ML16245A709
| ML16245A709 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 08/24/1979 |
| From: | Antoinette Lewis NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Bryan S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16245A443 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7910030879 | |
| Download: ML16245A709 (19) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NU AR. REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 AUG 2.4 197 HEMORAVDUM FOR:
Samuel E. Bryan, A/D for Field Coordination, DROI, IE FROM:
R. C. Lewis, Acting Chief, Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch, RII SUEJECT:
INFORMATION FOR NRC/TMI SPECIAL INQUIRY GROUP (H10-000113-107)
Enclosed please find the information on Oconee as requested in paragraph 3 o: :he enclosure to the memo dated August 1, 1979, from S. E. Bryan.
It is our ur:erst anding that paragraphs I and 2 will be provided by other Offices.
C. Lewis, Acting Chief Reactor Operaticns and Nuciear Support Branch
Enclosure:
COC T:
a-tin
-55O 0 0 6
/7 J9.1 0
s O
ENCLOSURE OCONEE 1 2
3
The following list of significant operational events, incidents, occurrences and transients is provided in response to the July 24, 1979 request. The list was developed by reviewing inspection reports, enforcement history, LER files and the licensee s log of incidents.
- 1. Reactor Trios The licensee's records on reactor trips were examined and operational problems are summarized below.
Cause Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Low Reactor Coolant Flow 4
4 0
Integrated Control System 15 inabilitv to handle trans ient resulting in high RC outlet temp, RC Pressure or Reactor Power.
High RC Pressure due to 18 9
3 loss of feedwater
'-Maua TrrD*
38 28 22 Total 75 47 33 ltentional Manual Trips when performing tests and other manual tries as reouired 0: proceoures n reeGwater System The_ overazionalI S7S onal problems experienced with the main fedwater system have ben a loss of one or both main feedwater pumps.
Each bump has anroximatelv a 60 ier-cnt capacity and with reactor power at or oreater t han 60 percent
-ressure reactor trip or manual trip results upon loss of one main E Du.p.
The pump loss problem has generally been traced to a ICS mal function.
0:her problems with the-main feedwater system have included mechanical failures n
lss of main feed pump condenser vacuum.
Fe
-tr system problems investigated by the licensee to date are listed below:
MAIN FEED.ATER SYSTEM Date Incident Unit No.
Reportabli 0;/11/,
Reactor Manuallv Trined I
.o When "B" Feedwater Pump Tripped.
Eclo(sure Oconee 1, 2, 30
-2 MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM Date Incident Unit No.
Reportable
.10/30/78-Reactor Trip Following 2
No Loss of FDW Valve Dif ferential Pressure Control 10/03/78 Reactor Trip on High 2
No Pressure Due to FDW Pump B Trip 10/17/78 Reactor Trip on High 2
No Pressure FDW Pump B Tripped 10/18/78 Reactor Trip Due to FDW 1
No Swing when put in Auto 0S/21/77 Reactor Trip Following No Problem With Feedwater Block Valves 10/6 Feedwater Pump B Trio 2
\\0 During Turbine Trip Test 01/02/76 Manual Trip Due to Loss 3
c of Both FW Pumps 03/19/75 Manual TriD Due to Loss of FWP on Low Vacuum 08/2375 Trip Due to Loss of 2
No Feedwater 08/05/75 Trip Due to FDW Pump A 2
No Trip During Thrust Bearing Wear Trip Test 0 ///
Manual Reactor Trip 2o Following FW Pump Turbine Trip on Vacuum 11/18/7 Runback to 15%' Due to No Decrease in FDW Flow 11/09/74 Reactor Trip on Reactor 3
Protection System High Flux Feedwater Demand
Pnc>ur (Oconee.1, 2, 3
-3 MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM Date Incident Unit No.
Reportable 10/17/74.
Unit 3 Tripped from 16/o 3
No Full Power Due to Loss of Feedwater 10/13/74 Trip Due to Loss of FDW 3
No Reactor Protection System Ch. A, B, and C Tripped 04/206/74 Manual Trip From-5% Full Power on Loss of FDW Pump Turbine
- 3. Emergencv Feedwater System The problems with the emergency feedwater system have been associated with
. erlooic surveillance testing of the turbine driven pump.
The turbine trip echanism would become.out-of-adjustment, due to vibrations, and when a test start was initiated, the turbine would trip and the stop valve would close. This has been corrected through the prevehtive maintenance program.
occasion insufficient lube oil system pressure caused the turbine to r o start on test.
Adjustments to the oil pressure svitch r
made Snd system operability restored.
date, the number of recorded incidents related to emfro nc feeda -ter Cs7ems are one for Unit 1, two for Unit 2, and five for Un4 t3 EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEN Late Incident Unit No.
Reportable
/7/2579 Emergency Feedwater Pump 2
No Was Declared Inoperable (Seal Leak)
Emergency FDW Pump Tur-2 No bine Rendered Inoperable
/6/
9 Emergency FDW Pump Would 3
No Not Start 1'C7 C
Emergency FD-Pump Failed 1
cu to Start During PT 1/A/600/11
Incl(sure (Oconee 1, 2, 3)
-4 EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEN Date Incident Unit No.
Reportable 04/27/78 Emergency FDW Pump Turbine 3
No Failed to Start 11/13/76 Emergency FDW Pump Line 3
No From Hotwell Bent by Secondary Side Water Hammer 04/30/75 Emergency FDW Pump 3
UE-287/75-5 Discovered to Be Inoperable 0,2 D
Emergency FDW Pump 3
No Recirc. Line Leak While Feeding Unit 2 OTSG's afety Related Instrumentation 1eraional problems involving safety related instrum,-tation ar divided
+/- nto two nain categories.
These are failure o t o
c' breokers to instantaneously trip and required sa presure transmtters to drift out of calibration.
The CRD events are summarized belo and were pari resalonsKP 'or iSsuance of I7B 79-09; the problem has been corrected 3t OCone.
R uiat o r rollowup on these events is documented in IE Inspection p ots
/
0-270/79-5, 50-287/79-5, 50-269/79-7, 50-270/79-,
and the routine follolup on each reportable event.
CONTROL ROD DR IVET "atR Incident Un2i9t No.
/
eor-abe CRD Brea-ker CB-1 Failed RO-269/79-5 to Open Luring On-Line Test 01/22/79 CRD Breaker CB-1 Failed 1
D0-90 9
to Open During On-Line Test 0 18/79CRD Breaker ::10 Did Not RO-287 79-2 Trip During On-Line Test, IP/0/B/305/3A
Enclosure (Oconee 1, 2,
- 3) 5 CONTROL ROD DRIVE Date Incident Unit No.
Reportable 12/17/78.
CRD Breaker #11 Failed 3
No to Open During Startup 08/07/75 CRD Breaker Failed in 3
AO-287/75-11 Untripped Condition 01/20/74 Failure.of CRD Breaker No CB-4 to Close on Unit Startup 04/23/73 Evaluation of CRD Breaker 1
No Unit to Trip When I X 3 Transformer Failed on April 23, 1973
.ne roblem of engineered safeguards pressure transmitters drifting out of calloration has not been completely corrected. Adjustments were made to the Surveilance program related to this instrumentation as a temporary fix.
The licensee is continuing its investigation and inspector followup continues.
Then the instrument calibration drifts beyond the technical specification setpoint limit, the licensee reports the event as an LER.
The temoorary corrective action taken has been to adjust the setpoint conservatively and to perform surveillance often enough so that the drift is caught before the TS setpoint is exceeded.
Subsequently, there have been no reportable events.
long term corrective action being pursued by the licensee is to test a spare transmitter in an environment similar to that where the instrumentation s in use.
This work is underway.
Casual factors and :anai resuitS of the test program are expected within several months.
iis Iem is carried as an inspection followup item and will be closed in a uture Inspection report.
The events related to this problem are listed below.
ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS PRESSURE TRANSHITTERS ate Incident Unit No.
Reportable i0/23/78 ES Channel 3 RE Narrow 2
C-2 Range Pressure Trans mitter Out of Calibration 09/14/78 Reactor Building Pressure Transmitters Out of Calibration
nclos(ure Oconee 1, 2, 3)0
-6 ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS PRESSURE TRANS ITTERS Date Incident Unit No.
Reportable 08/08/78 Reactor Building Pressure 1
RO-269/78-17 Transmitter Less than Technical Specification Value 04/04/78 Analog Channel 12 Reactor 2
RO-270/7S-5 Building Narrow Range Pressure Transmitter Found Out of Technical Specification Value 12/08/77 Found ES Reactor Building 2
R0-270/77-16 Pressure Transmitter Valued Out of Service 11/28/77 Inoperable Pressure and 3
RO-2S7/77-16 Flow in Reactor Protection System Channel A 0619/75 ES Pressure Transmitter 53 AC-237/75-8 Found Out of Calibration OTHER SAFETY RELATED INSTRUIENTAT IC' Date Incident Unit fo.
0eortable 07/24 79 Feed Breaker to CTI 1
Not Issued (Transformer)
Would Not Close -
Isolated Main Feed Bus 05/22/79 PS-68 (Pressure Switch) 2 RO-270/79-3 Discovered with a Setting in Excess of 4 ptig 12/14/78 Reactor Trip on Pressure/
-2697g2 Temp. (Short in Coil of T
Recorder) avg.
11/29/78S Engineered Safeguards RO-28778-18 Analog Channel B Tripned on Reactor Building High Pressure 11/23/78 ES Channel A Tripped (Degraded Node;
nclodure (Oconee 1, 2, 3)
-7 OTHER SAFETY RELATED INSTRUMENTATIO Date Incident Unit No.
Reortable 04/03/77 Reactor Trip on High 1No Reactor Coolant Pressure Due to Failed ICS Module 05/28/75 Reactor Building High 1
AO-269/75-6 Pressure Trip. Pressure Switch Set Over Limit
- 5. Safetv Related Ventilation The penetration room ventilation system has been declared inoperable on a number of occasions. A leak in the main feedwater line that passes through the penetration room will increase the humidity to saturation condition within the room and if the ventilation system was placed into operation, the nigh humidity would affect the charcoal filters rendering them ineffective.
The licensee uses a humidity limit of <70% to declare the ventilation system operable.
Above 70% relative humidity, the system is inoperable and Technical Specification gives required action.
To correct this problem, the licensee is considering alternate means for providing proper ventilation. In addition, sea+/- weld around the feedwater check valve hine in nas oeen tried to eliminate the source of humidity.
Final resolution for this problem has not been determined.
The events are listed below:
SAFETY RELATED \\ENTILATION
'ate Incident Unit No.
ReDortable 07/1S/79 Penetration Room 1
Not Issued Ventilation System Declared Inoperative 12/07/78 Penetration Room 3
RO-28S7/78-19 Ventilation Trains A&B Inoperative 06/29/77 Both Trains of Penetration 1
RO-269/77-21 Room Ventilation System Inoperable 10/20/73 Penetration Room Integrity 1
No Breached
Elsre (Oconee 1, 2, 3)
-8 T 1 System The operational problems on the low pressure injection system have been pri marly valve failures and borated water storage tank level instrumentation problems: The most recent problem has been the discovery of a tube leak on 2A LPT cooler.
On two occasions, 2-LP-21 failed to open during a surveillance test.
The problem was determined to be electrical and has been repaired. Also, LP 12 and 14 on Units 1 and 2 experienced a broken guide stem.
These four valves Iave Deen replaced and no problems have been encountered since replacement.
(The LP 12 and 14 on Unit 3 are of a different design and did not require replacement.)
LOW PRESSURE INJECTION SYSTEM -
VALVES Date Incident Unit No.
Reportable 04/05/77 2LP-21 Failed to Open 2
RO-270/77-6 During Reactor Building Spray Logic Test 2LP-21 Failed to Open 2
UE-270/75-19 During Checkout
'..25/75 Guide Pin Discovered Hissing From 2LP-12 j2//
Piece Missing From 2LP-12.
Piece Hissing From 2LP-14 e
level instrumentation on the borated water storage tank failed on a number of occasions due to purging of the sensing lens.
Additional heat
-racing and insulation has been added to the sensing lines to correct this problem. In addition, operators check the sensing line daily during freezing e-ather to verify that the insulation is present.and that the heat tracing is energized. The events are listed below.
Regulatory follow u is documented in Inspection Report 50-269/77-3. 50-270/77-3, and 50-287/77-3, during routine review and followup of the LER's listed below.
BORATED WATER STORAGE TANK Date Incident Unit No.
Reportable 0
Borated Water Storage 1
R4-269/78-23 Tank Level 1 Trans mitter Found Out of Calibration
/O/D//
Channel 1 of BVST Level Instrumentation Inc rable
Enclo(sure Oconee 1, 2, 3
-9 BORA.TED ATER STOPGE T§NK Date Incident Unit
- o.
Renortable 04/16/77 BWST Level Instrument 1
R0-269/77-13 Channel Inoperable 04/12/77 BWST Level Instr.
1 RO-269/77-13 Channel Inoperable 04/09/77 BWST Level Instrument Inoperable Due to Plugged Impulse Line 01/11/77 Lost One Channel of BVST RO-270/77-1 Level Instr. Due to Frozen Impulse Line 12/21/76 One Channel of B-ST Level 3
Instr.:
Frozen Impulse Line 121/5Both BNST Level Channels Inoperable Due to Frozen Impulse Lines 07/14/75 BWST Level Instruments Out 3
AO-237/75-10 of Calibration -
Level in Tank Low 12/22/73 Loss of Both BUST Level 1
A0-9073-3 Channels
- 7. PI System
.:error in the ECCS small break analysis was repocrted by 33&] and DPC in oril 1978.
The licensee has submitted a design change to NRP.
The change w.as approved and has been installed at Unit 3. Followup is documented in Inspction Report 50-287/79-15 and 50-287/79-18. The LUR RO-269/73-l1.
was given the routine followup.
(.
RCA Sys tem The problems with RCS involved the reactor coolant and the specimen sample holder. Problems with RC pumps have been:
- 1) motor o-I fires
' sea" water leakage; and 3) high RC flow.
Modifications have been completed to the pumm motor oil s thO problem has been resolved. Nodifications for the Binghan sea nece installeG. and this problem appears to be rSo
lure (Oconee 1, 2, 3)-0 10 The high reactor coolant flow problem was identified on Oconee 1 during initial power escalation testing. It was also identified on Oconee Units 2 and 3. Investigation and followup on this item resulted in a change to the fuel assembly holddown spring constant.
Discussions with NRR and the licensee resolved the matter.
Inspection Reports discussing the high RC flow issue are as follows:
-1 0- 2 0-3 50-269/73-4 50-270/75-7 50-287/74-13 50-269/76-12 50-270/76-12 50-287/75-2 50-287/75-7 50-270/76-12 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM iate Incident Unit No.
Reportable 06/19/77 Motor 3B1 Reactor 3
No Coolant Pump Over heated 11/08/76 Explosion/Fire on 1A2 RC 1
No Pump While Adding Oil 04/02/75 Indicated RC Flow 113.67%
)uE-70/i5-7 of Design 01/31/75 Small Oil Fire on 2E1 2o RC Pump 0C /19/74 Leak From 2B1 RC Pump o
During Heatup 01/22/74 Unit 2 Trip From Approxi-2 NC matelv 20% FP -
Seal Leak on 2B2 RCP caused Loss of RC Water to Reactor Building 07/29/73 RC Flow Greater than 100%
1 05/09/73 Rapid Loss of Oil to 1
>o Reactor Coolant Pump 2A1
. nco
,re (Oconee 1, 2, 3
-11 KRACTOR COOLANT SYSTEN Date Incident Unit No.
Reportable 03/27/73 Oil Spill on Reactor 1
No Pump 1Bi 03/06/73 Reactor Coolant Pump 1
No 1A1 Fire
- 9.
Xeowee Hydro (Emergency Power Svstem)
There have been two kinds of problems with Keowee.
One was administrative and the second was problems with a field flashing breaker.
Both are con sidered resolved.
.e aministrative controls weaknesses led to events that resulted in not v
the Keowee unit available as required by Technical SpecifiCations.
Iegulator-efforts resulted in higher controls and more formalrocedures
- .or maintaining the status of the units.
Since 1977, no major problems have been identified with administrative control.
1K December 77, a problem with the field flashing breaker on Kowee Unit 2 Ts i
fhis event and subseQuent events were reported as LER s.
- aultv breaker was replaced and the problem was resolve".
Srol rr with Cutler-Hammer relays was reported to NRC ad IE
-0" as z sue. C he problem dealt with the emergency power sitchng loic sstem.
All 1ater-Hamner relays involved were replaced
-M NDember-178.
The p
nEEm Las been resolved.
T ee ents involving Keowee are summarized below.
IE fol io s acusi sed Cr y
Inspection Reports 50-269/78-13, 50-270/78-12. 50-287/78-12.
5&-269/6(-6, 50-270/76-6, 50-287/76-6, and 50-269/76-4.
KEOWEE HYDRO (EMERGENCY POWER SOURCE) bate Incident Unit No.
ReDortable J10/i Keowee
)2 Field 1
RO-a/7-I Flashing Brea1er Failed to Close 1.0 78 Keowee #2 Field 1 2 3 RO-269/7814 Flashing Breaker Failed to Close u
8/
U Emergency Startup 1
2 30-2/7.-1 of Keowee Inhibited
Enfle "Ore (conee 1, 2, 3)0
-12 KEOWEE HYDRO (EMERGENCY PO ER SOURCE)
Date Incident Unit No.
Reportable 03/22/78 Keowee 1#2 Failed to 1, 2, 3 RO-269/78-9 Start -
General Field Flashing Breaker 03/14/78 (Cutler Hammer Relays 1; 2, 3
RO-269/78-7 Rep.) Keowee /'2 Failed to Start - General Field Flashing Breaker Problem 03/10/78 Keowee 1#2 Field Flashing 1, 2, 3 RO-269/78-6 Breaker Failed to Close 02/22/78 Keowee Unit 2 Failed to 1, 20 3 RO-29/78-3 Start Due to General Field Flashing Breaker 0
Keowee Unit 2 Failed to 1, 2. 3 RO-269/78-1 Start Due to Problem VWith Generator Field 12/09/77Keowee Unit 2 Failed to 1
3 0
Start Due to Problem with Generator Field 05,7/
Emergency Lockout of 1: 23 R0-269/77-17 Keowee Units During Test 10/0 /76 ES (Engineered Safe-0 N
guards) Start of Both Keowee Units During Test
)30/76 Keowee Unit Not Avail-
- 1. 2 3
PO-269/76-15 able to Supply 230 KV Yellow Bus 16/76 Emergency Start on No Keowee Ch. A by Button Somehow Pushed
/09/ 6 Keowee Unit I Tripped
- 1. 2 o
From Underground During U nit 2 Maintenance
ure (Oconee 1, 2, 3-13 KOWJEE HYDRO (EIERGENCY POR SOURCE; Date Incident Unit No.
Reportable 07/01/76 Keowee Unit 2 Wouldn't 1, 3 No Operate 22 XWE Because of Air Circuit Breaker #2 Problem 06/10/76 Partial Failure to Kewoee 1, 3 RO-269/76-10 Unit 2 06/08/76 Keowee Isolated From Both 1, 3 RO-269/76-9 Overhead and Underground Feeders 06/07/76 Keowee ACB :1 Failure-1, 3 RO-269/76-8 Not Available to Overhead Line 05/26/76 Keowee Unit 1 Removed 1; 2, 3 RO-287/76-7 From Service Vithout Connecting Unit 2 to Underground 11/05/75 Keowee Unit 2 Failed
- 1. 2. 3 AO-2G9j75-13 to Start Due to Exci tation Breaker Problem 0,/28/75 One String of Keowee 2, 3 and One Switching Station Batteries Out of Service 07003/5 Keowee Unit 2 Became N/A AO-26975-8 Inoperable As Did Lee Gas Turbine 06/13/75 Keowee Unit 1 Tripped 3
No on ES (Engineered Safeguards) & Didn't Restart 0/30/75 Keowee Unit 2 Tripped 1
AC2 After Emergency Start Keowee Unit 1 Locked 30-237j7 6
Out While Connected to Underground During Emergencv Start Test
zntlecure (Ocoee 1, 2,3)
-14 KEOEE HIYDRO (EMERGENCY POWER SOURCE)
Date Incident Unit No.
Reportable 02/11/75 Keowee Emergency Start 3
UE-287/73-1 Button in Unit 3 Control Room Not Operable 04/2 3/ 74 Trip of Keowee During 1
UE-269/70-1 Emergency Start Tests 2,027 Keowee Unit 1 Removed N/A AO-269/74-1 From Service 09/21/73 Unit 1 Keowee Not 1
No Available for Emergency 06/27/73 Keowee Unit 1 Failure 1
UE-269/73-5 to Start (Normal Start)
UJ. radrant Tilt and Power 0Scillation q udr a nt power tilt problm wa s first observed at ower followine s-artup a.ter refueling on Unit 1. cycle 4. LI n
V investicated and were held with N&E
\\NR, B&U, and DPL.
robiem has been s
d Reference reports are listed below.
-. 47, Oconee Unit 1, Cycle 4-Reload Report, iarcn 1977 r
- 0. Parker to G. Case, 10-4-77
- 0. Parker to E. G. Case, 11/9/77 et 0. Parker to E.
G. Case, 1-23-78
- Leztter, 0. Parker to E. G. Case, 12-14-77 I
en g in Bethesda, Maryland,
- NRC, DPC, and B&Y
-poe oscillation and a oscillating quadrant power tilt was identified on Ocone unit 3. These subjects are discussed in IE Inspection Reports 50-287/
71 030-2/7-20, 50-287/78-26, and 50-287/78-31.
se pr o-le-ms have been extensively investigated by the licenll andby nS cons utants using experiments and analysis.
The res and Conclusions are published in a report available from DPC:
7Ibvestigation of Low Anomalies at Oconee 3 (R-010)..by F.
- 0. 0Hoff C. Robinson, Technology for Energv Corp.
L SZ related to these problems are listed below.
-Enclosure (Oconee 1, 2, 3)-15 QUADRANT TILT ATD POER OSC IO Date Incident Unit No.
Recortable 12/08/79-Quadrant Power Tilt 3
RO-287/78-20 Above Steady State Limit 06/17/79 Reactor Quadrant R0-269/79-19 Power Tilt Above Steady State Limit 05/07/79 Quadrant Power Tilt 1
RO-269/79-13 Beyond Error Adjust Limit 08/18/78 Quadrant Tilt Above 1
RO-269/78-18 Steadv State Positive 08/06/78 Quadrant Power Tilt 1
RO-269/78-16 Beyond Limit (Greater than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />) 12/05/77 Uncoupled Axial Power No Shaping Rod 02/28/77 Rod/6 Group Dropped P0-Z C Causing Runback &
Quadrant Power Tilt 02/26/76 Dropped Rod 5 Group 2 -
2 R-270/76-3 Tilt Exceeded Limit
- 11.
Condenser Circulating Vater System Normally the CCW System circulates water from Lake Keowee through the condenser and back to Keowee. Upon Loss of power to the CCW pumps, an emergency line opens and the CCW continues to operate as an-unassisteC siOor for decay heat removal and emergency cooling reauirements. The vave t
iat must operate to convert the system have failed, on test a number o In problem is
.thought to be caused due to environmental conditions athe valve location ine valves are located in a valvD pit outside and dampness causes electrical failurd. The item is currently being reviewed by ET Summary o1 events are listed below.
EncIosure (Oconee 1, 2, 3)0
-16 CONDENSER CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM Date Incident Unit No.
Reportable 06/30/79 5 of 6 Condenser 2
No Circulating Water Emergency Discharge Valves Found Closed 07/21/77 CCW-8 Found Electrically 1, 2, 3 No Inoperable (Emergency Condition Valve) 09/22/76 CCW-8 Failed to Operate 3
o During PT 04/1076 CCW-8 Failed During Test 2
No 0
0 CCW-8 Failed to Operate 1
N0 Electrically During Test
/19/75 3CCW-93 and CCW-8 Didn't 3
UL-287/75-4 Open During CCW Test.
U /T; 73 Inoperability of Valve CCV-8
. n n e Building Flooding Coc ober 10,
- 1976, an incident occurred that reslred in flooing of tne tu building to a depth of about one foot.
Lead resoonsiD7ilY for1 Le z
-l on and resolution was transferred to NRR on Octob
- 29. 1976.
- e licensee's corrective action is described in R0-287/76-1S.
In addition a stand'v shutdown facility is currently under construction to provide a rliaDle ultimate heat sink in case a flood occurs that results in severe o a-age to the turbine building. This action is discussed in a letter from U.
Parker to E.
G. Case, dated February 1 197S.