and correcting problems within the program.
Personnel. involved in the transfer, packaging, and transport of radioactive materials and wastes were properly trained and qualified.
October 28, 1998 14 DIABLOCANYON
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE ITEM DESCRIPTION 12/12/97 STR IR 97-22 NRC PS 5A 12/12/97 STR IR 97-22 NRC PS 1B 3A An in.depth audit was performed by knowledgeable individuals with technical support from other sites.
The offsite interface was effectively evaluated, and a positive method was used to make the results available to offsite agencies.
Emergency plan implementation by both crews during the simulator walkthroughs was good.
Emergency conditions were quickly recognized and classified.
Offsite agency notifications were timely. Dose calculations'and protective action recommendations were correct.
12/12/97 VIO SL IV IR 97-22 NRC PS 1B 3B Five of five operating crew members would be required to wear special respirator glasses; however the crew members were not aware of the existence and/or location of the glasses.
12/12/97 STR IR 97-22 NRC PS 1C 12/12/97 STR IR 97-22 NRC PS 1C Overall, the emergency preparedness program was strong. With minor exceptions, major program elements were well controlled and implemented.
The emergency preparedness training program was well implemented and tracked.
Program enhancements, including a job task analysis, lesson plan upgrades, and increased drill frequency demonstrated a high level of management support. The emergency preparedness program was well supervised and staffed, and each staff member made a conscientious contribution to program implementation.
12/12/97 WK 12/11/97 STR 12/11/97 STR IR 97-22 NRC PS 5B IR 97-20 NRC PS 5A 5B IR 97-20 NRC PS 1C 5C Timely response to emergency preparedness action requests was poor; the average request was nearly 2 years old. Immediate response actions to review and prioritize the list were appropriate.
A lower-level action tracking system database was enhanced to allow comment trending and participant feedback Effective, comprehensive biennial audits of the radiological environmental monitoring and meteorological monitoring programs were performed.
Timely corrective actions were implemented.
Qualified auditors, who were assisted by experienced and knowledgeable technical specialists, performed the audits. An appropriate assessment was conducted of the licensee's laboratory responsible for performing sample analyses.
Overall, good radiological environmental and meteorological monitoring programs were effectively implemented.
Environmental sampling locations were properly established and met station procedure requirements.
Environmental sampling equipment was properly calibrated and maintained.
Appropriate changes were made to the environmental sample locations described in station procedures as a result of the annual land use censuses.
Good radiological environmental monitoring program implementing procedures were maintained.
The meteorological instrumentation was properly calibrated and maintained.
October 28, 1998 15 DIABLOCANYON
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE.
ITEM DESCRIPTION 12/11/97 STR 12/05/97 STR 12/05/97 STR 12/05/97 STR 12/05/97 STR 12/05/97 STR 12/05/97 STR 12/05/97 STR 11/22/97 NCV 11/22/97 STR 10/11/97 STR IR 97-20 NRC PS 1C 3B IR 97-21 NRC PS 2A IR 97-21 NRC PS 1C IR 97-21 NRC PS 1C IR 97-21 NRC PS 1C IR 97-21 NRC PS 1C IR 97-21 NRC PS 2A 2B IR 97-21 NRC PS 1C 3B IR 97-19 LIC PS 1B 3A IR 97-19 NRC PS 1B IR 97-16 NRC PS 3A 3B The knowledge and performance of the environmental program's management and technical staff were excellent. Trained, experienced, and qualified environmental technicians were effectively conducting the radiological environmental monitoring program.
Effective vital area barriers and detection systems were in place that would provide delay and detection to individuals attempting unauthorized entry.
A very good security training program had been implemented.
Medical examinations for security officers were thorough and well documented.
A very good program to protect safeguards information was in place. An excellent training video provided instructions to individuals regarding the overall protection of safeguards information.
A very good security backup power supply system was in place.
Monthly tests of this system indicated that it performed extremely well.
A very good records and reports program was in place. The security staff was correctly reporting security events.
Good protected area barriers and detection systems were maintained.
During performance testing of the detection system, all attempts to intrude into the protected area were detected.
The compensatory measures program was effectively implemented.
Security personnel were well trained on the program requirements.
Following the reactor trip and safety injection event, updates to state and county officials were not made, and a notification for termination of the NOUE was not timely.
During a reactor trip and safety injection event, the licensee performed well in properly classifying the notification of unusual event (NOUE) and initiallynotifying the proper personnel and outside agencies upon activation of the emergency plan.
Radiation protection technicians provided high quality support to operations personnel in performance of the venting of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS). The radiation protection technicians were knowledgeable of radiological protective measures, proficient in handling the vent bottle, hoses, gloves, rags and waste water, and performed numerous radiation and contamination surveys.
October 28, 1998 16 DIABLOCANYON
PLANTISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA.
TEMPLATE CODE ITEM DESCRIPTION 10/10/97 STR IR 97-18 NRC PS 1C 3B 10/10/97 STR IR 97-18 NRC PS 5A 5B Training and qualification programs for chemistry/radiation protection technicians and non-licensed radwaste operators were properly implemented.
Chemistry personnel and non.licensed radwaste operators had an excellent understanding of the radioactive liquid and gaseous radioactive waste effluent management program, offsite dose calculations, and regulatory requirements.
5C An effective quality assurance program was maintained.
Management oversight of the radioactive waste effluent management program was good. The quality assurance audits of the radiological waste effluent management program activities were technically comprehensive and provided good program evaluation.
Action requests related to liquid and gaseous radioactive waste management program activities were closed in a timely manner.
10/10/97 STR 10/10/97 STR 10/10/97 STR IR 97-18 NRC PS 2A 2B IR 97-18 NRC PS 1C IR 97-18 NRC PS 2B Allliquid and gaseous effluent radiation monitoring instrumentation was operable and properly maintained, tested, and calibrated.
The liquid and gaseous radioactive waste effluent management programs were effectively implemented.
Implementing procedures for the liquid and gaseous radioactive waste effluent management programs provided proper guidance.
Poor radiation protection sample handling techniques were used while handling potentially contaminated samples.
Between 1993 and 1995, the licensee was in the fourth quartile (worst regarding the activity contained in the effluents reIeased) for airborne tritium, liquid tritium, liquid mixed isotopes for pressurized water reactors.
The effluent data showed a significant reduction in the amount of effluent radioactivity released after the removal of the Unit 2 failed fuel rod in the spring of 1996.
The engineered-safety feature air cleaning ventilation systems'urveillance testing program was properly implemented.
October 28, 1998 17 DIABLOCANYON
,r
ENCLOSURE 2 Dale
+pe SF A Sources ID Issue Description Codes GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PIMTABLELABELS Actual date ofan event or significant issue for those items that have a clear date of occurrence, the date the source of the information was issued (such as the LFR date), or, for inspection reports, the last date of the inspection period.
The categorization of the issue - see the Type Item Code table.
SALP Functional Area Codes: OPS for Operations; MAINTfor Maintenance; ENG for Engineering; and PS for Plant Support.
The document that contains the issue information: IR for NRC Inspection Report or LER for Licensee Event Report.
Identification of who discovered issue: N for NRC; L for Licensee; or S for Self Identifying (events).
Details of the issue from the LFR text or from the IR Executive Summaries.
Template Codes - see table.
F.D TYPE ITEM CODES Enforcement Action Letter with CivilPenalty Enforcement Discretion - No CivilPenalty TEMPLATECODES Operational Performance: A - Normal Operations; B - Operations During Transients; and C - Programs and Processes Strength Weakness VIO NCV DEV Positive Negative LER URI ~~
Licensing MISC Overall Strong Licensee Performance Overall Weak Licensee Performance Escalated Enforcement Item-Waiting Final NRC Action Violation Level I, II,III,or IV Non-Cited Violation Deviation from Licensee Commitment to NRC Individual Good Inspection Finding Individual Poor Inspection Finding Licensee Event Report to the NRC Unresolved Item from Inspection Report Licensing Issue from NRR Miscellaneous - Emergency Preparedness Finding (EP),
Declared Emergency, Nonconformance Issue, etc.
Material Condition: A - Equipment Condition or B - Programs and Processes Human Performance: A - Work Performance; B - Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities/
Training; C - Work Environment Engineering/Design: A - Design; B - Engineering Support; C - Programs and Processes Problem Identiilcation and Resolution: A - Identification; B - Analysis; and C-Resolution NOTES:
EEIs are apparent violations ofNRC requirements that are being considered forescalated~
enforcement action in accordance with the "General Statement ofPolicy and Procedure for~
NRC Enforcement Action" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identiiled by the EEIs and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are made.
Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, the licensee willbe provided withan opportunity to either (I)respond to the apparent violation or (2) request a predecisional enforcement conference.
URIs are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation.
However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.
ENCLOSURE 3 DIABLOCANYON INSPECTION PLAN IP - Inspection Procedure Tl - Temporary Instruction Core Inspection - Minimum NRC Inspection Program (mandatoIy ail plants)
INSPECTION TITLE/
PROGRAM AREA NUMBER OF INSPECTORS DATES TYPE OF INSPECTION/COMMENTS IP 73753 INSERVICE INSPECTION IP 81700 'HYSICALSECURITY PROGRAM IP 71001 REQUALIFICATIONPROGRAM EVALUATION EFFECTIVENESS OF LICENSEE CONTROLS IN IP 40500 IDENTIFYING,RESOLVING, AND PREVENTING PROBLEMS IP 83750 OCCUPATIONALRADIATIONEXPOSURE RADIOACTIVEWASTE TREATMENT,AND EFFLUENT AND ENVIRONMENTALMONITORING 3/1-5/99 4/5-9/99 5/3-7/99 5/1 7-21/99 6/14-18/99 6/1 4-18/99 CORE INSPECTION CORE INSPECTION CORE INSPECTION CORE INSPECTION CORE INSPECTION CORE INSPECTION
A l