ML13331A926
| ML13331A926 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 04/28/1987 |
| From: | Baskin K, Holcombe J San Diego Gas & Electric Co, Southern California Edison Co |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13331A925 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-65271 NUDOCS 8705050388 | |
| Download: ML13331A926 (9) | |
Text
BEFORE THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Application of SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON
)
COMPANY and SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY )
for a Class 104(b) License to Acquire,
)
DOCKET NO. 50-206 Possess, and Use a Utilization Facility as
)
Part of Unit No. 1 of the San Onofre Nuclear )
Amendment No. 140 Generating Station
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SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY and SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, hereby submit Amendment Application No. 140.
This amendment consists of Proposed Change No. 164 to Provisional Operating License No. DPR-13. Proposed Change No. 164 modifies the Technical Specifications incorporated in Provisional Operating License No. DPR-13 as Appendix A.
Proposed Change No. 164 is a request to revise Section 3.1.2, Operational Components, with its applicable Basis; and Table 4.1.2, Minimum Equipment Check and Sampling Frequency of the Appendix A Technical Specifications.
In the event of conflict, the information in Amendment Application No. 140 supersedes the information previously submitted.
8705050388 870428 PDR ADOCK 05000206 P
-2 Based on the safety analysis provided in the Description of Proposed Change No. 164 and Safety Analysis, it is concluded that (1) Proposed Change No. 140 does not involve an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59, nor does it present significant hazards considerations not described or implicit in the Final Safety Analysis, and (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 170.12, the fee of $150 is herewith remitted.
IAA:8202F
-3 Subscribed on this day of 1987.
Respectfully submitted, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY By:
1 4
Kinneth P. Baskin Vice President Subscribed and sworn before me this day of
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_7 Nota Public in and for the County of Los Angeles, State of California My Commission Expires: 4 Lv4LZ/QZ OFFKIAL SEAL AGNES CRABTREE Notary Public-California Charles R. Kocher LOSANGELESCOUNTY James A. Beoletto My Comm. Exp. Sep. 14, 1990 Attorneys for Southern California Edison Company By:
a Jame e
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-4 Subscribed on this day of i,?e/
L
, 1987.
Respectfully submitted, SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY By: ~64
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'J/,'C.
Holcombe Vice President Subscribed and sworn to before me this L(day of 194 n7
/4.
Wary Publi /,n angffor e County of an Diego, -*ate of Cal' ornia My Commission Expires:
OFFICIA SEAL JILL QUIGLEY David R. Pigott NOTARY PUBUC-CAUFORNIA Samuel B. Casey PRINCIPAL OFFCE IN ameWoCOCNu Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe My Commission Eqp March 7,1989 Attorneys for San Diego a
aweGas
& Electric Company By:
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David R. Pigott
89 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of SOUTHERN
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CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY
)
and SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC
)
Docket No. 50-206 COMPANY (San Onofre Nuclear
)
Generating Station Unit No. 1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of Amendment Application No. 140 was served on the following by deposit in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, on the 30th day of April 1987.
Henry 3. McGurren, Esq.
Staff Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20545 David R. Pigott, Esq.
Samuel B. Casey, Esq.
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe 600 Montgomery Street San Francisco, California 94111 L. G. Hinkleman Bechtel Power Corporation P.O. Box 60860, Terminal Annex Los Angeles, California 90060 Michael L. Mellor, Esq.
Thelen, Marrin, Johnson & Bridges Two Embarcadero Center San Francisco, California 94111 Huey Johnson Secretary for Resources State of California 1416 Ninth Street Sacramento, California 95814 Janice E. Kerr, General Counsel California Public Utilities Commission 5066 State Building San Francisco, California 94102
-2 James McGuffin Western Regional Manager Westinghouse Electric Corporation Post Office Box 2728 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 A. I. Gaede P.O. Box 373 San Clemente, California 92672 Frederick E. John, Executive Director California Public Utilities Commission 5050 State Building San Francisco, California 94102 Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 J7s A. 'Beollet t
DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED CHANGE NO. 164 AND SAFETY ANALYSIS This is a request to revise Appendix A Technical Specification 3.1.2, Operational Components, with its applicable Basis and Table 4.1.2, Minimum Equipment Check and Sampling Frequency.
References:
A. Letter, M. 0. Medford (SCE) to 3. A. Zwolinski (NRC), dated August 30, 1985, Technical Specification 3.1.2 Operating Status of Reactor Coolant System Equipment B. Letter, M. 0. Medford (SCE) to 3. A. Zwolinski (NRC), dated October 17, 1985, Technical Specification 3.1.2 Description Effective October 4, 1984, the San Onofre Unit 1 Technical Specifications were revised to require redundant means of decay heat removal (DHR) in all modes of plant operation. This revision was consistent with the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications and, in addition to other changes, it required that in Mode 3 at least two reactor coolant loops be operable and at least one loop in operation.
Subsequent to the time that the revision to the San Onofre Unit 1 Technical Specifications was developed and became effective, the safety analysis assumptions for Mode 3 regarding the number of operating reactor coolant loops were reevaluated by Westinghouse. Based on this review it was concluded that the FSA safety analyses performed at Hot Zero Power (HZP) are assumed to bound Mode 3 operation. The accidents which are limiting at HZP are steamline break, rod ejection and bank withdrawal from subcritical. In the analysis for rod ejection for San Onofre Unit 1, the safety analyses assumed that two reactor coolant pumps were running. In the bank withdrawal from subcritical analysis and steamline break, the safety analyses assumed that three pumps were running.
For the rod ejection and steamline break events, the inconsistency between the safety analyses and the revised Technical Specifications will not impact the conclusions presented in the FSA. However, for the bank withdrawal from subcritical accident, new analyses show that the DNB design basis may not be met when only one pump is in operation. Thus, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications is reduced.
By Reference A, SCE notified the NRC that the DHR requirements for Mode 3 were being reviewed with Westinghouse to determine whether a Technical Specification change was necessary and that, in the interim, all three reactor coolant pumps would be maintained in operation whenever the reactor trip breakers are in a closed position. It should be noted that the potential for control rod motion out of the core is present only when the two reactor trip breakers connected in series with the gripper and lift coils of the control rod drive mechanisms are closed and the coils are energized.
By Reference B, SCE notified the NRC that a Technical Specification change would be submitted requiring operation of all three reactor coolant pumps in Mode 3 (reactor trip breakers closed).
-2 Proposed Change No. 164 consists of the following:
- 1. Changes to Technical Specifications 3.1.2.C and 3.1.2.D requiring operation of all three reactor coolant loops and their associated steam generators not only in Modes 1 and 2 (as at present), but also in Mode 3 if the reactor trip breakers are closed. The exceptions to this requirement will be as stated in proposed Technical Specification 3.1.2.D.
- 2. A change to Technical Specification 3.1.2.E, making plant operation in Mode 3 with one reactor coolant loop in operation conditional on both reactor trip breakers being open.
- 3. Changes to the Basis for Technical Specification 3.1.2 for editorial improvement and to provide the basis for the requirements stated in 1 and 2 above.
- 4. Changes to Item No. 15 of Table 4.1.2 in the Technical Specifications reflecting the new requirements stated above.
Existing Technical Specifications The existing Technical Specifications are contained in Enclosure I.
Proposed Technical Specifications The proposed Technical Specifications are contained in Enclosure II. Changes from the existing text, as presented in Enclosure I, are identified by vertical bars in the margin.
Safety Analysis Proposed Change No. 164 is deemed not to constitute a significant hazards consideration, based on the following discussion.
- 1. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No As seen in the Description, this proposed change upgrades the Mode 3 decay heat removal (DHR) requirements with reactor trip breakers closed to those that presently exist for Modes 1 and 2. This change is totally consistent with the plant safety analysis assumptions regarding the number of operating reactor coolant (RC) loops in Mode 3. If for some reason it is desired or becomes necessary to take one or two RC loops out of service while remaining in Mode 3, this can be accomplished if the reactor trip breakers are first opened to preclude the possibility of an accidental control rod bank withdrawal.
Thus, this proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
-3
- 2.
Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response
No This proposed change does not change the physical configuration of the plant. It upgrades an existing limiting condition for operation for San Onofre Unit 1 consistent with the FSAR assumptions, but does not relax any other existing limiting condition for operation. Thus, the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated is not created by this proposed change.
- 3.
Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No The San Onofre Unit 1 Technical Specifications require that all three reactor coolant loops be in operation in Modes 1 and 2 (reactor is at power).
An extension of this requirement to Mode 3 (reactor is subcritical) cannot cause a reduction in a margin of safety.
Proposed Change No. 164 satisfies Example (ii) of the Examples of Amendments that are Considered Not Likely to Involve Significant Hazards Considerations (page 7751 of the Federal Register, dated March 6, 1986) in that it "constitutes an additional limitation, restriction or control not presently included in the technical specifications."
Safety and Significant Hazards Determination Based on the Safety Analysis, it is concluded that:
(1) Proposed Change No. 164 does not constitute a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10 CFR 50.92; (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change; and (3) this action will not result in a condition which significantly alters the impact of the station on the environment as described in the NRC's Final Environmental Statement.
IAA:6624F