ML15261A207

Summary of 981001 Meeting with Util in Rockville,Md Re License Renewal Scoping & Screening Process Used in Preparation of Oconee License Renewal Application.List of Meeting Attendees & Copy of Presentation Material Encl

ML15261A207
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	10/30/1998
From:	Joseph Sebrosky NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
References
NUDOCS 9811040238
Download: ML15261A207 (46)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 October 30, 1998 LICENSEE:

Duke Energy Corporation (Duke)

FACILITY:

Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3

SUMMARY

OF MEETING BETWEEN THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC) STAFF AND DUKE REPRESENTATIVES TO DISCUSS THE OCONEE LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION On October 1, 1998, representatives of Duke met with the NRC staff in Rockville, Maryland, to discuss-tbe Oconee license renewal application. The purpose of the meeting was for Duke to provide an overview to the staff of the license renewal scoping and screening process used in the preparation of the Oconee license renewal application. A list of meeting attendees is provided in Enclosure 1. A copy of the presentation material discussed at the meeting is provided in Enclosure 2.

Duke first presented an overview of the license renewal process and the NEI 95-10 guidance, which they used as the basis for its application. Duke then provided an overview of the scoping process for the following areas: structural, mechanical, electrical, and for regulated events.

Highlights from these areas are discussed below.

Structural Highlights Duke first identified all of the Oconee structures onsite and then applied the scoping criteria to the structures. Once the structures that were within scope of the license renewal rule were identified, Duke identified the structural components in the structures and applied the scoping process to identify the structural components that are subject to an aging management review.

The total list of Oconee structures was compiled from the following sources: Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Site General Arrangement Drawings, Commodities and Facilities Drawings, and Quality Standards Manual, NSD307. The staff questioned how certain items were treated during the scoping process. For example, piles for structural foundations were not considered a structure in the scoping process. Duke responded that for purposes of its scoping, this item was considered a component and was evaluated at that level. The staff also.

questioned if the scoping done to comply with the maintenance rule had the same results as the scoping that was done for the license renewal rule. Duke responded that the set of structures that resulted from the maintenance rule scoping was larger than those for the license renewal rule, because the scoping, although similar for the two rules, is not the same (e.g., the maintenance, rule evaluated structures that are required to support emergency operating procedures; the license renewal rule has no equivalent requirement).

Mechanical Highlights Duke noted that the mechanical scoping process posed a challenge because the definition of safety-related structures, systems, and components found in 54.4(a)(1) of the license renewal 98114239. 98f030:

POR ADOCK 05000269.

P FUR

&4P October 30, 1998 rule does not match the definition of safety-related that is used in Oconee's current licensing basis (CLB). The reason for the discrepancy is that the safety-related definition used in the license renewal rule was promulgated after the Oconee units were licensed. Duke stated that the definition of safety-related found in 54.4(a)(1) was used in the scoping process for the license renewal application to develop the list of components found in the application. In response to a question from the staff, Duke stated that it did not intend to change its CLB definition of safety-related to match the definition found in 54.4(a)(1). Duke believes that the change is unnecessary because it complies with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 54 in Duke's license renewal application.

The staff asked Duke how insulation was treated that serves a safety-related function. The example the staff used was that for some plants the insulation on the boric acid tank served a safety-related function. Duke stated that it would get back to the staff on whether or not it had any insulation at Oconee that served a safety-related function, and if it did, how it was treated in the scoping process.

Electrical Scoping Duke noted that the process used for electrical scoping was different than the process used in the structural and mechanical areas. The electrical scoping was based on system function, not on component function. An outline of the electrical scoping process can be found in. The staff asked if Duke excluded components from the scope of the license renewal rule based on performance or condition monitoring. Duke indicated that it had on a limited basis. The staff stated that the rule does not allow excluding components based on performance or condition monitoring. The staff indicated that it would evaluate Duke's position further as part of its review and that further meetings on how the electrical scoping was performed would be beneficial.

Regulated Events The last portion of the meeting was used to discuss how Duke complied with 54.4(a)(3) of the license renewal rule. The staff noted that Baltimore Gas and Electric had a separate section in its license renewal application for Calvert Cliffs dedicated to fire protection and that it was difficult to find this information in Duke's application for Oconee. Duke noted that its discussion concerning fire protection is found throughout its application as opposed to a separate section.

Duke provided the staff with a notebook of information regarding fire protection and other regulated events (i.e., environmental qualification, pressurized thermal shock, anticipated transients without scram, and station blackout) to assist the staff in its review of the issues.

Duke noted that all the information was currently on the docket and constituted Duke's current licensing basis regarding regulated events. Duke compiled the information in one notebook so October 30, 1998 that it could easily be reviewed. The staff stated that it may need a combination of a site visit and requests for additional information in this area to resolve its concerns.

Joseph M. Sebrosky, Project Manager License Renewal Project Directorate Division of Reactor Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287

Enclosures:

As stated cc w/encls: See next page DISTRIBUTION:

See next page DOCUMENT NAME:G:\\SEBRQSKY\\10-1-OCO.SUM OFFICE LA PDLR/DRPM:PM PRLR/DRPM: PM PDLR:D NAME

_Berry JSebrosky_ Soffma ClGrim DATE 10/ 198 1 0/198*

1098 U

1098 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Distribution:

Hard copy PUBLIC tb-ckiet-ile~

PDLR RF M. EI-Zeftawy, ACRS T2E2 F. Miraglia J. Raval J. Roe K. Steven West D. Matthews J. Guo C. Grimes Chang-Yang Li T. Essig B. Thomas G. Lainas M. Snodderly J. Strosnider M. Razzaque G. Bagchi D. Thatcher H. Brammer J. Calvo T. Hiltz P. Shermanski G. Holahan T. Cheng S. Newberry J. Vera C. Gratton R. Wessman L. Spessard S. Black R. Correia R. Latta J. Peralta J. Moore R. Weisman M. Zobler E. Hackett A. Murphy T. Martin D. Martin W. McDowell S. Droggitis PDLR Staff H. Berkow D. LaBarge L. Plisco C. Ogle R. Trojanowski M. Scott C. Julian R. Architzel J. Wilson R. Gill, Duke D. Walters, NEI

Oconee Nuclear Station (Lnse Renewal) cc:

Paul R. Newton, Esquire Duke Energy Corporation Mr. J. E. Burchfield 422 South Church Street Compliance Manager Mail Stop PB-05E Duke Energy Corporation Charlotte, North Carolina 28201-1006 Oconee Nuclear Site P. 0. Box 1439 J. Michael McGarry, III, Esquire Seneca, South Carolina 29679 Anne W. Cottingham, Esquire Winston and Strawn Ms. Karen E. Long 1400 L Street, NW.

Assistant Attorney General Washington, DC 20005 North Carolina Department of Justice P.O0. Box 629 Mr. Rick N. Edwards Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Framatome Technologies Suite 525 L. A. Keller 1700 Rockville Pike Manager - Nuclear Regulatory Licensing Rockville, Maryland 20852-1631 Duke Energy Corporation 526 South Church Street Manager, LIS Charlotte, North Carolina 28201-1006 NUS Corporation 2650 McCormick Drive, 3rd Floor Mr. Richard M. Fry, Director Clearwater, Florida 34619-1035 Division of Radiation Protection North Carolina Department of Senior Resident Inspector Environment, Health, and U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Natural Resources 7812B Rochester Highway 3825 Barrett Drive Seneca, South Carolina 29672 Raleigh, North Carolina, 27609-7721 Regional Administrator, Region II Gregory D. Robison U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Duke Energy Corporation Atlanta Federal Center Mail Stop EC-12R 61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85 P. 0. Box 1006 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Charlotte, North Carolina 28201-1006 Virgil R. Autry, Director Robert L. Gill, Jr.

Division of Radioactive Waste Management Duke Energy Corporation Bureau of Land and Waste Management Mail Stop EC-12R Department of Health and P. 0. Box 1006 Environmental Control Charlotte, North Carolina 28201-1006 2600 Bull Street RLGILL@DUKE-ENERGY.COM Columbia, South Carolina 29201-1708 Douglas J. Walters County Supervisor of Oconee County Nuclear Energy Institute Walhalla, South Carolina 29621 1776 I Street, NW Suite 400 W. R. McCollum, Jr., Vice President Washington, DC 20006-3708 Oconee Site DJW@NEI.ORG Duke Energy Corporation P. 0. Box 1439 Chattooga River Watershed Coalition Seneca, SC 29679 P. 0. Box 2006 Clayton, GA 30525 Manager-NcerRgltr iesn

ATTENDANCE LIST OCTOBER 1. 1998 NRC MEETING WITH DUKE OCONEE UNITS 1, 2. AND 3 (10 CFR PART 54)

NAME ORGANIZATION

1.

Steve Hoffman NRC/NRR/DRPM/PDLR

2.

Joe Sebrosky NRC/NRR/DRPM/PDLR

3.

Bob Prato NRC/NRR/DRPM/PDLR

4.

Hai-Boh Wang NRC/NRR/DRPM/PDLR

5.

Wan C. Liu NRC/NRR/DRPM/PDLR

6.

Sam Lee NRC/NRR/DRPM/PDLR

7.

Janak H. Raval NRC/NRR/DSSA/SPLB

8.

Chris Gratton NRC/NRR/DSSA/SPLB

9.

K. Steven West NRC/NRR/DSSA/SPLB

10.

J. S. Guo NRC/NRR/DSSA/SPLB

11.

Chang-Yang Li NRC/NRR/DSSA/SPLB

12.

Brian Thomas NRC/NRR/DSSA/SPLB

13.

Michael Snodderly NRC/NRR/DSSA/SCSB

14.

Muhammad Razzaque NRC/NRR/DSSA/SRXB

15.

Dale Thatcher NRC/NRR/DE/EELB

16.

Jose Calvo NRC/NRR/DE/EELB

17.

Paul Shemanski NRC/NRR/DE/EELB

18.

Goutam Bagchi NRC/NRR/DE/ECGB

19.

Thomas M. Cheng NRC/NRRIDE/ECGB

20.

Jit Vora NRC/RES/DET/EMMEB

21.

Dick Wessman NRC/NRR/DE/EMEB

22.

Richard Correia NRC/NRR/DRCH/HQMB

23. Juan Peralta NRC/NRR/DRCH/HQMB

24. Suzanne Black NRC/NRR/DRCH/HQMB

25.

Robert Latta NRC/NRR/DRCH/HQMB

26.

Robert Weisman NRC/OGC

27.

Debbie Ramsey Duke Power

28.

Greg Robison Duke Power

29.

Rounette Nader Duke Power

30.

Paul Colaianni Duke Power

31.

Lynn Connor Doc-Search Associates

32.

Nancy Chapman SERCH/Bechtel

33.

Michael Henig Virginia Power

34.

Mike Neal NUSIS

35.

Doug Walters NEI

OCONEE LICENSE RENEWAL SCOPING & SCREENING PROCESS OVERVIEW October 1, 1998 Purpose of meeting:

To review the license renewal scoping and screening process used in preparation of the Oconee license renewal application.

Duke Presenters Paul Colaianni Rounette Nader Debbie Ramsey Greg Robison Agenda Part 1 - Scoping & Screening General Overview................... 1-2 P.M.

• Overview/NEI 95-10 Guidance

+ Oconee Structural Scoping & Screening

• Oconee Mechanical Scoping & Screening

+ Oconee Electrical Scoping & Screening Part 2 - Regulated Events........................................................2-3 P.M.

Environmental Qualification (EQ)

Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS)

Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)

Station Blackout Fire Protection Enclosure

NEI 95-10 [REVISION 01 INDUSTRY GUIDELINE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE REQUIREMENTS OF10 CFR PART 54 THE LICENSE RENEWAL RULE NUCLEAR ENERGY IN S T IT UTE MARCH1996 SUITE 400 1776 I STREET.

NW WASHINGTON, D{

20006-3708 2027 39 8000

NEI 95-10 REVISION 0 March 1, 1996 FIGURE 2.0 -1 LICENSE RENEWAL IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS Identify systems.

ldentyTAAs &

structures, & components &

entifLs Intended functions within the scope exemptions [§ 54.3]

of license renewal [§ 54.4]

(Section 5.0)

(Section 3.0)

Methods to Identify structures & com ponents subject to aging management review

[§ 54.21(a)(1)(i) & (ii)] [§ 54.21(a)(2)]

(Section 4.1)

Methods for demonstrating that Methods for evaluating TLAAs &

the effects of aging are adequately managed exemptions [§ 54-21(c)(1), (2)]

(Section 4.2)(Scin50 Content of Application Technical Information:

-Identify long-lived passive SCs (§54.21(a)(1)]

-Describe & justify methods [§ 54.21(a)(2)]

• Demonstrate aging effects managed [J 54.21(a)(3)]

-Evaluation of TI.AAs [6 4.21 (c)]

(Section 6.0)

CLB Changes affecting LRA FSAR Supplement Technical J§ 6.21(~l 5-2 1(d)]Specification changes

[54.22

L0 NEI 95-10 REVISION 0 March 1, 1996 FIGURE 3.0-1 A METHOD TO IDENTIFY SSCs AND INTENDED FUNCTIONS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF LICENSE RENEWAL [§ 54.4(a) &(b)]

For each system, structure, or component (SSC) in the plant Identify applicable Information sources (process the SSC through each path)

Is the SSC Is the relied on to Yes SSC safety demonstrate No related?

compliance with (5 54.4(a)(1)]

certain NRC regulations?

[ 54.4(a)(3)]

Yes No Is the SSC non-safety related No whose failure could prevent a safety related function?

(§ 54.4(a)(2)]

Yes F

Identify the function(s) that meets the -dentify the function(s) that demonstrates compliance requirements of [§ 54.4(a)(1) or (2)]

with the Commission's regulations [$ 4.4(a)(3)]

+

SSC is SSCs within the scope of license renewal and the associated Intended functions are identified not within the scope of license renewal rule Figure 4.1-1 1

9

NEI 95-10 REVISION 0 March 1, 1996 FIGURE 4.1-1 IDENTIFICATION OF STRUCTURES AND COMPONENTS SUBJECT TO AGING MANAGEMENT REVIEW [§ S4.21(a)(1)]

From Figure 3.0-1 For each SSC determined to be within the scope of the rule, define the evaluation boundaries of the SSCs No Is the SSC Yes a structure?

Identify the

-is the components component Yes th su r component a

m withIn the considered passive sequi t mepnent N

-- o-evaluation In the IPA bsubec to relaemientr boundary process?

bsednaified ife or and their

[6F54.21(a)(1)(i)]

specifiet imeio functions[

5.1a()i)

Determine If structure No Yes or component commodity r

groupings apply Aging management List the structures, components, and commodity review is not groups required that require aging management review Figure 4.2-1,4.2-2, or 4.2-3 20

TABLE 2.2-2. TYPICAL STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, AND COMMODITY GROUPS, AND 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1)(i) DETERMINATIONS FOR INTEGRATED PLANT ASSESSMENT (Continued)

ITEM CATEGORY STRUCTURE, COMPONENT, OR STRUCTURE, COMMODITY GROUP COMPONENT, OR COMMODITY GROUP MEETS 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1)(i)

(YESINO) 23 Structures ASME Class 1 Hangers and Supports Yes (Contd.)

24 Non-ASME Class 1 Hangers and Yes Supports 25 Snubbers No 26 Reactor Coolant ASME Class 1 Piping Yes Pressure Boundary Components (Note: the components of the RCPB are defined by each plant's CLB and site specific documentation) 27 Reactor Vessel Yes 28 Reactor Coolant Pumps Yes (Casing) 29 Control Rod Drives No 30 Control Rod Drive Housing Yes 31 Steam Generators Yes 32 Pressurizers Yes 33 Non-Class 1 Underground Piping Yes Piping Components 34 Piping in Low Temperature Yes Demineralized Water Service 35 Piping in High Temperature Single Yes Phase Service 36 Piping in Multiple Phase Service Yes 37 Service Water Piping Yes T le. 2.2-2.~ 4-5 S e <.3 2.2-10 Working Draft, September 1997

UlUNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-ooo January 22, 1997 ORGANIZATION:

Duke Power Company

SUMMARY

OF SITE VISIT AND MEETING BETWEEN THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND DUKE POWER REPRESENTATIVES TO DISCUSS THE STAFF'S COMMENTS ON THE REVISED OCONEE LICENSE RENEWAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION REPORT, OLRP-JO0i, DATED NOVEMBER 4, 1996 (REACTOR BUILDING EXAMPLE) (TAC NOS. M96277, M96278, AND M96279)

On January 6, 1997, the NRC staff conducted a site visit at the Duke Power offices in Charlotte, North Carolina in order to complete its rev iew of Duke's revised Oconee License Renewal Technical Information Report, OLRP-1001 (Reactor Building Example) dated November 4, 1996.

Duke Power undertook a rewrite of the original report dated July 31, 1996, after the NRC staff informed Duke in September 1996 that the July 31 report did not contain sufficient information for the staff to conduct a technical review. On December 5, 1996, the staff agreed to perform a "format and content" review of the Duke revised report and provide feedback on the acceptability of the report by January 7, 1997.

The staff reviewed the Duke revised report using information contained in draft Nuclear Energy Institute License Renewal Implementation Guideline (NEI 95-10) and the lessons learned from the 1996 Industry License Renewal Demonstration Project.

The staff's comments on the Duke revised report are contained in a staff comment matrix (Attachment 1).

The comment matrix provides references to the applicable section of NEI 95-10 for the specific information item described. The staff's comments are contained in notes to the matrix.

After drafting the comments contained in Attachment 1, the staff conducted a site visit to Duke Power's offices in Charlotte to review onsite documentation supporting the revised report. Onsite documentation reviewed by the staff included Oconee reactor building drawings, civil inspection reports, inspection procedures, and aging management review results. Additionally, the staff had discussions with plant engineers and site license renewal project managers regarding the onsite documentation. As a result of the onsite reviews and discussions the staff determined that Duke had adequately listed the structures and components subject to an aging management review in the report and that onsite documentation provided traceability to individual structures and components when the larger component groupings were identified in the report, consistent with the staff's previous position on the requirements for Tisting structures and components in a license renewal application. The staff's position is included in Attachment 1. Additionally the staff's onsite review also determined that Duke had provided a basis for their component groupings as required by NEI 95-10. As a result of the on site review, the staff determined that no additional actions on format and content for the reactor building report are necessary by Duke for comments 1 and 2 on the comment matrix.

Elements of "the list" requited by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1)

1. In the application, the list should be of sufficient detail so that there is assurance that all the structures and components subject to an aging management review have been identified.

2. An applicant may apply some convention to group structures or components to gain efficiency. If this is done, the convention must be described in the application. The grouping should be traceable to documentation maintained on-site.

3. On-site, the applicant must control and maintain documentation to identify each structure or component that was determined to be subject to an aging management review. This documentation must be sufficient to allow the staff to independently identify each structure and component determined to be subject to an aging management review. This documentation should identify each structure or component within the groupings included in the application.

Duke rEnergy Oconee License Renewal Scoping I Screening Process Overview Structures October 1, 1998 Debbie Ramsey

~1ift

-J F2

Structural Identify all Oconee Structures Process Scope Structures and Intended Functions

§§ 54.4(a) & (b)

Chapters 2.2 & 2.7 of OLRP-1001 [3.1]

[]-NEI 95-10Rev.

O Section Reference Identify Oconee Structural Components Chapter 2.7 of OLRP-1001 Scope Structural Components and Intended Functions, §§ 54.4(a) & (b)

Chapter 2.7 of OLRP-1001 [3.1]

Identify Structures and Components Subject to AMR, § 54.21(a)(1)

Chapter 2.7 of OLRP-1001 [4.1]

Define Structural Component Groups Chapter 2.7 of OLRP-1001 Identify and Assess Potential Aging Effects for Component Groups Chapters 3.2 & 3.7 of OLRP-1001 [4.2.1.1 Identify Applicable Aging Effects for Components of Each Structure Chapters 3.2 & 3.7 of OLRP-1001 [4.2.1.1]

Identify Existing or New Programs for Managing Aging Effects Chapter 3.7 of OLRP-1001 [4.2.1.2]

Demonstrate Program Effectiveness

§ 54.21(a)(3)

Chapter 4 of OLRP-1001 [4.2.1.3]

Structure Identification Total list of Oconee structures was compiled from the following sources:

- Oconee Nuclear Station UFSAR

- Oconee Site General Arrangement Drawings

- Oconee Commodities and Facilities Drawings Oualiy Standards Manual, NSD 307

Oconee Nuclear Station 3.2 Classification of Structures, Components, and Systems

-4.

3.2 CLASSIFICATION OF STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, AND SYSTEMS 3.2.1 SEISMIC CLASSIFICATION 3.2.1.1 Structures The design bases for normal operating conditions are governed by the applicable building design codes.

The basic design criterion for the worst loss-of-coolant accident and seismic conditions is that there shall be no loss of function if that function is related to public safety.

AEC publication TID 7024, "Nuclear Reactors and Earthquake," as amplified in Chapter 3, "Design of Structures, Components, Equipment, and Systems" is used as the basic design guide for seismic analysis.

The design basis earthquake ground acceleration at the site is 0.05g.

The maximum hypothetical earthquake ground acceleration is 0.10g. and 0.15g for Class I structures founded on bedrock and overburden respectively.

The plant structures are classified as one of three classes according to their function and the degree of integrity required to protect the public.

3.2.1.1.1 Class I Class I structures are those which prevent uncontrolled release of radioactivity and are designed to withstand all loadings without loss of function. Class I structures include the following:

Portions of the Auxiliary Building that house engineered safeguards systems, control room, fuel storage facilities and radioactive materials.

Reactor Building and its penetrations.

2 3

CT4 Transformer and 4KV Switchgear Enclosures (Blockhouses) (Reference Section 8.3.1.4.1, 3

"Auxiliary Transformers.")

Unit Vent.

3.2.1.1.2 Class 2 Class 2 structures are those whose limited damage would not result in a release of radioactivity and would 2

permit a controlled plant shutdown but could interrupt power generation. Class 2 structures include the 2

following:

2 Oconee Intake Structure 2

Oconee Turbine and Auxiliary Buildings, except as included in Class 1 2

Oconee Intake Canal Dike 2

Oconee Intake Underwater Weir 2

Keowee Powerhouse 2

Keowee Spillway 2

Keowee Service Bay Substructure UNCONTROLLED 2

Keowee Breaker Vault (31 DEC 1997) 3-37

3.2 Classification of Structures, Components, and-Systems Oconce Nuclear Station 2

Kkowee IAtake Structure 2

Keowee Power and Penstock Tunnels 2

Keowee Dam 2

CCW Intake Piping 2

CCW Discharge Piping 2

ECCW Piping (Structural Portion outside of Turbine Building) 2 Little River Dam and Dikes 7

Essential Siphon Vacuum System Intake Dike Trench 7

Essential Siphon Vacuum Cable Trench 7

Essential Siphon Vacuum Building 3.2.1.1.3 Class 3 Class 3 structures are those whose failure could inconvenience operation, but which are not essential to power generation, orderly shutdown or maintenance of the reactor in a safe condition. They include all structures not included in Classes I and 2.

3.2.1.2 Components and Systems (pability is provided to shutdown safely all three units in the event of a maximum hypothetical earthquake.

Equipment and portions of systems that can withstand the maximum hypothetical earthquake are identified in Section 3.2.2, "System Quality Group Classification."

3.2.2 SYSTEM QUALITY GROUP CLASSIFICATION This section defines the design criteria used with respect to the loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), and natural phenomena and also explains the division of components and piping into classifications related to design and function. These criteria are as follows:

A maximum hypothetical earthquake will not result in a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), but the simultaneous occurrence of these events will not result in loss of function to vital safety related 5

components or systems. The simultaneous occurrence of the maximum hypothetical earthquake and a 5

LOCA is only a design criteria. A LOCA is not postulated to occur simultaneously with a maximum 5

hypothetical earthquake during accident analysis.

In addition, pipe failures during a maximum 5

hypothetical earthquake are not postulated as part of the accident analysis.

A tornado will not be allowed to cause a LOCA.

A tornado does not occur simultaneously with or following a LOCA.

A tornado and earthquake do not occur simultaneously.

5 An earthquake can occur simultaneously with a loss of offsite power.

UNCONTROLLED A turbine missile will not be allowed to cause a LOCA.

A turbine missile does not occur simultaneously with a LOCA.

T.e following design objectives result from consideration of the design criteria:

1. Loss-of-Coolant Accident 3-38 (31 DEC 1997)

54.4(a)(3) Scoping

• Structures which satisfy 54.4(a) (3) criteria were identified through review of licensing commitments for the regulated events.

Fire Protection Environmental Qualification

- Pressurized Thermal Shock

- Anticipated Transient without Scram Station Blackout

Table 3.1 Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Structure Scoping Summary (Includes All Oconee Structures)

Structure' Class' LR Function' SR NSR FP EQ PTS ATWS SB3O Documentation Instrumentation Facility(8021) 3 N

N N

N N

N N

N Intake Canal Dike 2

Y 5,10,12 N

Y N

N N

N N

PFSAR - Class 2 OSS-0254.00-00-3002 Class 2, Function NSD-307 - Class 2 Function 10 - not needed se discussion Section 3.2.

Itiake Structure e

2 2,7 N

Y Y

N N

NTN203SAR02

-~

A OSS-0254,66-0O-3002 Sti Coyle, Memo C-lass 2 Interim Radwaste Building (8092) 3 N

N N

N N

N N

N

,Keowee Breaker Vault 2

Y',

23,6 N

Y N

N N

N N

.FSAR-Cses 2

~TJCoylIe MemTo-Class 2 OSS-0254.004000 - Class 2A Functions 4bt307 - Class 2

~

Keowee Intake Structure 2

Y 2,7 N

Y Y

N N

N N

1SAR-Class 2

TI oyle Memo-Class 2 biS-0254.00-00-4000 Class 2 NSD-307 - Class 2 Keowee Penstock 2

Y 2,7 N

Y Y

N N

N N

FSAR-Class 2 OSS.0254.00-00-4000, Class 2 NSD-307 - Class 2 Keowee Power House 2

Y Y 2,3 N

Y N

N N

N N

FSAR sCeass 2

A. ~

TTiCoyle Merno-Class 2, OSS-0254.00-00-4000 bClass2 Functions I.SD-307 - Class 2 OSS-0274.00-00-0007 UNCONTROLLED July 30,1998 Rev. 0 Page 18

Component Identification

• Appendix B of NEI 95-10 Rev. 0

• NUMARC Containment and Class I Structures Industry Report

• Regulated Events Commitments

• Oconee Civil / Structural Drawings

• Structure Design Basis Specifications

• Plant Walkdowns

Table 4.1 Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Structural Components and Functions Category and Component Function(s) - See Table 3.2 for Master List of Functions Disposition Anchorage/ Embedments (exposed

2. Provides structural and/or functional support to safety related equipment.

In scope surfaces)

7. Provides structural and/or functional support to non-safety related equipment where failure of this structural component could directly prevent satisfactory accomplishment of any of the required safety-related functions.

Battery Racks

2. Provides structural and/or functional support to safety related equipment.

In scope Cable Tray & Conduit

2. Provides structural and/or functional support to safety related equipment.

In scope

7. Provides structural and/or functional support to non-safety related equipment where failure of this structural component could directly prevent satisfactory accomplishment of any of the required safety-related functions.

Cable Tray & Conduit Supports

2. Provides structural and/or functional support to safety related equipment.

In scope

7. Provides structural and/or functional support to non-safety related equipment where failure of this structural component could directly prevent satisfactory accomplishment of any of the required safety-related functions.

Checkered Plate

3. Provides shelter/protection to safety related equipment.

In scope Control Boards

2. Provides structural and/or functional support to safety related equipment.

Covered w/electrical cabinets

3. Provides shelter/protection to safety related equipment.

7. Provides structural and/or functional support to non-safety related equipment where failure of this structural component could directly prevent satisfactory accomplishment of any of the required safety-related functions.

Control Room Ceiling

7. Provides structural and/or functional support to non-safety related In scope equipment where failure of this structural component could directly prevent satisfactory accomplishment of any of the required safety-related functions.

L Controlled Leakage Doors

1. Provides pressure boundary and/or fission product barrier.

In scope - covered with specialty doors UNCONTROLLED OSS-0274.00000007 Rev. 0 Page 32

UNCONTROLLED OSS-0274.00-00-0007 July 30, 1998 Rev. 0 Page 40 Table 4.2 Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Structures and Components Subject to AMR Matrix Structure Component Anchorage/Embedments (exposed surface)

X X

X X

X X X Battery Racks X

X X

X Cable Tray & Conduit X

X X

X X

X X

Cable Tray & Conduit Supports X

X X

X X

X X

Checkered Plate X

X X X X X X

Control Boards X

X X

Control Room Ceiling X

X X

Crane Rails & Girders X

X X

X X

Electrical & Instrument Panels & Enclosures X

X X X X X X Elevated Water Storage Tank (exterior)

X Equipment Component Supports X

X X X X X X Expansion Anchors X

X X X X X X Fire Doors X

X Flood, Pressure and Specialty Doors X

X X X X HVAC Duct Supports X

Instrument Line Supports X

I X X

X X

Instrument Racks & Frames X

X X

X X

X Lead Shielding Supports X

X Metal Siding X

Piles X

Pipe Supports X

X X

X X

X X

Stairs, Platform, & Grating Supports X

X X X X X Structural Steel Beams, Columns, Plates & Trusses X

X X

X X

X Sump Screens X

Transmission Towers X

_ Unit Vent Stack X

Key: X - Component is present in this structure.

Oconee Nuclear Station Application for Renewed Operating Licenses License Renewal - Technical Information Structures & Structural Components Table 2.7-4 Keowee Structure Components and Their Intended Functions Key: Structural function numbers identified in the Table correspond to the functions listed following the Table. Shaded cells indicate that the component does not perform the listed function.

ui ment Pads2 Foundation 2

Foudation 2

owel 2iu on tentp R

dConcrete B

Colunlo o Ss a

3Jun198 7

Roofmen Slabs 2

7 SodteiniEniomt (exchsdsrae Battery Rack foric he 122D Instume ntaon andllControl Caerae& ConditBas26 7

Calems Trao &lbs Cond Suarts Checere Plate6 Cotrl Roomi Eilinmn AnhrgeEbdmns2 7

(expoed suface2 Cranle rail & Goirdr 7uprs2 Table 2.7-4 continues on the next page.

2.7-36 Revision 2 Volume I.doc June 1998

Oconee Nuclear Station Application for Renewed Operating Licenses License Renewal - Technical Information Structures & Structural Components Table 2.7-4 Keowee Structure Components and Their Intended Functions (continued)

Intended Functions (Identified in the note below)

Steel in Air Environment continued u

Electrical & Instrument Panels 2

3 7

Euipment Component SU rts 2

-7 Expansion Anchors 27 Flood, Pressure & Specialty e3 Doors

I Instrument Line Su arts 2

7 Instrument Racks & Frames 2

7 Pip Supprts27 Stairs, Platforms & Grating 2

7 Supprts Structural Steel Beams, 2

7 Columns, Plates & Trusses Steel in Fluid Environment Structural Intended Functions:

1. Provides pressure boundary and or fission product barrier.

2.

Provides structural and / or functional support to safety-related equipment.

3.

Provides shelter/protection to safety-related equipment (including radiation shielding).

4.

Provides rated fire barrier to confine or retard a fire from spreading to or from adjacent areas of the plant.

5.

Provides source of cooling water for plant shutdown.

6.

Serves as missile (intemnal or external) barrier.

7.

Provides structural and / or functional support to non-safety related equipment where failure of this structural component could directly prevent satisfactory accomplishment of any of the required safety-related functions..

8.

Provides a protective barrier for internal / extemnal flood event 9.Provides path for release of filtered and unfiltered gaseous discharge.

10. Impounds water for ultimate heat sink during loss of Lake Keowee.

11. Provides heat sink during SBO or design basis accidents.

12. Impounds water for generation at Keowee Hydro Station.

2.7-37 Revision 2 Volume I.doc June 1998

Duke IE nergym Oconee License Renewal Scoping / Screening Process Overview Mechanical October 1, 1998 Rounette Nader

Scoping Methodology Identify all mechanical flow paths which are relied Upon to remain functional during and following design basis events on mechanical flow diagrams by identifying on the drawings all of the flow paths

)necessary for the system intended functions to be accomplished, as (a) Plant systems, structures, and components within the scope of this part are-well as those that may functionally prevent those sstems from performing their intended function. This identification may include (ii) TheeadcapabiliSSCs that have been traditionally identified as being non-safety IdniSafety-related

systems, ecl, rla tatts which are relied uponO to remain functional during and following design bases events (as defined in 10 CFRa 50.49(b)(1)) to ensure the following functions:fucons tolbelaoms (i) The Integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, (ii) The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdowns condtion orIdentify the non-safety-related flow paths whose failure may adversely affect essential (iii) The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could systems or equipment by highlighting all the result in potential off-site exposure comparable to the 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines.

Duke Class D piping on mechanical flow diagrams. Duke Pipe Class D piping systems require both piping pressure boundary and structural integrity under seismic conditions.

Information From: Oconee drawings Identify all interfacing flow paths which share a common pressure boundary with the flow paths identified above. Examples of this include branch lines and instrument lines off of highlighted mechanical flow paths.

Information From: Oconee Calculations 10 CFR 54.4 (a) Plant systems, structures, and components within the scope of this Identify mechanical safety-related piping which is defined with Duke Class part are (2) All nonsafety-related systems, structures, and components whose A, B, C, or F piping classifications. These Duke pipe classes indicate that the piping is QA-1 and corresponds to Safety Class I, II, or III of ANSI N18.2-1973. To ensure completeness in mechanical component screening, flow paths within the boundaries of piping systems containing these piping classifications are included in the scope of License Renewal.

Information From: Oconee Drawings Differentiate between Class 1 and Non-Class 1 piping and components. Class 1 piping and components are defined as Regulation those located within ISI Class A piping and are highlighted in yellow. Non class 1 portions are highlighted in blue.

Information From: Oconee drawings Oconee Scoping Process Step

Rules For Highlighting Of OLRFD Drawings Oconee license renewal flow diagrams (OLRFD) are flagged and highlighted to establish the license renewal system evaluation boundaries of the mechanical systems identified in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 of OLRP-1001. The system intended functions required during and after a design basis event, identified as "DBE", are highlighted on flow diagrams to associate specific mechanical flow paths with the performance of the system intended functions. The methodology and criteria used to determine the mechanical flow paths supporting DBE mitigation and for flagging and highlighting-the drawings includes the following:

Identify all mechanical flow paths which are relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events on mechanical flow diagrams by identifying on the drawings all of the flow paths necessary for the system intended functions to be accomplished, as well as those that may functionally prevent those systems from performing their intended function.

This identification may include SSCs that have been traditionally identified as being non safety-related at Oconee.

Identify the non-safety-related flow paths whose failure may adversely affect essential systems or equipment by highlighting all the Duke Class D piping on mechanical flow diagrams. Duke Pipe Class D piping systems require both piping pressure boundary and structural integrity under seismic conditions.

Identify all interfacing flow paths which share a common pressure boundary with the flow paths identified above. Examples of this include branch lines and instrument lines off of highlighted mechanical flow paths.

Identify mechanical safety-related piping which is defined with Duke Class A, B, C, or F piping classifications. These Duke pipe classes indicate that the piping is QA-1 and corresponds to Safety Class I, II, or III of ANSI N18.2-1973. To ensure completeness in mechanical component screening, flow paths within the boundaries of piping systems containing these piping classifications are included in the scope of License Renewal.

Differentiate between Class I and Non-Class I piping and components. Class 1 piping and components are defined as those located within ISI Class A piping and are highlighted in yellow. Non class I portions are highlighted in blue.

Systems which are relied upon to perform or support performance of a function that demonstrates compliance with the NRC regulations described in paragraph 54.4(a)(3) are within the scope of license renewal. All mechanical flow paths which are necessary to allow the system to perform or support a required system intended function for the regulated events are flagged and highlighted.

The result of this methodology is a set of flagged and highlighted flow diagrams which identifies the license renewal evaluation boundaries corresponding to the scoping criteria in 10CFR54.4(a)(1) through 54.4(a)(3).

Additional guidelines used in flagging and highlighting the OLRFD drawings are:

On vents, drains and test connections, line is only highlighted to outlet of valve.

To keep "Clutter" of drawings to a minimum, no LR flags are placed on Vents, drains and test connections. LR boundary is always at the discharge of the valve.

All instrumentation lines normally open to the process system through, but not including the instrument, are included in License Renewal. These lines are not highlighted except for containment penetrations.

Specificatio OS-0243.00-40-0001 DATE: January 1, 1983 Page A3 Revision 17, June 1, 1995 A.l DUKE PIPING CLASSES AND APPLICABLE CODES AND STANDARDS FOR ORIGINAL OCONEE AND KEOWEE PIPING SYSTEMS (AND MODIFICATIONS)

DUKE APPLICABLE CODE NORMAL SEISMIC CLASS CODE(1)

CLASS QA DESIGN NOTES CONDITION A

USAS B31.7 I

I Yes 4

B USAS B31.7 II1Yes 4

C USAS B31.7 HII I\\

Yes D (Old)

USASB31.7 NQ 5

D (New)

USASB31.1.0 4

5 E (Old)

USASB31.7 M

E(New)

USASB31.1.0 2

No 2

Notes I. abe USIAS B31.7t~

cod anIsa Yadess oriina SCAS ytm B31.7 intale toUA-3.

eurmns Eftv -4,almdfctost ths rgnlssesadnwCasEsytm ilb eindn ntle oUSAS B31.1.0O..

3. USSB USOwiAppyi o oeo standard 2

speifed be die iUSAS B31.1.0e

6.

o USAS B31.1

1.

No H

As speqfied

.h-ii 1.Daam and Table A-

i.

Th ee efecdive daNtes21 for Kewcil eutemes hoerg pipngone ncanit 1sonleflown pag.

n abeA1 T h e c o e ff cti e at s o r e o e c wi l b t e a m as th se f o O o n c N cl a r ni I o n th e f o l oi4 page.

Specif~n No.: OS-0243.0040-o001 Date: January 1, 1983 Page AS Revision 17, June 1, 1995 A.2 DUKE PIPING CLASSES AND APPLICABLE CODES AND STANDARDS FOR OCNEE STANDBY SHUTDOWN FACILITY SYSTEMS (AND MODIFICATIONS)

The Oconee Standby Shutdown Facility, a Modification to the original station, has been determined by Duke Power Company to fall under the requirements of Section )G of the ASME Code which specifies use of a Construction Code. Applicable Construction Code requirements are as specified below.

DUKE APPLICABLE CODE NORMAL QA SEISMIC CLASS CODE()

CLASS CONDITION DESIGN NOTES A

ASME El I

IYes B

ASME 11 2

C ASME M 3

Yes D

ANSI B31.1 6 %

4 Yes E

ANSI B3 1.1 2

NO F

ANSI B3 I N Yes G

kNSI No HSe

~

or No 3

or rii~

Drai~

Notes

1.

Effective Code. Dates: ASME Section I,1974 Edition, Summer 1975 Addendum.

ANSIG31.1, 1973 Edition, Summer 1975 Addendum Design, procurement, abrication, installation, an ition and examination o the Oconee Standby Shutdown Facility shall be performed to the codes and standards specified in the above table. Technical requirements of the codes and standards shall be followed; howeve, existing Duke Power Programatic and admnimstrative criteria and procedures will take precedence over these codes' and standards' requirements. For example, minimum wall thickness, materials, stress allowables, welding, and NDE techniques and acceptance crteria shall be performed as required in these codes; however, the Code stamps are not to be applied, and Code forms and quality assurance requirements need not be used due to equivalent or analogous Duke forms and requirements. An Authorzed Nuclear Inspector will be required. It is the duty of the organization or department responsible for an item or acti ivty to a h

technical compliance and procedural compatibility with the applicable codes and standards for that item of activity. This specification is to be used except where superseded by the technical requirements of the applicable codes.

OSS-0274.00-00-0002 May 1, 1998 Revision I Page 15 Table 3.1 Component / Component Groupings Listing Refer to Section 3.2.2 COMPONENT AMR?

COMPONENT GROUPINGS Pipe Y

Pipe Pipe Fittings Y

Pipe Tubing Y

Tubing Tubing Fittings Y

Tubing Thermowells Y

Pipe Spool Piece Y

Pipe 8lank Flange Y

P ipe Blind Flange y

Pipe Ductwork Y

',Duct*rk Spent Fuel Transfer Tube None uffler/Silencer Y

Noie ire Hose N____

.*.oi ire Hose Rack y

g\\

' 4one pray, Mulsifyer, Sprinkler Nozzles None______________

ir EectY p

None raps N_____

Valves___________

ontinuous Drain Orifice Y

n oRetitoOrfc None Yow Restrictor (Pipe Fitting)

None Yuick Disconnect Pipe Fexible Hose N

None Mechanical Expansion Joints Y

2 None Fleire olRack Y

None

Dpray, MulsifyerSprinklerNozs None Expansion Coil N

None ossure Breakdown Coil Y

None pectacle Flange Y

None Mechanical Bellows Y

None Valves (Body Only)

Y Valves Tlxottle Valves (Body Only)

Y Valves Dacuu Breaker (Body Only)

Y Valves Check Valve (Body Only)

Y Valves Automatic Recirculation Control Valve (Body Only)

Y Valves Automatic Flow Control Valve (Body Only)

Y Valves Pessure Regulating Valve (Body Only)

Y Valves Temperature Regulating Valve (Body Only)

Y Valves Ai and Vacuum Valve (Body Only)

Y Valves fetExpansion Valve (Body Only)

Y Valves efreteinExpno Valve (Body Only)

Y

-Valves ingle Cycle Relief Valve (Rupture Disks) (Body YValves nNone ee Way Valve (Body Only)

Y Valves Tee Way Temperature Regulating Valve (Body Y

Valves Tee Way Pressure Regulating Valve (Body Only)

Y Valves

OSS-0274.00-00-0002 May 1, 1998 Revision I Page 16 Table 3.1 Component / Component Groupings Listing Refer to Section 3.2.2 COMPONENT AMR?

COMPONENT GROUPINGS Ram Valve (Body Only)

Y Valves Fire Hydrant (Body Only)

Y Valves Dampers N

None Luvers N

None Heat Exchangers Y

None Condensers Y

None Heating/Cooling/Refrigerant Coils Y

None Steam Generators Y

None Electric Heaters Y

Nork Chillers Y

Evaporators Y

'one Feedwater Heaters Y

Moisture Separator Reheaters Y

t

..None Room/Building Heaters/Coolers Y

o.

il Coolers YNone\\

Motor Coolers No Tanks__Y

'None urge TnY ks L None Yessure Vessels None eactorVessel

-Y None Yccumulators None Motwells 77 Y

None Pressurizer esseY None Expansion Tank y

None Discharge Accumulator/Pulsation Da 'r N

Y None Pumps (Casing Only)

Y None SSF Submersible Pump (Casing Only)

Y None ans/Blowers N

None Ar Compressors N

None Turbochargers (Casing Only)

Y None Ar Motors (Casing Only)

Y None Ar Handling Units Y

None Turbines (Shell Only)

Y None Yngines N

None Fovenor N

None nstrumentation N

None AirFlow Monitors N

None

.itot Tube Y

None Ainubar Y

None Aiow Orifice Y

None Tow Nozzle Y

None ow Glass Y

None Flowmeter (Venturi)

Y None vel Glass Y

None ightglass Y

None ow Switch (Inline)

Y None

OSS-0274.00-00-0002 May 1, 1998 Revision I Page 17 Table 3.1 Component / Component Groupings Listing Refer to Section 3.2.2 COMPONENT AMR?

COMPONENT GROUPINGS Filters Y

None Strainers Y

None Demineralizers Y

None Agitator (Mixer)

Y None Lubricator Y

Non Air/Gas Dryer Y

None Screen/Grille Y

Non Governor Air Boost Y

Funnels Eductor

't Von lenderY None istributorY None ydrogen Recombiners None ireExYnguishers None Self-Contained Breathing Air Pack%~ 'jN None e

Paneone Sample Panels None Analyzers N

None X

A

Appendix A-2 0SS4274.00-M-002 May 1, 1998 Oconee Component Screening Results

'Revision 01 Environment RAW WATER Page A2-5 COMP/CMDTY CS SS LAS BZ AL INC CU CI DI REMARKS PSP;n HHPSWh PPUsM SerAice tPer System 0HPSPU0001 X

HPSW PUMP A, MATERIAL PER SYSTEM DBD OHPSPU0002 X

HPSW PUMP B, MATERIAL PER SYSTEM DBD OHPSPU0003 X

HPSW JOCKEY PUMP, MATERIAL PERE SYSTEM DBD 0HPSTK0001 X

ASTM GR283 GRADE C PER SYSTEM DBD; ELEVATED WATER STORAGE TANK EXPANSION JOINT X

X FILTER X

FIRE HYDRANT IV rA Yk HOSE RACK X

MULSIFYER X

ORIFICE X

ALL ORIFICE CONSTRUCTED OF STAINLESS STEEL PIPE

-X X

X SPRINKLER X

MATERIAL PER H.L. LEFKOWITZ ONS STRAINER X

X X

TUBING X

X X

COPPER TUBING CONTAINS BRASS FITTINGS VALVES X

X X

X

Duike 0Energy.

Oconee License Renewal Scoping / Screening Process Overview Electrical Components October 1, 1998 Paul Colaianni Av

OCONEE PROCESS TO IDENTIFY & LIST ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS SUBJECT TO OR INCLUDED IN THE AGING MANAGEMENT REVIEW IPA Steps Identify All Types of Electrical Components Installed at Oconee Identify the Basic Functions

§54.21(a)(l)(i) of Electrical Component Types Determinations Determine Which Electrical Component Types Perform Their Function Without Moving Parts or Without A Change in Configuration or Properties Divide Electrical Component Groups for the Purposes of the Aging Management Review Scope Electrical Components Based on Their Installed Location

§54.4 Scoping Scope Electrical Components Based on Their System Function

§54.21(a)(1)(ii)

Determine Which Electrical Components Review are Subject to Replacement Based on a Qualified Life or Specified Time Period List Electrical Components Sub ect to or Included in the AMR

OSS-0274.00-00-0006 September 10, 1998 Revision: 0 Page 4-19 TABLE 4-1 TYPES OF ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS INSTALLED AT OCONEE Electrical Conponent Types Alarm Units Load Centers Analyzers Loop Controllers Annunciators Meters Batteries Motor Control Centers Bus Motors Cables and Connections Power Distribution Panels Chargers Power Supplies Circuit Breakers Radiation Monitors Converters Recorders Communication Equipment Regulators Electrical Controls and Panel Internal Relays Component Assemblies RTDs Electrical Penetration Assemblies Sensors Elements Switchgear Fuses Signal Conditioners Generators Solenoid Operators Heat Tracing Solid-State Devices Heaters Surge Arresters Indicators Switches Insulators Thermocouples Inverters Transducers Isolators Transformers Light Bulbs Transmitters Line Traps Foi2 T14Foi2MATION DuLY

OSS-0274.00-00-0006 September 10, 1998 Revision: 0 Page 4-21 COMPONENT FUNCTIONS column (left column) identifies the function applicable to all components in the group as the basis for grouping them.

TABLE 4-2 GROUPING ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS BY FUNCTION SRP-LR Component Functions Electrical Component Groups Item Numbers To sense a parameter and Alarm Units 104 provide an output at a (e.g., fire detection devices) predetermined (threshold) level.

To examine the item being Analyzers 97 analyzed and determine its (e.g., gas analyzer, conductivity analyzer) constituent parts.

To audibly and visually alert Annunciator 115 operators of a plant condition or (e.g., lights, buzzers, alarms) occurrence.

To store energy.

Batteries 134 To electrically connect two Bus, Cables and Connections 141, 142 sections of an electrical circuit.

(e.g., power cable, instrument cable, control cable, communication cable, bare cable, connector, splice, terminal block, isolated-phase bus, segregated-phase bus, nonsegregated phase bus, switchyard bus)

To convert energy from one Chargers, Converters, Inverters 109, 110, form into another form.

(e.g., voltage/current converter, voltage/pneumatic converter, 135 battery charger/inverter, motor-generator set)

To connect or disconnect an Circuit Breakers 128 electrical circuit in a controlled (e.g., air circuit breaker, molded case circuit breaker, oil-filled manner.

circui breaker)

To permit the interchange of Communication Equipment N/A information.

(e.g., telephone, video or audio recording or playback equipment, intercom, computer terminal, electronic messaging, radios, power-line carrier equipment)

To provide an operator/plant Electrical Controls and Panel Internal Component 138 equipment and system control Assemblies and monitoring interface.

(includes internal devices such as, but not limited to, switches, indicating lights, annunciators, recorders, indicators, meters, relays, fuses, fuse blocks, terminal blocks, hook-up wire)

To electrically connect two Electrical Penetration Assemblies 16 sections of an electrical circuit through the containment wall while maintaining containment integrity.

To convert a measured physical Elements, RTDs, Sensors, Thermocouples, Transducers 86, 88, parameter into a proportional (e.g., temperature sensor, conductivity element, flow element, 93, 120, electrical output or parameter thermocouple, RTD, vibration probe, watt transducer, amp 121 change.

transducer, frequency transducer, power factor transducer, speed transducer, var transducer, vibration transducer, voltage transducer)

FoR IN Fe R MAT/oWN

OSS-0274.00-00-0006 September 10, 1998 Revision: 0 Page 13-166 13.3 RESULTS -STRUCTURES AND AREAS INCLUDED IN THE ELECTRICAL IPA With these adjustments, the result was a list of structures and areas that envelope all site locations that contain electrical components within §54.4(a) scope. The structures and areas included in the electrical IPA are listed in the following table along with a description.

TABLE 13-1 STRUCTURES AND AREAS INCLUDED IN THE ELECTRICAL IPA Structure or Area Description Auxiliary Buildings Includes all levels of the Auxiliary Buildings including the Hot Machine Shop and Spent Fuel Pools for Units 1&2 (shared) and Unit 3, and penetration rooms Intake Structure Includes the CCW pump intake structure Keowee Structures Includes the Powerhouse, Spillway, Breaker Vault, Intake Structure, Service Bay Structure, and Penstock Reactor Buildings Includes all levels of all three Reactor Buildings and the Unit Vents Standby Shutdown Facility Includes all levels and rooms in the Standby Shutdown Facility Turbine Buildings Includes all levels of the Turbine Buildings and the Switchgear Blockhouses for Units 1&2 (shared) and Unit 3 Yard Structures Includes all areas and components outside the other buildings.

Specifically, this includes the following:

• 230kV Keowee Transmission Line structures

• 230kV Switchyard structures and Relay House (includes the area within the switchyard boundary fence)

• Appendix R Warehouse [Appendix R cable only]

• cable trenches

• cable conduit direct buried components (cables and ground conductors)

Elevated Water Storage Tank Keowee Transformer Yard [components associated with Keowee Transformer 1] (the gravel covered area outside, on the South side of the Keowee powerhouse structure where Keowee Transformer 1 and Keowee transmission line support structures are located)

Oconee Transformer Yard [components associated with transformers CTI, CT2 and CT3] (the gravel covered area outside, on the East side of the Turbine Buildings where the unit main step-up transformers and the unit start-up transformers are located)

FoRZ

Electrical Component Included in the Aging Management Review Electrical Component Types Specific Electrical Components Subject to or Included in the AMR Bus

- Isolated-Phase Bus Keowee Isolated-Phase Bus is subject to an AMR.

- Nonsegregated-Phase Bus 4160V Nonsegregated-Phase Bus is subject to an AMR.

- Segregated-Phase Bus Keowee Segregated-Phase Bus is subject to an AMR.

- Switchyard Bus Switchyard Bus in the 230kV Switchyard are included in the AMR. (list is a bounding set)

Insulated Cables & Connections Insulated Cables & Connections located in IPA structures and areas, not in EQ Program and not used for Fire Detectors are included in the AMR. (list is a bounding set)

Transmission Conductors Transmission Conductors associated with Keowee Transmission Line & 230kV Switchyard are included in the AMR. (list is a bounding set)

Insulators Keowee Transmission Line & 230kV Switchyard Insulators are included in the AMR. (list is a bounding set)

Duke dEnergy.

Oconee License Renewal Scoping / Screening Process Overview Regulated Events October 1, 1998 Paul Colaianni Rounette Nader Debbie Ramsey Greg Robison SZ:~

Oconee Nuclear Station Application for Renewed Operating Licenses License Renewal -Technical Information Identification of Systems, Structures, and Components Within the Scope of License Renewal Oconee structures are designated as either Class 1, 2, or 3. Oconee Class 1 structures are those which prevent uncontrolled release of radioactivity and are designed to withstand all loadings without loss of function as defined in the Oconee UFSAR. This Oconee classification is consistent with the intent of §54.4(a)(1). Therefore, Duke has determined that Oconee Class 1 structures are within the scope of license renewal and meet the criteria contained in §54.4(a)(1).

Oconee Class 2 structures are those whose limited damage (1) would not result in a release of radioactivity, (2) would permit a controlled plant shutdown, but (3) could interrupt power generation. The Oconee UFSAR, Chapter 3.2 states that Class 2 structures do not perform any nuclear safety-related function but that their failure could reduce the function of a safety-related system to an unacceptable level. This Oconee classification is consistent with the intent of §54.4(a)(2). Therefore, Duke has determined that Oconee Class 2 structures are within the scope of license renewal and meet the criteria contained in §54.4(a)(2).

Oconee Class 3 structures are those structures whose failure could inconvenience operation but are not essential to power generation, orderly shutdown, or maintenance of the reactor in a safe shutdown condition. Oconee Class 3 structures do not meet the criteria in either §54.4(a)(1) or §54.4(a)(2) and, therefore, are outside the scope of license renewal.

2.2.2 REVIEw To CRITERIA IN §54.4 (a)(3)

Oconee structures and mechanical systems were also evaluated to determine whether they are required to demonstrate compliance with NRC regulations for events identified in

§54.4(a)(3). Each of the following sections includes a brief discussion of the regulated event and the associated Oconee documents which identify the Oconee structures and mechanical systems relied upon in the safety analyses or plant evaluation to demonstrate compliance with the regulated event Structures and mechanical systems which are relied upon to perform or support performance of a function that demonstrates compliance with the NRC regulations described in §54.4(a)(3) are within the scope of license renewal.

2.2.2.1 Fire Protection Section 54.4(a)(3) requires that all systems, structures, and components relied upon in safety analyses or plant evaluations to demonstrate compliance with §50.48, the NRC regulation governing fire protection, be included within the scope of license renewal. The Oconee Fire Protection Program is based on compliance with General Design Criteria 2.2-4 Revision 2 Volume I.doc June 1998

Oconee Nuclear Station Application for Renewed Operating Licenses License Renewal - Technical Information Identification of Systems, Structures, and Components Within the Scope of License Renewal (GDC) 3 [Reference 2.2-5]. Oconee conforms to GDC 3, as described in NRC Safety Evaluation Reports dated August 11, 1978 and April 28, 1983 [Reference 2.2-6, Sections l.G, I.J, and 111.0].

The Oconee fire protection program is based on an evaluation of the potential fire hazards throughout the plant and the effect of postulated design basis fires relative to maintaining the ability to perform safe shutdown functions and minimize radioactive releases to the environment. As part of the response to BTP 9.5-1, Oconee proposed a dedicated Standby Shutdown Facility (see Section 1.2.3 of OLRP-1001) to comply with more recent separation and protection requirements than those addressed in the original Oconee design. The NRC Safety Evaluation for the Standby Shutdown Facility identifies the systems and structures required for the fire protection program.

Pre-1979 plants, including all three Oconee units, were required to comply with the backfit provisions of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. The following documents were reviewed to determine the Oconee structures and mechanical systems relied upon to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R:

• U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the Matter of Duke Power Company Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, & 3, dated August 11, 1978.

• U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Exemption from the Fire Protection Requirements of Section III.G of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, dated August 21, 1989.

• U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Safety Evaluation of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Oconee Nuclear Station Standby Shutdown Facility, dated April 28, 1983.

The structures and mechanical systems required to demonstrate compliance with BTP 9.5-1 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, are identified by reviewing the Oconee-specific documents addressing each topic. A structure or mechanical system is within the scope of license renewal when a portion is relied upon for compliance with the NRC fire protection regulations.

2.2-5 Revision 2 Volume I.doc June 1998

Oconee Nuclear Station Application for Renewed Operating Licenses License Renewal - Technical Information Identification of Systems, Structures, and Components Within the Scope of License Renewal 2.2.2.2 Environmental Qualification (EQ)

Section 54.4(a)(3) requires that all systems and structures relied upon in safety analyses or plant evaluations to perform a function that demonstrates compliance with §50.49, the NRC regulation governing environmental qualification, be included within the scope of license renewal. A master list of all equipment contained in the Environmental Qualification (EQ) Program has been compiled for each of the Oconee units. The identification of structures and mechanical systems containing environmentally qualified equipment required a review of the components in the EQ list.

Based upon a review of these documents, Duke determined that no Oconee structures are required to demonstrate compliance with the environmental qualification requirements in

§54.4(a)(3). Furthermore, no systems at Keowee Hydroelectric Station or the Standby Shutdown Facility contain EQ equipment.

2.2.2.3 Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS)

Section 54.4(a)(3) requires that all systems, structures, and components relied upon in safety analyses or plant evaluations to demonstrate compliance with §50.61, the NRC regulation governing pressurized thermal shock, be included within the scope of license renewal. Pressurized thermal shock [Footnote 3] is a phenomenon limited to the reactor vessel in the Reactor Coolant System. The identification of mechanical systems relied on to demonstrate compliance with §50.61, other than the Reactor Coolant System, required a review of docketed licensing correspondence.

Duke determined that the only mechanical system required to demonstrate compliance with §50.61 is the Reactor Coolant System. None of the Oconee reactor vessels will exceed the PTS screening criteria during their current operating licenses. Therefore, no systems or components other than the reactor vessels are required to comply with §50.61.

Since the vessels are a part of the Reactor Coolant System, the Reactor Coolant System is within the scope of license renewal.

Oconee structures are not required to demonstrate compliance with §50.61. If future Pressurized Thermal Shock analyses require the addition of other systems and components to comply with §50.61, these systems and components will be evaluated in accordance with the regulatory requirements in effect at that time.

3. Pressurized Thermal Shock is an Oconee time-limited aging analysis which is evaluated in Section 5.4.2 of OLRP-1001.

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Oconee Nuclear Station Application for Renewed Operating Licenses License Renewal - Technical Information Identification of Systems, Structures, and Components Within the Scope of License Renewal 2.2.2.4 Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)

Section 54.4(a)(3) requires that all systems, structures, and components relied upon in safety analyses or plant evaluations to perform a function that demonstrates compliance with §50.62, the NRC regulation governing anticipated transient without scram, are required to be included within the scope of license renewal. The Duke response to this regulation was the installation at Oconee of a dual-purpose control system as outlined in

§50.62. Although this is not a mechanical system, it monitors and actuates mechanical systems. Oconee installed the Diverse Scram System and the ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry to address the requirements of this regulation. Systems that provide input into this control system or respond to an output of this control system are part of the commitment to §50.62 and are within the scope of license renewal.

Duke reviewed the design of these systems to identify structures and mechanical systems relied upon to demonstrate compliance with §50.62. This review identified the required Oconee mechanical systems. However, structures or mechanical systems at Keowee or the Standby Shutdown Facility are not required to demonstrate compliance with the ATWS requirements in §54.4(a)(3).

2.2.2.5 Station Blackout Section 54.4(a)(3) requires that all systems, structures, and components relied upon in safety analyses or plant evaluations to demonstrate compliance with §50.63, the NRC regulation governing station blackout, be included within the scope of license renewal.

The Duke response to §50.63 for Oconee was approved by an NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated March 10, 1992, and NRC Supplemental SER dated December 3, 1992 [References 2.2-7 and 2.2-8]. Oconee complies with §50.63 by conforming to NUMARC Report 8700 and Nuclear Regulatory Guide 1.155. The equipment relied upon to comply with this regulation is within the scope of license renewal. Based upon a review of these documents, as well as other Oconee-specific documents, Duke identified the structures required to demonstrate compliance with the station blackout requirements in §54.4(a)(3) and their intended functions.

The mechanical systems relied upon to meet the requirements of station blackout were included as a part of the Oconee design study discussed in Section 2.2.1.1 (a).

Mechanical systems at Keowee Hydroelectric station are not required for station blackout.

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