ML14181A969
| ML14181A969 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14181A968 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-97-13, NUDOCS 9801210155 | |
| Download: ML14181A969 (26) | |
See also: IR 05000261/1997013
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket No:
50-261
License No:
Report No:
50-261/97-13
Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company
Facility:
H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit No. 2
Location:
2112 Old Camden Rd.
Hartsville, SC 29550
O Dates:
November 17-21. 1997
Inspectors:
W. Sartor. Exercise Team Leader
W. Rankin. Sr. Project Manager
J. Kreh. Radiation Specialist
B. Desai, Resident Inspector
Approved by:
K. Barr. Chief. Plant Support Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosure
9801210155 971231
ADOCK 05000261
Q
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
H. B. ROBINSON POWER PLANT UNIT 2
NRC Inspection Report No. 50-261/97-13
This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of
the biennial emergency preparedness exercise for the H. B. Robinson Steam
Electric Plant Unit No. 2. This NRC/FEMA evaluated exercise was a plume and
ingestion pathway exercise fully participated in by the State of South
Carolina and Risk Counties. The plume exposure exercise was conducted on
November 18, 1997 from 6:30 a.m. until 12:48 p.m. This report summarized the
observations of the four-person NRC team that assessed the adequacy of the
licensee's emergency preparedness program as the utility implemented its
Emergency Plan and Procedures for the plume exposure exercise. The NRC
evaluators observed licensee response from the Control Room Simulator (CRS),
the Technical Support Center (TSC), the Operational Support Center, and the
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
Based on the performance observed, the
evaluators concluded that the licensee successfully demonstrated its ability
to implement the Robinson Emergency Plan and Procedures in response to the
simulated accident.
Program Areas Evaluated and Results
Scenario--The scenario developed for this exercise was effective for
testing the integrated emergency response capability and exercise
preparations were well organized (Section P4.1).
Onsite Emergency Organization--Predesignated personnel with well defined
responsibilities promptly staffed the Emergency Response Facilities
(ERFs)(Section P4.2).
Emergency Classification System--The licensee had a standard system for
emergency classifications and used it to effectively classify the off
normal events. An Exercise Weakness was identified for failure to
promptly declare a Notification of Unusual Event (Section P4.3)
Notifications Methods and Procedures--The licensee demonstrated the
ability to make timely and concise initial and follow-up notifications
to the States and counties (Section P4.4).
Emergency Communications--Provisions existed for the prompt
communications among principal response organizations to emergency
personnel, and they were effectively used during the exercise to provide
timely information and coordinate emergency response (Section P4.5).
Public Education and Information--The Joint Information Center and its
staff were activated and functioned in a manner that provided for the
dissemination of coordinated and accurate information to the public via
the news media (Section P4.6).
2
Emergency Facilities and Equipment--ERFs were organized, equipped, and
maintained in a manner that provided for the emergency response
(Section P4.7).
Exercise Critique--The controller/evaluator organization conducted an
excellent critique process (Section P4.8).
Report Details
Summary of Exercise Events
This biennial emergency preparedness exercise included full participation by
the State of South Carolina and associated Risk Counties. The plume exposure
exercise was evaluated by an NRC inspection team and was conducted from
6:30 a.m. to 12:48 p.m. on November 18, 1997. Player critiques were conducted
by the licensee's emergency response participants in the Emergency Response
Facilities (ERFs) following termination of the exercise. The NRC exit meeting
was conducted on November 20. 1997. following the licensee's summary to
management of exercise results.
Plant Support
P4.
Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness (EP)
P4.1 Exercise Scenario
a. Inspection Scope (82302)
The inspectors reviewed the exercise scenario to determine whether
provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major
portion of the basic elements of the licensee's plan.
b. Observations and Findings
The licensee submitted its scenario scope and objectives for the H. B.
Robinson Steam Electric Plant (HBRSEP), Unit No. 2 Emergency
Preparedness Exercise to the NRC with a letter dated September 3, 1997.
The exercise scenario with controller information and simulation data
was submitted with a letter dated October 2, 1997. A review of the
package indicated that the scenario was adequate to exercise the onsite
and offsite emergency organizations of the licensee and provided
sufficient information to the State of South Carolina and local
government agencies for their participation in the exercise.
c. Conclusion
The scenario developed for this exercise was effective for testing the
integrated emergency response capability and exercise preparations were
organized.
P4.2 Onsite Emergency Organization
a. Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed the functioning of the onsite emergency
organization to determine whether the responsibilities for emergency
response were defined and whether adequate staffing was available to
respond to the simulated emergency.
2
b. Observations and Findings
The inspectors noted that the responsibilities for emergency response
were clearly defined. The Superintendent for Shift Operations in the
Control Room Simulator assumed the responsibilities as the Site
Emergency Coordinator (SEC) and managed the designated responsibilities
to include the call-out of personnel to staff the emergency response
facilities (ERFs). The personnel responding constituted Team A of an
emergency response organization (ERO) with four teams, each serving on a
duty week rotational basis. Team A's response exemplified a well
trained ERO by the performance observed during the exercise. Each of
the four teams participated in three integrated drills during 1997 which
included participation by different operating shifts in the Control Room
Simulator. The predesignated personnel responded and staffed the ERFs.
c. Conclusion
Well trained personnel assigned ERO responsibilities per a duty rooster
responded promptly. All positions were filled with personnel aware of
their predesignated responsibilities.
P4.3 Emergency Classification System
a. Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed selected emergency response personnel to
determine whether a standard emergency classification and action level
scheme was in use by the licensee.
b. Observation and Findings
The Emergency Procedure EPCLA-01. Emergency Control, provided
consolidated guidance for classifying emergencies from the Control Room
or Technical Support Center (TSC). The Emergency procedure EPCLA-02,
Emergency Action Level User's Guide, provided guidance on the use of
Emergency Action Levels (EALs) for classifying an emergency. A
Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) was declared at 8:10 a.m. due to a
fire in the protected area lasting greater than 10 minutes. This was a
correct classification according to the scenario, but it was not timely.
Specifically, the Fire Alarm reset time was 7:25 a.m. with a visual
confirmation of the fire at 7:38 a.m. Accordingly, the 10 minute fire
parameter was met by 7:48 a.m., 22 minutes before the NOUE declaration
was made and 32 minutes before the notification message was initiated.
This delayed NOUE declaration was identified as an exercise weakness.-
Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 50-216/97-13-01, The NOUE declaration was
not made timely when the EAL was exceeded. The licensee also identified
this issue in their critique process and initiated corrective action
during the week of the inspection. The remainder of the classifications
which occurred at the more significant levels of emergency declarations
3
were all made correctly and timely. Specifically, the Alert declaration
was also made from the CRS by the SEC at 8:59 a.m. based on the loss of
one fission product barrier breached (fuel fission product barrier),
with the other barriers intact. Both the Site Area Emergency (SAE) and
General Emergency (GE) declarations were made by the SEC in the TSC.
The SAE was declared at 10:02 a.m. based on two fission product barriers
breached (fuel and reactor coolant system). The GE was declared at
10:47 a.m. based on three fission product barriers breached.
c. Conclusion
The licensee had a standard system for determining emergency
classifications. The NOUE declaration was not timely and identified as
an Exercise Weakness. The more significant emergency classifications
were correct and timely.
P4.4 Notification Methods and Procedures
a. Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed the licensee's notification of State and local
governmental organizations and emergency personnel to determine whether
timely and substantive emergency information was provided in accordance
with procedures.
b. Observations and Findings
The initial emergency notifications to the State of South Carolina and
the county authorities were made within 15 minutes following the NOUE
declaration. Responsibility for offsite notifications was assumed by
the EOF when it activated. The notifications to the State and counties
were made promptly from the EOF. The licensee used a Emergency
Notification Form for State and local governments that was prepared via
computer, providing improved legibility and expediting the transmission
of information to those agencies.
The licensee's use of this system
was very effective in providing concise and informative event
descriptions to the offsite authorities. The system was also
effectively used for follow-up notifications.
c.
Conclusion
The licensee was very effective in providing timely and concise
information for the initial and follow-up notifications to the States
and counties.
4
P4.5 Emergency Communications
a. Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed the flow of communications within the emergency
response organization and from and between the ERFs to determine whether
provisions existed for the prompt transmission of emergency information.
b. Observation and Findings
The inspectors observed that the communications between the utility and
offsite agencies and amongst the ERFs were effective for the prompt
transmission of emergency information.
Responsible personnel were kept
informed of ongoing events and communicated effectively in performing
accident mitigation and initiating protective actions for both onsite
and offsite personnel.
c. Conclusion
Provisions existed for the prompt communications among principal
response organizations to emergency personnel, and they were effectively
used during the exercise to provide timely information and coordinate
emergency response.
P4.6 Public Education and Information
a. Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed how information concerning the simulated
emergency was made available to the public.
b. Observations and Findings
Carolina Power & Light (CP&L) activated its Joint Information Center
(JIC) at 9:50 a.m. at the CP&L Southern Region Complex, 1601 W. Lucas
Street, Florence, South Carolina. The licensee provided a total of 8
news releases during the exercise. The news releases were timely and
provided appropriate information regarding the emergency conditions.
c. Conclusions
The JIC and its staff were activated and functioned in a manner that
provided for the dissemination of coordinated and accurate information
to the public via the news media.
5
P4.7 Emergency Facilities and Equipment
a. Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed the activation, staffing, and operation of
selected ERFs to determine whether adequate emergency facilities and
equipment were available and maintained to support an emergency
response.
b. Observations and Findings
Control Room Simulator - An inspector observed that the on-shift
designated crew in the Simulator adequately responded to the off-normal
events. The facility and equipment supported the crew as they entered
the Emergency Plan and responded to the simulated emergency. .
Technical Support Center - The TSC was promptly staffed and activated
after the Alert declaration. Personnel arrived within minutes of the
Alert, and the TSC was fully activated within 44 minutes. Upon
activation, the TSC Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) assumed the
responsibility to classify emergency events from the CRS. The SEC. in
consultation with TSC staff, promptly and correctly classified the Site
Area and General Emergencies.
The inspectors observed that the TSC staff worked well as a team to
identify degrading plant conditions that would warrant upgrading the
emergency classification. The coordination between the SEC and the SRO
in the utilization of the emergency action level flowcharts for
emergency classification purposes was effective overall.
The SEC was observed to exercise effective command and control and
conducted briefings that were consistently clear, thorough, and
sufficiently frequent. Each briefing was announced well in advance to
allow TSC personnel an opportunity to prepare. All key functional
managers in the TSC participated in the emergency briefings and assisted
in revising TSC mission priorities as emergency conditions changed. TSC
staff worked well together to determine effective mitigating actions
with good technical analysis and conservative decision making.
Operational Support Center (OSC) - The OSC was activated in accordance
with procedures and in a timely manner. The staffing was noted to be
adequate and the activities initiated by the OSC were proactive.
Periodic briefings were conducted and were found to be descriptive of
the ongoing problems. The layout of the OSC provided for the dispatch
of damage control teams in a timely manner. Habitability and
contamination assessments were periodically conducted in the OSC.
6
Emergency Operations Facility - Staffing of the EOF began promptly after
the declaration of the Alert classification. At 9:32 a.m., a detailed
turnover briefing began with the Control Room, TSC. and EOF. At
9:43 a.m. (44 minutes after the Alert declaration), the EOF was declared
activated by the Emergency Response Manager (ERM). The ERM provided
concise and informative briefings to the staff on a periodic basis, and
maintained excellent command and control of facility operations.
Personnel staffing the EOF were knowledgeable concerning their emergency
responsibilities. Key EOF positions were provided computer terminals
with access to the Emergency Response Facility Information System
(ERFIS). which allowed for the real-time display and trending of
simulated plant data. In general, equipment and supplies available in
support of the licensee's response to the simulated emergency were
superior and represented the "state of the art" in emergency response
technology. Noise levels in the EOF were moderate, and never impeded
the function of the facility.
c. Conclusion
ERFs were organized, equipped in many cases with superior "state of the
art" equipment, and maintained in a manner that provided for very
effective emergency response.
P4.8 Exercise Critique
a. Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed the facility critiques immediately following the
exercise and portions of the controller/evaluator organization critique
process to determine whether weaknesses noted in the licensee's
emergency response organization were formally presented to licensee
management.
b. Observations and Findings
The licensee conducted adequate player critiques following exercise
termination. The controller and evaluator staff also conducted a
detailed review of observations made during the exercise. Each
deficiency noted by the evaluator staff was well defined with proposed
corrective action, an assigned responsibility and proposed due date.
The licensee used a low threshold for identifying deficiencies in
performance resulting in the issuance of nine Condition Reports.
7
c. Conclusion
The controller/evaluator organization conducted an excellent critique
process, with a low threshold for identifying deficiencies.
V. Management Meetings
X1
Exit Meeting Summary
The Team Leader presented the inspection summary to members of licensee
management following the licensee's critique on November 20, 1997. The
summary indicated above average performance. The one negative observation
concerned the NOUE declaration in paragraph with the exception of the
exercise weakness identified in paragraph P4.3.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSON CONTACTED
Licensee
J. Adams, Shift Technical Assistant
C. Baker. Administrative Assistant to Vice President
L. Baxley, Radiation Control Supervisor
R. Barnett, Maintenance Superintendent
D. Burriss. Senior Analyst
A. Carly, Communications Manager
S. Collins. Radiation Control Supervisor
D. Edwards, Engineering Technician
M. Gann. Project Analyst
H. Goddard, Senior Support Analyst
T. Hodges. Support Analyst
R. Howell, Project Analyst
G. Johnson, Supervisor. Emergency Preparedness
E. Jones. Project Accountant
A. Lucas, Emergency Preparedness Senior Analyst
L. Lynch. Maintenance Supervisor
J. Moyer. Plant General Manager
T. Natale. Manager, Training
P. Odom. Project Analyst
R. Pierce. Project Analyst
T. Pilo. Radiation Supervisor
J. Rudick. Project Accountant
B. Steele, Superintendent. Work Coordinator
W. Stover. Relief Superintendent of Shift Operations
R. Warden. Manager Nuclear Assessment Section
T. Wilkerson, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 82301:
Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors
IP 82302:
Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED
Opened
50-261/97-13-01
IFI
Exercise Weakness - The NOUE declaration was not
timely made when the EAL was exceeded (Section P4.3).
Attachment (15 pages):
Scope and Objectives. Narrative
Summary and Timeline
Mr. L. A. Reyes
Attachment to Serial: RNP-RA/97-0193
Page 3 of 11I
2.0
Scope
Mission and Purpose of Exercise
The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate portions of Carolina Power and Light Company
emergency response capabilities and other elements of H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant
(HBRSEP) Unit No. 2 Radiological Emergency Plan and associated implementing procedures
in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulation 10CFR50.47(b).
A simulated accident at the HBRSEP will involve planned response actions to include
emergency classification; notification of offsite organizations; notification of plant personnel;
augmentation of personnel (normal work day); activation of emergency response facilities
including the Joint information Center (JIC); and the dispatching of plant Damage Control
teams.
Exercise Schedule
A. Participant Briefing
November 17, 1997 @ 10:00
HBRSEP Information Center
B. Final Controller Meeting
November 17, 1997 @ 14:00
EOF/TSC Room 412
C. Exercise (Plume)
November 18, 1997 @ 06:30-13:00
D. Facility Critique
At the conclusion of the exercise
E. Lead Evaluator Critique
November 19, 1997 @ 09:00
HBRSEP Administration Building Room 216
F. CP&L Critique
November 20, 1997 @ 14:00
HBRSEP Information Center
G. NRC Exit
Date and time to be determined
HBRSEP Information Center
H. Participant Critique
November 20, 1997 @ 13:00
Darlington County Emergency Operation Center,
1625 Harry Byrd Highway
Darlington, S. C. 29532
I. Public critique
November 20, 1997 @ 14:00
Darlington County Emergency Operation Center,
.1625 Harry Byrd Highway
Darlington, S. C. 29532
Mr. L. A. Keyes
Attachment to Serial: RNP-RA/97-0193
Page 4 of 11
Exercise Scope Participation
Participation by Organization
Participants
Extent of participation
Notify
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Steam Electric
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CP&L Corporate
Communications
x
Darlington, Lee.
aNCiterfield
Counuies
Florence County
_
State of South
X
X
Carolina
NRC Resident
X
NRC Operations
X
Center
NRC Region 11
X
Inspectors
HoCSitl
X
Response Team
__
X
__
Fire Department.
X
Emergency
X
Medical Services
Hospital
X
-__
__
__
Agreement
X
Physician
Media
x***
Full activation of the site NRC resident will be determined by the resident.
FTS-2000 will be used and the NRC will be given the opportunity to participate. If NRC is not
participating, then CP&L will provide a simulated NRC contact.
An invitation will be extended to local area media to participate as mock media and/or to observe.
Attachment to Serial: RNP-RA/97-0193
Page 5 of 11
Participation by Facilit
Facilities
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Operations Support
X
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Center
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Technical Support
X
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Center
_
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1
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Emergency
X
X
Operations Facility
Joint Information
X
X
Center
CP&L Corporate
X
X
Communications
State Mobile Lab
X
X
Hospital
X
Forward
Emergency
X*
X*
Operations
Center
Darlington. Lee,
and Chesterfield
X
X
Counties
Florence County
X
X
State Emergency
X
X
Operation
Center
I
- The FEOC will be used as a base of operations by the Department of Health and Environmental Control
Attachment to Serial: RNP-RA/97-0193
Page 6 of 11
Participation by Non-CP&L Organizations
Activities
Extent of Panicipation
Frequency
Time
Source
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Evacuation
X
X
X
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Access Control
X
X
X
X
Use of KI
X
X
X
X
Fire Department
X
Emergency
Medical
X
Services
Ambulance
Contamination
X
Control
Hospital
Contamination
X
Control
Agreement
Physician to
X
Site
News Release
X
X
X
X
Press
X
X
X
X
Conference
Attachment to Serial: RNP-RA/97-U193
Page 7 of 11
Participation by CP&L
Activities
Extent of Participation
Frequency
Time
Source
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Accident Assessment
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EAL Clasification
x__
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X
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Notification
X
x
x__
X
___
x
Accountability
X
___
X
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X
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Evacuation
X
___
X
___
XX
Protective Area Acctess
X
X
X
X
Control
I
I
I
Use of Dosimetry
X
X
X
X
Use of KI
X
X
X
X
Use of Protective Clothing
X
X
X
X
Use of SCBA
X
X
X
X
Use of Respirators
X
X
X
X
Source Term
X
X
X
X
Determination
Dose Assessment
X
X
X
X
Offsite Protective Action
X
X
X
X
Recommendation
Fire Brigade
X
X
X
X
First Aid Team
X
Decontamination
X
Security
X
X
X
X
PASS Sample
X
X
X
X
Other Samples
X
X
X
X
Lab Analysis
X
X
X
X
Onsite Surveys
X
X
X
X
Offsite Surveys
X
X
X
X
Press Conference
X
X
X
X
Media Calls
X
X
X
X
News release
X
X
X
X
Rumor Control
X
X
X
X
Recovery
X
Mr. L. A. Reyes
Attachment to Serial: RNP-RA/97-0193
Page 8 of 11
The following is a definition of terms found in the tables in the preceding pages
1.
Participation
A.
Extent of Participation:
Not Involved - These groups will not participate. They may or may not be simulated
by controllers as necessary.
Limited - Participation is limited to less than full participation. Evaluations by
controllers will not penalize participants on items caused by the limited participation.
Full Participation - A full staff is expected to participate in the facilities involved.
Controllers - Will be used to simulate organizations not participating.
Evaluators - Will evaluate the exercise.
Observers - Outside organizations have requested to send observers to the areas
checked.
Simulated - Where controllers are not used to simulate an organization that is not
participating, the entire interface with the non-participating organization is simulated.
B.
Notify:
Actual - Notification methods and procedures are used to notify the participating
organization.
Simulated - The organization is not actually notified by procedure. The notification
may be made to an artificial number with a controller staged to receive the
information, or it may be simulated.
Start/Finish - Notifications will be at the start and finish of an exercise and not
continual updates.
C.
Activation:
Actual - Actual activation may involve notifying the emergency organization members
at their work place and home, and set up of the facility is performed by the
participants.
Pre-staged - The affected personnel may be in place or in a nearby place on standby
when the initial notification to begin activation is received.
2.
Facilities
Mr. L. A. Reyes
Attachment to Serial: RNP-RA/97-0193
Page 9 of 11
A.
Staffing:
Not Activated - No one reports to the facility.
Single Shift - Each position is expected to be staffed by a primary or alternate
designee. No shift turnover is expected or required, but individual turnovers are
acceptable if unavoidable schedule conflicts occur.
Multiple Shift - A shift turnover is required to meet exercise objectives.
Augmentation - An augmentation drill progressing from the on-shift complement to an
activated emergency response organization is performed.
B.
Setup:
Simulated - Setup of the facility is simulated.
Actual - Participants are expected to set up their facilities from everyday use to
emergency use.
Pre-staged - Setup of the facility is already pre-staged in the emergency mode.
Alternate - Where available, an alternate facility will be used.
3.
CP&L and Non-CP&L Activities
A.
Extent:
Not Tested - This activity is not within the scope and objectives.
Simulated - This activity is not within the scope and objectives, but it must be
simulated by the participants and/or controllers to assure a complete and logical
exercise.
Partial - This activity is expected to be performed to the extent that plant completion
can permit. Evaluators will not penalize participants for non-performance of activities
where they must be simulated due to circumstances beyond their control; for example,
lab analyses may involve participants in the lab using props instead of actual
equipment.
Full - This activity is expected to be performed in full without simulation. For
example, full use of SCBAs and protective clothing means donning the clothing and
equipment and using the breathing air.
B.
Frequency:
Mr. L. A. Reyes
Attachment to Serial: RNP-RA/97-0193
Page 10 of 11
One Time - This activity can be demonstrated one time to the evaluators in order to
fulfill exercise objectives.
Every Time - This activity must be performed every time as required by the conditions
in response to the scenario. The evaluators, when available, will observe each time the
activity is performed.
Specific Time - Where an activity is pre-staged or constrained by the scenario, such as
for offsite fire participation, a specific time will be built into the scenario for the
activity.
C.
Time:
Real Time - The activity is performed by the participants in response to the scenario
for as long as it takes.
Compressed Time - Some activities take so long, such as analysis of field collected
samples in the mobile laboratory, that time must be compressed to complete that
activity within the exercise schedule.
D.
Source:
Participants - The driving force behind the activity will be participant response to the
scenario. No messages will be handed out to participants to initiate the action.
Scenario - Driving force for initiating the activity will be a message handed to the
participant from the controller.
Mr. L. A. Reyes
Attachment to Serial: RNP-RA/97-0193
Page 11 of 11
Section 3.0 Objectives
Itei#
Obj. #
il
fiRObjectives for the1997 Biennial ExefciLksT1
RE1
1
7
Demonstrate the ability to provide a representative to the State Emergency
Operations Center/Forward Emergency Operations Center (SEOC/FEOC) (when
activated) and County Emergency Operations Center (EOCs).
2
8
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate radiological monitoring and analysis.
3
9
Demonstrate the ability to identify and properly classify events using appropriate
procedures, plant system parameter values, and the Emergency Action Levels
(EALs).
4
10
Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify, and mobilize Emergency Response
Organization (ERO) personnel.
5
11
Demonstrate the ability to make initial emergency notification to State and
Chesterfield, Darlington, and Lee County Warning Points or EOCs within 15
minutes following declaration of each emergency classification.
6
12
Demonstrate the ability to make follow-up notifications to State and Chesterfield,
Darlington, and Lee County Warning Points or EOCs within 60 minutes following
initial and change of classification notifications.
7
13
Demonstrate the ability to formulate protective action recommendations and
transmit to State and County personnel.
8
14
Demonstrate the ability to communicate with State and County personnel using
primary and backup communication systems. *
9
16
Demonstrate the ability to communicate between the Control Room (CR),
Technical Support Center (TSC), Emergency Operations Facility (EOF),
Operational Support Center (OSC), Joint Information Center (JIC), and
Environmental Monitoring teams.
10
17
Demonstrate the ability to communicate with the NRC within 60 minutes following
each emergency classification declaration.
11
18
Demonstrate the ability to activate the JIC and interface with the news media.
12
19
Demonstrate the ability to provide a Corporate spokesperson and timely
dissemination of information to the news media.
13
20
Demonstrate the ability to deal with rumors.
14
21
Demonstrate the ability to obtain data from meteorological, hydrologic, seismic,
radiological monitors, and sampling devices.**
15
22
Demonstrate the ability to obtain samples and analyze data from the Post Accident
Sampling System (PASS) and other post accident monitoring equipment.
16
23
Demonstrate the ability to determine the source term and magnitude of releases.
17
24
Demonstrate the ability to project dosage to the public, from the ingestion pathway,
based on plant and field data.
18
29
Demonstrate the ability to provide ERO personnel protective clothing, respiratory
protection, dosimetry, and radioprotective drugs. This also includes determination
of doses received and maintenance of dose records 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day.
19
39
Perform a critique at the conclusion of an exercise to evaluate the ability of
organizations to respond as required.
Only primary communications will be used unless an actual failure occurs.
No Hydrologic or seismic monitors will be used.
H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit No. 2
Biennial Exercise
November 18, 1997
Narrative Summary and Timeline
Note
This exercise wvill include an Ingestion Pathway Zone (IPZ) demonstration, with full
participation by the State and County agencies. The exercise will be conducted with the
simulator in interactive mode. AII times (except the start of the release) are for planning
purposes and may vary due to the response of the operators.
The scenario begins at 0630 in the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant (HBRSEP) Unit No. 2
Simulator with the unit at 100 percent power, middle of core life and in a 245 day continuous
run. Charging Pump "A" is running initially, this unit will experience problems with the suction
stabilizer relief later. "A" Emergency Diesel Generator is out of service for a six month
mechanical inspection . Work is ongoing, but could be complete in two hours if a decision is
made to restore the diesel generator.
At approximately 0645, the Simulator Control Room will receive a call from Murray and Trettel
(Meteorological Company) informing them that a severe weather system is rapidly approaching.
High winds, heavy rain, hail, and severe lightning may accompany this front. With the passing
of the front, moderate winds and clear skies can be expected.
At 0700, this storm engulfs the plant site with severe lightning and heavy winds gusting to 30
miles per hour. A lightning strike in the switch yard occurs, and is noted by security personnel at
approximately 0702. Subsequent investigations near the center (B phase) Main Transformer will
reveal debris from the ground cable ceramic insulators and charring of the cable. This cable runs
down a separate transmission tower just south of the transformer. These items confirm the
lightning strike and provide the basis for future electrical problems.
At 0711, the firealarm for the 4160 Room is received due to a small fire on the supply breaker
(52/20) from the Auxiliary Transformer to 4KV Bus 4&5. The fire and damage is strictly
limited to this supply breaker. Since this is a small fire, it is not anticipated that off site support
will be requested, however, if so this will be simulated. The fire brigade will be dispatched to
the scene, but thick smoke and heat from the breaker cubicle make further inspection difficult.
After approximately 12 minutes, around 0730, the fire will go out and smoke will begin to clear.
Also at 0730, "D" Instrument Air Compressor begins making a loud metallic noise which should
trigger shutdown of the compressor.
An UNUSUAL EVENT should be declared at approximately 0730 due to the fire lasting greater
than 10 minutes in the protected area. It is not anticipated that the Emergency Response
Facilities will be activated, but discretionary activation is possible. Upon termination of the fire a
team should be dispatched to trouble shoot and repair the cause of the fire. Damage assessment
may begin after this time.
2
At 0735; a Loose Parts Monitoring System (LPMS) alarm will occur due to impacts in the upper
region of the reactor vessel. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) activity begins to increase as fuel
damage occurs. The letdown radiation monitor, R-9, begins to trend upward at 0745.
At 0800, an intercooler relief on the Primary Air Compressor begins to lift. This failure may be
isolated and corrected by a repair team. Instrument Air Compressors "A" and "B" will remain
available throughout the scenario, however, loss of "D" Instrument Air Compressor may increase
the priority of this repair.
After approximately thirty minutes R-9 will have increased greater than 5000 mR. This exceeds
the Emergency Action Level (EAL) for declaring the fuel fission product barrier breached.
Conditions for an ALERT will be met, and at approximately 0830 an ALERT should be
declared. The State and Counties will be notified, beepers will be initiated and all on site
Emergency Response Facilities will be requested to activate at this time. During this same time,
the Control Room will note the following indications for the Containment Vacuum Relief
Valves:
Valve
Indication
Actual Position
V-12-12
Dual
Closed
V-12-13
Dual
Closed
A multi-discipline team, or mission if the OSC is activated, should be dispatched to determine if
a release path to the environment exists. The outer relief valve will be found closed, thus no
pathway is available. Indication problems are caused by faulty limit switches which will need to
be replaced. Other indications of lightning strike damage will include "B" Circulating Water
Pump trip and 4KV AC ground alarms on Bus 4 will flash in at various-times.
At 0930, a 90 gallon per minute (gpm) primary to secondary RCS leak will be initiated in "B"
Steam Generator (SG). This will breach the second fission product barrier. Loss of 2 fission
product barriers meets the conditions required for a SITE AREA EMERGENCY. At
approximately 0945, a SITE AREA EMERGENCY should be declared.
Shortly after declaration of the SITE AREA EMERGENCY, a loud, high pitched noise will
begin as the "A" Charging Pump suction stabilizer relief begins to lift. This adds approximately
10 gpm to the leakage from the RCS (100 gpm total) and may be repaired, if attempted.
At 1015 the RCS leak will ramp to 250 gpm. Later, at 1045, a secondary Power Operated Relief
Valve (PORV) on "B" Main Steam Line (monitored by radiation monitor R-3 I B) will open to
start the OFF-SITE RELEASE. This is the failure of the final fission product barrier.
About 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after turbine trip, at approximately I 100, the turbine zero speed alarm will be
received in the Simulator Control Room. However, the turbine does not automatically go on the
turning gear. This will be indicated by status lights on the turbine control panel and an alarm on
the Control Room alarm panel.
A GENERAL EMERGENCY should be declared based on the loss of three fission product
barriers at approximately 1100. Shortly before the PORV lifts the magnitude of the fuel failure
will increase. The will further confirm the GENERAL EMERGENCY classification. From
1030 until 1215 all actions to repair the PORV will not succeed. The release will continue while
the Control Room cools down and depressurizes the RCS to mitigate the release.
At approximately 13)00, contingent on demonstration of off site objectives, the exercise will be
terminated. After a short break a critique will be conducted in each CP&L facility.
4
'EvlitDes
'
T=0
0630
IC-13
Reactor Power
100%
Time in Core Lile
MOL
Turbine Load
740 Mwe
Rod Height
CD-D 218 Steps
Tave
575 degrees F.
RCS Pressure
2236 psig
Xenon:
Equilibrium
Boron Concentration 630 ppm
Days on line
245
"A" EDG
OOS for 6
month inspection
"A" Charging Pump operating
T=15
0645
The Simulator Operations Crew
assumes the watch
Call From Murray & Trettel
(Meteorologists) about weather
conditions.
T=32
0702
- Lightning strike reported to the
Dispatch AD to investigate noise.
Control Room.
- "D" Instrument Air (IA)
Possible Mechanical Team dispatch to investigate.
Compressor making loud noise.
T=41
0711
IRF FPS125 (None 0) Actuate
Fire alarm, Zone 29, due to fire
Review EALs.
on 4kv bus 4&5 breaker 52/20
T=48
0718
Approximate time for Fire Tech.
Fire Brigade Response
or Team Leader at scene.
T=58
0728
Approximate time for the
UNUSUAL EVENT to be
declared due to fire lasting more
than 10 minutes in the Protected
Area
5
TTm'Cock
4~Een t Dsr
o
T=60
0730
From panel mimics APP-009 C-4,
4KV Bus 4 Ground,
4KV SWITCHGEAR GROUND
approximate time fire out
ORP XNO9CO4 (None 00)
Alarm On
T=65
0735
RCT02 @.001 ramp in 1000 sec
LPMS alarm on the upper core.
Possible PASS mission and increase in Radiological
From panel mimics APP-036 1-4,
monitoring of the Aux building
ORP XN36104 (None 00)
AlarmOn
AoIsTA/System Engineer mission to LIMS
T=75
0745
RCTO2i.003 ramp in 1000 sec
- Increase in RCS activity due to
Failed Fuel
- R-9 begins to trend upward
T=90
0800
Primary Air Compressor relief
Dispatch AO, Possible Mechanical1eam
begins to lift.
T=95
0805
RCT02 @.005 ramp in 1000 sec
Increase in RCS activity due to
Possible PASS mission
Failed Fuel
T= 120
0830
From panel mimics APP-009 C-4,
- Approximate time for ALERT
Activate on site facilities.
4KV SWITCIGEAR GROUND
to be declared.
ORP XN09CO4 (None 00)
- 4KV Bus 4 Ground.
Alarm _On
T=125
0835
From panel mimics ORP
Vacuum relief valve (V-12-12 &
Damage Control Mission to inspect Vacuum Relief
XI)DO0881
(None 00) On
V-12-13) dual indication given.
Valves (V-12-12 and V12-13)
ORP XDDO088D (None 00) On
Circulating Water Pump "B"
IMF CWSOIB (None 00) Ok
trip.
T=180
0930
IMF SGNO21 (None 00) 75
Primary to secondary leakage of
Review EALs
75 gpm in "B" SG.
T=195
09'15
SITE AREA EMERGENCY
Activate Joint Information Center,
to be declared due to the loss of
Simulate Site Evacuation
two fission Product Barriersta
6
4e50
T=210
1000
MMF SGNO2L (None 00) 85
"A" Charging Pump Suction
Possible AO sent to investigate loud squeal coming
Stabilizer Relief lilts, adds 10
from Charging Pump Room.
gpm to RCS leak rate.
Possible Mechanical Mission.
T=225
1015
IMF SGNO2E (None 00) 250
Primary to secondary leakage to
increase to 250 gpm in "B" SG
T=240
1030
IMF TURI3 (Nonc 00) 0k
Turbine at zero speed, turbine
Possible Mechanical Mission
does not go on turning gear.
T=255
1045
IMF MSS04B (None 00) 100
"B" Main Steam Line PORV
Review EALs.
Damage Control Mission to repair PORV
opens, OFF SITE RELEASE
to begins, PORV to remain open
for at least I hour.
T=270
1100
GENERAL EMERGENCY
Declared due to the loss of three
Fission Product Barriers
T=390
1300
Terminate the exercise
Inform Control Room to make announcement
P
i=405
1315
Critique in eachs acility.
7