ML15261A192
| ML15261A192 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 05/29/1998 |
| From: | Casto C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Mccollum W DUKE POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9806170026 | |
| Download: ML15261A192 (33) | |
Text
CATEGORY 2 REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTIONYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9806170026 DOC.DATE: 98/05/29 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
FACIL:50-269 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Duke Power Co.
05000269 50-270 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Duke Power Co.
05000270 50-287 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Duke Power Co.
05000287 72-0004 Oconee ISFSI, 50-269, 50-270 & 50-287, 07200004 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION CASTO,C.A.
Region 2 (Post 820201)
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION MCCOLLUM,W.R.
Duke Power Co.
C
SUBJECT:
Discusses results of semiannual PPR of Oconee completed on A
980504.PPR involved participation of Mgt Oversight Group &
all technical divs in evaluating insp results & safety T
performance info for period of 971001-980331.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE40D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR 4 ENCL _ SIZE:
.i E
TITLE: Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) Report G
NOTES:
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T NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE.
TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 25 ENCL 25
May 29, 1998 Duke Energy Corporation ATTN:
Mr. W. R. McCollum Vice President Oconee Nuclear Station P. 0. Box 1439 Seneca, SC 29679
SUBJECT:
PLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW (PPR) OCONEE
Dear Mr. McCollum:
On May 4. the NRC staff completed the semiannual PPR of Oconee. The staff conducts these reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to develop an integrated understanding of safety performance. The results are used by NRC management to facilitate planning and allocation of inspection resources. The PPR for Qconee involved the participation of Management Oversight Group (MOG) members as well as all technical divisions in evaluating inspection results and safety performance information for the period from October 1997 through March 1998. PPRs provide NRC management with a current summary of licensee performance and serve as inputs to the NRC Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) and senior management meeting (SMM) reviews. contains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant Issues Matrix (PIM), that were considered during this PPR process to arrive at an integrated view of licensee performance trends. The PIM includes only items from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and Oconee. The PPR may also have considered some predecisional and draft material that does not appear in the attached PIM, including observations from events and inspections that had occurred since the last NRC inspection report was issued, but had not yet received full review and consideration. This material will be placed in the Public Document Room as part of the normal issuance of.NRC inspection reports and other correspondence.
The area of operating performance was evaluated by the PPR as good with good performance noted during normal operations, operations during transients, and programs and processes. Human performance was viewed as adequate by the PPR with work performance and knowledge, skills, and abilities also assessed as adequate. The area of problem identification and resolution was evaluated as poor overall. This was primarily the result of poor performance in your resolution of some problems. On the other hand, the PPR assessed your identification of problems as good as evidenced by the adequate documentation of deficiencies. The PPR noted mixed results on your analysis of problems and assessed this area as adequate. Material condition, as well as the subcategories of equipment conditions and program and processes, were all evaluated as poor. This assessment is the direct result of numerous equipment breakdowns and deficiencies which have impacted facility operation. Likewise, engineering design and the sub-areas of design and engineering support were 9806170026 980529 PDR ADOCK 05000269 6
DEC 2
evaluated as poor. This was a consequence of the numerous design problems which were identified during this period. Two areas, human performance-work environment and engineering design-programs and processes, were not evaluated due to insufficient inspection data this period.
This letter advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the Oconee PPR review. It is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite. Enclosure 2 details our inspection plan for the next 8 months. These inspections are based upon the assessment made during the PPR and in conjunction with the MOG. While.this represents our current inspection plans, inspections may be consolidated, added, or deleted based upon the MOG's direction. We will continue to coordinate future MOG directed inspections with your staff.
Resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.
During this scheduling cycle, we will be focusing some of our discretionary inspection effort on the resolution of open inspection items. Therefore, additional inspections may be conducted, which are not listed on Enclosure 2, to close open inspection items that are ready to be resolved. You will be notified at least three weeks prior to the start of these inspections.
The NRC's general policy for reactor inspections is that each inspectionshall be announced, except when announcing the inspection could reasonably compromise the objectives of the inspectors. Therefore, some specific inspections, such as in the security and radiological protection areas, are not included on Enclosure 2 and may not be announced.
We will inform you of any changes to the enclosed inspection plan. If you have any questions, please contact Charles Ogle at (404) 562-4510.
Sincerely, Original signed by:
Charles A. Casto Deputy Director Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, 50-287, 72-04 License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55, SNM-2503
Enclosures:
- 1. Plant Issues Matrix
- 2. Inspection Plan cc w/encls:
(See page 3)
DEC 3
cc w/encls:
Mr. J. E. Burchfield Compliance Duke Energy Corporation P. 0. Box 1439 Seneca, SC 29679 Mr. Paul R. Newton Legal Department (PB05E)
Duke Energy Corporation 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242-0001 Mr. Robert P. Gruber Executive Director Public Staff - NCUC P. 0. Box 29520 Raleigh. NC 27626-0520 Mr. Robert B. Borsum Framatome Technologies 1700 Rockville Pike. Suite 525 Rockville, MD 20852 Mr. J. Michael McGarry, III, Esq.
Winston and Strawn 1400 L Street, NW Washington, D. C. 20005 Mr. Mel Fry, Acting Director Division of Radiation Protection N. C. Department of Environmental Health & Natural Resources 3825 Barrett Drive Raleigh, NC 27609-7721 Mr. Max Batavia, Chief Bureau of Radiological Health South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control 2600 Bull Street Columbia, SC 29201 County Supervisor of Oconee County Walhalla, SC 29621 cc w/encls cont'd:
(See Page 4)
DEC 4
cc w/encls cont'd:
Manager, LIS NUS Corporation 2650 McCormick Drive Clearwater, FL 34619-1035 Mr. G. A. Copp Licensing - EC050 Duke Energy Corporation P. 0. Box 1006 Charlotte, NC 28201-1006 Ms. Karen E. Long Assistant Attorney General N. C. Department of Justice P. 0. Box 629 Raleigh, NC 27602 Distribution w/encls:
D. LaBarge, NRR R. Carroll, RII C. Ogle, RII C. Payne, RII C. Casto, RII PUBLIC NRC Resident Inspector OFFICE RII DRS RII:DR RI DS RII:DRS RII RS RII:DRP SIGNATURE CT MAME PFre i&son TPeebLes KB ABeli/
Kli COgLe DATE 5/
/98 5/198
/98 5
/98 S5 27/98 5/
/98 5/
/98 COPY?
YES/
NO NO ESNYE%
Y NO Y
NO YES NO YES NO OFFICT' RECORD COPY D
NAME:
P:1PPROCO5.13
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUES MATRIX by SALP Functional Area OCONEE 27-May-98 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES V ERATIONS I.
j4 3/21/98 NCV IR 98-02; VIO 98-02-02 LICENSEE Failure to complete an adequate review of all items necessary for Unit 1 startup 1 2 3 4 5
resulted in a non-cited violation. (Section 04.2)
A El1:0O0 B EE 11*
3/21/98 NCV IR 98-02; NCV 98-02-01 SELF A non-cited violation was identified with three examples for failure to follow 1 2 3 4 5 procedure. (Section 04.1)
A 0000E B 11EE E l c E EEEl 3/21/98 Positive IR 98-02 NRC The shutdown of Unit 2 and reduced inventory operations were completed properly 1 2 3 4 5 with deliberate operator action, good supervisory oversight, and good procedure adherence. (Section 01.4)
A EO EE B EEl -E 3/21/98 LER PLT SUP IR 98-02, LER 269/98-07 LICENSEE The licensee reported a potential non-conservatism in the procedure for response to 1 2 3 4 5
Appendix R fires in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72. The compensatory actions established appeared to be adequate. (Section 01.3)
A O
E E E
B 0E0EE C E 00E 2/7/98 URI ENG IR 97-18; URI 97-18-03 LICENSEE An apparent lack of agreement between the Safe Shutdown Facility diesel technical 1.2 3 4 5 manual and operations procedures will be tracked through an unresolved item.
(Section 03.1)
A E 0 E 0 B ElE~
2/7/98 Positive IR 97-18, LER 269/98-02 NRC Operations satisfactorily manipulated Unit I to cold shutdown for repairs and 1 2 3 4 5
investigation of a 2 gallon per minute leak from a crack on a one-inch drain line off the pressurizer surge line. Operations made appropriate notifications and reports.
A E
0 0
(Section 01.7)
B EO 0 c E E0EE FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 3/30/98 Page 1 of 25 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 5/4/98
OCONEE 27-May-98 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 2/7/98 Positive ENG IR 97-18 LICENSEE The licensee carefully tested and satisfactorily replaced a Unit 1 control rod, which 1 2 3 4 5 had latching problems. Operations and engineering provided good overall controls during the rod freedom of motion test. (Section 01.6)
A El 0 0
El 0l B ZElE00E cOl 000l E 2/7/98 URI IR 97-18; URI 97-18-02 NRC The licensee exited a 24-hour limiting condition for operation on the Unit 3 reactor 1 2 3 4 5 building emergency hatch without fully understanding that a Technical Specification interpretation did not relieve them of the surveillance requirements for further A OOO El El testing. This issue was left unresolved pending review of past practices. (Section 01.5)
B El00 0 0 cO 0@
2/7/98 Positive IR 97-18 LICENSEE Operations personnel displayed a good questioning attitude that allowed them to 1 2 3 4 5 detect an unexpected power increase during letdown flow instrument calibrations.
This problem is also discussed in Section M3.1. (Section 01.4)
A El ElOEl B
0 00[El 2/7/98 NCV IR 97-18, LER 269/97-11; NRC.
Operations personnel satisfactorily shut down Unit 1 following a steam generator
- 1. 2 3 4 5 NCV 97-18-01 tube leak. The licensee identified a related procedure problem that resulted in a Non Cited Violation.. Operations satisfactorily performed the shutdown and overall once A El El El El0 through steam generator configuration control work. The licensee drained the reactor coolant system in a controlled fashion to reduced inventory levels five times during B 0 E El El 0 the work. This problem is also discussed in Section M1.4 (Section 01.3)
C 0
OEl E
2/5/98 URI SAQV IR 98-01; URI 98-01-01 NRC The licensee's administrative procedures for the Nuclear Safety Review Board 1 2 3 4 5 contradicted Technical Specifications regarding review of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations 50.59 safety evaluations. This was left unresolved pending further NRC A El EO El El review of licensee changes to the review process. (Section 07.4)
B El El D [I c 0 OlO 2/5/98 Positive SAQV IR 98-01 NRC Plant Operations Review Committee activities were generally in compliance with 1 2 3 4 5 selected licensee commitments and licensee administrative procedures. Related licensee-identified discrepancies had been properly addressed in the corrective A El El El El E action program. (Section 07.3)
B 0000 0 c
l 0El 2/5/98 Positive SAQV IR 98-01 NRC The reviewed licensee audits and assessments were performed in accordance with 1 2 3 4 5 NRC regulations and the licensee's quality assurance program commitments and procedures. The audits and assessments were effective in identifying continued A El DO El E0 weaknesses And areas for improvement in problem investigation process report quality. The audit findings generally reflected those identified by the inspection team B 0 0 0 0 0 and the licensee was actively addressing the audit-related deficiencies during the C 0 E l El El inspection period. (Section 07.2)
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 3/30/98 Page 2 of 25 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 5/4/98
OCONEE 27-May-98 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 2/5/98 Positive SAQV IR 98-01 NRC Generally, problem investigation process reports reviewed by the inspection team 1 2 3 4 5 reflected appropriate screening, operability and reportability determinations, with adequate documentation of the problem and corrective actions. The inspection team A El El 0 El 0 identified instances of non-compliance with Nuclear System Directive 208 which paralleled the lidbnsee's audit findings stemming from the Oconee Recovery Plan B El El El El 0 focus on problem investigation process report quality improvements. The licensee c El El El El was actively pursuing corrective actions for the previously identified problems with problem investigation process implementation. (Section 07.1) 12/27/97 Positive ENG IR 97-16 NRC The inspectors concluded that the emergency power switching logic functional test 1 2 3 4 5
was performed in accordance with the procedure and with supervisory and engineering oversight. The inspectors concluded that the problem identification A 0 E] El El process report appropriately addressed a deficiency involving a potential conflict between the test and the shutdown risk matrix. (Section M1.5).
B EEl E0 0 12/27/97 Positive ENG IR 97-16 NRC The Units 1 and 2 post-modification low pressure service water full flow test 1 2 3 4 5
adequately tested the system performance and was technically well managed by the system engineer. The operators involved with the test were well-briefed and A 0 El 0 El El conservatively responded during the testing. (Section M1.2)
B El El 1El 0 c El ElInlEl 12/27/97 VIO IR 97-16; VIO 97-16-03 SELF The inspectors identified a violation for inadequate procedures. Three examples 1 2 3 4 5
were identified that resulted in unexpected responses of operating systems.
(Section 03.2)
A 0E0 El El B El Ell1Ell C El 11fl1l 12/27/97 NCV IR 97-16, LER 287/97-04; LICENSEE A non-cited violation was identified for an inadequate procedure, which failed to 1 2 3 4 5 NCV 97-16-02 prevent missing a required Technical Specification surveillance requirement.
(Section 03.1)
A El El E B 0ElElEl ScOl 000~
12/27/97 Weakness MAINT IR 97-16 LICENSEE During post-maintenance testing, the licensee discovered that a primary core flood 1 2 3 4 5 check valve leaked in excess of Technical Specification limits. The licensee had not performed intermediate checks of the repaired valve prior to performing the post-A 0 0 0 l El maintenance testing. The lack of an interim check of work performance quality before valve re-assembly was considered a procedural weakness. The licensee had B 0 0 0 0 0 no previous problems with these valves. Operational recovery efforts, reduced C El El El inventory control, and root cause analysis were good. Retesting indicated that the rework had been satisfactory. (Section 02.3)
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 3/30/98 Page 3 of 25 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 5/4/98
OCONEE 27-May-98 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 12/27/97 Positive ENG IR 97-16 SELF During the return to service of Unit 1 reactor coolant pumps, a seal injection valve 1 2 3 4 5
experienced a socket weld failure. The operators responded in a controlled manner to the failure, utilizing their off-normal procedures. The licensee demonstrated good A El El ElO investigative techniques during the recovery period. (Section 02.2):
B El ElEl 0El c El El 1l E 12/27/97 VIO ENG IR 97-16; VIO 97-16-01 SELF A violation was identified involving the simultaneous testing of safety-related 1 2 3 4 5
electrical systems in two units that created a significant voltage transient. (Section 02.1)
A DElEl El B El El El El0 C ElEl@
12/27/97 Positive ENG IR 97-16 NRC Results of physics testing of the new Unit 1 core, were satisfactory. Operations and 1 2 3 4 5 engineering controlled the evolution satisfactorily. (Section 01.5)
A 0El0El BEl El 1El El c F1 EllEl 12/27/97 Positive MAINT IR 97-16 NRC During a three-hour closeout tour of the Unit 1 reactor building, the inspectors found 1 2 3 4 5 the building in near-ready condition for power operations. Corrective actions from other previous closeout problems had been effective in improving the licensee's A
E l El El containment closeout process. (Section 01.4) c 1-El El l 12/27/97 Weakness IR 97-16 SELF During a high pressure injection flow test, the licensee discovered a leaking drain 1 2 3 4 5 valve. The initial level of documentation of this problem was poor. Immediately following discovery, the licensee did not bound the problem or attempt to completely A E El 0 El 0 assess the scope of the problem prior to the onshift crew departing. These were considered weak investigative practices. Subsequent investigations were adequate B El El E 0 and proposed activities were properly scoped. (Section 01.2) c El El El 11/15/97 Positive MAINT IR 97-15 NRC The inspectors concluded that the licensee's program and preparations for cold 1 2 3 4
- 5.
weather were good. (Section 02.2)
A 00010El B ElIElElEl cEl 000El 11/15/97 Positive MAINT.
IR 97-15 NRC The licensees power reduction and replacement of a degrading Unit 2 main seal oil 1 2 3 4 5 pump was proactive and performed without incident. (Section 02.1)
A [El 0ElEl B El0ElElEl c El 0000 FROM. 10/1/97 TO: 3/30/98 Pag 4 of 25 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 5/4/98
OCONEE 27-May-98 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 11/15/97 Strength IR 97-15 NRC Refueling activities were completed in a professional and conservative manner. The 1 2 3 4 5 use of the reactor engineer on the refueling bridge in the reactor building, the use of an extra licensed operator in the spent fuel pool area during refueling, and the new A 0 El 0 El El level of licensee safety conscious overview were strengths. (Section 01.2)
B ElEEl E]El 11/15/97 Positive IR 97-15 NRC In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety conscious.
1 2 3 4 5
(Section 01.1)
A 0E0ElEl B El l1lE l E
c 1l ElE@:
10/18/97 VIO IR 97-14; VIO 97-14-03 SELF The inspectors identified a violation for a failure to provide appropriate instructions 1 2 3 4 5
for resetting Switchgear iX lockout in Keowee Alarm Response Guide SA1/E-04, 600V SWGR 1X Lockout Relay. (Section 08.5)
A OOO E
El OO B 0EEl0El cOl 000E 10/18/97 VIO IR 97-14, AIT97-1 1; VIO SELF The inspectors identified a violation for a failure to follow Lee Steam Station 1 2 3 4 5 97-14-02 Operating Procedure, Emergency Power Or Back-up Power To Oconee, which caused the loss of CT-5 and the consequent loss of Oconee main feeder busses on A El El 0 June 20, 1997. (Section 08.4)
B 0E0El00 cOl 000~
10/18/97 Positive IR 97-14 LICENSEE The licensee has completed annual operational assessments in the areas of 1 2 3 4 5
communications and procedures. The contents of the assessments were relevant to improving plant activities and safety performance. (Section 08.2)
A El El 0 El 0 B E l1 0 131l 1 l
C 0000 10/18/97 Positive IR 97-14 LICENSEE The licensee accurately determined the cause of adverse trends in configuration 1 2 3 4 5 control and developed corrective actions to reverse the trends. However, by the end of the inspection period, the licensee had not implemented all these actions.
A E El El El. El Consequently, configuration control trends remain unchanged. (Section 08.1)
B 0El0EEl CE 000 10/18/97 Negative IR 97-14 NRC Poor administrative controls of isolation of Technical Specification required low 1 2 3 4 5 pressure service water loads resulted in a negative finding on the control of out-of service equipment. (Section 03.2)
A 0 ElOEl B 00E0 cO 0El FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 3/30/98 Page 5 of 25 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 5/4/98
OCONEE 27-May-98 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 10/18/97 URI IR 97-14; URI 97-14-01 NRC An Unresolved Item was identified dealing with the failure to follow the low 1 2 3 4 5 temperature over pressure procedure guidance. (Section 03.1)
A 00E000 cE1-EEE 10/18/97 Positive IR 97-14 NRC During a forced shutdown to replace the 3B reactor building cooling unit fan motor, 1 2 3 4 5 the licensee successfully completed an extensive and complex surveillance of the replacement 3B high pressure injection pump. The pump had been replaced in A
E 0 E 0 0 parallel with the reactor building cooling unit fan motor to preclude a possible future shutdown due to an observed gradual pump degradation. (Section 01.5)
B 0 0 E0 CE OO@
10/18/97 LER MAINT IR 97-14; LER 269/97-09 NRC The licensee did not perform a required Technical Specification surveillance on Units 1 2 3 4 5 1 and 3 during the last refueling. The affected units were shutdown at the time of discovery and performance of the surveillance indicated that the involved A
E E E
instruments were within tolerance. The licensee issued a Licensee Event Report after the end of the inspection period. Further follow up of this issue will be tracked B
0 E E under the Licensee Event Report. (Section 01.4)
CO 0EE 10/18/97 Positive IR 97-14 NRC The inspectors concluded that both the shutdown and startup of Unit 3 were 1 2 3 4 5 performed appropriately. (Section 01.3)
A 0EE0EE B 1El EE c E EEE1:
10/18/97 Positive IR 97-14 NRC In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious.
1 2 3 4 5 (Section 01.1)
A I
0E B E:1EEE CE EE*
3/21/98 Positive IR 98-02 NRC Segments of the licensee's third ten-year inservice inspection interval program that 1 2 3 4 5 were reviewed complied with Code requirements. Inservice inspection examinations observed were performed in a satisfactory manner. Fabrication and examination A E E E E records of high pressure injection nozzle component welds were consistent with Code requirements and licensee commitments. Technicians were well trained and B 0 0 10 E had good knowledge of plant equipment and procedural requirements. The c E E E licensee's evaluation of inspection results were documented with accuracy and clarity. (Section M1.6)
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 3/30/98 Page 6 of 25 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 5/4/98
OCONEE 27-May-98 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 3/21/98 Positive IR 98-02 NRC The licensee's response to the apparent snubber lockup problem on the 1B2 reactor 1 2 3 4 5 coolant pump motor was well planned and carried out in a timely manner. Soliciting assistance from the vendor resulted in the correct diagnosis of the problem and A El E OO ElO produced positive results. (Section M1.5)
B~
E]~~
CO 0 001:1E 3/21/98 Positive IR 98-02 NRC The*Unit 2 low pressure injection cooler test was performed in a well planned 1 2 3 4 5 manner, the applicable procedure was followed, personnel were well qualified to perform their assigned tasks, and the results showed that low pressure injection A El El l El El coolers 2A and 2B are capable of performing their design function. (Section M1.4)
B 11 11E 3/21/98 Positive ENG IR 98-02 NRC The licensee's response to the Unit 1 pressurizer surge line drain line vibration 1 2 3 4 5 phenomenon was appropriate. Maintenance and engineering provided good coverage of the issue. Evaluation of the problem and corrective actions taken and A El O El El planned were consistent with plant safety and code requirements. (Section M1.3) cO0 Ell 3/21/98 NCV IR 98-02; VIO 98-02-08 SELF A non-cited violation was identified for failure to follow procedure when calibrating a 1 2 3 4 5 component cooling flow transmitter. (Section M4.1)
A ElEl0ElEl B 1El1El Ell 3/21/98 Positive IR 98-02 NRC Corrective actions as a result of an inadvertent start of the Unit 3 standby component 1 2 3 4 5 cooling pump heightened the sensitivity of instrument technicians to, procedural compliance and proper communications. The inspectors considered this a positive A El O El E El result of the licensee's recovery plan. (Section M4.1) 3/21/98 VIO IR 98-02; VIO 98-02-07 NRC The licensee's failure to implement procedural requirements for material condition 1 2 3 4 5 and housekeeping practices on safety-related components and in the areas housing these components and structures was identified as a violation. (Section M2.3)
A ElOOOOEl ElO BE 0ElEl c
El El0 3/21/98 URI IR 98-02; VIO 98-02-06 NRC An unresolved item was identified for past operability concerns for improperly 1 2 3 4 5 installed packing gland followers for valve 1HP-149. (Section M2.2)
A 000Ell30 B 9 T: 3El El El c l :1 El ElE FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 3/30/98 Page 7 of 25 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 5/4/98
OCONEE 27-May-98 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 3/21/98 VIO IR 98-02; VIO 98-02-05 NRC Material condition in the Unit 1 west penetration room was deficient. A violation was 1 2 3 4 5 identified for failure to follow a minor modification instruction for adequate packing gland adjustment on valve 1HP-286. (Section M2.2)
A El E0El El l B El El lEl cEl 0E0 3/21/98 VIO IR 98-02; VIO 98-02-04 NRC A violation of procedural requirements was identified for foreign material control 1 2 3 4 5
practices during maintenance in the Unit 1 and 2 spent fuel pool. (Section M2.1)
A 00000l~
c8 0000 3/21/98 VIO IR 98-02; VIO 98-02-03 NRC A violation was identified for failure to follow the nuclear site directive for 1 2 3 4 5
modifications when repairing the Unit 2 turbine driven emergency feedwater pump hotwell suction line. (Section M1.2)
A El 0 0 El 0 B ElEl0 El cO-ElEl 2/23/98 Weakness ENG TAC MA0607, 2/23/98 NRC Based on our review of the submittal, the staff is concerned about the timeliness of 1 2 3 4 5
your application. Your staff failed to recognize the effect that extending the operating cycle would have on the inability to perform certain Unit 2 refueling outage A EO O E E ElOOO surveillances within the interval allowed by the TS. As a result, the amendment application was submitted too close to the start of the refueling outage, which B
El 0 El l E caused agency resources to be diverted and the application to be processed in a C El El El nonroutine manner. In addition, confusion and a processing delay arose when the need to add additional surveillances was discovered and verbally transmitted to the staff, causing plans to be made to withdraw the application and, subsequently, changed. These problems indicate that changes are needed to the process used at the site to control surveillance schedules when a change to the operating cycle is made.
2/7/98 URI IR 97-18, LER 269/98-03 NRC On January 30, 1998, the licensee was granted verbal enforcement discretion on 1 2 3 4 statements in their TS regarding TS surveillance performance intervals. The licensee submitted a TS change to allow eighteen-month periodicity of surveillance A El El El E
instead of a refueling outage periodicity. The inspectors had reviewed the change for completeness. Additional followup on the enforcement discretion will be tracked B El 0 El 0 under an unresolved item. (Section X2) cEl 000 2/7/98 Weakness IR 97-18 LICENSEE During inspection and testing of Safe Shutdown Facility 600 volt breakers, several 1 2 3 4 5 problems were identified by the licensee. The licensee satisfactorily addressed the immediate equipment problems. Several issues regarding grease hardening and A ElO El El E l trip device past operability were identified. (Section M3.2)
B El El / El El8 c El El11l1l FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 3/30/98 Page 8 of 25 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 5/4/98
OCONEE 27-May-98 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 2/7/98 VIO IR 97-18; VIO 97-18-05 SELF A violation was identified for failure to revise a high pressure injection system 1 2 3 4 5 letdown flow instrument calibration procedure following modification of the Unit 3 integrated control system. (Section M3.1)
AEOEOE
- B EE. 10El 2/7/98 Weakness ENG IR 97-18, LER 269/97-11 NRC The December 28, 1997, Unit 1 shutdown for primary-to-secondary leakage that was 1 2 3 4 5
the result of past repairs where there had been an apparent over-reliance on the results of visual inspections, and less than adequate appreciation for primary water A E]
EO stress corrosion cracking. (Section M1.4)
B 00O CE1-EE@
g 2/7/98 Positive PLT SUP IR 97-18 NRC During the pressurizer surge line drain line work, pipe removal and reinstallation 1 2 3 4 5
practices and controls were generally acceptable. Health physics personnel appropriately supported the maintenance activities.
(Section M1.3) One rework A EE 0 E E item was observed that is discussed as a violation in Inspection Report 50 269,270,287/98-01.
B E E 00 C E 00 2/7/98 Positive IR 97-18 NRC The licensee and its primary vendor removed and disassembled a malfunctioning 1 2 3 4 5
Unit 1 control rod mechanism, finding no definitive problem. The overall inspection work was performed in a satisfactory manner, with care to detect as-found A E 0 E E El conditions. (Section M1.2)
B 00000 2/7/98 URI IR 97-18: URI 97-18-04 NRC Maintenance activities were generally completed thoroughly and professionally. One 1 2 3 4 5 unresolved item was opened on the use of Teflon tape on the low pressure injection system. (Section M1.1)
A 0 0 0 0 0 B OEOE c E0E 2/5/98 Negative IR 98-01 NRC Continuing problems in the area of Technical Specification surveillance tracking and 1 2 3 4 5 scheduling have not been resolved through the corrective action program. The inspection team identified a number of clerical errorsand the licensee has A E E 0 E documented problems with the tracking or completion of surveillance activities in a number of problem investigation process reports. Accordingly, more licensee B 0 0 OO 0 management attention is warranted in this area. (Section M7.1) c E E
E 2/5/98 Weakness IR 98-01 NRC The inspection team concluded that not requiring Less Significant Event Category 3 1 2 3 4 5 problem investigation process reports to be reviewed for generic applicability was a weakness in Nuclear Site Directive NSD 208 and the problem investigation process.
A E E E E E (Section M3.1)
B EEE CE EE E FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 3/30/98 Page 9 of 25 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 5/4/98
OCONEE 27-May-98 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 2/5/98 VIO IR 98-01; VIO 98-01-02 SELF A violation of Technical Specification 6.4.1.e was identified regarding an inadequacy 1 2 3 4 5 in maintenance procedure MP/0/A/1810/014. Specifically, the procedure did not provide sufficient instructions for limiting the amount of purge paper to be used as A
O El El 0 OEl O
weld damming material. As a result, the drain line connected to the Unit 1 pressurizer surgh line became blocked following welding. The licensee had previous B Ol 0 0 0 opportunities to correct this procedural inadequacy from earlier related experiences C
documented in problem investigation process reports. (Section M3.1) 2/5/98 Negative ENG IR 98-01 NRC The licensee's newly implemented program to trend and analyze cause and event 1 2 3 4 5 code data from problem investigation process reports had yet to produce auditable results. In conjunction with the licensee's Engineering Support Program, the Failure A El E El El Analysis and Trending program and its associated semi-annual Equipment History Trend Report were considered adequate tools for assisting engineering in identifying B 0 0 0 0 and assessing plant equipment performance trends. An in-depth review of two risk cEl l00 significant systems and associated components discerned that a considerable length of time passed before arriving at viable solutions for resolving repetitive problems.
(Section M2.2) 2/5/98 Positive IR 98-01 NRC Problem deficiency tags observed during plant tours, were generally only around six 1 2 3 4 5 months old. Some of the oldest deficiency tags observed (October 1994 and August 1996), identified auxiliary service water (tornado) pump supply valve seat leakage A El 0 l El 0 and noticeable operator oil leakage. The licensee indicated that these problems, along with an auxiliary service water pump seal leak that was beginning to cause B
E 0 El El El pump base corrosion, were scheduled for resolution during the upcoming Unit 2 C El El El El refueling outage. (Section M2.1) 2/5/98 Positive IR 98-01 NRC System and equipment reliability is a major focus area of the Oconee Recovery 1 2 3 4 5 Plan. Newly implemented under this Plan, the Top Equipment Problem Resolution process has begun to focus attention on the resolution of a considerable number of A El El El El E equipment/material condition issues; some of which are long-standing. (Section M2.1)
B a
0 0 [
CO E
- 000 12/27/97 VIO ENG IR 97-16; VIO 97-16-06 NRC The inspectors identified three examples of a violation for failure to properly control 1 2 3 4 modifications. (Section M3.1)
A ElEl00El B ElD 000 cOl 00El 12/27/97 NCV IR 97-16; NCV 97-16-05 LICENSEE A non-cited violation was identified for a failure to follow procedure when assembling 1 2 3 4 5 a control rod drive mechanism after maintenance. (Section M1.4)
A El0ElEl0 B ElElElEl cEl El FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 3/30/98 Page 10 of 25 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 5/4/98
OCONEE 27-May-98 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 12/27/97 NCV ENG IR 97-16; NCV 97-16-04 LICENSEE A non-cited violation was identified for failure to provide written instructions for 1 2 3 4 5
changing the washers in the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump overspeed trip plunger. (Section M1.3)
AOO El 0E El B 00E0 CO El 0001 12/27/97 Positive IR 97-16 NRC The inspectors concluded that general maintenance activities were completed 1 2 3 4 5 thoroughly and professionally. (Section M1.1)
A El1 EI ElI B 1El El El c El E 1S 12/27/97 LER ENG IR 97-16; LER 269/97-10 LICENSEE Through a licensee initiated audit, additional potential problems were uncovered in 1 2 3 4 5 the reactor building emergency sump flow paths. The licensee performed corrective actions to remove strainers, flanges, and insulation from all three buildings as A
El El El El applicable to assure present operability. Further follow up of this issue will be accomplished through review of associated Licensee Event Report 50-269/97-10, B 0 0 0 0 E which will address past operability. (Section 01.3) cO 0l0l0 11/15/97 Positive ENG IR 97-15 LICENSEE The licensee implemented repairs in once-through-steam-generator 1B tubes in a 1 2 3 4 5
conservative manner, following administrative controls and applicable controlling procedures. Technical support provided good guidance and oversight while the A El 0 0 El El activity was in progress. (Section M2.3) 13 00 00 c
1l El l:l 11/15/97 Negative ENG IR 97-15 NRC The failures of mechanical feedwater piping connections to the Unit IB steam 1 2 3 4 5
generator were not being identified and trended as repeat failures. (Section M2.2).
A 0Ell0000 B El000l0 cO OEl 11/15/97 Positive ENG IR 97-15 LICENSEE The condition of the Oconee once-through-steam-generators has seen additional 1 2 3 4 5 licensee attention through Babcock & Wilcox Owners Group sponsored tube pulls in each unit, and the contract with Dominion Engineering Incorporated to do an A ElElElElEl independent review of the Oconee steam generator program. (Section M2.2)
B 00El00 c El 1 El 0~
11/15/97 URI IR 97-15; URI 97-15-02 NRC Assembly of low pressure service water valves with the wrong parts resulted in an 1 2 3 4 5 Unresolved Item concerning parts identification. (Section M2.1)
A ElElElEl B El 00 0 El c E 00 FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 3/30/98 Page 11 of 25 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 5/4/98
OCONEE 27-May-98 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
IDd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 11/15/97 Weakness OPS IR 97-15 NRC The practice of obtaining an oil sample from the Unit 2 turbine driven emergency 1 2 3 4 5 feedwater pump without it running was a weakness in the oil sampling methodology. A request by operations for a procedure to govern the realignment 6f A O El 0 0l El the pump's steam supply was seen as a conservative measure to protect the steam header piping aid structural supports from possible water and steam hammers.
B Ol S El E (Section M1.7) cO El 01 0 11/15/97 Positive ENG IR 97-15 LICENSEE The licensee's process for the evaluation of steam generator eddy current data was 1 2 3 4 5 being conducted in accordance with current industry guidelines and expectations.
(Section M1.6)
AO O
ElOOOEl B
0000 11/15/97 VIO IR 97-15; VIO 97-15-01 NRC The failure by maintenance personnel to complete a Technical Specification required 1 2 3 4 5 surveillance on low pressure injection flow instruments resulted in a violation.
(Section M1.5)
A ElOElOEl B
S 11El El c El EllEl 11/15/97 Positive ENG IR 97-15 NRC The Failure Investigation Process team was aggressively pursuing the root cause for 1 2 3 4 5 the failure of the MARBO plugging tool. All maintenance and inspection activities observed for installation of the 24-inch MARBO plug were performed in a A El El O El E conscientious manner by qualified personnel in accordance with detailed procedures. Welding and non-destructive examination activities observed and B El S 0 0 reviewed were performed in accordance with the applicable code and procedure c El El El El requirements. (Section M1.4) 11/15/97 Positive ENG IR 97-15 NRC Strong management oversight, good communications, and sound coordination by 1 2 3 4 5
engineering and maintenance resulted in an error free recovery of a broken MARBO stopple plug from the low pressure service water system. (Section M1.3)
A El El OO El E B El 1Ell 11/15/97 MISC ENG IR 97-15 LICENSEE During the period, the licensee searched for and found a missing piece from the 1A1 1 2 3 4 5
Reactor Coolant Pump impeller. During the search, the licensee found other reactor vessel related pieces that had been missing since 1981. The licensee was A El El E El El generating an evaluation on the vessel related piece that would remain in place.
Video inspection of the Unit 1 reactor coolant pumps had been performed and the B El [ El El El licensee was evaluating continued operations of the three pumps with observed c El El El El impeller degradation for an additional fuel cycle. (Section M1.2) 11/15/97 Positive IR 97-15 NRC The inspectors concluded that general maintenance activities were completed 1 2 3 4 5
thoroughly and professionally. (Section M1.1)
A ElE1El B El T: 3E c El ElEll FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 3/30/98 Page 12 of 25 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 5/4/98
OCONEE 27-May-98 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 10/18/97 NCV IR 97-14; NCV 97-14-05 NRC The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for a failure to provide detailed 1 2 3 4 5 guidance in the preventive maintenance procedure for measuring the timer settings for the Y coil in DB-50 breakers. (Section M8.2)
AD EOOOOE B 00E00 cO 0E]0 10/18/97 VIO IR 97-14; VIO 97-14-04 NRC The inspectors identified a violation for a failure to translate information from a 1 2 3 4 5 Westinghouse technical manual to the licensee's maintenance procedure for the DB 25 circuit breakers. (Section M8.1)
A E
OE B3 0E0E cE 0E 10/18/97 Weakness IR 97-14 NRC The inspectors identified a weakness in the foreign material exclusion program 1 2 3 4 5 based on multiple examples of poor foreign material exclusion practices. (Section M3.1)
A 0 E E E B E EE1:1 10/18/97 Positive IR 97-14 SELF To reduce the likelihood of peeling polar crane paint and extensive hanger paint 1 2 3 4 5 intrusion into refueling activities, the licensee installed a protective foreign material tent over the.Unit 1 refueling cavity. This was installed prior to opening the reactor A E 0 E0 E0 coolant system and commencing fuel off-load. (Section M2.1)
B 00000 CO 0 001:1:
10/18/97 Positive IR 97-14 NRC Volumetric inservice inspection of designated welds was performed satisfactorily by 1 2 3 4 5 qualified and well trained personnel following approved nondestructive examination procedures. (Section M1.12)
A E 0 E B E E EEl 10/18/97 Positive IR 97-14 NRC Low pressure service water system modifications to replace certain valves and 1 2 3 4 5 LPSW pump minimum flow lines were well planned. Valve and pipe replacements were being installed consistent with applicable code requirements and quality A EOO 0 EO criteria. (Section M1.11)
B E0E C E E 1EE 10/18/97 Positive IR 97-14 NRC A nuclear station modification to replace certain valves and associated piping in the 1 2 3 4 5 high pressure injection system was being performed following applicable code requirements. Prefabricated subassemblies exhibited good workmanship attributes A O E 0 OO and material records were retrievable and in order. Nondestructive examinations met applicable code requirements; they were performed and the results interpreted B E 0 E E E in a conservative manner. (Section M1.10)
CE EE FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 3/30/98 Page 13 of 25 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 5/4/98
OCONEE 27-May-98 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 10/18/97 Positive IR 97-14 NRC The licensee provided excellent work control in the lifting/removal of the 1A1 reactor 1 2 3 4 5 coolant pump with health physics personnel providing positive support. The pump's impeller was missing part of one vane and exhibited what appeared to be cavitation A O El S El El damage on other vanes. A licensee evaluation was in progress. (Section M1.9)
B -ED :El Ell CO1-000E 10/18/97 Positive IR 97-14 SELF Upper surge tank work was well-engineered with good technical work control.
1 2 3 4 5
Overall, initial tank condition was good. Use of uncovered wood in the tanks with minimal foreign material control was an example of foreign material process A El El OOEl El weakness that the licensee addressed prior to work performance. (Section M1.8)
B 1El ElEl El c El 0 1:1 10/18/97 Positive IR 97-14 NRC Increased leakage from the 2LP-1 valve's body to bonnet joint resulted in a Unit 2 1 2 3 4 5
shutdown to allow for a satisfactory seal injection repair. The licensee applied appropriate operational experience review and met current NRC guidance during the A 0 0 El El repair effort. Operational controls during the period were good. Final repair will occur at the next refueling or fuel off load. (Section M1.7)
B El El El El l cEl ElElEl 10/18/97 Positive IR 97-14 NRC Although problems did occur during emergency start testing of the Keowee Hydro 1 2 3 4 5 Units, overall, the tests were carried out properly with good pre-job briefs, good test performance, and proper equipment control. During testing, a field flash breaker coil A 0El El E l El failed (smoldered). Licensee actions in response were appropriate. (Section M1.6)
B3 El 11El 0O 10/18/97 Positive IR 97-14 NRC The inspectors concluded that the Unit 3 main turbine generator voltage regulator 1 2 3 4 5 automatic card was adjusted in accordance with procedures and with engineering and supervisory oversight. The adjustments were consistent with the latest vendor A El El El E El information. (Section M1.5) ca: 000 10/18/97 Positive ENG IR 97-14 NRC During performance of major modifications to the Units 1 and 2 low pressure service 1 2 3 4 5 water piping, the majority of the observed work was professionally and properly carried out. One of the plugs installed in a 42-inch pipe was stranded in the pipe AO O
El El OEl when removal was attempted. Corrective action will occur outside the inspection period with the licensee forming a Failure Investigation Process team to investigate B
El 0 0 0 the cause and recommend a possible resolution. (Section M.4) c El El l E 10/18/97 Positive IR 97-14 NRC Keowee preventive maintenance and testing activities were generally completed 1 2 3 4 5 thoroughly with procedures and work orders at the job site. The inspectors concluded that with the 1A sump pump check valve leaking, the 1B sump pump was A El El OOEl El able to pump at 35 gpm. This is sufficient to pump down the wheel well sump due to the 2 gpm limit on leakage. Although pump discharge check valve leakage had been B E 0 E
0 0 a previous work-around, new valves are scheduled for installation in the near future.
C El El El El (Section M.3)
FROM: 10/1 /97 TO: 3/30/98 Page 14 of 25 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 5/4/98
OCONEE 27-May-98 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 10/18/97 Positive ENG IR 97-14 NRC Overall, maintenance troubleshooting and quarantine of parts in response to the 1 2 3 4 5
observed breaker closing coil failure on Keowee Hydro Unit 2 was good. The replacement of the Y relay timers on the Keowee safety-related Westinghouse DB-A O ED El El 25 and 50 breakers was a conservative corrective action. (Section M1.2)
B 1-11ED lEl c
0 1001 10/18/97 Positive IR 97-14 NRC The inspectors concluded that general maintenance activities were completed 1 2 3 4 5 thoroughly and professionally. (Section M1.1)
A El0SElEl B El El El 0~
3/21/98 Positive OPS IR 98-02 NRC The actual Unit 1 integrated control system testing completed during power 1 2 3 4 5
operations was conducted in a well controlled manner with good evaluation of results. (Section E8.1)
A 0 0 El 00 B 0ElElE0El c
0 00F11:
3/21/98 Positive IR 98-02 NRC The licensee used an acceptable approach to determine the operability of the high 1 2 3 4 5
pressure injection system injection and crossover valves after the failure of valve 1HP-27 to close. (Section E1.1)
A ElElEl 0
c l El l-l 3/21/98 VIO IR 98-02; VIO 98-02-12 LICENSEE The licensee discovered that design errors had been introduced into reactor physics 1 2 3 4 5 analysis for power-imbalance on all three Oconee units. This problem was documented as a design control violation. (Section E3.3)
A E E 0El B 0000 cO0 Ell0 3/21/98 NCV IR 98-02; NCV 98-02-11 LICENSEE The licensee failed to make a required 1995 10 CFR 50.46 report. This was 1 2 3 4 5 identified as a non-cited violation. (Section E3.2)
A ElElElEl 0
B 0000ElEl C E 000 3/21/98 URI MAINT IR 98-02; URI 98-02-10 LICENSEE An unresolved item was identified on engineering review of as-built conditions for the 1 2 3 4 5 reactor building emergency sump and the borated water storage tank level instrumentation. (Section E3.1)
A E0 B El
- 0 P FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 3/30/98 Page 15 of 25 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 5/4/98
.OCONEE 27-May-98 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 3/21/98 URI MAINT IR 98-02; VIO 98-02-09 NRC The past operability and control of preventive maintenance for valve 1HP-27 was left 1 2 3 4 5 unresolved pending further review. (Section E1.1)
A LLL00 B LIDLIE I lE CLE E ELIE 2/7/98 Positive IR 97-18 NRC The licensee was making good progress in the installation of the service water 1 2 3 4 5 modifications. Modifications on Unit 2 should be completed during the March 1998 outage. (Section E8.2)
A LILIO lIL B ElILILI M L 217/98 NCV IR 97-18, LER 269/97-10; LICENSEE A Non-Cited Violation was identified for failure to follow procedures controlling 1 2 3 4 5 NCV 97-18-10 modifications as discussed in Licensee Event Report 50-269/97-10, regarding reactor building sump issues. (Section E8.1)
A S 0
0ll B
EIII lI 2/7/98 VIO IR 97-18; VIO 97-18-08 LICENSEE Two additional examples of the violation resulting from procedural inadequacies 1 2 3 4 5 were-identified on the Keowee Hydroelectric units. One example involved the motor operated automatic voltage adjusters on both Keowee units not being adjusted in A L L L LI LI accordance with their applicable drawings due to lack of procedural detail. The other example involved missed in-service tests on both Keowee Hydroelectric units due to B 0 0 0 0 0 engineering not converting a temporary test into a periodic test of lube oil valves.
cO 0 OO (Section E2.2) 217/98 VIO IR 97-18; VIO 97-18-05 SELF Three examples of a violation resulting from procedural inadequacies were 1 2 3 4 5 identified. An engineering supported troubleshooting procedure did not minimize risk to equipment and was not completely validated prior to performing work. Use of the A OOL procedure on Unit 2 integrated control system wiring resulted in unexpected system responses. The other two examples are discussed in Section E2.2. (Section E2.1)
B L 0
cLI 1LI 2/7/98 Weakness IR 97-18 NRC Replacement of the cracked one-inch drain line on the pressurizer surge line was
.1 2 3 4 5 consistent with applicable code requirements. A lack of attention to detail in the planning phase of welding the replacement line caused a significant job delay and A L L 0 LI LI the need to cut and re-weld a new weld on the line. Engineering provided adequate support and took an active role in determining the root cause of the crack. Welding, B 0 0 0 0 0 nondestructive examination, and process control activities were satisfactory. Stress C
analysis calculations determined that thermal stratification and hanger loads on the drain line exceeded code allowable usage factor requirements on the drain line nozzle.
(Section E1.1)
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 3/30/98 Page 16 of 25 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 5/4/98
OCONEE 27-May-98 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 2/5/98 Positive IR 98-01 NRC The inspection team concluded that operating experience information reviewed by 1 2 3 4 5 the team was being processed in accordance with the licensee's procedures.
However, as indicated by the violation identified in Section M3.1 of this inspection A El El 0 El 0 report, not all of the corrective actions identified through the operating experience program reviews were being implemented by the Oconee site. Findings from B El El 0El El assessments of the operating experience program were documented and tracked in C 0 El El the licensee's corrective action program. (Section E7.3) 2/5/98 Positive ENG IR 98-01 NRC The Self-Initiated Technical Audit of the High Pressure Injection and Low Pressure 1 2 3 4 5
Injection systems and the High Pressure Injection System Reliability Study were thorough and detailed efforts that effectively identified equipment and programmatic A El O
El El O issues, as well as provided pertinent recommendations. These recommendations were appropriately captured in the licensee's corrective action program. (Section B 0 0 0 0 E7.2) cO O
El 2/5/98 Positive SAQV IR 98-01 NRC The inspection team concluded that the licensee conducted good reviews during 1 2 3 4 5 Phase 1 of the voluntary Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Review Project. The licensee appropriately captured the majority of identified UFSAR discrepancies into A El El El El 0 its corrective action program and added those that were identified by the inspection team. One inspector followup item was identified for further evaluation of startup BOOO 0 0 thermal transient number 23, associated with the reactor coolant system, and c El ElO0 El incorporation of the related calculations into fatigue analyses. (Section E7.1) 2/5/98 Negative IR 98-01 NRC The Failure Analysis and Trending Program and Equipment History Trend Reports 1 2 3 4 5
for the evaluation of equipment performance were adequate. However, the inspection team identified examples of incorrect documentation of engineering A OOOOOE El responses regarding failure analysis of certain equipment. Accordingly, more attention to detail is warranted in compiling engineering review comments in this B 0 0 0 0 0 area. (Section E2.1) cO E 00 12/27/97 VIO MAINT IR 97-16; VIO 97-16-08 NRC The inspectors identified a violation for failure to conduct the required review of out-1 2 3 4 5 of-tolerance as-found conditions when test results did not meet acceptance criteria.
(Section E8.1)
AO 0
El B El 0El E c El El l-l 12/27/97 VIO IR 97-16; VIO 97-16-07 NRC Current engineering guidance relative to Unit 1 reactor coolant pump operation at 1 2 3 4 5
less than required net positive suction head was not clearly communicated to licensed operators. This was a training weakness in that site engineers did not A 0 El 0 l El change existing plant curves and that operations did not train their personnel appropriately in this area. A violation was issued regarding a past engineering B 0 0 0 0 E failure to translate the reactor coolant pump design details into plant operational C El El El El curves which contributed to impeller pieces being eroded, impacting plant operations. (Section E1.1)
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 3/30/98 Page 17 of 25 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 5/4/98
OCONEE 27-May-98 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 12/27/97 Strength OPS IR 97-16 NRC The Unit 1 integrated control system testing was conducted in a well controlled and 1 2 3 4 5
professional manner with thorough pre-job briefings and good evaluation of results.
(Section 01.6)
A E El O O B 1El ElEl El C 1 11-El EE 11/15/97 VIO IR 97-15; VIO 97-15-09 NRC The failure to revise the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report to reflect different fuel 1 2 3 4 5 enrichments since 1994 was identified as a violation. The discrepancy had been previously identified, but went uncorrected. (Section E8.3)
A O l El 0 B E 00El c El
- 1E 11/15/97 Strength IR 97-15 NRC The engineering self-assessments performed in 1997 were effective in identifying 1 2 3 4 5
and assuring correction of deficiencies in engineering performance. (Section E7.1)
A 0El 00[9 B 1El 1l1lED 11/15/97 Positive IR 97-15 NRC Design control for a Unit 1 low pressure service water modifications was good. The 1 2 3 4 5 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations were detailed and thorough. (Section E3.1)
A El0ElEl B E] 000M00 c 1l El 11El 11/15/97 Positive IR 97-15 NRC Based on a review of engineering activities, engineering support to operations and 1 2 3 4 5 maintenance was adequate. (Section E2.1)
A 0El00ElEl B ElEl -1lEll C 00000I 10/18/97 VIO IR 97-14; VIO 97-14-09 NRC The inspectors identified a violation for a failure to implement a modification inside 1 2 3 4 5
the licensee's approved modification process, resulting in the modification not receiving a post-modification test. (Section E8.4)
A El 0 El El B E]
El ID E 10/18/97 VIO IR 97-14;-97-14-08 NRC Failure to evaluate heavy load lifts over safety-related components while Unit 1 was 1 2 3 4 5
above cold shutdown conditions resulted in a violation. (Section E3.1)
A 0El0E B 1019 : 3 9 PEl c El El El El FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 3/30/98 Page 18 of 25 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 5/4/98
OCONEE 27-May-98 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
IDd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 10/18/97 Positive IR 97-14 SELF The test of reactor building cooling unit breakers was performed in accordance with 1 2 3 4 5 an approved procedure, by knowledgeable personnel, and with engineering oversight. The inspectors considered the breaker testing activities by the A OOO El O
ElE engineering, maintenance, and procurement quality assurance personnel to be good.
(Section E2.2).0 c El 1:1:Ell 10/18/97 Positive IR 97-14 NRC The'inspectors concluded that the engineering real-time support for a Keowee Hydro 1 2 3 4 5 Unit emergency start test was effective. The performance of the failure investigation group in identifying the failure mechanism for the Y relay timer was excellent. A A
El E 0 El 0 review of the present timer logic network for possible modification is considered an example of good safety attitudes. (Section E2.1)
B El El E
cO OO(l 10/18/97 VIO IR 97-14; VIO 97-14-07 NRC The failure to ensure complete removal of unqualified thermal insulation from the 1 2 3 4 5
reactor buildings caused an inaccurate calculation of operability and resulted in a violation based on inadequate corrective action. (Section E1.2)
A El 0 0 0 0 B ElEl 110 l COl 000:
10/18/97 VIO IR 97-14; VIO 97-14-06 SELF The inspectors identified one violation in which improper assessment of emergency 1 2 3 4 5
feedwater valve operation resulted in a recurrence of a previous component failure in the emergency feedwater system. (Section E1.1)
A E El EEl B 1El l:l0 l 3/21/98 Positive IR 98-02 NRC The licensee was effectively maintaining controls for radioactive material and waste 1 2 3 4 5 processing. (Section R1.1)
A ElElEl B 11E ] ~El 1 c
0 0ElE 3/21/98 Positive IR 98-02 NRC The meteorological instrumentation had been adequately maintained and the 1 2 3 4 5 meteorological monitoring program had been effectively implemented. (Section R2.2)
A El El El El B ElOS El Ell c
0ElEl 3/21/98 Positive IR 98-02 NRC Effluent and environmental monitors were being maintained in an operational 1 2 3 4 5 condition to comply with Technical Specification requirements and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report commitments. (Section R2.1)
A El E E 0 El B 000ElEEl c
El000 FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 3/30/98 Page 19 of 25 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 5/4/98
OCONEE 27-May-98 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 3/21/98 Positive IR 98-02 NRC Personnel involved with performing environmental and effluent surveys were 1 2 3 4 5
maintaining current training qualifications. (Section R5)
A El00ElEl NB ElElIEl El0 c
E E
3/21/98 Positive IR 98-02 NRC The licensee's water chemistry control program for monitoring primary and 1 2 3 4 5
secondary water quality had been effectively implemented, for those parameters reviewed, in accordance with the Technical Specification requirements and the A E0 El AOOOOOEl Station Chemistry Manual for water chemistry. (Section R1.2)
B 0000 0
c ElEl 3/21/98 Positive IR 98-02 NRC The licensee had continued to effectively implement a program for shipping 1 2 3 4 5
radioactive materials. (Section Ri.3)
A 0000 ElEl B El El El ElE c
0ElEl 3/21/98 URI IR 98-02; URI 98-02-13 NRC An unresolved item was identified to determine if a Unit 2 sample tube was 1 2 3 4 5
constructed as shown on a design drawing. (Section R2.1)
A ElElEl 00 B E] 0000El c E El0 3/5/98 Positive IR 98-04 NRC The inspector verified that the total number of trained security officers and armed 1 2 3 4 5 personnel immediately available to fulfill response requirements met the number specified in the Security and Contingency Plan. One full-time member of the A El El El El El security organization who had the authority to direct security activities did not have duties that conflicted with the assignment to direct all activities during an incident B El El El El El (Section 6.3).
c 0
0 0 3/5/98 Positive IR 98-04 NRC The inspector's review found that the security force training records met the Training 1 2 3 4 5 and Qualification Plan and regulatory requirements (Section 5.2).
A 00ElElElEl B El El ~El ElE cE 0ElEl 3/5/98 Positive IR 98-04 NRC The inspector concluded through observation and interviews of security force 1 2 3 4 5
personnel, that the security force was being trained effectively and according to the Training and Qualification Plan and regulatory requirements (Section.5.1).
A El El E El El B El1El El El c
000Ra FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 3/30/98 Page 20 of 25 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 5/4/98
OCONEE 27-May-98 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 3/5/98 Positive IR 98-04 NRC The inspectors review of random samples of the Security Procedures verified that 1 2 3 4 5 the procedures adequately met the Security and Contingency Plan commitments and practices (Section S3.2).
AOOO El DEl0 B EJ El El ElEl 3/5/98 Positive IR 98-04 NRC The inspectors review of plan changes verified that the changes did not decrease 1 2 3 4 5 the effectiveness of the Security and Contingency Plan and the Training and Qualification Plan (Section S3.1).
A E E E E
B 0
0El CO W
3/5/98 VIO IR 98-04; VIO 98-04-01 LICENSEE A repeat violation was identified for failure to secure unattended safeguards 1 2 3 4 5
information. The unattended safeguards information was not disclosed or compromised (Section S1.4).
AOO E O OE B El El -1EIEl c 0 EE0 3/5/98 Positive IR 98-04 NRC The inspectors evaluation of the Fitness For Duty Program determined that there 1 2 3 4 5 were no changes to the licensee's Fitness For Duty Program and that the program was adequate and met the licensees' commitments and NRC requirements (Section A El El El El S1.3).
B E] l 1El c 0 00E]
2/7/98 NCV IR 97-18; NCV 97-18-11 LICENSEE A Non-Cited Violation was identified for failure to perform a continuous fire watch as 1 2 3 4 5 required by the selected license commitments. The licensee had performed hourly fire watches instead of continuous fire watches when they removed the Unit 2 and 3 A El El El El El startup transformers fire protection deluge system from service. (Section F1.1)
B El10lODEE COED 12/27/97 VIO IR 97-16; VIO 97-16-09 NRC The inspectors identified a violation for an individual's failure to follow procedure for 1 2 3 4
- 5.
contamination control. (Section R1.1)
A ElElElEl B ElElO1El El COE El El 1l 12/3/97 Weakness IR 97-17 NRC Review of the appropriate records and reports revealed weaknesses in the General 1 2 3 4 5 Employee Training program and the Physical Security Plan (Section S3.4)
A ElEl]0 B 1/9 El E El El C El 1l111l FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 3/30/98 Page 21 of 25 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 5/4/98
OCONEE 27-May-98 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 12/3/97 Positive IR 97-17 NRC The control room barriers which included the controlled access door met the 1 2 3 4 5 Physical Security Plan, commitments and regulatory requirements (Section S2.7).
A E0ElElEl cB E0lIE0E 12/3/97 NCV IR 97-17; NCV 97-17-01 LICENSEE The inspection of the October 30, 1997 event identified one non-cited violation 1 2 3 4 5 concerning vital area access control (Section S2.6).
A ElElEEl B 1:1 1-ElEJEl c 11 00E 12/3/97 Positive IR 97-17 NRC The licensee's compensatory measures implemented for the degraded security 1 2 3 4 5
conditions at the Control Room door were within the commitments of the Physical Security Plan (Section S1.3).
A ElElElOEl B
E0ID c E0 001El 11/15/97 Positive SAQV IR 97-15 NRC The 1995 audit and assessment of the facility's fire protection program were 1 2 3 4 5
comprehensive and appropriate corrective action was promptly taken to resolve identified issues. (Section F7.1)
A El O21 0 El B~ EIEI FI1 l :
C 1 1-000 11/15/97 Weakness IR 97-15 NRC Fire brigade performance during a drill conducted during this inspection period was 1 2 3 4 5
mixed. Subsequent brigade performance after resolution of drill identified deficiencies was satisfactory. (Section F5.1)
AO El[10 E B ElE0El0 cM OOEJE 11/15/97 Strength IR 97-15 NRC The fire brigade organization and training met the requirements of the site 1 2 3 4 5
procedures. The use of the fire brigade safety officer position during fire emergencies was identified as a program strength. (Section F5.1)
AO El lD El El B ElEl1 E E c S 000l E 11/15/97 VIO ENG IR 97-15 NRC A violation was identified involving the failure to provide fire fighting strategies for all 1 2 3 4 5
plant areas which contained safety-related equipment or presented an exposure hazard to safety-related components. (Section F3.1)
AOBO El El O
E c El El0El00 FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 3/30/98 Page 22 of 25 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 5/4/98
OCONEE 27-May-98 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 11/15/97 Positive IR 97-15 NRC In general, fire protection program implementing procedures were well written and 1 2 3 4 5 met the licensee's commitments to the NRC requirements. Procedure implementation for the control of ignition sources and transient combustibles was A El 0 El E good. Overall, general housekeeping was satisfactory. (Section F3.1)
B EO El 10 E c
El 0
11/15/97 MISC IR 97-15 LICENSEE The fire barrier penetration seals were functional. However, the licensee had 1 2 3 4 5
implemented a project to provide documentation to identify the design specification and bounding test criteria applicable to each fire barrier penetration. (Section F2.3)
A El El El El El B El EEl Ell C 0l000 11/15/97 Positive IR 97-15 NRC Adequate surveillance and test procedures were provided for the fire protection 1 2 3 4 5 systems and features, and implementation of the procedures was effective. (Section F2.2).
A El El El B 1ElElEl El 11/15/97 Positive MAINT IR 97-15 NRC The low number of inoperable or degraded fire protection components, in conjunction 1 2 3 4 5 with the good material condition of the fire protection components and fire brigade equipment, indicated appropriate emphasis had been placed on the maintenance A El 0 El 0El El and operability of the fire protection equipment and components. (Section F2.1)
B ElEl 0ElEl c
ElElEl 11/15/97 NCV IR 97-15; NCVs 97 LICENSEE Three non-cited violations were identified for the licensee's failure to meet the fire 1 2 3 4 5 04, -05, -06 protection operability requirements for three required fire protection features.
(Section F1.1)
AO E ]
0 0l0 B
El0lElEll 11/15/97 Positive IR 97-15 NRC The licensee's fire protection staff demonstrated an aggressive attitude in the 1 2 3 4 5
identification and correction of fire protection deficiencies. (Section F1.1)
A 0000El ll B E100El0El c
ElEl 11/15/97 Positive IR 97-15 NRC The inspectors determined that the licensee was performing Quality Assurance 1 2 3 4 5 audits and effectively assessing the radiation protection program as required by 10 CFR Part 20.1101. The inspectors also determined that the licensee was completing A E O
El El El El corrective actions in a timely manner. (Section R7.1)
B El El 1El 0~
c ElEl FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 3/30/98 Page 23 of 25 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 5/4/98
OCONEE 27-May-98 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 11/15/97 Positive MAINT IR 97-15 NRC It was concluded that the meteorological instrumentation had been adequately 1 2 3 4 5
maintained and that the meteorological monitoring program had been effectively implemented. (Section R2.1)
AO D
0El El B El E :El [Il 11/15/97 Positive IR 97-15 NRC The inspectors determined that the licensee had effectively implemented a program 1 2 3 4 5 for shipping radioactive materials required by NRC and Department of Transportation regulations. (Section R1.3)
AOOO ElOEEE B 110 El El El 11/15/97 Positive IR 97-15 NRC It was concluded that the licensee's water chemistry control program for monitoring 1 2 3 4 5 primary and secondary water quality had been effectively implemented, for those parameters reviewed, in accordance with the Technical Specification requirements A O O
El El O Ol and the Station Chemistry Manual for Pressurized Water Reactor water chemistry.
(Section R1.2)
B 0 E ElEl c
Ell 11/15/97 Strength IR 97-15 NRC Based on observations and procedural reviews, the inspectors determined the 1 2 3 4 5 licensee was effectively maintaining controls for radioactive waste and waste processing. One unresolved item was identified to determine monitoring AO El El El El requirements for radiological work in two onsite buildings. The licensee's initiative to improve resin sluice processing systems to maintain exposures As Low As 1 E El El El 0 Reasonably Achievable and to improve environmental controls for resin sluicing was c E El El El viewed as a strength. (Section RI1) 10/18/97 Positive IR 97-14 NRC The inspectors determined that the licensee was performing Quality Assurance 1 2 3 4 5 audits and effectively assessing the radiation protection program as required by 10 CFR Part 20.1101. The inspectors also determined the licensee was completing A El El El El0 corrective actions in a timely manner. (Section R7.1)
B El El 1-1 E C 11 1:El1 10/18/97 VIO IR 97-14; VIO 97-14-10 NRC A violation was identified, with two examples, for inadequate radiation protection 1 2 3 4 5 practices and controls which allowed entry into a posted radiation area. (Section R1.3)
A ElEl0 ElEl B El3 S El El C~ El 1 l11l 10/18/97 Positive IR 97-14 NRC The inspectors determined licensee management demonstrated strong support for 1 2 3 4 5 ALARA and the licensee's programs for controlling exposures ALARA were effective. (Section R1.2)
AOO O
ElElEl B 00000lEl c D ElEl FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 3/30/98 Page 24 of 25 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 5/4/98
OCONEE 27-May-98 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 10/18/97 Positive IR 97-14 NRC Based on observations and procedural reviews, the inspectors determined the 1 2 3 4 5
licensee was effectively maintaining controls for personnel monitoring, control of radioactive material, radiological postings, and radiation area/high radiation area A 0 El 0 El controls as required by 10 CFR Part 20. (Section R1.1)
B E 0ElElElEl c S 0El SMM Template Codes:
SALP Functional Areas:
ID Code:
1A OPERATION PERFORMANCE - Normal Operations LICENSEE LICENSEE 1B OPERATION PERFORMANCE - Operations During Transients ENG ENGINEERING NRC NRC iC OPERATION PERFORMANCE - Programs and Processes MAINT MAINTENANCE SELF SELF-REVEALED 2A MATERIAL CONDITION - Equipment Condition OPS OPERATIONS 2B MATERIAL CONDITION - Programs and Processes PLT SUP PLANT SUPPORT 3A HUMAN PERFORMANCE -Work Performance SAQV SAFETY ASSESSMENT & QV 3B HUMAN PERFORMANCE - KSA 3C HUMAN PERFORMANCE-Work Environment 4A ENGINEERING/DESIGN - Design 4B ENGINEERING/DESIGN - Engineering Support 4C ENGINEERING/DESIGN -
Programs and Processes 5A PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION & SOLUTION - Identification 5B PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION & SOLUTION - Analysis 5C PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION & SOLUTION -Resolution EEls are apparent violations of NRC requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1 600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identified by the EEls and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are made. Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, the licensee will be provided with an opportunity to either (1) respond to the apparent violation or (2) request a predecisional enforcement conference.
URIs are unresolved Items about which more Information is required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation.
However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 3/30/98 Page 25 of 25 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 5/4/98
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION INSPECTION PLAN INSPECTION PLANNED PROCEDURE/
TITLE NUMBER OF INSPECTION TYPE OF INSPECTION COMMENTS TEMPORARY INSPECTOt(S DATES INSTRUCTION IP 71714 COLD WEATHER PREPARATIONS 1 (RI) 12/98 Regional Initiative - seasonal region-wide initiative INITIAL OPERATOR LICENSE 3
11/98 Initial Examinations EXAMINATIONS 12/98 IP 60855 ISFSI (Loading) 1(RI)
(pending load Regional Initiative -
ISFSI schedule) loading operations (DRP review)
IP 62700 MAINTENANCE IMPLEMENTATION 1
8/98 Regional Initiative - MOG IP 92902 FOLLOWUP - MAINTENANCE Recovery Plan Review: work backlog management: outage readiness; ops/maint interface; post.maint/mod testing: open items IP 62700 MAINTENANCE IMPLEMENTATION 1
7/98 Regional Initiative IP 92902 FOLLOWUP - MAINTENANCE Maintenance Rule followup inspection (review periodic assessment): open items IP 73753 INSERVICE INSPECTION 1
8/98 Regional Initiative - MOG IP 92902 FOLLOWUP - MAINTENANCE Recovery Plan Review: ISI Defense Plan (ISI program assessments): open items IP 73753 INSERVICE INSPECTION 1
9/98 Core - during Unit 3 RFO (to include augmented inspection program)
9/98 Regional Initiative - steam generator inspections during Unit 3
RFO 1
INSPECTION PLANNED PROCEDURE/
TITLE NUMBER OF INSPECTION TYPE OF INSPECTION - COMMENTS TEMPORARY INSPECTORS DATES INSTRUCTION IP 37550 ENGINEERING 1 -3 Regional Initiative - MOG IP 92903 FOLLOWUP - ENGINEERING Recovery Plan Review:
IP 37001 10CFR 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATIONS 7/98 -
- HPI System Review IP 40500 PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION/RESOLUTION 6/98 -
- HPI/LPI SITA 7/98,8/98,9/98-
- OSROC 11/98 -
- LPSW/ECCW 11/98 -
- UFSAR 8/98 -
- SQUG Outlier Resolution 7/98.10/98 -
- GL 96-06 8/98,9/98 -
EFW SSEI 7/98,9/98 -
- Configuration Management 10/98 -
- System Teams 7/98.9/98 -
- Temporary Mods 7/98 -
- Secondary System Reliability 8/98,9/98,11/98
- PIP Backlog 8/98,9/98,11/98
- PIP Quality Improvements 8/98,9/98.11/98
- Manager Obs/Group Self-Assess 8/98,9/98,11/98
- Root Cause/Corrective Action TBD -
- Operations Procedures (EOPs) 10/98 -
- Eng/Ops/Maint Interface 10/98 -
- Post Maint/Mod Testing 11/98.12/98 -
- Containment Coatings (during above) open items IP 83750 OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE 1
7/98 Core 10/98 IP 84750 RADIOACTIVE WASTE SYSTEMS, WATER 1
8/98 Core CHEMISTRY, CONFIRMATORY MEASUREMENTS AND RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING 2
INSPECTION T
PLANNED PROCEDURE/
T ENUMBER OF INSPECTION TYPE OF INSPECTION - COMMENTS TEMPORARY INSPECTORS DATES INSTRUCTION N
IP 86750 SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTE 1
8/98 Core MANAGEMENT AND TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IP 60855 ISFSI (Loading) 1 (pending load Regional Initiative -
ISFSI HP schedule) activities (DRS-HP aspects)
IP 82301 EVALUATION OF EXERCISES FOR POWER 4
8/98 Core -
EP Exercise REACTORS IP 82302 REVIEW OF EXERCISE OBJECTIVES AND SCENARIOS FOR POWER REACTORS IP 60855 ISFSI (Loading) 1 (pending load Regional Initiative schedule)
Resolution of ISFSI weld issues (DRS-engineering review)
IP 81700 PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM FOR 1
8/98 Regional Initiative - Review of POWER REACTORS corporate access authorizaton program IP 81700 PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM FOR 1
9/98 Core
_POWER REACTORS 3