ML14028A150

Initial Exam 2013-301 Final Simulator Scenarios

ML14028A150
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	01/28/2014
From:	NRC/RGN-II
To:	Duke Energy Carolinas
References
50-369/13-301, 50-370/13-301
Download: ML14028A150 (190)

Text

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Final (Rev_01 0413)

Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

1 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions:

The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: Pzr PORV 1 NC-32B has been isolated (per AP-il) due to leakage through its seat.

ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11 ACTION A.

1 EMF27, SM Line D/Outer Doghouse Radiation Monitor, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-8, E 2, GROUNDWATER HI LEVEL, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating). The crew will perform PT/i /A/4600/0O1, RCCA Movement Test upon taking the shift.

Event MaIf.

Event Type*

Event No.

No.

Description 1

LOA C-RO RCCA Withdrawal Test/i C3 HDP Trip HWO12 C-SRO 2

PLP C-BOP RCS High Activity due to Crud Burst 089 C(TS)-SRO 3

REM C-BOP Letdown Valve 1 NV-35A fails CLOSED NVOO35A C-SRO 4

PLP C-RO Electrical Grid Voltage Oscillations 014 C-SRO 5

NA N(TS)-SRO Real Time Contingency 6

LOA R-RO IPB Fan Failure/Rapid Downpower IPBOO1 1P8002 N-SRO REM M-RO MSIV Closure/Steam Generator Tube Rupture SMOO7AB SGOOiA M-SRO 8

EPOO1 NA Loss of Off-Site Power 9

RNOO3A NA Failure of 1A RN Pump to Auto Start 10 REM NA 1NC-36B Fails to OPEN NCOO36B (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Final (Rev_01 0413)

McGuire 2013 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: Pzr PORV 1 NC-32B has been isolated (per AP-i 1) due to leakage through its seat.

ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11 ACTION A.

1 EMF27, SM Line D/Outer Doghouse Radiation Monitor, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-8, E 2, GROUNDWATER HI LEVEL, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating). The crew will perform PT/i /A/4600/001, RCCA Movement Test upon taking the shift.

Shortly after taking the watch, the crew will perform PT/i /A/4600/00i, RCCA Movement Test.

During the course of the surveillance, the 1C3 Heater Drain Pump will trip. The operator will restore any individual rod bank to its initial position, place control rods in manual (and/or AUTO), and use the Control Room Expectation Manual, to immediately reduce Turbine load as needed to maintain Rx power less than pre-transient condition.

As a result of the plant transient, a Crud Burst will occur and 1 EMF48, Reactor Coolant Water Radiation Monitor, will alarm.

The operator will respond in accordance with ARP1RAD-2/C-3, 1EMF 48 Reactor Coolant Hi Rad, and implement AP/i/A15500/18, High Activity in Reactor Coolant. The operator will raise Letdown flow at the request of Chemistry and address Technical Specification 3.4.16, RCS Specific Activity.

Next, 1 NV-35, Variable Flow Letdown Orifice Isolation Valve, will fail Closed.

The operator will enter AP/i/AJ5500/12, Loss of Letdown, Charging or Seal Injection, and establish Excess Letdown.

Subsequently, electrical disturbances cause grid voltage to drop to 216 Ky.

The operator will respond in accordance with AP/i/A/5500/05, Generator Voltage and Electrical Grid Disturbances, and make adjustments of Main Generator voltage.

Shortly afterwards, TCC will call and report that Real Time Contingency Analysis indicates that 230KV Switchyard Voltage would not be adequate should Unit 1 trip. The operator will go to Enclosure 3 (RTCA Actions with Unit One On-line), and enter Technical Specification 3.0.3, Applicability.

The operator will also need to evaluate Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources Operating.

While implementing Enclosure 3, both IPB Fans will fail.

The crew will respond in accordance with ARP1AD-il/J5, IPB AIR FLOW TROUBLE, and perform a rapid downpower in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/04, Rapid Downpower.

During the downpower, the 1A MSIV will fail CLOSED. The transient will result in a 300 gpm SGTR in the 1A Steam Generator. The crew will manually trip the reactor. Shortly after the reactor trip a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) will occur, and both Emergency Diesel Generators will start and repower Busses 1 ETA and 1 ETB. The crew will enter EP/i/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to EP/1/A15000/ES-0.i, Reactor Trip Response.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Final (Rev_01 0413)

When the crew recognizes that Safety Injection will be required, the crew will manually actuate SI and return to E-O.

Upon SI Actuation the 1A RN Pump will fail to start automatically, and the operator will need to manually start this pump.

Upon completion of E-O, the crew will transition to EPI1IAI5000IE-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

Because of the LOOP the NCS cooldown will need to be accomplished using the Steam Generator PORVs on the intact Steam Generators.

During the NCS depressurization, Pressurizer PORV 1 NC-36B will fail to OPEN, and the operator will be required to open Pressurizer PORV 1 NC-34A to depressurize the plant.

The scenario will terminate at Step 22.c of E-3, after the crew has closed the Cold Leg Isolation Valves from the NV System.

Critical Tasks:

E-3A Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs.

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of AP between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs.

Upon a loss of \\P, the crew must transition to a contingency procedure that constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy.

If the crew fails to isolate steam from the SG, or feed flow into the SG the ruptured SG pressure will tend to decrease to the same pressures as the intact SGs, requiring a transition to a contingency procedure, and delaying the stopping of RCS leakage into the SG.

E-3C Depressurize the NCS to meet SI termination criteria before the Quality of the steam exiting the SG exceeds 80% (.8 on Void Fraction SGINFO_1. cts).

Safety Significance:

Failure to stop the reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates the mitigation of the event.

It also constitutes a significant reduction of Safety Margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

If RCS depressurization does NOT occur, the inventory in the secondary side of the ruptured SG will occur leading to water release through the SG PORV or Safety Valve, which could cause and unisolable fault in the ruptured SG.

PROGRAM:

McGuire Operations Training MODULE:

Initial License Operator Training Class 29 TOPIC:

NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N13-1-l

REFERENCES:

1.

AP/l/A1550011 1, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies (Rev 1 1) 2.

Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV5)

(Amendment 221 /203) 3.

PT/1/A/4600/OO1, RCCA Movement Test (Rev 46) 4.

Control Room Crew Expectations Manual (Rev 8/8/12) 5.

OP/1/A16100/O1OR Annunciator Response for Panel 1RAD-2 (Rev 38) 6.

AP/1 /A/5500/1 8, High Activity in Reactor Coolant (Rev 4) 7.

OP/1/A/62001001 A, Chemical and Volume Control System Letdown (Rev 49) 8.

Technical Specification 3.4.16, RCS Specific Activity (Amendment 266/246) 9.

AP/1/A/5500/12, Loss of Letdown, Charging or Seal Injection (Rev 24)

10. AP/1/A15500/05, Generator Voltage and Electrical Grid Disturbances (Rev 11)

11. Technical Specification 3.0.3, Applicability (Amendment 238/220)

12. Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources Operating (Amendment 221/203)

13. OP/1/6100/010LAnnunciator Response for Panel 1RAD-2 (Rev 73)

14. AP/1/A15500/04, Rapid Downpower (Rev 24)

15. EP/1/AJ5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev 33)

16. EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response (Rev 34)

17. EP/1/A15000/E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture (Rev 23)

Validation Time: 145 minutes Author:

David Lazarony, Western Technical Services, Inc.

Facility Review:

Rev. 110413

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

1 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions:

The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: Pzr PORV 1 NC-32B has been isolated due to leakage through its seat.

ACTION has been taken to comply with Technical Specifications.

1 EMF27, SM Line D/Outer Doghouse Radiation Monitor, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-8, E-2, GROUNDWATER HI LEVEL, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating). The crew will perform PT/1/A/4600/001, RCCA Movement Test upon taking the shift.

Event Malt.

Event Type*

Event No.

No.

Description 1

LOA C-RO RCCA Withdrawal Test/i 03 HDP Trip HWO12 C-SRO 2

PLP C-BOP RCS High Activity due to Crud Burst 089 C(TS)-SRO 3

REM C-BOP Letdown Valve 1 NV-35A fails CLOSED NVOO35A C-SRO 4

PLP C-RO Electrical Grid Voltage Oscillations 014 C-SRO 5

NA N(TS)-SRO Real Time Contingency 6

LOA R-RO IPB Fan Failure/Rapid Downpower IPBOO1 N-BOP IPBOO2 N-SRO 7

REM M-RO MSIV Closure/Steam Generator Tube Rupture SMOO7AB M-BOP SGOO1A M-SRO 8

EPOO1 NA Loss of Off-Site Power 9

RNOO3A NA Failure of 1A RN Pump to Auto Start 10 REM NA 1 NC-36B Fails to OPEN NCOO36B (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 McGuire 2013 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

Pzr PORV 1 NC-32B has been isolated due to leakage through its seat.

ACTION has been taken to comply with Technical Specifications.

1 EMF27, SM Line D/Outer Doghouse Radiation Monitor, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-8, E-2, GROUNDWATER HI LEVEL, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating). The crew will perform PT/1/A14600/001, RCCA Movement Test upon taking the shift.

Shortly after taking the watch, the crew will perform PT/1/A14600/001, RCCA Movement Test.

During the course of the surveillance, the 1C3 Heater Drain Pump will trip.

The operator will restore any individual rod bank to its initial position, place control rods in manual (and/or AUTO),

and use the Control Room Expectation Manual, to immediately reduce Turbine load as needed to maintain Rx power less than pre-transient condition.

As a result of the plant transient, a Crud Burst will occur and 1 EMF48, Reactor Coolant Water Radiation Monitor, will alarm. The operator will respond in accordance with ARP1 RAD-2/C-3, 1EMF 48 Reactor Coolant Hi Rad, and implement AP/11A15500/18, High Activity in Reactor Coolant.

The operator will raise Letdown flow at the request of Chemistry and address Technical Specification 3.4.16, RCS Specific Activity.

Next, 1 NV-35, Variable Flow Letdown Orifice Isolation Valve, will fail Closed. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/12, Loss of Letdown, Charging or Seal Injection, and establish Excess Letdown.

Subsequently, electrical disturbances cause grid voltage to drop to 216 KV. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/05, Generator Voltage and Electrical Grid Disturbances, and make adjustments of Main Generator voltage.

Shortly afterwards, TCC will call and report that Real Time Contingency Analysis indicates that 230KV Switchyard Voltage would not be adequate should Unit 1 trip.

The operator will go to (RTCA Actions with Unit One On-line), and enter Technical Specification 3.0.3, Applicability.

The operator will also need to evaluate Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources Operating.

While implementing Enclosure 3, both IPB Fans will fail. The crew will respond in accordance with ARP1AD-11/J5, IPB AIR FLOW TROUBLE, and perform a rapid downpower in accordance with AP/1 /A15500/04, Rapid Downpower.

During the downpower, the 1A MSIV will fail CLOSED.

The transient will result in a 300 gpm SGTR in the 1A Steam Generator.

The crew will manually trip the reactor.

Shortly after the reactor trip a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) will occur, and both Emergency Diesel Generators will start and repower Busses 1 ETA and 1 ETB. The crew will enter EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to EP/1/A15000/ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.

When the crew recognizes that Safety Injection will be required, the crew will manually actuate SI and return to E-0. Upon SI Actuation the 1A RN Pump will fail to start automatically, and the operator will need to manually start this pump.

Upon completion of E-0, the crew will transition to EP/1/A15000/E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

Because of the LOOP the NCS Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 cooldown will need to be accomplished using the Steam Generator PORVs on the intact Steam Generators.

During the NCS depressurization, Pressurizer PORV 1 NC-36B will fail to OPEN, and the operator will be required to open Pressurizer PORV 1 NC-34A to depressurize the plant.

The scenario will terminate at Step 22.c of E-3, after the crew has closed the Cold Leg Isolation Valves from the NV System.

Critical Tasks:

E-3A Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs.

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of AP between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. Upon a loss of AP, the crew must transition to a contingency procedure that constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy.

If the crew fails to isolate steam from the SG, or feed flow into the SG the ruptured SG pressure will tend to decrease to the same pressures as the intact SGs, requiring a transition to a contingency procedure, and delaying the stopping of RCS leakage into the SG.

E-3C Depressurize the NCS to meet SI termination criteria before the Quality of the steam exiting the SG exceeds 80% (.8 on Void Fraction SGINFO_1. cts).

Safety Significance:

Failure to stop the reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates the mitigation of the event.

It also constitutes a significant reduction of Safety Margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

If RCS depressurization does NOT occur, the inventory in the secondary side of the ruptured SG will occur leading to water release through the SG PORV or Safety Valve, which could cause and unisolable fault in the ruptured SG.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q

Sim. Setup Rod Step On Q

Reset to Temp IC 258 T =0 Malfunctions (From IC-39):

(Originally 39).

Close 1 NC32B (Pzr PORV 1 NC-32B leaking)

Close 1 NC31 B (Pzr PORV Block Valve)

Close 1 NC271 (PORV Drain Isolation) insert MAL-EMF-27 = 0.1 (1EMF27 Failure) insert OVR-1AD8_E02 = ON (MCB Annunciator 1 AD8/E2)

From IC-258 Per Lesson Plan 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 1 insert MAL-RNOO3A=AUTO, no delay/ramp (1 A RN Pump Auto Start Failure) insert REM-NC-0036B = 0.0 no delay/ramp (Pzr PORV 1 NC-36B fails to OPEN) insert MAL-EPOO1 ACTIVE cd=X01_099_2 EQ 1 (Blackout triggered off of Reactor Trip Breaker OPEN light)

Q RUN Place Tagout)O-Stick on:

Pzr PORV 1 NC-32B (0-stick)

Reset all SLIMs 1EMF27 (0-stick)

MCB Annunciator 1AD-8, E-2 (0-stick)

Q Update Status Board, NOTE: RMWST DO = <1000 ppb.

Setup OAC Q

Freeze.

Q Update Fresh Tech.

Spec. Log.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 D

Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Fill out the AOs Available section of Shift Turnover Info.

Q Prior to Crew RUN Briefing Q

Crew Briefing 1.

Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements 2.

Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3.

Provide crew with a copy of PT/11N46001001 marked up for scenario as follows:

Step 7.1 initialed.

Step 8.1 Initialed.

Step 8.2 initialed.

Step 8.3 NA initialed.

Note prior to Step 12 checked.

Step 12.1 Checkbox checked.

Step 12.2 initialed.

Step 12.3 NA initialed.

Step 12.4 Person Notified is John Weber.

Step 12.5 Section 12.6 Checkbox is checked.

4.

Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

5.

Retain a copy of OP/i /A16200/OO1A which will need to be provided to the crew during Event 2.

Q T-O Begin Familiarization Period Q

At direction of Execute Lesson Plan examiner for Simulator Scenario N13-1-1.

Q At direction of Event 1 RCCA Withdrawal Test/i C3 HDP Trip examiner insert LOA-HWO12 =

Racked_Out insert H_X13_059_3=1 Conditional to HWO12 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q

At direction of Event 2 RCS High Activity due to Crud Burst examiner insert PLP-089 = 300 NOTE: This malfunction requires 4 minutes to build in, prior to the first indication.

Q At direction of Event 3 Letdown Valve 1 NV-35A fails CLOSED examiner insert REM-NVOO35A =

0.0 Ramp = 10 seconds Q

At direction of Event 4 Electrical Grid Voltage Oscillations examiner insert PLP-014=480 delay=0 ramp=120 seconds Q

At direction of Event 5 Real Time Contingency examiner Q

At direction of Event 6 IPB Fan Failure/Rapid Downpower examiner insert LOA-IPBOO1 =

OFF insert LOA-IPBOO1 =

OFF Q

At direction of Event 7 MSIV Closure/Steam Generator Tube Rupture examiner insert REM-SMOO7AB

0.0 Ramp = 10 seconds insert MAL-SGOO1A

300 delay=20 ramp=60 seconds Q

Post-Rx Trip Event 8 Loss of Off-Site Power This malfunction will occur on Reactor Trip.

Q Post-SI Act Event 9 Failure of 1A RN Pump to Auto Start This malfunction will occur on Safety Injection actuation.

Q Post-SI Act Event 10 1NC-36B Fails to OPEN This malfunction will occur on Safety Injection actuation.

Q Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

1 Page 8

of 65 Event

Description:

RCCA Withdrawal TestIiC3 HDP Trip Shortly after taking the watch, the crew will perform PT/1/A14600/OO1, RCCA Movement Test.

During the course of the surveillance, the 103 Heater Drain Pump will trip. The operator will restore any individual rod bank to its initial position, place control rods in manual (and/or AUTO), and use the Control Room Expectation Manual, to immediately reduce Turbine load as needed to maintain Rx power less than pre-transient condition.

Booth Operator Instructions:

WHEN SD Bank B has been inserted 10 steps insert LOA-HWO12 = Racked_Out (See Page 10)

Indications Available:

Turbine starts to lower.

OAC Alarm 1 HW45, 103 Heater Drain Tank Hi Level Dump Not Closed 103 HDP Green status light is LIT.

103 HDP amps indicates 0 Time pa.

RO RO A

Ir,.I..:.....

A.pi.LeU IiiLI1JI I1 Del PT/i /N4600/00i, RCCA MOVEMENT TEST (Step 12.6) Rod Movement Surveillance in Modes 1 or 2 (Step 12.6.1) IF AT ANY TIME it becomes necessary to move rods to stabilize the plant, complete the following:

Comments NOTE: The RO will perform this ACTION after the secondary plant transient occurs.

RO (Step 12.6.2) Record position of Shutdown Bank A demand step counters.

• (Step 12.6..2.1) Select SDA with CRD Bank Select. (Pause between each bank selected).

• (Step 12.6.1.1) Restore any individual bank to initial position.

. (Step 12.6.1.2) Select MANUAL with CRD Bank Select.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

9 of 65 Event

Description:

1 Event#

N 13-1 Scenario #

1 Page RCCA Withdrawal TestIlC3 HDP Trip

• (Step 12.6.2.2) Check lit GRP NOTE: The AC will contact SELECT C on the following:

IAE.

Booth Instructor: as IAE, acknowledge, and report that required lights are LIT.

. Power Cabinet 2AC AC

• Power Cabinet 1AC

• (Step 12.6.2.3) IF Rod Control Cabinet GRP SELECT C dark,_stop...

• (Step 12.6.2.4) Insert rods at least 10 steps as shown on demand step counters.

• (Step 12.6.2.5) IF required to reposition rods due to misalignment....

• (Step 12.6.2.6) Check each individual rod responded to control signal by checking position against DRPI and CAC DRPI and record data on 3.1 (Control Rod Drive Movement Data Sheet).

• (Step 12.6.2.7) Restore rods to position recorded in Step 12.6.2 and check individual rods follow demand.

RC (Step 12.6.3) Record position of Shutdown Bank B demand step counters.

• (Step 12.6.3.1) Select SDB with CRD Bank Selecr

• (Step 12.6.3.2) Check lit GAP NOTE: The RO will contact SELECT C on the following:

IAE.

Booth Instructor: as IAE, acknowledge, and report that required lights are LIT.

• Power Cabinet 2BD

• Power Cabinet 1 BD

• (Step 12.6.3.3) IF Rod Control Cabinet GAP SELECT C dark...

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

1 Page 10 of 65 Event

Description:

RCCA Withdrawal Test/1C3 HDP Trip Time Pos.

Expected Actions/Behavior

• (Step 12.6.3.4) Insert rods at least 10 steps as shown on demand step counters.

Comments Booth Operator Instructions:

AFTER the RO has inserted Shutdown Bank B 10 steps into the core, insert LOA-HWO1 2 = Racked_Out RO CONTROL ROOM CREW EXPECTATIONS MANUAL Transient load changes: Manual is preferred immediately reduce 2OMWe and then reduce as needed to maintain Rx power less than pre-transient condition. After the initial 20 MWe load reduction, it is preferred that the operators use multiple and diverse indications to determine how much more load should be reduced. TPBE on the OAC updates once per minute. Other indications (PR meters and Delta T meters) will indicate reactor response more quickly and will enable the operators to control the plant even more precisely. (This combines the Operator Fundamentals of Conservatism and Controlling Plant Evolutions Precisely).

NOTE: The RO will restore any individual rod bank to its initial position, place control rods in manual (and/or AUTO).

NOTE: The crew may diagnose an overpower condition and adjust turbine load per the Crew Expectation Manual.

NOTE: The CRS may dispatch a AO to investigate the HDP.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AC, and report Pump is stopped and hotter than the others.

If the crew investigates further and dispatches an AC to Switchgear, acknowledge as AC, and report A Breaker Overcurrent relay has operated.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

1 Page 11 of 65 Event

Description:

RCCA Withdrawal TestIlC3 HDP Trip lime; Pos.

ExpectedActions/Behavior At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Examiner Note: The Event 2 malfunction requires 4 minutes to build in, prior to the first indication.

Comments NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the HDP.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

2 Page 12 of 65 Event

Description:

RCS High Activity due to Crud Burst As a result of the plant transient, a Crud Burst will occur and 1 EMF48, Reactor Coolant Water Radiation Monitor, will alarm.

The operator will respond in accordance with ARP1RAD-2/C-3, 1EMF 48 Reactor Coolant Hi Rad, and implement AP/1/A15500/18, High Activity in Reactor Coolant. The operator will raise Letdown flow at the request of Chemistry and address Technical Specification 3.4.16, RCS Specific Activity.

Booth Operator Instructions:

insert PLP-089 = 300 (This Malfunction requires 4 minutes to build in, prior to the first indication.)

Indications Available:

1EMF-48inTRIP2 Subsequently, 1EMF-18 in TRIP 2 MCB Annunciator 1 RAD-2/C-3 1 EMF 48 REACTOR COOLANT HI RAD MCB Annunciator 1RAD-3/C-3 1EMF 18 REACTOR COOLANT FILTER 1A Time Pos.

Expected Actions/Behavior CRS (Step 1) Go To AP/1IA/55001018 (High Activity in Reactor Coolant).

(Step 2) Notify Chemistry.

NOTE: The BOP may address either or both AR Ps, prior to entering AP18.

OP/1/N6100/010 R, ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE FOR PANEL 1RAD-2 C-3, 1EMF 48 REACTOR COOLANT HI RAD (Step 3) Notify RP.

Comments NOTE: The CRS will enter AR-18.

OP/1/N6100/010 S, ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE FOR PANEL 1RAD-3 D-3, 1EMF 18 REACTOR COOLANT FILTER 1A CRS (Step 1) If an expected alarm or testing in progress, no further action required.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

2 Page 13 of 65 Event

Description:

RCS High Activity due to Crud Burst Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 2) IF a valid alarm:

NotifyRP.

IF conditions warrant, evacuate area.

Monitor area EMFs.

CRS (Step 3) IF primary system leak,...

NOTE: There is no NC System leak.

CRS (Step 4) IF high activity in reactor coolant, go to API1IA/55001018 (High Activity in Reactor Coolant).

CRS (Step 5) IF NC filter high radiation,...

NOTE: The CRS will enter AP 18.

API1IA/5500/18, HIGH ACTIVITY IN REACTOR COOLANT BOP (Step 1) Place one Outside Pressure Filter NOTE: The CRS may assign train in service PER Enclosure 1 the BOP to perform this action.

(Pressurizing the Control Room).

If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 1.

Other Examiners follow AP18 Actions, Step 2, on Page 15.

API1IN5500/18, HIGH ACTIVITY IN REACTOR COOLANT ENCLOSURE 1, PRESSURIZING THE CONTROL ROOM BOP (Step 1) Pressurize Control Room using Examiner NOTE: Follow the Outside Air Pressure Fans as follows:

actions associated with if BOP is assigned by CRS to perform.

Ensure at least one of the following groups of air intake valves are OPEN:

Unit 1 air intake valves:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

2 Page 14 of 65 Event

Description:

RCS High Activity due to Crud Burst Time Pos..

Expected Actions/Behavior OR 1VC-1A (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol From Unit 1) 1VC-2A (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol From Unit 1) 1VC-3B (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol From Unit 1) 1VC-4B (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol From Unit 1)

Unit 2 air intake valves:

1VC-9A (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol From Unit 2) 1VC-1OA (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol From Unit 2) 1VC-11B (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol From Unit 2) 1VC-12B (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol From Unit 2)

Comments BOP (Step 5) Depress OFF for the following:

CRA-OAD-4 (CR Area Otsd Fans Dam per)

CRA-OAD-3 (CR Area Otsd Fans Damper)

BOP BOP BOP (Step 2) IF A train VC/YC selected, THEN place A TRAIND CR OUTSIDE AIR PRESS FAN to ON.

(Step 3) IF B train VC/YC selected, THEN place B TRAIN CR OUTSIDE AIR PRESS FAN to ON.

(Step 4) Depress MAN for the following:

I

1. 1 CRA OUTSD AIR FAN

1. 2 CRA OUTSD AIR FAN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

2 Page 15 of 65 Event

Description:

RCS High Activity due to Crud Burst Time Pos.

BOP/

AC CR5 CRS Expected ActionslBehavior Comments AP111N5500118, HIGH ACTIVITY IN REACTOR COOLANT (Step 2) Check 1 NV-i 27A (LID Hx Outlet 3-Way Temp Cntrl)

ALIGNED TO DEMIN.

(Step 3) Check Dose Equivalent Iodine

PREVIOUSLY DETERMINED TO EXCEED ACTION LEVEL 3 LIMIT PER NSD 306, NUCLEAR FUEL RELIABILITY.

(Step 3 RNO) GO TO Step 5.

Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE.

CRS (Step 5) Determine cause of high activity as NOTE: The CRS may call follows:

WCC/Chemistry to address the cause of high activity.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCCIChem istry.

As Chemistry (Time Compression) report that you suspect a Crud Burst, but DEl is 1.2.icIgm.

Request Chemistry to check decontamination factor of mixed bed dem ineralizer.

Notify Chemistry to perform an NC Booth Instructor System isotopic analysis to determine if As Chemistry (Time high activity is from a crud burst or failed Compression) report that you ue.

suspect a Crud Burst, but DEl is 1.2 icIgm.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

2 Page 16 of 65 Event

Description:

RCS High Activity due to Crud Burst Expected Actions/Behavior (Step 6) IF AT ANY TIME it is determined that high activity is from crud burst, THEN raise letdown flow to 120 GPM PER OP/l/A/62001001 A (Chemical and Volume Control System Letdown), Enclosure 4.5 (Establishing Maximum Normal Letdown).

Floor Instructor: Provide a previously prepared copy of OPI1IAJ6200IOO1A to BOP after BOP locates Simulator Copy of procedure.

Comments NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

NOTE: The CRS may assign the BOP to perform this action.

If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 4.5.

Other Examiners follow AP18 Actions, Step 7, on Page 18.

0P111N6200/OO1 A, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM LETDOWN ENCLOSURE 4.5, ESTABLISHING MAXIMUM NORMAL LETDOWN Examiner NOTE: Follow the actions associated with.5 if BOP is assigned by CRS to perform.

CRS/

(Step 3.1) Evaluate all outstanding R&Rs NOTE: The CRS/BOP may BOP that may impact performance of this call WCC to address the procedure.

R&Rs.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC, and report none.

BOP (Step 3.2) Notify RP that Letdown is being NOTE: The CRS/BOP may changed and may affect dose rates in call WCC/RP to address affected areas.

letdown flowrate change.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RP.

BOP (Step 3.3) IF Cation Bed Demineralizer is NOTE: The Cation Bed service,...

Demineralizer is NOT in service.

Time Pos.

BOP

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

2 Page 17 of 65 Event

Description:

RCS High Activity due to Crud Burst Tirtie Pos.

BOP BOP Expected Actions/Behavior (Step 3.4) Evaluate NC Filter tP prior to increasing letdown flow.

(Step 3.5) Perform the following sections applicable:

Section 3.6, Increasing Normal Letdown to less than or equal to 120 gpm using 1 NV-459 (Variable liD Orifice Outlet Flow Cntrl)

Comments NOTE: The BOP may contact the AO to evaluate filter £P.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report P normal (5-15 psid),

and acceptable to raise flow.

BOP (Step 3.6) Increasing Normal Letdown to less than or equal to 120 gpm using 1 NV-459 (Variable LID Orifice Outlet Flow Cntrl)

BOP IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to manually control charging flow, place 1 NV-238 (Charging Line Flow Control) in manual.

BOP IF AT ANY TIME it is desired, place 1 KC 132 (Ui LD Hx KD OtIt Temp Cntrl) manual loader to manual and control temperature as required.

BOP IF 1NV-459 (Variable LID Orifice Outlet NOTE: 1NV-459 is in service.

Flow Cntrl) NOT in service...

BOP Place 1NV-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) in manual.

BOP Adjust 1NV-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) to reduce letdown pressure to 150-250 psig.

BOP Perform the following concurrently:

Slowly open 1 NV-459 ((Variable LID Orifice Outlet Flow Cntrl) increasing letdown flow to desired flow rate.

Adjust 1NV-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) to maintain letdown pressure less than 500 psig.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

2 Page 18 of 65 Event

Description:

RCS High Activity due to Crud Burst 1ime Pos.

BOP BOP Expected Actions/Behavior Adjust 1 NV-241 (Seal Injection Flow Control) to maintain NC Pump Seal Injection flow.

IF NC System at normal operating temperature and pressure, adjust 1 NV-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) to maintain 200-375 psig letdown pressure.

Ensure 1NV-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) setpoint at actual letdown pressure.

Place 1NV-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) in auto.

IF NC System at reduced temperature and pressure,...

IF 1NV-238 (Charging Line Flow Control) in manual,...

Ensure 1KC-132(U1 LDHxKCOtIt Temp Cntrl) manual loader adjusted to desired setpoint and in auto.

BOP BOP NOTE: NC System is at normal operating temperature and pressure.

NOTE: NC System is at normal operating temperature and pressure.

NOTE: 1NV-238 is in AUTO.

Comments AP/1/A15500/18, HIGH ACTIVITY IN REACTOR COOLANT CRS (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME it is determined NOTE: The high activity is that high activity is from failed fuel,...

NOT from failed fuel.

CRS (Step 8) Notify Radwaste to ensure VCT H2 purge flow is established.

CRS (Step 9) REFER TO Tech Spec 3.4.16 (RCS Specific Activity).

Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-l Scenario #

1 Event #

2 Page 19 of 65 Event

Description:

RCS High Activity due to Crud Burst CRS (Step 10) WHEN station management NOTE: This is a Continuous determines Control Room pressurization no Action. The CRS will make longer required, THEN secure PER both board operators aware.

OP/i /A/6450/01 1 (Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water System), Enclosure 4.4 (Control Room Atmosphere Pressurization During Abnormal Conditions).

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.16, RCS SPECIFIC ACTIVITY CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION Examiner NOTE: The CRS ACTION TIME will determine that ACTION A A. DOSE A.1 Verify Once per4 must be entered.

EQUIVALEN DOSE hours T 1-131 not EQUIVALE within limit.

NT 1-131 6OpCiIgm.

AND A.2 Restore DOSE EQUIVALE NT 1-131 to within limit.

48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

CRS CRS CRS LCO 3.4.16 The specific activity of the reactor coolant shall be within limits.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, and 2.

ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

3 Page 20 of 65 Event

Description:

Letdown Valve 1 NV-35 fails CLOSED

Next, 1 NV-35, Variable Flow Letdown Orifice Isolation Valve, will fail Closed.

The operator will enter AP/1/A15500/12, Loss of Letdown, Charging or Seal Injection, and establish Excess Letdown.

Booth Operator Instructions:

insert REM-NV0035A = 0.0 (Ramp = 10 seconds)

Indications Available:

Letdown flow (1 NVP5530) indicates 0 gpm.

1 NV-35A Green status light is LIT.

Pzr Level trending upward.

Charging flow (1 NVP5630) starts to lower.

Time Pos.

Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS will enter AR-12.

AP/1/N5500112, LOSS OF LETDOWN, CHARGING OR SEAL INJECTION CRS (Step 3) Stop any power or temperature changes in progress.

BOP BOP (Step 1) Check if charging is aligned to Regenerative Hx as follows:

Charging flow GREATER THAN 20 GPM 1 NV-241 (Ui Seal Water Inj Flow Control)

THROTTLED OPEN 1 NV-244A (Ui Charging Hdr Cont Outside Isol)

- OPEN 1NV-245B (Ui Charging Hdr Cont Outside Isol)

OPEN.

(Step 2) Check Pzr Level LESS THAN 96%,

NOTE: The BOP may take MANUAL control of 1 NV-238 to control Charging flow.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

3 Page 21 of 65 Event

Description:

Letdown Valve 1 NV-35 fails CLOSED Time Pos.

RO/

BOP CRS BOP BOP Expected Actions/Behavior (Step 4) Announce occurrence on paging system.

(Step 5) IF this AP entered due to loss of letdown only, THEN GO TO Step 37.

(Step 37) Ensure the following valves are CLOSED:

1 NV-458A (Ui 75 GPM L.D Orifice OtIt Cont Isol) 1NV-457A (Ui 45 GPM LiD Orifice Otlt Cont Isol) 1 NV-35A (Ui Variable LID Orifice OtIt Cont Isol).

(Step 38) Ensure NC System makeup controller is auto.

Comments NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 AC.

BOP (Step 42) Operate Pzr heaters as follows:

Check A, B, and D Pzr heater group supply breakers on vertical board

CLOSED.

Check normal Pzr spray AVAILABLE.

BOP BOP BOP (Step 39) Ensure charging flow going down to maintain Pzr at program level.

(Step 40) Check LETDN RELIEF HI TEMP alarm (1AD-7, 1-4)

HAS REMAINED DARK.

(Step 41) Check 1 NV-2iA (Ui NV Supply to Ui Aux PZR Spray Isol)

CLOSED.

NOTE: The BOP may take MANUAL control of 1 NV-238 to control Charging flow.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

3 Page 22 of 65 Event

Description:

Letdown Valve 1 NV-35 fails CLOSED Time Pos.

BOP CRS Expected Actions/Behavior Place the following Pzr heater groups in manual and ON to maximize spray flow:

• A

.8

• D (Step 43) Check the following valves

OPEN:

1NV-1A (Ui NC LID Isol To Regenerative Hx) 1NV-2A (Ui NC LID Isol To Regenerative Hx).

(Step 44) GO TO Step 49.

Comments BOP (Step 49) Establish normal letdown as NOTE: Although attempts will follows:

be made, Normal Letdown will NOT be able to be established.

Ensure 1NV-459 (Ui Variable LID Orifice Outlet Flow Cntrl) is CLOSED.

Place 1NV-124 (Ui Letdown Press Control) in manual with output between 40-45% OPEN.

Check OAC IN SERVICE.

Check valve position on OAC for 1 NV-124 INDICATING THROTTLED.

Check the following valves OPEN:

1NV-1A(Ui NC L/D lsolTo Regenerative_Hx) 1NV-2A(U1 NC L/D IsolTo Regenerative_Hs).

Establish cooling to Regenerative Hx by performing the following concurrently:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

3 Page 23 of 65 Event

Description:

Letdown Valve 1 NV-35 fails CLOSED Pos.

Expected Actions/Behavior Establish at least 65 GPM charging flow by THROTTLING OPEN 1NV-238 (Ui Charging Hdr Control) or raising PD pump speed.

THROTTLE 1 NV-241 (Ui Seal Water lnj Flow Control) to establish approximately 8 GPM seal injection flow to each NC pump.

OPEN letdown line isolation valves as follows:

OPEN 1NV-7B (Ui Letdown Cont Outside Isol).

OPEN 1NV-iA(Ui NC LID IsolTo Regenerative Hx).

OPEN 1 NV-2A (Ui NC LID Isol To Regenerative Hx).

OPEN 1 NV-35A (Ui Variable LID Orifice OtIt Cont Isol).

Comments NOTE: The BOP will take MANUAL control of 1NV-238 to control Charging flow.

NOTE:

1 NV-35A cannot be opened.

BOP (Step 52) Establish excess letdown as fol lows:

Adjust charging to minimum while NOTE: The BOP will take maintaining the following:

MANUAL control of 1 NV-238 to control Charging flow.

NC pump seal injection flow greater that 6 GPM Pzr level at program level.

IF AT ANY TIME excess letdown cannot be established, THEN observe Note prior to Step 53 and GO TO Step 53 to establish letdown using Ax Vessel Head Vents.

OPEN the following valves:

CRS (Step 49g RNO) GO TO Step 52 NOTE: Although attempts will be made, Normal Letdown will NOT be able to be established.

Time

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

3 Page 24 of 65 Event

Description:

Letdown Valve 1 NV-35 fails CLOSED Time Post Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 1KC-315B(U1 ExcessLJDHxKC Ret Hdr Cont Otsd Isol).

1KC-305B (Ui KC To Excess LID Hx Cont Outside Isol).

BOP Ensure 1NV-27B (Ui Excess LID Hx Outlet 3-Way Cntrl) selected to VCT position.

OPEN 1NV-26B (Ui Excess LiD Hx Outlet Cntrl Wait 2 minutes.

CLOSE 1NV-26B (Ui Excess LID Hx Outlet Cntrl).

Check the following valves OPEN:

1NV-94AC (Ui NC Pumps Seal Water Return Cont Inside Isol) 1 NV-95B (Ui NC Pumps Seal Water Return Cont Outside Isol).

OPEN 1 NV-24B (1 C NC Loop To Excess LID Hx Iso!).

OPEN 1 NV-25B (1 C NC Loop To Excess LID Hx Isol).

Check the following:

Reactor - CRITICAL 1 NV-27B ALIGNED TO VCT.

RO Closely monitor reactor response once excess letdown is in service.

Slowly OPEN 1 NV-26B while maintaining excess letdown Hx temperature less than 200°F.

CRS GO TO Step 52.r.

Notify Primary Chemistry that excess NOTE: The CRS may call letdown is in service.

Chemistry.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry.

Adjust charging flow as desired while maintaining the following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario#

1 Event#

3 Page 25 of 65 Event

Description:

Letdown Valve 1 NV-35 fails CLOSED Time Pos Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NC pump seal injection flow greater than 6 GPM Pzr level at program level.

Operate Pzr heaters as desired.

BOP WHEN time allows, THEN notify NOTE: The CRS may call engineering to document the following Engineering.

transients:

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Engineering.

Letdown isolation Potential charging nozzle transient IF NV Aux Spray was in service...

Check 1 NV-27B (Ui Excess LID Hx Outlet 3-Way Cntrl)

ALIGNED TO VCT.

IF AT ANY TIME VCT level needs to be NOTE: This is a Continuous lowered....

Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

WHEN normal letdown available...

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

WHEN desired to isolate excess NOTE: This is a Continuous letdown...

Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

RETURN TO procedure and step in effect.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the failed valve.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

4 Page 26 of 65 Event

Description:

Electrical Grid Voltage Oscillations Subsequently, electrical disturbances cause grid voltage to drop to 216 KV.

The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/AJ5500/05, Generator Voltage and Electrical Grid Disturbances, and make adjustments of Main Generator voltage.

Booth Operator Instructions:

insert PLP-014 = 480, delay=0 ramp=120 (Grid Disturbance)

Indications Available:

OAC Alarm: Ui GENERATOR X PHASE AMPS OAC Alarm: Ui GENERATOR Y PHASE AMPS OAC Alarm: Ui GENERATOR Z PHASE AMPS OAC Alarm: 230 KV Y BUS VOLTS OAC Alarm: 230 KV R BUS VOLTS Main Generator MVARs rise to outside of Generator Capability Curve MCB Annunciator 1AD-i/C-5, EXCITATION LIMITER IN ACTION Time Pose Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP/11N5500/05, GENERATOR VOLTAGE AND ELECTRICAL GRID DISTURBANCES CRS (Step 1) Announce occurrence on page.

NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

CRS (Step 3) Notify Unit 2 to evaluate Floor Instructor: As U2 RO, implementing AP/2/A/5500/05 (Generator acknowledge.

Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances).

CRS (Step 2) Ensure dispatcher is aware of problem.

NOTE: The CRS/BOP will contact SOC.

Booth Instructor: as SOC, acknowledge.

As SOC, Booth Instructor report Electrical Grid voltage disturbances are occurring.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

4 Page 27 of 65 Event

Description:

Electrical Grid Voltage Oscillations Check OAC IN SERVICE.

Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 4) Check Unit 1 Generator TIED TO GRID.

CRS (Step 5) IF AT ANY TIME reactor power is NOTE: This is a Continuous greater than 100%, THEN reduce turbine Action. The CRS will make load to maintain reactor power less than both board operators aware.

100%.

RO (Step 6) Check Unit 1 Generator frequency-GREATER THAN 58.5 Hz.

RO (Step 7) Monitor Generator Capability Curve NOTE: The RO or BOP will as follows:

most likely place Curve on OAC Screen.

Check Generator voltage LESS THAN NOTE: The Generator voltage 24 KV.

will be 22.7 Ky.

Monitor Generator Capability Curve PER OAC turn on code GENCAP.

RO (Step 8) Check Generator MVARs WITHIN NOTE: The MVARs will NOT LIMITS OF GENERATOR CAPABILITY be within the capability curve.

CURVE.

CRS (Step 8 RNO) GO TO Step 11.

RO (Step 11) Adjust MVARs to within the capability curve by performing one of the following:

Depress LOWER on the VOLTAGE NOTE: This adjustment will ADJUST to reduce lagging MVARs.

NOT be effective at controlling MVARs.

OR Depress RAISE on the VOLTAGE ADJUST to reduce leading MVARs.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

4 Page 28 of 65 Event

Description:

Electrical Grid Voltage Oscillations Time Pos RO AC AC CRS AC Expected Actions/Behavior (Step 12) Check Generator MVARs WITHIN LIMITS CF GENERATOR CAPABILITY CURVE.

Comments NOTE: The MVARs will NOT be within the capability curve.

(Step 12 RNO) IF actions in Step 11 do not restore MVARs, THEN perform the following:

IF voltage regulator in AUTO, THEN perform the following:

Place voltage regulator in MAN.

Adjust MVARs to within the capability curve.

curve, IF unable to maintain MVAR5 within NOTE: The MVARs will be able to be adjusted with the Voltage Regulator in MANUAL.

(Step 13) Monitor Generator frequency as follows:

CRS (Step 16 RNC) GO TO Step 20.

Check generator frequency BETWEEN 59.9 60.1 Hz.

IF AT ANY TIME generator frequency is abnormal OR TCC/SOC reports abnormal grid frequency condition, THEN GO TO Step 13d.

GCTOStep16.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

(Step 16) Check if voltage regulator malfunction has occurred:

Generator MVARs FLUCTUATED WITHOUT A KNOWN GRID DISTURBANCE IN EFFECT OAC turn on code MAINGEN INDICATES PROBLEM WITH VOLTAGE REGULATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR COMMON TROUBLE alarm (lAD-i, D-4)

- LIT.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

4 Page 29 of 65 Event

Description:

Electrical Grid Voltage Oscillations Real Time Contingency Analysis (RTCA) indicated that switchyard voltage would not be adequate should the unit I.

OR OR OR Time Pos.

Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 20) Check if TCC or SOC has reported any of the following:

Real Time Contingency Analysis (RTCA) indicates that switchyard voltage would not be adequate if further crid deqradation occurs.

Red grid condition exists or is predicted within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Degraded 230 KV switchyard (grid)

NOTE:

if NOT already done, voltage or frequency condition exists.

As SOC, Booth Instructor report Electrical Grid voltage disturbances are occurring.

CRS (Step 21) Notify Work Window Manager or NOTE: The CRS may call STA to perform the following in electronic risk WCC to address the Voltage assessment tool:

regulator fai lure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

CRS (Step 22) Evaluate rescheduling work on the NOTE: The CRS will following equipment during degraded grid determine that there are no condition time frame:

effects on this equipment.

Enter PRA code OSSA_GRID for expected duration of event.

Evaluated results.

Emergency D/Gs Vital or Aux Control Power Systems SSF equipment

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

4 Page 30 of 65 Event

Description:

Electrical Grid Voltage Oscillations Time Pos.

CRS RO CRS/

RO Expected Actions/Behavior (Step 23) Evaluate the following:

Stopping any ongoing surveillance testing.

Stopping any ongoing maintenance activities.

Returning systems to normal/functional status.

(Step 24) Check Unit 1 Generator TIED TO GRID.

(Step 25) IF AT ANY TIME TCC reports that Real Time Contingency Analysis (RTCA) indicates 230 KV switchyard (grid) voltage would not be adequate should Unit 1 trip, THEN GO TO Enclosure 3 (RTCA Actions with Unit One On-line).

Comments NOTE: The CRS will determine that there are no activities or tests that need to be stopped. The CRS may call WCC on expediting 1 EMF27 Radiation Monitor return to normal.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

CRS (Step 27) WHEN conditions return to normal, NOTE: This is a Continuous THEN perform the following:

Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Check Generator frequency HAS REMAINED GREATER THAN 58.5 HZ.

Check Unit 1 Generator TIED TO GRID.

Ensure Unit 1 Generator Bus Voltage is adjusted PER Data Book, Enclosure 4.3, Table 3.1.3, Generator Voltage Operating Schedule, including any operational restrictions.

CR5 (Step 26) IF AT ANY TIME offsite power is inoperable, THEN REFER TO the following Tech Specs:

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

4 Page 31 of 65 Event

Description:

Electrical Grid Voltage Oscillations Time Pos.

Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS Exit this AP.

NOTE: The GAS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

NOTE: It is possible that the crew will initiate a down power to clear the high Generator Amperage alarms on the OAG.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

5 Page 32 of 65 Event

Description:

Real Time Contingency Shortly afterwards, TCC will call and report that Real Time Contingency Analysis indicates that 230KV Switchyard Voltage would not be adequate should Unit 1 trip. The operator will go to Enclosure 3 (RTCA Actions with Unit One On-line), and enter Technical Specification 3.0.3, Applicability.

The operator will also need to evaluate Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources Operating.

Booth Operator Instructions:

As TCC, call and report that Real Time Contingency Analysis indicates that 230KV Switchyard Voltage would not be adequate should Unit 1 trip.

Indications Available:

NA Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments AP111A15500105, GENERATOR VOLTAGE AND ELECTRICAL GRID DISTURBANCES ENCLOSURE 3, RTCA ACTIONS WITH UNIT ONE ON-LINE BOP (Step 1) Check 1 ETA and 1 ETB BOTH SUPPLIED FROM UNIT OFFSITE POWER.

CRS!

(Step 2) Start a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> timer from time of BOP receiving notification from TCC that switchyard voltage (grid) is degraded.

CRS (Step 3) Enter L.C.O 3.0.3, due to both trains of ECCS inoperable (Tech Spec 3.5.2).

Comply with L.C.O 3.0.3, but minimize NOTE: The CRS will prepare the load reduction during the first three for the load reduction, but hours. (reducing load aggravates the grid delay this action.

disturbance).

CRS (Step 4) Declare both Unit 1 offsite power sources inoperable per Tech Spec 3.8.1.

NOTE: The CRS will implement Continuous Action Step 25 of AP5, and perform of AP5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

5 Page 33 of 65 Event

Description:

Real Time Contingency Tame Pos Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS (Step 5) IF the normal power source is inoperable for trains of shared systems (shared RN valves, VC,YC,VA), THEN perform the following:

Enter L.C.O 3.0.3 for RN, VC, YC, and AC Sources (Tech Specs 3.7.7, 3.7.9, 3.7.10,_3.8.1).

Comply with L.C.O 3.0.3, but NOTE: The CRS will prepare minimize the load reduction during for the load reduction, but the first three hours. (reducing load delay this action.

aggravates the grid_disturbance).

Enter appropriate required action for VA (Tech_Spec_3.7.11).

Notify Regulatory Compliance to NOTE: The CRS may call evaluate requesting a NOED (Notice of Regulatory Compliance to Enforcement Discretion) due to loss of address the RTCA.

normal power source to shared systems.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Regulatory Compliance.

IF operable offsite power source becomes available, THEN evaluate realigning shared systems to operable source.

Examiner NOTE: The assessment of LCO 3.0.3 and 3.8.1 may be delayed until after the exam.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3, APPLICABILITY CRS LCO 3.0.3 When an LCO is not met and the associated ACTIONS are not met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the associated ACTIONS, the unit shall be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable. Action shall be initiated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to place the unit, as applicable, in:

MODE 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />; MODE 4 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />; and MODE 5 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

5 Page 34 of 65 Event

Description:

Real Time Contingency Tine Pos.

CRS Expected Actions/Behavior Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.

Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation in accordance with the LCO or ACTIONS, completion of the actions required by LCO 3.0.3 is not required.

LCO 3.0.3 is only applicable in MODES 1,2,3, and 4.

CRS Two diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power Systems; Examiner NOTE: The CRS will determine that the LCO 3.0.3 ACTION must be entered.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 38i, AC SOURCES - OPERATING CRS LCD 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:

Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power System; and AND The automatic load sequencers for Train A and Train B shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 CRS ACTIONS Comments

Appendix D Operator Action Form ESD-2 Time Pos.

Expe Led Actions/Be 35 of 65 Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

5 Page Event

Description:

Real Time Contingency vior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME CRS A. One offsite A.1 Perform SR 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> circuit 3.8.1.1 for AND inoperable.

OPERABLE offsite circuit.

Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter AND A.2 Declare required 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> form feature(s) with no discovery of no offsite power offsite power to available ne train inoperable when concurrent with its redundant inoperability of required redundant feature(s) is required inoperable, feature(s)

AND A.3 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> offsite circuit to OPERABLE AND status.

6 days form discovery of failure to meet LCO C. Two offsite C.1 Declare 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> from Examiner NOTE: The CRS circuits required discovery of will determine that ACTION A inoperable, feature(s)

Condition C inoperable when concurrent with

& C of LCO 3.8.1 must be its redundant inoperability of entered.

required redundant feature(s) is required inoperable, feature(s)

AND C.2 Restore one 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.

After Evaluation of Technical Specification 3.8.1, or at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, move to Event #6.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

6 Page 36 of 65 Event

Description:

IPB Fan Failure/Rapid Downpower While implementing Enclosure 3, both IPB Fans will fail.

The crew will respond in accordance with ARP1AD-11/J5, IPB AIR FLOW TROUBLE, and perform a rapid downpower in accordance with API1IAI5500/04, Rapid Downpower.

Booth Operator Instructions:

Insert LOA-IPBOO1 and IPBOO2 = OFF Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator 1AD1 1/1-5; IPB TROUBLE MCB Annunciator 1AD1 1/J-5; IPB AIR FLOW TROUBLE OAC Alarm 1A IPB Blower OFF OAC Alarm 1 B IPB Blower OFF CRS CRS/

BOP BOP Expected Actions/Behavior BOP (Step 4) IF both fans off, perform the NOTE: The CRS will dispatch following within 15 minutes:

an AO to take this action.

Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge. Within 2 mm report that neither IPB Fan will start.

Place fan in AUTO to MAN.

IF neither fan will start, go to AP/1/A15000/004 (Rapid Down Power) and reduce Turbine Generator until the following obtained:

20,000 amps for double Busline (Approximately 700 MWs, 58% RTP)

ARP1 AD-i i/J5, IPB AIR FLOW TROUBLE (Step 1) IF load rejection...

(Step 2) Send operator to IPB Alarm Panel to determine and acknowledge the alarm.

(Step 3) IF a zone lockout occurred Comments NOTE: A load rejection is NOT occurring.

NOTE: A Zone Lockout has NOT occurred.

Time Pos.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

6 Page 37 of 65 Event

Description:

IPB Fan Failure/Rapid Downpower Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehr Comments 10,000 amps for single Busline (approximately 350 MWs, 30% RTP)

NOTE: The CRS will transition to AP-4.

AP/1/N5500/04, RAPID DOWNPOWER RO/

(Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

BOP CRS (Step 2) Announce occurrence on page.

NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 3) Check turbine control IN AUTO.

RO (Step 4) Check MW LOOP IN SERVICE.

RO (Step 4 RNO) Depress MW IN/MW OUT pushbutton.

CRS (Step 5) Check shutdown to Mode 3

DESIRED.

CRS (Step 5 RNO) Observe Note prior to Step 8 and GO TO Step 8.

CRS (Step 8) Determine the required power NOTE: The CRS will reduce reduction rate (MW/rn in).

load at 30-60 MWe/minute.

RO (Step 9) Check control rods IN AUTO.

NOTE: The Control Rods may or may not be in AUTO.

If not, the RO will perform the Step 9 RNO and place the Control Rods in AUTO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

6 Page 38 of 65 Event

Description:

IPB Fan Failure/Rapid Downpower Time Pos RO BOP RO Expected Actions/Behavior (Step 9 RNO) Perform the following:

IF auto control available, THEN perform the following:

Place control rods in auto.

GO TO Step 10.

(Step 10) Notify SOC of load reduction (red dispatcher phone).

(Step 11) Initiate turbine load reduction to desired load at desired rate.

Comments Booth Instructor: as SOC, acknowledge.

BOP (Step 12) Borate NC System as follows:

Energize all backup Pzr heaters.

CRS Check unit to be shutdown VIA NOTE: It is normal practice to REACTOR TRIP FROM 15% POWER.

shut down the reactor by driving rods, rather than tripping from 15%.

CRS (Step 1 2b. RNO) GO TO Step 1 2.d.

BOP Determine boration amount based on the following:

Power Reduction Rate (MW/mm)

Present NC System Boron Concentration (ppm)

Total Power change_(%).

Record calculated boration amount:

NOTE: Based on the rate of load reduction the total boration is 500-600 gallons.

RO Check auto or manual rod control

AVAILABLE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

6 Page 39 of 65 Event

Description:

IPB Fan Failure/Rapid Downpower Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP Perform boration in 4 equal additions NOTE: The CRS may assign during load reduction PER the BOP to perform this action.

OP/i /A/61 50/009 (Boron Concentration If so, BOP Examiner foNow Control), Enclosure 4.7 (Boration Using actions of Enclosure 4 7 1 NV-265B (Boric Acid to NV Pumps)).

Other Examiners follow AP-4 Actions, Step 13, on Page 40.

OPI1/N61 50/009 BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ENCLOSURE 4.7 BORATION USING 1 NV-265B (BORIC ACID TO NV PUMPS)

BOP (Step 3.1) Evaluate all outstanding R&Rs that may impact performance of this procedure.

BOP (Step 3.2) Evaluate energizing additional pressurizer heaters per OP/i /AJ6i 00/003 (Controlling Procedure For Unit Operation) to enhance system mixing when changing NC System boron concentration. (R. M.)

BOP (Step 3.3) Perform following sections, as applicable:

Section 3.6, Adding Greater Than 20 Gallons of Boric Acid BOP (Step 3.6) Adding Greater Than 20 Gallons of Boric Acid Ensure one of the following running:

lABATrans Pump OR iBBATransPump Determine length of time 1NV-265B (Ui NV Pump Boric Acid Sup Isol) full open as follows: (R.M.)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

6 Page 40 of 65 Event

Description:

IPB Fan Failure/Rapid Downpower Time Pos.

BOP Expected Actions/Behavior IF using Table 4.7-1 (Time 1NV-2658 Full Open With One BAT Pump Running), record time 1NV-265B full open from table:

sec.

IF using equation, perform the following:

Calculate time 1 NV-265 is to to be Full Open.

Comments Open 1NV-265B (Ui NV Pump Boric Acid Sup_Isol)._(R.M.)

HOLD until 1NV-265B (Ui NV Boric Acid Sup Isol) full open time elapsed, THEN close 1NV-265B (Ui NV Pump Boric Acid Sup_Isol)._(R.M.)

IF 1NV-265B (U1 NV Boric Acid Sup Isol) will NOT close...

IF BA Trans Pump started in Step 3.6.1, perform the following:

Ensure the following off:

a lABATrans Pump iBBATransPump Ensure one of the following selected to AUTO:

lABATrans Pump OR iBBATransPump API1!A15500104, RAPID DOWNPOWER Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRSIRO continue HERE.

RO (Step 13) Check control rods MOVING IN AS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN T-AVG AT T-REF.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

6 Page 41 of 65 Event

Description:

IPB Fan Failure/Rapid Downpower Time Pós.

RO CRS CR5 Expected Actions/Behavior (Step 14) Display Rod Insertion Limits on OAC by entering turn on code RIL.

(Step 15) IF AT ANY TIME CONTROL ROD BANK LO LO LIMIT alarm (1AD-2, B-9) is lit, THEN perform one of the following to comply with Tech Spec 3.1.6 (Control Bank Insertion Limits)

Ensure alarm clears within one hour as Xenon builds in.

OR Initiate boration as necessary within one hour to restore control rods above insertion limits.

(Step 16) IF AT ANYTIME during this procedure C-7A is received, THEN ensure Transient Monitor freeze is triggered.

Comments NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

CRS (Step 18) Notify Reactor Engineer on duty of NOTE: The CRS may call load reduction.

WCC/RE to address the load reduction.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RE.

CRS (Step 17) REFER TO the following:

RP/OIA/5700/000 (Classification of Emergency)

RP/O/N57001010 (NRC Immediate Notification Requirements).

NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

6 Page 42 of 65 Event

Description:

IPB Fan Failure/Rapid Downpower ixaminer F

..e.

may proceed past Step 18 of AP4 while waiting for the BOP to complete the first boration.

If so, wait until the BOP is complete with the first boration an them proceed to the next event.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #7-1 O

During the downpower, the 1A MSIV will fail CLOSED. The transient will result in a 300 gpm SGTR in the 1A Steam Generator. The crew will manually trip the reactor. Shortly after the reactor trip a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) will occur, and both Emergency Diesel Generators will start and repower Busses 1 ETA and 1 ETB. The crew will enter EPI1IAI5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to EP/1/A15000/ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. When the crew recognizes that Safety Injection will be required, the crew will manually actuate SI and return to E-0.

Upon SI Actuation the 1A RN Pump will fail to start automatically, and the operator will need to manually start this pump.

Upon completion of E-0, the crew will transition to EP/1/A15000/E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

Because of the LOOP the NCS cooldown will need to be accomplished using the Steam Generator PORVs on the intact Steam Generators.

During the NCS depressurization, Pressurizer PORV 1 NC-36B will fail to OPEN, and the operator will be required to open Pressurizer PORV 1 NC-34A to depressurize the plant.

The scenario will terminate at Step 22.c of E-3, after the crew has closed the Cold Lea Isolation Valves from the NV System.

Booth Operator Instructions:

Insert REM-SMOO7AB (MSIV Closure)

Insert MAL-SGOO1A 300 delay=20 ramp=60 (SIG 1A Tube Rupture)

Indications Available:

1SM7AB Green status light is LIT.

1A SG Steam Flow lowering.

1A SG Feedflow lowering.

1A SG Narrow Range Level is lowering.

After SGTR:

Pzr level lowers uncontrollably Pzr pressure lowers consistently with Pzr level EPI1IN5000IE-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip:

Immediate Action All rod bottom lights LIT NOTE: The LOOP has caused DRPI to de-energize.

RO!

BOP (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of E-O, prior to the CRS addressing the EP.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 43 of 65 Event

Description:

MSIV Closure/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power! Failure of 1 A RN Pump to Auto Start/i NC-36B Fails to OPEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario#

1 Event#

7,8,9 & 10 Page 44 of 65 Event

Description:

MSIV ClosurelSteam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power/ Failure of 1 A RN Pump to Auto Startll NC-36B Fails to OPEN Time Pos,.

RO RO BOP RO/

BOP Expected Actions/Behavior Reactor trip and bypass breakers

OPEN hR amps GOING DOWN.

(Step 2 RNO) Perform the following:

Trip reactor.

IF reactor will not trip...

(Step 3) Check Turbine Trip:

All throttle valves CLOSED.

(Step 4) Check 1 ETA and 1 ETB

ENERGIZED.

(Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated:

Comments NOTE: The reactor will trip manually.

Immediate Action Immediate Action Immediate Action RO!

(Step 5 RNO) Perform the following:

Immediate Action BOP Check if S/I is required:

Pzr pressure less than 1845 PSIG OR Containment pressure greater than 1 PSIG.

IF S/I is required NOTE: SI will NOT be required.

RO/

IF S/I is not required, THEN perform the BOP following:

SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED status light (1 SI-i 8) LIT.

Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1SI-14)

LIT.

NOTE: SI will NOT be actuated.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 45 of 65 Event

Description:

MSIV Closure/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Oft-Site Power! Failure of 1 A RN Pump to Auto Startll NC-36B Fails to OPEN BOP (Step 2) Check the following:

VI pressure

- GREATER THAN 85 PSIG.

Any Unit 1 6900V bus

- ENERGIZED.

NOTE: A LOOP has occurred, all 6900 Volt Buses will be de energized.

Implement EP/1 /N5000/F-O (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).

CRS GO TO EP/1/A15000/ES-O.1 (Reactor Trip Response).

NOTE: The CRS will transition to ES-0.1.

EP/1/N5000/ES-O.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE RO/

(Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

BOP RO/

(Step 2 RNO) Perform the following:

BOP IF loss of offsite power has occurred, THEN perform the following:

RO CLOSE all MSIVs.

CLOSE all MSIV Bypass Valves.

BOP Ensure at least 2 KR pumps on.

NOTE: The CRS/BOP may dispatch an AC to investigate the status of the KR/KL pumps.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AC, and report Pumps are ON.

(No CR Indication)

Ensure at least 2 RL pumps on.

Notify Unit 2 operator to start 2A RN pump.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 46 of 65 Event

Description:

MSIV Closure/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power! Failure of 1 A RN Pump to Auto Start/i NC-36B Fails to OPEN NOTE: The GAS may ask U2 AC to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 AC.

s Expected Actions/Beha Comments AC IF AT ANY TIME VI pressure is less than 60 NOTE: The MSIVs and PSIG, THEN....

Bypass Valves will be closed at this time.

RO/

IF CA control valves cannot be throttled in NOTE: This is a Continuous BOP subsequent steps, THEN control flow PER Action. The CRS will make EP/1 /A/5000/G-1 (Generic Enclosures),

both board operators aware. 6 (CA Flow Control With Loss of VI).

IF S/G N/R level is less than 11% in all S/Gs, NOTE: It is expected that NA THEN Level will be> 11% in at least one SG.

RO/

WHEN N/A level is greater than 11% in at BOP least one S/G, THEN THROTTLE feed flow further to achieve the following:

Minimize cooldown Maintain at least one S/G N/A level greater than 11%.

BOP IF VI pressure is less than 85 PSIG, NOTE: It is expected that VI THEN Header pressure will be> 85 psig.

RO/

IF AT ANY TIME VI pressure is less than 60 NOTE: This is a Continuous BOP PSIG, THEN ensure RN aligned PER Action. The GAS will make (Aligning B Train RN To Pond).

both board operators aware.

CRS (Step 4) REFER TO the following:

NOTE: The CR5 may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

RP/0/A15700/000 (Classification of Emergency)

RP/0/A/5700/010 (NRC Immediate Notification Requirements).

CRS (Step 3) Announce: Unit 1 Reactor trip, non essential personnel stay out of Unit 1 turbine bldg.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 47 of 65 Event

Description:

MSIV Closure/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power! Failure of 1 A RN Pump to Auto Start/i NC-36B Fails to OPEN RO (Step 5) Check NC temperatures:

IF any NC pump on, THEN....

NOTE: The NCPs will be OFF due to the LOOP.

IF all NC pumps off, THEN check NC T Colds

- STABLE OR TRENDING TO 557°F.

NOTE: It is expected that the crew will transition back to E-0 based on ES-0.1 Foldout Page Criteria: IF NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs is less than 0°F OR Pzr level cannot be maintained greater than 4%, THEN initiate S/I and GO TO EPI1IAJ5000/E-O (Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection).

EP/1/A/5000/E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO/

(Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

NOTE: Crew will carry out BOP Immediate Actions of E-0, prior to the CRS addressing the EP.

RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip:

Immediate Action All rod bottom lights LIT NOTE: The LOOP has caused DRPI to de-energize.

Reactor trip and bypass breakers

OPEN hR amps GOING DOWN.

RO (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following:

Trip reactor.

IF reactor will not trip...

NOTE: The reactor will trip manually.

RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip:

Immediate Action

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 48 of 65 Event

Description:

MSIV Closure/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power/ Failure of 1 A RN Pump to Auto Start/i NC-36B Fails to OPEN Time Pos,.

BOP RO/

BOP CRS Expected Actions/Behavior All throttle valves CLOSED.

(Step 4) Check 1 ETA and 1 ETB

ENERGIZED.

(Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated:

SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED status light (151-i 8) LIT.

Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1SI-14)

LIT.

(Step 6) Announce Unit 1 Safety Injection.

Comments Immediate Action Immediate Action NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on Energized train(s):

Groups 1,2, 5DARK.

Group3LIT.

Group 4 LIT AS REQUIRED.

Group 6 LIT.

NOTE: The 1A RN Pump has failed to Auto Start.

CRS GOTOSteplO.

RO (Step 10) Check proper CA pump status:

BOP BOP (Step 7) Check all Feedwater Isolation status lights (1SI-4)

LIT.

(Step 8) Check Phase A RESET lights

DARK.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 49 of 65 Event

Description:

MSIV Closure/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power/ Failure of 1 A RN Pump to Auto Start/i NC-36B Fails to OPEN Time Pos.

BOP BOP CRS RO Expected Actions/Behavior MD CA pumps ON.

N/R level in at least 3 SIGs GREATER THAN 17%.

Comments (Step 1 1) Check all KC pumps ON.

(Step 12) Check both RN pumps ON.

NOTE: The 1A RN Pump has failed to Auto Start.

If it has NOT been started previously, it will be started here using the RNO.

(Step 12 RNO) Perform the following:

Start pump(s).

IF any RN pump off....

(Step 13) Notify Unit 2 to perform the following:

BOP (Step 15) Check Containment Pressure

NOTE: Containment Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG.

is normal.

BOP (Step 16) Check S/I flow:

Start2ARN pump.

Floor Instructor: As U2 RO report 2A RN Pump is running.

THROTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum for existing plant condition.

Booth Instructor:

insert LOA-RN087 (Start 2A RN Pump) insert LOA-RN083 8050.000000 delay=0 ramp=10 (Unit 2 Train A Demand Flow)

(Step 14) Check all S/G pressures

GREATER THAN 775 PSIG.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 50 of 65 Event

Description:

MSIV Closure/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power! Failure of 1 A RN Pump to Auto Start!1 NC-36B Fails to OPEN Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Check NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW gauge INDICATING FLOW.

Check NC pressure LESS THAN 1600 PSIG.

BOP (Step 1 6b RNO) Perform the following:

Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running pump(s) OPEN:

1ND-68A (1A ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol) 1ND-67B (lB ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol).

CRS IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 17.

RO/

(Step 18) Check CA flow:

BOP Total CA flow GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

BOP Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.

RO/

WHEN each S/G N/R level is greater NOTE: This is a Continuous BOP than 11% (32% ACC), THEN control CA Action. The CRS will make flow to maintain that S/G N/R level both board operators aware.

between 11% (32% ACC) and 50%.

CRS (Step 17) Notify OSM or other SRO to perform EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions Following an S/I) within 10 minutes.

NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 51 of 65 Event

Description:

MSIV Closure/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power! Failure of 1 A RN Pump to Auto Start/i NC-36B Fails to OPEN Pos.

RO Expected Actions/Behavior (Step 19) Check NC temperatures:

lFanyNCpumpson...

Comments NOTE: The crew may isolate CA flow to the ruptured 1A SG based on E-O Foldout Page criteria (#4).

IF both of the following conditions met, THEN stop CA flow to affected S/G:

Level going up in an uncontrolled manner or radiation level in that SIG is abnormal N/R level

- GREATER THAN 11%(32%ACC).

NOTE: NC Pumps are OFF due to the LOOP.

EP/1/A15000/E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ENCLOSURE 3, UNCONTROLLED NC SYSTEM COOLDOWN OR IF all NC pumps off, THEN check NC T-Colds STABLE OR TRENDING TO 557°F.

(Step 19 RNO) Perform the following based on plant conditions:

IF temperature less than 557°F AND going down, THEN attempt to stop Cooldown PER Enclosure 3 (Uncontrolled NC System Cooldown).

NOTE: The CRS may assign the RO (BOP) to perform this action.

If so, RO (BOP) Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 3.

Other Examiners follow E-O Actions, Step 20, on Page 53.

ROI (Step 1) Check steam dump valves

BOP CLOSED.

Time

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N 131 Scenario #

1 Event #

7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 52 of 65 Event

Description:

MSIV Closure/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power! Failure of 1 A RN Pump to Auto Start/i NC-36B Fails to OPEN Time Pos.

RO/

(BOP)

RO!

(BOP)

RO/

(BOP)

RO!

(BOP)

Expected Actions/Behavior (Step 2) Check all SM PORVs CLOSED.

(Step 3) Check MSR RESET light

- LIT (Step 3 RNO) Perform the following on MSR controls:

Depress SYSTEM MANUAL.

Depress RESET.

(Step 4) Check any NC pump ON.

Comments NOTE: The NC Pumps will be OFF due to the LOOP.

RO/

(Step 6) Control feed flow as follows:

(BOP)

IF S/G N/R level is less than 11% (32%

ACC) in all SIGs, WHEN N/r level is greater than 1 1%

(32% ACC) in at least one SIG, THEN THROTTLE feed flow further to:

Minimize cooldown Maintain at least one S/G N/A level greater than 1 1% (32%ACC).

AO/

(BOP)

(Step 4 RNO) Perform the following:

IF any NC T-Cold is still going down, THEN GO TO Step 6.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 53 of 65 Event

Description:

MSIV Closure/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power! Failure of 1 A RN Pump to Auto Start/i NC-36B Fails to OPEN Time Pos.

RO/

(BOP)

Expected Actions/Behavior (Step 7) Check MSIVs ANY OPEN.

RO/

(BOP)

RO/

(BOP)

RO/

(BOP)

(Step 8) CLOSE 1SM-15 (Ui SM to MSR 2t Stg Tube Bundles Isol).

(Step 9) Check any NC pump ON.

(Step 9 RNO) Perform the following:

IF any NC T-Cold is still going down, THEN GO TO RNO for Step 10.

IF cooldown stopped, THEN exit this enclosure.

Comments NOTE: The crew may isolate CA flow to the ruptured 1 A SG based on E-0 Foldout Page criteria (#4).

IF both of the following conditions met, THEN stop CA flow to affected S/G:

Level going up in an uncontrolled manner or radiation level in that S/G is abnormal N/R level

- GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC).

NOTE: All MSIVs are closed.

NOTE: The NC Pumps will be OFF due to the LOOP.

Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO(BOP) continue HERE.

EPI1IAI5000IE-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION BOP (Step 20) Check Pzr PORV and spray (RO) valves:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 54 of 65 Event

Description:

MSIV Closure/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power! Failure of 1 A RN Pump to Auto Start/i NC-36B Fails to OPEN Time Pos.

BOP (RO)

BOP (RO)

BOP (RO)

Expected Actions/Behavior All Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

Normal Pzr spray valves CLOSED.

At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve-OPEN.

(Step 21) Check NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 0°F.

(Step 22) Check if main steamlines intact:

All S/G pressures STABLE OR GOING UP All S/Gs PRESSURIZED.

(Step 23) Check if S/G tubes intact:

Comments NOTE: Rad Monitors will indicate that one or more SG tubes is ruptured.

CRS (Step 23 RNO) IF S/G levels going up in an NOTE: The 1A SG Level is uncontrolled manner OR any EMF abnormal, increasing in an uncontrolled THEN perform the following:

manner.

Implement EP/1/A/5000/F-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).

The following secondary EMFs

NORMAL:

1 EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) 1 EMF-34(L) (S/G Sample (Lo Range))

1 EMF-24 (S/G A) 1EMF-25(S/GB) 1 EMF-26 (S/G C) 1 EMF-27 (S/G D).

S/G levels STABLE OR GOING UP IN A CONTROLLED MANNER.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 55 of 65 Event

Description:

MSIV Closure/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power/ Failure of 1 A RN Pump to Auto Start/i NC-36B Fails to OPEN Time Pose Expected Actions/Behavior GO TO EP/1/A!5000/E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture).

ROI BOP BOP Comments NOTE: The CRS will transition to E-3.

EP/1/N5000/E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

(Step 2) Identify ruptured SIG(s):

OR AnyS/G N/R levelGOING UP INAN UNCONTROLLED MANNER Chemistry or RP has determined ruptured S/G.

NOTE: The 1A SG Level is increasing in an uncontrolled manner.

NOTE: The CRS may contact Chemistry for sampling.

Booth Instructor:

Acknowledge as appropriate.

RO (Step 4) Isolate flow from ruptured S/G(s) as follows:

Check ruptured S/G(s) PORV

CLOSED.

RO OR Any of the following EMFs ABOVE NORMAL:

1 EMF-24 (S/G A) 1EMF-25(S/GB) 1EMF-26(S/GC) 1 EMF-27 (S/G D)

(Step 3) Check at least one S/G

AVAILABLE FOR NC SYSTEM COOLDOWN.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 56 of 65 Event

Description:

MSIV Closure/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power/ Failure of 1 A RN Pump to Auto Start/i NC-36B Fails to OPEN Time Pos.

RD BOP RD Expected Actions/Behavior Check SIGs 1 B and 1 C INTACT.

Check blowdown isolation valves on ruptured SIGI(s)

CLOSED.

For 1A S/G:

1BB-1B (1A S/G Blowdown Cont Outside iso! Control) 1 BB-5A (A S/G BB Cont Inside lsoi).

CLOSE steam drain on ruptured S/G(s) 1SM-83 (A SM Line Drain iso!)

CLOSE the following valves on ruptured S/G(s):

MS1V Comments NOTE: The 1A SG is NOT intact.

RO (Step 5) Control ruptured S/G(s) level as follows:

Check ruptured S/G(s) N/R level

GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC).

BOP isolate feed flow to ruptured S/G(s):

For1AS/G:

CLOSE 1CA-66AC (Ui TD CA Pump Disch TO 1A S/G 1501).

CLOSE 1CA-62A(1ACA Pump Disch To 1A S/G iso!).

MS1V bypass valve.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 57 of 65 Event

Description:

MSIV Closure/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power/ Failure of 1 A RN Pump to Auto Start/i NC-36B Fails to OPEN Time Pos.

Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRITICAL TASK:

(E-3A) Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs.

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of AP between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. Upon a loss of AP, the crew must transition to a contingency procedure that constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy.

If the crew fails to isolate steam from the SG, or feed flow into the SG the ruptured SG pressure will tend to decrease to the same pressures as the intact SOs, requiring a transition to a contingency procedure, and delaying the stopping of RCS leakage into the SG.

RO (Step 6) Check ruptured SIG(s) pressure

GREATER THAN 280 PSIG.

BOP (Step 7) Check any NC pump RUNNING.

NOTE: NC Pumps are OFF due to the LOOP.

RO!

(Step 7 RNO) Disregard NC T-Cold BOP indication in the ruptured loop, until directed by this EP or until this EP is exited.

BOP (Step 8) Check Pzr pressure GREATER THAN 1955 PSIG.

RO (Step 9) Initiate NC System cooldown as follows:

CRS Determine required core exit temperature based on lowest ruptured S/G pressure:

>1000-1099 psig

- 508°F NOTE: The CRS will likely determine the target

>1099 psig

- 520 F temperature to be 508 or 520°F.

RO Check the following valves on ruptured S/G(s)

CLOSED:

MSIV MSIV bypass valve.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 58 of 65 Event

Description:

MSIV Closure/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power/ Failure of 1 A RN Pump to Auto Start/i NC-36B Fails to OPEN Time Pos.

RO RO AC AC CRS Expected Actions/Behavior Check ruptured SIG(s) SM PORV

CLOSED.

Check S/G(s) lB and 10 INTACT.

(Step 9e) Check condenser available:

C-9 COND AVAILABLE FOR STEAM DUMP status light (1 SI-i 8)

LIT (Step 9e RNO) GO TO ANO for Step 9.h.

Comments NOTE: The 1A SG is ruptured.

NOTE: Due to the LOOP, the Condenser is NOT available.

BOP (Step 9h RNO) Perform the following:

Ensure at least one Pzr PORV isolation valve is OPEN.

IF VI is lost, OR a Phase B Isolation has NOTE: Neither condition has occurred, THEN align N2 to all PORVs by occurred.

OPENING the following valves:

IF Pzr pressure is greater than 1955 NOTE: Pzr Pressure may be <

PSIG, THEN depressurize to 1900 PSIG 1955 psig.

If pressure> 1955 using Pzr PORV.

psig, the crew will have to depressurize.

RO Depress BLOCK on Low Pressure Steam line Isolation block switches.

BOP Maintain NC pressure less than 1955 PSIG.

RO Ensure Main Steam Isolation reset.

RO Ensure SM PORVs reset.

RO IF any intact S/G SM PORV isolation NOTE: All S/G SM PORV valves is closed isolation valves are OPEN.

RO Dump steam using all intact S/G(s) SM PORVs at maximum rate as follows:

CLOSE SM PORV manual NOTE: The RO will close the loader on ruptured S/G(s).

1A SM PORV manual loader (0%).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 59 of 65 Event

Description:

MSIV Closure/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power/ Failure of 1 A RN Pump to Auto Start/i NC-36B Fails to OPEN Time Pos CRS CRS RO RO Expected Actions/Behavior Place intact S/G SM PORV manual loaders at 50%.

Select MANUAL on SM PORV MODE SELECT.

Adjust manual loaders on intact S/G SM PORVs as required to control intact S/G depressurization rate at approximately 2 PSIG per second.

IF any intact SIG SM PORV closed,...

IF no intact S/G available...

(Step 9i) Check Low Pressure Steamline Isolation BLOCKED.

(Step 9.j) Check Core exit T/Cs-LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE.

Comments NOTE: The RO will place the 1B, 1C and 1D SM PORV manual loaders to 50%.

NOTE: The RO will initiate the NCS Cooldown at this point.

NOTE: The 1 B, 1 C and 1 D SG are available.

NOTE: It is likely that when the CRS arrives at this step, that the target temperature will NOT be reached.

RO (Step 9.j RNO) Perform the following:

NOTE: This action will be taken after the target temperature has been achieved.

WHEN Core exit T/Cs are less than required temperature, THEN perform the following:

Stop NC System cooldown.

Maintain core exit T/Cs less than required temperature.

CRS GO TO Step 10.

NOTE: The CRS will proceed and return to this step when the target temperature has been achieved.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 60 of 65 Event

Description:

MSIV Closure/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power? Failure of 1 A RN Pump to Auto Start/i NC-36B Fails to OPEN Time Pos.

xpectec1 Actions/behavior Check N/R level in any intact SIG

GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC).

Power to all Pzr PORV isolation valves

AVAILABLE.

All Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve

OPEN.

S/I

Comments RO (Step 10) Control intact S/G levels:

Throttle feed flow to maintain all intact S/G N/R levels between 22% (32% ACC) and 50%.

BOP (Step 11) Check Pzr PORVs and isolation valves:

BOP (Step 12) Reset the following:

BOP (Step 13) Establish VI to containment as follows:

Sequencers Phase A Isolation Phase B Isolation Open the following valves:

1 VI-1 29B (VI Supply to A Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol))

1 VI-1 60B (VI Supply to B Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol))

1VI-150B (Lwr Cont Non Ess Cont Outside Isol).

Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 85 PSIG.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 61 of 65 Event

Description:

MSIV Closure/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power? Failure of 1 A RN Pump to Auto Start/i NC-36B Fails to OPEN Time Pos.

RO CRS RO Expected Actions/Behavior (Step 14) Check if NC System cooldown should be stopped as foflows:

Check cooldown INITIATED PER STEP 9.

Check Core exit T/Cs LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE.

(Step 14b RNO) Perform the following:

IF AT ANY TIME while in this step ruptured SIG pressure changes by over 100 PSIG, AND ruptured S/G pressure is greater than 400 PSIG, THEN select a new target temperature from table in Step 9.a.

Do not continue until core exit T/Cs are less than target temperature.

(Step 14c) Stop NC System cooldown.

Maintain Core exit T/Cs LESS THAN REQURIED TEMPERATURE.

Comments NOTE: It is likely that when the CRS arrives at this step, that the target temperature will NOT be reached.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware, and HOLD.

BOP (Step 18) Depressurize NC System using Pzr PORV as follows:

RO RO BOP CRS (Step 15) Check ruptured SIG(s) pressure

STABLE OR GOING UP.

(Step 16) Check NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 20°F.

(Step 17) Depressurize NC System using Pzr spray as follows:

Check normal Pzr spray flow

AVAILABLE.

(Step 1 7a RNO) GO TO Step 18.

NOTE: All NC Pumps are OFF, Pzr Spray is NOT available.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 62 of 65 Event

Description:

MSIV Closure/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power! Failure of 1 A RN Pump to Auto Startll NC-36B Fails to OPEN Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Check at least one Pzr PORV -

AVAILABLE.

Open one Pzr PORV.

NOTE: If the operator attempts to open 1 NC-36B it will fail to open. The operator will need to use one of the other two Pzr PORVs.

Do not continue until any of the following conditions satisfied:

NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs

- LESS THAN 0°F OR Pzr level

- GREATER THAN 76%

(58% ACC).

OR Both of the following:

NC pressure

- LESS THAN RUPTURED S/G(s)

PRESSURE.

Pzr level

- GREATER THAN 11% (29% ACC).

Close Pzr PORV.

Close Pzr spray valves.

CRITICAL TASK:

(E-3C) Depressurize the NCS to meet SI termination criteria before the Quality of the steam exiting the SG exceeds 80% (.8 on Void Fraction SGINFO_1. cts).

Safety Significance:

Failure to stop the reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates the mitigation of the event.

It also constitutes a significant reduction of Safety Margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

If RCS depressurization does NOT occur, the inventory in the secondary side of the ruptured SG will occur leading to water release through the SG PORV or Safety Valve, which could cause and unisolable fault in the ruptured SG.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 63 of 65 Event

Description:

MSIV Closure/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power/ Failure of 1 A RN Pump to Auto Start/i NC-36B Fails to OPEN Th..-.

I IIII BOP RO/

BOP C.,...nnnt1 A s..;,nu.

(Step 19) Check NC pressure

- GOING UP.

(Step 20) Check S/I termination criteria:

NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs

GREATER THAN 0°F.

Secondary heat sink:

OR N/R level in at least one intact S/G

GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC).

Total feed flow available to S/G(s)

GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

NC pressure STABLE OR GOING UP.

Pzr level GREATER THAN 11% (29%

ACC).

Comments I..AJ,Lil I.,LIdI Il LJI I V BOP (Step 22) Isolate NV S/I flowpath as follows:

Check the following valves

- OPEN 1NV-221A (Ui NV Pumps Suct From FWST Isol) 1NV-222B (Ui NV Pumps Suct From FWST Isol).

Check the following valves

- OPEN 1NV-150B (Ui NV Pump Recirc NOTE: Both valves are lsol).

CLOSED.

1NV-151A (Ui NV Pump Recirc sal).

BOP Close the following valves:

NOTE: The BOP will close Both valves.

BOP (Step 21) Stop S/I pumps as follows:

NI pumps.

All but one NV pump.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 64 of 65 Event

Description:

MSIV Closure/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power! Failure of 1 A RN Pump to Auto Start/i NC-36B Fails to OPEN Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior 1NI-9A (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV) 1NI-1OB (NC Cold Leg nj From NV).

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

Comments

UNIT 1 STATUS:

Power Level:

100%

NCS [B]

925 ppm Pzr [B]:

925 ppm Xe:

Per OAC Power History:

At this power level for 178 days Core Burnup:

251 EFPDs CONTROLLING PROCEDURE:

OP/i /A161 00/03 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME THE SHIFT:

The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

Pzr PORV 1 NC-32B has been isolated due to leakage through its seat. ACTION has been taken to comply with Technical Specifications.

1 EMF27, SM Line D/Outer Doghouse Radiation Monitor, failed last shift (IAE is investigating).

MCB Annunciator 1AD-8, E-2, GROUNDWATER HI LEVEL, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating).

Crew Directions:

The crew will perform PT/i/N4600/001, RCCA Movement Test upon taking the shift, starting with the movement of Shutdown Bank A and continuing in the order identified in Section 12.6 of PT/i/A14600/001.

IAE Technician Ralph is standing by at the Rod Control Power Cabinets to assist at X2608.

Work Control SRO/Offsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe NLOs AVAILABLE Uniti Unit2 Aux Bldg.

John Aux Bldg.

Chris Turb Bldg. Bob Turb Bldg. Mike 5

th Rounds. Carol Extra(s)

Bill Ed Wayne Tanya

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Final (Rev_i 10413)

Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

2 Op Test No.:

N13-i Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions:

The plant is at 74% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1A Boric Acid Transfer Pump is OOS for motor replacement.

The 1 B MDCA Pump is OOS for pump bearing replacement.

It is expected back in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. 1ASP-5121, AS Header Pressure, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-7, J-4, BAT EMPTY, has spuriously alarmed (IAE is investigating).

The crew will be expected to continue with the power increase upon turnover.

Event MaIf.

Event Type*

Event No.

No.

Description 1

NA R-RO Power Increase N-BOP N-SRO 2

MAL 1-BOP Power Range Channel N41 fails HIGH ENBO13A l(TS)-SRO 3

REM C-RO Steam Dump Valve fails OPEN SB0003 C-SRO 4

MAL C-RO Zone 1 B Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in EPOO3C C-BOP AUTO/Stuck Rod! Standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster IREOO9 Pumps fail to Auto Start IREO1OD12 C(TS)-SRO 5

MAL M-RO Feedline Break (Doghouse) 1 D!ATWS CFOO6D IPEOO1 IPEOO2 M-SRO 6

MAL NA 1A MDCA fails to START automatically CAOO4A 7

MAL NA 1A TDCA fails to START automatically CAOO3A CAOO3B 8

LOA NA lB Boric Acid Transfer Pump fails to START NV044 (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Final (Rev 1 10413)

McGuire 2013 NRC Scenario #2 The plant is at 74% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1A Boric Acid Transfer Pump is OOS for motor replacement. The 1 B MDCA Pump is OOS for pump bearing replacement.

It is expected back in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. 1ASP-5121, AS Header Pressure, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MOB Annunciator 1AD-7, J-4, BAT EMPTY, has spuriously alarmed (IAE is investigating).

The crew will be expected to continue with the power increase upon turnover.

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100%

starting with Step 3.37.9 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OPI1IAI6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.

The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, Alternate

Dilute, of OP/1/A/6150/009, Boron Concentration Control, and raise Turbine load in accordance with 0P111A16300/OO1 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change.

Following this, Power Range Instrument N41 Lower Detector will fail HIGH.

The operator will enter API1/A15500/16, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation, and remove N41 from service, including the control power fuse from the instrument sealing in the RPS logic, and override the input from the N41 Channel to the overpower Rod Stop, permitting power escalation to 100%. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation.

Next, the Steam Dump Valve SB-3 will slowly fail to FULL OPEN due to a valve positioner failure.

The crew will enter AP/1/A15500/01, Steam Leak, stabilize turbine load, attempt to close, and ultimately isolate the valve.

Subsequently, a Zone lB Lockout causes PCB 11 and 12 to open, as well as the lB Main Generator Breaker to open and the turbine to automatically runback to 56%. The operator will implement AP/1/A15500/03, Load Rejection.

During the runback the operator will notice that the rods do not move in auto, and the operator will need to drive rods in manually. When the Control Rods are driven inward, one Control Bank D rod will stick in its original position.

Additionally, on the runback the standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster Pump will fail to automatically start requiring the operator to manually start both pumps.

After stabilizing the plant, the operator will address AP/1/A15500/14, Rod Control Malfunction, to address the Stuck Rod. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits, and Technical Specification 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio.

Following this, a slowly developing Feedline Break will occur in the 1 D Feedline inside the Doghouse, however, the Reactor will fail to trip both automatically and manually from the control room.

The operator will enter EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and immediately transition to EP/1/A15000/FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. The operator will need to direct that the Rod Drive MG Sets be tripped locally.

On the reactor trip, the in-service CA Pumps will fail to start automatically, and will need to be manually started.

When attempted, the both the 1A MDCA Pump and TDCA Pump will start manually.

When the operator attempts to Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l Final (Rev_il 0413) emergency Borate the lB Boric Acid Pump will fail to start, and the operator will have to implement emergency boration via the FWST.

The operator will continue to drive rods in manually until reactor power is less than 5%.

The operator will then return to E-O and transition to EPI1/A/50001E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, to isolate the 1 D Steam Generator.

The scenario will terminate when the crew transitions out of E-2 to either EP/11A15000/ES-1.1, SI Termination, or EPI1IAJ5000/E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

Critical Tasks:

FR-S.1 C Continually drive rods inward until the Reactor is tripped or until the control rods are on the bottom.

Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor power remains higher than it otherwise would if the action is not taken.

Performance of the critical task would move the reactor power lower to prevent a subsequent an unnecessary challenge to reactor core operational limits.

A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control.

E-0 F Establish 450 gpm of CA Flow to the Steam Generators before transition out of FR-S.1.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish a Secondary Heat Sink through the initiation of CA flow unnecessarily challenges both the HEAT SINK and the CORE COOLING Critical Safety Functions. Additionally, the FSAR Safety Analysis results are predicated on the assumption that at least one train of safeguards actuates and delivers a minimum amount of AFW flow to the Steam Generators.

Failure to perform this task, when the ability to do so exists, results in a violation of the Facility License Condition and places the plant in an unanalyzed condition.

E-2A Isolate the Faulted Steam Generator before transitioning out of E-2.

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a Faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the Critical Safety Functions that would not otherwise occur. Failure to isolate flow could result in an unwarranted Orange or Red Path condition on NC Integrity and/or Subcriticality (if cooldown is allowed to continue uncontrollably).

PROGRAM:

McGuire Operations Training MODULE:

Initial License Operator Training Class 29 TOPIC:

NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N13-1-2

REFERENCES:

1.

Power Increase, of OP/1/A16100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation (Rev 184) 2.

OP/1/A/6150/009, Boron Concentration Control (Rev 118) 3.

OP/1/A/6300/001 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change (Rev 11) 4.

AP/1/A/5500/16, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation (Rev 13) 5.

Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation (Amendment 184/1 66) 6.

Control Room Crew Expectations Manual (Rev 8/8/12) 7.

AP/1/A/5500/01, Steam Leak (Rev 18) 8.

AP/1/A15500/03, Load Rejection (Rev 28) 9.

AP/1/A15500/14, Rod Control Malfunction (Rev 16)

10. Technical Specification LCO 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits (Amendment 184/1 66)

11. Technical Specification 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (Amendment 184/166)

12. EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev 33)

13. EP/1/A15000/FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS (Rev 14)

14. EP/1/A15000/E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation (Rev 10)

15. EP/1/A15000/ES-1.1, SI Termination (Rev 26)

Validation Time: 131 minutes Author:

David Lazarony, Western Technical Services, Inc.

Facility Review:

Rev. 110413 1

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions:

The plant is at 74% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1A Boric Acid Transfer Pump is OOS for motor replacement. The 1 B MDCA Pump is OOS for pump bearing replacement.

It is expected back in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. 1ASP-5121, AS Header Pressure, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-7, J-4, BAT EMPTY, has spuriously alarmed (IAE is investigating).

The crew will be expected to continue with the power increase upon turnover.

Event Maif.

Event Type*

Event No.

No.

Description 1

NA R-RO Power Increase N-BOP N-SRO 2

MAC 1-BOP Power Range Channel N41 fails HIGH ENBO13A l(TS)-SRO 3

REM C-RO Steam Dump Valve fails OPEN SB0003 C-SRO MAL C-RO Zone 1 B Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in EPOO3C Df AUTO/Stuck Rod/ Standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster IREOO9 Pumps fail to Auto Start REO1OD12 C(TS)-SRO 5

MAL M-RO Feedline Break (Doghouse) 1 D/ATWS CFOO6D M-BOP IPEOO1 M-SRO IPEOO2 6

MAC NA 1A MDCA fails to START automatically CAOO4A 7

MAC NA 1A TDCA fails to START automatically CAOO3A CAOO3B 8

LOA NA lB Boric Acid Transfer Pump fails to START NV044 (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 McGuire 2013 NRC Scenario #2 The plant is at 74% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1A Boric Acid Transfer Pump is OOS for motor replacement. The 1 B MDCA Pump is OOS for pump bearing replacement.

It is expected back in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. 1ASP-5121, AS Header Pressure, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-7, J-4, BAT EMPTY, has spuriously alarmed (IAE is investigating). The crew will be expected to continue with the power increase upon turnover.

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100% starting with Step 3.37.9 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A16100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with.4, Alternate Dilute, of OPI1/A161501009, Boron Concentration Control, and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/11A163001001 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change.

Following this, Power Range Instrument N41 Lower Detector will fail HIGH.

The operator will enter AP/1/A15500116, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation, and remove N41 from service, including the control power fuse from the instrument sealing in the RPS logic, and override the input from the N41 Channel to the overpower Rod Stop, permitting power escalation to 100%.

The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS)

Instrumentation.

Next, the Steam Dump Valve SB-3 will slowly fail to FULL OPEN due to a valve positioner failure.

The crew will enter AP/1/A15500/01, Steam Leak, stabilize turbine load, attempt to close, and ultimately isolate the valve.

Subsequently, a Zone lB Lockout causes PCB 11 and 12 to open, as well as the lB Main Generator Breaker to open and the turbine to automatically runback to 56%. The operator will implement AP/1/A15500/03, Load Rejection.

During the runback the operator will notice that the rods do not move in auto, and the operator will need to drive rods in manually. When the Control Rods are driven inward, one Control Bank D rod will stick in its original position.

Additionally, on the runback the standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster Pump will fail to automatically start requiring the operator to manually start both pumps.

After stabilizing the plant, the operator will address AP/1/A15500/14, Rod Control Malfunction, to address the Stuck Rod.

The operator will address Technical Specification 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits, and Technical Specification 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio.

Following this, a slowly developing Feedline Break will occur in the 1D Feedline inside the Doghouse, however, the Reactor will fail to trip both automatically and manually from the control room.

The operator will enter EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and immediately transition to EP/1/A15000/FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.

The operator will need to direct that the Rod Drive MG Sets be tripped locally.

On the reactor trip, the in-service CA Pumps will fail to start automatically, and will need to be manually started.

When attempted, the both the 1A MDCA Pump and TDCA Pump will start manually. When the operator attempts to emergency Borate the 1 B Boric Acid Pump will fail to start, and the operator will have to implement emergency boration via the FWST.

The operator will continue to drive rods in manually until reactor power is less than 5%.

The operator will then return to E-0 and transition to EP/1/N5000/E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, to isolate the 1 D Steam Generator.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 The scenario will terminate when the crew transitions out of E-2 to either EP/1/A15000/ES-1.1, SI Termination, or EP/1/A15000/E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

Critical Tasks:

FR-S.1 C Continually drive rods inward until the Reactor is tripped or until the control rods are on the bottom.

Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor power remains higher than it otherwise would if the action is not taken. Performance of the critical task would move the reactor power lower to prevent a subsequent an unnecessary challenge to reactor core operational limits.

A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control.

E-0 F Establish 450 gpm of CA Flow to the Steam Generators before transition out of FR-S.1.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish a Secondary Heat Sink through the initiation of CA flow unnecessarily challenges both the HEAT SINK and the CORE COOLING Critical Safety Functions.

Additionally, the FSAR Safety Analysis results are predicated on the assumption that at least one train of safeguards actuates and delivers a minimum amount of AFW flow to the Steam Generators.

Failure to perform this task, when the ability to do so exists, results in a violation of the Facility License Condition and places the plant in an unanalyzed condition.

E-2A Isolate the Faulted Steam Generator before transitioning out of E-2.

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a Faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the Critical Safety Functions that would not otherwise occur.

Failure to isolate flow could result in an unwarranted Orange or Red Path condition on NC Integrity and/or Subcriticality (if cooldown is allowed to continue uncontrollably).

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q

Sim. Setup Rod Step On Q

Reset to Temp I/C 259 T = 0 Malfunctions (From IC-37):

(Originally IC-37).

insert LOA-NV043 = RACKED_OUT (BA Pump 1 A Breaker Rackout) insert OVR-H_X1 0_239G_1 = 0 (BA Transfer Pump OFF Indicating light) insert LOA-CAO1O = RACKED_OUT (CA Pump 1 B Breaker Rackout) insert LOA-CAO1OA = RACKED_OUT (CA Pump 1 B Control Power) insert H_X02_030_1 = 0 (1 ASP-51 21)

From IC-259 Per Lesson Plan 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 2 1C Hotwell Pump: Type in mon CPALM1 DOO74TVSP and change value from -1 to 1.

1 C Condensate Booster Pump: Type in mon CPANM1 Dl 366TVSP and change value from -1 to 1.

Insert MAL-IPEOO1A = TRUE (ATWS)

Insert MAL-IPEOO1B = TRUE (ATWS)

Insert MAL-IPEOO2A = TRUE (ATWS)

Insert MAL-IPEOO2B = TRUE (ATWS) insert MAL-CAOO4A = AUTO (1A MDCA Pump Start Failure [auto])

insert MAL-CAOO3A and CAOO3B FAILURE (TDCA Pump Start Failure [auto Only])

Q RUN Place TagoutiO-Stick on:

1 A BA Transfer Pump (Tagout)

Reset all IMs 18 MDCA Pump (Tagout) 1 ASP-51 21 (0-stick)

MCB Annunciator 1AD-71J-4 (0-stick)

Q Update Status Board, NOTE: RMWST DO = <1000 ppb.

Setup OAC Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q

Freeze.

Q Update Fresh Tech.

Spec. Log.

Q Fill out the AOs Available section of Shift Turnover Info.

Q Prior to Crew RUN Briefing Q

Crew Briefing 1.

Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements 2.

Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3.

Provide crew with Reactivity Plan associated with power increase.

4.

Provide Enclosure 4.1 of OP/i /A161001003 marked up as follows:

Step 2.3 initialed.

Note prior to Step 3.1 checked.

Step 3.1 Checkbox is checked.

Step 3.2 initialed.

Step 3.3 initialed.

Step 3.3.1 Checkbox is checked.

Step 3.3.2 Checkbox is checked, Step 3.37.9 is entered.

Step 3.3.3 Checkbox is checked.

Step 3.3.4 Initialed.

5.

Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

Q T-O Begin Familiarization Period Q

At direction of Execute Lesson Plan examiner for Simulator Scenario N13-1-2.

Q At direction of Event 1 Power Increase examiner Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q

At direction of Event 2 Power Range Channel N41 fails HIGH examiner insert MAL-ENBO13A

=100 Q

At direction of Event 3 Steam Dump Valve fails OPEN examiner Insert REM-SB0003 =

NOTE: REM SB 0002 = 0 [delay 60 seconds] to 25, delay = 0, ramp =

close SB-3 in let isolation 120 seconds Q

At direction of Event 4 Zone 1 B Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to examiner move in AUTO/Stuck Rod! Standby Hotwell and insert MALEPOO3C =

Condensate Booster Pumps fail to Auto Start ACTIVE delay = 10 seconds insert MAL-IREOO9 =

FAIL_OF_AUTO Insert MAL IREO1OD12

=TR UE X13_098_1 = 1 (1C X13_098_1 = 0; Cd = X13_098_2 =0 Hotwell Pump fails to X13 101 1 = 0; cd = X13 101 2 =0 Auto Start)

Xi 3_i 01_i = 1 (1C CBP fails to Auto Start)

Q At direction of Event 5 Feedline Break (Doghouse) 1 D/ATWS examiner insert MAL-CFOO6D =

1760000 (600 second Ramp)

ATWS will occur on attempted Reactor Trip.

Q Post-Rx Trip Event 6 1A MDCA fails to START automatically Attempt This malfunction will occur on Reactor Trip.

Q Post-Rx Trip Event 7 1A TDCA fails to START automatically Attempt This malfunction will occur on Reactor Trip.

DEL IA MAL-CAOO3A = 2; cd = X10_073_i =1 DEL IA MAL-CAOO3B = 2; cd = X10_073_1 =1 Q

Post-Rx Trip Event 8 1 B Boric Acid Transfer Pump fails to START Attempt insert LOA-NV044 =

This malfunction will occur on Feedline Break.

Racked_OUT (BA Pump 1 B Start Failure

[auto/manual])

Q Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner

-7

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

1 Page 8

of 62 Event

Description:

Power Increase Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100%

starting with Step 3.37.9 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.

The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, Alternate

Dilute, of OP/1/A16150/009, Boron Concentration Control, and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/1/A16300100l A, Turbine-Generator Load Change.

Booth Operator Instructions:

NA Indications Available:

NA OP/i /N6100/003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATIONS ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE CRS (Step 3.37.9) Prior to increasing to greater NOTE: The power increase than 75% RTP, check all governor valves will be at 2 MWe/minute.

open.

RO/

(Step 3.37.10) WHEN 77-80% RTP, enable, NOTE: Based on the extent of BOP OTDT DCS alarming as follows:

the power increase, this action may or may not be taken.

On DCS graphics, select MAINTENANCE MENU.

Select TAVG, DELTA T INPUTS &

ALARM CHECKING graphic.

Select ON for the following:

NCAA 5422 NCAA 5462 NCAA 5502 NCAA 5542 OTDELTAT-FAIL (Step 3.37.11) IF initial startup

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

1 Page 9

of 62 Event

Description:

Power Increase Time Pos.

Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3.11) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to NOTE: It is NOT desired to adjust reactor makeup water flow, adjust Rx adjust reactor makeup water M/U Water Flow Control setpoint to achieve flow.

desired flowrate.

BOP BOP BOP BOP BOP (Step 3.36.12) IF performing Generator/Automatic Voltage Regulator (AVR) testing at 78% RTP...

OP/1/N61 50/009, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ENCLOSURE 4.4, ALTERNATE DILUTE (Step 3.6) Determine amount of reactor makeup water needed to obtain desired boron concentration using McGuire Data Book, OAC, Reactor Group Guidance, or plant parameters (T-Ave, Steam Pressure, Xenon worth, etc.). (R.M.)

Total Reactor Makeup Water:

(Step 3.7) Ensure the following reset to zero:

(R.M.)

Total Make Up Flow Counter Boric Acid Flow Counter (Step 3.8) Set Total Make Up Flow Counter to value determined in Step 3.6. (R.M.)

(Step 3.9) Select ALTERNATE DILUTE on NC Sys M/U Controller.

(Step 3.10) IF desired to makeup only through 1NV-175A (Ui Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control), select CLOSED on 1 NV-i 71 A (Ui Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control).

NOTE: The BOP may repeat this task as needed during the power increase.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

1 Page 10 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Increase Time Pos.

BOP BOP BOP BOP Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 3.12) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to manually adjust reactor makeup water flow, perform the following:

(Step 3.12.1) Place Rx M/U Water Flow Control in manual.

(Step 3.12.2) Adjust Rx M/U Water Flow Control output to control reactor makeup water flowrate.

(Step 3.13) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to lower VCT level, perform the following:

(Step 3.13.1) Monitor Letdown Pressure.

(Step 3.13.2) Select HUT on 1NV-137A (Ui NC Filters OtIt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Contrl).

(Step 3.13.3) IF Letdown Pressure increases greater than 20 psig, notify CRS.

NOTE: The BOP may do this at any time to lower VCT level.

BOP (Step 3.16) Check NC System Make Up red light lit.

(Step 3.13.4) AFTER desired level achieved, select AUTO on 1NV-137A (Ui NC Filters OtIt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl).

(Step 3.14) IF AT ANY TIME plant parameters require termination of dilution, perform the following:

(Step 3.14.1) Place NC System Make Up to STOP. (R.M.)

(Step 3.14.2) IF 1NV-137A (Ui NC Filters OtIt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) was placed to HUT, place to AUTO.

(Step 3.15) Momentarily select START on NC System Make Up. (R.M.)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

1 Page 11 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Increase BOP BOP BOP BOP BOP (Step 3.17) Check 1NV-175A (Ui Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control) open.

(Step 3.18) Check 1NV-252A (Rx M/U Water Supply To Ui BA Blender Cntrl) open or throttled as required.

(Step 3.19) IF 1NV-171A (Ui Boric Acid Blender To VCT Inlet Control) in AUTO, check 1 NV-i 71 A (Ui Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control) open.

(Step 3.20) Check Rx M/U Water Pump starts.

(Step 3.21) Monitor Total Make Up Flow Counter. (R.M.)

NOTE: 1NV-i7iA is NOT in AUTO.

BOP (Step 3.23) Ensure dilution terminated as follows: (R.M.)

(Step 3.23.1) IF in AUTO, ensure the following off:

1A Rx M/U Water Pump lB Ax M/U Water Pump BOP (Step 3.23.2) Ensure the following closed:

1NV-175A(Ui Boric Acid BlenderTo VCT Outlet Control)

BOP (Step 3.22) HOLD until one of the following occurs:

Amount of reactor makeup water recorded per Step 3.6 added OR Reactor makeup water addition manually terminated

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

1 Page 12 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Increase Pos.

BOP BOP BOP BOP Expected Actions/Behavior 1 NV-252A (RX M/U Water Supply To Ui BA Blender Cntrl) 1 NV-i 71 A (Ui Boric Acid Blender To VCT In let Control)

(Step 3.24) Ensure 1NV-i7lA(U1 Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control) in AUTO.

(Step 3.25) Ensure Rx M/U Water Flow Control in AUTO. (R.M.)

(Step 3.26) IF Rx M.U Water Flow Control adjusted per Step 3.1 1 (Step 3.27) Ensure 1NV-137A (Ui NC Filters OtIt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) in AUTO.

Comments NOTE: The Rx M.U Water Flow Control was NOT adjusted.

BOP (Step 3.32) Ensure the following reset to zero: (R.M.)

Total Make Up Flow Counter Boric Acid Flow Counter BOP BOP BOP BOP (Step 3.28) IF desired to flush blender....

(Step 3.29) Select AUTO for NC Sys M!U Controller.

(Step 3.30) Momentarily select START on NC System Make Up.

(Step 3.31) Check NC System Make Up red light lit.

NOTE: It is NOT desired to flush the blender.

Time

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

1 Page 13 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Increase Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3.33) Record in Auto Log that final blender content is Rx Makeup Water.

OP/1/N6300/OO1 A, TURBINE-GENERATOR STARTUP/SHUTDOWN ENCLOSURE 4.1, TURBINE-GENERATOR LOAD CHANGE RD (Step 3.5.2) IF Turbine in OPERATOR AUTO, perform the following:

(Step 3.5.2.1) Ensure desired change within Calculated Capability Curve.

(Step 3.5.2.2) IF turbine load will increase or decrease more than 10 MWs, notify Dispatcher of expected load change.

(Step 3.5.2.3) Depress LOAD RATE.

(Step 3.5.2.4) Enter desired load rate in NOTE: the RD will select 2 VARIABLE DISPLAY.

MWe/Min loading rate.

(Step_3.5.2.5)_Depress ENTER.

(Step_3.5.2.6)_Depress REFERENCE.

(Step 3.5.2.7) Enter desired load in VARIABLE DISPLAY.

(Step_3.5.2.8)_Depress ENTER.

(Step_3.5.2.9)_Depress GO (Step 3.5.2.10) Check load changes at selected rate.

OP/1/A/61 00/003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATIONS ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE CRS (Step 3.37.13) Continue power increase to NOTE: The power increase 95% RTP.

will be at 2 MWe/minute.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Following this, Power Range Instrument N41 Lower Detector will fail HIGH.

The operator will enter AP/1/A15500/16, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation, and remove N41 from service, including the control power fuse from the instrument sealing in the RPS logic, and override the input from the N41 Channel to the overpower Rod Stop, permitting power escalation to 100%. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation.

Booth Operator Instructions:

insert MAL-ENBO13A = 100 Indications Available:

MC8 Indication for PR-41 indicates 100%

MCB Annunciator 1AD-2/B-2 UPPER DET HI FLUX DEV OR AUTO DEFEAT MCB Annunciator 1AD-2/B-3 POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVIATION MCB Annunciator 1AD-2/C-8 P-R OVERPOWER ROD STOP MCB Annunciator 1AD-6/F-8 OPDT PROTECTION ALERT Time Pos.

Expected Actions/Behavior RO (Step 4) Check P/R channels ONLY ONE NOTE: A channel Check will CHANNEL FAILED.

reveal that only the Upper Detector on N41 has failed.

CRS (Step 5) Secure any power increase in NOTE: The power increase progress.

will be stabilized.

Comments AP/1/N5500/16, MALFUNCTION OF NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION CASE Ill, POWER RANGE MALFUNCTION RO RO CRS (Step 1) Place control rods in manual.

(Step 2) Check S/G levels AT PROGRAMMED LEVEL.

(Step 3) Announce occurrence on paging system.

NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

2 Page 14 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Range Channel N41 fails HIGH

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

2 Page 15 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Range Channel N41 fails HIGH Time Pos.

RO BOP Expected Actions/Behavior (Step 6) Check the following interlocks IN REQUIRED STATE FOR EXISTING PLANT CONDITONS:

P-7 Lo Power Ax Trips Blocked P-8 Hi Pwr Lo Flo Ax Trip Blocked P-1O Nuclear at Power.

(Step 7) Perform the following actions at the MISCELLANEOUS CONTROL AND INDICATION PANEL drawer:

Place the appropriate ROD STOP BYPASS switch to the failed channel position.

Place the POWER MISMATCH BYPASS switch to the failed channel position Comments NOTE: The BOP will operate the switch for N41.

NOTE: The BOP will place the switch in the N41 position.

BOP (Step 9) Perform the following action at the COMPARATOR AND RATE drawer:

Place the COMPARATOR CHANNEL NOTE: The BOP will place DEFEAT switch to the failed channel the switch in the N41 position.

position.

Check the COMPARATOR DEFEAT light LIT.

BOP (Step 8) Perform the following actions at the DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR drawer:

Place the UPPER SECTION switch to the failed channel position.

Check the CHANNEL DEFEAT light for the upper section LIT.

Place the LOWER SECTION switch to the failed channel position.

Check the CHANNEL DEFEAT light for the lower section LIT.

NOTE: The BOP will place the switch in the N41 position.

NOTE: The BOP will place the switch in the N41 position.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

2 Page 16 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Range Channel N41 fails HIGH Time

Pos, BOP BOP BOPI AC Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 10) Trip bistables of failed channel as follows:

Remove Control Power fuses from POWER RANGE A drawer for failed channel.

IF Power Range Cabinet shows evidence of damage (i.e. visual smoke or abnormal smell)

(Step 1 1) Check the following status lights for the failed channel LIT:

NUC OVERPOWER ROD STOP CH 1(11, III, IV) BYP (1SI-19)

P/A HI FLUX LO STPT (1SI-2)

P/A HI FLUX HI STPT (1SI-2)

P/A HI FLUX RATE (1SI-3)

Comments NOTE: This action will cause Annunciators to alarm on MCB Panel 1AD-2.

NOTE: There is no such evidence displayed.

BOP/

(Step 13) Check the following status lights on RO 1SI-18--LIT:

P/A LO SETPOINT TRAIN A TRIP BLOCKED P/R LO SETPOINT TRAIN B TRIP BLOCKED BOP/

RO (Step 12) Check the following annunciator lights LIT:

P/A HI VOLTAGE FAILURE (1AD-2, F-3)

P/A HI FLUX HI STPT ALERT (1AD-2, A-3)

P/R HI FLUX RATE ALERT (1AD-2, A 1)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

2 Page 17 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Range Channel N41 fails HIGH RO RO RO RO CRS CRS (Step 14) Check all CF control valves IN AUTO.

(Step 15) Ensure operable P/A channel selected to record on NIS Recorder.

NOTE: The RO will ensure that N41 is NOT selected to be recorded.

(Step 16) Adjust control rods to maintain T Avg at T-Ref.

(Step 17) WHEN T-Avg within 1°F of T-Ref AND auto rod control desired, THEN return control rods to auto.

NOTE: The Control Rods will be placed back in AUTO.

(Step 18) instruct IAE to trip the following bistables associated with failed P/R channel within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of failure PER IP/11A13090101 4 (Tripping inoperable Protection Channels):

OPDT NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address tripping the Bistables.

CRS (Step 20) IF AT ANY TIME IAE completes Step 18, THEN check the following status lights for affected P/R LIT:

For P/R N-41 NC LOOP A OPDT RX TRIP (1SI-7)

NC LOOP A OTDT AX TRIP (1SI-7)

OTDT If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

(Step 19) IF AT ANY TIME failed P/A channel is repaired prior to IAE tripping bistables, THEN perform the following:

Inform IAE that bistables are no longer required to be tripped.

NOTE: The Power Range Channel will NOT be repaired.

GOTOStep21.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

2 Page 18 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Range Channel N41 fails HIGH Time Pos.

CRS CRS

.I LAP1.U ML1UJIItJdVIU1:

F%--

(Step 21) WHEN malfunctioning P/R channel repaired, THEN

,Vl1UhIJL NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 33.1, REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM (RTS)

INSTRUMENTATION GAS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1 CRS ACTIONS LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Power Range Channel N41 fails HIGH N131 Scenario #

2 Event #

2 Page 19 of 62 T. One or more channel(s) inoperable.

NOTE: The CRS will likely refer to Section 2, Page 11 of the Technical Specification Reference Manual.

NOTE: This Action is associated with Functions 2.a and 3 (Hi Flux Hi setpoint and hi positive rate trips).

NOTE: This Action is associated with Functions 2.b, 6 and 7 (Hi Flux Lo setpoint, OPDT and OTDT trips).

NOTE: This Action is associated with Functions 1 6.b and 16.c (P-7 and P-8).

NOTE: This Action is associated with Function 1 6.d (P-i 0).

Time Pos.

Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One or more A.1 Enter the Immediately Functions Condition with one or referenced in more Table 3.3.1-1 required for the channels channel(s).

inoperable.

D. One channel 0.1.1 Only required inoperable to be performed 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> form when the discovery of Power Range THERMAL Neutron Flux POWER >75%

Input to QPTFt RTP is inoperable Perform SR 3.2.4.2 AND Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> AND thereafter.

0.1.2 Place channel in trip.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR 0.2 Be in MODE 3 78 Hours E. One channel E.1 Place channel 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> inoperable, in trip.

OR 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> E.2 Be in MODE 3 S. One or more S.1 Verify 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> channel(s) interlock is in inoperable, required state for existing unit conditions.

OR S.2 Be in MODE 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> 3.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> T.1 Verify interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions.

OR T.2 Be in MODE 2 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

2 Page 20 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Range Channel N41 fails HIGH Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

3 Page 21 of 62 Event

Description:

Steam Dump Valve fails OPEN Next, the Steam Dump Valve SB-3 will slowly fail to FULL OPEN due to a valve positioner failure.

The crew will enter AP/1/A15500/O1, Steam Leak, stabilize turbine load, attempt to close, and ultimately isolate the valve.

Booth Operator Instructions:

insert REM-SB0003 =.25, Ramp =

120 seconds Indications Available:

1SB-3 Red status light LIT MWe decreasing Tavg-Tref deviation rising Rods stepping out in AUTO Rx Power rising Steam flow rising Time Pose Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONTROL ROOM CREW EXPECTATIONS MANUAL RO Transient load changes: Manual is preferred NOTE: The crew may immediately reduce 2OMWe and then diagnose an overpower reduce as needed to maintain Rx power less condition and adjust turbine than pre-transient condition. After the initial load per the Crew Expectation 20 MWe load reduction, it is preferred that Manual.

the operators use multiple and diverse indications to determine how much more load should be reduced. TPBE on the OAC updates once per minute. Other indications (PR meters and Delta T meters) will indicate reactor response more quickly and will enable the operators to control the plant even more precisely. (This combines the Operator Fundamental of Conservatism and Controlling Plant Evolutions Precisely).

NOTE: It is likely that the operator will take actions to isolate the Steam Dump Valve prior to being directed by the CRS.

(Step 13)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-i Scenario #

3 Event #

3 Page 22 of 62 Event

Description:

Steam Dump Valve fails OPEN Excore Nis LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%.

Time Pos.

Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP/1/N5500/O1, STEAM LEAK CRS (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

RO (Step 2) Reduce turbine load to maintain the following:

NC Loop D/Ts LESS THAN 60°F DIT T-Avg AT T-REF.

CRS (Step 3) Check containment entry IN NOTE: A Containment Entry is PROGRESS.

NOT in progress.

CRS (Step 3 RNO) GO TO Step 5.

BOP (Step 5) Check Pzr pressure prior to event

GREATER THAN P-li (1955 PSIG).

BOP (Step 6) Check Pzr level STABLE OR GOING UP.

BOP (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME while in this NOTE: This is a Continuous procedure Pzr level cannot be maintained Action. The CRS will make stable, THEN RETURN TO Step 6.

both board operators aware.

CRS (Step 8) GO TO Step 12.

CRS (Step 12) Announce occurrence on paging NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO system.

to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

3 Page 23 of 62 Event

Description:

Steam Dump Valve fails OPEN RO (Step 13) Identify and isolate leak on Unit 1 as follows:

(Step 1 3a) Check SM PORVs CLOSED.

RO (Step 13.b) Check condenser dump NOTE: Steam Dump Valve valves CLOSED.

1 SB-3 will be OPEN.

RO (Step 13b RNO) IF steam dumps required to be closed, THEN perform the following:

Select OFF RESET on the following NOTE: Selecting OFF/RESET switches:

will have no effect.

STEAM DUMP INTLK BYPASS CHANNEL A STEAM DUMP INTLK BYPASS CHANNEL B IF valve will not close, THEN dispatch NOTE: The CRS will dispatch operator to CLOSE condenser dump an operator to close the valve isolation valve, isolation valve.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, THEN REM SB 0002 = 0 [delay 60 seconds] to close SB-3 inlet isolation.

RO WHEN leaking condenser dump valve is isolated OR repaired, THEN return the following switches to ON:

STEAM DUMP INTLK BYPASS CHANNEL A STEAM DUMP INTLK BYPASS CHANNEL B.

BOP (Step 13.c) Check containment conditions NORMAL:

Containment temperature Containment pressure Containment humidity

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

3 Page 24 of 62 Event

Description:

Steam Dump Valve fails OPEN Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Containment floor and equipment sump level.

RO /

(Step 13.d) Check TD CA pump OFF.

BOP BOP (Step 1 3.e) Check valves on STEAM NOTE: One or more of these LINE DRAIN VALVES board (1 MC-9)

valves may be cycling. The CLOSED.

RNO will direct closing the valves.

CRS (Step 13.f) Check opposite Unit (Unit 2)

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO STEAM HEADER PRESSURE

for AS Header pressure.

GREATER THAN 200 PSIG.

If so, Floor Instructor report as U2 RO that U2 Steam Header pressure is 1 000 psig.

(Step 1 3.g) Dispatch operator to check NOTE: The CRS may dispatch for leaks.

an AO to look for leaks.

If so, Floor Instructor:

acknowledge.

Booth Instructor: Report back in 3-5 minutes that there are no leaks.

NOTE: The CRS may NOT dispatch AOs to look for leaks because it is understood that the Steam Dump valve opening was the reason that AP-1 was entered.

BOP (Step 14) Check UST level STABLE OR GOING UP.

CRS (Step 15) Evaluate unit shutdown as follows:

Check unit status IN MODE 1 OR 2.

Determine if unit shutdown or load NOTE: CRS may call reduction is warranted based on the WCC/Management to address following criteria:

the startup.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

Size of leak Location of leak

Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

3 Page Event

Description:

Steam Dump Valve fails OPEN 25 of 62 Time Pos.

Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Rate of depletion of secondary inventory IF steam is leaking from a secondary NOTE: No Relief Valve is heater relief OR MSR relief valve, leaking.

THEN reducing turbine load....

IF turbine trip will isolate steam leak NOTE: A Turbine Trip is NOT (such as feedwater heater leak or needed to isolate the steam MSR leak)...

leak.

Check unit shutdown or load reduction

NOTE: Shutdown/Load REQUIRED.

Reduction will NOT be required.

CRS (Step 15.c RNO) Perform the following:

Maintain present plant conditions until leak can be isolated or repaired.

Exit this procedure.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

NOTE: The CRS may address Tech Specs based on plant response.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS CRS ACTIONS CRS CRS LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for pressurizer pressure, RCS average temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be within the limits specified in Table 3.4.1-1.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

NOTE: If NC System Pressure drops to < 2216 psig on the failure, then TS 3.4.1 might be entered and exited during the transient.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

3 Page 26 of 62 Event

Description:

Steam Dump Valve fails OPEN CONDITION A. Pressurizer pressure or RCS average tern perature DNB pararneters not within urn its.

A.1 REQUIRED ACTION Restore DNB pararn eter(s) to within lirnit.

Time Pos.

Expected Actions/Behavior Comments COMPLETION TIME 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Subsequently, a Zone lB Lockout causes PCB 11 and 12 to open, as well as the lB Main Generator Breaker to open and the turbine to automatically runback to 56%. The operator will implement AP/1/A15500/03, Load Rejection.

During the runback the operator will notice that the rods do not move in auto, and the operator will need to drive rods in manually. When the Control Rods are driven inward, one Control Bank D rod will stick in its original position.

Additionally, on the runback the standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster Pump will fail to automatically start requiring the operator to manually start both pumps.

After stabilizing the plant, the operator will address AP/1/A15500/14, Rod Control Malfunction, to address the Stuck Rod. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits, and Technical Specification 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio.

Booth Operator Instructions:

insert MAL-EPOO3C = ACTIVE delay = 10 seconds insert MAL-IRE0O9 = FAIL_OF_AUTO Insert MAL IREO1OD12 =TRUE X13_098_1 = 1 (1C Hotwell Pump fails to Auto Start)

X13_101_1 = 1 (1C CBP fails to Auto Start)

Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator lAD-i, D6, DEH TURBINE RUNBACK, alarms.

Turbine Generator MWe lowering.

Tavg-Tref deviation with no Auto Rod motion.

MCB Annunciator 1 AD-li, K3, UNIT 1 LOCKOUT, alarms.

1 of 2 Main Generator Breakers is OPEN.

PCB-ii and 12 OPEN.

AP111N5500103, LOAD REJECTION Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

4 Page 27 of 62 Event

Description:

Zone 1 B Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rod! Standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster Pumps fail to Auto Start

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

4 Page 28 of 62 Event

Description:

Zone 1 B Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rod! Standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster Pumps fail to Auto Start Time Pos.

RO RO RO Expected Actions/Behavior (Step 1) Ensure control rods in auto.

(Step 2) Check Turbine Generator response as follows:

Check Generator TIED TO GRID.

Check Generator output GOING DOWN AS REQUIRED.

(Step 3) Check control rod response as follows:

Check control banks MOVING IN AS R EQU I R ED.

(Step 3a RNO) IF no rods will move in auto; THEN perform the following:

Place Control Rods in manual.

Comments Immediate Action NOTE: While the RO will see that the Control Rods are in AUTO, it will also be observed that Rods are NOT moving, and that they are required to move. The RO will inform the CRS of the situation, and the CRS will direct that the RO control the rods in MANUAL to maintain Tavg-Tref.

RO (Step 3b RNO) IF two or more control rods NOTE: Only one Control Rod are misaligned greater that 24 steps...

(D12) is misaligned from Group D.

RO RO Insert rods to reduce T-avg equal to programmed T-Ref.

If no rods will move, THEN Check all rods ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK.

NOTE: The Control Rods will NOT be moving in as required.

NOTE: The Control Rods will move in MANUAL.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event

Description:

Zone 1 B Lockout causing Runback?Rods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rod? Standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster Pumps fail to Auto Start Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

4 Page 29 of 62 Pos.

BOP RO CRS Expected Actions/Behavior (Step 4) Check CM system response as follows:

Standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster pumps RUNNING.

(Step 4a RNO) Start pumps 1CM-420 (Unit 1 Generator Load Rejection Bypass control)

OPEN.

(Step 5) IF runback to 56% power in effect, THEN ensure turbine inlet pressure going down to less than or equal to 500 PSIG.

(Step 6) Announce: UNIT 1 LOAD REJECTION, NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL STAY OUT OF UNIT 1 TURBINE BLDG.

Comments NOTE: The BOP will need to manually start both the standby Hotwell Pump and the Standby Booster Pump.

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

CRS I (Step 7 RNO) Perform the following:

RO Designate an operator to continuously monitor reactor power.

IF AT ANY TIME reactor power is less NOTE: This is a Continuous than 20%, THEN perform Step 8 to Action. The CRS will stabilize reactor power.

designate the RO to observe this action.

CRS GO TO Step 9.

RO (Step 9) Check condenser dump valves

MODULATING OPEN.

RO (Step 7) Check PIR meters LESS THAN 20%.

Time

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

4 Page 30 of 62 Event

Description:

Zone 1 B Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rod! Standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster Pumps fail to Auto Start Time Pos.

BOP Expected Actions/Behavior (Step 10) Check IPB AIR FLOW TROUBLE alarm (lAD-li, J-5)

DARK.

Comments RO (Step 10 RNO) within 15 minutes of lockout initiation, restore 1 PB cooling as follows:

IF MAIN GENERATOR less than NOTE: The Main Generator is 10,000 amps...

NOT < 10,000 amps.

CRS Dispatch operator to check the following NOTE: The CRS will dispatch areas for signs of fire and notify Control an AO.

Room of results within 5 minutes:

1A Main Step Up Transformer 1 B Main Step Up Transformer Unit 1 IPB Fan Enclosure area.

CRS Record approximate time lockout occurred.

CRS Do not continue until operator has been Booth Instructor:

given sufficient time (approximately Within 3 minutes, as AO minutes) to complete fire inspection, report that there does NOT appear to be a fire around the transformers or IPB Fan area.

CRS IF operator confirms a fire has NOTE: No fire has occurred.

occurred...

CRS IF operator confirms no fire has NOTE: The CRS will dispatch occurred, THEN dispatch operator to an AO.

perform the following at the Unit 1 IPB ALARM PANEL:

Depress LOCKOUT OVERRIDE on the fan in MAN.

IF IPB fan in MAN cannot be Booth Instructor:

started, Within 3 minutes, as AO report that the Lockout Overide has been pressed, and the 1A IPB Fan is running.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

4 Page 31 of 62 Event

Description:

Zone 1 B Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rod! Standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster Pumps fail to Auto Start Time Pos.

CRS BOP RO CRS Expected Actions/Behavior IF neither IPB fan can be started (Step 1 1) Check Pzr pressure control response as follows:

Ensure Pzr heater are in auto.

Ensure Pzr spray control valves are in auto.

Check Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

Check Pzr spray control valves CLOSED (Step 12) Check load rejection DUE TO LOSS OF CF PUMP.

(Step 12 RNO) GO TO Step 15 Comments NOTE: The 1A IPB Fan is running.

NOTE: The load rejection was NOT due to a Loss of CF Pump.

RO (Step 19) Check Main Generator as follows:

Check Generator Breakers EITHER GENERATOR BREAKERS CLOSED.

Check Generator TIED TO GRID.

Check generator power factor 0.9 TO 1.0 LAGGING.

RO RO CRS (Step 15) Check turbine inlet pressure

LESS THAN 330 PSIG.

(Step 15 RNO) Perform the following:

IF AT ANY TIME turbine inlet pressure drops to less than 330 PSIG, THEN GO TO Step 16.

GO TO Step 19.

NOTE: Turbine Inlet pressure is 470 psig.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Time Pos.

Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS GO TO Step 20.

CRS (Step 20) Ensure the following have been NOTE: The CRS may ask implemented:

OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

RPIOIAI5700/000 (Classification of Emergency)

RP/01A157001010 (NRC Immediate Notification Requirements).

RO (Step 21) WHEN transient is over, THEN perform the following:

Check reactor power GREATER THAN 40%.

Check the following on in service CF pump(s):

Low pressure governor control IN AUTO High pressure governor control IN AUTO.

Check SM flow on all S/Gs LESS NOTE: SM flow is 58%.

THAN 75%.

Check SM flow on all S/Gs LESS NOTE: SM flow is 58%.

THAN 25%.

RO (Step 21d RNO) Perform the following:

Check the following CF control bypass valves CLOSED:

iCE-i O4AB (1A S/G CF Control Bypass)

- CLOSED iCE-i O5AB (lB S/G CF Control Bypass)

- CLOSED iCE-i O6AB (1C S/G CF Control Bypass)

- CLOSED Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

4 Page 32 of 62 Event

Description:

Zone 1 B Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rod! Standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster Pumps fail to Auto Start

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

4 Page 33 of 62 Event

Description:

Zone 1 B Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rod! Standby HotweU and Condensate Booster Pumps fail to Auto Start Time Pos.

RO CRS BOP no RO Expected Actions/Behavior 1 CF-i O7AB (1 D S/G CF Control Bypass)

- CLOSED Comments IF any CF control bypass valve is open...

GO TO Step 21.f.

NOTE: All CF control bypass valves are closed.

Slowly CLOSE 1CM-420 (Unit 1 Generator Load Rejection Bypass Control) while monitoring Condensate Booster pump suction pressure.

NOTE: The BOP will close 1 CM-420.

WHEN 1CM-420 is closed, THEN check load rejection signal reset (OAC turn on code CM).

Reposition manual loader for 1 CM-420 to 100% OPEN.

IF thermal power is greater than 15%,

THEN within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of reaching stable conditions, ensure each power range channel is within 2% of heat balance.

NOTE: The BOP will open 1 CM-420.

CRS (Step 22 RNO) GO TO Step 24.

Check T-Avg GREATER THAN 561 °F.

Check CONTROL ROD BANK LO LO LIMIT alarm (1AD-2, B-9)

DARK.

Check CONTROL ROD BANK LO LIMIT alarm (1AD-2, A-9)

DARK.

NOTE: 1AD-2, A-9 may be LIT.

If so, the operator will perform Step 21.1 RNO.

(Step 21.1 RNO) Ensure the CONTROL ROD BANK LO LIMIT alarm clears as Xenon builds in.

(Step 22) Check load rejection DUE TO LOSS OF CF PUMP.

NOTE: The load rejection was NOT due to a Loss of CF Pump.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

4 Page 34 of 62 Event

Description:

Zone 1 B Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rod/ Standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster Pumps fail to Auto Start Time Pos.

BOP BOP Expected Actions/Behavior (Step 24) Shutdown unnecessary running plant equipment as follows:

Condensate Booster pumps and place in auto.

Hotwell pumps and place in auto.

IF desired to secure, THEN dispatch operator to shutdown PER OP/i /B/6250/004 (Feedwater Heater Vents, Drains and Bleed System).2 (System Shutdown) the following:

Unit 1 C Heater Drain Tank pumps Unit 1 G Heater Drain Tank pumps.

Comments NOTE: The GAS may transition to AP-14 based on the failure of Rods to move in AUTO, and the stuck rod.

RO (Step 26) WHEN condenser dump valves closed AND no longer required for temperature control, THEN reset C-7A using STEAM DUMP SELECT switch.

NOTE: The GAS will transition to AP-14 based on the failure of Rods to move in AUTO, and the stuck rod.

CR5 (Step 25) IF power change greater than 15%

in one hour, THEN notify Primary Chemistry to perform required Tech Spec sampling.

NOTE: The CR5 may call Chemistry to address the power decrease.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

4 Page 35 of 62 Event

Description:

Zone 1 B Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rod/ Standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster Pumps fail to Auto Start Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP/11N550011 4, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION RO (Step 1) IF two or more rods are either Immediate Action dropped OR misaligned by great than 24 NOTE: Only one Rod is steps,...

misaligned during this event.

RO (Step 2) Place control rods in manual.

Immediate Action NOTE: The RO will place the rods in Manual.

RO (Step 3) Check rod movement STOPPED.

Immediate Action RO (Step 4) Check all rods ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK.

RO (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following.

IF misaligned rod(s) due to DRPI NOTE: Only one rod is indication failure only,...

misaligned.

IF T-Avg has gone down NOTE: The RO may adjust load on the Turbine to maintain Tavg-Tref = 1°F.

GO TO Enclosure 1 (Response To Dropped or Misaligned Rod)

NOTE: The CRS will transition to Enclosure 1.

AP111AJ5500114, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION ENCLOSURE 1, RESPONSE TO DROPPED OR MISALIGNED ROD CRS (Step 1) Announce occurrence on paging NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 system.

RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

4 Page 36 of 62 Event

Description:

Zone 1 B Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rod? Standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster Pumps fail to Auto Start Pos.

CRS RO CRS Expected Actions/Behavior (Step 2) Dispatch rod control system qualified IAE to perform the following:

Correct cause of misaligned rod.

Notify Control Room operators when auto or manual rod motion is available for reactivity control.

(Step 3) Do not move rods until IAE determines rod movement is available.

(Step 4) IF AT ANY TIME a runback occurs while in this procedure, THEN Comments NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/IAE as appropriate.

NOTE: A runback has already occurred, and the Control Rods have been moved in MANUAL.

CRS (Step 8) REFER TO the following Tech Specs while continuing in the enclosure:

Tech Spec 3.1.4 (Rod Group Alignment NOTE: The CRS may check Limits).

the TS now and conclude that LCO 3.1.4 must be entered.

Tech Spec 3.1.5 (Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits).

RO RO RO (Step 5) Check ROD CONTROL URGENT FAILURE alarm (1AD-2, A-b)

DARK.

(Step 6) Use OAC point Ml P1385 (Reactor Thermal Power, Best Estimate) to determine reactor power in subsequent steps.

(Step 7) Check AFD (Tech Spec 3.2.3)

WITHIN TECH SPEC LIMITS.

Time

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

4 Page 37 of 62 Event

Description:

Zone 1 B Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rod! Standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster Pumps fail to Auto Start CRS CRS Tech Spec 3.1.6 (Control Bank Insertion Limits).

Tech Spec 3.2.4 (QPTR)

NOTE: The CRS may check the TS now and conclude that LCO 3.2.4 must be entered.

Ensure shutdown margin calculation is performed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

Examiner NOTE:

It is intended that the CRS evaluate the TS at this point.

If the CRS requests the WCC evaluate the TS, and continues with Enclosure 1 of AP14, move to the next event, and evaluate the TS after the exam has been completed.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.1.4, ROD GROUP ALIGNMENT LIMITS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME LCO 3.1.4 All shutdown and control rods shall be OPERABLE, with all individual indicated rod positions within 12 steps of their group step counter demand position.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

4 Page 38 of 62 Event

Description:

Zone 1 B Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rod! Standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster Pumps fail to Auto Start Time Pos.

Expe ed Actions/Be avior Comments B. One rod not B.lRestore rod 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> within to within alignment alignment

limits, limits.

OR B.2.1.1 Verify SDM is 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> within the limit specified in the COLR.

OR B.2.1.2 Initiate boration to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> restore SDM to within limit.

AND B.2.2 Reduce 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> THERMAL POWER to

<75% RTP.

AND B.2.3 Verify SDM is within the Once per limit specified 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> in the COLR.

AND 5.2.4 Perform SR 3.2.1.1.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> AND B.2.5 Perform SR 3.2.2.1.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> AND B.2.6 Re-evaluate safety 5 days analyses and confirm results remain valid for duration of operation under these conditions.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.2A, QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO CRS LCO 3.2.4 The QPTR shall be 1.02.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

4 Page 39 of 62 Event

Description:

Zone 1 B Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rod! Standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster Pumps fail to Auto Start A. QPTR not within limit.

REQUIRED ACTION A.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER 3% from RTP for each 1% of QPTR

>102.

AND A.2 Perform SR 3.2.4.1 and reduce THERMAL POWER 3% from RTP for each 1% of QPTR

>1.02.

AND A.3 Perform SR 3.2.1.1 and SR 3.2.2.1.

AND A.4 Reduce Power Range Neutron Flux High Trip Setpoint 3%

for each 1%

of QPTR>

1.02.

AND COMPLETION TIME 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 with THERMAL POWER >50% RTP.

ACTIONS CONDITION 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> AND Once per 7 days thereafter 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> A.5 Reevaluate safety Prior to

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

4 Page 40 of 62 Event

Description:

Zone 1 B Lockout causing Runback/Rods tail to move in AUTO/Stuck Rod? Standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster Pumps fail to Auto Start Time Pos.

Expected Actions/Behavior Comments analyses and increasing confirm THERMAL results POWER above remain valid the more for duration restrictive limit of operation of Required under this Action A.1 or condition.

A.2 AND A.6 Calibrate Prior to excore increasing detectors to THERMAL show zero POWER above QPT.

the more restrictive limit of Required Action A.1 or A.2 AND A.7 Perform SR 3.2.1.1 and Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> SR 32.2.1.

after reaching RTP OR Within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> after increasing THERMAL POWER above the more restrictive limit of Required Action A.1 or A.2 At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move Events #5-8.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

5, 6, 7 & 8 Page 41 of 62 Event

Description:

Feedline Break (Doghouse) 1 D/ATWS/1 A MDCA fails to START automatically/i A TDCA fails to START automatically/i B Boric Acid Transfer Pump fails to START Following this, a slowly developing Feedline Break will occur in the 1 D Feedline inside the Doghouse, however, the Reactor will fail to trip both automatically and manually from the control room.

The operator will enter EP/1/A15000/E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and immediately transition to EP/1/A15000/FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. The operator will need to direct that the Rod Drive MG Sets be tripped locally.

On the reactor trip, the in-service CA Pumps will fail to start automatically, and will need to be manually started. When attempted, the both the 1A MDCA Pump and TDCA Pump will start manually.

When the operator attempts to emergency Borate the 1 B Boric Acid Pump will fail to start, and the operator will have to implement emergency boration via the FWST. The operator will continue to drive rods in manually until reactor power is less than 5%.

The operator will then return to E-O and transition to EP/1IN5000IE-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, to isolate the 1D Steam Generator.

The scenario will terminate when the crew transitions out of E-2 to either EP/1IAI5000IES-1.1, SI Termination, or EPI1IAI5000/E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

Booth Operator Instructions:

insert MAL-CF0O6D = 1760000 (600 second Ramp)

MAL-NV044 = Racked_OUT (BA Pump 1 B Start Failure [auto/manual])

Indications Available:

1 D SG Narrow Range level starts to lower MCB Annunciator 1AD-4/B-4, S/G D LEVEL DEVIATION OAC ALARM OUTER DOGHOUSE AREA TEMP AREA 1 OAC ALARM OUTER DOGHOUSE AREA TEMP AREA 2 MCB Annunciator 1AD-5/H-6, OUTER DOGHOUSE LEVEL HI Time Pos.

Expected Actions/Behavior RO/

BOP (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

Comments NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of E-O, prior to the CRS addressing the EP.

EPI1/A15000/E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip:

Immediate Action

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

5, 6, 7 & 8 Page 42 of 62 Event

Description:

Feedline Break (Doghouse) 1 D/ATWS/1 A MDCA fails to START automatically/i A TDCA fails to START automatically/i B Boric Acid Transfer Pump fails to START All rod bottom lights LIT Reactor trip and bypass breakers

OPEN I/A amps GOING DOWN.

NOTE: The reactor will NOT trip automatically or manually.

RO (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following:

Immediate Action Trip reactor.

IF reactor will not trip, THEN perform the following:

Implement EP/1 /A/5000/F-O (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).

CRS GO TO EP/1/A/5000/FR-S.1 (Response To Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS).

NOTE: The CRS will transition to FR-S.l.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

5, 6, 7 & 8 Page 43 of 62 Event

Description:

Feedline Break (Doghouse) 1 D/ATWS/1 A MDCA fails to START automatically/i A TDCA fails to START automatically/i B Boric Acid Transfer Pump fails to START NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AC or U2 RO to trip the reactor locally.

If so, Floor Instructor:

Acknowledge as AO.

If so, Booth Instructor:

Upon exiting FR-S.1:

dellA MAL-IPEOO1A = TRUE (Train A Reactor Trip Auto Failure) dellA MAL-IPEOO1B = TRUE (Train B Reactor Trip Auto Failure)

After Emergency Boration has been initiated, as AO, Report that the Rx trip breakers have been tripped locally.

EP/1/N5000/FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of FR-S.1, prior to the CRS addressing the EP.

RO (Step 1) Check Reactor Trip:

Immediate Action All rod bottom lights

- LIT Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN hR amps - GOING DOWN.

RO (Step 1 RNO) Perform the following:

Immediate Action Trip the reactor.

IF reactor will not trip, THEN manually NOTE: The RO will manually insert rods.

drive Rods inward.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

5, 6, 7 & 8 Page 44 of 62 Event

Description:

Feedline Break (Doghouse) 1 D/ATWS/i A MDCA fails to START automatically/i A TDCA fails to START automatically/i B Boric Acid Transfer Pump fails to START Continually drive rods inward until the Reactor is tripped or until the control rods are on the bottom.

Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor power remains higher than it otherwise would if the action is not taken. Performance of the critical task would move the reactor power lower to prevent a subsequent an unnecessary challenge to reactor core operational limits. A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control.

BOP (Step 2) Check Turbine Trip:

All throttle valves CLOSED.

RO/

(Step 3) Monitor Foldout page.

BOP BOP (Step 4) Check proper CA pump status:

MD CA pumps ON.

NOTE: The 1 B MDCA Pump is OOS.

BOP (Step 4.a RNO) Start pumps.

NOTE: The 1A MDCA Pump has failed to start automatically, and will require MANUAL start.

BOP Check N/R Level in at least 3 S/Gs

NOTE: All SIG levels will be GREATER THAN 17%.

lower than 17%.

BOP (Step 4.b RNO) Ensure TD CA pump is NOTE: The TDCA Pump has

running, failed to start automatically, and will require MANUAL start.

CRITICAL TASK:

FR-Si C

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

5, 6, 7 & 8 Page 45 of 62 Event

Description:

Feedline Break (Doghouse) i D/ATWS/i A MDCA fails to START automatically/i A TDCA fails to START automatically/i B Boric Acid Transfer Pump fails to START BOP (Step 5) Initiate emergency boration of NC System as follows:

Ensure one NV pump

- ON Align boration flowpath as follows:

Open 1NV-265B (Ui NV Pump Boric Acid Sup_Isol).

Start both boric acid transfer pumps.

NOTE: Neither BA Transfer Pump will be running.

Check emergency boration flow

GREATER THAN 30 GPM.

BOP (Step 5.b.3 RNO) IF NV pump suction is aligned to VCT, THEN align to FWST as follows:

OPEN 1NV-221A (Ui NV Pump Suct From FWST Isol)

OPEN 1 NV-222B (Ui NV Pump Suct From FWST Isol)

CLOSE 1NV-141A (Ui VCT Outlet Isol)

CLOSE 1NV-i42B (Ui VCT Outlet NOTE: The BOP will need to Isol).

re-align the suction of the NV Pumps to the FWST since SI is likely to have NOT occurred at this point in the transient.

BOP Check if NV flowpath aligned to NC System:

1NV-244A (Ui Charging Hdr Cont Outside Isol)

OPEN.

1NV-245B (Ui Charging Hdr Cont Outside Isol)

OPEN.

Ensure charging flow is greater than emergency boration flow.

Check Pzr pressure LESS THAN 2335 PSIG.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

5, 6, 7 & 8 Page 46 of 62 Event

Description:

Feedline Break (Doghouse) 1 D/ATWS/1 A MDCA fails to START automatically/i A TDCA fails to START automatically/i B Boric Acid Transfer Pump fails to START BOP (Step 6) Close the following VQ valves:

CLOSE 1VQ-1A (Ui Cont Air Release Inside Isol)

CLOSE 1VQ-6A (Ui Cont Air Addition Inside Isol)

CLOSE 1VQ-2B (Ui Cont Air Release Outside isol)

CLOSE 1VQ-5B (Ui Cont Air Addition Outside Isol)

BOP (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure an S/i signal exists or occurs, THEN perform the following:

Have another Licensed Operator check Examiner NOTE: SI may or S/I equipment PER Enclosure 3 may NOT have occurred at this point.

If it has, or when it does, the CRS will hand Enclosure 3 off totheBOP.

Examiner following the BOP, continue with the Enclosure 3 scripted steps below.

Examiners following the CRS/RO proceed to FR-S.i Step 8 on Page 49.

CRS Continue with this procedure.

EP/1 /N5000/FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS ENCLOSURE 3, SUBSEQUENT S/I ACTIONS Examiner NOTE: Follow the actions associated with if BOP is assigned by CRS to perform.

BOP (Step 1) Check i ETA and 1 ETB

ENERGIZED.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

5, 6, 7 & 8 Page 47 of 62 Event

Description:

Feedline Break (Doghouse) 1D/ATWS/1A MDCA fails to START automatically/i A TDCA fails to START automatically/i B Boric Acid Transfer Pump fails to START BOP BOP (Step 2) Check both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1 SI-i 4) LIT.

(Step 3) Check all Feedwater Isolation status lights (iSI-4)

LIT.

(Step 4) Check Phase A RESET lights

DARK.

(Step 5) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):

Groupsl,2,5DARK.

Group3LIT.

Group 4 LIT AS REQUIRED.

Group6-LIT Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 6) Check proper CA pump status:

MD CA pumps

- ON NOTE: The 1A MD CA Pump should be RUNNING.

(Step 5.d RNO) GO TO Step 5.f.

Check the following:

OAC-INSERVICE LOCA Sequencer Actuated status light (iSl-14) on energized train(s)

LIT, Perform the following on energized train(s):

Check OAC Monitor Light Program (MONL) for Group 6 windows that are dark.

Align valves as required.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

5, 6, 7 & 8 Page 48 of 62 Event

Description:

Feedline Break (Doghouse) i D/ATWS/i A MDCA fails to START automatically/i A TDCA fails to START automatically/i B Boric Acid Transfer Pump fails to START BOP BOP BOP (Step 7) Check all KC pumps ON.

(Step 8) Check both RN pumps ON.

(Step 9) Notify Unit 2 to perform the following:

NOTE: The BOP will direct the U2 BOP to start the 2A RN Pump.

Floor Instructor: As U2 RO report 2A RN Pump is running.

Booth Instructor:

insert LOA-RN087 (Start 2A RN Pump) insert LOA-RN083 8050.000000 delay=0 ramp=10 (Unit 2 Train A Demand Flow)

(Step 6.a RNO) Start pumps.

NOTE: The lB MD CA Pump is QOS, and will NOT be started.

N/R level in at least 3 SIGs GREATER THAN 17%.

(Step 6.b RNO) Ensure TD CA pump on.

NOTE: The TDCA Pump should be RUNNING.

BOP (Step 10) Check all S/G pressures

NOTE: The BOP will GREATER THAN 775 PSIG.

determine that the 1 D SG is depressurizing.

BOP (Step 10 RNO) Perform the following:

Check the following valves closed:

Start 2A RN pump.

THROTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum for existing plant conditions.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES..D-2 Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

5, 6, 7 & 8 Page 49 of 62 Event

Description:

Feedline Break (Doghouse) 1 D/ATWS/i A MDCA fails to START automatically/i A TDCA fails to START automatically/i B Boric Acid Transfer Pump fails to START AIIMSIVs All MSIV bypass valves All SM PORVs.

IF valves open...

NOTE: All Valves are Closed.

BOP (Step 13) Notify OSM or other SRO to NOTE: The BOP may ask perform EP/1/N5000/G-1 (Generic OSM to address.

Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions Followin an S/I)

If so, Floor Instructor g

acknowledge as OSM.

NOTE: The BOP will report that Enclosure 3 has been completed to the CRS.

BOP BOP (Step 11) Check Containment Pressure

HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG.

(Step 12) IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure containment pressure goes above 3 PSIG, THEN perform Step 11).

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

EP/1/N5000/FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE.

RO (Step 8) Check if the following trips have occurred:

Reactor trip.

RO/

(Step 8.b) Turbine trip.

BOP RO (Step 9) Check reactor subcritical as follows:

NOTE: It is likely that the RO has driven rods in manually such that power is <5% or close to being <5%.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

5, 6, 7 & 8 Page 50 of 62 Event

Description:

Feedline Break (Doghouse) 1 D/ATWS/1 A MDCA fails to START automatically/i A TDCA fails to START automatically/i B Boric Acid Transfer Pump fails to START W/R Neutron Flux LESS THAN 5%

acknowledge as Chemistry.

Time Pos.

Expected Actions/Behavior Comments P/R channels LESS THAN 5%

I/A SUR NEGATIVE.

CRS (Step 10 ) GO TO Step 17.

RO (Step 17) Ensure adequate shutdown margin as follows:

Obtain current NC boron concentration NOTE: The CRS/RO may call from Primary Chemistry.

Chemistry.

If so, Booth Instructor WHEN current NC boron concentration is NOTE: The CRS may ask the obtained, THEN perform shutdown U2 RO to perform this action.

margin calculation PER If so Floor Instructor OPIO/A16100/006 (Reactivity Balance acknowledge as U2 RO.

Calculation).

WHEN following conditions satisfied, NOTE: This is a Continuous THEN NC System boration may be Action. The CRS will make stopped:

both board operators aware.

Uncontrolled cooldown has been NOTE: The BOP will stopped.

determine that the 1 D SG is depressurizing.

CRS (Step 18) REFER TO the following:

NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

Adequate shutdown margin is obtained.

RP/0/A/5700/000 (Classification of Emergency).

RPIO/A15700/010 (NRC Immediate Notification Requirements).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

5, 6, 7 & 8 Page 51 of 62 Event

Description:

Feedline Break (Doghouse) 1 D/ATWS/i A MDCA fails to START automatically/i A TDCA fails to START automatically/i B Boric Acid Transfer Pump fails to START CRS (Step 19) RETURN TO procedure and step NOTE: The CRS will transition in effect.

back to E-O.

Establish 450 gpm of CA Flow to the Steam Generators before transition out of FR-S.1.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish a Secondary Heat Sink through the initiation of CA flow unnecessarily challenges both the HEAT SINK and the CORE COOLING Critical Safety Functions. Additionally, the FSAR Safety Analysis results are predicated on the assumption that at least one train of safeguards actuates and delivers a minimum amount of AFW flow to the Steam Generators. Failure to perform this task, when the ability to do so exists, results in a violation of the Facility License Condition and places the plant in an unanalyzed condition.

EP/1/A15000/E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ROt (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

NOTE: Crew will carry out BOP Immediate Actions of E-O, prior to the CRS addressing the EP.

RO (Step 2) Check Reactor trip:

Immediate Action All rod bottom lights LIT Reactor trip and bypass breakers

OPEN I/RampsGOING DOWN.

RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip:

Immediate Action All throttle valves CLOSED.

BOP (Step 4) Check 1 ETA and 1 ETB

Immediate Action ENERGIZED.

CRITICAL TASK:

E-0 F

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

5, 6, 7 & 8 Page 52 of 62 Event

Description:

Feedline Break (Doghouse) 1 D/ATWS/1 A MDCA fails to START automatically/i A TDCA fails to START automatically/i B Boric Acid Transfer Pump fails to START CRS BOP BOP (Step 6) Announce Unit 1 Safety Injection.

(Step 7) Check all Feedwater Isolation status lights (1SI-4)

LIT.

(Step 8) Check Phase A RESET lights

DARK.

RO/

(Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated:

Immediate Action BOP A SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED NOTE: It is expected that SI status light (1 SI-i 8) LIT.

will either be actuated already, or REQUIRED by this time.

Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights_(1 SI-i 4) LIT.

BOP (Step 10) Check proper CA pump status:

MD CA pumps

- ON NOTE: The 1A MDCA Pump will be RUNNING.

BOP (Step 10.a RNO) Start pumps.

NOTE: No attempt will be made to start the i B MDCA Pump.

BOP CRS (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):

Groupsi,2,5DARK.

Group3LIT.

Group 4 LIT AS REQUIRED.

Group6LIT.

GOTOStep1O.

NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

5, 6, 7 & 8 Page 53 of 62 Event

Description:

Feedline Break (Doghouse) 1 D!ATWS/i A MDCA fails to START automatically/i A TDCA fails to START automatically/i B Boric Acid Transfer Pump fails to START BOP BOP BOP CRS N/R level is at least 3 SIGs GREATER THAN 17%.

(Step 1O.b RNO) Ensure TD CA pump on.

(Step 11) Check all KC pumpsON.

(Step 12) Check both RN pumps ON.

(Step 13) Notify Unit 2 to perform the following:

RO (Step 14 RNO) Perform the following:

Check the following closed:

All MSIVs All MSIV bypass valves RO Start 2A RN pump.

THROTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum for existing plant conditions.

(Step 14) Check all SIG pressures

GREATER THAN 775 PSIG.

NOTE: The TDCA Pump should be RUNNING at this time.

NOTE: The CRS will direct the U2 BOP to start the 2A RN Pump.

Floor Instructor: As U2 RO report 2A RN Pump is running.

Booth Instructor:

insert LOA-RN087 (Start 2A RN Pump) insert LOA-RN083 8050.000000 delay=0 ramp=10 (Unit 2 Train A Demand Flow)

NOTE: The 1D SG is depressurizing.

Aendix D Ooerator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

5, 6, 7 & 8 Page 54 of 62 Event

Description:

Feedline Break (Doghouse) 1 D/ATWS/1 A MDCA tails to START automatically/i A TDCA tails to START automatically/i B Boric Acid Transter Pump tails to START All SM PORVs.

IF any valve open, NOTE: All SG Valves are Closed.

ROI (Step 15) Check Containment Pressure

NOTE: Containment Pressure BOP HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG.

is normal.

BOP (Step 16) Check S/I flow:

Check NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW gauge INDICATING FLOW.

Check NC pressure LESS THAN 1600 NOTE: NC Pressure is >1600 PSIG.

psig.

BOP (Step 16.b RNO) Perform the following:

Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running_pump(s) OPEN:

1ND-68A (1A ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow lsol) 1 ND-67B (1 B ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol).

CRS IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 17.

RO/

(Step 18) Check CA flow:

BOP Total CA flow GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

CRS (Step 17) Notify OSM or other SRO to perform EP/1/A15000/G-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions Following an S/I) within 10 minutes.

NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

5, 6, 7 & 8 Page 55 of 62 Event

Description:

Feedline Break (Doghouse) 1 D/ATWS/1 A MDCA fails to START automatically/i A TDCA fails to START automatically/i B Boric Acid Transfer Pump fails to START RO CRS (Step 19) Check NC temperatures:

IF any NC pump on, THEN check NC T-Avg-STABLE OR TRENDING TO 557°F.

(Step 19 RNO) Perform the following based on plant conditions:

BOP Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 60 PS 1G.

RO WHEN N/A level in any SIG greater than NOTE: This is a Continuous 11% (32% ACC), THEN control CA flow Action. The CRS will make to maintain that S/G N/R level between both board operators aware.

11% (32% ACC) and 50%.

NOTE: All NC Pumps will be ON. Enclosure 3 may be performed if temperature is lowering.

NOTE: The CRS may assign the RO to perform this action.

If so, RO Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 3.

Other Examiners follow E-0 Actions, Step 20, on Page 57.

E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ENCLOSURE 3, UNCONTROLLED NC SYSTEM COOLDOWN Examiner NOTE: Follow the actions associated with if RO is assigned by CAS to perform.

AO/

(Step 1) Check steam dump valves

NOTE: 1SB-3 is failed OPEN, BOP CLOSED.

but isolated.

IF temperature less than 557°F AND going down, THEN attempt to stop cooldown PEA Enclosure 3 (Uncontrolled NC System Cooldown).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

5, 6, 7 & 8 Page 56 of 62 Event

Description:

Feedline Break (Doghouse) 1 D/ATWS/i A MDCA fails to START automatically/i A TDCA tails to START automatically/i B Boric Acid Transfer Pump fails to START ROI (Step 2) Check all SM PORVs CLOSED.

BOP RO/

(Step 7) Check MSIVs ANY OPEN.

NOTE: All MSlVs are Closed.

BOP AO/

BOP AO/

BOP AO/

BOP RO BOP/

AOl BOP (Step 3) Check MSR RESET light LIT.

(Step 4) Check any NC pump ON.

(Step 5) Check NC T-Avg GOING DOWN.

(Step 6) Control feed flow as follows:

IF SIG N/R level is less than 11% (32%

ACC) in all S/Gs THEN THROTTLE feed flow to achieve the following:

Minimize cooldown.

Maintain total feed flow greater than 450 GPM.

WHEN N/R level is greater than 11%

(32% ACC) in at least one S/G, THEN THROTTLE feed flow further to:

Minimize cooldown NOTE: CA flow will be provided to 1A, lB and 1C SGs.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES..D-2 Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

5, 6, 7 & 8 Page 57 of 62 Event

Description:

Feedline Break (Doghouse) 1 D!ATWS/i A MDCA fails to START automatically/i A TDCA fails to START automatically/i B Boric Acid Transfer Pump fails to START BOP (RO)

(Step 21) Check NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 0°F.

(Step 7 RNO) Perform the following:

Close MSIV bypass valves.

Exit this enclosure.

E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/BOP continue HERE.

BOP (Step 20) Check Pzr PORV and spray (RO) valves:

All Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

Normal Pzr spray valves CLOSED.

At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve

OPEN.

BOP (RO)

CRS CRS CRS (Step 22) Check if main steamlines intact:

All S/G pressures STABLE OR GOING UP All S/Gs PRESSURIZED.

(Step 22 RNO) IF any S/G is faulted, THEN perform the following:

Implement EP/1/A15000/F-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).

GO TO EP/1/N5000/E-2 (Faulted Steam Generator Isolation),

NOTE: The 1D SG is depressurizing.

NOTE: The CRS will transition to E-2.

EP/1/N5000/E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

5, 6, 7 & 8 Page 58 of 62 Event

Description:

Feedline Break (Doghouse) 1 D!ATWS/1 A MDCA fails to START automatically/i A TDCA fails to START automatically/i B Boric Acid Transfer Pump fails to START Time Pos.

ROI BOP CRS ROl BOP RO!

BOP Expected Actions/Behavior (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

(Step 2) Maintain any faulted SIG or secondary break isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for NC System cooldown.

(Step 3) Check the following valves

CLOSED:

AIIMSIVs All MSIV bypass valves.

(Step 4) Check at least one S/G pressure

STABLE OR GOING UP.

Comments NOTE: Anytime that a AO is dispatched to look for steam leaks, wait 2 minutes, then report that steam is coming from both the interior and the exterior doghouses.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

NOTE: Although all SG pressures may be decreasing slowly, the operator will report stable based on plant conditions (i.e. faulted SG).

Otherwise a transition to ECA 2.1 will be made.

RO/

(Step 6) Maintain at least on S/G available BOP for NC System cooldown in subsequent steps.

RO/

BOP (Step 5) Identify faulted S/G(s):

Any S/G pressure GOING DOWN IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR Any S/G DEPRESSURIZED.

NOTE: The 1 D SG is depressurizing.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-2A Isolate the Faulted Steam Generators before transitioning out of E-2.

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a Faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the Critical Safety Functions that would not otherwise occur. Failure to isolate flow could result in an unwarranted Orange or Red Path condition on NC Integrity and/or Subcriticality (if cooldown is allowed to continue uncontrollably).

Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

5, 6, 7 & 8 Page 59 of 62 Event

Description:

Feedline Break (Doghouse) 1 D/ATWS/1 A MDCA fails to START automatically/i A TDCA fails to START automatically/i B Boric Acid Transfer Pump fails to START RO/

BOP (Step 7) Check faulted S/G(s) SM PORV

CLOS ED.

BOP (Step 8) Reset CA modulating valves.

RO/

(Step 9) Isolate faulted S/G(s) as follows:

BOP RO/

For1DS/G:

BOP Check S/G D FDW ISOLATED status light (1SI-4)

LIT.

CLOSE 1CA-38B (Ui TD CA Pump Disch To 1D S/G Isol).

CLOSE 1CA-42B (lB CA Pump Disch To 1 D S/G Isol).

Check BB valves CLOSED:

1 BB-4B (1 D S/G Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) 1BB-8A (D S/G BB Cont Inside Isol).

CLOSE 1SM-lOl (D SM Line Drain Isol).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

5, 6, 7 & 8 Page 60 of 62 Event

Description:

Feedline Break (Doghouse) 1 D/ATWS/1 A MDCA fails to START automatically/i A TDCA fails to START automatically/i B Boric Acid Transfer Pump fails to START RO (Step 10) CLOSE 1AS-12 (Ui SM To AS Hdr Control Inlet Isol).

BOP (Step 1 1) Check if S/G tubes intact as follows:

Check the following EMFs NORMAL:

1 EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) 1EMF-24(S/GA) 1 EMF-25 (S/G_B) 1 EMF-26_(S/G_C) 1 EMF-27 (S/G_D).

IF any SIG has previously been identified NOTE: There is no previously as ruptured...

known SGTL.

CRS Notify RP to perform the following:

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/RP to request Radiation Surveys.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RP.

If S/G(s) fault known to be outside containment, THEN monitor area of steam fault for radiation.

Frisk all Unit 1 SIG cation columns to determine if activity level is significantly higher for any S/G.

Notify Control Room of any abnormal radiation conditions.

WHEN activity results reported, THEN notify station management to evaluate S/G activity.

RO/

(Step 12) Check S/I termination criteria:

BOP

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

5, 6, 7 & 8 Page 61 of 62 Event

Description:

Feedline Break (Doghouse) 1 D/ATWS/1 A MDCA fails to START automatically/i A TDCA fails to START automatically/i B Boric Acid Transfer Pump fails to START Time Pos.

Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs

GREATER THAN 0°F.

Secondary heat sink:

NIR level in at least on intact SIG

GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC)

OR Total feed flow to intact S/Gs

GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

NC pressure STABLE OR GOING UP.

Pzr level GREATER THAN 11% (29%

ACC).

(Step 1 2.d RNO) GO TO Step 13 (Step 13) GO TO EP/1/A15000/E-1 (Loss of Reactor Or Secondary Coolant).

NOTE: The CRS will transition to ES-1.1, or El.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner Terminate the Exam.

UNIT 1 STATUS:

Power Level:

74%

NCS [B]

1037 ppm Pzr [B]:

1037 ppm Xe:

Per OAC Power History:

At this power level for four days Core Burnup:

251 EFPDs CONTROLLING PROCEDURE:

OP/i /A/6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME THE SHIFT:

The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The plant is 30.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> into a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Technical Specification ACTION clock on LCO 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1A Boric Acid Transfer Pump is OOS for motor replacement.

The 1 B MDCA Pump is OOS for pump bearing replacement.

It is expected back in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

iASP-5121, AS Header Pressure, failed last shift (IAE is investigating).

MCB Annunciator 1AD-7, J-4, BAT EMPTY, has spuriously alarmed (IAE is investigating).

Crew Directions:

The crew will be expected to continue with the power increase upon turnover starting with Step 3.37.9 of Enclosure 4.1 of OP/1/A/6i00/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.

Use of Alternate Dilute has been approved.

RE has recommended an initial Alternate Dilution of 200 gallons.

Turbine loading rate will be 2MWe/minute.

Work Control SRO/Offsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe NLOs AVAILABLE Uniti Unit2 Aux Bldg.

John Aux Bldg.

Chris Turb Bldg. Bob Turb Bldg. Mike 5

th Rounds. Carol Extra(s)

Bill Ed Wayne Tanya

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Final (Rev 1 10513)

Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

4 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions:

The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1C Hotwell Pump is QOS for motor replacement.

However, it is expected back within the next four hours.

1 NB LT

5420, RMWST

Level, failed low last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator lAD-i, F-9, DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNCT, has failed to off (IAE is investigating). The crew will be expected to raise power to 30% upon turnover.

Event Malf.

Event Type*

Event No.

No.

Description 1

NC0027c C-BOP Pzr Spray Valve (1 NC-27) Controller fails OPEN C(TS)-SRO 2

C-RO TDCA Pump starts inadvertently ABC C(TS)-SRO C-BOP NCS Leak C(TS)-SRO 4

NA R-RO Rapid Downpower N-BOP N-SRO C-RO Sequentially Dropped Rods IREOO6P1O C(TS)-SRO 6

MAL M-RO Rod Ejection/SB LOCA NCOO5D4 M-BOP M-SRO jjo NA 1 A NV Pump Trip 8

BOO1B NA EDG B Sequencer Failure 9

MAL NA 1A NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO NIOO1A 10 NCOO5F14 NA 2t Rod Ejection/SB LOCA (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Final (Rev 1 10513)

McGuire 2013 NRC Scenario #4 The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1C Hotwell Pump is OOS for motor replacement.

However, it is expected back within the next four hours.

1 NB LT-5420, RMWST Level, failed low last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator lAD-i, F-9, DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNCT, has failed to off (IAE is investigating). The crew will be expected to raise power to 30% upon turnover.

Shortly after taking the watch, the Pzr Spray Valve Controller, 1 NC-27C A Spray, demand will fail to full output.

The operator will enter AP/1/A15500/11, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies.

The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.

Next, the Turbine Driven CA Pump will inadvertently start causing the plant to cooldown and reactor power to rise. The crew will recognize that the pump should not be running and stop the pump using OP/1/A16250/002, Auxiliary Feedwater System. The operator may use AP/1!A15500/1, Steam Leak, to diagnose the failure.

The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System, and SLC 16.9.7, Standby Shutdown System.

Following this, a 30 gpm leak will develop on the reactor head from a Control Rod Guide Tube.

The crew will implement AP/1/A15500/10, NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage.

Ultimately, the crew will enter AP/1/A15500/4, Rapid Downpower.

During the downpower, one Control Bank D Control Rod will drop into the core.

The operator will respond in accordance with ARP1AD-2/D-9, RPI at Bottom Rod Drop and will implement AP/1/A15500/14, Rod Control Malfunction. Shortly after this, a second Control Rod will drop requiring that the operator manually trip the reactor. The crew will enter EP/1/N5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

On the trip, Control Rod D-4 will be ejected from the core causing a 1000 gpm Small Break LOCA.

The operator will trip the Reactor and actuate Safety Injection, and then enter EPI1IAJ5000IE-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

On the Safety Injection actuation the EDG B Sequencer will fail to automatically sequence, and the operator will need to manually start ECCS loads. Additionally, the 1A NV Pump will trip, and the 1A NI Pump will fail to start automatically. The operator will be required to start the 1A NI Pump manually.

Upon completion of E-0, the operator will transition to EP/1/A15000/E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

At that time a second Control Rod (F-14) will be ejected from the core causing the Small Break LOCA to degrade to the point at which the NC Pumps will need to be tripped. The scenario will terminate at Step 10 of E-1, after the crew has been directed to return back to the beginning of E-1.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Final (Rev_110513)

Critical Tasks:

E-O J Establish flow from at least one high-head ECCS Pump before transition out of E Safety Significance: Failure to establish flow from the NV System after failure of the automatic actuation constitutes a demonstrated inability by the operator to recognize a failure and/or correct a failure of an ESF System or component. The FSAR analyses of response to high energy line breaks assume that at least one train of safeguards actuates.

If the minimum assumed ESF components are NOT actuated the Safety Analyses results are invalid. Because compliance with the assumptions in the FSAR is part of the facility license, failure to comply constitutes a violation of the license condition.

SS (E1C)

Trip NC Pumps within 5 minutes of loss of SCM (4600/113/E13.1)

Safety Significance: Failure to trip all NCPs on a loss of subcooled margin can lead to core uncovery and to fuel temperatures in excess of 2200°F.

PT/0/A14600/113, 3.1 states that McGuire is committed to having NC Pumps tripped within 5 minutes of a loss of subcooling. The Safety Analysis recommends that the NC Pumps be tripped within 2 minutes to limit the depth and duration of core uncovery.

It is a management expectation that the NC Pumps be tripped as quickly as possible, but within 5 minutes of a loss of subcooling.

Failure to take this action represents mis operation by the operator which leads to degradation of the fuel cladding fission produce barrier, and a violation of a license condition.

PROGRAM:

McGuire Operations Training MODULE:

Initial License Operator Training Class 29 TOPIC:

NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N13-1-4

REFERENCES:

1.

AP/1 /A15500/i 1, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies (Rev 11) 2.

Technical Specification 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits (Amendment 21 9/201) 3.

OP/i /A16250/002, Auxiliary Feedwater System (Rev 118) 4.

AP/1/A15500101, Steam Leak (Rev 18) 5.

Technical Specification 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System (Amendment 221/203) 6.

Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.7, Standby Shutdown System (Revision 133) 7.

AP/1/A/5500/10, NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps (Rev 22) 8.

Technical Specification 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage. (Amendment 237/21 9) 9.

AP/1/A15500/04, Rapid Downpower (Rev 22)

10. AP/1/A/5500114, Rod Control Malfunction (Rev 16) ii. EP/i/A/50001E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev 33)

12. EP/1/A/5000/E-.i, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolanf (Rev 15)

Validation Time: 100 minutes Author:

David Lazarony, Western Technical Services, Inc.

Facility Review:

Rev. 110613 1

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

4 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO)

(RO)

(BOP) initial Conditions:

The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1C Hotwell Pump is OOS for motor replacement.

However, it is expected back within the next four hours.

1 NB LT

5420, RMWST

Level, failed low last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator lAD-i, F-9, DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNCT, has failed to off (IAE is investigating). The crew will be expected to raise power to 30% upon turnover.

Event MaIf.

Event Type*

Event No.

No.

Description 1

REM C-BOP Pzr Spray Valve (1 NC-27) Controller fails OPEN NCOO27C C(TS)-SRO 2

REM C-RO TDCA Pump starts inadvertently SA0048 ABC C(TS)-SRO 3

MAL C-BOP NCS Leak NCOO7D C(TS)-SRO 4

NA R-RO Rapid Downpower N-BOP N-SRO 5

MAL C-RO Sequentially Dropped Rods IREOO6B6 IREOO6P1O C(TS)-SRO 6

MAL M-RO Rod Ejection/SB LOCA NCOO5D4 M-BOP M-SRO NA 1A NV Pump Trip 8

EQBOO1B NA EDG B Sequencer Failure 9

MAL NA 1A NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO NlOOi A 10 MAL NA 2

nd Rod Ejection/SB LOCA NCOO5F1 4 (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 McGuire 2013 NRC Scenario #4 The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

10 Hotwell Pump is OOS for motor replacement.

However, it is expected back within the next four hours.

1NB LT-5420, RMWST Level, failed low last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator lAD-i, F-9, DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNCT, has failed to off (IAE is investigating). The crew will be expected to raise power to 30% upon turnover.

Shortly after taking the watch, the Pzr Spray Valve Controller, 1NC-27C A Spray, demand will fail to full output.

The operator will enter AP/1/A15500/1 1, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies.

The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.

Next, the Turbine Driven CA Pump will inadvertently start causing the plant to cooldown and reactor power to rise. The crew will recognize that the pump should not be running and stop the pump using OP/1/A16250/002, Auxiliary Feedwater System.

The operator may use AP/1/AJ5500/1, Steam Leak, to diagnose the failure.

The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System, and SLC 16.9.7, Standby Shutdown System.

Following this, a 30 gpm leak will develop on the reactor head from a Control Rod Guide Tube.

The crew will implement AP/1/A15500/10, NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage.

Ultimately, the crew will enter AP/1/A/5500/4, Rapid Downpower.

During the downpower, one Control Bank D Control Rod will drop into the core. The operator will respond in accordance with ARP1AD-2/D-9, RPI at Bottom Rod Drop and will implement AP/1/A15500/14, Rod Control Malfunction. Shortly after this, a second Control Rod will drop requiring that the operator manually trip the reactor.

The crew will enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

On the trip, Control Rod D-4 will be ejected from the core causing a 1000 gpm Small Break LOCA.

The operator will trip the Reactor and actuate Safety Injection, and then enter EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. On the Safety Injection actuation the EDG B Sequencer will fail to automatically sequence, and the operator will need to manually start ECCS loads.

Additionally, the 1A NV Pump will trip, and the 1A NI Pump will fail to start automatically. The operator will be required to start the 1A NI Pump manually.

Upon completion of E-0, the operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

At that time a second Control Rod (F-14) will be ejected from the core causing the Small Break LOCA to degrade to the point at which the NC Pumps will need to be tripped. The scenario will terminate at Step 10 of E-1, after the crew has been directed to return back to the beginning of E-1.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Critical Tasks:

E-O J Establish flow from at least one high-head ECCS Pump before transition out of E-O.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish flow from the NV System after failure of the automatic actuation constitutes a demonstrated inability by the operator to recognize a failure and/or correct a failure of an ESF System or component. The FSAR analyses of response to high energy line breaks assume that at least one train of safeguards actuates.

If the minimum assumed ESF components are NOT actuated the Safety Analyses results are invalid. Because compliance with the assumptions in the FSAR is part of the facility license, failure to comply constitutes a violation of the license condition.

SS (E1C)

Trip NC Pumps within 5 minutes of loss of SCM (4600/113/El 3.1)

Safety Significance: Failure to trip all NCPs on a loss of subcooled margin can lead to core uncovery and to fuel temperatures in excess of 2200°F.

PT/O/A14600/113, Enclosure 13.1 states that McGuire is commiffed to having NC Pumps tripped within 5 minutes of a loss of subcooling. The Safety Analysis recommends that the NC Pumps be tripped within 2 minutes to limit the depth and duration of core uncovery.

It is a management expectation that the NC Pumps be tripped as quickly as possible, but within 5 minutes of a loss of subcooling. Failure to take this action represents mis-operation by the operator which leads to degradation of the fuel cladding fission produce barrier, and a violation of a license condition.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTlON Q

Sim. Setup Rod Step On Q

Reset to Temp I/C 261 T = 0 Malfunctions: (From IC-i 3)

(Originally IC-i3).

insert LOA-CM058 = RACKED OUT (Hotwell Pump 1 C Breaker Rackout) insert LOA-CMO58A = RACKED_OUT (Hotwell Pump 1C Control Power) insert H_X05_082_i = 0 (1 NB LT-5420) insert H_X01_001 FOg_i = 0 = OFF (1AD-i/F-9 failed OFF)

From lC-261:

Per Lesson Plan 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Insert LOA-NV046 = RACKED_OUT cd =

H_XO1_094_2 = 1 (Rx Trip Breaker Open Light) insert MAL-EQBOO1 B = 0 (EDG B Sequencer Failure) insert MAL-NIOO1 A = AUTO (1 A NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO) insert MAL-NCOO5D4 = 1000 delay=0 ramp=0 cd = H_X01_094_2 = 1 (Rx Trip Breaker Open Light)

Q RUN Place TagoutlO-Stick on:

1C Hotwell Pump (Tagout)

Reset all SLIMs 1 NB LT-5420 (0-stick)

MCB Annunciator 1AD-i/F-9 (0-stick)

Q Update Status Board, NOTE: RMWST DO = <1000 ppb.

Setup OAC Q

Freeze.

Q Update Fresh Tech.

Spec. Log.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q

Fill out the AOs Available section of Shift Turnover Info.

Prior to Crew RUN Briefing Q

Crew Briefing 1.

Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements.

2.

Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3.

Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

Q T-O Begin Familiarization Period Q

At direction of Execute Lesson Plan examiner for Simulator Scenario Ni 3-1 -4.

Q At direction of Event 1 Pzr Spray Valve (1 NC-27) Controller fails OPEN examiner insert REM-NCOO27C =

1 delay=0 ramp=60 SECONDS REM-NCOO27C =0 delay=5 cd=Xl 06051 EQ 1 (Delete Remote function when Emergency Close switch taken to CLOSE)

Q At direction of Event 2 TDCA Pump starts inadvertently examiner insert REM SAOO48ABC = 1.0 Q

At direction of Event 3 NCS Leak examiner insert MAL-NCOO7D =

0.35 Q

Upon direction Event 4 Rapid Downpower in AP-lO Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q

At direction of Event 5 Sequentially Dropped Rods examiner Insert MAL-IREOO6B6 and MAL-IREOO6P10 (At Ieast30 seconds delayed)

Q Post-Rx Trip Event 6 Rod Ejection/SB LOCA This malfunction will occur on Reactor Trip.

Q Post-Rx Trip Event 7 1A NV Pump Trip This malfunction will occur on Reactor Trip.

Q Post-SI Act Event 8 EDG B Sequencer Failure This malfunction will occur on Safety Injection actuation.

Q Post-SI Act Event 9 1A NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO This malfunction will occur on Safety Injection actuation.

Q Transition to Event 10 2 Rod Ejection/SB LOCA E-1 insert MAL-NCOO5F14 This malfunction will occur on Transition to E

=2000 1.

Q Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner.

Following this, the Pzr Spray Valve Controller, 1 NC-27C A Spray, demand will fail to full output. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/1 1, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.

Booth Operator Instructions:

insert REM-NCOO27C = 1 delay=0 ramp=60 SECONDS REM-NCOO27C =0 delay=5 cd=Xl 0_605_l EQ 1 (Delete Remote function when Emergency Close switch taken to CLOSE)

Indications Available:

NCS/Pzr pressure lowers OAC Alarm: Ui PZR PRESS I through IV 1NC-27C SLIMs LS indication 50 or 100%

MCB Annunciator 1AD6/C-6 PZR LO PRESS CONTROL NOTE: The BOP may take all the necessary actions in the Immediate Actions, before CRS reads AOP.

AP/11N5500111, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE ANOMALIES BOP (Step 4) Check Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

BOP BOP BOP BOP (Step 1) Check Pzr pressure HAS GONE DOWN.

(Step 2) Check Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

(Step 3) Check Pzr spray valves

- CLOSED (Step 3 RNO) CLOSE Pzr spray valve(s).

Immediate Action Immediate Action Immediate Action NOTE: The BOP will recognize that the SLIMs is NOT effective at controlling the valve, and operate the EMERG SWITCH.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

1 Page 8

of 54 Event

Description:

Pzr Spray Valve (1 NC-27) Controller fails OPEN Appendix D Operator Action Form ESD-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

1 Page 9

of 54 Event

Description:

Pzr Spray Valve (1 NC-27) Controller fails OPEN Pose BOP CRS BOP Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 5) Check Pzr spray valves

CLOSED.

(Step 6) Announce occurrence on page.

(Step 7) Check 1 NV-21 A (NV Spray to PZR Isol)

CLOSED.

NOTE: IF the BOP has already used the EMERG SWITCH, the CRS may answer YES, and continue to Step 6.

If NOT, the Step 5 RNO will be performed.

NOTE: When the BOP uses this switch the Spray Valve will Close.

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

BOP (Step 11) Check 1 NC-27 PRESSURIZER NOTE:

In order to close the SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE switch

malfunctioning Spray Valve, SELECTED TO NORMAL.

the BOP had to take the EMERG SWITCH to CLOSE.

BOP BOP BOP (Step 8) Check the following Pzr heaters

ON:

1A lB 1D (Step 9) Check 1 C Pzr heaters ON.

(Step 10) Check PZR PRESS MASTER

IN AUTO.

Tirne Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event#

1 Page Pzr Spray Valve (1 NC-27) Controller fails OPEN 10 of 54 CRS (Step 11 RNO) Notify station management to NOTE: The CRS may call ensure switch restored to NORMAL once WCC/Station Management to spray valve is repaired.

address the switch position.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

BOP (Step 12) Check 1NC-29 PRESSURIZER SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE switch

SELECTED TO NORMAL.

BOP (Step 13) Check Pzr pressure GOING UP TO DESIRED PRESSURE.

CRS (Step 14) Exit this procedure.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the valve failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS CRS LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for NOTE: If NC System Pressure pres.surizer pressure, RCS average drops to < 2216 psig on the temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be failure, then TS 3.4.1 might be within the limits specified in Table 3.4.1-1.

entered and exited during the transient.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

CRS ACTIONS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

1 Page 11 of 54 Event

Description:

Pzr Spray Valve (1 NC-27) Controller fails OPEN Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. Pressurizer A.1 Restore DNB 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> pressure or parameter(s)

RCS average to within limit.

temperature DNB parameters not within lim its.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

-11

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

2 Page 12 of 54 Event

Description:

TDCA Pump starts inadvertently Next, the Turbine Driven CA Pump will inadvertently start causing the plant to cooldown and reactor power to rise. The crew will recognize that the pump should not be running and stop the pump using OP/1/A16250/002, Auxiliary Feedwater System. The operator may use AP/1/N5500/1, Steam Leak, to diagnose the failure.

The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System, and SLC 16.9.7, Standby Shutdown System.

Booth Operator Instructions:

insert REM-SAOO48ABC = 1.0 Indications Available:

1 SA48ABC Red status light is LIT.

TDCA Pump Turbine Speed rising MCB Annunciator 1AD-5/F1 TURBINE DRIVEN CA PUMP LO SUCTION PRESSURE CF Bypass Valves closing on all SGs except 1A SG Reactor power starts to rise CONTROL ROOM EXPECTATIONS MANUAL RO/

CA Operation above 10% power.

BOP IF CA Auto start at greater than 3% power NOTE: The BOP will throttle and Main Feedwater is providing flow to the CA flow from the TDCA Pump, steam generators, then CA flow should be rendering the CA Pumps throttled/isolated as soon as practical. This inoperable.

will make the affected CA pumps inoperable due to the control valve not being fully open above 10% as required by the CA Surveillance Requirements.

AP/1/A/5500/01, STEAM LEAK CRS (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

RO (Step 2) Reduce turbine load to maintain the NOTE: The RO will need to following:

reduce load to limit reactor power.

Excore NIs LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

2 Page 13 of 54 Event

Description:

TDCA Pump starts inadvertently NC Loop D/Ts LESS THAN 60°F D1T T-Avg AT T-REF.

CRS (Step 3) Check containment entry IN NOTE: A Containment Entry is PROGRESS.

NOT in progress.

CRS (Step 3 RNO) GO TO Step 5.

BOP (Step 5) Check Pzr pressure prior to event

GREATER THAN P-li (1955 PSIG).

BOP (Step 6) Check Pzr level STABLE OR NOTE: Pzr level is expected to GOING UP.

be stable, however, it may be lowering.

If so, perform Step 6 RNO. Otherwise continue with Step 7.

BOP (Step 6 RNO) Perform the following as required to maintain level:

IF Pzr level going down with maximum NOTE: It is expected that the charging flow...

BOP will be able to control Pzr level.

BOP (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME while in this NOTE: This is a Continuous procedure Pzr level cannot be maintained Action. The CRS will make stable, THEN RETURN TO Step 6.

both board operators aware.

Maintain charging flow less than 200 GPM at all times in subsequent steps.

Ensure 1NV-238 (Ui Charging Hdr Control) OPENING.

OPEN 1NV-241 (Ui Seal Water nj Flow Control) while maintaining NC pump seal flow greater than 6 GPM.

Reduce or isolate letdown.

Start additional NV pump.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

2 Page 14 of 54 Event

Description:

TDCA Pump starts inadvertently Time Pos.

CRS CRS RO Expected Actions/Behavior (Step 8) GO TO Step 12.

(Step 12) Announce occurrence on paging system.

(Step 13) Identify and isolate leak on Unit 1 as follows:

(Step 13a) Check SM PORVs

CLOSED.

Comments NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 13.b) Check condenser dump valves CLOSED.

(Step 13.b RNO) IF steam dumps NOTE: The Steam Dumps are required to be closed..,

likely to be closed.

BOP (Step 13.c) Check containment conditions NORMAL:

Containment temperature Containment pressure Containment humidity Containment floor and equipment sump level.

RO /

(Step 13.d) Check TD CA pump OFF.

BOP NOTE: The TDCA Pump is running.

(Step 13.d RNO) IF operation of TD CA Examiner NOTE: CRS may pump is causing uncontrolled cooldown direct that the TDCA Pump be AND flow from TD CA pump not stopped per the OP.

required, THEN stop TD CA pump PER If so continue as scri ted OP/i /A/6250/002 (Auxiliary Feedwater

p System) Enclosure 4.4 (Manual If NOT, continue with the Operation of #1 TD CA Pump) remaining steps of AP-1 on Page 16.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N131 Scenario #

4 Event #

2 Page 15 of 54 Event

Description:

TDCA Pump starts inadvertently Tirne Pos.

Expected Actions!Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS may address Tech Specs based on plant response.

OP/i1N6250/002, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM ENCLOSURE 4.4, MANUAL OPERATION OF #1 TD CA PUMP BOP BOP (Step 3.1) Evaluate all outstanding R&Rs that may impact performance of this procedure.

(Step 3.2) Ensure that a pre-job briefing has been performed that includes discussion of reactivity management concerns with this procedure.

NOTE: The CRS/BOP may call WCC/IAE to address the R&Rs on the TDCA Pump.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC, and report none exist.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the R&Rs on the TDCA Pump.

BOP (Step 3.6) Stopping #1 TD CA Pump IF stopping pump following EP/AP, NOTE: The CRS may decide check TURB depressed on the to take this action if the OP following:

was entered from APi.

CA Modulating Valves Reset Train A CA Modulating Valves Reset Train B IF operating #1 TD CA Pump locally...

NOTE: The pump is NOT to be operated locally.

BOP Ensure the following closed:

1CA-64AB (Ui TD CA Pump Disch to 1 A S/G Control)

BOP BOP (Step 3.3) IF #1 TD CA Pump to be operated locally...

(Step 3.4) Perform the following sections, as applicable:

Section 3.6, Stopping #1 TD CA Pump NOTE: The pump is NOT to be operated locally.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

2 Page 16 of 54 Event

Description:

TDCA Pump starts inadvertently Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 1CA-52AB (Ui TD CA Pump Disch to 1 B SIG Control) 1CA-48AB (Ui TD CA Pump Disch to 1 C SIG Control) 1CA-36AB (Ui TD CA Pump Disch to 1 D SIG Control)

BOP Ensure RESET lit on TD CA Pump Auto Start Reset.

BOP Place #1 TD CA Pump in STOP.

Ensure the following closed:

1SA-48ABC (1C S/G SM Supply To NOTE: The CRS will Ui TD CA Pump Turb lsol) recognize that 1SA-48ABC has failed OPEN.

Because of this the CRS may dispatch an AC to locally close the upstream isolation valve 1 SA-i. The only other choice is to leave the TDCA Pump running.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as AO.

Booth Instructor: Wait 3 minutes and Insert REM SA0001 = 0.0; then call as AC and report that 1 SA-1 is CLOSED.

iSA-49AB (lB S!G SM Supply To Ui TD CA Pump Turb Isol)

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

API1IN5500IO1, STEAM LEAK Examiner NOTE: Continue here if the OP is NOT used to stop TDCA Pump.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N 13-1 Scenario #

Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

TDCA Pump starts inadvertently 4

Event#

2 Page 17 of 54 Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 13.e) Check valves on STEAM NOTE: One or more of these LINE DRAIN VALVES board (1 MC-9)

valves may be cycling. The CLOSED.

RNO will direct closing the valves.

CRS (Step 13.f) Check opposite Unit (Unit 2)

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO STEAM HEADER PRESSURE

for AS Header pressure.

GREATER THAN 200 PS 1G.

If so, Floor Instructor report as U2 RO that U2 Steam Header pressure is 1OOO p51g.

(Step 1 3.g) Dispatch operator to check NOTE: The CRS may dispatch for leaks.

an AO to look for leaks.

If so, Floor Instructor:

acknowledge.

Booth Instructor: Report back in 3-5 minutes that there are no leaks.

NOTE: The CRS may NOT dispatch AOs to look for leaks because it is understood that the Steam Dump valve opening was the reason that AP-1 was entered.

BOP (Step 14) Check UST level STABLE OR GOING UP.

CRS (Step 15) Evaluate unit shutdown as follows:

Check unit status IN MODE 1 OR 2.

Determine if unit shutdown or load NOTE: CRS may call reduction is warranted based on the WCC/Management to address following criteria:

the startup.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

Size of leak Location of leak Rate of depletion of secondary inventory AoDendix D Ooerator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

2 Page 18 of 54 Event

Description:

TDCA Pump starts inadvertently Time Ps.

Expected ActlonslBehavior CRS (Step 15.c RNO) Perform the following:

Maintain present plant conditions until leak can be isolated or repaired.

Exit this procedure.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

NOTE: The CRS may address Tech Specs based on plant response.

Comments IF steam is leaking from a secondary heater relief OR MSR relief valve, THEN reducing turbine load....

IF turbine trip will isolate steam leak (such as feedwater heater leak or MSR leak)...

Check unit shutdown or load reduction

REQU I R ED.

NOTE: No Relief Valve is leaking.

NOTE: A Turbine Trip is NOT needed to isolate the steam leak.

NOTE: Shutdown/Load Reduction will NOT be required.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.5, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW) SYSTEM CRS LCO 3.7.5 Three AFW trains shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, 2, And 3, MODE 4 when steam generator is relied upon for heat removal.

CRS ACTIONS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

2 Page 19 of 54 Event

Description:

TDCA Pump starts inadvertently Comments Time Pos.

Expected Actions/Behav.

CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One steam A.1 Restore 7 days supply to steam supply AND turbine driven to AFW pump OPERABLE 10 days form inoperable status.

discovery of failure to meet the LCO B. One AFW B.1 Restore AFW 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> NOTE: The CRS will train train to AND determine that ACTION A Only inoperable in OPERABLE

if iSA-i has been isolated, MODE 1, 2, status.

10 days from or3for discovery of and B must be entered.

reasons failure to meet other than the LCO Condition A.

SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENT 16.9.7, STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM CRS COMMITMENT The Standby Shutdown System (SSS) shall be FUNCTIONAL.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2, and 3.

CRS REMEDIAL ACTIONS The SRO should ensure that security is notified 10 minutes prior to declaring the SSS inoperable. Immediately upon discovery of the SSS inoperability, Security must be notified to implement compensatory measures within 10 minutes of discovery.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

2 Page 20 of 54 Event

Description:

TDCA Pump starts inadvertently Pós CRS Expected Actions/Behavior CONDITION A. One or more required SSS components identified in Table 16.9.7-1 non functional.

REQUIRED ACTION A.1 Verify the FUNCTIONA LITY of fire detection and suppression systems in the associated areas identified in TabIel 6.9.7-AND A.2 Restore the component to FUNCTIONAL status.

COMPLETION TIME 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 7 days Comments NOTE: The CRS will determine that SLC 16.9.7 ACTION A is applicable.

Time At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

- 20

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Following this, a 30 gpm leak will develop on the reactor head from a Control Rod Guide Tube.

The crew will implement AP/1/A15500/10, NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage.

Booth Operator Instructions:

insert MAL-NCOO7D = 0.35 Indications Available:

OAC Alarm (Ml EO1 98) 1 EMF-39L Hi Alarm.

Pzr Level decreases.

Containment Pressure increases.

lAD-i 3/B-3, CONT PRESS ALERT HI.

1RAD-1IE-2, 1EMF CONTAINMENT PARTS.

Time Pos.

Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP/1/A/5500/10, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN the CAPACITY of BOTH NV PUMPS CASE II, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE NOTE: The NCS leak is NOT known to be in the Aux Building.

NOTE: A Containment Entry is NOT in progress.

BOP (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following as required to maintain level:

BOP Maintain charging flow less than 200 GPM at all times in subsequent_steps.

Ensure 1 NV-238 (Charging Line Flow Control)_opening.

BOP SAC BOP (Step 1) Check leak KNOWN TO BE IN THE AUX BUILDING.

(Step 1 RNO) Perform the following:

IF containment entry is in progress IF in Modes 1-4, OR no-mode, THEN GO TO Step 2.

(Step 2) Check Pzr level STABLE OR GOING UP.

Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

3 Page 21 of 54 Event

Description:

NCS Leak

- 21

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

3 Page 22 of 54 Event

Description:

NCS Leak Pos BOP BOP BOP Expected Actions/Behavior Open 1 NV-241 (Ui Seal Water lnj Flow Control) while maintaining NC pump seal flow greater than 6 GPM.

Reduce or isolate letdown.

Start additional NV pump.

IF Pzr level cannot be maintained greater than 4%, OR Pzr level going down with maximum charging flow....

(Step 3) IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure Pzr level cannot be maintained stable (Step 4) Check Pzr pressure STABLE OR TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG.

Comments NOTE: The BOP may reduce letdown flow to 45 gpm, or isolate it altogether.

NOTE: The BOP will NOT need to start an additional NV Pump.

NOTE: The Pzr level is NOT <

4%, or decreasing with maximum Charging flow.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

RO /

(Step 7) Estimate leak rate using any of the BOP following methods:

Monitor OAC NV graphic OR Compare charging flow to letdown flow plus seal return flow OR RO SRO (Step 5) check main steam line intact:

Reactor power AT TURBINE POWER NC Loop T-Avg STABLE.

(Step 6) Announce occurrence on page.

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

1ime

- 22

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

N13-1 Scenario #

NCS Leak 4

Event#

3 Page 23 of 54 Monitor VCT level trend (OAC point NOTE: The leak should be Ml P1271).

estimated to be 30-40 gpm.

CRS (Step 8) REFER TO RP/OIA/5700/000 NOTE: CRS may ask OSM to (Classification of Emergency).

address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

CRS (Step 9) IF AT ANY TIME NC leakage exceeds Tech Spec limits, THEN perform the following:

Ensure Outside Air Pressure Filter train NOTE: CRS may ask U2 BOP in service PER OPIO/N6450/01 1 to address.

(Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water If so, Floor Instructor System), Enclosure 4.4 (Control Room acknowledge as U2 BOP.

Atmosphere Pressurization During Abnormal Conditions).

Examiner NOTE: The CRS may assign the BOP to perform this action.

If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of OP/0/A/6450/01 1.4.

Other Examiners follow AP 10 Actions, Step 10, on Page 25.

Have another SRO evaluate if leakage NOTE: CRS may ask OSM to exceeds SLC 16.9.7 condition C limits address, OR call Security on and immediately notify security if SSF is their own inoperable.

If OSM is asked, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

If the CRS calls Security, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Security.

0145011, CONTROL AREA VENTILATION/CHILLED WATER SYSTEM ENCLOSURE 4.4, CONTROL ROOM ATMOSPHERE PRESSURIZATION DURING ABNORMAL CONDITIONS

- 23

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

3 Page 24 of 54 Event

Description:

NCS Leak Pos.

BOP BOP BOP Expected Actions/Behavior (Step 3.1) Evaluate all outstanding R&Rs that may impact performance of this procedure.

(Step 3.2) Pressurize Control Room using Outside Air Pressure Fans as follows:

(Step 3.2.1) Ensure at least one the following groups of intake valves open:

1VC-1A (VC Otsd Air Intake sal from Unit 1) 1VC-2A (VC Otsd Air Intake lsol from Unit 1) 1VC-3B (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 1) 1VC-4B (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 1)

OR 1 VC-9A (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 2) 1VC-1OA (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 2) 1 VC-1 1 B (VC Otsd Air Intake IsoI from Unit 2) 1VC-12B (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 2)

BOP (Step 3.2.4) Depress MAN for the following (to ensure fans off):

1. 1 CRA Otsd Air Fan

1. 2 CRA Otsd Air Fan BOP BOP (Step 3.2.2) IF A Train VC / YC operating, place A Train CR Outside Air Press Fan to ON.

(Step 3.2.3) IF B Train VC I YC operating, place B Train CR Outside Air Press Fan to Time Comments

- 24

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

3 Page 25 of 54 Event

Description:

NCS Leak Time Pose BOP BOP Expected Actions/Behavior (Step 3.2.5) Depress OFF for the following:

CRA-OAD-4 (CR Area Otsd Air Fans Damper)

CRA-OAD-3 (CR Area Otsd Air Fans Damoer)

(Step 3.2.6) Check the following dark:

CRA-OAD-4 (CR Area Otsd Air Fans Damper) OPEN light CRA-OAD-3 (CR Area Otsd Air Fans Damper) OPEN liaht Comments Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRSIRO continue HERE.

API1/N550011 0, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN the CAPACITY of BOTH NV PUMPS CASE II, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE SRO (Step 10) IF AT ANY TIME VCT level goes below 16% (VCT ABNORMAL LEVEL alarm (1AD-7, D-3) low setpoint), THEN align NV pump suction to FWST NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

BOP (Step 13) Check NC pump thermal barriers intact as follows:

NC pump thermal barrier KC outlet flows and temperatures on OAC KC graphic NORMAL (flow and temperature should be similar for all 4 NC pumps).

KC surge tank level rates on OAC KC graphic NORMAL.

BOP BOP (Step 11) IF AT ANY TIME Containment pressure exceeds Tech Spec limit (0.3 PSIG), THEN evaluate placing all 4 VL AHU mode select switches in HIGH to prevent them from cycling around 0.5 PSIG.

(Step 12) Check seal leakoff on all NC pumps LESS THAN 6 GPM.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

- 25

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

3 Page 26 of 54 Event

Description:

NCS Leak lime Pos.

CRS BOP CRS BOP Expected Actions/Behavior KC Surge Tank level NORMAL.

1 EMF-46A (Train A Component Cooling)

- NORMAL.

1 EMF-46B (Train B Component Cooling)

- NORMAL.

(Step 14) GO TO Step 16.

(Step 16) Check leak SUSPECTED ON LETDOWN LINE NEAR DEMINERALIZERS.

(Step 16 RNO) GO TO Step 18.

(Step 18) Check leak KNOWN TO BE ON NORMAL LETDOWN LINE.

Comments NOTE: The NCS leak is NOT suspected to be on the Letdown Line near the Dem ineralizers.

NOTE: The NCS leak is NOT known to be on the Normal Letdown Line.

BOP (Step 24) Check the following indications

NORMAL:

CRS BOP CRS GOP CRS (Step 18 RNO) GO TO Step 20.

(Step 20) Check leak KNOWN TO BE ON VCT.

(Step 20 RNO) GO TO Step 22.

(Step 22) Check leak KNOWN TO BE ON NORMAL CHARGING LINE DOWNSTREAM OF 1 NV-244A (Charging Line Cont Outside Isol).

(Step 22 RNO) GO TO Step 24.

NOTE: The NCS leak is NOT known to be on the VCT.

NOTE: The NCS leak is NOT known to be on the Normal Charging Line downstream of 1 NV-244A.

- 26

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

3 Page 27 of 54 Event

Description:

NCS Leak Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Pzr safeties:

PZR RELIEF VALVE TEMP PZR RELIEF LINE NO FLOW acoustic indication light.

Pzr PORVs:

PZR RELIEF VALVE TEMP.

PRT conditions:

Pressure Level Temperature BOP (Step 25) check all CLA levels NORMAL.

BOP (Step 26) Check the following NCDT parameters:

Level NORMAL Temperature NORMAL PUMP FLOW AT RECIRC FLOW.

BOP (Step 27) Check Containment floor and equipment sumps NORMAL.

BOP (Step 27 RNO) IF level going up AND NOTE: CRS may call WCC to Containment is accessible, THEN check address.

inputs to CFAE sumps per PTI1IN415OIOO1D (identifying sump I so, Bootii Instructor leakage).

acknowledge as WCC, and respond as appropriate.

CRS (Step 28) Check leak location HAS BEEN NOTE: The NCS leak location IDENTIFIED.

has NOT been identified.

CRS (Step 28 RNO) Perform the following steps as necessary to identify location of leak:

- 27

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Time Pos.

NCS Leak Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

N13-1 Scenario#

4 Event#

3 Page 28 of 54 Expected ActionslBehavior Comments IF leak is inside containment, THEN evaluate isolating letdown and charging PER Steps 19 and 23 to see if leak exists on these headers.

Notify WCC SRO to review recent NOTE: GAS may call WCC to changes in plant status:

address the leak.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WGG, and respond as appropriate.

Any equipment removed from service Any equipment returned to service Any venting or draining in progress.

BOP Notify Aadwaste Ghemistry to check the NOTE: GAS may call RW to following tanks and sumps for excessive address the leak.

input:

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AW, and respond as appropriate.

ND/NS sump AHT Waste Drain Tank WEFT EDT Spent Resin Storage Tank.

IF affected tank or sump readily NOTE: The NCS leak location identified has NOT been identified.

BOP IF affected tank or sump not identified, THEN check all tanks and sumps in next steps.

Gheck inputs to desired tanks and sumps NOTE: GAS may ask U2 BOP PER PT/1/A14150/OO1D (Identifying NG to perform.

System Leakage).

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 BOP.

BOP IF necessary to check inputs to EDT or NOTE: The NGS leak location WEFT, THEN is known to be in the Gontainment.

- 28

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

3 Page 29 of 54 Event

Description:

NCS Leak Pos.

CRS CRS CRS Expected Actions/Behavior IF leakage suspected through 1NV-137A (NC Filters Otit 3-Way Cntrl) to RHT, THEN IF leak possibly going to Unit 1 BAT, THEN (Step 29) Ensure RP is notified of location and size of leak.

(Step 30) Contact station management to evaluate need to shutdown.

Comments NOTE: The NCS leak location is known to be in the Containment.

NOTE: The NCS leak location is known to be in the Containment.

NOTE: CRS may call WCC/RP to address the NCS leak.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RP.

NOTE: CRS may call WCC to contact management.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC, and as Station Management direct that the plant be taken off-line within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

CRS (Step 32) Shutdown PER one of the following:

OP/1/A16100/003 (Controlling Procedure For Unit Operation), Enclosure 4.2 (Power_Reduction)

OR AP/1/A/5500/04 (Rapid Downpower).

NOTE: The CRS will transition to AP-4.

CRS (Step 31) Check unit shutdown

REQUIRED.

Time

- 29

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

3 Page 30 of 54 Event

Description:

NCS Leak Time Pos.

Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: It is likely that the CRS will acknowledge that the Technical Specification for leakage has been exceeded, but not stop to assess.

Examiner NOTE: May seek to discuss with CRS after the scenario.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.13, RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE CRS 3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE CRS LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:

No pressure boundary LEAKAGE; 1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE; 10 gpm identified LEAKAGE; 389 gallons per day total primary to secondary LEAKAGE through steam generators (SGs); and 135 gallons per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE through any one steam generator (SG).

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, AND 4.

CRS ACTIONS NOTE: The CRS will determine that LCO 3.4.13 is NOT met, and that Condition A is applicable, during the course of the transient.

CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME

- 30

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

3 Page 31 of 54 Event

Description:

NCS Leak Pos.

CRS CRS CRS CRS Expected Actions/Behavior A.

RcS Operational LEAKAGE not within limits for reasons other than pressure boundary LEAKAGE or primary to secondary LEAKAGE.

4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENT 16.9.7 STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM 16.9.7 Standby Shutdown System COMMITMENT: The Standby Shutdown System (SSS) shall be operable.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2, and 3.

REMEDIAL ACTIONS:

The SRO should ensure that security is notified 10 minutes prior to declaring the SSS inoperable. Immediately upon discovery of the SSS inoperability, Security must be notified to implement compensatory measures within 10 minutes of the discovery.

If inoperable SSS component is located inside containment, repairs shall be made at the first outage which permits containment access.

CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE within Urn its.

Comments NOTE: The CRS may have already handed this off the OSM, however, the remedial action of notifying Security within 10 minutes must be identified by the CRS.

Time

- 31

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

3 Page Event

Description:

NCS Leak 32 of 54 Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments C.

Total C.1 Declare the Immediately Unidentified Standby

LEAKAGE, Makeup Identified Pump

LEAKAGE, inoperable.

and reactor coolant AND pump seal C.2 Enter leakoff> 20 Condition gpm.

A.

OR Total reactor coolant pump seal leakoff>

16.3 gpm.

When directed to perform a shutdown in AP-lO move to Event #4.

- 32

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

4 Page 33 of 54 Event

Description:

Rapid Downpower Ultimately, the crew will enter API1IN5500/4, Rapid Downpower.

Booth Operator Instructions:

NA Indications Available:

NA.

Time Pos.

RO!

BOP CRS Expected Actions/Behavior AP/1/N5500/04, RAPID DOWNPOWER (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

(Step 2) Announce occurrence on page.

Comments NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 3) Check turbine control IN AUTO.

AC (Step 4) Check MW LOOP IN SERVICE.

RO (Step 4 RNO) Depress MW IN/MW OUT pushbutton.

CAS (Step 5) Check shutdown to Mode 3

DESIRED.

CRS (Step 6) Check if Shutdown Via Reactor Trip from 15% Power appropriate:

Shutdown Via Reactor Trip from 15% PowerDESIRED At least two CA pumps OPERABLE.

- 33

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES..D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

4 Page 34 of 54 Event

Description:

Rapid Downpower CRS CRS RO BOP RO (Step 7) Enter target load of 180 MW in turbine control panel.

(Step 8) Determine the required power reduction rate (MW/mm).

(Step 9) Check control rods IN AUTO.

(Step 10) Notify SOC of load reduction (red dispatcher phone).

(Step 11) Initiate turbine load reduction to desired load at desired rate.

NOTE: The CRS will reduce load at 17-20 MWe/minute.

Booth Instructor: as SOC, acknowledge.

BOP (Step 12) Borate NC System as follows:

Energize all backup Pzr heaters.

CRS Check unit to be shutdown VIA NOTE: It is normal practice to REACTOR TRIP FROM 15% POWER.

shut down the reactor by driving rods, rather than tripping from 15%.

CRS (Step 12b. RNO) GO TO Step 12.d.

BOP Determine boration amount based on the following:

Power Reduction Rate (MW/mm)

Present NC System Boron Concentration (ppm)

Total Power change_(%).

Record calculated boration amount:

NOTE: Based on the rate of load reduction the total boration is 1 000-1 100 gallons.

RO Check auto or manual rod control

AVAILABLE.

- 34

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

4 Page 35 of 54 Event

Description:

Rapid Downpower BOP Perform boration in 4 equal additions during load reduction PER OP/i /N61 50/009 (Boron Concentration Control), Enclosure 4.7 (Boration Using 1 NV-265B (Boric Acid to NV Pumps)).

NOTE: The CRS may assign the BOP to perform this action.

If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 4.7.

Other Examiners follow AP-4 Actions, Step 13, on Page 36.

OPI1/N61 50/009 BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ENCLOSURE 4J BORATION USING 1NV-265B (BORIC ACID TO NV PUMPS)

BOP BOP (Step 3.1) Evaluate all outstanding R&Rs that may impact performance of this procedure.

(Step 3.2) Evaluate energizing additional pressurizer heaters per OP/1/A/6100/003 (Controlling Procedure For Unit Operation) to enhance system mixing when changing NC System boron concentration. (R. M.)

BOP (Step 3.6) Adding Greater Than 20 Gallons of Boric Acid Ensure one of the following running:

lABATransPump OR lB BA Trans Pump Determine length of time 1 NV-265B (Ui NV Pump Boric Acid Sup lsol) full open as follows: (R.M.)

BOP IF using Table 4.7-1 (Time 1 NV 265B Full Open With One BAT Pump Running), record time 1 NV 265B full open from table:

sec.

BOP (Step 3.3) Perform following sections, as applicable:

Section 3.6, Adding Greater Than 20 Gallons of Boric Acid

- 35

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

4 Page 36 of 54 Event

Description:

Rapid Downpower IF using equation, perform the following:

Calculate time 1 NV-265 is to to be Full Open.

Open 1 NV-265B (Ui NV Pump Boric Acid Sup Isol). (R.M.)

HOLD until 1 NV-265B (Ui NV Boric Acid Sup lsol) full open time elapsed, THEN close 1NV-265B (Ui NV Pump Boric Acid Sup Isol). (R.M.)

IF 1 NV-265B (Ui NV Boric Acid Sup Isol) will NOT close...

IF BA Trans Pump started in Step 3.6.1, perform the following:

Ensure the following off:

lABATransPump iBBATransPump Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE.

RO OR Ensure one of the following selected to AUTO:

lABATrans Pump iBBATransPump AP111A15500104, RAPID DOWNPOWER (Step 13) Check control rods MOVING IN AS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN T-AVG AT T-REF.

RO (Step 14) Display Rod Insertion Limits on OAC by entering turn on code RIL.

- 36

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

4 Page 37 of 54 Event

Description:

Rapid Downpower CRS CRS CRS (Step 15) IF AT ANY TIME CONTROL ROD BANK LO LO LIMIT alarm (1AD-2, B-9) is lit, THEN perform one of the following to comply with Tech Spec 3.1.6 (Control Bank Insertion Limits)

Ensure alarm clears within one hour as Xenon builds in.

OR Initiate boration as necessary within one hour to restore control rods above insertion limits.

(Step 16) IF AT ANY TIME during this procedure C-7A is received, THEN ensure Transient Monitor freeze is triggered.

(Step 17) REFER TO the following:

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

CRS (Step 18) Notify Reactor Engineer on duty of NOTE: The CRS may call load reduction.

WCC/RE to address the load reduction.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RE.

Examiner NOTE: The CRS may proceed past Step 18 of AP4 while waiting for the BOP to complete the first boration.

If so, wait until the BOP is complete with the first boration an them proceed to the next event.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.

RP/O/N5700/000 (Classification of Emergency)

RP!O/N5700/O1O (NRC Immediate Notification Requirements).

- 37

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

5 Page 38 of 54 Event

Description:

Sequentially Dropped Rods During the downpower, one Control Bank D Control Rod will drop into the core.

The operator will respond in accordance with ARP1AD-2/D-9, RPI at Bottom Rod Drop and will implement AP/1/A15500/14, Rod Control Malfunction. Shortly after this, a second Control Rod will drop requiring that the operator manually trip the reactor. The crew will enter EP/1/N5000/E.0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Booth Operator Instructions:

Insert IREOO6B6 (1) and IREO06P1O (1),

30 seconds delayed, or at the discretion of the Lead Examiner)

Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, D-9, RPI AT BOTTOM ROD DROP, alarms.

MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, D-1O, RPI URGENT FAILURE, alarms.

MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, E-9, RPI AT BOTTOM> 1 ROD DROPPED, alarms.

DRPI indication that Control Rod B6 is on the bottom.

Subsequently:

DRPI indication that Control Rod PlO is on the bottom.

Time Pos.

Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP111N5500114, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION RO (Step 1) IF more than one rod dropped, OR Immediate Action misaligned by greater than 24 steps, THEN perform the following:

Trip Reactor.

NOTE: The rods will drop sequentially so the action of tripping the reactor will be delayed, but Immediate upon observation.

GO TO EPI1/AJ5000IE-O (Reactor Trip or Safety_Injection).

RO (Step 2) Place control rods in manual.

Immediate Action RO (Step 3) Check rod movement STOPPED.

Immediate Action 38

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N 13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

5 Page 39 of 54 Event

Description:

Sequentially Dropped Rods Time Pos.

RO Expected Actions/Behavior (Step 4) Check all rods ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK, Comments (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following:

IF misaligned rod(s) due to DRPI indication failure only, THEN exit this procedure.

IF T-Avg has gone down, THEN lower Turbine load as necessary to restore T Avg to T-Ref.

GO TO Enclosure 1 (Response To Dropped or Misaligned Rod).

NOTE: Upon recognition of the dropped rod, the RO will perform Step 1 which now applies.

(Step 1) IF two or more rods are either dropped OR misaligned by greater than 24 steps, THEN perform the following:

Trip Reactor.

Immediate Action NOTE: The rods will drop sequentially so the action of tripping the reactor will be delayed, but Immediate upon observation.

GO TO EP/11A15000/E-O (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

Upon a Manual Reactor Trip move to Events #6-10.

- 39

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 40 of 54 Event

Description:

Rod Ejection/SB LOCAl 1 A NV Pump Trip/EDG B Sequencer Failure/i A NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO/2 Rod Ejection/SB LOCA On the trip, Control Rod D-4 will be ejected from the core causing a 1000 gpm Small Break LOCA.

The operator will trip the Reactor and actuate Safety Injection, and then enter EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

On the Safety Injection actuation the EDG B Sequencer will fail to automatically sequence, and the operator will need to manually start ECCS loads. Additionally, the 1A NV Pump will trip, and the 1A NI Pump will fail to start automatically. The operator will be required to start the 1A NI Pump manually. Upon completion of E-0, the operator will transition to EP/1/A15000/E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

At that time a second Control Rod (F-14) will be ejected from the core causing the Small Break LOCA to degrade to the point at which the NC Pumps will need to be tripped.

The scenario will terminate at Step 10 of E-1, after the crew has been directed to return back to the beginning of E-1.

Booth Operator Instructions:

insert NCOO5D4 (1000 gpm)

Indications Available:

Control Rod D-4 Red Rod Bottom Light flashes on DRPI Containment Pressure starts to rise Charging flow starts to increase Pzr level starts to lower Time Pós Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of E-0, prior to the CRS addressing the EP.

EPI1/N5000/E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO/

BOP (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip:

Immediate Action All rod bottom lights LIT NOTE: The Ejected Rod does NOT indicate on the Bottom.

Reactor trip and bypass breakers

OPEN hR amps GOING DOWN.

40-

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 41 of 54 Event

Description:

Rod Ejection/SB LOCAl 1 A NV Pump TripIEDG B Sequencer Failure/i A NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO/2 Rod Ejection/SB LOCA RO BOP RO/

BOP (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip:

All throttle valves CLOSED.

(Step 4) Check 1 ETA and 1 ETB

ENERGIZED.

(Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated:

SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED status light (1SI-18)

LIT.

Immediate Action Immediate Action Immediate Action NOTE: The CRS may decide to transition to ES-O.1 based on the condition required for SI not met.

If so, they will return to E-O shortly when SI conditions are met.

nrnmpntq, RO (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following:

Immediate Action Trip reactor.

IF reactor will not trip, BOP (Step 8) Check Phase A RESET lights

DARK.

CRS BOP Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1 SI-14)

LIT.

(Step 6) Announce Unit 1 Safety Injection.

(Step 7) Check all Feedwater Isolation status lights (1 S 1-4)

LIT.

NOTE: The CRS may ask the U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

- 41

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

8, 7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 42 of 54 Event

Description:

Rod Ejection/SB LOCAl 1A NV Pump Trip/EDG B Sequencer Failure/i A NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO/2 Rod Ejection/SB LOCA BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):

Groups 1,2,5 DARK.

Group3LIT.

Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Group 4 LITE AS REQUIRED.

NOTE: Several lights will be DARK (1A NV Pump has tripped, 1A NI Pump has failed to start, EDG B Sequencer has failed to operate).

The BOP will need to manually start train B equipment and the 1A NI Pump.

CRS GOTOSTEP1O.

(Step 9.c RNO) Align or start components as required.

Group6LIT.

Critical Task:

E-O J Establish flow from at least one high-head ECCS Pump before transition out of E 0.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish flow from the NV System after failure of the automatic actuation constitutes a demonstrated inability by the operator to recognize a failure and/or correct a failure of an ESF System or component. The FSAR analyses of response to high energy line breaks assume that at least one train of safeguards actuates.

If the minimum assumed ESF components are NOT actuated the Safety Analyses results are invalid. Because compliance with the assumptions in the FSAR is part of the facility license, failure to comply constitutes a violation of the license condition.

BOP (Step 10) Check proper CA pump status:

MD CA pumps ON NOTE: The 1 B MDCA will need to be manually started (Step 10.a RNO) Start pumps.

- 42

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 43 of 54 Event

Description:

Rod Ejection/SB LOCN 1 A NV Pump Trip/EDG B Sequencer Failure/i A NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO/2r Rod Ejection/SB LOCA Comments BOP (Step 11) Check all KC pumps

- ON BOP (Step 12) Check both RN pumps ON.

CRS (Step 13) Notify Unit 2 to start 2A RN pump.

Floor Instructor: As U2 RO report 2A RN Pump is running.

Start 2A RN pump.

THROTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum Booth Instructor:

for existing plant conditions.

insert LOA-RN087 (Start 2A RN Pump) insert LOA-RN083 8050.000000 delay=0 ramp=10 (Unit 2 Train A Demand Flow)

BOP (Step 16) Check S/I flow:

BOP Check NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW gauge INDICATING FLOW.

Check NC pressure LESS THAN 1600 NOTE: NCS pressure could PSIG.

be greater than or less than 1600 psig.

If pressure is greater than 1600 psig, then perform RNO.

BOP (Step 1 6.b RNO) Perform the following:

RO BOP NOTE: Containment pressure is 2.5 psig, and slowly rising due to the LOCA.

N/R level in at least 3 S/Gs GREATER THAN 17%.

(Step 14) Check all S/G pressures

GREATER THAN 775 P31G.

(Step 15) Check Containment Pressure

HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG.

- 43

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 44 of 54 Event

Description:

Rod Ejection/SB LOCAl 1A NV Pump Trip/EDG B Sequencer Failure/i A NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO/2 Rod Ejection/SB LOCA Time Pos.

CRS CRS BOP Expected Actions/Behavior Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running pump(s) open:

1ND-68A (1A ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol) 1 ND-67B (1 B ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol).

IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 17.

(Step 17) Notify OSM or other SRO to perform EP/1/A15000/G-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions Following an S/I) within 10 minutes.

(Step 18) Check CA flow:

Total CA flow GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.

WHEN each S/G N/R level is greater than 11% (32% ACC), THEN control CA flow to maintain that S/G N/A levels between 11% (32% ACC) and 50%.

Comments NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

BOP (Step 20) Check Pzr PORV and spray valves:

RO (Step 19) Check NC temperatures:

IF all NC pumps off, THEN check NC T Avg STABLE OR TRENDING TO 557°F.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

NOTE: The use of adverse Containment numbers is required if Containment Pressure is > 3 psig.

NOTE: The NC Pumps could be on or off depending on NC Subcooling and Containment Pressure.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 45 of 54 Event

Description:

Rod Ejection/SB LOCA/ 1A NV Pump Trip/EDG B Sequencer Failure/i A NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO/2 Rod Ejection/SB LOCA All Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

RO (Step 22) Check if main steamlines intact:

All S/G pressures STABLE OR GOING UP All S/Gs PRESSURIZED.

RO/

BOP (Step 23) Check if SIG tubes intact:

Normal Pzr spray valves

- CLOSED At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve

OPEN.

RO (Step 21) Check NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 0°F.

RO/

(Step 24) Check if NC System intact as BOP follows:

The following secondary EMFs

NORMAL:

1 EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) 1 EMF-34(L) (S/G Sample (Lo Range))

1EMF-24(S/GA) 1EMF-25(S/GB) 1 EMF-26 (S/G C) 1EMF-27(S/GD)

S/G levels STABLE OR GOING UP IN A CONTROLLED MANNER.

- 45..

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 46 of 54 Event

Description:

Rod Ejection/SB LOCA/ 1 A NV Pump Trip/EDG B Sequencer Failure/i A NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO/2 Rod Ejection/SB LOCA Time Pos.

Expected Actions/Behavior 1 EMF-38(L) (Containment Particulate (LR))

- NORMAL 1 EMF-39(L) (Containment Gas (Lo Range))

- NORMAL 1 EMF-40 (Containment Iodine)

NORMAL Check containment pressure LESS THAN 1 PSIG Check containment sump level NORMAL Comments NOTE: 1EMF-38L is in TRIP 2.

BOP (Step 24 RNO) Perform the following:

IF H2 Igniters are off, THEN perform the NOTE: The H2 Igniters are following:

OFF.

Energize H2 Igniters by depressing ON and OVERRIDE.

Dispatch operator to stop all Unit 1 NOTE: The CRS will dispatch NE AHUs PER EP/1/A15000/G-1 an AO.

(Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 28 Booth Instructor: as AO, (De-energizing Ice Condenser acknowledge AHUs).

CRS IF AT ANY TIME both of the following NOTE: These conditions conditions exist, THEN perform exist. (VX Manual Start And If so, it is likely that the CRS Isolating RV Cooling),

will assign the BOP to perform.

Containment pressure has remained less than 3 PS 1G.

Containment pressure is between 1 PSIG and 3 PSIG.

Implement EP/1IAJ5000/F-O (Critical Safety Function Status Trees),

- 46

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 47 of 54 Event

Description:

Rod Ejection/SB LOCAl 1 A NV Pump TripIEDG B Sequencer Failure/i A NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO/2 Rod Ejection/SB LOCA Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments GO TO EP/11N5000/E-1 (Loss Of Reactor Or Secondary Coolant).

NOTE: CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

Booth Operator Instructions:

insert MAL-NCOO5F14 = 2000 Indications Available:

Control Rod F-14 Red Rod Bottom Light flashes on DRPI Containment Pressure starts to rise again Charging flow starts to increase.

Pzr level starts to lower.

Examiner NOTE: NC Subcooling will be lost on this 2

u,d SBLOCA.

The five minute Clock to stop the NC Pumps should start WHEN subcooling is 0°F/NEGATIVE.

Record Time:

EP/1/A/5000/E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT RO (Step 3) Check if main steamlines intact:

All S/G pressures STABLE OR GOING UP All S/Gs PRESSURIZED.

(Step 4) Control intact S/G levels:

RO/

BOP (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

RO (Step 2) Check NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 0°F.

- 47

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Rod Ejection/SB LOCA/ 1A NV Pump Trip/EDG B Sequencer Failure/lA NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO/2 Rod Ejection/SB LOCA N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

6,7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 48 of 54 Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RD Check N/R level in any intact S/G

NOTE: Adverse Containment GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC).

Numbers will be used.

BOP Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.

RD THROTTLE feed flow to maintain all NOTE: Adverse Containment intact S/G N/R levels between 11% (32%

Numbers will be used.

ACC) and 50%.

CRS (Step 5) Check secondary radiation normal as follows:

Check all S!Gs INTACT.

Notify RP to perform the following:

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/RP to address the switch position.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RP.

Frisk all Unit 1 S/G cation columns to determine if activity level is significantly higher for any S/G.

Notify Control Room of survey results.

CRS WHEN survey results reported, THEN NOTE: This is a Continuous perform the following:

Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Check all S/G(s) activity levels

NORMAL.

BOP Check secondary EMFs NORMAL:

1 EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) 1 EMF-34(L) (S/G Sample (Lo Range))

1 EMF-24 (S/G_A) 1 EMF-25 (SIG_B) 1EMF-26(S/GC) 1 EMF-27 (S/G_D).

- 48

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

6,7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 9

of 54 Event

Description:

Rod Ejection/SB LOCAl 1A NV Pump Trip/EDG B Sequencer Failure/i A NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO/2 Rod Ejection/SB LOCA Pos.

BOP RO/

BOP Expected Actions/Behavior (Step 6) Check Pzr PORVs and isolation valves:

Power to all Pzr PORV isolation valves

AVAILABLE.

All Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve

OPEN.

IF AT ANY TIME any Pzr PORV opens due to high pressure, THEN after pressure goes below 2315 PSIG, ensure PORV closes or is isolated.

(Step 7) Check S/I termination criteria:

NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs

GREATER THAN 0°F.

Comments NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

BOP (Step 8) Check if ND pump should be stopped:

NC pressure GREATER THAN 275 NOTE: The ND Pumps are PSIG.

both ON.

NC pressure STABLE OR GOING UP.

NOTE: Containment pressure is 4 psig due to the LOCA.

BOP RO/

BOP (Step 7.a RNO) GO TO Step 7.f.

Monitor S/I termination criteria PER (S/I Termination Criteria) while in the procedure.

IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure S/I termination criteria is met, THEN RETURN TO Step 7.

NOTE: Pzr Level is NOT>

11% (29%).

NOTE: Pzr Spray is NOT available.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Time

- 49

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 50 of 54 Event

Description:

Rod Ejection/SB LOCAl 1A NV Pump Trip/EDG B Sequencer Failure/i A NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO/2 Rod Ejection/SB LOCA CRITICAL TASK:

(SS (E1C)) Trip NC Pumps within 5 minutes of loss of SCM (4600/113/E13.1)

Safety Significance: Failure to trip all NCPs on a loss of subcooled margin can lead to core uncovery and to fuel temperatures in excess of 2200°F. PT/0/A4600/1 13, Enclosure 13.1 states that McGuire is committed to having NC Pumps tripped within 5 minutes of a loss of subcooling.

The Safety Analysis recommends that the NC Pumps be tripped within 2 minutes to limit the depth and duration of core uncovery.

It is a management expectation that the NC Pumps be tripped as quickly as possible, but within 5 minutes of a loss of subcooling. Failure to take this action represents mis-operation by the operator which leads to degradation of the fuel cladding fission produce barrier, and a violation of a license condition.

Record Pump Stop Time:

subtract time recorded at time of the loss SCM on page 47

=

minutes.

BOP (Step 10) Check if D/Gs should be stopped:

AnyD/G-ON Check 1 ETA energized by offsite power NOTE: NC System pressure as follows:

is rising.

1 ETA Emergency Breaker

- OPEN 1 ETA ENERGIZED.

NOTE: The CRS will return to Step 1 of E-1, and await transition to ES-i.3 Criteria.

Check 1 ETB energized by offsite power as follows:

1 ETB Emergency Breaker

- OPEN 1ETBENERGIZED.

Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 8.b RNO) GO TO Step 9.

BOP (Step 9) Check NC and S/G pressures:

All S/G pressure STABLE OR GOING UP.

NC pressure STABLE OR GOING DOWN.

- 50

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event 4*

6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 51 of 54 Event

Description:

Rod Ejection/SB LOCA/ 1A NV Pump Trip/EDG B Sequencer Failure/lA NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO/2 Rod Ejection/SB LOCA Time Pos.

CRS Expected Actions/Behavior Reset the following:

S/I.

Sequencers.

IF AT ANY TIME a BlO signal occurs, THEN restart S/I equipment previously on.

Dispatch operator to stop unloaded DIG(s) and place in standby readiness PER OP/i /A/6350/002 (Diesel Generator):

..3 (iA D/G Shutdown)

..4 (1 B D/G Shutdown)

Comments NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO to stop the EDGs.

Floor Instructor:

Acknowledge as AO.

Booth Instructor: After 5 minutes insert LOA-DGOO3 STOP_DSG.

Booth Instructor: After 5 minutes insert LOA-DGOO4 STOP_DSG.

BOP (Step 11) Check containment H2 concentration:

Ensure operator dispatch to stop Unit 1 NOTE: This action was likely NE AHUs PER EP/i/A15000/G-i taken previously.

(Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 28 (De-If NOT the CRS will dispatch energizing Ice Condenser AHU5).

an AO.

Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge insert LOA-NFO16 STOP (Ice Condenser AHU Start/Stop)

Check H2 analyzers IN SERVICE.

BOP (Step 11.b RNO) Perform the following:

- 51

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 52 of 54 Event

Description:

Rod Ejection/SB LOCN 1A NV Pump Trip/EDG B Sequencer Failure/i A NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO/2 Rod Ejection/SB LOCA Dispatch operator to place H2 analyzers in service PER EP/l/N5000/G-l (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 5 (Placing H2 Analyzers In Service).

WHEN H2 analyzers in service, THEN complete Steps lic and lid.

GOTOStepl2.

Check H2 Igniters ON.

omments NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO.

Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge.

Booth Instructor:

insert LOA-VXOO9 enabled delay=300 (H2 Analyzer i A) insert LOA-VXO1O ENABLED delay=600 (H2 Analyzer 1 B)

Tihe.

Pos.

BOP (Step 12) Initiate evaluation of plant status as follows:

Check Cold Leg Recirc capability from at least one train as follows:

Train A:

1A ND pump AVAILABLE.

1NI-185A (1A ND Pump Suction From Cont Sump Isol)

POWER AVAILABLE.

OR Train B:

1 B ND pump AVAILABLE.

1NI-184B (lB ND Pump Suction From Cont Sump Isol)

POWER AVAILABLE.

Check for potential leak in aux bldg as follows:

Check aux bldg radiation.

All area monitor EMFs

NORMAL.

- 52

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N13-1 Scenario #

4 Event #

6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 53 of 54 Event

Description:

Rod Ejection/SB LOCN 1 A NV Pump Trip/EDG B Sequencer Failure/i A NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO/2 Rod Ejection/SB LOCA EMF-41 (Aux Bldg Ventilation)

NORMAL Check NC to ND pressure boundary intact as follows:

ND Temperature

- NORMAL ND Flow-NORMAL ND Pressure NORMAL.

WHEN TSC staffed...

PoS1 Expected Actions/Behavior BOP (Step 13) Check if NC System cooldown and depressurization is required:

NC pressure GREATER THAN 275 PSIG.

GO TO EP/1/A/5000IES-1.2 (Post LOCA Cooldown And Depressurization).

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

(rmmntc NOTE: The TSC will NOT be staffed yet.

NOTE: The CRS will transition to ES-1.2.

Time

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UNIT 1 STATUS:

Power Level:

100%

NCS [B]

925 ppm Pzr [B]:

925 ppm Xe:

Per OAC Power History:

At this power level for 178 days Core Burnup:

251 EFPDs CONTROLLING PROCEDURE:

OP/1/A16100/03 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME THE SHIFT:

The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1C Hotwell Pump is OOS for motor replacement. However, it is expected back within the next four hours.

1NB LT-5420, RMWST Level indication, failed low last shift (IAE is investigating).

MCB Annunciator lAD-i, F-9, DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNCT, has failed to off (IAE is investigating).

Crew Directions:

Maintain present power level.

Work Control SRO/Offsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe NLOs AVAILABLE Unit 1 Unit 2 Aux Bldg.

John Aux Bldg.

Chris Turb Bldg. Bob Turb Bldg. Mike 5

th Rounds. Carol Extra(s)

Bill Ed Wayne Tanya

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