ML13325A953
| ML13325A953 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 11/18/2013 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | Duke Energy Progress |
| References | |
| 50-400/13-301 | |
| Download: ML13325A953 (151) | |
Text
sri 020r9-suni fina1formvt rlr ES-201 - xamination Preparation Checklist Form ES-201-1 Facility: Date of Examination: Li/2o 3 Developed by: Written - Facility NRC II Operating - Facility ENRC D Target Chief Date* Task Description (Reference) Examiners Initials
-180 1. Examination administration date confirmed (Cia; C.2.a and b)
-120 2. NRC examiners and facility contact assigned (C.1 .d; C.2.e) !/3/i 3
-120 3. Facility contact briefed on security and other requirements (C.2.c) /,
3 Y
-120 4. Corporate notification letter sent (C.2.d) i/ 14/i3 7ØL
[-90] [5. Reference material due (C.1 .e; C.3.c; Attachment 3)]
3/2c/,3 11L
{-75} 6. Integrated examination outline(s) due, including Forms ES-201-2, ES-201-3, ES-301 -1, ES-301 -2, ES-301 -5, ES-D-1 s, ES-401 -1/2, ES-401 -3, nd ES-401-4, as applicable (C.1.e and f; C.3.d)
{-70} {7. Examination outline(s) reviewed by NRC and feedb ck rovided to facility licensee (C.2.h; C.3.e)}
4)3113
{-45} 8. Proposed examinations (including written, walk-through JPMs, and scenarios, as applicable), supporting documentation (including Forms ES-301-3, ES-301-4, ES-301-5, ES-301-6, and ES-401-6, and any Form ES-201-3 updates), and reference materials due (C.i.e, f, g and h; C.3.d)
-30 9. Preliminary license applications (NRC Form 398s) due (CII; C2.g; ES-202)
-14 10. Final license applications due and Form ES-201-4 prepared (C 1.1; Q.2.i; ES-202) 8/26/13
-14 11. Examination approved by NRC supervisor for facility licensee review (C.2.h; C.3.f) J)
/A j 3J,3 2
g/ -
-14 12. Examinations reviewed with facility licensee (Cli; C.2.far*ih; C.3.g)
-7 13. Written examinations and operating tests approved by NRC supervisor (C.2.i; C.3.h) V,6/,3
-7 14. Final applications reviewed; 1 or2 (if>10) applications audited to confirm qualifications I eligibility; and examination approval and waiver letters sent (C.2.i; Attachment 5; ES-202, C2.e; ES-204)
-7 15. Proctoring/written exam administration guidelines reviewed with facility licensee (C.3.k)
/i/,
-7 16. Approved scenarios, job performance measures, and questions distributed to NRC examiners (C.3.i) i/./i Target dates are generally based on facility-prepared examinations and are keyed to the examination date identified in the corporate notification letter. They are for planning purposes and may be adjusted on a case-by case basis in coordination with the facility licensee.
[Applies only] {Does not apply} to examinations prepared by the NRC.
-WRITTEN EXAM SAMPLE PLAN ONLY ES-201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Form ES-201-2 Facility: SHEARON HARRIS Date of Examination: SEPTEMBER 2013 Initials Item Task Description
- 1. a. Verify that the outline(s) fit(s) the appropriate model, in accordance with ES-401.
R b. Assess whether the outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance with I Section D.1 of ES-401 and whether all K/A categories are appropriately sampled. ,1 T c. Assess whether the outline over-emphasizes any systems, evolutions, or generic topics.
- d. Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected K/A statements are appropriate. 474 (
- 2. a. Using Form ES-301 -5, verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number of normal evolutions, instrument and component failures, technical specifications, S and major transients.
M b. Assess whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the projected number U and mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule L without compromising exam integrity, and ensure that each applicant can be tested using A at least one new or significantly modified scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated T from the applicants audit test(s), and that scenarios will not be repeated on subsequent days.
- c. To the extent possible, assess whether the outline(s) conform(s) with the qualitative and quantitative criteria specified on Form ES-301-4 and described in Appendix D.
- 3. a. Verify that the systems walk-through outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301 -2:
(1) the outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and in-plant tasks W distributed among the safety functions as specified on the form I (2) task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is within the limits specified on the form T (3) no tasks are duplicated from the applicants audit test(s)
(4) the number of new or modified tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specified on the form (5) the number of alternate path, low-power, emergency, and RCA tasks meet the criteria on the form.
- b. Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301 -1:
(1) the tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form (2) at least one task is new or significantly modified (3) no more than one task is repeated from the last two NRC licensing examinations
- c. Determine if there are enough different outlines to test the projected number and mix of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days.
- 4. a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered Al in the appropriate exam sections.
G E b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41/43 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate.
- c. Ensure that K/A importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5.
- d. Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections. 1 t L e. Check the entire exam for balance of coverage.
- f. Assess whether the exam fits the appropriate job level (RD or SRO). Ij j C
- a. Author Mlc/M?EL
- b. Facility Reviewer (*) 1/4
_)
- d. NRC Supervisor // (- 12 I)
Note: # Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column c; chief examiner concurrence required.
Not applicable for NRC-prepared examination outlines 775 £S-wi-z dz4cm.t sy4f 1i fr)rgffe,41 -an nM.
-SIMULA TOR AND WALKTHRO UGH EXAM OUTLINE ONLY-ES-201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Form ES-201-2 Facility: Harris Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: 09-09-2013 Initials Item Task Description a b* c#
- 1. a. Verify that the outline(s) fit(s) the appropriate model, in accordance with ES-401.
w R b. Assess whether the outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance with I Section D.1 of ES-401 and whether all K/A categories are appropriately sampled.
N A E c. Assess whether the outline over-emphasizes any systems, evolutions, or generic topics.
N d. Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected K/A statements are appropriate.
- 2. a. Using Form ES-301 -5, verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number S
of normal evolutions, instrument and component failures, technical specifications, and major transients.
9 /4 72 M b. Assess whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the projected number U and mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule L without compromising exam integrity, and ensure that each applicant can be tested using A at least one new or significantly modified scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated ()
T from the applicants audit test(s), and that scenarios will not be repeated on subsequent days.
- c. To the extent possible, assess whether the outline(s) conform(s) with the qualitative and quantitative criteria specified on Form ES-301-4 and described in Appendix D.
- 3. a. Verify that the systems walk-through outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-2:
(1) the outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and in-plant tasks W distributed among the safety functions as specified on the form
/ (2) task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is within the limits specified on the form T (3) no tasks are duplicated from the applicants audit test(s)
(4) the number of new or modified tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specified on the form (5) the number of alternate path, low-power, emergency, and RCA tasks meet the criteria on the form.
- b. Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301 -1:
(1) the tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form (2) at least one task is new or significantly modified -
(3) no more than one task is repeated from the last two NRC licensing examinations
- c. Determine if there are enough different outlines to test the projected number and mix 5) of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days.
- 4. a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered in the appropriate exam sections. 5 ,4f G
E b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41/43 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate.
- c. Ensure that K/A importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5.
R d. Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections. C)
L e. Check the entire exam for balance of coverage.
- Printed Name/ i nature Date
- a. Author ( /rtr /4ij b.
c.
Facility Reviewer (*)
NRC Chief Examiner (#)
S 1*10 N £c4( iaOT ZLA.NO Ck*LL-6/2i
/ J o3JZ1/2o13
- d. NRC Supervisor (Vik Fr*Ji Note: # Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column c; chief examiner concurrence required.
Not applicable for NRC-prepared examination outlines This form ES-201-2 documents only the Simulator and Walkthrough exam outline.
ES-201, Page 25 of 27
ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3
- 1. Pre-Examination py /c3 I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 9/9/2013 as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.
- 2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
PRINTED NAME JOB TITLE / RESPONSIBILITY SIGNATURE (1) DATE SIGNATURE (2) DATE NOTE
- 1. Richard (JR) Horton SNOTI I Lead Exam Developer 12/17/12 i.
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ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3
- 1. Pre-Examination 1
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I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 9/9/2013 as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.
- 2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowdge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of
- 5. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
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1!7 C ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3
- 1. Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.
- 2. Post-Examination To the best of my 5 I 1
knodge, i id , not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of I 1fr7. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
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Horton, Richard (JR)
From: Mac McDade <mcdade54@gmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, September 26, 2013 10:58 PM To: Horton, Richard (JR)
Subject:
Re: 2013 Harris Station NRC Exam Completion I agree to the statement. How did the exam go?
On Sep 26, 2013 10:38 PM, Horton, Richard (JR) <Richard.Horton2(duke-energy.com> wrote:
To all, Examination Security has been lifted for the HNP ILC 13-1 NRC Exam. The Operating Exam was administered the week of 9/9/13 and 9/16/13. The written exam was administered on 9/25/13. The Exam Security forms are located on my desk in the HEEC building on the instructor office wing (Across from C-109). Please come by and sign off the agreement and return your red exam security badge. It is preferred that you sign off in person, however if unable to come by my desk, I can sign you off if you reply to this e-mail stating that you agree with the following statement:
To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week of 9/9/13, 9/16/13 and on 9/25/13. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performancefeedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
The c-mails are going to he attached to the security agreement forms and mailed to the NRC Chief Examiner. After you send me this statement you may remove your exam badge. Either send me your badge through the company mail or leave your security badge on my desk the next time you are at the HEEC building. When responding that you would like me to sign you off the agreement please respond with the following statement (or similar).
I have ,read and agree wi/h the holded statement he/ow. Please sign me off/he security agreement.
Thanks for your support during the development and implementation of the ILC 13-1 NRC Exam.
1
Horton, Richard (JR)
From: Bolin, Bob 3ent: Thursday, September26, 2013 2:33 PM Tb: Horton, Richard (JR)
Subject:
RE: 2013 Harris Station NRC Exam Completion To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week of 9/9/13, 9/16/13 and on 9/25/13. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
I have read and agree with the bolded statement below. Please sign me off the security agreement.
7i Sr. OPs Training Instructor DUKE ENERGY.
Brunswick Nuclear Plant Bob. Bolincduke-enerqy.com Work (910) 457-3078 1
Horton, Richard (JR)
From: Home, Bruce Sent: Tuesday, October 01, 2013 8:37 AM To: Horton, Richard (JR)
Subject:
RE: 2013 Harris Station NRC Exam Completion
- Richard, I have read and agree with the bolded statement below. Please sign me off the security agreement.
Scott From: Horton, Richard (JR)
Sent: Thursday, September 26, 2013 2:30 PM To: Gunter, William; Bolin, Bob; Rouse, Bradley; Kelly, Kyle; Eagle III, Eugene; Home, Bruce; Hinman, Michael; Christopherson, Mark; Matheny, Michael; Pickar, George; Lipsky, Ryan
Subject:
2013 Harris Station NRC Exam Completion To all, Examination Security has been lifted for the HNP ILC 13-1 NRC Exam. The Operating Exam was administered the week of 9/9/13 and 9/16/13. The written exam was administered on 9/25/13. The Exam Security forms are located on my desk in the HEEC building on the instructor office wing (Across from C-109). Please come by and sign off the agreement and return your red exam security badge. It is preferred that you sign off in person, however if unable to come by my desk, I can sign you off if you reply to this e-mail stating that you agree with the following statement:
To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week of 9/9/13, 9/16/13 and on 9/25/13. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
The e-mails are going to be attached to the security agreement forms and mailed to the NRC Chief Examiner. After you send me this statement you may remove your exam badge. Either send me your badge through the company mail or leave your security badge on my desk the next time you are at the HEEC building. When responding that you would like me to sign you off the agreement please respond with the following statement (or similar).
I have read and agree with the bolded statement below. Please sign me off the security agreement.
Thanks for your support during the development and implementation of the ILC 13-1 NRC Exam.
JR Horton Sr Nuclear Training Instructor Harris Nuclear Plant Duke Energy Progress, Inc Email: richard.horton2@duke-enegy.com Phone: 919-362-3334 Exam room: 919-362-3582 Mobile: 919-600-4875 Vnet: 8-772-3334/3582 1
Horton, Richard (JR)
From: Hinman, Michael Sent: Tuesday, October01, 2013 4:33 AM To: Horton, Richard (JR)
Subject:
RE: signing security agreement I have read and agree with the bolded statement below. Please sign me off the security agreement, To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week of 9/9/13, 9/16/13 and on 9/25/13. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
Original Message----
From: Horton, Richard (JR)
Sent: Monday, September 30, 2013 11:13 PM To: Hinman, Michael
Subject:
signing security agreement You get a chance to signoff security?
Horton, Richard (JR)
From: Christopherson, Mark 5ent: Tuesday, October 01, 2013 2:08 PM To: Horton, Richard (JR)
Subject:
RE: 2013 Harris Station NRC Exam Completion JR, I have read and agree with the bolded statement below. Please sign me off of the security agreement the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week of 9/9/13, 9/16/13 and on 9/25/13. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
From: Horton, Richard (JR)
Sent: Thursday, September 26, 2013 2:29 PM To: Gunter, William; Bolin, Bob; Rouse, Bradley; Kelly, Kyle; Eagle III, Eugene; Home, Bruce; Hinman, Michael; Christopherson, Mark; Matheny, Michael; Pickar, George; Lipsky, Ryan
Subject:
2013 Harris Station NRC Exam Completion To all, Examination Security has been lifted for the HNP ILC 13-1 NRC Exam. The Operating Exam was administered the week of 9/9/13 and 9/16/13. The written exam was administered on 9/25/13. The Exam Security forms are located on my desk in the HEEC building on the instructor office wing (Across from C-109). Please come by and sign off the agreement and return your red exam security badge. It is preferred that you sign off in person, however if unable to come by my desk, I can sign you off if you reply to this e-mail stating that you agree with the following statement:
To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week of 9/9/13, 9/16/13 and on 9/25/13. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
The e-mails are going to be attached to the security agreement forms and mailed to the NRC Chief Examiner. After you send me this statement you may remove your exam badge. Either send me your badge through the company mail or leave your security badge on my desk the next time you are at the HEEC building. When responding that you would like me to sign you off the agreement please respond with the following statement (or similar).
I have read and agree with the bolded statement below. Please sign me off the security agreement.
Thanks for your support during the development and implementation of the ILC 13-1 NRC Exam.
JR Horton Sr Nuclear Training Instructor Harris Nuclear Plant Duke Energy Progress, Inc Email: richard.horton2@duke-enegy.com Phone: 919-362-3334 Exam room: 919-362-3582 Mobile: 919-600-4875 Vnet: 8-772-3334/3582 1
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-l Facility: Harris Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: September 9, 2013 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: 05000400/2013301 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*
Determine Active / Inactive Status Of Off Shift License Personnel (JPM ADM-069-a) Common Conduct of Operations N, R K/A G2.1.1 2013 NRC ROISRO Al-I Determine Average RCS Boron Concentration per EOP-ECA-0. 1 (JPM ADM-020-a) Common Conduct of Operations D, R K/A G2.1.20 2013 NRC ROISROAI-2 Perform a Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) calculation with a control rod misaligned.
(JPM ADM-010-e)
Equipment Control M,R KJAG2.2.12 2013 NRC RO A2 Using Survey Maps, Simplified Drawings, Plant Maps and valve lists, determine stay times while performing a clearance activity
. (JPM-ADM-51-c) Common P, R Radiation Control K/A G2.3.4 2OI3NRCROISROA3 NOT SELECTED FOR RO Emergency Procedures/Plan N/A 2013 NRC RO A4 NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.
Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (4)
(D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes) (2)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1) (2)
(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected) (1) 08/30/2013 Rev. FINAL
2013 NRC RO Admin JPM Summary 2013 NRC SRO Al-I (Common)- - Determine Active I Inactive Status Of Off Shift License Personnel (JPM ADM-069-a) NEW K/A G2. 1.1 Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements.
(CFR: 41.10/45.13) RO 3.8 SRO 4.2 The work history of four license operators is provided to the candidate. The operators work on the FIN Team, rotational assignment to Training, Work Control and the Procedures Writers group. The candidate must review the work history for each individual and determine the active or inactive status of each person in order to stand an on-shift watch position.
2013 NRC RO AI-2 (Common) Determine Average RCS Boron Concentration per EOP-ECA-0. I (JPM ADM-020-b)
KIA G2. 1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.
(CFR: 41.10/43.5/45.12) RO 4.6/SRO 4.6 The candidate must perform a calculation to determine average RCS boron concentration in order to complete a Shutdown Margin calculation as required by EOP-ECA-0.1, Loss Of All AC Power Recovery Without SI Required. The candidate is provided a list of plant conditions and is required to calculate the average RCS boron concentration for these conditions lAW EOP-ECA-0. 1, Attachment 1.
2013 NRC RO A2 Perform a Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) calculation with a control rod misaligned.
(JPM ADM-010-e) MODIFIED K/A G2.2. 12- Knowledge of su,veillance procedures.
(CFR: 41.10/45.13) RO 3.7 SRO 4.1 The candidate must perform a QPTR calculation in accordance with surveillance procedure OST-1039, Calculation of Quadrant power Tilt Ratio, Weekly Interval and as required by the AOP-001, Malfunction of Rod Control and Indication System for a misaligned rod at 95%
power. For SROs this JPM requires the candidate to identify applicable Tech Spec LCOs.
NOTE: This JPM will be modified by changing the initial reactor power, the control rod that is dropped into the reactor, and the values of the PRNI upper and lower detectors. These changes result in the QPTR value that exceeds 1.09. The Tech Spec action is now different due to the value exceeding 1.09.
2 08/30/20 13 Rev. FINAL
2013 NRC RO Admin JPM Summary (continued) 2013 NRC RO A3 (Common) Using Survey Maps, Simplified Drawings, Plant Maps and valve lists, determine stay times while performing a clearance activity (JPM-ADM-51-c) Previous 2011 NRC Exam JPM *randomly selected from bank K/A G2. 3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.
(CFR: 41.12/43.4/45.10) RO 3.2/SRO 3.7 The applicant will be supplied a survey map of a location in the RAB and a clearance mission to complete in this radioactive area. The location also contains one or more hot spots. They must determine the individual stay times of two Auxiliary Operators (AO), and ensure they are or are not exceeding the annual administrative dose limits. They will be provided Survey Maps, Simplified plant drawings to locate va)ves, Plant Maps of the area and a plant valve list to determine the location of the valves they will be hanging a clearance on. The given information will supply the accumulated annual whole body doses for the two ADs, one of which recently worked for another utility. They must perform their calculations based on Progress Energy Administrative Dose Limits.
2013 NRC RO A4 Not selected 3
08/30/20 13 Rev. FINAL
Revision Comments 2013 NRC RO Admin JPM Summary JPM Al-i was replace with NEW JPM on the topic of license maintenance to as recommended by the enhancement from the NRC to remove the overlap Error with the audit exam administrative JPM. The new JPM will require the candidate to evaluate the active or inactive status of 4 off-shift license holding personnel and determine which persons are eligible to stand watch based on meeting the requirements of an active license.
JPM Al-2 was updated to the current procedure revision, but did not require major changes from the original submittal form.
JPM A2 was modified as described and updated based on feedback from the Chief Examiner and did not require major changes for the original submittal form.
JPM A3 was replaced by randomly selecting a previously used A3 Administrative Topic.
The 2011 NRC Exam A3 JPM was selected from the previous 4 NRC and Audit exam A3 topics and updated for the current procedure revision. The selected JPM requires the candidate to determine the stay time for two Auxiliary Operators hanging clearance on the CVCS system. The original submittal form was revised to reflect the changes to the selected JPM.
All comments during NRC Prep week have also been addressed. Attached is a separate attached copy of the required changes and checked completion.
4 08/30/2013 Rev. FINAL
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Harris Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: September 9, 2013 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: 05000400/2013301 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*
Determine Active / Inactive Status Of Off Shift License Personnel
. (JPM ADM-069-a) Common Conduct of Operations N, R K/A G2.1.1 2013 NRC RO I SRO Al-I Determine Average RCS Boron Concentration per EOP-ECA-0. I (JPM ADM-020-b) Common Conduct of Operations D R K/AG2.1.20 2013 NRC ROISROAI-2 Perform a Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) calculation with a control rod misaligned and Evaluate Tech Specs.
(JPM ADM-010-f)
Equipment Control M,R K/AG2.2.12 2013 NRC SRO A2 Using Survey Maps, Simplified Drawings, Plant Maps and valve lists, determine stay times while performing a clearance activity
. (JPM-ADM-51-b) Common P, R Radiation Control K/A G2.3.4 2013 NRC RO I SRO A3 Given a Set of Plant Conditions, Classify an Event.
(JPM ADM-064-a)
Emergency Procedures/Plan N, R 1(JA G2.4.41 2013 NRC SRO A4 NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.
Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (5)
(D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes) (2)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1) (3)
(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected) (I) 08/30/2013 Rev. FINAL
2013 NRC SRO Admin JPM Summary 2013 NRC SRO Al-I (Common)
- - Determine Active / Inactive Status Of Off Shift License Personnel (JPM ADM-069-a) NEW K/A G2. 1.1 - Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements.
(CFR: 41.10/45.13) RO 3.8 SRO 4.2 The work history of four license operators is provided to the candidate. The operators work on the FIN Team, Training Department Rotation of Assignment, Work Control and the Procedures Writers group. The candidate must review the work history for each individual and determine the active or inactive status of each person in order to stand an on-shift watch position.
2013 NRC SRO A1-2 (Common) Determine Average RCS Boron Concentration per EOP-ECA-0. I (JPM ADM-020-b) DIRECT K/A G2. 1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.
(CFR: 41.10/43.5/45.12) RO 4.6/SRO 4.6 The candidate must perform a calculation to determine average RCS boron concentration in order to complete a Shutdown Margin calculation as required by EOP-ECA-0.1, Loss Of All AC Power Recovery Without SI Required. The candidate is provided a list of plant conditions and is required to calculate the average RCS boron concentration for these conditions lAW EOP-ECA-0. 1, Attachment 1.
2013 NRC SRO A2 Perform a Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) calculation with a control rod misaligned and Evaluate Tech Specs (JPM ADM-010-f) MODIFIED K/A G2.2. 12- Knowledge of surveillance procedures.
(CFR: 41.10/45.13) RO 3.7 SRO 4.1 The candidate must perform a QPTR calculation in accordance with surveillance procedure OST-1 039, Calculation of Quadrant power Tilt Ratio, Weekly Interval and as required by the AOP-001, Malfunction of Rod Control and Indication System for a misaligned rod at 95%
power. For SROs this JPM requires the candidate to identify applicable Tech Spec LCOs.
NOTE: This JPM will be modified by changing the initial reactor power, the control rod that is dropped into the reactor, and the values of the PRNI upper and lower detectors. These changes result in the QPTR value that exceeds 1.09. The Tech Spec action is now different due to the value exceeding 1.09.
2 08/30/20 13 Rev. FINAL
2013 NRC SRO Admin JPM Summary (continued) 2013 NRC SRO A3 (Common) Using Survey Maps, Simplified Drawings, Plant Maps and valve lists, determine stay times while performing a clearance activity (JPM-ADM-51-b) Previous 2011 NRC Exam JPM *randomly selected from bank K/A G2.3. 4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.
(CFR: 41.12/43.4/45.1O)R03.2 SRO3.7 The applicant will be supplied a survey map of a location in the RAB and a clearance mission to complete in this radioactive area. The location also contains one or more hot spots. They must determine the individual stay times for two Auxiliary Operators (AC) without exceeding the annual administrative dose limits. They will be provided Survey Maps, Simplified plant drawings to locate valves, Plant Maps of the area and a plant valve list to determine the location of the valves they will be hanging a clearance on. The given information will supply the accumulated annual whole body doses for the two AOs, one of which recently worked for another utility. They must perform their calculations based on Progress Energy Administrative Dose Limits.
2013 NRC SRO A4 Given a set of conditions, Classify an Event (JPM-ADM-064-a) NEW K/A G2.4.41 Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications (CFR: 41.10/43.5/45.11) RO 2.9 SRO 4.6 Given a set of initial conditions and the EAL Flow Path, the candidate must classify the appropriate Emergency Action Level for the event in progress.
3 08/30/20 13 Rev. FINAL
Revision Comments 2013 NRC SRO Admin JPM Summary JPM Al-i was replace with NEW JPM on the topic of license maintenance to as recommended by the enhancement from the NRC to remove the overlap Error with the audit exam administrative JPM. The new JPM will require the candidate to evaluate the active or inactive status of 4 off-shift license holding personnel and determine which persons are eligible to stand watch based on meeting the requirements of an active license.
JPM Al-2 was updated to the current procedure revision, but did not require major changes from the original submittal form.
JPM A2 was modified as described and updated based on feedback from the Chief Examiner and did not require major changes for the original submittal form.
JPM A3 was replaced by randomly selecting a previously used A3 Administrative Topic.
The 2011 NRC Exam A3 JPM was selected from the previous 4 NRC and Audit exam A3 topics and updated for the current procedure revision. The selected JPM requires the candidate to determine the stay time for two Auxiliary Operators hanging clearance on the CVCS system. The original submittal form was revised to reflect the changes to the selected JPM.
JPM A4 was created as described and updated based on feedback from the Chief Examiner and did not require major changes for the original submittal form.
All comments during NRC Prep week have also been addressed. Attached is a separate attached copy of the required changes and checked completion.
4 08/30/2013 Rev. FINAL
ES-301 Control Roomlln-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Harris Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: 09/09/2013 Exam Level: RO SRO-l SRO-U (bold) Operating Test No.: 05000400/2013301 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-l); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including I ESF bold)
System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function
- a. Perform Control Rod and Rod Position Indicator Exercise per OST-I 005 (OST-I 005) (JPM-CR-256-d) A, N, S I KIA 001 A2.1I
- b. Respond to the loss of the running CSIP (AOP-018) (JPM-CR-038-a)
A D 5 2 K/A APE 022 AAI.01
- d. Perform Max Rate Cooldown for a SG Tube Rupture (E-3) A, N, L, S 4S (J PM-CR-282-a)
K/A041A4.08
- e. Return the Containment Fan Coolers to normal following a Safety Injection actuation. (OP-169) (JPM CR-260-a)
ROOnly D,EN,L,S 5 K/A 022 A4.01
- f. Loss Of All AC While Paralleling EDO from MCB for Testing (OP-I 55) (JPM-CR-203-c) A, M, EN, S 6 K/A 064 A4.06
- g. Restore an Excore NI Channel to service (at power, Nl-43 failed) (OWP-RP-25) (JPM-CR-278-a) N, s 7 K/A 015A4.03
- h. Align CCW to Support RHR System (OP-145) (JPM CR-085-a) D, L, S 8 K/A 008 A4.01 08/30/2013 Rev. FINAL I
In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-l); (2 or 3 for SRO-U - BOLD)
- i. Place the ASI System in Standby Alignment (OP-185)
(JPM-IP-277-a) L, N, R 2 K/A 004 A411
- j. Local Inspection of Annunciator Cabinets (AOP-037)
(JPM IP-273-a)
D E 7 KJA 016A2.02
- k. Perform an Instrument Air System Leak Isolation Locally (Turbine Bldg I Yard)
(JPM-lP-161-a) D, E, L 8 K/A APE 065 AA2.03
@ All RO and SRO-l control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
Type Codes Criteria for RO I SRO-l I SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 I 4-6 I 2-3 (5, 5, 3)
(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9I 8I 4 (5, 4, 1)
(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1 I 1 I 1 (2, 2, 1)
(EN)gineeredsafetyfeature - / - I 1 (2,1,1)
(L)ow-Power I Shutdown 1 I 1 I 1 (5, 4, 2)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1 (A) 2I 2/ 1 (5, 5, 4)
(P)revious 2 exams 3I 3/ 2 (0, 0, 0)
(R)CA 1I1I1 (1,1,1)
(S)imulator 08/30/20 13 Rev. FINAL 2
2013 NRC Control Roomlln-Plant JPM Summary Simulator JPMs JPM a Perform Control Rod and Rod Position Indicator Exercise per OST-1 005 (JPM-CR-256-d) New SRO Upgrade K/A 001 A2. 11 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the foiowing malfunction or operations on the CRDS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Situations requiring a reactor trip (CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13) RO 4.4/SRO 4.7 The candidate will assume the watch with the unit operating at 100% power and will be directed to perform OST-1 005 commencing with Control Bank D in section 7.2. The candidate will insert and withdraw Control Bank D 10 steps as required. The candidate will continue OST-1 005 and select the next Control Bank and insert the Control Bank 10 steps as required. Once the candidate begins to insert the next selected Control Bank, the Alternate Path will begin and a malfunction of the rod control system will result in the Control Rods continuing to insert once the demand for rod motion has stopped. This will cause RCS Tavg, and Reactor Power will lower in response to the control rods inserting and the Control Rod step counter will continue to lower. The candidate should recognize the failure of the rod control system and perform AOP-001 immediate actions to place Rod Control in manual. The candidate may or may not select the manual position. Rod Control is considered to be in manual as long as the Auto position is not selected and being in Control Bank A satisfies this step. Rod motion will continue in either case requiring the candidate to perform the RNO action and initiate a manual reactor trip. The candidate will announce the Reactor is tripped and begin to perform the immediate actions of E-0. Once the candidate verifies that the Reactor and Turbine are tripped evaluation on this JPM is complete.
JPM b Respond to the loss of the running CSIP (JPM-CR-038-a) Direct K/A APE 022 AA 1.01 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: CVCS letdown and charging (CFR: 41.7/45.5/45.6) RO 3.4/SRO 3.3 With the plant at 100% power and the ASI system OOS for planned maintenance the candidate will assume the Operator at the Controls (OAC) responsibilities. The A CSIP will trip requiring the candidate to enter AOP-01 8. AOP-01 8 will direct the candidate to isolate letdown in response to the loss of charging flow. While the candidate is assessing letdown RCP Thermal Barrier Flow Control valve (1CC-252) will shut. Following the isolation of letdown the candidate will evaluate the status of component cooling water to the RCP Thermal Barrier and determine that flow is isolated. The Alternate Path of this JPM will begin when the candidate evaluates AOP-01 8, Attachment I RCP trip limits. They will determine that the trip limit #4 Loss of all RCP seal injection (including ASI) is met due to the loss of CCW flow to the RCP Thermal Barrier Hx. The actions that should be taken for this condition are to Trip the Reactor and complete the immediate actions of EOP-E-0. After the Reactor and Turbine trip is verified the candidate will return to AOP-018 to stop all RCPs and shut the PRZ Spray controllers for RCS loops A and B. Once the candidate has stopped all RCPs and shut the PRZ Spray controllers for RCS loops A and B, evaluation on this JPM is complete.
08/30/20 13 Rev. FAL 3
2013 NRC Control Roomlln-Plant JPM Summary Simulator JPMs (continued)
JPM c Pressurizer PORV Failure (AOP-019)
(JPM-CR-252-a) New SRO Upgrade K/A APE 027 AAI.03 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: Pressure control when on a steam bubble (CFR41.7/45.5/45.6)R03.6 SRO3.5 The candidate will assume the Operator at the Controls (OAC) responsibilities and be directed to maintain current plant conditions of 100% steady state power. Soon after assuming the watch the Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller PK-444B will begin to fail in Automatic to 100%. This will cause BOTH Pressurizer Spray valves to go from full closed to the full open position. The candidate should identify the failure and enter AOP-019. While performing the immediate actions the candidate should complete the Alternate Path (Take manual control of the Pressurizer Master Controller and lower the output to close the Pressurizer Spray Valves.) IF the candidate takes manual of control of BOTH Pressurizer Spray valves and NOT PK-444B then the master controller will continue to fail and Pressurizer PORV 444B will go full open. When the RCS pressure is <2000 psig an auto shut signal will be sent to PORV 444B but by this time the pressure excursion will be so great that it will most likely cause an automatic Reactor Trip on OTL\T and Safety Injection on Low Pressurizer Pressure (at 1850 psig). Once the candidate places the Pressurizer Master Controller is in manual OR both Pressurizer Spray Valves are manually shut AND PORV 444B is shut, evaluation on this JPM is complete.
JPM d Perform Max Rate Cooldown for a SG Tube Rupture (E-3)
(JPM-CR-282-a) New K/A 041 A4.08 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Steam dump valves (CFR: 41.7/45.5 to 45.8)) RO 3.0 SRO 3.1 The candidate will be assigned the BOP position and is directed to perform E-3 commencing with step 28. The candidate will be required to determine the target temperature for the ruptured SG and perform a Max rate cooldown to the target temperature using the Steam Dumps. The Alternate Path will be that once the cooldown using the Steam Dumps is in progress the condenser steam dumps will become unavailable and go shut. The candidate must determine that the cooldown has stopped due to the failure of the Steam Dumps and recommence the Max rate cooldown using the SG PORVs on the intact A and B SGs. Once the candidate stabilizes the RCS below the target temperature, evaluation of this JPM is complete.
08/30/2013 Rev. FINAL 4
2013 NRC Control Roomlln-Plant JPM Summary Simulator JPMs (continued)
JPM e Return the Containment Fan Coolers to normal following an SI actuation. (OP-i 69)
(JPM CR-260-a) Direct RO Only K/A 026 A4. 01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: CCS fans (CFR: 41.7/45.5 to 45.8) RO 3.6/SRO 3.6 The candidate is informed an inadvertent SI initiation has occurred and the control room staff has entered EOP-E-0 and EOP-ES-1.1. Attachment 1 of EOP-ES-i.i is being performed to realign plant systems. The candidate is directed to realign containment fan coolers lAW Attachment 1 step 6.a using OP-i 69, Containment Cooling And Ventilation, Section 8.4. The candidate will be directed to align the A Train of CNMT Fan Coolers for normal service. The candidate will secure both A Train CNMT Fan Coolers and verify proper damper alignment for the secured fans. The candidate will restart the A Train Fans per section 5.1 of OP-i69. To minimize the starting current required for Hi-Speed operation the fans are initially started in Lo-Speed, then stopped and restarted in Hi-Speed. The candidate will return to section 8.4 to secure the B Train of CNMT Fan Coolers. Once the B Train of CNMT Fan Coolers are in standby and the determination is made that Maximum Cooling Mode is NOT required, evaluation on this JPM is complete.
JPM f Loss Of All AC While Paralleling a Emergency Diesel Generator from the Main Control Room for Testing (OP-i 55) (JPM-CR-203-c) SRO Upgrade Modified Previous NRC Exam 2012 *randomly selected from bank K/A 064 A4.06 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Manual start, loading, and stopping of the ED/G (CFR: 41.7/45.5 to 45.8) RO 3.9 SRO 3.9 The candidate will be informed that they are the BOP Operator and will be directed by the CRS to parallel the 1 B-SB Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) to the grid from the Main Control Board lAW section 5.3 of OP-155. The candidate will exercise the EDG voltage and governor controls then parallel the EDG. After parallel operations have been achieved a Loss of Off Site Power will occur when the generator load exceeds 2 MW. The Alternate Path occurs when the loss of power requires the candidate to manually open the EDG output breaker lAW OP-i 55 precaution and limitation #24. The EDG output breaker will not automatically close requiring the candidate to perform the actions of ECA-0.0 to restore power to the 6.9 Emergency Bus by closing the EDG output breaker. Previous JPM was modified to include the failure of the undervoltage relay for the I B-SB Emergency Bus in addition to the failure of the LOSP logic for the EDG output breaker. This additional failure requires the candidate to perform the actions of ECA-0.0 to re-energize the Emergency Bus.
08/30/2013 Rev. FINAL 5 C7/
2013 NRC Control Roomlln-PIantJPM Summary Simulator JPMs (continued)
JPM q Restore an Excore NI Channel to service (at power, NI failed) (OWP-RP-25)
(JPM-CR-278-a) New K/A 015 A4.03 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Trip bypasses (CFR: 41.7/45.5 to 45.8) RO 3.8/SRO 3.9 New JPM to restore previously repaired failed N 1-43 to service.
The candidate will assume the watch with the plant at 100% steady state power and the PRNI channel NI-43 which failed downscale earlier repaired. The candidate will be required to return Nl-43 to service lAW OWP-RP-25. OWP-RP-25 ensures the components that have Nl-43 as an input, Rod Control and SG Feedwater regulating bypass valves are in manual control to prevent spurious movement or uncontrolled changes in level. The candidate will verify the controllers are in manual. The OWP will require the candidate to contact maintenance (l&C personnel) to return the two previously trip bistables for the Channel Ill OTAT signals to normal in the Process Instrument Cabinet 3 (PIC-3).
The candidate will return the following items to NORMAL
- At the Detector Current Comparator Drawer: Both upper and lower sections of Nl-43
- At the Comparator and Rate Drawer: Comparator Channel Defeat switch The candidate will return the following items to OPERATE
- At the Miscellaneous Control and Indication Panel: Power Mismatch Bypass switch and the Rod Stop Bypass switch.
The candidate will have to contact maintenance (I&C personnel) a second time and direct them to re-connect the N 1-43 power supply leads to the NI drawer. After the l&C personnel re-connect the Nl-43 power supply leads the candidate will verify proper bi-stable and annunciator configuration for the restoration of NI-43 to service. Finally the candidate will have to restore the plant computer (ERFIS) point to processing and document the position of MCB components for the current plant conditions with N 1-43. Once the candidate reports that OWP-RP-25 is complete to the CRS, evaluation on this JPM is complete.
JPM h Align CCW to Support RHR System (OP-145)
(JPM CR-085-a) Direct K/A 008 A4. 10 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Conditions that require the operation of two CCW coolers (CFR: 41.7/455) RO 3.3/SRO 3.1 The plant is in Mode 4 and a cool down is in progress. The CRS directs the candidate to align CCW to support RHR operation lAW OP-145 section 8.9. After reviewing section 8.9 the candidate determines a second CCW pump is required to be started and transitions to section 5.2. The candidate starts the B CCW pump lAW section 5.2 and returns to section 8.9 and isolates the A train essential header of the CCW from the non essential header.
The candidate will align the B train essential header to supply RHR HX B. The candidate will verify both trains of the CCW system operating parameters are within the required band on the MCB indicators. The candidate will contact a non license operator (NLO) to locally verify the CCW flow to the Gross Failed Fuel Detector is within the required band. Once the candidate contacts the NLO to verify CCW flow locally then evaluation on this JPM is complete.
08/30/20 13 Rev. FINAL 6
2013 NRC Control Roomlln-Plant JPM Summary In-Plant JPMs JPM i Place the ASI System in Standby Alignment (OP-I 85)
(JPM-IP-277-a) New SRO Upgrade K/A 004 A4. 11 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: RCP Seal injection flow (CFR: 41.7/45.5 to 45.8) RO 3.4/SRO 3.3 NOTE: This JPM is inside the RCA.
The plant is in Mode 4 and a heat up is in progress. The CRS directs the candidate to place the ASI system in automatic standby alignment lAW OP-i 85 section 5.1. The candidate will verify the ASI supply header isolation valves are open and the status of the ASI system control panel. The candidate will realign the ASI pump to automatic and return the Squib valve bypass control switches to normal alignment on the ASI control panel. The candidate will turn on the ASI system control panel feeder supply breaker and the ASI pump power supply breaker. The candidate will recheck the indications on the ASI system control panel for the proper standby alignment of the system. Once the candidate proceeds to section 5.1.3, Automatic Standby alignment configuration control closeout then evaluation on this JPM is complete.
JPM i Local Inspection of Annunciator Cabinets (AOP-037)
(JPM lP-273-a) Direct K/A 016 A2. 02 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the NNIS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of power supply (CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.3/45.5) RO 2.9/SRO 3.2 The candidate is informed that the control room annunciator System 2 power failure alarm has been received and the CRS has entered AOP-037. The CRS will direct the candidate to check the status of System 2 annunciator power supplies per AOP-037 Attachment 2. The candidate will perform Attachment 2 and obtain the annunciator cabinet key. The JPM cues include information of the proper status of the power supply light indications. The candidate will initial for the indications that remain lit. The candidate will determine based on the cues that one of the System 2, Bay 1, 12 VDC power supplies, one of the System 2, Bay 3, 12 VDC power supplies and the System 2, Bay 5, 24 VDC power supplies are de-energized.
The candidate will also be asked to identify how many annunciators are affected by the malfunction. Once the CRS is notified that AOP-037, Attachment 2 is complete and the number of annunciators affected are identified then evaluation on this JPM is complete.
08/30/2013 Rev. FINAL 7
2013 NRC Control Roomlln-PIantJPM Summary In-Plant JPMs (continued)
JPM k Perform an Instrument Air System Leak Isolation Locally (Turbine Bldg I Yard)
(AOP-017) (JPM-IP-1 61-a) Direct SRO Upgrade K/A APE 065 AA2.03 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: Location and isolation of leaks (CFR: 43.5/45.13) RQ 2.6/SRO 2.9 The candidate is informed that the plant was operating at 100% when the plant was tripped due to lowering instrument air pressure. AOP-017 is being performed. The CRS directs the operator to perform Attachment 3 of AOP-01 7 to reduce instrument air header loads. They will be required to isolate individual sections of the instrument air system within the Turbine Building and contact the Main Control room staff following the completion of each action to determine if the prior actions have successfully isolated the instrument air leak. The JPM cues include information of the proper sequence of actions that must be taken in order reposition the valves and due to the valve locations a description of the nearest ladder location is given to simulate climbing to the valve location. Once notified by the Main Control room that the instrument air header pressure has stabilized then evaluation on this JPM is complete.
08/30/2013 Rev. FINAL 8
Revision Comments 2013 NRC Control Roomlln-Plant JPM Summary Simulator JPM revisions:
JPM a Completion of the JPM has been extended to wait until AFTER the candidate verifies that the Reactor and the Turbine are tripped in accordance with immediate action steps 1 and 2 of E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
JPM b no changes were made to this JPM.
JPM c Replaced JPM c Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller Failure based on NRC comment that the JPM was in error stating that the JPM was NOT an Alternate Path JPM. The replacement JPM has is a new JPM titled Pressurizer PORV Failure. This JPM has also been chosen to be used for the SRO Upgrades. The JPM was developed based on the example provided by the NRC for a no-tell JPM. The new JPM has the candidate assume the shift during normal full power operation. Pressurizer PORV 445A will then inadvertently lift. Adverse affects of the PORV on the RCS will cause RCS pressure to lower and both Pressurizer Spray valves to shut. Indications that the PORV has lifted will be annunciators, PORV tail pipe temperature increase, PRT temperature and level changes and the PORV 445A red and green indicating lights will both be ON. The candidate will respond by identifying AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control entry conditions are met. After identification of the malfunction the candidate should shut the associated block valve and verify that the RCS pressure stabilizes, IF the candidate does not act on this failure a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection actuation will occur.
JPM d During development of enhancement changes recommended by the NRC and comments received during Operator validation of this JPM we determined that the JPM should be replaced with another Safety Function 4 JPM.
Increasing the levels on the SGs to high levels was not realistic since having SG high levels indicated that the crew was not maintaining control of SG levels during this event. The event in progress was a Small Break LOCA with Containment Pressure in excess of 3 psig (adverse Containment). In this case SG levels would be maintained between 40-50%. We had raised the SG levels to 75% and as soon as the Operator assumed shift they reduced AFW flow to zero to prevent SG overfill and attempt to get level back in band. With the immediate reduction of AFW flow the failure criteria for SG overfill was immediately removed. Even when told not to reduce AFW flows we could not get consistent results that would provide pass/fail criteria based on flow or discharge pressure.
Additionally, Operator validation determined that a Loss Of Power to the control system would need to have more indications than the ones we developed for the JPM. We asked the Simulator support group to help in the development of additional variations of AFW system responses and were unable to complete the changes to get the JPM validated prior to the required date to send the exam to the NRC. The Simulator support person in charge of modifying the event for us is currently on vacation and jury duty. We may have been able to incorporate the changes prior to prep week but instead chose to replace this JPM.
JPM d is now Verify Main Feedwater Actuation Per OMM-004 Attachment 6. This JPM will NOT be used for the SRO Upgrades since JPM c will be used.
08/30/2013 Rev. FINAL 9
Revision Comments 2013 NRC Control Roomlln-Plant JPM Summary During NRC Exam prep week the previous identified JPM was determined to not provide substantive evaluation property and was replaced with a new JPM. The new JPM will have the candidate perform the max rate cooldown for a ruptured SG and while the cooldown is in progress the Steam dumps will fail shut requiring the candidate to complete the cooldown using the SG PORVs. This JPM is now identified as NEW on form ES-301-2.
JPM e No changes to JPM e. We replaced the Audit Exam JPM to eliminate the error of this JPM being too similar to the Audit Exam JPM that was selected. The Audit Exam JPM will have the candidates reduce Containment Spray flow following Containment Spray actuation. They will have to determine the required number of spray pumps to have in operation based on Containment pressure, RWST level and the number of Containment Fan Coolers in operation.
JPM f - We have replaced the original JPM Restore Off-site Power to an Emergency Bus with LOSP While Paralleling EDG from MCB for Testing. We were unable to modify the JPM to correct the error identified by the NRC and took the suggestion of replacement. The JPM we selected was randomly chosen from the HNP JPM bank of Safety Function 6 JPMs. The replacement JPM was last used on the 2012 NRC Exam. We have identified this JPM on form ES-301-2 as Previous.
During NRC Exam prep week the previous 2012 JPM was modified to provide a different outcome for the candidate to remove predictability. The failure of the Emergency Bus undervoltage relay requires the candidate to perform the actions of ECA-O.0. This JPM is now identified as Modified on form ES-301-2.
JPM g No changes were made to this new JPM.
JPM h This HNP bank JPM was enhanced per instructions provided by the NRC to ensure that the standards for each JPM step involving a verification of CCW flow has a band, a value, and pass/fail criteria for being outside the band based on instrument the scale of the instrument used.
In-Plant JPM revisions:
JPM i We have enhanced the communication cues and included a requirement of finding the location of the local tank level gauge. The JPM will now have the candidate go to three different areas to complete the task.
JPM j We have enhanced the JPM by adding marked up drawings to provide the candidate the indications of the light configuration of the power supplies. This has eliminated the communication for which light is on or off. Additionally, we have added a requirement to identify how many of the annunciators were affected based on the results of which power supplies were de-energized.
JPM k We have added cues in the initial steps that will provide a reduction in communications. We have not changed the JPM to have the candidate perform ALL 5 steps based on how the travel paths that would be involved to complete this JPM. The steps would have to be performed in the order that is written which would 08/30/2013 Rev. FtNAL 10
Revision Comments 2013 NRC Control Roomlln-Plant JPM Summary have the candidate and evaluator travel from the Turbine Building into the RAB, back to the Turbine Building and back into the RAB. Since we have already included a JPM that involves entering the RAB and received feedback from the Operators that they would have more than one individual perform this task we have the JPM written out to ONLY do the actions in the Turbine Building. These actions are in several locations and will provide a good evaluation of the candidates ability to find the equipment and demonstrate how to operate the valves while employing personal safety.
08/30/2013 Rev. FINAL 11
Harris Nuclear Plant 2013 NRC Operating Exam Submittal 8-31-2013 I FINAL ES-301 Operating Test Quality Checklist Form ES-301-3 Facility: Shearon Harris Date of Examination: 09-09-2013 Operating Test Number: 05000400/2013301 Initials
- 1. General Criteria
- a. The operating test conforms with the previously approved outline; changes are consistent with sampling requirements (e.g., 10 CFR 55.45, operational importance, safety function distribution). 6) j_
- b. There is no day-to-day repetition between this and other operating tests to be administered during this examination.
.__J
- c. The operating test shall not duplicate items from the applicants audit test(s). (see Section D. l.a.)
- d. Overlap with the written examination and between different parts of the operating test is within acceptable limits.
W
- e. It appears that the operating test will differentiate between competent and less-than-competent applicants at the designated license level. =
- 2. Walk-Through Criteria -- --
- a. Each JPM includes the following, as applicable: -
- initial conditions
- initiating cues
- references and tools, including associated procedures
- reasonable and validated time limits (average time allowed for completion) and specific designation if deemed to be time-critical by the facility licensee
- operationally important specific performance criteria that include:
detailed expected actions with exact criteria and nomenclature system response and other examiner cues statements describing important observations to be made by the applicant criteria for successful completion of the task identification of critical steps and their associated performance standards restrictions on the sequence of steps, if applicable
- b. Ensure that any changes from the previously approved systems and administrative walk-through outlines (Forms ES-30 1-1 and 2) have not caused the test to deviate from any of the acceptance EE9 ..%
criteria (e.g., item distribution, bank use, repetition from the last 2 NRC examinations) specified on those forms and Form ES-201-2.
- 3. Simulator Criteria --
The associated simulator operating tests (scenario sets) have been reviewed in accordance with Form ES-301-4 and a copy is attached.
Printed Name / Signature Date
- a. Author Richard (JR) Horton I . 8/31/13
- b. Facility Reviewer(*) Simon Schwindt / . 8/31/13
- c. NRC Chief Examiner (#) S
- d. NRC Supervisor 2 /4/y NOTE: The facility signature is not applicable for NRC-developed tests.
- Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column c; chief examiner concurrence required.
ES-301, Page 24 of 27
\ \\ I c
Harris Nuclear Plant 2013 NRC Operating Exam Submittal 8-31-2013 / FINAL ES-301 Simulator Scenario Quality Checklist Form ES-301-4 Facilty: Shearon Harris Date of Exam: 09-09-2013 Scenario Numbers: 1/2 / 3 / 4 / 5 Operating Test No.: 05000400/2013301 QUALITATIVE ATTRIBUTES lrtials a b* f
- 1. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the operators into expected events. 6?
- 2. The scenarios consist mostly of related events.
- 3. Each event description consists of
. the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated
- the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event
- the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew
- the expected operator actions (by shift position)
- the event termination point (if applicable)
- 4. No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.
- 5. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics. (3
- 6. Sequencing and timing of events is reasonable, and allows the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.
- 7. If time compression techniques are used, the scenario summary clearly so indicates.
Operators have sufficient time to carry out expected activities without undue time constraints.
Cues are given.
- 8. The simulator modeling is not altered. 7JT 7 ,,
- 9. The scenarios have been validated. Pursuant to 10 CFR 55.46(d), any open simulator performance deficiencies or deviations from the referenced plant have been evaluated to ensure that functional fidelity is maintained while running the planned scenarios.
,%74 C
- 10. Every operator will be evaluated using at least one new or significantly modified scenario.
All other scenarios have been altered in accordance with Section D.5 of ES-301.
1 /I41
- 11. All individual operator competencies can be evaluated, as verified using Form ES-301-6 (submit the form along with the simulator scenarios).
.4/ 7.3(_
- 12. Each applicant will be significantly involved in the minimum number of transients and events specified on Form ES-301-5 (submit the form with the simulator scenarios).
- 13. The level of difficulty is appropriate to support licensing decisions for each crew position.
é Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes -- --
- 1. Total malfunctions (58) 9 / 9 / 10 / 8 / 8 I3.
- 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (12) 4/2/3/2/3 6?
- 3. Abnormal events (24) 4/5/6/5/6 4/ 41/1,
- 4. Majortransients(12) 1/2/2/1 / 1 (J)
- 9) ..1(
- 5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (12) 2/2/2/ 1 /3
- 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (02) 0/ 1 /1 / 1 / 1 6-
- 7. Critical tasks (23) 2/2/3/4/2 7?j)L ES-301, Page 25 of 27
SCENARIOS 1, 2, 3 AND 4 RO List (5 total)
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Shearon Harris Date of Exam: 09-09-2013 Operating Test No.: 05000400/2013301 A E Scenarios p E 1 2 3 4 T M L CREW CREW CREW CREW r N POSITION POSITION POSITION POSmON A A T S A B S A B S A B S A B L N R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R T P M*
T 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P E R IU RO-1 RX R2 1 1 NOR Ni 11 SRO-l Ii 3 12C4 6 4 C6 SRO-U MAJ M6 M7 2 2 TS 00 RO-2 RX R6 1 1
- NOR Ni N2 2 1 SRO-I I/C C3 16 Ci C3 C4 C5 6 4 SRO-U MAJ M8 M7 M7 3 2 TS 00 RO-3 RX R2 1 1
- NOR Ni N5 21 SRO-l ,,s l2C4 12C4 11 13 C6 SRO-U MAJ M6 M7 M7 3 2 TS 00 Instructions:
- 1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
- 2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-i basis.
- 3. Whenever practical both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
1 08/3 1/20 13 Rev. FINAL
SCENARIOS 1, 2, 3 AND 4 RO List (5 total)
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301 -5
[aciiity: Shearon Harris Date of Exam: 09-09-2013 Operating Test No.: 05000400/2013301 A E Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E o I L N CREW CREW CREW CREW N T
I T POSifiON POSfl1ON POSITION POSfl1ON A C S A B S A B S A B S A B L u A T R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 M(*)
N Y o C P 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P RU T P E
RO-4 RX R6 1 1 NOR N2 11 SRO-i C1C3 C4C5 4 4 o-u MAJ M7 M7 2 2 TS 00 RO-5 RX Ri 1 1
- NOR N5 N2 2 1 SRO-I I/C C2 D
SRO-U C4 C4C5 4 4 MAJ M8 M722 TS 0 *0 Instructions:
Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
- 2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-i basis.
- 3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
2 08/31/2013 Rev. FINAL
\ ,\
SCENARIOS 1, 2, 3 AND 4 SRO Instant List (5 total)
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Shearon Harris Date of Exam: 09-09-2013 Operating Test No.: 05000400/2013301 A E Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E o I L N CREW CREW CREW CREW N T
I T POSfl1ON POSmON POSmON POSfl1ON I A
C S A B S A B S A B S A B L A T R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 M(*)
NI V 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P R IU T P E
NOR N: 21 I/C 1113 1315 C3l6 C4C5 9 4 SRO-U C6 D MAJ M6 M8 M7 3 2 TS T1T3 T5 3 2 SROl2OR N2 I/C 1113 1315 C316 C4C5 9 4 SRO-U C6 LI MAJ M6 M8 M7 3 2 TS T1T3 T5 3 2 NOR N5 N2 SRO-13 I/C 1113 1315 12C4 C4C5 9 4 SRO-U C6 LI MAJ M6 M7 M7 3 2 TS T1T3 T5 3 2 Instructions:
- 1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
- 2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-i basis.
- 3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
3 08/31/2013 Rev. FINAL
SCENARIOS 1, 2, 3 AND 4 SRO Instant List (5 total)
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Shearon Harris Date of Exam: 09-09-2013 Operating Test No.: 05000400/20 13301 A E Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E o I L N CREW CREW CREW CREW N T
I T POSITION POSITION POSfl1ON POSmON A C 5A B S A B S A B S A B L A T R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 M(*)
N y 0 c 0 c p C p 0 C P R lU T
E NOR SRO-14 _
5 N
I/C 12 C2C3 1113 C4 C416 C6 SRO-U MAJ M6 M8 M7 3 2 TS T3T4 T6 3 2 SRO-15 NOR I/C
++
C2C4 6 4 SRO-U MAJ M8 M7 2 2 TS T1T3 T4 3 2 Instructions:
- 1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATCy and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
- 2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-i basis.
- 3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
4 08/31/2013 Rev. FINAL
SCENARIOS 1, 2, 3 AND 4 SRO Upgrade List (3 total)
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Shearon Harris Date of Exam: 09-09-2013 Operating Test No.: 05000400/2013301 A E Scenarios P V L N CREW CREW CREW CREW N I T T POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION I c M A T S A B S A B S A B S A B L U
, R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 M*
IN 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P T P RU E
NOR o-i I/C 1213 4 2 LI SRO-U1 MAJ M6 1 1 S TS T2T4 2 2 NOR N1NIN5 31 o-i I/C 1213 C2C3 SRO-U2 s MAJ M6 T2T4 M8 T3T4 21 TS T6 5 2 20 NOR I/C zz__:
1213 C1l2 8
C4l5 C3C4 2 SRO-U3 MAJ M6 M7 2 1 TS T2T4 T1T3 T4 5 2 Instructions:
Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position.
If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
- 2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-I basis.
- 3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
5 08/31/2013 Rev. FINAL
SCENARIO SPARE ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Shearon Harris Date of Exam: 09-09-2013 Operating Test No.: 05000400/2013301 A E Scenarios P V 5 T M P E o I L N CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION N T
I T A C S A B L U A T R T 0 M(*)
N Y 0 C P T P E
NOR Ni o-I/C 12C3C4C5C6 5 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ M7 1 2 2 1
- TS T3T5 2 0 2 2 RO RX 0 110 SRO-l NOR 12 C5 C6 iii:
3 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ M7 1 2 2 1 TS 0022 RO RX 0 110
- NOR Ni 1111 SRO-l I/C C3 C4 2 4 4 2 o-u MAJ M7 1 2 2 1 D TS 0022 Instructions:
- 1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
- 2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-i basis.
- 3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
Revision FINAL Changes have been made to the transient and event checklist based on the incorporation of NRC enhancements into HNP Scenarios that were revised during the Prep Week. The events listed in this revision correspond to the HNP Scenarios 1-5 submitted on 8-31-2013.
JR Horton 8-31-2013 6 08/31/2013 Rev. FINAL
ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Harris Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: 09-09-2013 Operating Test No.: 05000400/2013301 APPLI CANTS RO RO (BOP) SRO-U SRO-l SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO C ompe t encies
. 12 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2341 2- 2-3 4 SRO RO Interpret! 0 2,4, 1,3, 1,3, 2,4, 3,4, 2,4, 4,5, 2,3, 2,3, 0 0 3,5, 2,3, 2,5, 1,2, 1,3, Diagnose 7,8, 5,6, 6,7, 6,7 7,8, 6,7, 7,8, 4,5, 4,5, 6,8 4,5, 7,8, 3,4, 4,5, Events 9, 8 8 9,10 8,9 9 6,7, 7,9, 7,9, 9,10 5,6, 6,7, 1 ,11 7,8, and Conditions 9 8,9 Comply With 0 1,2, 1,3, 1,2, 1,2, 1,3, 2,4, 2, 1,2, 1,2, 0 0 1,3, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, and 5,6, 5,6, 3,6, 4,6, 4,7, 5,6, 4,5, 3,4, 3,4, 5,6, 3,4, 5,6, 3,4, 3,4, Use 7,8, 8 7,8 7 8,9, 7,8, 7,8, 5,6, 5,6, 8 5,6, 7,8, 5,6, 5,6, Procedures 1 10 9 9 7,8, 7,10 7, 9,10 7,8, 7,8, 10, 9,10 11 10, 11 9 9 11 11 Operate Control 0 1,2, 1,3, 1,2, 1,2, 1,3, 2,4, 2, 0 0 0 0 1,3, 0 1,2, 0 0 Boards (2) 5,6, 5,6 3,6, 4,6, 4,7, 5,6, 4,5, 5,6, 5,6, 7,8, 7,8 7 8,9, 7,8, 7,8, 8 7,8, 10, 10 9 9 10, 11 11 Communicate 0 1,2, 1,3, 1,2, 1,2, 1,3, 2,4, 2, 1,2, 1,2, 0 0 1,3, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, and Interact 5,6, 5,6, 3,6, 4,6, 4,7, 5,6, 4,5, 3,4, 3,4, 5,6, 3,4, 5,6, 3,4, 3,4, 7,8, 8 7,8 7 8,9, 7,8, 7,8, 5,6, 5,6, 8 5,6, 7,8, 5,6, 5,6, 9, 10 9 9 7,8, 7,9, 7, 9,10 7,8, 7,8, 10, 9,10 10, 9,10, 11 9 9 11 11 11 Demonstrate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,2, 1,2, 0 0 0 1,2, 0 1,2, 1,2, Supervisory 3,4, 3,4, 3,4, 3,4, 3,4, Ability (3) 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 7,8, 7,9, 7, 7,8, 7,8, 9,10 10, 9,10, 9 9 11 11 Comply With 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,4 3,4, 0 0 0 3,4,5 0 1, 3, 2,4, and 6 5 5,8, Use Tech. 9 Specs. (3) -= = = = = = = = =
Notes:
(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.
(2) Optional for an SRO-U.
(3) Only applicable to SROs.
Instructions: Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant.
ES-301, Page 27 of 27
ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Harris Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: 09-09-2013 Operating Test No.: 05000400/2013301 APPLICANTS RO RO (BOP) SRO-U SRO-l SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARI SCENARIO 0
Competencies Interpret/Diagnose! Events 2,5,6,7,8,9 3,4,7,10 2,3,4,5,6,7, 2,3,4,5,6,7,8, and Conditions 8,9,10 9,10 Comply With and 2,5,6,7,8,9 1,3,4,7,10 1,2,3,4,5,6, 1,2,3,4,5,6,7, Use Procedures (1) 7,8,9,10 8,9,10 Operate Control 2,5,6,7,8,9 1,3,4,7,10 0 0 Boards (2)
Communicate 2,5,6,7,8,9 1,3,4,7,10 1,2,3,4,5,6, 1,2,3,4,5,6,7, and Interact 7,8,9,10 8,9,10 Demonstrate Supervisory Ability (3) 0 0 Comply With and 0 0 3,5 3,5 Use Tech. Specs. (3)
Notes:
(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.
(2) Optional for an SRO-U.
(3) Only applicable to SROs.
SCENARIO # 5 submitted as a SPARE Scenario Instructions:
Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate eveiy applicable competency for every applicant.
Revision I Changes made to list based on re-ordering Scenario to match events sent for 45 day submittal.
Archie Lucky 7-03-2013 ES-301 Page 27 of 27
ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility: SHEARON HARRIS Date of Exam: SEPTEMBER 2013 oPots_ SRO-Only Points Tier Group 1 1 1 K KIKIK K KIA A A A G A2 G* Total 1 2j3j4 5 6j1 2 3 4
- Total
- 1. 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 3 3 6 Emergency &
Abnormal 2 N/A 2 2 N/A 1 9 2 2 4 Evolutions Tier Totals 4 4 5 5 5 4 27 5 5 10
= = = = = = = = =
1 22332333232 28 3 2 5 2.
Plant 2 iLL!+/-L.QI_LJ_L 10 0 2 1 3 Systems Tier Totals 3 3 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 38 5 3 8
- 3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7 Categories 3 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the HO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two).
- 2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.
The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions.
The final HO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 poInts.
- 3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not Included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1 .b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
- 4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
- 5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected.
Use the HO and SRO ratings for the HO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
- 6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and KIA categories.
- 7. The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1 .b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.
- 8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IRS) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier tOtals for each category in the table above; it fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for HO and SRO-only exams.
- 9. For Tier 3, select topics from SectIon 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRS, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401 -3. UmIt SRO selections to KIM that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.
ES-401 2 Form ES-401 -2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Evnlutions Tier Emergen andAbnormal - 1/Group I EIAPE #1 Name I Safety Function K K K A A 0 K/A Topic(s) IR #
12312 000007 (BW)E02&E10; CE/E02) Reactor Rob? SIC2.O1 Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space P. 001 O2.
Accident / 3
- R 0091(2.03 000009 Small Break LOCA /3 000011 Oil E2 .4 47 Large Break LOCA /
000015117 RCP Malfunctions /4 g Rosgg.oa.
000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup 12 R RO22&AI.og 000025LossofRHRSystemI4 S 0 5
1 ZS AA.o 000026 Loss of Component Cooling P. 024, AAI. DS Water/8 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction! 3 000029A1WSI1 02.9EKI.Ot S O9 2,c9 000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture/3 000040 (BW/E05; CEIEO5; WIEI2) p P Q44) A.K,3 .03 Steam Line Rupture Excessive Heat Transfer /4 Ak3 000054 (CEIEO6) Loss of Main R P. 054 Feedwaterl4 S O54A-. 4.47 000055 Blackout 16 3 $ pss eA .D..
=
Station 000056 Loss of Off-site Power /6 W P. Q5(.A.+.45 000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus /6 r
000058 Loss of DC Power! 5 - -
- P. 05E 42.01 S O5 4r3 000062 Loss ofNuclearSvcWaterl4 P. OP. AA2.0J 000065 Loss Instrument Air /8 P. 0b5 Al3. 0
=
of WIE04LOcAOutsideContainment/3 P. WEO4. E1432.
-WIE1-1-Loss-of-Emergency Coolant- P. WEll EM.3 Reclrc/4 Heat R WEO5 EJ(1.2.
Transfer BWIE04nade- of Secondary quate Heat Sink 14 -
000077 Generator Voltage and Electric R 077A24.4 Grid Disturbances /6 K/A Category Totals: .3 3 3 3 3 Group Point Total: 1W6 4
- 5
()
ES-401, REV 9 T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR Ki 1(2 K3 1(4 1(5 1(6 Al A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:
Rb SRO 007EK2.02 Reactor Trip Stabilization Recovery
- - 2.6 2.8 [] [] [] [] j] [] [] [] Breakers, relays and disconnects Il 008AK2.02 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 2.7 2.7 LI [] [] LI [] [] [] LI [] [] Sensors and detectors 009EK2.03 Small Break LOCA / 3 3 3.3 [] [] [] [] LI [] LI [] S/Gs 011 EG2.4.47 Large Break LOCA I 3 4.2 4.2 LI [j [] [] LI [] [] [] [] [] [ Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate and timely manner utilizing the approprIate control room reference material.
01 5AK1 .02 RCP Malfunctions / 4 3.7 4.1 Q LI LI [] [] [] [] [] LI LI Consequences of an RCPS failure 022AA1 .08 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup! 2 3.4 3.3 LI LI LI LI LI LI 1 LI LI LI fl VCT level 026AA1 .05 Loss of Component Cooling Water! 8 3.1 3.1 LI [] LI LI LI LI The CCWS surge tank. including level control and level LI LI fl LI alarms and radiation alarm 029EK1.01 ATWS/1 2.8 3.1 LI LI LI LI LI El El LI LI El Reactor nucleonics and thenTlo.hydraulics behavior f/e& uiie L 7
ihi fd& (1(I1 jfl 040AK3.03 -
Steam Uris Rupture Excessive Heat 35 LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI Steam line non-return valves Transter/4 054AA2.02 Loss of Main Feedwater /4 4.1 4.4 LI LI LI El LI LI El Differentiation between loss of all MFW and trip of one LI LI LI MFW pump 056AG2.4.45 Loss of Off-site Power /6 4.1 4.3 LILILILILILIL1LILILI Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of each annunciator or alarm.
Page 1 of 2 12/18/2012 2:20 PM
ES-401, REV 9 T 1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR Kl K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:
RO SHO 058AA2.0l Loss of DC Power /6 3.7 4.1 El El fl Q [J Q Q [ [] [] That a loss of dc power has occurred; verification that substitute power sources have come on line 062AA2.01 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water! 4 2.9 3.5 [] [J El [] [] [] [] j] [] [] [] Location of a leak in the SWS 065AK3.08 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 3.7 3.9 El LI () LI El El El El El LI fl Actions contained In EOP for loss of instrument air 077AG2.4.4 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid 4.5 4.7 [J [J [J [] [] [] [] [] [] Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system Disturbances / 6 operating parameters wtiich are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures.
WEO4EK3.2 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 3.4 4.0 El El El LI LI LI El El El [] Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (LOCA Outside Containment).
WEO5EK1.2 Inadequate Heat Transfer Loss of
- 3.9 4.5 LI El LI El LI El El El Li LI Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures Secondary Heat Sink! 4 associated with (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink).
WE1 I EA1 .3 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. / 4 3.7 4.2 El El El El LI El I El El LI LI Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.
Page 2 of 2 12/18/2012 2:20 PM
ES-401, REV 9 SRO T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-4012 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1K2K3K4K5K6A1A2A3A4G TOPIC:
RO SRO 025AA2.05 Loss of RHR System /4 3.1 Limitations on LPI flow and temperature rates of change 029EA2.09 ATWS /1 DLDOELDJE1OD Occurrence of a main turbine/reactor trip 038EG2.4.30 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 2.7 4.1 Knowledge of events related to system operations/status that must be reported to internal ornizations or outside agencies.
054AG2.4.47 Loss of Main Feedwater / 4 4.2 4.2 Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate and timely manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material.
055EA2.04 Station Blackout 16 3.7 4.1 Instruments and controls operable with only dc battery power available 058AG2.4.3 Loss of DC Power /6 E1E1LLILL1LDL1 Ability to identify post-accident instrumentation.
Page 1 of 1 12/18/2012 12:58PM
ES-401 3 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abrrmal Plant Evolutions- Tier
=
1/Group 2 EIAPE #1 Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K!A Topic(s) IR #
12312 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal/I KROOIMI.OI 000003 Dropped Control Rod/I 000005 Inoperable/Studc Control Rod It S S DOS AcA ,03 000024 Emergency Boration I1 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction 12 000032 Loss of Source Range NI 17 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI /7 000038 (BW!A08) Fuel Handling Accident /8
-i---- R.O3AK2.OI 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak! 3 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum 14 R
R 03? AL4.J4 DSIAAI.04 1aaL 1
I /
000059 Accidental Liquid RadWaste Rel. /9 P o% A K3.a#
000060 Accidental Radwaste ReL /9 5 O(,O AGi2 2 31
=
Gaseous S pe,i AA.2 000061 ARM System Alarms / 7 5 .
000067 Plant Fire On-sfte /8 000068 (BW/A06) Control Room Evac. / 8 (6LossofCTMTlntegrity!5 000074 (W/E06&E07) Inad. Core CoolIng /4
=
RWEI4 R O14 AI.I EA2.03 S D(4 A2.2.2S 000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity /9 W/EO1 & E02 Rediagnosis & SI Termination 13 W/E13 Steam Generator Over-pressure /4
=
R WEI5 K3.I W/El5ContainmentFlooding!5 W/E18 High Containment Radiation 19 BW/A0I Plant Runback I 1 BW/A02&A03 Loss of NNI-X!Y / 7 -
BW/Ao4TurbineTrlp!4 BW/A05 Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 BW/A07 Flooding /8 BW/E03 Inadequate Subcooling Margin /4
=
P W03 iUI BW/E08LOCACooldown-Depress./4 BW/E09; CE!A13; WIEO9&E10 Natural Circ. /4 BW)E13&E14 EOP Rules and Enclosures CE/Al I; W/E08 RCS Overcooling PTS /4 CE/A16 Excess RCS Leakage / 2 CE/E09 Functional Recovery K/A Category Point Totals: I I Z 3. j*
= 2.
Group Point Total: 9/4
ES-401, REV 9 T1G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR Ki K2 K3 K4 KS K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:
RO SRO 001 AA2.0l Continuous Rod WIthdrawal/i 4.2 4.2 LI LI [] L] [1 [1 [1 I [1 LI [1 Reactor tripped breaker indicator 036AK2.0l Fuel Handling Accident / 8 2.9 3.5 [] j [] [] [] [] [] [] LI LI LI Fuel handling equipment 037AG2.4.34 Steam Generator tube Leak /3 4.2 4.1 LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI I Know4edge of RO tasks performed outside the main control room during an emergency and the resultant iie,4 /&y operational effects O51AA1.04 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 2.5 2.5 [] LI LI LI LI LI I] LI LI El LI Rod position 059AK3.04 Accidental Liquid RadWaste Rel. /9 3.8 4.3 LI LI L] LI Li Li LI LI LI LI LI Actions contained in EOP for accidental liquid radioactive-waste release 074EA2.03 mad. Core Cooling / 4 3.8 4.1 LI LI LI LI LI LI LI l] LI LI LI Availability of turbine bypass valves for cooldown WEO3EK1.1 LOCACooldown-Depress./4 3.4 4.0 f] LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.
WE14EA1.l Loss of CTMT lntegflty/5 3.7 3.7 LI LI LI LI LI LI I1 LI LI LI LI Components and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes and automatic and manual features.
WE15EK3.1 Containment Flooding / 5 2.7 2.9 LILiILiLIELILILILILI Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.
Page 1 of *l 12118/2012 12:58PM
ES-401,REV9 SRO T1G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1K2K3K4K5K6A1A2A3A4G TOPIC:
RO SRO 005AA2.03 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod /1 3*5 Required actions if more than one rod is stuck or inoperable 060AG2.2.37 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. /9 3.6 4.6 Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment 061 AA2.02 ARM System Alarms / 7 2.9 3.2 Normal radiation intensity for each ARM system channel 069AG2.2.25 Loss of CTMT Integrity /5 324.2 Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.
Page 1 of 1 12/18/2012 12:58PM
ES-401 4 Form ES-401 -2 ES-401 PlantS stems-11er2IGrouffiORO Form ES-401-2 System #1 Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s)
R 0QsI.2,D2.
003 Reactor Coolant Pump 00+42.15 O04Chemicaland Volume Control R 0o4 JC .2b R oo P4. D 005 Residual Heat Removal
=
P 001. ç2.l.3o Oo6EmergencyCoreCooling 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench P. 001 2. 1. 20 Tank P. 001 144.ol 008 Component Cooling Water p 00$ AS 0$*
010 Pressurizer Pressure Control P. P. 012 1C4.oZ.
012 Reactor Protection 013 Engineered Safety Features A P. 013 A4.0I Actuation A 013 J2..DI 022 Containment Cooling R 02.2. A4..o3 025 Ice Condenser -
026 Containment Spray f ...-/
P. 03, 039 AZ. 03 039 Main and Reheat Steam 0
059 Main Feedwater 061 AwdliarylEmergency P. P b(,I 146.05 Feedwater P. 0 I Al. 0)
P. .. P. DIn. 14Z.0I A,I1 062 AC Electrical Distribution O63DCElectrlcalDlstributlon - -
P. -
te *° 24t 064 Emergency Diese[Generator R. P. c*4. p.0 073 Process Radiation R 013 A4.
Monitoring P S P. Q7(p ,jO( SQTC A?.0I 076 Service Water 078 Instrument Air - -
P. W3 I(1.o5 c l03Containment
=
K/A Categoiy Point Totais: 2. 3 3 eL 3 J 3. 3 2.. Group Point Total: 2815
.3
ES-401, REV 9 T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR KI 1(2 K3 K4 K5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:
RO SRO 003A2.02 Reactor Coolant Pump 3.7 3.9 [] [] [] [] [J El ] [] El Conditions which exist for an abnormal shutdown of an RCP in comparison to a normal shutdown of an RCP 004A2.13 Chemical and Volume Control 3.6 3.9 [] El [] [J [] [J [] El (] [j Low RWST 0041(5.26 Chemical and Volume Control 3.1 3.2 fl fl [] [] [) El [I [] [] El El Relationship between VCT pressure arid NPSH for charging pumps 005A1 .05 ResIdual Heat Removal 3.3 3.3 [] [] [] [] [] [] ] [] [] [] [] Detection of and response to presence of water in RHR emergency sump 006G2.l .30 Emergency Core Cooling 4.4 4.0 El El fl El [] [] [] [] [] El ] Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls.
007G2.1 .20 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 4.6 4.6 El El El El El LI El [I LI El ] Ability to execute procedure steps.
007K4.01 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 2.6 2.9 LI LI El l El El El El LI El El Quench tank cooling 008A3.08 Component Cooling Water 3.6 3.7 El LI El El El El El El ll El LI Automatic actions associated with the CCWS that occur as a result of a safety injection signal 010K6.02 Pressurizer Pressure Control 3.2 3.5 El El El LI El l El El El El El 2FI 010K6.03 Pressurizer Pressure Control 3.2 3.6 El El El El El F] El El El El El PZR sprays and heaters 012K4.02 Reactor Protection 3.9 4.3 El LI LI II LI El LI LI LI El El Automatic reactor trip when RPS setpoints are exceeded for each RPS function; basis for each Page 1 of 3 12/18/2012 12:58PM
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T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 ES-401, REV 9 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1K2K3K4K5K6A1A2A3A4G TOPIC:
RO SRO 0631(3.02 DC Electrical Distribution 3*5 * [][ILIL]LILILIL1L]D Components using DC control power 0641(6.08 Emergency Diesel Generator 3.2 3.3 LI LILILILILILID LI LI Fuel oil storage tanks 073A4.02 Process Radiation Monitoring 3.7 3.7 LI LILILILILILILILI LI Radiation monitoring system control panel 076K1 .01 Service Water 3.4 3.3 jJ LILILILILILILILI LI LI CCW system 0781(3.01 Instrument Air 3.1 3.4 LI LIILILILILIL1 LI LI Containment air system 103K1.03 Containment 3.1 3.5 LILILILILILILILI LI LI Shield building vent system Page 3 of 3 12)18/2012 12:58 PM
ES-401, REV 9 SRO T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR Ki K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:
RO SRO 039A2.03 Main and Reheat Steam 3.4 3.7 [] El Q Q [] [] [] [3 [3 [] Indications and alarms fo main steam and area radiation monitors (during SGTR) 062A2.11 AC Electrical Distribution 3.7 4.1 [3 [] [3 [3 [3 [3 [] } [] [] [3 Aligning standby equipment with correct emergency por source (DIG) 063G2.2.40 DC Electrical Distribution 3.4 4.7 [] [3 [3 [3 [3 [3 [3 [3 [] [] j Ability to apply tedinical specifications for a system.
076A2.01 Service Water 3.5 3.7 [3 [3 [3 [3 [] [] [] (] [] [] [3 Loss of SWS 103G2.2.22 ContaInment 4.0 4.7 [3 [3 [3 [] [3 [3 El El El El {] Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.
Page 1 of 1 1211812012 12:58PM
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ES-401, REV 9 SRO T2G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTUNE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR Ki 1<2 1<3 1<4 K5 1<6 Al A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:
RO SRO 01 7G2.1 .7 In-core Temperature MonItor 4.4 4.7 [1 [] [] 0 0 fl [] [] 0 0 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior and instrument Interpretation.
028A2.02 Hydrogen Recornblner and Purge 3.5 3.9 Q 0 0 0 0 [} 0 0 [1 [] LOCA condition and related concern over hydrogen Control 068A2.04 Uquid Radwaste 3.3 3.3 LI LI 0 0 0 LI LI I [1 0 LI Failure of automatic isolation Page 1 of 1 12/1&2012 12:58 PM
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ES-401,REV9 T3 PWR EXAMINA11ON OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR 1(1 1(2 K3 1(4 1(5 1(6 Al A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:
HO SRO G2.1 .13 Conduct of operations 2.5 3.2 Q Q LI LI LI El El O U Q Knowledge of facility requirements for controlling vital /
controlled access.
Gal .15 Conduct of operatIons 2.7 3.4 0 LI LI [] [] [] [][J [J Knowledge of administrative requirements for temporary management directives such as standing orders, night orders, Operations memos, etc.
G2.l.19 Conduct of operations 39 38 [ILI LI [][] [] [] Ability to use plant computer to evaluate system or component status.
G2.2.20 Equipment Control 2.6 3.8 LI LI LI LI LI LI LI U LI LI (J Knowledge of the process for managing troubleshooting activities.
G2.2.39 Equipment Control 3.9 4.5 LI LI C] C] LI Cl LI LI [] [] Knowledge of less than one hour technical specification action statements for systems.
G2.3.11 Radiation Control 3.8 4.3 LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI Ability to control radiation releases.
G2.3.12 Radiation Control 3.2 3.7 LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties G2.4.22 Emergency Procedures/Plans 3.6 4.4 LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing safety functions during abnormal/emergency operations.
G2.4.27 Emergency Procedures/Plans 3.4 3.9 LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI J Knowledge of afire in the planr procedures.
G2.4.29 Emergency Procedures/Plans 3.1 44 LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI Knowiedgeoftheemergencyplan.
Page 1 of 1 12118/2012 12:58PM
ES-401, REV 9 SRO T3 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1K2K3K4K51(6A1A2A3A4G TOPIC:
RO SRO G2.1 .41 Conduct of operations 2.8 3.7 Knowfedge of the refueling processes G2.2.13 Equipment Control 4.1 4.3 DD1DLiL1LL Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures.
G2.2.40 Equipment Control
- DLJEIE1DDL1l11L1 Ability to apply technical specifications for a system.
G2.3.14 Radiation Control 3.4 3.8 Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities G2.3.4 Radiation Contrd 3.2 3.7 DLIE1I Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal and emergency conditions G2.4.40 Emergency Procedures/Plans 2.7 4.5 EL1I Knowledge of the SROs responsibilities in emergency plan implementation.
G2.4.46 Emergency Procedures/Plans 4.2 4.2 Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the plant conditions.
Page 1 of 1 12/18/2012 12:58PM
Harris Nuclear Plant 2013 NRC Written Exam Submittal 8-31-2013 / FINAL ES-401 Record of Rejected KIAs Form ES-401-4 Tier I Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A RO T1G2 037 AG2.4.34 The only HNP RO tasks outside of the MCR are addressed by AOP-004, Main Control Room Evacuation. Unable to write a question for this K/A due to the lack of an RO task for the original K/A.
Replace with randomly selected K/A 037 AG2.4.31 by Bruno Caballero 4/18/2013 T1G1 040 AK3.03 The Main Steam Supply system at HNP is not designed with in-line Non-return check valves. Unable to write a question for this K/A due to the lack of Non-return check valves in this system at HNP.
Replace with randomly selected K/A 040 AK3.02 by Bruno Caballero 6/13/2013 T2G1 026 Al .04 The Containment Spray system at HNP is operated independent of the humidity level of Containment. Unable to write a question for this K/A due to the lack procedural actions or an RO task for the original K/A.
Replace with randomly selected K/A 026 Al .05 by Bruno Caballero 6/13/2013 T2G1 039 A2.01 The original K/A overlaps with RO Q#24 (074-lnadeq CC EA2.03) because the. same knowledge of how LOOP affects steam dump availability is being tested. (double jeopardy).
Replace with randomly selected K/A 039 A2.04 by Bruno Caballero 8/20/2013 SRO None ES-40l Page 27 of 33
Harris Nuclear Plant 2013 NRC Written Exam Submittal FINAL 09-04-20 13 ES-401 Written Examination Quality Checklist Form ES-401-6 Facility: Shearon Harris - Test No. 05000400/201 3301 Date of Exam: 09-25-2013 Exam Level: RO SRO Initial Item Description a b* c#
- 1. Questions and answers are technically accurate and applicable to the facility. 3
- 2. a.
b.
NRC K/As are referenced for all questions.
Facility learning objectives are referenced as available.
(3 ,:;4
- 4. The sampling process was random and systematic (If more than 4 RO or 2 SRO questions were repeated from the last 2 NRC licensing exams, consult the NRR OL program office).
- 5. Question duplication from the license screening/audit exam was controlled as indicated below (check the item that applies) and appears appropriate:
the audit exam was systematically and randomly developed; or the audit exam was completed before the license exam was started; or /L the examinations were developed independently; or X the licensee certifies that there is no duplication; or other (explain)
- 6. Bank use meets limits (no more than 75 percent Bank Modified New from the bank, at least 10 percent new, and the rest I I new or modified); enter the actual RO / SRO-only 27 / 9 I 6I0 I 42 / 16 question distribution(s) at right. I I
- 7. Between 50 and 60 percent of the questions on the RO Memory C/A I
exam are written at the comprehension/ analysis level; the SRO exam may exceed 60 percent if the randomly selected K/As support the higher cognitive levels; enter 30 / 6 I I
45 / 19 A the actual RO I SRO question distribution(s) at right. I
- 8. References/handouts provided do not give away answers or aid in the elimination of distractors.
- 9. Question content conforms with specific K/A statements in the previously approved examination outline and is appropriate for the tier to which they are assigned; deviations are justified.
- 10. Question psychometric quality and format meet the guidelines in ES Appendix B.
- 11. The exam contains the required number of one-point, multiple choice items; the total is correct and agrees with the value on the cover sheet.
Printed Name / Signature Date
- a. Author Richard (JR) Horton / 9/04/2013
- b. Facility Reviewer (*) Simon Schwindt / 71 9/04/2013
- c. NRC Chief Examiner (#) ckao/
- d. NRC Regional Supervisor Note:
- The facility reviewers initials/signature are not applicable for NRC-developed examinations.
- Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column c; chief examiner concurrence required.
ES-401, Page 29 of 33
\
ES-401 Harris 2013 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 1 7-8-13: Licensee contacted regarding the high number of
] unacceptable items in the first 30 RO test items.
Gen 7-1 6-13: The ES-401 -9 worksheet for the 75 RO questions was transmitted to the licensee.
The RO exam was PRELIMINARILY determined to NOT meet the NUREG 1021 acceptability range based on the following 22 2test items (29.3% 30.66%) being unacceptable in accordance with ES-401.
- Cred Dist: 5, 11, 44, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 33, 46, 47, 50, 52, 55, 63, 66
/
7 1
Questions with more than one correct answer LCD = 1, or LCD =
repaired. . ...._
5 were rated as enhancements; however, these items must still be
)
The final determination on the RO exam quality will be made following any post-exam comments in accordance with ES-SO 1.
Additionally, any items listed above that may eventually require K/A replacement or were misunderstood by the Chief Examiner will be credited.
PiVA-L- 4iv,yt (I3O-13)
A/OX P4jji) 1 (_)
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f2O: 3, Bc; 1 £9
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only Gen 7/23/13: The ES-401-9 worksheet for the 25 SRO questions was provided to the licensee.
The SRO exam was PRELIMINARILY determined to NOT meet the NUREG 1021 acceptability range based on the following 12 test items (48%) being unacceptable in accordance with ES-401 (underlined items had two flaws):
e Cred Dist: 79, 83, 86, 87, 89, 90, 93, 94, 97, 99
. Q=KIA: 79,83,84
. SRO-only: 92, 93, 94 Questions with more than one correct answer, LOD = 1, or LOD = 5 were rated as enhancements; however, these items must still be repaired.
The final determination on the SRO exam quality will be made following any post-exam comments in accordance with ES-501.
Additionally, any items listed above that may eventually require K/A replacement or were misunderstood by the Chief Examiner will be credited.
Gen Unless otherwise noted, Column 2 (LOD) is acceptable, that is, in the 24 range. Column 2 will be finalized after the final exam submittal.
Questions are flagged as LOD = 1 or LOD 5 in Column 2 must be repaired.
Gen Column 1 will be completed after the final versions of the exam questions are submitted by the licensee.
Gen The SRO applicants should be provided with the applicable Tech Spec whenever they are required to apply an action statement 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> because memorization of Tech Specs is borderline minutia and the question is vulnerable to post-exam appeals and could be deleted from the exam.
Gen Even, question which refers to a Tech Spec should include the name and number of the Tech Spec within the stem.
Instructions
[Refer to Section D of ES-401 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts.]
- 1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.
- 2. Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) of each question using a 1 5 (easy difficult) rating scale (questions in the 2 4 range are acceptable).
- 3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:
- The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information).
- The stem or distractors contain cues (i.e., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc).
- The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements.
- The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors should be repaired, more than one is unacceptable.
- One or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stem).
- 4. Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified:
- The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid K/A but, as written, is not operational in content).
- The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory).
- The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons).
- The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements.
- 5. Check guestions that are samrled for conformance-with the approved K/A and those that are designated SRO-only (K/A and license level mismatches are unacceptable).
- 6. Enter question source: (B)ank, (M)odified, or (N)ew. Check that (M)odified questions meet criteria of ES-401 Section D.2.f.
- 7. Based on the reviewers judgment, is the question as written (U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement, or (S)atisfactory?
- 8. At a minimum, explain any U ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met).
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD r (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q ISRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A jOnly 2 x x x x B E 007 EK2.02,T1G1
- 1. Job-Link and/or QKJA: The stem isnt clear as to plant (procedural) status (E-0, ES-0.1, GP-004, OP-104, Section 5.3.2.3??); normally, the reactor trip breakers are (procedurally) closed during startup, which does not meet the intent of the Tier 1/Group 1 emergency/abnormal topic. What is the status of the plant at this time? IF the plant status involves the implementation of E-0 or ES-0.1, then this question may meet the intent of the Tier 1/ Group 1 topic; however, this plant status information should be added to the stem.
The question must test some aspect of the emergency/abnormal (Tier 1, Group 1) category. If the reactor trip breakers are being closed during a startup (see OP-i 04, Section 5.3.2.3), then the Tier 1, Group 1 aspect of the K/A isnt being met.
- 2. Cred Dist: Steam Generator low water level trips are never bypassed, which makes Choices A/B borderline plausible.
Consider making the SG level at 30%.
- 3. Stem Focus: The phrase assuming all other conditions are met for closing the Reactor Trip Breakers is vague.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 2 x x x x N E 008 AK2.02, T1G1
- 1. Cue: The 3 bullet unnecessarily cues the applicants that a pressurizer vapor space accident has occurred instead of testing their ability to identify this based on given indications.
- 2. Partial: Choice D can be successfully argued as correct because the OACs interpretation of primary cause (vs secondary?) for reporting (to the CRS) is subjective.
nd 2
- 3. Stem Focus: The bullet is too vague.
- 4. Stem Focus: Avoid the use of the phrase would be in the WOOTF stem question because it is subjective.
- 5. Backwards Logic: The stem question requires the applicants to go back in time and think of the reason why the OAC has already reported something to the CRS.
Suggest providing temperature/level indications/containment parameters and then test the applicants knowledge of the size/location of an RCS leak.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD r r (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/E Cred. I Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link unitsj ward K/A Only 3 x x x M E 009 EK2.03, T1G1 Partial: An applicant can successfully argue that Choice D is also correct because the 2 part of the fill-in-the-blank statement is not specific to EOP-ES-i .2, Step 1 Of. That is, an applicant can justify that the SGs are not really required (condenser available) since the fill-in-the-blank statement does not ask the applicant whether the Condenser-Available Requirements listed in Step i0.f are met. The 2 nd part of the fill-in-the-blank statement is too subjective because it doesnt tie the applicant to EOP-ES-i .2 requirements.
- 2. Stem Focus: The question is confusing because it combines two separate points in time with one fill-in-the-blank statement.
The is part of the fill-in-the-blank statement implies that the crew is implementing E-0 and the 2nd part of the fill-in-the-blank statement implies that the crew is (will be?) implementing EOP ES-1.2, Step 10.f. What procedure is the crew implementing right now?
Suggest telling the applicants where the crew is with respect to procedure implementation and then split out the fill-in-the-blank sentence into two sentences - - one part will ask what is required, and the other part will be to predict what is used when the crew implements ES-i .2, Step i Of.
- 3. Cue: The ist bullet in the stem is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
- 4. Stem Focus: The word should (in the ist part of each choice) is too subjective. (Is the word should being used to look backward in time?) Modify the i 5t part of the fill-in-the-blank statement to test the applicants knowledge of what is required/is not required.
- 5. The 1 5t part of this question tests the following E-0 foldout criteria and overlaps with RO Q# 4.
FOLDOUT
- RCPTRIP CRITERIA IF both of the followlnq occur. jH4stop all RCPs:
- SI flow GREATER THAN 200 GPM
- 6. Ensure no overlap with scenarios critical tasks.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD r r (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F I Cred. Partial Job- I Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/MIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 4 x x N E 011 EG2.4.47 This question overlaps with RO Q#3 because it tests the following E-0 foldout criteria (again).
FOLDOUT
- RCPTRICTEIA iE both of the folkiwbig occur, flj stop af RCPs:
St flow GREATER THAN 200 6PM RCS pmsswe LESS THAN 1400 P516 Suggest testing the applicants knowledge of what to do with the RHR pumps in accordance with E-1, Sten 8, Check RHR Status and one other piece of knowledge (that requires the applicant to recognize a trend, etc.).
- 2. Partial: The stem question does not include in accordance with therefore, an applicant could potentially argue more than one correct answer.
- 3. Stem Focus: The word alignment is misspelled.
- 4. Stem Focus: Re-word each of the four choices as follows (to be more precise).
A. Stop RCPs; Leave RHR Pumps running B. Leave RCPs running; Stop RHR Pumps C. Stop RCPs RHR pumps D. Leave RCPs RHR pumps running Explore the possibility of adding ALB-004, Window 2-2 in alarm (not window 2-4)
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LCD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 5 x x N U 015 AK1.02, T1G1
- 1. Cred Dist: Choices B/C (stop power increase) can be (correctly) eliminated based on the fact that the stem does not indicate a power increase was in progress.
- 2. Cred Dist: Choice C (continue raising power) is not plausible because raising power with annunciators alarming is never a conservative action.
- 3. Stem Focus: Choices B/C should be streamlined to eliminate the investigate wording items.
- 4. Stem Focus: The 3 bullet is a cryptic way of saying that the pump has tripped. Just tell the applicants that the A RCP has tripped. Alternatively, re-work the question to test a situation where the pump has a sheared shaft event.
Suggest re-working the question to provide the alarms (in the stem) and then test the applicants ability to diagnose a RCP has tripped (instead of telling them) versus some other plausible malfunction; and the required action (trip the reactor or perform a normal plant shutdown) in accordance with ALB-10, 6-3A.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD r r (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F I Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus j Dist. Linkj units ward K/A Only 5 x x x Comments on revised question received from licensee on 8/5/13 Partial: Choice A (stop power increase) is the same thing as Choice D (commence an orderly shutdown.
- 2. Cred Dist: Choice C (continue raising power after an RCP has tripped) is not plausible because something bad has happened in the plant and raising power after something bad has happened is never a good idea. Also, it is the only choice that says to raise power.
- 3. Stem Focus: The 3 bullet should simply state that the RCP has tripped.
Suggest the following, but add another element associated with the required actions.
(Hint: Wouldnt the crew have to place the spray valve in manual and close it so that the B loop spray wouldnt backward flow into theA loop? This is one idea for the 1st part of the following suggest. What procedure addresses closing the loop A spray valve once the pump tripped?)
WOOTF identifies the required action in accordance with APP ALB-O1O, 6-3A?
A. 5t part, Trip Reactor, Go to E-O i
B. 1 part; Trip Reactor, Go to E-O C. 1st part; Commence a plant shutdown lAW GP-006 st 1
D. part, Commence a plant shutdown lAW GP-006
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F I Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link junits ward K/A Only 6 x x B E 022AA1.08,T1G1
- 1. Job-Link: The premise of the question is that the auto-makeup function was (partially?) disabled (in accordance with OP-i 07.1, Attachment 2, Mode 6 Inadvertent Dilution Component Lineup) and then VCT level began to lower. Is the AOP-003 entry required??? Need to understand how VCT level is normally maintained in Mode 6 when OP-i 07.1, Attachment 2 lineup has been performed.
- 2. Stem Focus: Streamline the choices as follows, in order to be symmetric.
A. From the MCB: open CS-291 & 292 (title) and close CS-165 & 166 (title)
B. Locally: open CS-278 (title) and CS-274 (title)
C. From the MCB: Start one boric acid pump, open CS283 (title), CS-156 (title), and CS-151 (title)
D. Locally: open CS-287 (title) and CS-274 (title)
- 3. Stem Focus: Which one of the four choices reflects the normal (at power) lineup to restore VCT level?
- 4. Stem Focus: Re-word the stem question as follows, to clarify attachment and streamline:
WOOTF is required in accordance with AOP-003, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control, Attachment 5, Manual Makeup in Modes 5 & 6?
7 1 M E 026 AA1.05, T1G1 [NRC 2012 EXAM, RO-5]
- 1. LOD=1: The question can be solely answered using GFES knowledge because the first sign of cavitation (at 12:18) is also the correct answer.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 8 x x x N E 29 EK1.01, T1G1: These comments only pertain to the Early Subpiittal Sample Question [5-21-1 31; see next line for repla\ementlrepair comments.
- 1. Job-i4nk: The FR-S.1 background document description for the Conditin II transient (Loss of Load and/or Turbine Trip) states on page 1 1\hat the analysis for this event assumes a loss of condenseN,acuum, which is different than the premise of the proposed qçstion. Consequently, there may be no correct answer to this,uestion. Need to verify on the simulator that the SG Safeties stift%Jift (following a 100% power A1WS turbine trip) when the steam mps and SG PORVs operate (condenser remains available).\rovide results to Chief Examiner.
- 2. Cred Dist: The 2 pa\of Choice B (PZR PORV5 & SG Safeties dont lift) is not plausible\(or two reasons:
- The PZR PORV5 areNçcluded in the fill-in-the-blank statement. Its not plauble that nothing lifts, especially given the i part of Choi B is reactor power rising. By eliminating the PZR PORVf(om the fill-in-the-blank statement, this Choice becothes plausible.
- The grammar (raise) in the 1strt of Choices NB doesnt flow with the wording of the fill-in-fIe-blank statement. This can be used (successfully) to eliminNe these two choices.
- 3. Stem Focus: The 3 bullet (The automatic4 manual reactor trip attempts have failed) should be replaced withthe control panel indications that the applicant would see if this vqre the case, instead of telling them.
- 4. Stem Focus: The word reactor power in the fill-in-e-blank statement should be specific as to what indication is bJng used, power range NI?
- 5. Stem Focus: The 2 bullet can be streamlined as A leak\n the DEH system caused a turbine trip.
- 6. Stem Focus: Add another bullet to the stem to indicate that th Steam Dumps are in the Tavg mode.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem ICues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia! #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focusj Dist. Link junits ward K/A Only 8 x x N E 029 EK1.01, T1G1: Second version received 7-1-13
- 1. Cred Dist: The plausibility of the l part of Choices A/B (reactor power will rise after a turbine trip & ATWS) is borderline because all reactors have a negative moderator temperature coefficient.
- 2. Stem Focus: The 3 bullet can be streamlined to only say A turbine trip occurs.
- 3. Stem Focus: Re-work the fill-in-the-blank statement (to eliminate the need for the sentence above it) as Before the actions of FR-S. I are completed, Power Range Channel indications will_______ and SG Safety valves will To address Comment #1, explore keeping the 2 part of the question and re-working the 1 st part to test the applicants knowledge of FR-S.1 requirements for (when) subcriticality has been achieved. That is, power range channels less than 5%
(versus another plausible distracter).
Need to verify the safety valve response on the simulator and provide results to chief examiner.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD I (F/H) (1-5) I Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIMIN UIEIS Explanation Focusj Dist. Link ward K/A Only 9 x x N U 4QAK3.O3, T1G1: Early Submittal Sample Question [5-21-13].
Thecomments only pertain to the Early Submittal Sample Questi[5-21-13]; see next line for replacement/repair comments.
- 1. Cred DIt, The first part of Choices C/D (non-return valves automatict1 open) is not plausible because non-return valves (check valvedo not automatically open. In other words, the wording of the fiilc.n-the-blank phrase non-return valves are expected to automcally to prevent.. does not lend itself to choosing open. Anaplicant can successfully eliminate Choices C/D solely based on thew,rding of the fill-in-the-blank phrase.
- 2. Job-Link: There are some*Vstinghouse designs that incorporate check valves downstream of tliMSIVs; these check valves limit the steam flow from intact steam tiqps (via the crossover piping) backwards thru a steam line with a Iik. (reason)
At Harris, the main steam lines do not iiude non-return valves; however, there are MSR non-return valves>,hich prevent energy in the turbine from back flowing into the MSRsusing a turbine overspeed condition (different reason)
The wording of the K/A seems to target the Westinghquse designs that incorporate check valves downstream of the MSl\1that is, the K/A seems to target main steamline non-return valves\which are NOT the same as MSR non-return valves.
Suggest replacing the K/A.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/MIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 9 x x x N E 040 AK3.02, Ti Cl: Second submittal with new K/A Cue: The stem has the capitalized words Steam Line Break occurs , and this is also the correct ESFAS signal that occurs.
(This flaw also makes the plausibility for the 1st part of Choices C/D very borderline- even with containment pressure rising.) If an applicant had no idea which ESFAS signal auto-initiated, he/she can (correctly) eliminate Choices C/D because the stem Steam Line Break.
- 2. Cred Dist: Choice A (MSL Isolation occurs to prevent uncontrolled SG level) is not plausible because the reason listed doesnt correlate with why a MSIV auto-closes.
Additionally, this reason is not grammatically correct, that is, the word level doesnt include something after it, like transient.
[Hint: In order to hit a reason K/A, an RO question can be written in such a way that the applicant has to identify the signal(s) that are causing the actuation to occur. In other words, the reason piece of the question doesnt necessarily have to be words; it also could be a set point/plant condition/etc. that is the reason for why the stem conditions exist.J
- /units: The 4 th
- 3. bullet (RCS temperature) is not clear with respect to whether this is the value of Tavg, including which control panel indication from where this value was obtained.
Suggest re-working the question to 1) eliminate the cue and 2) make the 1 5t part of the choices:
A. MSL Isolation ONLY B. MSL Isolation and MFW Isolation C. MSL Isolation ONLY D. MSL Isolation and MFW Isolation
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia j #1 Back- Q= SRO BIMIN UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link 1ut5 ward K/A Only 10 x x N E 054AA2.02,T1G1 1 Cred Dist: Choice B (both feed pumps keep running) is not plausible because an (inadvertent) SI signal will cause something to happen, that is, an inadvertent SI causes a MFIS signal, which trips MFW Pumps. Suggest modifying this choice to be:
No Main FWpump trip initially generated; Both MFW pumps will trip when Tavg lowers to < 564°F.
- 2. Stem Focus: Clarify in Choice D:
B Main FWpump will trip; A Main FWpump continues to run until Tavg lowers to < 564°F.
- 3. Stem Focus: Modify Choice A:
Both Main FWpumps immediately trip.
- 4. Stem Focus: Avoid the use of the words would or should in the stem question. Consider the following:
The unit is operating at 100% power.
An inadvertent Train B SI signal actuation occurs.
WOOTF predicts the Main FWPump response?
Another suggestion (if the changes above arent acceptable) is to re-work the question (to eliminate comment #1) by testing the applicants ability to predict whether both MFW pumps trip (or just B MFW Pump) and the required procedure actions during this abnormal/emergency topic.
11 x x N U 056AG2.4.45,T1G1
- 1. Cred Dist: Choices A, B, & C are not plausible because the stem tells the applicants that (the root cause of the plant problem is) a LOOP occurred. Choices A, B, & C can be eliminated solely based on the logic that these choices merely reflect symptoms of the loss of offsite AC power.
- 2. Cue: The stem tells the applicant that a LOOP occurred instead of providing the applicants with control room indications.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIM/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 11 1 Comments on revised question received from licensee on 8/5/13
- 1. LOD1: After the repairs to this question, it will provide no discriminatory value on the exam because the loss of the Startup Transformer and DG outweigh everything else.
Suggest keeping Choice B (AOP-12) and Choice D (AOP-025),
but adding a seal leak off value to the stem for plausibility.
- 2. After making the suggestion (see above), the 4 th, 5th and 8th bullets can be eliminated because they are expected conditions following a loss of both Startup Transformers.
12 5 x x M E 058AA2.O1,T1G1 LOD = 5 I Partial: The proposed questions tests the (RO) applicants ability to make an operability determination, which is typically an SRO responsibility. Even though TS 3.8.3.1 above-the-line info says:
118 volt AC Wtal Bus IDP-IA-Slll energized from its associated inverter connected to 125-volt D.C. Bus DP1BSA*,
Furthermore, this is a gray operability call, because the only thing wrong is the Channel Ill UPS Trouble annunciator (ALB 15-4-5) alarming, which indicates a problem with the DC source.
This does not necessarily mean that Vital Bus 1DP-1A isnt still connected to 125-volt D.C. Bus DP-1 B-SA. Therefore, an applicant could (successfully) argue that there is no correct answer.
- 2. Cred Dist: Choice C (inverter still operable even though AC and DC both lost) is not plausible because an inverter wont function when its AC and DC sources are lost.
Cue: The 4 th
- 3. bullet j/ the applicant the status of a (local?)
switch instead of requiring them to know the normal plan alignment for the switch.
- 4. Cue: The 1 5t fill-in-the-blank statement includes the phrase input has Iost_, instead of:
The 7.5 KVA Channel Ill Inverter
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LCD r
unitsjI ward (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link K/A Only 13 x B E 062AA2.01,T1G1 [2012 NRC Exam]
- 1. Cred Dist: Choices A/B can be (correctly) eliminated gii by choosing the header with the lowest pressure at 11:40.
14 x N E T1G1: Early Submittal Sample Question [5-21-13].
These comThsnt only pertain to the Early Submittal Sample Question [5-21-13]ee..xt line for replacement/repair comments.
- 1. Partial: Choice D (PZRThOR equipped with instrument air accumulators) is also correct beu.sthe pressurizer PORV accumulators (IA-SA, 1B-NNS, and 1CSB)re supplied with nitrogen instrument air for motive power to 1aQJators (see page 11 of Pzr Press Ctl Rev. 6 Student Text).
14 x N J 065 AK3.08, TIGI: Second submittal E 1. Cred Dist: Choices A/C (nitrogen gas as the primary pneumatic source) is not plausible because generally nitrogen is used as a backup pneumatic source because it costs money to replenish.
- 2. Ensure the question does not overlap with RO Q# 54, Choice D, loss of instrument air effects on PZR PORV5.
Explore the possibility of testing the reason for EOP actions involving a LOlA as follows (21 part may need work):
Given the following plant conditions:
- The crew is implementing E-3
- Train A, Phase A valves cannot be reset WOOTF completes both statements?
The required RCS depressurization will be accomplished with The E-3 RCS depressurization termination criteria, when PZR Normal Sprays are used, termination criteria listed for when PORV5 are used to depressurize the RCS.
A. Normal PZR sprays; is NOT the same B. Normal PZR sprays; is exactly the same C. PZR PORVs; is NOT the same D. PZR POR Vs; is exactly the same
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD r (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Ipartiai Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A 101y 14 S Comments on revised question received from licensee on 8/5/13
- 1. In the 2 nd fill-in-the-blank statement, consider using the word is (just before the blank) instead of are. Websters allows the singular form of the word criteria.
- 2. In the 2 nd fill-in-the-blank statement, insert commas before and after the phrase .when using the PZR Spray Valves.
15 x B U 077 AG2.4.4
- 1. Cred Dist: Choice A (reducing load will fix a low frequency condition) is not plausible because raising load raises frequency. This is GFES
- 2. Cred Dist: Choice B (raising excitation will fix a low frequency condition) is not plausible because raising excitation only raises VARS. This is GFES.
- 3. Cred Dist: Choice C (perform a slow controlled normal shutdown) is not plausible because keeping the generator tied to the system while lowering load will subject the plant safety busses to a low frequency condition.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIMIN UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 15 Comments on revised question received from licensee on 8/5/13 Partial: An applicant can successfully argue that Choice B (59 liz) and Choice C (58.5 hz) are correct because after 5 minutes the generator must be taken offline (immediately). Also, 59 hz is right on the line as far as the wording of Step 2 in AOP-028, which could be construed as minutia.
Suggest the following:
The plant is operating at 100% power.
WOOTF completes the following statements in accordance with AOP-028, Grid Instability?
One of the entty condition set points listed in the AOP is frequency less than The highest frequency at which an automatic reactor trip, as well as a trip of all RCPs, will occur is A. 6Ohz;58.4hz B. 6Ohz;57.5hz C. 59.5 hz; 57.5hz D. 59.5 hz; 58.4 hz Note to exam reviewers: If an under frequency condition (57.5 Hz) exists on two (2/3) Auxiliary Buses 1A, 1B, 1C, AND power is above P-7, a reactor trip will occur, as well as a trip of all RCPs.
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK L0D (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIM/N UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 16 x x N E WEO4 EK3.2, T1G1 nd 2
- 1. Stem Focus: Modify the bullet and the stem question as follows:
A LOCA has occurred in the RAB and the crew is implementing ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment, Step 6 Check Break Isolated.
WOOTF identifies a parameter trend, which is used to confirm that the break is isolated, including the reason for the trend?
- 2. Stem Focus: The second part of each choice can be streamlined as follows:
A. RCS Pressure rising; SI Flow is filling up RCS B. PZR Level rising; SI Flow is filling up RCS C. SI Flow lowering; break is isolated D. RAB Rad Levels lowering; break is isolated 17 x B U WEO5EK1.2,T1G1
- 1. Cred Dist: Choice D (50 kpph is AFWs capability) is not plausible because the stem (2 bullet) says that AFW feed capability has been restored.
- 2. Cred Dist: Choice C (50 kpph is to prevent pressure control problems) is not plausible because RCS pressure will RISE when feed water flow is severely restricted, which is a pressure control problem.
- 3. Cred Dist: Choice B (50 kpph is to minimize RPV stresses) is borderline not plausible because the extreme challenge (i.e.,
RED priority) of FR-H.1 means significant core uncovery and potential core damage will follow. Therefore, RPV stress concerns are not plausible at a time when bleed & feed is in progress.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK L0D (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 17 Comments on revised question received from licensee on 8/5/13 LOD=5: The proposed repair asks the RO applicants for the EOP basis, which is borderline SRO knowledge. There is a potential that an RO applicant can appeal the question based on LCD =5.
In order to hit the K/A (implication of the EOP procedure during Loss of Heat Sink) within the RO knowledge realm, suggest the following:
Given the following plant conditions:
- Bleed & Feed was in progress
- Main Feed water is now available
- No AFW pumps are available
- Core Exit Thermocouple temperatures are stable
- Ail SG wide range levels are 10%
WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with FRP H. 1, Attachment 1, Guidance on Restoration of Feed Flow?
Feed one intact SG at no more than Feed flow may be raised to maximum rate as soon as wide range level rises to greater than A. 50 kpph; 15%
B. 5okpph;25%
C. the lowest controllable rate; 15%
D. the lowest controllable rate; 25%
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK L0D (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 18 x x x N U WEll EA1.3,T1G1 Cred Dist: The 1st part of Choices C/D (CT pump was manually stopped to minimize the rise in containment sump level) is not plausible because the containment sump level will always rise (and continue to rise) during a LOCA and is not a concern.
[Note: The licensees question submittal explanation described that the plausibility of these two Choices was that stopping the CT pump somehow conserved the amount of NaOH available, which ensured that the correct amount of NaOH would eventually be injected to the containment sump by the single CT pump that remained in operation. This is not plausible because the amount of NaOH reserved for a LOCA is a fixed volume.]
- 2. Stem Focus: The 3 bullet says that CL Recirc was implemented (fully?); however, the 4 th and 5 th bullets provide conflicting information with respect to pumps running with suction aligned to RWST.
- 3. Partial: An applicant can (successfully) argue that there is no correct reason listed for why the CT pump was secured because if the applicant assumed that Cold Leg Recirc was previously in service per ES-i .3, Step 11, then CT pumps are already aligned to the sump. Since the stem is vague (see 3 bullet) as to what caused the loss of CL recirc, an applicant could (justifIably) assume that the CT pumps are already running aligned to the sump.
Comments on revised question received from licensee on 8/5/13 Cred Dist: Same issue. The 1 st part of Choices C/D (CT pump was manually stopped to minimize the rise in containment sump level) is not plausible because the containment sump level will always rise (and continue to rise) during a LOCA and is not a concern.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- I Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A jOnly 19 x x N U 001 AA2.01, T1G2
- 1. Cred Dist: The 1 st part of Choices A/B (reactor is tripped) is not plausible because the bullet in the stem says that CBD rods are continuing to withdraw. The reactor can never be tripped if rods are coming out.
- 2. Stem Focus: The grammar of the fill-in-the-blank statement
.. means a there is a possible.. is incorrect.
Suggest re-working to a two-part question that tests the applicants AOP-001 knowledge (of when a reactor trip is required) and their ability to interpret the before and after pictures of the reactor trip breakers.
19 S Comments on revised question received from licensee on 8/5/13
- 1. Stem Focus: Move the pictures to the stem before the WOOTF stem question.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK (F/H)
LOD (1-5) r B/M/N U/E/S Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q ISRO Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A j01y 20 x B U 036 AK2.01,T1G2 Cred Dist: Choice C (LOOP will affect SR & IR indications) is not plausible because the stem does not include any information related to the status of the 12OVAC Instrument busses/inverters and because the term reactivity condition is vague.
- 2. Cred Dist: Choice D (LOOP will affect the containment rad monitors) is not plausible because the stem does not include any information related to rad monitor status and/or its power supply status.
- 3. Cred Dist: Choice A (LOOP will affect the ability to add water to the cavity) is borderline plausible because (of DG5) the stem does not include any information related to makeup/DG equipment status.
The stem of the question (including the lead-in sentence right before the choices) points the applicant to the correct answer because the distracter plausibility suffers since the stem doesnt contain information which could potentially make the distracter plausible.
Suggest writing a question for a situation where, when moving a fuel assembly, the load cell fluctuated outside the 100 lb allowable tolerance band. Then test the applicants knowledge of one/all of the following Q learning objectives while the crew is performing the required action listed in FHP-020, Attachment 12- Movement of Binding Assemblies.
- 5. IDENTIFY issodated remote and local nstrumesitatson, indications, alarms, and controls for the FHS.
- 6. STATE the interlocks, permissive, and automatic control functions of the FHS, and the basis for each.
- 7. DESCRIBE how the Fuel Handling and Storage is used in the response to, and mitigation of events as described in the applicable AOPs and EOPs.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK L0D (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 20 Comments on revised question received from licensee on 8/5/13
- 1. Cue: The stem question specifically asks for the LOOP affect.
The repairs to the question (adding Instrument Busses and EDG) dont make the choices plausible.
- 2. Cred Dist: Choice C (monitor reactivity of the core) is vague; therefore, it is not plausible.
- 3. Cred Dist: Choice D (monitor rad levels inside cnmt) is vague; therefore, it is not plausible.
- 4. Cred Dist: Choice A (add makeup water to cavity) is not plausible because another DG is still available.
- 5. Stem Focus: There are two competing issues going on in the stem: 1) cavity level lowering and 2) LOOP, which is disjointed.
- 6. Q=KIA: The question should focus on one fuel handling incident and the AOP-13 and/or FHP-020 response to the incident. The question is only testing the applicants knowledge of the power supply to the manipulator.
Suggest writing a question for a situation where, when moving a fuel assembly, the load cell fluctuated outside the 100 lb allowable tolerance band. Then test the applicants knowledge of one/all of the following Q learning objectives while the crew is performing the required action listed in FHP-020, Attachment 12 Movement of Binding Assemblies.
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 21 x x B U 037G2.4.31,T1G2
- 1. Cred Dist: Choices NC are not plausible because (unlike Choices BID) they do not include an end-state benefit. For example, in Choice C (depressurize the ruptured SG below the unaffected SG pressures in order to???). Similarly, in Choice A (remove sensible heat from the ruptured SG in order to ??). By not including the end-state benefit, these choices can be eliminated solely based on psychometrics.
- 2. Partial: Choice A (the reason B SG HL temp is lowered is to remove heat) can be successfully argued as correct because:
- 1) the stem question doesnt include the qualifying phrase in accordance with the basis document forAOP-016 and 2) by removing heat from the SG HL, a release to the environment, in turn, is minimized since the SG PORV set point wont be reached.
- 3. Cred Dist: Choice D (minimize the likelihood of a later PTS event) is not plausible because: 1) PTS concerns are exacerbated by cooling down the RCS and 2) the use of the word later is a poor grammar choice, which detracts from credibility.
This K/A statement lends itself to several other possibilities for RO test items.
The proposed question (once repairs are made) could potentially be used as Q#23 (accidental liquid radwaste release).
22 x x N U 051 AA1.04, T1G2 Cred Dist: Choices A/B (generator output rises during a loss of condenser vacuum) is not plausible because: 1) MWe always goes down when vacuum goes away and 2) the stem does not include any information related to the generator controls (Imp-In or Imp-out status).
- 2. Minutia: How do the applicants know that Tavg doesnt rise by more than 1 .5F? Verify with Operations Management that this is not testing minutia.
Suggest re-working the question to test the applicants knowledge of the set point for BANK LOW INSERTION LIMIT (or BANK LOW-LOW INSERTION LIMIT using a reference) during a situation where rods are in auto and condenser vacuum is continuing to lower.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK L0D (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 23 x x N E AK3.O4, TIG2: Early Submittal Sample Question [5-21-13].
The comments only pertain to the Early Submittal Sample Questilsp [5-21-1 3]; see next line for replacement/repair comments.
- 1. Sterocus: The 2nd part of the stem question (whats the reasonr the evaluation required in the procedure) is vague; the word aluation is too vague. IF the word evaluation is replaced wftkreason for de-energizing RHR and Containment Spray Pumps kd isolating CSIPs from the RWST, then this makes the 2 pattf B/D not plausible.
- 2. Cue: The last portio\,of the 1 5t bullet (...and has just been shut down at the start of an bqtage..) is not necessary to elicit the correct response since th,O applicants should know that Mode 3 represents 35OFhich precludes shutdown cooling operation.
- 3. Stem Focus: The 1 st part of the siçi question uses the word should. This should be replaced wittirequired.
- 4. Stem Focus: The 3 bullet should incluvalues for actual and indicated levels.
Suggest re-working the 2 part of this questioçreason for an action in the AOP) because of comment #1 liste&bove.
IF there is not a good AOP question to test this KIA,çother possibility exists with respect to how the EOP directs th\crew to position the SG PORV controller on the ruptured SG andy.
This may be able to hit the k/A for reasons for action in EO related to accidental liquid release.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD r (F/H) (1-5) I Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 I Back- Q= SRO BIMIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link unitsj ward K/A Only 23 x x N U 059 AK3.04, T1G2: Second submittal Cred Dist: The 2 part of Choices B/D (the reason to de energize affected equipment is to prevent RHR pumps from getting air entrained) is not plausible because shutdown cooling suction is from the RCS (not the RWST).
- 2. Stem Focus: The 2 part of Choices B/D can be streamlined to before RWST level is low enough to cause air entrainment in the RHR pump suction.
- 3. Stem Focus: To raise the plausibility of the 15t part of Choices C/D (AOP-20 is required for falling RWST level), add pressurizer level on a lowering trend to the stem.
As previously suggested on 5-21-13 (see above), another possibility for this question is when the EOP directs the crew to position the SG PORV controller on a ruptured SG to prevent an accidental (liquid-steam) release. You may be able to use RO Q# 21 (once its repaired) to hit this K/A.
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q SRO B/M/N UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 24 x x N E 0 EA2.03, T1G2: Early Submittal Sample Question [5-21-1 31.
The comments only pertain to the Early Submittal Sample Quest [5-21-1 3]; see next line for replacement/repair comments.
- 1. Cue\The 2 part of Choices A/C (steam dumps to the 2iIL includes a phrase that is not needed to elicit the correct repnse.
- 2. Cue: lnstead\ftlljng the applicants that a loss of offsite power has occurred, piide information indicative of a loss of offsite power. For examp1e, an 86 Lockout occurs on both SUTs, followed by the curreN.plant conditions = LOOP. Alternatively, provide the status of BO bus (sses), which will required the applicant to deduce the aajability of the main condenser.
Stem Focus: The 1 st
- 3. fill-in-thlank statement is vague because of the phrase can be dcribed as.* Recommend rewording the 1st fill-in-the-blank sttement to test the applicants knowledge of which procedure is reqti,ed (FR-C.1 or FR-C.2).
Based on the SRO clarification guidancIocument, RO knowledge includes red/orange path critick.safety function status trees.
- 4. Stem Focus: In the 2 bullet, the phrase foiow1iia the Reactor trip and Safety Injection is not needed since the conditions provided already indicate this information.
- 5. Stem (one) Focus: The stem question asks for WOOTF comp sentence. Modify to say WOOTF completes both statements?
24 x x N E 074 EA2.03, Ti G2: Second submittal
- 1. Cue: The last phrase in the 1 5t bullet (when a LOCA occurred) is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
- 2. Stem Focus: Lower the containment pressure to 3.5 psig.
- 3. This question may overlap with RO Q#44 (039-MRSS, A2.01) because the same knowledge of how LOOP affects steam dump availability is being tested.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1 -5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q I SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. j Link units ward K/A 101y 25 x x B U WEO3 EK1.i, T1G2 It appears that the explanation provided with the proposed question (including the distracter analysis) is not associated with the CLA5.
Cred Dist: Choice B (RCS pressure cant be lowered to less than 300 psig if CLA5 arent isolated) is not plausible because the operator can always lower reactor pressure manually and the CL.As cant keep the RCS system pressure high forever with the RCS break in progress.
- 2. Cred Dist: Choice D (CLAs are isolated to save their inventory in case we need it later) is not plausible because the isolation valves are being closed, which could preclude getting the CLAs back again if a MOV failure occurred.
- 3. Partial: An applicant can (successfully) argue that Choice A is correct because the phrase in accordance with WOB ES-i .2, Background document.. is not included in the stem question.
Suggest the following:
A small break LOCA occurred.
The crew is performing ES-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown &
Depressurization and reaches the following step:
Check If SI Accumulators Should Be Isolated During RCS Depressurization:
WOOTF identifies 1) the parameter used to determine whether the CLA5 are required to be isolated, and 2) an operational implication if the crew falls to isolate the CLAs in accordance with the bases document for ES-1.2?
A. Reactor pressure < 1000 psig; exact verbatim reason from bases B. Reactor pressure < 1000 psig; another plausible reason C. RVLIS Upper Range > 94%; exact verbatim reason from bases D. RVLIS Upper Range > 94%; another plausible reason
Q#
1.
LOK 2.
LODr
[ 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
(F/H) I (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back-Focus Q= SRO B/M/N UIEIS Explanation Dist. Link junits ward K/A Only 26 x N U WE14EA1.1,T1G2
- 1. Q=K/A: Based on CSFSTs, a high containment pressure condition, i.e.,close to 10 psig, is not being tested; therefore, the K/A is not being met.
- 2. Q=K/A: The proposed question gjj tests Tier 2 (Plant Systems) aspects of a Phase A/B signal on the containment isolation system (See K/A Catalog excerpt below for 103 AA2.03,below) because it can be answered solely by knowing the containment pressure threshold for a Phase A/B signals and the valves required to auto-isolate for these signals.
Even though the 1 st and 3 bullets say that the crew is implementing, E-0 Attachment 3 during a small break LOCA, the question does not test the applicants ability to monitor/operate components during the implementation of the emergency/abnormal procedure associated with high containment pressure, such as AOP-23 (Loss of Containment Integrity) or EOP-FR.Z-1 (Response to High Containment Pressure), which is the required Tier 1 aspect.
.r (A CI3thJiIWIU sytei.i.
iAdb)be ix epztdkti., isepticeaEe N e.nxct,c.ifr,I. . ftaN d. c.x,qes if Umse
.alftins ,r enS.s fFR 41.5 /435 /45.3 (45.l AiM In1egratdlftk rtc list 2 W A292 Nice yp1satcondi1nsfocwonontthenL ..
A203 PhaseA4Ehston. .... -. -.
A204 Contimentevacustion(includng recognilionof 11cr eleenc) 3.5° 34° A2.O5 Emergency continmrnt noIsy 29 39
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 27 x x N E E15(CnmtFlooding)WE15,EK3.1,T1G2 Partial: of the choices can be (successfully) argued as correct (that is, question would be deleted during a post-exam appeal) because of the (loose) stem phrase sources of water that are evaluated for operational concern,... and the wording of FR-Z.2, Step 1:
- 1. Identify Unexpected Source Of Water To Sump:
- a. Check the folkwing parameters:
[]* ESW booster pump flows AND pressures NORMAL Li
- CCWsurgetanklevel-STABLE El
- RWSTIeveI-NORMAL DEPLETION U
- CST level NORMAL DEPLETION E]
- CNMTfancoolersflow NORMAL C]
- NSWdischarge pressure-NORMAL That is, CST, ESW, RCS, RWST are ALL evaluated for operational concern during FR-Z.2.
- 2. Stem Focus: The stem question should say in accordance with Westinghouse Owners Group çNOG) Background Document for FR-Z.2 instead of in accordance with FR-Z.2.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD r
(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. lPartiai Job- Minutia #1 I Back- Q= SRO BIMIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link unitsl ward K/A Only 28 x x x x N E 003 (RCP) A2.02, T2G1
- 1. Minutia: The 2 portion of the fill-in-the-blank statement (operator required to stop the RCP in accordance with )
seems to target the applicants knowledge of where the wording which says to stop the RCP, which may be minutia. GP 007, Section 4.22 (Precaution & Limitation), states:
When the #1 RCP Seal differential pressure is below 200 psid or when VCT pressure is below 15 psig, the RCP must not be operated.
- 2. Cue: The fill-in-the-blank statement tells the applicants that a limit has been exceeded.
- 3. Stem Focus: The 1 bullet is vague because it does not provide the plant status (why is the unit being shutdown, Tavg, RCS pressure) and procedure being implemented to accomplish the plant cool down.
- 4. Stem Focus: The stem does not indicate which thrust bearing (upper or lower?) temperatures are being trended.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD r r (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/MIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link! units ward K/A Only 29 x x x N E 004 (CVCS) A2.i3 Cue: 1 RH-i is a shutdown cooling suction valve from RCS Loop A. Because 1 RH-i (and its title) are included in the fill-in-the-blank statement, the answer to the i portion of the fill-in-the-blank statement can be deduced by knowing that shutdown cooling is not desired at this time, that is, the answer to the 1St part of fill-in-the-blank statement has to be CLOSED since 1 RH-1 is listed. In other words, the i part of Choices C/D (open the 1 RH-i) is not plausible because the stem says that a large break LOCA has occurred.
- 2. Cue: The wording of the stem questions phrase to establish the A CSIP suction source for.... is a cue that the answer to the 2 part of the fill-in-the-blank statement is 1 RH-25 SA, SUCTION from RHR Heat Exchanger A-SA. (1 Sl-340 is not a suction valve.)
- 3. QKJA: The applicants ability to implement the ES-i .3 valve alignment requirements and/or the 1RH-25 & 1CS-746 valve interlock logic feature is not being tested because of the cues provided in the stem. (See comment #s 1 & 2 above). ES-401 clarifies for A2 k/a statements that if the 15t part of the statement (ability to predict the impacts of low RWST level) cannot be tested without an extraordinary amount of effort, then the intent of the k/a statement can still be met if the 2r portion of the k/a statement (use procedures to correct, control, mitigate) is tested. However, in this case, the k/a statement is not being tested.
- 4. Cue: The 2 bullet is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
- 5. Stem Focus: None of the information before the stem question is required to answer the question.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIMIN UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 30 x x N E 004 (CVCS) K5.26, T2G1 Partial: An applicant can (successfully) argue that Choice D (CSIP gas binding can occur at 15% VCT level) because the only warning provided in ALB-007-4-3 or AOP-003 is the following statement:
Low VCT level is a precursor to gas binding the CSIP5.
- 2. Partial: An applicant can (successfully) argue that there is no correct answer because neither ALB-007-4-3 nor AOP-003 specify the exact level at which gas binding of the CSIP will occur.
- 3. Stem Focus: It is not clear that LT-1 15 has failed high.
[Note: The intent of the Chief Examiner comment provided to the licensee before the draft exam submittal was to keep the K/A (since the licensee had difficulty writing a question for VCT pressure effects on charging pump NPSH) and attempt to write a question related to VCT level because it also (indirectly) affects charging pump NPSH (suction pressure). For example, if the licensees procedures included specific VCT level values at which gas intrusion occurred.]
Suggest testing OP-107 precautions and limitations (P&L) associated with VCT pressure and/or level. For example, consider P&L 4.0. #51:
RCP Seal Return is normally aligned to the top of the VCTto reduce the potential for hydrogen gas returning to the CSIP suction. (Reference SOER 97-1 and 2.6.9) and/or P&L 4.0. #16:
VCT pressure is ilmited to between 20 and 30 psig for the automatic makeup mode of operation.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q SRO BIM/N UIE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 31 x N E 005 (RHR) Al .05, T2G1 Cred Dist: The 2 part of Choices BID (reason for level is to pH control) is borderline plausible because the stem asks for the minimum sump level to put cold leg recirc in service. Therefore, adequate level in the sump is always a common sense choice when compared to sump chemistry.
- 2. Cred Dist: The question analysis did not indicate why 137.5 inches is a plausible value. Discuss with the licensee.
Suggest incorporating a fill-in-the-blank as follows:
WOOTF completes the statement in accordance with ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, Attachment 1, Evaluation of Degraded Recirculation Sump Performance?
A minimum of 142 inches indicated on the ensures the recirc sump strainers are completely submerged.
A wide range containment sump level indication of______
correlates to the bottom of the recirc sump.
A. Containment Sump Wide Range Level Indicators; 0%
B. Containment Sump Wide Range Level Indicators; 54 inches C. Containment Recirc Sump Narrow Range Level Indicators; 0%
D. Containment Recirc Sump Narrow Range Level Indicators; 54 inches
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD r
(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q ISRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A jOnly 32 x x N E 006 (ECCS) G2.1.30, T2G1 st 1
Cue: The and 2 fill-in-the-blank statements include a description of the switch, that is, the fill-in-the-blank statements call it a manual transfer switch. Therefore, an applicant can eliminate Choices A/C solely because these choices provide a description of a different switch, that is, Choices A/C describe a control power knife switch.
- 2. Stem Focus: The stem question should refer to Attachment 5 of OP-i 07.
st 1
- 3. Stem Focus: The grammar of the fill-in-the-blank statement (in the RAB 236/286) can be improved as in the RAB on elevation 236/286.
Suggest the following:
WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with OP-107, CVCS, Attachment 5, Replacing B CSIP with C CSIP?
To align the C CSIP to lB-SB, a transfer switch located in the R.4B, on elevation , must be operated.
First, the B Train Kirk Key Lock Switch must be rotated, then must be closed.
A. 236 just south of the CSIP A room, the transfer switch, which is a knife switch, B. 236, just south of the CSIP A room, a handle must be placed into the handle casting and the transfer switch C. 286, in the switchgear room, the transfer switch, which is a knife switch, D. 286 in the switchgear room, a handle must be placed into the handle casting and the transfer switch
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 33 X N U 007 (PRT) G2.1.20
- 1. Cred Dist: Choice A (venting the PRT to remedy a high level condition) is not plausible because venting is performed at the top of a tank/reservoir whereas draining is always performed at the bottom of a tank/reservoir. Venting the PRT to lower level does not make sense, that is, physics are not correct.
- 2. Cred Dist: Choice D (draining the PRT to remedy a high pressure condition) is not plausible because draining will affect the PRT LEVEL, which, in turn, would/could cause the LEVEL band to be in an alarm condition.
34 1 B E 007 (PRT) K4.01 LOD = 1: Follow this (psychometric) logic:
Choices C/D are presenting the same strategy (drain & fill strategy); they cant be both be right, so these choices must be incorrect.
PRT is RCS (contaminated) water so Choice B (service water) cant be right because that goes back out to the environment.
Suggest the following:
WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with OP-100, RCS?
Per the OP-100 precautions and ilmitation, Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT) temperature should be maintained less than A rapid cool down of the PRT can be performed by draining the PRT and providing makeup water to the spray header from the A. 120F; Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT)
B. 120°F; Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank (RMWST)
C. 150°F;RCDT D. 150°F; RMWST
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 35 x B E 008 (CCWS) A3.08, T2G1
- 1. Partial: The word DIRECTLY is always subjective. Therefore, an applicant can (successfully) argue that Choices B/C/D are also correct since an SI signal triggers a Phase A, which causes 1CC-I 76 auto-closure.
Suggest re-working the question to test something similar to the following:
A reactor trip occurred and the following conditions currently exist:
. PZR level: 0%
. PZR press: 1800 psig
. SG levels: 50%
. Containment press: 2 psig WOOTF predicts the status of the CCW supply to the Letdown Heat Exchanger and the RCP5?
36 x x B E 0I0(PZRPCS)K6.02,T2GI Cred Dist: (Borderline) For Choices A/C, the word until in the fill-in-the-blank statement implies that the PORVs will close when a safety injection occurs, which makes Choices A/C not plausible.
- 2. Stem Focus: Add a 3R1 bullet that clarifies that the PORV handswitches are aligned as they are normally aligned with the unit at 100% power (All 3 PORVs in AUTO).
Suggest the following:
WOOTF completes both statements to predict the response of the PZR Pressure Control System with no operator action?
1 PZR PORV(s) will automatically OPEN.
A pressurizer low pressure safety injection system actuation (2) occur. (will/will not)
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q SRO BIMIN U/EIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 37 x x x B U 010 (PZR PCS) K6.03, T2G1 1 Q=K/A: The proposed question does not test the applicants knowledge of how a loss of sprays/heaters affects the pressure control system OR how a malfunction of sprays/heaters affects the pressure control system. The proposed question tests the applicants knowledge of how a set point adjustment affects the pressure control system.
- 2. Cred Dist: Choice D (PORV will cycle) is not plausible because the PORV 444B is designed to either be fully open or fully closed, that is, it will not maintain pressure.
- 3. Partial: An applicant could contend that the word slowly (in the 3 bullet) meant over a period of 4 days, which could yield no correct answer.
38 x x N E 012 (RPS) K4.02, T2G1
- 1. Partial: Choice A (high level trip prevents over-pressurizing RCS) can also be argued as correct because the level trip is a backup feature for the pressure trip.
- 2. Stem Focus: Ensure that there are two level channels indicating 92% (instead of just one).
- 3. Stem Focus: Ensure the stem question includes the phrase
.and the basis for the automatic trip in accordance with tech specs.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/EIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 39 x x B E 013(ESFAS)A4.O1,T2G1 Partial: Because the stem is not precisely worded for a specific point in time, an applicant can argue that sequencer program B
& C previously ran (during the LB LOCA) and that verification that the CSIPs & RHR Pump auto-started is still appropriated.
- 2. Stem Focus: For choices C/D, clarify the word start by changing to auto-start.
Suggest the following:
The crew was responding to a LOCA in accordance with E-1, Loss of Reactor Or Secondary Coolant and the following actions were taken:
- SI and Phase A have been reset
- Instrument Air & Nitrogen have been restored to containment
- RHR Pumps are running Subsequently, a loss of offsite power occurs.
WOOTF identifies the sequencer program that auto-initiated after the LOSP occurred whether the RHR pumps received an auto-start signal after the sequencer program was completed?
A. Program A; RHR Pumps will auto-start B. Program A; RHR Pumps must be manually started C. Program B; RHR Pumps will auto-start D. Program B; RHR Pumps must be manually started 40 x B E 013(ESFAS)K2.01,T2G1 Stem Focus: The wording of the fill-in-the-blank statement can be streamlined as follows:
Instrument Busses and_______ provide power to the ESFAS Slave Relays.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 41 x x M E 022 (CCS) A4.03, T2G1 [NRC 2012 Exam]
- 1. Q=K/A: Does the control room panel include position indication or control switches for the post-accident dampers? The K/A requires testing the applicants ability to operate and/or monitor dampers in the control room. Is there an annunciator for the post-accident dampers?
We may need to re-work the question to test the fan dampers (instead of the post-accident dampers), since the fan dampers DO have control panel indications.
- 2. Cue: The 2 and 3 bullets are not necessary to elicit the correct response.
42 x B E 026 (Cont Spray) A1.05, T2G1 Partial: To eliminate the possibility of a sub-set issue (Choice D also correct), suggest the following re-phrasing of the stem question:
WOOTF completes the statement?
Following a containment spray actuation signal, containment spray chemical addition valves ICT-1 I and ICT-12 will auto close when the containment spray additive tank level first lowers to
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD r (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F j Cred. Partial Job- j Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/MIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 43 x x N E 026 (Cont Spray) K3.02, T2G1 Stem Focus: Using the (1) and (2) numbers in parenthesis is very confusing, especially since the choices have valve numbers. For this question, consider not using the numbered values in parenthesis for the fill-in-the-blank statement.
- 2. Stem Focus: The CT pump A initial status (running & aligned to RWST) should be provided in the stem.
- 3. Partial: The choices where there is only one valve need to use the word ONLY to preclude sub-set issues.
Given the plant conditions
- The plant was operating at 100% power
- A LOCA occurred and the crew is implementing E-1, Loss of Reactor Or Secondary Coolant
- The CT Pump A tripped while aligned to the RWST WOOTF completes both statements if RWST Level subsequently lowers to the Low-Low set point?
When RWST level reaches the Lo-Lo level set point, recirc sump suction valve(s) will automatically open.
After the recirc suction valve(s) reach(es) the fuil-open position, RWST will automatically close.
[provide noun names]
A. ICT-102 ONLY; ICT-71 ONLY B. ICT-102 & ICT-105; ICT-71 ONLY C. 1-CT-102 ONLY; ICT-26 & ICT-71 D. ICT-102 & ICT-105; ICT-26 & ICT-71
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK L0D (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F J Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/EIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link j units ward K/A Only 44 B E 039(MRSS)A2.01,T2G1
- 1. This question overlaps with RO Q#24 (074-Inadeq CC- EA2.03) because the same knowledge of how LOOP affects steam dump availability is being tested. (double jeopardy)
The K/A should be changed. Contact Chief Examiner.
45 x B E 059 (MFW) K4.02, T2G1 [2012 NRC Exam]
Cred Dist: Choice B can be (correctly) eliminated solely based on psychometrics, that is, it doesnt make sense that a reactor trip is required if a runback is initiated because the purpose of the runback is to prevent a reactor trip; its the way the plant is designed. In order for a reactor trip to be plausible, the stem should contain another piece of information that could potentially be misconstrued as the need for a reactor trip.
- 2. Ensure SRO Q#79 stem conditions do not provide a cue to this question.
Suggest the following:
WOOTF completes both statements?
An automatic turbine runback will occur if__________
During the turbine runback, the turbine will close.
A. the Tavg-Tref mismatch is 16°F; governor valves only B. the Tavg-Tref mismatch is 16°F; governor & intercept valves C. one steam generator feed pump trips when generator load is above 60%; governor valves only D. one steam generator feed pump trips when generator load is above 60%; governor and intercept valves
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/EIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 46 x x N U 061 (AFW)A1.01,T2G1 Cred Dist: Choice B (open SG PORV5 to) is not plausible because the EOPs never direct this action to raise SG inventory.
- 2. Cred Dist: Choice D (do nothing but monitor) is not plausible because SG levels are dropping; therefore, something must be required.
- 3. Partial: Based QLJy on the information in the stem, can an applicant correctly assume that AFW flow cannot be raised>
160 kpph? If so, then Choice A is also correct. The answer choices should not be used to clarify the stem conditions.
For example, is there a correct answer to the following revised question pertaining to FR-H.1 entry?
Given the following plant conditions:
- The crew has been implementing ECA-0.0, Loss of AIIAC Power, for several minutes
- The TDAFW Pump is running in automatic and AFW flow is currently 160 kpph
- All SG NR levels are 9% and lowering WOOTF identifies the required action in accordance with the EOPs?
A. FR-H. 1 is required; [some other item]
B. FR-H. I is NOT required; [some other item]
C. FR-H. I is required; [some other item]
D. FR-H. I is NOT required; [some other item]
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIMIN UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 47 x x B U 061 (AFW) K5.05, T2G1 [2012 NRC Exam]
Note: One operational implication of receiving the SG A, B, C Back leakage High Temp alarm (aka feed line voiding & water hammer) is that the implementation of AOP-10, Section 3.3 (SG Back leakage) and Attachment 9, Cooling AFW Pumps & Piping may be required.
Cred Dist: Choice C (Initiation of AFW flow while back leakage annunciator alarm ing can cause corrosion) is not plausible because corrosion takes place over a long period of time.
- 2. Cred Dist: Choice B (Initiation of AFW flow while back leakage annunciator alarming can cause thermal binding) is not plausible because fluid flow doesnt cause thermal binding, and the stem question deals with flow (not cool down).
- 3. Cue: The word rapid is not needed to elicit the correct response.
Suggest the following replacement question:
The plant is operating at 100% power and the following alarm is received:
- SG A, B, C BACKLEAKAGE HIGH TEMP (ALB-014, 7-4)
Because of elevated TDAFW pump piping temperatures, the crew is implementing AOP-10, Feed water Malfunctions, Attachment 9, Cooling AFW Pumps & Piping.
The reason this condition occurred is because a SG During the implementation of Attachment 9, the TDAFW Pump will A. steam supply piping check valve is leaking; be inoperable due to the required valve alignment B. steam supply piping check valve is leaking; remain operable C. feed water piping check valve is leaking; be inoperable due to the required valve alignment D. feed water piping check valve is leaking; remain operable
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIM/N U/EIS Explanation
. Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 48 B S 062 (AC Distribution) K2.01, T2G1 49 x x x B E 063 (DC Distribution) A3.01, T2G1 Partial: There may be no correct answer because the OP 156.01 caution deals with a steadily decreasing charger output voltage (indicative of an internal charger fault) whereas the stem indicates that voltage has stabilized.
- 2. Cred Dist: Choice D (take out the A charger to remedy low voltage) is not plausible because the stem already says that the A charger is being removed from service; therefore, this choice cannot be an additional required action.
- 3. Stem Focus: The wording of the 2 bullet is not clear, that is, swapped to 1 B-SA in service.. is confusing. Add the section/title of OP-i 56.01 to this bullet.
WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with OP 156.01, Section 8.2. Rotation of 125 VDC NNS Batte,y Chargers?
When placing the 125 VDC batter, charger in seivice, its breaker is closed first.
A low DC Volt alarm expected after this first breaker is closed.
A. DC output; is NOT B. DC output; is C. ACinput;isNOT D. AC input; is
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q SRO B/M/N U/EIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 50 1 x B U 063 (DC Distribution) K3.02, T2G1
- 1. LOD1: The proposed question can be answered solely using GFES knowledge [See PWR Catalog Section 191008:
Breakers, Relays, & Disconnects, Ki .03, Loss of power supply circuit breaker indicator lights and capability in remotely open and close.]
This is the plant specific portion of the written exam; therefore, the k/a requires testing the applicants knowledge of how a loss of the DC system will affect a component that uses DC power at Harris.
- 2. Cred Dist: The 1 part of Choices A/C (the MDAFW pump breaker can still be operated with DC control power lost) is not plausible because DC control power is required to operate all AC breakers.
51 x x B E 064 (EDG) K6.08, T2G1 5t 1
Stem Focus: In the bullet, add a zero before .835.
- 2. #/units: IF the storage tank level indication system provides gallons then, the proposed question is acceptable; however, if the storage tank level reads out in percent, then the applicants should also be provided another curve. Discuss with the licensee.
- 3. Stem Focus: The stem can be streamlined (less reading burden) as follows:
Given the following EDG Fuel Oil data:
- Both Day Tanks specific gravity: 0.835
-Day TankA: 47%
- Storage Tank A: 90,000 gallons
- Day Tank B: 42%
- Storage Tank B: 110,000 gallons WOOTF identifies the status of the EDGs in accordance withTech Spec 3.8.1.1, Electrical Power Systems AC Sources?
[Reference Provided]
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Focus I
Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back-Dist.
Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Link unitsj ward K/A Only 52 x x B U 073 (PRM) A4.02, T2G1 1 Cred Dist: Choices C/D (vent rad monitors) can be (correctly) eliminated based on the title of AOP-20, that is, Reactor Coolant System activity. Since Choices C/D are not associated with reactor coolant, they can be eliminated.
- 2. Q=K/A: The k/a requires testing the applicants ability to operate the rad monitor controls OR test their ability to monitor the rad monitor controls. Since the stem the applicants that a high alarm exists (versus requiring them to analyze indications, values, etc.), the proposed question is borderline for hitting the k/A.
Suggest re-working the question to test the applicants ability to operate one of the rad monitors in accordance with OP-il 8.
Alternatively, a question can be written to test the applicants ability to operate/monitor any of the rad monitors in the student text.
53 x B E 076 (SWS) Ki .01, T2G1
- 1. Stem Focus: Enhance the 1 St bullet by describing what power lines, transformers, or busses were lost instead of telling the applicants that a LOOP occurred.
54 x x x x N E 078 (lAS) K3.01, T2G1
- 1. Cred Dist: Choice C (all pneumatically operated valves at Harris are unreliable when AS pressure is 85 psig) is not plausible because many valves have backup nitrogen supplies, etc.
- 2. Partial: Choice A (AN flow control valves will be closing) can (successfully) be argued as correct because the stem says that IA pressure is slowly lowering and Choice A is a future prediction because of the words will be.
- 3. Ensure this question (specifically, Choice D) does not overlap with RO Q# 14 (effects of LOlA on PORVs)
- 4. Stem Focus: The 2 bullet is not necessary.
- 5. Stem Focus: The 1 part of Choice B (Containment instrument air system pressure will cause ) is not necessary.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LCD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 55 x B U 103 (Cont Sys) K1.03, T2G1
- 1. Cred Dist: Choice B (cooling required for RCPs when no RCPs are in service) is not plausible because the stem states that no RCPs are running; therefore, the reason is not plausible.
- 2. Cred Dist: Choice A (rx support fans purpose is to cool Nis) is not plausible because the name of the fan (that is, reactor support cooling fan) provides its intended purpose; therefore, the reason is not plausible.
Suggest the following:
WOOTF completes both statements?
The Primaiy Shield Cooling sub-system consists of______
fans.
These fans are located in the Containment Building at elevation A. Two;221 B. Two; 236 C. Four;221 D. Four; 236 56 B S 011 (PZR LCS) K2.02, T2G2
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/E Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/MIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 57 x B E 015(NIS)K3.O1,T2G2 Stem Focus: The 4 bullet is not necessary.
- 2. Stem Focus: Incorporate time line to clarify the when in Choices A/B.
- 3. Stem Focus: To ensure Choice C remains plausible and add discriminatory value, provide status of P-b permissive light (instead of providing reactor power at 8%) which is indicative of reactor power, but tests the applicants knowledge of when the light is supposed to be on/off.
Suggest the following:
Given the following plant conditions:
- Startup is in progress
- The power range > 10% (P40) block permissive light is EXTINGUISHED
- IR N35 is inoperable and its Level Trip Switch is in the BYPASS position per OWP-RP-21, Reactor Protection
- The following events obcur:
@ 12:00: N35 instrument fuses blow 12:15: N35 control power fuses blow WOOTF identifies the status of the Reactor Trip Breakers, including the reason?
A. OPENED at 12:00, instrument fuses blew B. OPENED at 12:15, control power fuses blew C. CLOSED at 12:15 because the IR channels are BLOCKED at this time in accordance with the Startup procedure D. CLOSED at 12:15 because N35 Level Trip Switch is in BYPASS 58 N 5 016 (NNIS) A2.02, T2G2
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIMIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KJA Only 59 5 x x N E 028 (HRPS) K6.01, T2G2 LOD = 5: The proposed question tests the CR0) applicants knowledge of the FSAR design bases Section 6.2.5, which is beyond the scope of RO knowledge. This question is vulnerable to being deleted during a post-exam appeal.
- 2. Cred Dist: Choice D (high moisture content in the air) is not plausible because the stem does not include any humidity values.
- 3. Partial: Choice B should include the word only, that is, be maintained <4% only with purge inservice.
- 4. Ensure no overlap with SRO Q#92.
Consider the following suggestion; the loss or malfunction being tested is that recombiner operation beyond 4% [H2]
exceeds the capability of the recombiner.
WOOTF completes the following statement in accordance with OP-125, Post Accident Hydrogen System?
Containment H2 Recombiners should NOT be operated when containment________ because A. purge is placed in seivice; the purge filter train flow will exceed recombiner capabillty B. purge is placed in seivice; the purge system vents 100 cfm of the containment atmosphere to the plant vent stack.
C. H2 concentration is 4%; excessive heat will be generated in the recombiner D. H2 concentration is 4%; the 480 V MCC supply breaker to the recombiner will trip Alternatively, consider using SRO Q#92 to repair this question.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LCD r (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F j Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 60 x x B E 034 (FHES) G2.4.31 Partial: The term primary means of returning., cart is undefined; therefore, it is subjective.
- 2. Cred Dist: Choice D (redundant roller chain) is not plausible because the stem uses the phrase primary means and then also indicates that the roller chain has broken. In other words, the primary means of moving the cart IS the roller chain, and it is now broken, which means that a redundant roller chain cant be the orima,v means of returning the cart.
- 3. Cred Dist: Choice A (using divers) is borderline plausible because a fuel bundle is loaded on the cart and divers are only used as a last resort. The stem question uses the term primaiv means of returning the cart.., which makes Choice A (divers) not plausible.
Suggest the following:
A traverse drive system (roller chain) failure has occurred on the fuel transfer system conveyor while the cart was in the horizontal position and loaded with a fuel bundle.
WCOTF identifies how the conveyor car must be returned to the desired position in accordance with FHP-020, Refueling Operations [and some other piece of knowledge!?
A. A cable is connected to the fuel assembly handle; (some other knowledge]
B. A cable is connected to the pusher arm; [some other knowledge]
C. Etc.
- 0. Etc.
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. IPartiai Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q SRO B/M/N UIE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 61 1 x x N E 071 ONGDS) K5.04, T2G2
- 1. Partial: An applicant can (successfully) argue that there is no correct answer because OP-I 20.07 P&L #3 identifies an OXYGEN limit downstream of the recombiners (2%). P&L #17 (provided in the explanation with the proposed question) only discusses the lower flammability limit of hydrogen. Therefore, an applicant can argue that OP-i 20.07 does not provide guidance on the allowable hydrogen concentration downstream of the recombiners.
- 2. LOD=1: This question will not provide any discriminatory value because 4% is the universal flammability limit of hydrogen in air.
- 3. Stem Focus: The stem is missing the phrase in accordance with 62 x B E 072 (ARM) A3.01, T2G2 I. Partial: The phrase directly caused, in the stem question, is subjective. Therefore, Choice D (CPPMU Fans AH-8iA/B trip) can successfully be argued as correct because these fans receive a trip signal when the CPPE Fans 1 Di E-5 trip.
- 2. Please provide Chief Examiner with set point for 356iA thru D, and the associated annunciator that will alarm when this set point is exceeded.
- 3. This question provides a cue to SRO Q#84.
63 x x N U 075 (Circ Wtr) Ki .01, T2G2
- 1. Cred Dist: Choices B/C are not plausible because the combinations presented for backpressure/flow defy the physics of fluid flow.
- 2. Cue: The phrase .caused by the Cooling Tower risers.. (in the fill-in-the-blank statement) is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD r
(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 I Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. j Link unitsj ward K/A Only 64 x x x x x B E 079 (SAS) A4.01, T2G2
- 1. Partial: Depending on the location of the leak, an applicant could potentially argue no correct answer exists or potentially argue another correct answer exists because the stem doesnt specify where the IA pressure value was obtained. Modify the stem to include the MCB pressure instrument #/unid where the IA header pressure is being observed or the annunciators in alarm at this time rd 3
- 2. Cue: The trend on the bullet is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
- 3. Cred Dist: Choice A (SA isolation valve is OPEN even though low IA pressure alarm exists) is not plausible because the SA isolation valve should always be closed when a low IA pressure condition exists.
- 4. Stem Focus: The 2 bullet is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
- 5. #/units: The noun name of 1SA-506 appears to be SA Header Isol. Valve, not Instrument Air from Service Air Isolation Valve.
65 x x B E 086 (FP) K4.02, T2G2
- 1. Cred Dist: Choice C (motor pump OFF; diesel pump ON) is not plausible because the stem did not provide any information which potentially be misconstrued to mean that the motor pump was unavailable, etc. Most all plants are designed such that the motor pump auto-starts before the diesel pump; therefore, Choice C is not plausible.
5t 1
- 2. Stem Focus: Discuss whether the bullet is necessary.
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD[
(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Linkj units ward K/A Only 66 x x B U G2.1.13,T3
- 1. Cred Dist: An applicant can correctly eliminate Choices NB solely because the 1 st part of these choices is grammatically incorrect with the fill-in-the-blank statement. The Security Master Key is located in a locked box in SM desk.
- 2. Cred Dist: An applicant can correctly eliminate Choice B (the box in the SM desk is controlled by security) solely because the box is in the SMs desk, and .jLs are typically controlled by the owner of the desk.
- 3. Partial: The fill-in-the-blank statement does not mirror the statement in OMM-QOl, Section 5.1.7.6. Therefore, an applicant can successfully argue that Choice C is also correct because the word controlled (in the fill-in-the-blank statement) is subjective. For example, the key is located in the Main Control Room for use by operations personnel in an emergency to afford access to plant vital areas. This, in effect, is controlled by the Shift Manager, which makes Choice C correct.
67 1 x x B E G2.1.15,T3
- 1. Cred Dist: Choices C (SIs can be used in place of procedures) is not plausible because procedures are required for plant operation in accordance with the operating license.
- 2. Partial: Choice A (SIs are instructions or information of long-term significance) is also correct because instructions or information of long-term significance is equivalent to guidance in deallng with various types of plant problems to assure consistency between shifts.
- 3. Partial: Choice B (SIs are instructions to allow departure/deviation from a procedure) can potentially be correct because of a situation where an SI was used to communicate a significant plant problem or event which involved departure/deviation from a procedure.
- 4. LOD=1: This question will provide no discriminatory value.
Suggest writing a question to test an actual Standing Instruction that exists in the plant. Please provide Harris Standing Instructions.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LCD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/EIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 68 x B E G2.1.19,T3
- 1. Scenario 1 Event 3 overlaps with this question because it also is LT-112 failing high. The applicants will already be tested on their ability to use the computer to identify this failure.
- 2. Q=K/A: In order to test the K/A (Ability to use plant computer),
the stem should include a picture of a computer display, etc.,
that the applicants would have to navigate/use. Instead, the proposed question provides the information (ERFIS ID point values), which is not testing the K/A.
69 5 x x B E G2.2.20, T3 LOD=5: For the RO applicant, the proposed question may be too difficult. We may need to select another K/A if a discriminating question at the RO level cannot be written.
- 2. Stem Focus/Partial: P&L # 7 states:
Troubleshooting activities are preferably performed on equipment removed from service or tagged out so the troubleshooting activity does not adversely affect plant operation or safety (i.e., no risk). There are circumstances that require troubleshooting on equipment that is in service, thereby presenting a degree of risk. This procedure should be utilized in both circumstances.
An applicant could potentially argue that there are multiple correct answers in a situation where a clearance is used.
Suggest the following:
WOOTF identifies an example of a troubleshooting activity in accordance with AP-929, Troubleshooting Guide?
A. Pulling an annunciator card B. Replacing failed components on circuit boards C. Temporary M&TE Test point/jack connections D. Installing gags on valves
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIM/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 70 5 x N E G2.2.39, T3 LOD5: The 2 part of the question is beyond the scope of RO knowledge because it tests tech spec (This question can be (justifiably) deleted from the exam during the post-exam appeal process. ROs are responsible for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> action statements; however, the bases of the tech spec action statement is beyond the scope of RO knowledge. [See SRO clarification guidance document]
- 2. Stem Focus: The stem question does not include the phrase in accordance with the bases for Tech Spec 3.5.1.
The SIS lesson plan, Objective #10 does not support testing the RO applicants knowledge of Tech Spec bases.
Suggest re-working the question to test the RO applicants knowledge of the allowable range for which parameter, if outside the allowable range, requires an action statement of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />
[choose between pressure (correct) or boron concentration (incorrect) AND whether the accumulators are / are not required to be operable in Mode 3.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD r
(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= ISRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A 10h1y 71 x x x B U G2.3.11,T3 Q=KIA: The proposed question does not test the applicants ability to control a release. [The proposed question the applicants the AOP-5 required action and then tests the applicants knowledge of how the Fuel Handling Ventilation System will automatically align following a high radiation auto-initiation signal.] Instead, the proposed question (inappropriately) targets the APE 036 Fuel Handling Incidents topic (see klas below), whereas the intent of this Tier 3 K/A is to test the applicants ability to control releases.
AK2.02: Knowledge of the interrelations between the Fuel Handling Incidents and Radiation monitoring equipment (portable and installed)
AA1 .02: Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Fuel Handling Incidents: ARM system.
- 2. Cred Dist: The 2 nd part of Choices A/B (NORMAL dampers are OPEN) is not plausible because the 2 d bullet tells the applicants that AOP-5 requires the emergency lineup. Normal dampers are never OPEN in an emergency lineup.
d 2
- 3. Cue: The bullet is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
Suggest testing the applicants ability to perform an evolution in OP-i 20.07 or knowledge of a P&L in this procedure that pertains to controlling releases. For example, any of the following items may be applicable to this K/A:
The contents of two WGDTs crosstied during a release as long as the combined content of the tanks is less than curies.
Normally, no waste gas decay tanks are released until the contents are held up for a minimum of days.
The amount of radioactivity contained in each Gas Decay Tank shail be limited to less than or equal to equivalent______
curies.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LODr (F/H) I (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Linkj units ward K/A Only 72 1 M E G2.3.12, T3 [2012 NRC Exam, Q#70]
- 1. LOD=1: The proposed question tests General Employee Training (GET) knowledge associated with the definition of a locked high rad area (LHRA) and the required postings for a LHRA. The K/A requires testing radiological safety principle pertaining to licensed operator duties. The proposed question solely tests GET knowledge required for all plant personnel.
Suggest writing a question to test AP-545, Containment Entries, requirements.
73 x B E G2.4.22, T3
- 1. Cred Dist: Choice A (go to core cooling C.2) is not plausible because the stem doesnt list the status of the core cooling CSFST. Replace Choice A with FR-P.1 since this item is already listed in the stem.
74 x B E G2.4.27, T3 Job-Link: For the RO applicant, the proposed question should be written to test the AOP-36 procedure instead of testing the bases document. Suggest the following:
Given the following plant conditions:
- AOP-036, Safe Shutdown Following a Fire, is being implemented.
- Main Control Board CST Level indicators Ll-9010A 1-SA and Ll-9010B 1-SB are not available.
WOOTF completes the following statement?
In accordance with AOP-36.02, Fire Area 1-A-BAL-A, 1-A-BAL-G, 1-A-BAL-H, the alternate method of checking CST level greater than 10% is to use A. the local CST level indicator B. a graph of AFW Pump Suction pressure vs. CST level C. a graph of Condensate Transfer Suction pressure vs. CST level.
D. the CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK LOW MINIMUM LEVEL annunciator (ALB-017, 5-5)
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIM/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 75 5 x x B E G2.4.29, T3 LOD = 5: The proposed (RO) question tests the applicants knowledge of the North Carolina and NRC notification time requirements during an emergency declaration.
- 2. Cred Dist: Choice C is not plausible because a UE and ALERT always both require state and NRC notification.
r 3 th 6
- 3. Stem Focus: Only the and bullets are necessary in the stem.
- 4. Stem Focus: In the 3 1d and 6th bullets, the phrase . . .by the SEC is not required to elicit the correct response.
- 5. Clarify whether this question is significantly modified or bank question; exam submittal explanation explained that the times were changed.
Suggest testing the RO applicants knowledge of PEP5 as follows:
WOOTF completes both statements In accordance with PEP-230, Control Room Operations?
During an event including an Alert or higher all NLO watch stations should report to the promptly after putting work in a safe condition.
The must be informed when assigning additional duties to people who were already dispatched to perform another duty and have not yet returned from the first duty assignment A. Operations Support Center; Plant Operations Director B. Operations Support Center; Site Emergency Coordinator C. Control Room; Emergency Communicator D. Control Room; Plant Operations Director
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LCD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F I Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIM/N UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 76 x x x N E 025 (Loss RHR)AA2.05, T1G1 Cred Dist: (This is a typographical error; thus the question graded as enhancement.) The 2 part of Choices B/D can be eliminated solely based on the grammar, that is, the word pumps (instead of singular pump) because the stem says only one pump is running.
- 2. Stem Focus: The 2 bullet is not necessary.
- 3. Job-Link: Verify that two train RHR in operation does not conflict with normal operations when the cavity is flooded because, normally, when the refueling cavity is flooded, one train of RHR may be removed from service. Verify with GP and OP.
- 4. Stem Focus: The and 5 th bullets can be clarified with respect to past and present tense as follows:
Both RHR Pumps were operating in the Shutdown Cooling mode when the B RHR Pump tripped.
- 5. Stem Focus: The 2 part of Choices BID should be streamlined to eliminate wordiness and be proportionately the same length as Choices A/C.
- 6. Stem Focus: Suggest re-wording the stem question to ensure no partially correct answers as follows:
Given the following plant conditions:
- The plant is in Mode 6
- Refueling Cavity Level is 236
- Both RHR Pumps were operating in the Shutdown Cooling mode when the B RHR Pump tripped.
WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with Tech Spec 3.4.9.8, Refueling Operations RHR and Coolant Circulation?
The su,veillance requirement for Tech Spec 3.4.9.8 requires the RHR flow rate for this condition to be at least_______
The basis for this flow rate, in accordance with Tech Specs, is to A. 900 gpm; reduce the possibility of cavitation B. 900 gpm; minimize the effect of a boron dilution incident C. 2500 gpm; reduce the possiblilty of cavitation D. 2500 gpm; minimize the effect of a boron dilution incident
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F I Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back-units ward Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S K/A Only Explanation Focus Dist. Link 77 x x B E 029 (A1WS) EA2.09, T1G1 Cred Dist: The 2 part of Choice A (return to E-0 when an ATWS exists) is not plausible because nothing is ever more important than subcriticality.
- 2. Partial: Choice D (TDAFW Pump has tripped; continue in Si) could potentially be correct if the stem conditions dont specifically preclude a loss of FW ATWS scenario. Nothing in the stem indicates that the MDAFW Pumps are running, nor does the stem preclude the applicant from assuming the worst case analyzed transient of loss of FW ATWS. [Loss of FW ATWS scenario is worst case analyzed transient where the turbine is already tripped and the only thing feeding the SG is the TDAFW Pump].
- 3. Hint: Its not necessary to write a question to hit the main turbine trip portion of the K/A; the reactor trip portion is good enough.
Suggest writing the question to hit the reactor trip portion of the K/A in the following fashion.
- For the 15t part of the question, test the applicants ability to identify the occurrence of a reactor trip the local actions in FR-S.1 (Step 9 RNO) have been performed. In other words, what are ways that the crew in the control room may first identify that a reactor trip has finally occurred during an ATWS? [RO knowledge]
- For the 2 part of the question, test the SRO applicants ability to determine whether to immediately exit FR-S.i OR to stay in FR-S.i until a certain step/evolution is completed, despite the fact that the reactor trip finally occurred. (procedure selection) (Make the correct answer to be a point in FR-S.1 that requires staying in FR-S.i even though the reactor trip finally occurred.)
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/MIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 78 x x x N E 038 (SGTR) EG2.4.30, T1G1 [EALClassification]
The explanation summary provided with the proposed question indicated no reference provided to the applicants; however, the actual proposed question indicates a reference is provided to the applicant.
- 1. Cue: The last phrase in the stem question ( of an emergency release in progress.) is not necessary to elicit the correct response. To allow deleting this phrase, change the part of Choice B to 7:10.
- 2. Cred Dist: Choice C (6:00 classification w/ 6:35 notification time requirement) is not plausible because North Carolina always must be notified within 15 minutes for emergency classifications. Change the 2 part of Choice C to 6:15. This will test the applicants knowledge of identified vs unidentified leakage.
- 3. Stem Focus: For the 2 part of the stem question, add the words earliest required before the word time.
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
LOK LCD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 79 x x N U &4 AG2.4.47, T1G1: Early Submittal Sample Question [5-21-13].
Th comments only pertain to the Early Submittal Sample Questtqn [5-21-1 3]; see next line for replacement/repair comments.
- 1. SRnly: Both parts of the question can be answered with RO knowlee. The 1 st part of the question (AOP 10 vsAOP 15) can be d4uced using RO knowledge that the root cause of the transient isJ,ss of feed water.
The 2 part ofe question (Rapid down power vs Normal plant shutdown) can be4educed based on RO knowledge of the urgency of SG levelropping (not enough time to do a normal plant shutdown). \\
- 2. Cue/Partial: The 2 part kChoices A/B (Refer to..) cues the applicant that these choices çe incorrect because the stem question asks for a requiremen On the other hand, it is never incot to refer to any procedure (even if its the wrong procedure); theTheore, an applicant can successfully argue that Choice A is also\orrect.
- 3. Stem Focus: The last part of the stem quetin (the reason why..) is not required to meet the K/A; each oNhe four choices contains 3 parts (unnecessary). The reason ist required to elicit the correct response since the first two parts the question are all thats required. \\
Suggest writing a question to test the SRO applicants aU4y to analyze a trend associated with FW (heat sink) to make an emergency classification (provided the EALs).
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= ISRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A j01y 79 x x N U 054 (MFW) AG2.4.47, T1G1 [EAL Classification]
The stem condition (turbine runback) in this question provides a cue to RO#45.
The proposed question does not test the applicants ability to diagnose or trend the loss of AN at the SRO level. The SRO piece of the question (EAL classification for loss of annunciators) doesnt test the loss of AN KA at the SRO level.
The proposed question tests the applicants knowledge that a turbine runback is a transient, which is RO knowledge.
- 3. Cred Dist: Choices A/B (evacuate the site when a loss of annunciators occurs and a transient is in progress) are not plausible because the core is not being jeopardized; therefore, a site evacuation is not realistic.
- 4. Cred Dist: Choice D (UE based on losing annunciators for 15 minutes) is not plausible because the stem does not include how long the annunciators were lost.
Suggest writing a question to test the SRO applicants ability to analyze a FW trend (loss of heat sink CSFST AN parameters is one example) to make a procedure selection (be careful, Red/Orange paths are RO knowledge items) Q to make an emergency classification associated with loss of heat sink.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 80 x x B E 055 (SBO) EA2.04, T1G1 The K/A is very difficult to hit at the SRO level; this question is graded as an enhancement.
QK/A: The K/A is not being tested because the ability to determine WHICH instruments or controls remain available during a SBO is not being tested. IMS-70 a control; however, the choices dont test the applicants knowledge of whether this valve has power.
- 2. Partial: Choice D is also correct.
Suggest the following:
The unit was operating at 100% power when a SBO occurred.
The ASI system is supplying RCP seal injection.
The crew has progressed to ECA-0. 0, Step 29, to initiate a cool down to control pressurizer level using the SG PORVs.
WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with ECA 0.0?
SG PORVs can be operated from the control room.
The cool down is required to be stopped when A. All three; all cold leg temperatures reach 400°F B. ONLY the C; all cold leg temperatures reach 400°F C. All three; the CLAs inject to the RCS D. ONLY the C CLAs inject to the RCS Explanation: Even though the 2 part of the question doesnt involve selecting a procedure (always preferred), it does require detailed knowledge of the SBO procedure (Step 30) and the answer cannot be deduced using knowledge of the overall ECA 0.0 mitigative strategy. The 2 part of the question does involve interpretation of the instruments that remain available during the SBO event. (CL temps + accumulator pressures)
The 1 St part of the question hits the K/A because it tests which controls are available when only DC power exists.
Tough K/A.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK L0D (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 81 1 x x x N E 058 (Loss DC) AG2.4.3, Ti Gi
- 1. LOD=1: Since the EALs will be provided to the SRO applicants as a reference (for Q#s 78, 79, & 91), the 1st part of the question (the SRO part) is a direct lookup.
- 2. Cue: The phrase during an accident is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
th 4
- 3. Stem Focus: The 3 and bullets are not necessary.
- 4. Stem Focus: Split the fill-in-the-blank statement into two separate thoughts (see below).
- 5. Cred Dist: To provide plausibility to an instrument being available/not available, add another condition to the stem for an instrument bus being de-energized.
As an alternative to addressing comments 1 thru 5 above:
The SubCooling Monitor is a Post Accident Instrument.
Suggestion:
Test the SRO applicants ability to apply Tech Spec 3.3.3.6 following a loss of the wide range RCS Hot Leg temperature inputs to the SubCooling Monitor. (Subcooling Monitor is inoperable as well as the RCS WR RCS Hot Leg temps).
This will also allow testing the SRO applicants knowledge of Tech Spec 6.8.4.d.
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIMIN U/EIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 82 5 x B E 005 (mop/stuck rod) AA2.03, Ti G2
- 1. LOD5: The proposed question requires the applicants to memorize an action statement 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. This question is vulnerable to post-exam appeals and could be deleted from the exam. Provide the Tech Spec 3.1.3.1 to the applicants as a reference and re-work the question to not be a direct-lookup.
- 2. Cred Dist: Choices C/D can be (correctly) eliminated solely because these choices allow the rod misalignment to remain.
Suggest deleting the 6 e bullet and then re-working the question to test the applicants knowledge of whether the two Bank D rods are still trippable, in accordance with AOP-001, Attachment 5.
Re-work the choices to only indication the required Action Statement identifier (for example, Action A. or Action D.3.a, etc.)
83 x x N U 060 (accidental gas release) AG2.2.37, T1G2 Note to NRC reviewers: The WPB Stack 5 monitor is a P-l-G (however, the gas only portion is used) and also a WRGM.
st 1
Cred Dist: Choices A/B are not plausible because the part of Choices A/B (REM 3546 is Operable) contradicts with the 2nd part of Choices A/B (required ODCM action statements).
Additionally, the 1st part of Choices A/B are not plausible because 1) the 2 5d bullet says the WRGM portion is inoperable, and, 2) the readings for the P-l-G portion are cyan, which indicates a problem. (green is always good).
- 2. Q=KIA: The accidental gaseous radwaste release topic (AOP
- 09) is not being tested in the proposed question.
- 3. Stem Focus: It appears that either the 4 or bullet is unnecessary. Why does the 4 th bullet have to tell the applicants the color (cyan) of the readings IF the screen is telling the applicants that the color is cyan? Provide color screen print to applicants.
Suggest re-working the question to test an event involving AOP 09, where the applicant is implementing Step 6 (Refer to ODCM) when an ODCM gaseous release limit was exceeded.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q SRO BIM/N UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 84 5 x B U 061 (ARM) AA2.02, T1G2 QKIA: The proposed question does not test the applicants ability to determine or interpret the normal intensity of the CVI rad monitors because the 1 5t part of the question can be answered solely by knowing the units (mRemlhour vs iJCi/ml).
- 2. L0D5: The proposed question requires the applicants to memorize an action statement 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. This question is vulnerable to post-exam appeals and could be deleted from the exam. Provide the Tech Spec 3.3.3.1 to the applicants as a reference and re-work the question to not be a direct-lookup.
- 3. RO Q#62 provides a cue to this question.
Suggest re-working the question to test 1)the applicants knowledge of the normal reading for the containment range rad monitors (324 elev) and 2) their ability to apply the post accident monitoring tech spec when one rad monitor was previously inoperable and the second rad monitor is inoperable.
This is Tech Spec 3.3.3.6, Action c (initiate the pre-planned alternate method of monitoring).
What is the pre-planned alternate method of monitoring at Harris when no containment high range rad monitors are operable?
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK L0D (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 85 x x N U AG2.2.25, T1G2: Early Submittal Sample Question [5-21-1 3].
Theecomments only pertain to the Early Submittal Sample QuestiR45-21-13]; see next line for replacement/repair comments.
Cred bit: The 1St part of Choices A/C is not plausible because the stemsys that the inner door failed, that is, an applicant can guess fht using the inner door to fulfill Tech Specs is wrong (and he1e would be right).
- 2. Partial: Choice B1salso correct because the 2 nd part of the stem question is vagbwith respect to Containment Integrity Tech Spec. Since the1ch Spec number/title is not provided, an applicant could assume(he stem question is referring to either 3.6.1.1 (Prim Containr t Integrity), 3.6.1.3 (Containment Air Locks), or 3.6.1.6 (Containmt Vessel Integrity). If the applicant assumes 3.6.1.6, then Cbce B is also correct.
Suggest re-working the question to pr4j.de the applicants with a copy of TS 3 /4 6.1.3 (as an exam referee) and pose a situation where the personnel outer door br1çe on Day 1/time and the equipment inner door broke on Day 31iie. Test the applicants ability to 1) predict the date/time wheiNtie 7 day entry/exit allowance in Note 2 will expire and 2) asss whether only tech spec related activities/surveillances can be pormed in containment (during the 7 day grace period) or whethe\
any/all activities can be performed in the containment. (See Bases page B 3/4 6-1 for explanation.)
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= jSRO B/MIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A jonly 85 H 3 x N E 069 (Loss Cnmt Integrity) AG2.2.25, T1G2 Stem Focus: The initial conditions do not include the current plant MODE.
To streamline the question, and to ensure clarity, re-word as follows:
Given the following plant conditions:
- The plant is operating in Mode 3
- At 0900 on Sept 1, the Personnel Air Lock inner door inner seal fails
- At 0800 on Sept 3 the Emergency Air Lock inner door seal falls WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with Tech Spec 3.6.1.3, Containment Air Locks, and Tech Spec Bases?
Given these conditions, the LA TEST day/time that either of the airlocks can be used for entry/exit, under administrative controls, is During this period of time, the use of the airlock to perform non-Tech Spec required activities or repairs on non-vital plant is equipment is_______
(Reference provided)
A. 0900 on Sept 8 Th; allowed B. 0900 on Sept 8 th; NOT allowed th; 10 C. 0800 on Sept allowed D. 0800 on Sept 10 th; NOT allowed
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD I [
(F/H) (1-5) I Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- 0= SRO BIM/N U/E/S Explanation Focusj Dist. Link junits ward K/A Only 86 x x x B U 039 (MRSS) A2.03, T2G1 [2011 NRC SRO Q#1 3]
The proposed question overlaps with Scenario #3 events.
- 1. Cred Dist: The 1 st part of Choices NC (leave MS-70 open when B SG is rupture/faulted) is not plausible because the TDAFW Pump has two steam supplies.
- 2. Partial: Choice B (E-2 will direct closure of MS-70) is also correct because the applicant could justifiably argue that there is no SGTR. (see comment #3)
- 3. Stem Focus: There should be at least one other item in the stem indicative of a tube rupture.
nd 2
- 4. Stem Focus: The bullet is not grammatically correct.
- 5. Stem Focus: The 3 bullet should be the first item because this was an initial condition before anything else happened.
- 6. Job-Link: The bullet is vague. Why did the crew trip the reactor and initiate safety injection? Was it solely due to the B MSL Rad Monitor in High Alarm? This does not seem to be operationally valid.
Suggest re-working the question to test another item for the 1st part of the question (due to comment #1 above) and then, in the 2nt part of the question, test the applicants knowledge of which procedure progression is required. Specifically, E-O - E2 ECA-2. I - E3 - ECA-3. I [correct]
OR E-O - ECA-2. I 9 E3 9 ECA-3. I [wrong]
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD[
(F/H) I (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Linkj units ward K/A Only 87 x x N U 062 (AC Dist)A2.11, T2G1 Cred Dist: The 1 part of Choices NC (go to cold leg recirc) is not plausible because 1) small break LOCAs dont lead to cold leg recirc and 2) the stem does not include anything that could be potentially misconstrued to indicate RWST level issues
- 2. Stem Focus: The 3 and bullets can be eliminated.
Suggest the following: (discuss status of RHR pumps when exiting E-1 to ES-i .2 with licensee)
Given the following plant conditions:
- The unit was operating at 100% power
- A small break LOCA occurred
- RCS Pressure: 1175 psig, slowly lowering
- Safety Injection has been reset
- Subsequently, a LOOP occurs In accordance with ES-1.2, Post LOCA Cool down and Depressurization, WOOTF identifies:
- 1) the required procedure for equipment, and
- 2) whether/when [some other knowledge of ES-1.2]?
A. E-O, Attachment 6, Safeguards Equipment Realignment Following a Loop; (correct 2 portionj B. E-0, Attachment 8, Response to LOOP to AC Emergency After SI Actuation; [correct 2 portion]
C. E-0, Attachment 6, Safeguards Equipment Realignment Following a LOOP; [incorrect 2 portion].
D. E-0, Attachment 8, Response to LOOP to AC Emergency After SI Actuation; [incorrect 2 portion].
The 2 portion of the question should test the SRO applicants knowledge of ES-i .2.
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 88 1 x B F 063 (DC Distr) G2.2.40, T2G1
- 1. LOD=1: This is a direct lookup question.
- 2. Stem Focus: The stem question does not need to include the parenthesis information the (Reference Provided) is already included in the stem.
Suggest converting the question into a 2-part question.
The l part of the question choices should be either OPERABLE or INOPERABLE for the 1A-SA Battery Status.
For the 2 nd part of the question, present a situation where the lA-SB battery was also previously inoperable, concurrent with the pilot cell situation on the 1A-SA battery. One of the choices can be associated with Tech Spec 3.0.3 requirements.
Alternatively, use another question associated with an electrical panel/bus to test the applicants ability to apply the electrical distribution LCO required actions, which could potentially include a loss of safety function determination.
What procedure does Harris use to perform loss of safety function determinations? Please provide.
89 x x x B U 076 (SWS) A2.01, T2G1 Cred Dist: The 2 part of Choices C/D (keep the unit on-line by aligning equipment) is not plausible because the stem says the NSW leak is a large volume of water gushing and is inaccessible. Choices C/D can be eliminated gjjy on conservative decision making because its not conservative to keep the unit on-line with an inaccessible leak this large.
- 2. SRO-only: Immediate trip criteria (AOP-022, Section 3.2, Step
- 1) is RO knowledge.
- 3. Partial: The terms isolable and unisolable are subjective. An applicant could assume that the leak s isolable (if the NSW pumps are stopped and their discharge valves are closed) since the ESW portion of the system has auto-isolated. Therefore, there may be no correct answer.
Suggest using another question that tests the SRO applicants ability to apply a tech spec action statement (that is not a direct lookup).
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 90 5 x x N U bG2.2.22, T2G1: Early Submittal Sample Question [5-21-1 31.
Theecomments only pertain to the Early Submittal Sample Questib5-21-13]; see next line for replacement/repair comments.
LOD\,: An applicant can appeal a question that tests greater than 1 hbqr action statement information from memory.
However, ithis case, providing the TS 3.6.1.5 reference will make this quon a direct lookup.
- 2. SRO-only: The ?t.,part of the question (LCO requirements for containment tempeWure/pressure) is RO knowledge. The 2 part of the question cah4e deduced using test taking logic.
Since the SRO applicantNnow that less than or equal to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Tech Spec action statemenhare required RO knowledge, Choices A/C can be (correctly)minated.
- 3. Stem Focus: The containment teperature value should list the instrument number and/or title of theint value. What control room instrument provides indication for primary containment AVERAGE air temperature?
Suggest writing a question that tests the appli,ts ability to apply Tech Specs for ANY Containment LCO (Cqainment cooling, Containment Isolation Valves, ContainmenNlacuum Relief System, etc.), such that the question is not a direçt lookup (if a reference is provided) or such that the question testech Spec Bases knowledge during the application of the Tech Specs.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LCD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 90 x x N U 103 (Cnmt) G2.2.22, T2G1 The explanation summary provided with the proposed question indicated no reference provided to the applicants; however, the actual proposed question indicates a reference is provided to the applicant.
Cred Dist: The 2 part of Choice A is not plausible because required action to remedy exceeding the LCO temperature limit wont affect the number of pumps, fans, coolers (e.g. the word availabilitV) which are available. The phrase ensures..capability will be available is not congruent with the TS 3.6.1.5 required action because the required action isto reduce the temperature. Reducing temperature doesnt ensure the availability of containment cooling equipment.
- 2. Cred Dist: The 2 nd part of Choice C is not plausible because the stem conditions indicate a failed open containment isolation valve; therefore, any required action must be to isolate the penetration. Isolating something will never raise the availability of cooling capability. The phrase ensure availability of cooling capabilitj/ is not congruent with the TS 3.6.1.7 required action because the required action is to isolate something. The purpose of TS 3.6.1.7 is isolation.
- 3. Cred DIst: The 2 part of Choice D is not plausible because the stem conditions indicate a failed open containment isolation valve; therefore, any required action must be to isolate the penetration. Isolating purge will never lower the containment temperature. The premise of not exceeding the containment safety analysis value is not congruent with the TS 3.6.1.7 required action because the required action is to isolate something. Most likely, containment temperature is going to be jggr when a normal containment purge penetration is isolated.
The purpose of TS 3.6.1.7 is isolation.
- 4. Stem Focus: the 2 and 3 bullets do not make sense. That is, a steam leak in containment cant cause the normal purge inlet and discharge damper failures.
Suggest writing a question that tests the applicants ability to apply Tech Specs for ANY Containment LCO (Containment cooling, Containment Isolation Valves, Containment Vacuum Relief System, etc.), such that the question is not a direct lookup (if a reference is provided) or such that the question tests Tech Spec Bases knowledge during the application of the Tech Specs.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIMIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 91 x x N U T2G2: Early Submittal Sample Question [5-21-13].
Thes.çomments only pertain to the Early Submittal Sample QuestioIj21-13]; see next line for replacement/repair comments.
- 1. SRO-on1The overall mitigative strategy for a SGTR is to dump steai*fpm the intact steam generators to the condenser (if available) t&chieve a target CET (to ensure adequate subcooling) beforepressurizing the RCS to minimize tube leak flow. This is RO1owIedge being tested in the proposed question; the question donot include procedure selection or any other topic in 10CFR55.).
- 2. Cue: The last bullet (ERFlS-NOtaaiIable) is a cue; the stem should include the indications that thçrew would see on ERFIS instead of telling them that it is not availts1 There are several ways to fix this question. bic option is to write a question that tests the Fission Product Bqer Matrix classification(s) associated with core exit thermocoupts.
Another option is to write a question that tests the trans1tin point to SAMGs in the Core Cooling Tree. (See page 243 f96 in EP-EAL.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Focus I
Cred. IPartial Job- Minutia #1 Back-Dist. Link unitsj ward Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S K/A Only Explanation 91 x x x N E 017 (ITM) G2.1.7, T2G2 [EAL Classification]
Note: Since questions 78 & 79 also pertain with EAL classifications, the applicants will have the entire EAL charts (not just Table F-I).
- 1. Cred Dist: Since the applicants will have the EAL charts, Choice B is not plausible because the 2 part of this choice doesnt match the criterial listed above the fission product table.
In other words, two potential losses can never be a GE.
- 2. SRO-only: : In order to test the applicants knowledge of the EOP-USERS-GUIDE, change the A08 thermocouple reading to 1201 F. The knowledge of Red/Orange CSFSTs is RO knowledge. The ability to calculate subcooling is RO ability. To ensure the question does not test at the RO level, the applicant should be required to know the rules of how many thermocouples are required to make the E-plan call.
- 3. Stem Focus: Also, remove all the rising slowly items to prevent an applicant from using the Judgment section of Table F-l.
- 4. Stem Focus: To streamline the stem, replace the last two bullets with the SPTOP and CSFSTs are not available on the computer.
- 5. Stem Focus: Clarify which temperature indicator is being used to provide RCS temperature.
- 6. Stem Focus: Appears there are two typos (name of E-1 and word before NCAL).
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIMIN U/EIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 92 x N U 028 (HRPS) A2.02, T2G2 SRO-only: The proposed question solely tests the operation of the hydrogen recombiners in accordance with the operating procedure. The proposed question is not linked to any of the 7 topics in 10CFR55.43 (b). [This question could potentially be used to repair RO Q#59.]
- 2. Ensure no overlap with RO Q#59.
Suggest the following:
Given the following conditions:
- The hydrogen monitoring system and recombiners were placed in seivice in accordance with E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant and OP-125, Post Accident Hydrogen System.
- Due to a malfunction of the recombiners the containment hydrogen concentration is now greater than 4%.
- A General Emergency has been declared.
WOOTF completes both statements regarding the hydrogen in containment?
The containment hydrogen monitoring system is designed with an intermittent cycle of hydrogen indication for_ different sample points in containment.
The required Protective Action Recommendation is to evacuate a mile radius.
(Reference Provided: Page 21 of3I in PEP-I 10, PAR Process)
A. Three; 5 B. Six;5 C. Three; 2 D. Six; 2 Explanation: ,The K/A is being tested because a failure of the recombiner system to maintain hydrogen less than 4% occurred due to either operator error or equipment malfunction.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Focus I
Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back-Dist.
Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Link junits ward K/A Only 93 x x B U 068 (LRS) A2.04, T2G2 Cred Dist: Choice B (release is terminated) is not plausible because the stem says the discharge FLOW is still 28 gpm.
- 2. Cred Dist: Choices C/D (release may continue) are not plausible because anytime an auto-actuation failed to occur, the manual action is required to be performed.
- 3. SRO-only: The proposed question is not linked to any of the 7 topics in 1 OCFR55.43 (b) because, although each choice has a procedure listed, the answer can be deduced solely with the RO knowledge that failure of an auto-actuation requires a manual action to ensure the actuation.
Suggest providing the actual release permit for Hot Shower Tank A (including tank curie content and required set point for REM 1WL-3540 to the SRO applicants ..and then test their knowledge of (or ability to implement) any of the following:
- CRD-851, ODCM Software Instruction & Documentation
- PEP-310, Notification & Communication
- PLP-500, Radioactive Release Notification & Oil Spill Notification
- AP-617, Reportability Determination & Notification
- ODCM3.11.1.4,3.11.1.3
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 94 x x N U G2.1.41,T3 Cred Dist: Choices B/D are not plausible because they dont include item 2, specifically, stopping any action deemed potentially unsafe or detrimental to plant equipment or fuel, is always a responsibility of the SRO-Fuel Handling, and everyone, especially during refueling.
- 2. SRO-only: The difference between Choices A/C can be deduced using RO knowledge of who keeps the LCO books and where the SRO-Fuel Handling is located.
Suggest writing a question to test the SRO applicants knowledge of something to do with the refueling process and possibly a tech spec associated with section 3.9.
Alternatively, write a question to test the SRO applicants knowledge of an important refueling item and their ability to select a procedure.
For example, any other the following items might be used to support a two-part question related to a 10CFR55.43(b) topic:
- OSTs used during refueling (may need another part for this idea)
- Cautions associated with leaving 1 PP-427, Fuel Transfer Tube Gate Valve, open when no fuel movement is occurring (need another part for this idea)
- Whether the RWST remains operable during the performance of OP-i 16.01, Section 8.20. (may need another part for this idea).
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 95 x x B E G2.2.13, T3 Partial: An applicant can potentially argue that there is no correct answer to the first part of the question because it is not supported by OPS-NGGC-1 301 wording. OPS-NGGC-1301, Section 9.9.12 refers to equipment checklist authorization; however, this section does not specifically state that the SRO is required to authorize the installation of grounding devices.
Section 9.10 deals with ground installation/removal; however, Section 9.10 does not specifically state that the SRO is required to authorize the installation of grounding devices.
[SAF-SUBS-00048, Protective Grounding Guidelines, was not included with the reference disk and may provide more information on specifically who may authorize the installation of grounding devices.]
- 2. Cred Dist: Borderline plausibility with using independent verification to install grounding device.
Suggest splitting up the fill-in-the-blank statement to two separate items to preclude mixing concepts associated with who authorizes the equipment checklists and who authorizes installation of grounding devices. Nevertheless, Section 9.9.12 is not crystal clear on authorizing grounding devices.
Alternatively, there are many other items to write questions for Tier 3 SRO exam in OPS-NGGC-1 301.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q SRO BIMIN UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 96 x B E G2.2.40, Tier 3 Stem Focus: Every question which refers to a Tech Spec should include the name and number of the Tech Spec within the stem.
- 2. Stem Focus: The wording of the flllin-the-blank statement should be more precise, to ensure the SRO portion (2 portion) is being tested and no partially correct answer exists. The l portion of the question is RO knowledge.
Suggest the following:
WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with Tech Spec 3.1.1.1, Shutdown Margin (SDM) Modes I and 2?
When in Mode I or Mode 2, with Keff I, at least once eve,y 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, the SDM is determined to be 1770 pcm by_______
In accordance with the bases for Tech Spec 3.1.1.1, in Modes 1 and 2, the most restrictive condition for SDM is associated with a postulated________ accident.
A. OST-1036, Shutdown Margin Calculation; steam line break B. 0ST4021, Daily Surielilance Requirements Mode 1, 2; steam line break C. OST-1036, Shutdown Margin Calculation; inadvertent boron dilution D. OST-1021, Daily Surveillance Requirements Mode 1, 2; inadvertent boron dilution
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIM/N UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 97 x x x N EIU .3.14, T3: Early Submittal Sample Question [5-21-13]. These co1ments only pertain to the Early Submittal Sample Question [5 13]; e next line for replacementlrepair comments.
- 1. SQ1 Focus: Alot of the stem information can be eliminated usinthe following fill-in-the-blank statement:
In accbçdance with AOP-013, Fuel Handling accident, is the primy radiological concern for fuel off-loaded more than 6 months agbecause it will NOT be detected by personal dosimetty ora radiation monitors.
- 2. Job-Link: The 6\bullet in the stem says that the crew evacuated the FHas a precautionary measure even though Step 3.1 3.a requirean evacuation even when the FHB ARMs alert/high alarms are ciqared. Not sure why the phrase as a precautionary measurewas included in the 6 bullet.
- 3. Partial: An applicant can ae that there is no correct answer because of the way the stem qestion is worded. That is, the stem question asks for a person non-detectable rad exposure hazard. Even a beta-ethiter can be detected using the proper radiation detector/mode. n applicant can argue that Kr-85 can be detected.
- 4. SRO-only: This a borderline question beuse it is not clearly linked to one of the 7 topics listed in 1 OCFRS.43(b). The pedigree provided indicates that the proposedçuestion is linked to topic #6 (fuel handling equipment); however,is is questionable since the SRO applicant is not beinested on fuel handling equipment.
Suggest re-working the question to test the SRO appliQts on radiation/coolant/contamination readings that require NR\
notification (4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, etc) OR an emergency classification.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD I (FIR) (1-5) Stem Cues I TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/MIN UIEIS Explanation Focusj Dist. Link 1UJts ward K/A Only 97 x N U G2.3.14, T3 Cred Dist: The 2nd part of Choices B/D (NRC doesnt have to be notified following fuel bundle damage and transport of a contaminated individual to a hospital) is not plausible because the applicant can conservatively guess (correctly) that NRC notification should always be required for this type of incident.
[Previous early sample suggestion (see above) to test the SRO applicants on radiation/coolant/contamination readings that require NRC notification (4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, etc) OR an emergency classification not incorporated.]
Alternatively, suggest the following:
Given the following conditions:
- An accident occurred while moving fuel in the spent fuel pool and spent fuel was damaged.
- An employee was injured and contaminated.
- The employees radiation exposure due to the incident was 200 mrem; previous exposure for quarter was 150 mrem.
- The employee was transported to the hospital before he was de-contaminated.
WOOTF completes both statements?
In accordance with AOP-013, Fuel Handilng Accident, is the prima,y radiological concern for fuel off-loaded more than 6 months ago, and will NOT be detected by personal dosimetiy or area radiation monitors.
In accordance with AP-617, Reportability Determination, the NRC is required to be notified within (Reference Provided)
A. Iodine 131; 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> B. Iodine 131; 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> C. K,ypton 85; 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> D. Krypton 85; 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/MIN U)E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 98 x B E G2.3.4, T3 Stem Focus: The fill-in-the-blank statement wording and procedure reference should exactly mirror what the procedure says. (procedure says should)
Suggest the following:
WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with PEP-330, Radiological Consequences, Attachment 1, Limitations for Lifesaving and Emergency Reentry/Repair Actions?
Exposure in excess of 5 Rem TEDE shall not be permitted unless specifically authorized by the Emergency worker exposures during a lifesaving effort should be limited to rem TEDE.
A. Site Emergency Coordinator; 15 B. Emergency Response Manager; 15 C. Site Emergency Coordinator; 25 D. Emergency Response Manager; 25 (plausibility of 15 rem is dose to the eye is limited to 3 x the 5 rem limit)
(previously used bank question can be easily modified using Emergency Response Manager instead of Radiological Control Director)
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1 -5) Stem Cues T/F I Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- I Q SRO BIM/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link junits ward K/A 99 x N U G2.4.40,T3 Cred Dist: Choices C/D (SEC is allowed to delegate classifying the emergency to someone else) is not plausible.
Suggest the following:
WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with the plant emergency procedures (PEP5)?
The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) activation process shall start within of an emergency declaration which requires the emergency response facility activation.
The SECS task of making Protective Action Recommendations be delegated to another qualified member of the ERO.
A. 5 minutes; cannot B. 5minutes;can C. 15 minutes; cannot D. l5minutes;can
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIMIN UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A jOnly 100 x B E G2.4.46, T3 The explanation summary provided with the proposed question indicated no reference provided to the applicants; however, the actual proposed question indicates a reference is provided to the applicant.
- 2. Stem Focus: The 2 bullet is not necessary.
- 3. Stem Focus: The 1 st part of the stem question should say WOOTF identifies an expected alarm.
If the JPM is replaced, then this question can be repaired with the following suggestion.
Suggest gjjj,g the applicants the Tech Spec required action (no reference provided) and then test their knowledge of the technique for determining how far to reduce power, as follows:
Given the following plant conditions:
- The plant is operating at 97% power.
- Rod H2 is misaligned 6 steps.
- QPTRi5 1.07
- The SRO has entered the Tech Spec 3.2.4, QPTR, Action A.2, which requires reducing thermal power within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
WOOTF completes both statements?
is an expected alarm for these plant conditions.
In order to implement the QPTR Action statement, reactor power must be reduced to
ES-403 Written Examination Grading Form ES-403-1 Quality Checklist Facility: -iv Date of Exam: 3 Exam Level: RO L SRO LEt Initials Item Description a b c
- 1. Clean answer sheets copied before grading 14
- 2. Answer key changes and question deletions justified and_documented
- 3. Applicants scores checked for addition errors (reviewers_spot_check>_25%_of_examinations)
- 4. Grading for all borderline cases (80 +/-2% overall and 70 or 80, as_applicable,_+/-4%_on_the_SRO-only)_reviewed_in_detail
- 5. All other failing examinations checked to ensure that grades are justified
- 6. Performance on missed questions checked for training ir deficiencies and wording problems; evaluate validity 3 vi4 a i<
of_questions_missed_by_half or more of the_applicants Printed Name/Signature Date
- a. Grader
- b. Facility Reviewer(*) N/A N/A
- c. NRC Chief Examiner (*) 1U)D
- d. NRC Supervisor (*) R3
(*) The facility reviewers signature is not applicable for examinations graded by the NRC; two independent NRC reviews are required.