ML13309A230
| ML13309A230 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch, Monticello, Dresden, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Nine Mile Point, Fermi, Oyster Creek, Hope Creek, Cooper, Pilgrim, Susquehanna, Columbia, Brunswick, Limerick, Duane Arnold, Quad Cities, FitzPatrick, LaSalle, 05000294 |
| Issue date: | 09/30/2013 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Lamb J | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13309A030 | List: |
| References | |
| G10230229, NRC-277 | |
| Download: ML13309A230 (101) | |
Text
Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
10 CFR Petition Review Board Re[garding]
General Electric Mark I and II [Boiling Water Reactors] BWRs Docket Numbers: (n/a) [50-259, 50-260, 50-296, 50-325, 50-324, 50-397, 50-298, 50-237, 50-249, 50-331, 50-321, 50-366, 50-341, 50-354, 50-333, 50-373, 50-374, 50-352, 50-353, 50-263, 50-220, 50-410, 50-219, 50-277, 50-278, 50-293, 50-254, 50-265, 50-387, 50-388, and 50-271]
Location: telephone conference [Commissioners Hearing Room, One White Flint, Rockville, MD]
Date:
Monday, September 30, 2013 Work Order No.:
NRC-277 Pages 1-98[100]
NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
+ + + + +
3 10 CFR 2.206 PETITION REVIEW BOARD (PRB) 4 CONFERENCE CALL 5
RE[GARDING]
6 GENERAL ELECTRIC (GE) MARK I AND II BOILING WATER 7
REACTORS (BWRs) 8
+ + + + +
9 MONDAY 10 SEPTEMBER 30, 2013 11
+ + + + +
12 The conference call was held, Jack Davis, 13 Chairperson of the Petition Review Board, presiding.
14 PETITIONER[S]: BEYOND NUCLEAR, et. al. [Paul Gunter 15
- Beyond Nuclear (in person) 16 Tim Judson - CAN and NIRS (in person) 17 Jessica Azulay - AGREE (on phone) 18 Wally Taylor - Sierra Club Iowa (on phone) 19 Lewis Culbert - ACE (on phone) 20 Chuck Johnson - WA/OR PSR (on phone) 21 Gretel Johnston - BEST (on phone) 22 David Kraft - NEIS (on phone) 23 Mary Lampert - Pilgrim Watch (on phone) 24 Leslie Sullivan Sachs - SAGE (on phone) 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 2
Jeff Brown - GRAMMES (on phone)]
1 PETITION REVIEW BOARD MEMBERS 2
JACK DAVIS, Director, Mitigation Strategies 3
Directorate[, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4
(NRC)]
5 LEE BANIC, [NRC] Petition Manager for 2.206 6
petition 7
ROBERT DENNIG, Branch Chief, Nuclear Reactor 8
Regulation[, NRC]
9 MATTHEW GORDON, Office of the Executive [Director 10 of Operations, NRC]
11 JOHN LAMB, Senior Project Manager, Beaver Valley, 12 Seabrook and Oyster Creek Plants [NRC]
13 ERIC MICHEL, Senior Attorney [Attorney], Office 14 of General Counsel[, NRC]
15 WILLIAM RECKLEY, Japan Lessons Learned 16 Directorate[, NRC]
17
[WAYNE SCHMIDT, Region I, NRC 18 VERONICA RODRIGUEZ, Branch Chief, NRC]
19 NRC HEADQUARTERS STAFF 20 GEORGE SMITH, Facilitator 21 Wayne Smith, Region I 22
[TERRY BELTZ, NRC 23 AHSAN SALLMAN, NRC 24 MOHAN THADANI, NRC 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 3
THOMAS STEPHEN, NRC 1
PUBLIC (In Person) 2 JANA BERGMAN, Scientech 3
KEVIN KAMPS, Beyond Nuclear 4
PUBLIC (On Phone) 5 JOHN GIARUSSO, Commonwealth of Massachusetts 6
CHERYL LAATSCH, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 7
LISA MCFARLAND, Nebraska Power District 8
THOMAS HAFERA, Worley Parsons 9
LYNN ALBIN, State of Washington 10 CHRISTINE BARNCARD, Xcel Energy 11 BILL MCTIGUE, PSEG 12 ED DYKES, Constellation 13 MIKE CROWTHERS, PPL 14 KATE NOLAN, Duke 15 STEVIE DUPONT, Constellation 16 DAVE HELKER, Exelon 17 STEVEN HAMRICK, Florida Power and Light 18 TIM DEVIK, PSEG]
19 20 21 22 23 24 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 4
T-A-B-L-E O-F C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S 1
Welcoming Remarks and Introductions 2
John Lamb......................................4[5]
3 Remarks of the [PRB] Chairman 4
Jack Davis.....................................6[7]
5 Petitioners' Remarks 6
Paul Gunter..................................11[10]
7 Tim Judson.......................................23 8
Jessica Azulay...................................30 9
Lewis Cuthbert...............................38[37]
10 Charles Johnson..................................44 11 Mary Lampert.................................58[57]
12 Linda Lewison................................64[63]
13 Wally Taylor.................................71[70]
14 Gretel Johnson...............................74[73]
15 Leslie Sullivan Sachs........................80[79]
16 Jeff Brown...................................84[83]
17 Questions and Comments........................87[86]
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 5
1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 2
12:59 p.m.
3 MEMBER LAMB: Good afternoon. My name is 4
John Lamb and I an [am] the NRC Beaver Valley, Seabrook 5
and Oyster Creek senior project manager. We are here 6
today to allow the Petitioners represented by Mr. Paul 7
Gunter of Beyond Nuclear to address the Petition Review 8
Board, or PRB, regarding the 2.206 Petition dated March 9
21st, 2013. The ADAMS accession number is ML13085A218.
10 The PRB Chairman is Jack Davis. As part of the PRB's 11 review of this petition Mr. Paul Gunter has requested 12 this second opportunity to address the PRB.
13 This meeting is scheduled from 1:00 p.m. to 14 3:00 p.m. Eastern Time. The meeting is being recorded 15 by the NRC Operations Center and will be transcribed by 16 a court reporter. The transcript will become a 17 supplement to the petition. The transcript will also be 18 made available to the public.
19 I would like to open this meeting with 20 introductions. As we go around the table, please be sure 21 to clearly state your name, your position and t he [the]
22 office you work for within the NRC for the record.
23 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: I'm Jack Davis, Director 24 of Mitigating Strategies Directorate in NRR.
25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 6
MEMBER MICHEL: Eric Michel from the Office 1
of General Counsel.
2 MEMBER GORDON: Matthew Gordon, EDO's 3
Office.
4 MR. SMITH: Again, George Smith. I'll be 5
facilitating the meeting.
6 MR. GUNTER: Paul Gunter, Beyond Nuclear.
7 MR. JUDSON: Tim Judson, and I actually 8
have a change in affiliation to put on the record. I'm 9
on the petition. I was a representative of Citizens' 10 Awareness Network and Alliance for a Green Economy.
11 Still actually affiliated with those organizations, but 12 recently was appointed the associate director for the 13 Nuclear Information and Resource Service.
14 MEMBER RECKLEY: My name is Bill Reckley in 15 the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation [NRR], Japan 16 Lessons Learned Directorate.
17 MEMBER BANIC: Lee Banic, coordinator, 18 NRR.
19 MEMBER DENNIG: Bob Dennig, branch chief in 20 the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
21 MR. LAMB: Okay. We have completed 22 introduction at the NRC Headquarters at this time. Are 23 there any NRC participants from headquarters on the 24 phone?
25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 7
MR. SCHMIDT: John, this is Wayne Schmidt 1
from NRC Region I.
2 MR. LAMB: Okay. Thank you, Wayne. Are 3
there any NRC participants from the region? Wayne is 4
from the region. Anyone else?
5 (No audible response.)
6 MR. LAMB: Okay. Thank you. Due to the 7
large number of people for any of the licensees or members 8
of the public that are on the phone, I would appreciate 9
if you could send an email to john.lamb@nrc.gov as 10 confirmation of your participation by phone. My email 11 address is also located on the public meeting notice 12 under "Meeting Contact."
13 I would like to emphasize that we each need 14 to speak clearly and loudly to make sure that the court 15 reporter can accurately transcribe this meeting. If you 16 do have something that you would like to say, please state 17 your name for the record.
18 At this time[,] I will turn it over to the 19 PRB chairman, Jack Davis.
20 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: Good afternoon. As John 21 said, the purpose of today's meeting is the second 22 opportunity for you all to tell us if you have any 23 additional information, explanation from what we talked 24 about the last time. So it's part of the process.
25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 8
As you already know, I have to go through 1
this anyway, the PRB is made up typically of a chair, 2
which is at the [NRC] SES [Senior Executive Service]
3 level, the PRB project manager for it, and then a 4
coordinator. And then[,] we have technical experts 5
around the room that are associated with this project 6
that can help us with the technical issues.
7 A couple of things.[,] One, [one] is it's 8
not a [hearing] you know, as you know, and so you can't 9
ask us questions of the merits of your petition and so 10 on. No decision will be made during this meeting. And 11 then[,] of course[,] we can ask clarifying questions of 12 you to understand your position better and so on.
13 We will then conduct an internal 14 deliberation on any additional information you gave us 15 that's new since the last time. And of course, as you 16 know[,] from previous times that we provide you 17 information back on what the outcome of that deliberation 18 was.
19 We previously met in May [May 2, 2013], and 20 so it's been a couple of months, so perhaps there is 21 additional information. There's a couple of things that 22 I would just want to get on the record to make sure we 23 do it here properly, and I'm going to read it, so I 24 apologize for that, but it's for those that maybe aren't 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 9
familiar.
1 So[,] I'm going to highlight the scope of 2
your petition that's under review and on March 21st, 2013 3
Mr. Paul Gunter of Beyond Nuclear and several other folks 4
submitted to the NRC a petition under the 2.206 regarding 5
General Electric [GE] Mark I and Mark II boiling water 6
reactors [BWRs]. The petition has requested that the 7
NRC revoke the operating licenses for GE Mark I and two 8
[II] BWRs. And John has already talked about the ADAMS 9
accession number for that, but for those of you that 10 didn't get it, it's ML13084A218. And you can get the 11 exact wording. It's much [more] in depth than what I 12 just gave here.
13 A few of the highlights of NRC significant 14 activity since the last time we met. We internally met 15 on April 8th of 2013 to review the petition to determine 16 if NRC immediate action was needed. As you know, the PRB 17 determined that NRC immediate action was not needed on 18 the basis that there was no immediate safety to licensed 19 facilities or to the health and safety of the public.
20 Mr. Gunter, you were informed of this by an 21 email dated April 17th, 2013. The ML for that is 22 13112A584.
23 On May 2nd of 2013, the PRB met with the 24 Petitioners in the public meeting, and the transcript is 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 10 available underneath ADAMS accession ML13144A127.
1 On July 8th of 2013, the Petitioners were 2
informed via email of the PRB's initial recommendation, 3
and that is also underneath ML13190A262.
4 So with that, I'll turn it over to you, Paul, 5
and you can introduce your folks.
6 MR. GUNTER: Okay. My name is Paul Gunter 7
and I am director of the Reactor Oversight Project at 8
Beyond Nuclear. I'm going to allow those who are here 9
in the room that plan to speak to introduce themselves 10 and then we'll move to the phone bridge.
11 MR. JUDSON: Tim Judson, NIRS and Citizens' 12 Awareness Network.
13 MR. GUNTER: Okay. We'll move to the phone 14 bridge.
15 MS. LAMPERT: Mary Lampert, Pilgrim Watch.
16 MR. GUNTER: You have to speak up.
17 DR. CUTHBERT: Dr. Lewis Cuthbert, 18 Alliance for a Clean Environment, Pennsylvania, 19 regarding Limerick.
20 MS. AZULAY: Jessica Azulay, Alliance for 21 a Green Economy regarding Nine Mile Point and 22 FitzPatrick.
23 MR. TAYLOR: Wally Taylor with the Sierra 24 Club of Iowa regarding the Cooper Nuclear Station in 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 11 Nebraska and the Duane Arnold reactor in Iowa and the Quad 1
Cities nuclear reactor in Illinois.
2 MR. BROWN: Jeff Brown, Grandmothers, 3
Mothers and More for Energy Safety, GRAMMES, regarding 4
Oyster Creek in New Jersey.
5 MR. JOHNSON: Chuck Johnson, Washington 6
and Oregon Physicians for Social Responsibility 7
regarding the Columbia Generating Station Nuclear Plant 8
on the Columbia River in Washington State?[.]
9 MS.
JOHNSTON:
Gretel Johnston 10 representing BEST/MATRR in North Alabama regarding the 11 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant.
12 MS. SACHS: Leslie Sullivan Sachs, Safe and 13 Green Campaign and the SAGE Alliance regarding Vermont 14 Yankee.
15 MR. GUNTER: Mary Lampert, are you on the 16 line?
17 MS. LAMPERT: Yes, I wasn't I guess 18 speaking loud enough. Mary Lampert, Pilgrim Watch in 19 reference to the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, 20 Plymouth, Massachusetts.
21 MR. GUNTER: Linda Lewison, are you on the 22 line?
23 (No audible response.)
24 MR. GUNTER: Okay. Thank you. So if you 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 12 all would please mute your lines until I call your name 1
out, I believe we're ready to proceed.
2 Okay. Thank you for the opportunity. The 3
March petition requests the revocation of the operating 4
license for the 31 General Electric Mark I and Mark II 5
[BWRs] in the United States with unreliable pressure 6
suppression containment systems. The Petitioners 7
contend the current containment systems are not in 8
compliance with the general design criteria and 9
therefore they're licensing agreements.
The 10 Petitioners further argue that current corrective 11 actions in response to the Fukushima Daiichi Lessons 12 Learned Task Force as proposed by the NRC and the 13 General Electric operators do not provide the public 14 health and safety with timely, adequate and reasonable 15 protection in the event of a loss of coolant accident.
16 The demonstrated failure of the GE Mark I 17 and Mark II containment systems and the uncontrolled 18 release of radioactivity from Fukushima underscore the 19 Petitioner's requested action for the revocation of the 20 unreliable Mark I and Mark II boiling water reactors in 21 the United States.
22 I'd also like to request -- if we have our 23 PowerPoint put up [Slides are in ADAMS Accession No.
24 ML13298A085]. Is it? Is it up, or going up? It's up?
25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 13 Oh, there it is. Thank you. Next slide, please.
1 The former NRC chairman, Gregory Jaczko, 2
recently spoke in Tokyo on a panel before the Foreign 3
Correspondents Club of Japan on September 24th, 2013 on 4
the role of public involvement and the need to rethink 5
nuclear power issues.
6
[Former] Chairman Jaczko said, quote, "One 7
of the things that has become very clear to me and become 8
clear to me after the accident began is that there are 9
these kinds of nuclear accidents that really are 10 economy-wide impact and simply unacceptable in Japanese 11 society, in American society, and I think really all over 12 the world. So it gives us an opportunity to take a step 13 back and figure out ultimately how we go forward in a way 14 that eliminates the possibility of these kinds of 15 accidents. And one of the keys to that certainly is the 16 active involvement and engagement of the public.
17 "Decisions about nuclear technology are 18 often controversial. They are often very difficult 19 involving sometimes science that has limited consensus 20 among technical experts. And so it's incumbent to fully 21 engage the public and be active on the part of government, 22 on the part of utilities and on the part of citizens to 23 be active participants in this endeavor.
24 "We know what the impact of the Fukushima 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 14 Daiichi accident was. It's 160,000 people evacuated 1
from their homes, some, most of them still to this day.
2 It's a significant land contamination event and it's an 3
event that at minimum estimates have shown will impact 4
the Japanese economy on the order of $500 billion U.S.
5 I think if I do my math correctly, that's 50 trillion yen.
6 And it's an accident that will leave a legacy of cleanup 7
and decontamination and decommissioning that will last 8
for decades," he said.
9
[Former] Chairman Jaczko continued, quote, 10 "Ultimately we have to change the mind-set about people 11 believing that accidents can happen. Before the 12 accident too many people believed in that mind-set, and 13 that is part of the challenge, part of the important need 14 to change as we go forward. Fundamentally, as I've 15 looked at this accident and as I've talked to people in 16 communities that surround nuclear power plants in the 17 United States, in Japan, it's become clear to me that we 18 need to think about safety in a whole new way. We need 19 to think about nuclear technology being used in a way that 20 cannot lead to evacuations, it cannot lead to land 21 contamination events. This is something that we 22 wouldn't accept in any other kind of technology. And 23 even though these events are anticipated and expected to 24 be extremely rare, they still can happen, and they did 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 15 happen at Fukushima Daiichi.
1 "So as we go forward and as we think about 2
nuclear technology and the use of nuclear technology, 3
it's time to completely remove the possibility of severe 4
accidents. That means a whole new way about looking and 5
thinking about nuclear technology and it may mean 6
rethinking about the reactors that are in operation 7
today. This petition has challenged you, the Petition 8
Review Board 'to change the mind-set that accidents 9
cannot happen,' not to weigh continued operation and 10 probabilities but in the demonstrated unacceptable 11 performance and consequences of failure of this 12 containment design.
13 "The Petitioners urge this review board to 14 begin the rethinking by continuing to engage the public 15 through this petition the challenges, the continued 16 operation of this General Electric Fukushima-style 17 reactor with the demonstrated unreliable and 18 non-compliant reactor containment system.
19 "The NRC in its initial drafted 20 determination states that the petition raises issues 21 that have already been reviewed and evaluated by NRC.
22 Therefore, your petition meets the criteria for 23 rejection and requires no further review by the Agency.
24 The Board's determination to discontinue its review of 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 16 this petition relies on the assertion that the continued 1
operation of the GE Mark I and Mark II with the same 2
reliable containment as Fukushima Daiichi poses 'no 3
imminent risk to public health and safety' without 4
provided its reference documents for its conclusive 5
analysis based in large part on a prediction that a severe 6
accident that challenges the vulnerable containment 7
system will not occur at U.S. reactors.
8 "It relies in part upon NRC document SECY 9
2012-0157 that initially recommended the adoption for a 10 prompt order to install severe accident-capable 11 containment vents with high capacity radiation filters 12 that was then voted down by a majority of the Commission 13 in favor of an order for containment venting 14 modifications for two hardened vents on the containment 15 components without radiation filtration systems that 16 will not be installed as protective features for a 17 minimum of five years on the wet well and six years on 18 the dry well.
19 "The [PRB] Board provides no specific 20 response to any of the challenges raised in the petition 21 or the questions and concerns raised in the May 2 nd [2013]
22 public meeting. In other words, the NRC rejects 23 continued public involvement and engagement in this 24 emergency enforcement action where current public health 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 17 and safety concerns continue to rely upon the same 1
pressure suppression containment system demonstrated at 2
Fukushima to have a 100 percent failure rate under severe 3
accident conditions while NRC and industry move to 4
exclusively engage to how, to what degree and at what cost 5
they intend to restore some design requirement and 6
licensing agreements that are the focus of this public 7
petition.
8 "Given the evidence of this Agency's strong 9
inclination for failing to meet its own deadlines for 10 closing out decades-old open public health and safety 11 issues such as fire protection for safe reactor shutdown 12 systems and protecting recirculation for emergency core 13 cooling systems following a severe accident, there is no 14 reason for confidence in completion of the hardened 15 containment vents without radiation filtration systems 16 by 2018 and 2019. The public should be allowed to 17 continue to independently and constructively engage the 18 Agency's formal processes."
19 Next slide, please. "As established by 20 Chapter 10 of the United States Code of Federal 21 Regulations, Part 50, Appendix A, the General Design 22 Criteria states, 'these general design criteria 23 establish a minimum requirement for the principal design 24 criteria for water cooled nuclear power plants similar 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 18 in design and location to plants for which construction 1
permits had been issued by the United States," end quote.
2 The March petition contends that these 3
minimum requirements include compliance with Criterion 4
16 for the unreliable GE Mark I and Mark II containment 5
system. Criterion 16 reads, "Containment design.
6 Reactor containment and associated systems shall be 7
provided to establish an essentially leak-tight barrier 8
against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity and to 9
assure that the design conditions important to safety are 10 not exceeded as long as the postulated accident 11 continues." In the event of a severe accident the GE 12 Mark I and Mark II pressure suppression systems do not 13 provide with a reasonable level of confidence an 14 essentially leak-tight barrier against the uncontrolled 15 release of radioactivity into the environment.
16 In addition to the widespread land 17 contamination from the initial reactor meltdown and 18 breaches of containment at Fukushima Daiichi[,] numerous 19 news accounts include TEPCO and the Japanese 20 government's failure to stop the ongoing release of 21 radioactive contamination of ground water flowing from 22 the reactor site in what can only be described as the 23 uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the 24 environment.
25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 19 The Petitioners have previously presented 1
a lack of assurance that in the event of a severe accident 2
operator actions in response to such events such as the 3
core breach of the pressure vessel will create pathways 4
for radioactive releases when the dry well is flooded 5
such that the venting through the current hardened wet 6
well system and radioactivity scrubbing is going to be 7
precluded. The Petitioners have also previously 8
presented the issue of containment bypass in both the 9
Mark I and Mark II containments that can lead to 10 unfiltered radioactive releases to the atmosphere, yet 11 the NRC determination to suspend its review provides no 12 response and is silent on how these issues and 13 vulnerabilities impact public health and safety with the 14 current operations today.
15 As the Petitioners have presented, however, 16 the current NRC Enforcement Action 2013-0109, which 17 implements the 2018 and 2019 hardened vent completion 18 schedule for these unreliable Mark I and Mark II 19 containment systems, does not require any implementation 20 or installation of an enhanced radiation filtration 21 system to comport with General Design Criteria 16 other 22 than to pursue it through an indeterminate rulemaking 23 process rooted in a cost benefit analysis.
24 Next slide. Yet in contrast to NRC Order 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 20 Enforcement Action 2013-0190, which accommodates the 1
continued operation of U.S. GE boiling water reactors 2
with a minimum six-year timeline for designing and 3
installing a hardened vent system without an enhanced 4
radiation filter as a provision of restart for Japanese 5
boiling water reactors, the nuclear regulatory authority 6
[Japanese Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA)] has issued 7
a specified set of countermeasures to severe accidents 8
that include severe accident-capable hardened 9
containment vents with external high-capacity radiation 10 filtration systems. And this is noted in the outline of 11 the new regulatory requirements for light water 12
- reactors, April 2013 severe accident measures 13 requirements as part of the NRA's ongoing enforcement of 14 nuclear regulatory requirements for commercial nuclear 15 power plants.
16 And we also note here; next slide, that the 17
-- what you're looking at is essentially the hardened 18 vent severe accident-capable with a high-capacity 19 radiation filtration system which is now under 20 construction or at ground breaking for 14 boiling water 21 reactors in [Japan] the United States. And this is part 22 of the follow-on effort that AREVA and Hitachi GE have 23 undertaken in a June 2013 press announcement. But it is 24 our understanding that the Shimane nuclear units 1 and 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 21 2, including the Mark I there, will have a hardened severe 1
accident-capable vent with a radiation filtration system 2
to be completed by 2014. The Shika BWRs, including the 3
Mark I there, is to be completed by 2015 and additional 4
ground breaking activities at Tokai 2, Hamaoka, the 5
Higashidori and Onagawa and the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa units 6
where we have the hardened vents underway as a part of 7
the restart protocol.
8 So while Japanese nuclear reactors are 9
being required to install as countermeasures these 10 hardened filtered containment vents for completion as 11 early as 2014, U.S. reactors continue to operate with NRC 12 permission and allowed to stall for a minimum of six years 13 the same backfit without filters on identical 14 technology. In our view[,] we believe this to be an 15 effort to avoid a safety-related cost consequence on 16 already economically marginal power plants.
17 Next slide, please. We would also draw the 18
[PRB] Board's attention to Criterion 50. You're quite 19 familiar with this as the containment design basis that 20 requires that the reactor containment structure shall be 21 designed so that the containment structure and its 22 internal components can accommodate without exceeding 23 the design leakage rate and without sufficient margin the 24 calculated pressure and temperature conditions 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 22 resulting from any loss of coolant accident.
1 The operative word here in Criterion 50 of 2
course is that the containment design shall 3
"accommodate" the pressures and temperatures generated 4
by loss of coolant accident. In any other context[,]
5 "accommodate" is defined to mean to provide and have room 6
for, and in the context of nuclear power and the public 7
health and safety, to provide a place to stay for 8
radioactivity generated in a severe accident and reactor 9
core damage. However, the Mark I and Mark II pressure 10 suppression system is not expected to accommodate the 11 loss of coolant accident pressure and temperature.
12 Without venting the undersized containment, in order to 13 make room for increasing temperature, pressure and 14 explosive hydrogen gas which brings the public's 15 attention back to General Design Criterion 16 and the 16 lack of compliance with the requirement for an 17 essentially leak-tight barrier against the uncontrolled 18 release of radioactivity.
19 Next slide, please. In addition to 20 Fukushima[,] the failure to accommodate public health 21 and safety has another infamous historical context. The 22 White Star Line, the operator of the RMS Titanic, based 23 in a cost-cutting exercise and faulty assumptions that 24 the luxury liner was imperishable and that catastrophe 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 23 was so highly improbable that the company decided it 1
would only need to carry 20 lifeboats to accommodate its 2
passengers and crew of 2,207 on the maiden voyage.
3 Practically ever school-aged child is familiar with this 4
example of the failure to accommodate enough public 5
health and safety in the preparation for even the most 6
remote and improbable tragedy.
7 The current NRC Action Order EA 2013-109 8
does not provide for compliance with the general design 9
criteria and minimum requirements do not order or provide 10 for the amplification of the general design criteria in 11 the aftermath and consequence of the Fukushima Daiichi 12 nuclear accident.
13 So we ask who is being accommodated by the 14 Agency's current half-measures and slow walk to address 15 the unreliable containment issue. We urge you not to be 16 part of this mind-set about people believing that 17 accidents can't happen. As your own former NRC Chairman 18 Gregory Jaczko has now warned, we urge you to rethink, 19 reconsider and accept this petition for emergency 20 enforcement action for the requested action to revoke the 21 operating license of all GE Mark I and Mark II boiling 22 water reactors. Thank you.
23 And we'll now hear from Jim [Tim] Judson.
24 MR. JUDSON: Hi. Thanks. So I would like 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 24 to address some broader concerns about the way that the 1
NRC has been treating the questions regarding Mark I and 2
II boiling water reactors in the post-Fukushima 3
environment. And in particular, you know, I think the 4
Petitioners recognize that the industry is -- you know, 5
that these regulatory decisions are not happening in a 6
vacuum, and in fact are happening, you know, in a period 7
of what's, you know, beyond the questions raised by the 8
Fukushima accident, which, you know, really is sort of 9
a historical, you know, sort of financial crisis that the 10 industry is in at the moment. And we're very concerned 11 about the way that the NRC is taking up these issues in 12 that context.
13 In particular, you know, we appreciate that 14 NRC has various directives and imperatives by which it 15 takes regulatory action and balances the need for sort 16 of enhancing public safety and protecting the public 17 health with competing concerns regarding issues, you 18 know, such as regulatory burden to the industry that it 19 regulates.
20 Our concern is that the latter imperative 21 has completely overshadowed the former in the way that 22 the decisions are being made, and in particular[,] the 23 ways in which the issues raised by our petition have been 24 treated. And in regard to that[,] I would like to submit 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 25 some new information that's occurred since we initially 1
submitted the petition, which is a February 20th, 2013 2
report issued by UBS Investment Research, which is a 3
financial investment research firm, that covers, you 4
know, among other things the nuclear industry and has 5
been devoting a lot of attention to the economic 6
circumstances of nuclear power plants given the type of 7
market dynamics that we see prevailing across the 8
country, an [and]in particular in states, you know, where 9
the electric markets are deregulated. But I think what 10 we see is these same dynamics spreading into states that 11 are utility regulated on the basis of what they consider 12 reasonable costs for their rate payers to bear.
13 This February 20th [2013] report by UBS, 14 which is entitled, "In Search of Washington's Latest 15 Realities: D.C. Field Trip Take-Aways," [On October 4, 16 2013, NRC contacted Julien Dumoulin-Smith of UBS via 17 phone regarding this UBS report. UBS considers this 18 report proprietary via an email dated October 24, 2013 19 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13304B438). The proprietary UBS 20 report is contained in ADAMS Accssion No. ML13297A117).]
21 was issued after researchers at UBS visited with the 22 Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of 23 Energy regarding a number of the issues that they see as, 24 you know, sort of critical pending issues confronting the 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 26 nuclear corporations that they monitor investments in.
1 In particular[,] this report talks about 2
the NRC's inclinations in dealing with the hardened 3
containment vent issue in Mark I and Mark IIs, which Paul 4
referenced in his presentation. And they had this to say 5
regarding their anticipations of what NRC's action was 6
going to be on the hardened containment vent issue 7
following this meeting: And I quote here from the 8
summary on the first page of this report.
9 "A nearer-term mild positive is our belief 10 NRC is likely not to require filtered vents given their 11 material expense early next week." As I said[,] this 12 report was issued on February 20th, [2013] and as we 13 know[,] NRC the following week or shortly thereafter did 14 decide to back off on requiring the installation of 15 filters on containment vents in Mark I and IIs.
16 They go on to discuss this in greater detail 17 on page 5 of this report under a section called, "Look 18 for a Decision on Filtered Vents Next Week. Expect 19 Positive for Generators." Quote, "We look forward to 20
[for] a decision from the NRC next week on proposal to 21 require the installation of hardened filtered vents on 22 all Mark I and II units. We increasingly believe the NRC 23 may not require these added precautions given the added 24 stress this places on the incumbent portfolio[,] with NRC 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 27 staff initially estimating these vents would cost $15 1
[Mn] million, however, multiple other sources estimate 2
the true cost of such installation costs could be up to 3
$40 [Mn] million per unit. Given the [qualitative]
4 quality of factors cited as part of the cost-benefit 5
analysis used to justify their [the] retrofits, as well 6
as the fragile state of affairs among existing units[,]
7 it appears this [the] effort does not meet the usual rigor 8
of a quantitative cost-benefit analysis used to justify 9
such investments."
10 No [Now,] we recognize that this is not an 11 NRC document; this is a report, you know, by a party that 12 the NRC met with, but we consider, you know, especially 13 given the accuracy of the prediction that UBS had about 14 the NRC's ultimate action on this issue that the 15 underlying rationale for the taking of that action is 16 extremely disturbing.
And the reason[,]
in 17 particular[,] that it's disturbing is that first of all 18 the figures that are being cited here, whether it's $15 19 million or $40 million, are not in the way of enormous 20 capital investments that are typical in this industry.
21 And in fact[,] given the benefits that would accrue to 22 preventing the uncontrolled release of radiation in an 23 accident like we saw take place multiple times at 24 Fukushima in 2011, this is a very reasonable cost for the 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 28 expense that's been created as a result of not having such 1
reliable hardened containment filtered vents.
2 But[,] in particular[,] the consideration 3
of the impact that these type of investments might have 4
on the industry at this particular time is extremely 5
troubling and we want the NRC, you know, to be able to 6
reconsider the way that it evaluates regulatory burden, 7
in this matter in particular, but other matters more 8
broadly.
9 What I would like to distribute -- and I'm 10 sorry I didn't make enough copies for everyone at the 11 table. I wasn't sure how many NRC staff would be here.
12 But some charts detailing the exposure of the nuclear 13 industry to the type of financial risks that are present 14 at this time [The handout is contained in ADAMS Accession 15 No. ML13298A098].
16 There's two charts on this paper, you know, 17 looking more generally at the issue of how many nuclear 18 reactors in the U.S. are in states where the electricity 19 markets are deregulated. And in particular, the second 20 chart looks at the number of reactors, you know, that are 21 the subject of this petition that are also operating in 22 deregulated electricity markets.
23 What you see plainly is that the majority 24 of the reactors operating in this country; namely 57 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 29 percent, are operating in states with deregulated 1
electricity markets which are experiencing 2
unprecedented low market prices for electricity and 3
placing incredible pressure on the industry financially.
4 What you see in addition is that this 5
pattern is even more pronounced with respect to Mark I 6
and II reactors where 20 of the 31 Mark I and IIs in the 7
U.S. are operating in states where the electricity 8
markets are deregulated, or, in the case of Vermont 9
Yankee, are operating as a merchant reactor in a state 10 that hasn't deregulated.
11 The reason that we raise this is because, 12 you know, if the NRC is making decisions about safety 13 post-Fukushima and considering investments like $15 14 million, $40 million, which as I said are, you know, 15 within the realm of what's typical within the industry 16
-- they're not outrageous costs for capital expenses in 17 the industry, but these are being cited as potential 18 risks for reactor closure, that the NRC really -- you 19 know, I mean it's very troubling if the NRC is actually 20 taking those circumstances into account and deciding not 21 to require safety improvements and to take these kind of 22 enforcement actions [The transcript was forwarded to the 23 NRC Office of Inspector General for review].
24 You know, these plants in these markets are 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 30 experiencing large structural deficits in their 1
operating expenses. The cash flow deficits that many of 2
these Mark Is are experiencing, notably Vermont Yankee, 3
which has recently been announced to close, but also 4
other reactors: Fitzpatrick, Pilgrim, Nine Mile Point 5
1, and again these other, you know, 16 other Mark I and 6
II reactors in deregulated states. Sort of the 7
regulatory bar is being lowered to a really frightening 8
level if the NRC is taking into account the economic 9
circumstances of this industry at this time in making 10 these kind of regulatory decisions. And we would urge 11 the NRC to not consider the regulatory burden of these 12 expenses in making these decisions going forward.
13 If the industry, you know, ends up closing 14 reactors because they can't afford to meet basic safety 15 standards like those that are being required in Japan, 16 then in a certain sense that's the gamble the industry 17 accepted by moving into deregulation. I mean operators 18 like Exelon and Entergy entered into deregulated markets 19 and acquired fleets of reactors on that basis and this 20 is the risk that they assumed, and we did not expect when 21 that happened that the NRC would base regulatory 22 standards on the volatility of electricity market which 23 it doesn't even regulate itself.
24 MR. GUNTER: Thank you. Jessica Azulay, 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 31 AGREE?
1 MS. AZULAY: Yes, can you hear me?
2 MR. GUNTER: Speak a little louder.
3 MS. AZULAY: Can you hear me?
4 MR. GUNTER: Yes.
5 MS. AZULAY: Okay. Great. So my name is 6
Jessica Azulay. I'm calling in from Syracuse, New York 7
where I, along with about a million people, live within 8
50 files [miles] of two Mark I boiling water reactors and 9
one Mark II boiling water reactor, which are all located 10 in Scriba, New York on the shore of Lake Ontario.
11 I represent the Alliance for a Green 12 Economy, a coalition of grassroots organizations in New 13 York who together represent thousands of New Yorkers 14 concerned about the risks posed by the nuclear plants in 15 our state.
16 I'd like to thank the NRC for the 17 opportunity to speak today, and I'd also like to thank 18 Beyond Nuclear and my fellow nuclear watchdogs around the 19 country who are taking part in this very important 20 hearing [This is not a hearing; this is a public PRB 21 meeting under the 2.206 petition process].
22 We[,] at the Alliance for a Green Economy[,]
23 have reviewed the record on the Mark I and Mark II 24 reactors. We've looked at the NRC documents going back 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 32 decades. I have personally reviewed over 1,000 pages 1
released through a Freedom of Information Act request 2
about the containment and dangerous venting plans for the 3
FitzPatrick reactor, which is one of the Mark I boiling 4
water reactors in my region. We have carefully reviewed 5
the post-Fukushima reports from the NRC and the orders 6
NRC has given for installing and improving vents on 7
FitzPatrick, Nine Mile 1 and Nine Mile 2, and all the 8
other Mark I and Mark II reactors in the U.S.
9 This record clearly shows that the Mark I 10 and Mark II reactors by their original design do not 11 comply with the NRC's General Design Criterion 16 which 12 requires a reliable leak-proof containment to protect 13 the public from radiation exposure during an accident.
14 The record also clearly shows that this design flaw has 15 never been addressed in the Mark II reactors like Nine 16 Mile Point 2. It was not fully addressed in the Mark I 17 reactors that installed vents in the early '90s like Nine 18 Mile Point 1 and it was not fully addressed at FitzPatrick 19 also here in Central New York, the only Mark I in the U.S.
20 that doesn't have a hardened vent to the stack, and 21 instead has a reckless plan to blow the doors off the 22 standby gas treatment building in order to create a 23 so-called vent cap if it's needed. So in their current 24 state[,] none of the boiling water reactors in Central 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 33 New York meet General Design Criterion 16.
1 What's frustrating about this case is that 2
the NRC essentially agrees with us that right now these 3
reactors do not offer adequate protection from an 4
accident. And yet[,] instead of true protection from 5
the very real threats of today[,] we are offered the 6
promise of improvements tomorrow. And by tomorrow[,] I 7
mean five or six years from now, and maybe even longer.
8 In the order EA 13-109 issued on June 6th 9
of this year, NRC states that implementation of new vent 10 requirements
- are, quote, "necessary to provide 11 reasonable assurance of adequate protection on the 12 public health and safety." The order also states that 13 one of the factors that led to the order is to enhance 14 the Mark I and Mark II containments, quote, "by 15 addressing the relatively high probabilities that those 16 containments would fail should an accident progress to 17 melting the core," unquote.
18 Later in the same document[,] it is again 19 reiterated that, quote, "these modifications are needed 20 to protect public health and minimize danger to life or 21 property because they will give licensees greater 22 capabilities to respond to severe accidents and limit the 23 uncontrolled release of radioactive materials,"
24 unquote.
25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 34 Lest you accuse me of taking these quotes 1
out of context, I will note that in the same order it says, 2
quote, "The NRC staff has determined that continued 3
operation does not pose an imminent risk to public health 4
and safety." But then in the same sentence it says, 5
"However, the additional requirements outlined in EA 6
13-109 are necessary in light of insights gained from the 7
events at Fukushima Daiichi.
8 I'm sure you can understand that these 9
seemingly contradictory statements are incredibly 10 confusing and frustrating to people like me who are 11 trying to understand the risks in our communities. How 12 can you say that these reactors are safe to operate now, 13 but that the new vents you'll require are, quote, 14 "necessary to provide reasonable assurance of adequate 15 protection to the public health and safety in light of 16 the events at Fukushima?" It doesn't make any sense.
17 The first part of this contradictory 18 statement that these reactors don't pose an imminent 19 threat is offered as one of your justifications for 20 denying our petition. The statement is negated by the 21 mountain of evidence going back decades and by the NRC's 22 own justification for requiring yet more upgrades trying 23 to fix the flaws in the design.
24 You might say that NRC is addressing our 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 35 concerns through another process, the process by which 1
you'll require new vents to be installed on the plants 2
in question. But one of the main reasons we filed this 3
emergency enforcement petition is because the process is 4
allowing dangerous reactors to stay online and continue 5
to threaten us right now and for the foreseeable future, 6
for the several years it will take before the upgraded 7
vents are actually installed, if they even are installed 8
on the scheduled that you've laid out.
9 Meanwhile, there's been a decision by the 10 Commission so far not to require filters on the vents to 11 protect us from radiation if the vents have to be used 12 once they're installed, which means these new vents will 13 not bring the plants up to regulatory compliance on a 14 leak-proof containment.
15 You can also understand that we are 16 skeptical over whether these new so-called reliable 17 vents will be truly reliable since the last round 18 recommended by NRC proved not reliable at Fukushima in 19 their first real world test. These issues are at the 20 heart of your petition.
21 There is a saying that justice delayed is 22 justice denied. I believe similarly protection delayed 23 is protection denied. The NRC's job is to protect us 24 from the possibility that something could go wrong at one 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 36 of these reactors. It is not controversial at this point 1
to say that NRC itself admits that nuclear technology is 2
not perfect and that things do sometimes go wrong and that 3
accidents can happen even if they're unlikely. That's 4
why a reliable leak-proof containment is required by law 5
in all operating nuclear reactors.
6 This is not a hypothetical scenario for me 7
and my neighbors. Just last week[,] we found out that 8
due to a fairly small human error and inadequate 9
procedures in April of 2013 [April 16, 2013 - see NRC 10 Integrated Inspection Report, dated September 23, 2013 11 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13266A237) for details] Nine Mile 12 Point lost power to its cooling mechanisms and came 13 within less than two hours of boiling and within nine 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> of fuel exposure that could have led to a meltdown.
15 And because containment was not functional at the time 16 due to refueling activities, NRC was not sure there would 17 have been enough time to evacuate if the accident had 18 progressed. This is a reminder to all of us how 19 important regulation on containment is and how every day 20 we live exposed to the risk of a nuclear accident that 21 could destroy Upstate New York. We're asking you to shut 22 these plants down before that happens.
23 Your regulation doesn't say that a reliable 24 leak-proof containment should be planned to be in place 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 37 at some point in the future to protect us from accidents.
1 It says reactor containment and associated systems shall 2
be provided to establish an essentially leak-proof 3
barrier against the uncontrolled release of 4
radioactivity to the environment.
5 In recommending that our petition be 6
rejected[,] you have offered no evidence that a 7
leak-proof containment exists for these plants in 8
today's reality, nor have you assured us that we will have 9
truly leak-proof containment in the future. You have 10 only offered us the promise that in several years we might 11 get an improvement to the currently unreliable vents.
12 This is protection delayed and protection denied. I 13 strongly urge you to reconsider your initial 14 recommend[ation] and accept our petition for review.
15 Thank you.
16 MR. GUNTER: Thank you, Jessica. We'll 17 now hear from Lewis Cuthbert.
18 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: Before you do could you 19 ask whoever doesn't have their phone muted to please mute 20 it, because there's a lot of interference on the line 21 right now.
22 MS. LEWISON: And also, Paul, this is Linda 23 Lewison in Chicago, that I am online. Can you --
24 MR. GUNTER: Okay. Very good.
25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 38 MS. LEWISON: Can you hear me?
1 MR. GUNTER: Yes, we can.
2 MS. LEWISON: Okay.
3 MR. GUNTER: But we would like not to hear 4
the background noise. Can you all please mute your 5
lines? Star 6. Star 6, please. Thank you.
6 We still have somebody online without their 7
mute and with background noise. Please mute your line.
8 DR. CUTHBERT: Hi, can you hear me?
9 MR. GUNTER: Is this Lewis?
10 DR. CUTHBERT: Yes, it is, Paul.
11 MR. GUNTER: Go ahead, Lewis. And thank 12 you for whoever muted their line.
13 DR. CUTHBERT: Okay.
14 MR. GUNTER: Proceed.
15 DR. CUTHBERT: Good afternoon. Thank you 16 for the opportunity to share some perspective and 17 comments on behalf of the community that surrounds the 18 Limerick Nuclear Generating Station in Limerick, 19 Pennsylvania. My name is Dr. Lewis Cuthbert. I'm the 20 president of ACE, the Alliance for a Clean Environment.
21 After 14 years of investigating Limerick 22 Nuclear Plant, the Alliance for a Clean Environment has 23 compiled a body of evidence that strongly supports the 24 Beyond Nuclear petition from Paul Gunter --
25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 39 MR. GUNTER: Lewis?
1 DR. CUTHBERT: Yes?
2 MR. GUNTER: Are you still there? Okay.
3 I was just checking.
4 DR. CUTHBERT: Yes, I am. Shall I continue 5
or start again, Paul?
6 MR. GUNTER: Proceed.
7 DR. CUTHBERT: Okay. After 14 years of 8
investigating Limerick Nuclear Plant, the Alliance for 9
a Clean Environment has compiled a body of evidence that 10 strongly supports the Beyond Nuclear petition from Paul 11 Gunter calling for the emergency closure of GE boiling 12 water reactors.
13 Limerick's Mark II reactors have dangerous 14 and unreliable containment structures similar to those 15 that melted down at Fukushima. Limerick clearly 16 presents undue and unacceptable risk to public health, 17 safety and the environment. Radioactivity released in 18 an accident at Limerick could destroy the health and 19 lives of millions of people living in the greater 20 Philadelphia region. Over 8 million people live within 21 50 miles of Limerick. We cannot evacuate safely.
22 NRC's failure to require immediate 23 installation of vents with filters has been negligent 24 beyond belief, especially when NRC's own staff said vents 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 40 without filters could become a radioactive fire hose in 1
the sky and that filtered vents should be installed 2
regardless of the cost to industry.
3 Many structural flaws at Limerick Nuclear 4
Plant were defective from the beginning and cannot be 5
fixed. NRC is sweeping serious problems under the rug 6
further risking unnecessary radioactive catastrophe 7
[The transcript was sent to the NRC Allegation Program 8
for review]. NRC is failing to address Limerick's 9
flawed design issues as well as its history of multiple 10 reactor shutdowns, many of which are unexplained, plus 11 other serious problems and violations.
12
[Executive Director of Operations]
13 Commissioner Borchardt's June 25, 2013 [ADAMS Accession 14 No. ML131400044], letter to ACE suggests that the NRC is 15 not taking risk of meltdown at Limerick or threats to 16 public health and safety seriously enough. In a 21-page 17 response letter, 8/5/13, to [Executive Director of 18 Operations] Commissioner Borchardt ACE identified a body 19 of evidence showing why NRC cannot guarantee public 20 safety from Limerick operations and why NRC should close 21 Limerick. NRC repeatedly accommodates Exelon's 22 financial interests but further jeopardizes public 23 health and safety in the process. Major issues for our 24 community include the following: Exelon repeatedly 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 41 fails to comply with NRC regulations at Limerick. Then 1
NRC weakens regulations and amends Limerick's operating 2
licenses based on Exelon's outdated and faulty 3
assumptions even though Exelon's self-serving claims are 4
often contraindicated by their own reports to NRC.
5 Exelon did not provide testing that proved Limerick's two 6
reactors have not already become dangerously brittle 7
enough to either crack or shatter.
8 After 28 years of operation[,] there are 9
serious reactor issues not adequately addressed to 10 assure there will not be a loss of coolant accident that 11 could lead to a meltdown. In fact, risks are increasing.
12 Limerick's upgrades have increased reactor dome pressure 13 and corrosion levels, according to GE. Limerick is also 14 using new more powerful GE fuel which produces more 15 radiation, more heat and more stress on aging equipment.
16 Limerick's boiling water reactors involve 17 un-correctable degradation. The nuclear industry 18 itself admitted reactors are too costly to replace. On 19 June 1, 2011 [ADAMS Accession Nos. ML111780308, 20 ML112160612, and ML112410442], a petition was filed 21 against Exelon about Limerick's repeated shutdown 22 problems and serious reactor and system degradation.
23 NRC dismissed it [on September 2, 2011 (ADAMS Accession 24 No. ML112371884)].
25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 42 Limerick's shutdown safety valves and 1
control rods may not operate reliability [reliably] to 2
prevent meltdowns. That is unacceptable. Limerick's 3
spent fuel pools, like those at Fukushima, are 4
dangerously located on top of reactors, but Limerick's 5
radioactive risks are worse. Pools are packed far 6
beyond design capacity and documented to have been 7
constructed with sub-standard cement.
8 NRC documented corrosion and loss of 9
thickness in Limerick's fuel pools at rates far higher 10 than original calculations. Pitting corrosion was 2 to 11 10 times higher than general corrosion. Exelon 12 requested a delay of over a decade to recoat the pools 13 even though NRC told Exelon that to delay fuel pool 14 recoating was unacceptable. Inexplicably[,] NRC caved 15 and revised Limerick's regulations allowing Exelon to 16 delay recoating for more than a decade.
17 There is an earthquake fault under Limerick 18 with four others within 17 miles. The recent Virginia 19 earthquake triggered seismic reactor alarms at Limerick, 20 and the risk to Limerick was misleading because some 21 monitors were not operable.
22 And finally, Limerick is surrounded by one 23 of the most densely populated areas in the nation and 24 cannot be safely evacuated. In 1980, NRC stated that 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 43 Limerick had double the population density within 30 1
miles considered safe for evacuation even back then.
2 Now population density is four times that number.
3 Montgomery County officials in Pennsylvania expressed 4
concerns to NRC about the impossibility of safe 5
evacuation due to a
lack of and inadequate 6
infrastructure. Exelon's 2012 evacuation time estimate 7
for Limerick is both highly unrealistic and unworkable.
8 And in conclusion[,] I'd like to suggest on 9
behalf of millions of residents near and around the 10 Limerick Nuclear Generating Station that we believe the 11 evidence shows why it is imperative for NRC to revoke 12 Limerick Nuclear Plant's operating licenses and we ask 13 that all other Mark I and II reactors currently in 14 operation in the United States also close at the 15 direction of the NRC. Thank you for your consideration.
16 MR. GUNTER: Thank you, Lewis. Let's see, 17 before we hear from the next speaker I have been passed 18 a note that I misspoke in my testimony and that I stated 19 that there were 14 BWRs in the United States that were 20 undergoing the filtered vent [modification]. And my 21 intent is to correct the record to say that those were 22 14 BWRs in Japan. So thank you.
23 Okay. We have background noise on the line 24 again. Can you please mute if you're not on as a speaker?
25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 44 Can you please mute your line? Star 6.
1 Can we hear from Chuck Johnson with 2
Washington/Oregon PSR?
3 MR. JOHNSON: Yes, thank you. My name is 4
Charles K. Johnson and I'm the director of the Joint Task 5
Force on Nuclear Power for the Oregon and Washington 6
chapters of Physicians for Social Responsibility. My 7
comments follow on the previous comments in the May 8
[Public PRB meeting held on May 2,2013] public hearing 9
[that was not a hearing; it was a public PRB meeting held 10 in the 2.206 petition process] of John Pearson, M.D., our 11 Oregon PSR chapter president.
12 Thank you for the opportunity to present to 13 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regarding the issue of 14 the demonstrably inadequate containment structures 15 designed into the GE Mark I and Mark II nuclear power 16 reactors proven to be vulnerable to failure by the 17 multiple accidents in Fukushima, Japan and the plan to 18 allow unfiltered vented radioactive effluent from the 19 reactors to be pipelined into communities surrounding 20 them in the case of a worst case accident.
21 As it's been pointed out by Beyond Nuclear 22 and the rest of the co-signing groups in the petition for 23 revocation of the licenses for these inherently 24 dangerous reactors, this plan for dealing with severe 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 45 accident conditions will deliberately defeat the 1
licensed condition for maintaining public health and 2
safety through defense-in-depth protective reactor 3
systems including, quote, "an essentially leak-tight 4
valve against the controlled release of radioactivity to 5
the environment," end quote, associated with the 6
occurrence of reactor core fuel damage.
7
- Further, as previously
- stated, this 8
constitutes violations of these reactors' licensed 9
condition as required under 10 C.F.R., Appendix A, 10 General Design Criteria 10 and 16, and the operating 11 licenses should therefore be revoked.
12 We would like to emphasize three points 13 specific to our own reactor of concern, the Columbia 14 Generating Station, also known as the Washington Nuclear 15 Plant No. 2, located on the Hanford Nuclear Reservation 16 along the Columbia River 10 miles north of Richland, 17 Washington, each of the potential pathway by which an 18 accident could occur that is sufficient to cause the plan 19 for emergency breach of containment envisioned by the NRC 20 policy when it decided to allow the Columbia Nuclear 21 Plant to construct unfiltered vents to its GE BWR Mark 22 II containment design reactor which would intentionally 23 release radionuclides in quantities well beyond what the 24 plant is licensed to release into the surrounding 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 46 communities and the Pacific Northwest as a whole.
1 These three points are: (1) Geological 2
knowledge of the region has improved immensely with U.S.
3 Department of Energy studies showing that ground motion 4
in an earthquake is now potentially three times greater 5
than was known and planned for when the Columbia Nuclear 6
Plant was built; (2) volatile nuclear facilities exist 7
nearby on the Hanford Nuclear Reservation that could also 8
release large quantities of radioactive material in an 9
earthquake, a terrorist attack or a human-caused 10 accident which could cause the plant site to become so 11 radioactively hot that operators might be at immediate 12 health risk which could lead to an accident at the 13 Columbia Plant; and (3) a breach of the Grand Coulee Dam 14 would result in power cuts to the site that could last 15 for many days, would include the destruction of power and 16 water intake structure, roads and entire cities in the 17 path of a giant wall of water which would inundate the 18 base of the ultimate heat sink in the Columbia Nuclear 19 Plant itself.
20 Beginning with point No. 1, I would like to 21 note that the Oregon and Washington chapters of 22 Physicians for Social Responsibility sent a letter to the 23 NRC Chairwoman, Allison Macfarlane, on July 4 th [19 th],
24 2013 [ADAMS Accession No. ML13210A397]. It outlined our 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 47 concerns about the adequacy of the Columbia Nuclear Plant 1
to withstand an earthquake in light of geological 2
research for a federal high-level waste treatment 3
facility less than 10 miles from the plant that has now 4
been required to meet ground motion standards three times 5
those that the Columbia Nuclear Plant was designed to 6
meet. The new earthquake data available on the Hanford 7
Nuclear Reservation was not considered during the May 8
2012 relicensing of the Columbia Nuclear Plant because 9
it was said to be part of the, quote, "ongoing regulatory 10 oversight," end quote.
11 We've not had a reply from Chairwoman 12 Macfarlane or the NRC to our request for a meeting with 13 her [Chairman Macfarlane responded by letter dated 14 September 26, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13224A360)].
15 To date, the NRC has not explained their unconscionably 16 lax, quote, "regulatory oversight," end quote, of the 17 impact of new geologic data some of which has been widely 18 known to Washington State geologists for over a decade.
19 The original assessment of the plant site 20 in 1981 found that there was a low annual probability of 21 exceedance [exceeding], 0.00011, of the 0.025 g 22 laboratory ground motion threshold of the safe shutdown 23 earthquake for the Columbia Nuclear Plant. It was 24 licensed on that basis and this assessment has not been 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 48 changed since.
1 In the 30 years since the plant was 2
licensed[,]
there have been numerous geologic 3
investigations on the Hanford Reservation and 4
surrounding region conducted by the U.S. Geological 5
Survey, federal contractors, PNNL, Pacific Northwest 6
National Laboratory, the State of Washington, and 7
universities. The outcomes of these studies have piled 8
up the geologic evidence that indicates the original 9
Columbia Nuclear Plant's seismic risk assessment 10 significantly underestimated the potential risks to the 11 reactor and associated structures.
12 Among the evidence so far not considered by 13 the NRC regulators to our knowledge is the following:
14 More detailed mapping of folds and faults in the region 15 surrounding the Columbia Nuclear Plant site now exist.
16 The folds and faults considered in the original seismic 17 risk assessment have significantly longer lengths and 18 evidence of being geologically young indicating 19 relatively recent earthquakes. Longer fault lengths 20 also indicate that these longer faults may be capable of 21 producing much larger magnitude earthquakes.
22 Additional Yakima fold and thrust belt structures were 23 identified that could pose an earthquake risk to the 24 Columbia Nuclear Plant, including Frenchman Hills, 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 49 Manastash Ridge, Toppenish Ridge, Columbia Hills, Hog 1
Ranch-Naneum Ridge and Hite Fault.
2 The potential significance and importance 3
of a magnitude 6.5 to 7.4, quote, "1872 earthquake," end 4
quote, the largest historical earthquake to hit the 5
region, to the seismic risk analysis of the Columbia 6
Nuclear Plant was greatly reduced because the assumed 7
location of the epicenter for this event was more than 8
180 miles away than was determined by Bakun et al in 2002.
9 The revised location for the epicenter at the southern 10 end of Lake Chelan is approximately 99 miles from the 11 Columbia Nuclear Plant, rather than an additional 180 12 miles away as was believed at the time that they set the 13 standards for the plant.
14 Subsequent seismic risk assessments 15 performed by the U.S. Department of Energy for the 16 Hanford site that factored in newly available structural 17 geology data and generated estimates at peak vibratory 18 ground motions were significantly higher than those used 19 to establish the Columbia Nuclear Plant's license in 20 1981. The Geomatrix study in 1996 established peak 21 vibratory ground motion of 0.50 g on the Hanford site 10 22 miles from the Columbia Nuclear Plant, double that of the 23 estimate of the Columbia Nuclear Plant license.
24 New information about earthquake hazards 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 50 since Geomatrix forced the U.S. Department of Energy to 1
suspend work on their waste treatment plant, WTP, 2
facility to allow for new data collection and updated 3
seismic risk assessment. Three studies, Youngs, 2007; 4
Rohay and Brouns, 2007; Rohay and Reidel, 2005, 5
determined that the previous vibratory ground motion 6
estimate needed to be increase [increased] to 0.8 g 7
causing the U.S. Department of Energy to order 8
significant modification to the WTP facility. That's 9
three times larger than the Columbia Nuclear Plant was 10 required to meet. That facility is 10 miles away from 11 that plant.
12 A July 2010 letter from the Nuclear 13 Regulatory Commission to the operator of the Columbia 14 Nuclear Plant, Energy Northwest, requested that they 15 address their concerns that the most recent seismic risk 16 study in 1995 for the Columbia Nuclear Plant failed to 17 address more recent geologic findings and increased 18 seismic risk as determined for the WTP facility. Energy 19 Northwest replied that the Columbia Plant was, quote, "an 20 increased distance from the nearby seismic sources and 21 had different sub-surface geology conditions." These 22 conclusions are not born out by geological observation 23 in any study today, and yet the NRC has not required any 24 modification be made to the Columbia Nuclear Plant to 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 51 address the increased risk from the strong seismic 1
vibratory ground motion. In 2011, the U.S. Geological 2
Survey published a paper that will likely fundamentally 3
change several key assumptions that past seismic risk 4
assessments were based upon. The USGC found that the 5
maximum length of some of the Yakima fold and thrust belt 6
structures have been previously underestimated. Their 7
paper focused on the Umtanum Ridge which they were able 8
to trace through the Cascade Range where it merges with 9
active faults in the Puget Sound area. The Umtanum Ridge 10 structure, which terminates less than five miles north 11 of the Columbia Nuclear Plant, went from 77 miles to more 12 than 124 miles in length, greatly increasing the known 13 potential for large earthquakes.
14 They found that the structure of the Umtanum 15 Ridge was deeper than previously assumed and can produce 16 larger magnitude quakes as a result. They found 17 evidence that the Umtanum Ridge of trenching surface 18 scarps indicating that this structural feature may be 19 more seismically active than previously believed. This 20 new information will be factored into the new 21 probabilistic seismic hazard analysis being conducted by 22 the U.S. Department of Energy for the Hanford site 23 scheduled to be completed in 2014.
24 None of this new information has been addressed by Energy 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 52 Northwest and yet the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1
allows them to continue to operate the Columbia Plant at 2
full power under their clearly inadequate original 3
licensed earthquake standards.
4 So far in response to the post-Fukushima 5
requirements[,] Energy Northwest has in its walk-down in 6
April of 2011 of the Columbia Nuclear Plant determined 7
that they do not even meet these inadequate standards 8
finding that, quote, "the licensee determined that the 9
emergency response facilities, the power makeup system 10 and the fire protection systems were not seismically 11 qualified," end quote. And that, quote, "floor drain 12 isolation valves and sump level switches used to mitigate 13 internal flooding were not seismically qualified," end 14 quote.
15 Another seismic walk-down in November 2012 16 showed a total of 109 potentially seismic adverse 17 conditions. To date[,] we have nothing in writing to 18 show that these problems have been addressed and that 19 they have met the already inadequate 1983 standards.
20 Regarding point No. 2, the potential 21 interactivity of an accident on the Hanford Nuclear 22 Reservation, it should be noted that nine nuclear 23 reactors and four reprocessing plants at Hanford produce 24 nearly two-thirds of the plutonium used in the United 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 53 States for government purposes.
1 These site operations also created a large 2
volumes of radioactive and chemical waste. Some 3
contaminants were released into the environment exposing 4
people who live downwind and downstream. Other 5
contaminants were stored. The last reactor was shut 6
down in 1987 and the last reprocessing plant closed in 7
1990. Most of the human-made radioactivity and about 8
half of the chemicals remaining onsite are kept in 9
underground tanks and surface facilities. The rest 10 exist in the soil, groundwater and burial grounds.
11 Hanford contains about 40 percent of all of 12 the radioactivity that exists across the nuclear weapons 13 complex. More than 1,600 waste sites have been 14 identified on Hanford. Contained waste is held inside 15 structures such as underground tanks, buildings and 16 concrete basins. There are more than 500 waste 17 facilities at Hanford.
18 The primary threats of large-scale 19 radioactive contamination that could become an immediate 20 health hazard to Columbia Nuclear Plant workers are:
21 (1) The K basins near the closed K reactors in which a 22 shallow pond prevents deteriorated used fuel rod 23 material from catching fire and sending a cloud of 24 intense radiation across the Hanford site. If the pool 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 54 were to crack and drain, it would take minutes for a fire 1
to break out threatening workers throughout the site and 2
citizens beyond it.
3 (2) the waste encapsulation storage 4
facility, WESF, which contains 1,936 stainless steel 5
capsules holding 130 million curies of radioactive 6
cesium and strontium plus their decay products. These 7
are kept in water-filled pools in the WESF adjoining B 8
plant in the 200 area. These capsules have the largest 9
concentration on earth of strontium-90 and cesium-137, 10 are more radioactive than spent fuel and are held in a 11 50-year-old pool with no safety backups and no pretense 12 of containment. This pool is not rated to withstand even 13 a mild earthquake.
14 (3) The waste treatment plant, also 15 referred to as the Vitrification Plant, or Vit Plant, is 16 being built at Hanford to harden chemical and radioactive 17 tank wastes left from the plutonium extraction from spent 18 nuclear fuel. It has been delayed for seismic study, as 19 previously mentioned, but also due to whistle blower 20 complaints that the plant may be subject to hydrogen and 21 criticality explosions that could release large amounts 22 of life-threatening radioactive material onto the site 23 and the surrounding community.
24 The Hanford Nuclear Reservation contains 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 55 330 million curies of total radioactivity, less than the 1
361 million curies of total radioactivity at the Columbia 2
Plant site, but almost double the amount of radioactivity 3
available for release.
4 As mentioned above, some of these curies are 5
contained in materials that are not stored in a way that 6
could guarantee they are not subject to a catastrophic 7
release. If an earthquake, fire, terrorist attack, 8
human or mechanical error caused a catastrophic release, 9
it may force workers to leave the Columbia Nuclear Plant 10 facility in order to prevent an immediate loss of life 11 putting the plant itself at risk for a catastrophic 12 accident.
13 Finally, the threat of flooding at the site 14 must be considered as potential accident pathway. The 15 NRC's own studies, most recently the final safety 16 analysis report of the Columbia Generating Station in 17 December of 2012, of the potential for a catastrophic 18 Grand Coulee Dam terrorist attack scenario would put the 19 city of Richland under a 15-foot wave of swiftly churning 20 water and debris wiping out power infrastructure and all 21 water intake equipment from along the Columbia River.
22 The Columbia Nuclear Plant site is located 23 far enough above the river that it would avoid complete 24 inundation, but the backup water supply, the ultimate 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 56 heat sink contained in pools slightly below grade from 1
the reactor and turbines would be grazed by the high water 2
point possibly doing damage to the structural integrity 3
as well. The combination of a lack of off-site power for 4
an extended period of time, the cut off of the primary 5
water source and potential threat to its backup and the 6
massive destruction of local infrastructure, roads, 7
bridges, human organizational systems could lead to a 8
lack of power, water or both to continue the critical 9
cooling of the reactor core. We know from Fukushima what 10 that situation leads to with a GE BWR Mark I or Mark II 11 containment.
12 A letter from NRC employee Richard H.
13 Perkins, PE of the Division Risk Analysis Office of 14 Nuclear Reactor Regulation, dated September 14, 2012 to 15 the NRC's Office of the Inspector General, exposes the 16 concealment of this, quote, "significant nuclear safety 17 information from the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory 18 Commission." The Columbia Nuclear Plant was one of the 19 plants named as threatened in the suppressed study 20 entitled, quote, "Flooding of U.S. Nuclear Power Plants 21 Following Upstream Dam Failure [ADAMS Accession No.
22 ML12188A239]."
23 As has been observed by many nuclear 24 experts, the location of Fukushima next to the ocean and 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 57 the fact that the wind carried much of the radioactivity 1
from the explosions there out to sea diluted a large 2
amount of the exposure to humans and terrestrial life.
3 No such protection exists on river-based nuclear plants 4
like the Columbia Nuclear Plant. A Fukushima-style 5
accident there would be born by the wind over land and 6
water-related impacts would be felt by downstream river 7
uses for centuries.
8 In summary, in the case of the Columbia 9
Nuclear Plant there are potential pathways for the same 10 type of catastrophic containment breaching accidents 11 that occurred in Japan in 2011. These pathways are more 12 likely than the NRC and the reactor operator have been 13 willing to officially acknowledge to date. The plan to 14 place unfiltered vents on the Columbia Nuclear Plant's 15 containment system constitutes a basic violation of NRC 16 requirements for viable containment in order to safely 17 operate a nuclear power plant. For this reason[,] the 18 Columbia Nuclear Plant and all other plants with the same 19 or similar containment systems should be closed 20 immediately until they can be shown to have containment 21 systems that do not violate NRC requirements. Thank 22 you.
23 MR. GUNTER: Thank you, Chuck.
24 Mary Lampert? And we are 2:15, so we have 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 58 until 3:00. Okay.
1 MS. LAMPERT: Okay. Hi, this is Mary 2
Lampert, Pilgrim Watch, keeping an eye on the Pilgrim 3
Nuclear Power Plant.
4 We strongly object to the preliminary 5
statements that we are in no immediate danger. That is 6
on its face an absurd statement.
7 We know NRC does not have a crystal ball and 8
we can look at the facts brought forward by Tim Judson 9
and the petition I'm a part of that the economic situation 10 of boiling water reactors in deregulated markets is such 11 they cannot --
12 (Technical interruption.)
13 MS. LAMPERT: Hello?
14 MR. GUNTER: Go ahead, Mary.
15 MS. LAMPERT: They cannot compete with 16 cheaper available sources of electricity. And why this 17 presents a particular danger is this: That they're old 18 reactors. Pilgrim went online, for example, in '72.
19 And like old people, they're starting to fall apart.
20 They need replacements that Pilgrim and other old 21 reactors in deregulated markets are not spending the 22 money on, so things are breaking. And the NRC is not doing 23 its job of regulating nor putting in effect orders that 24 respond to the true challenges that we know from the 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 59 lessons learned at Fukushima.
1 So at Pilgrim[,] they have had 17 event 2
reports this year [From the NRC public webpage for event 3
reports, Pilgrim had 22 event reports from January 1, 4
2013 to September 30, 2013. The Event Report Nos. are 5
48664, 48665, 48685, 48712,48736, 48739, 48743, 48766, 6
48801, 48909, 48923, 48997, 49013, 49053, 49061, 49064, 7
49187, 49189, 49196, 49201, and 49296]. If you look at 8
the 100 reactors across the country, on average, they 9
have less than one shutdown per reactor this year.
10 Pilgrim has had nine times that [From the NRC public 11 webpage for event reports, Pilgrim has had 4 scrams from 12 January 1, 2013 to September 30, 2013. The Event Report 13 Nos. are 48664, 48736, 48923, and 49296]. So this goes 14 15 (Technical interruption.)
16 MS. LAMPERT: Hello?
17 MR. GUNTER: -- try and work it out.
18 MS. LAMPERT: Oh, okay. And so I agree 19 with much that has been said so far, and for efficiency 20 of time[,] I'll just add pieces here and there.
21 In regard to electric power, the spent fuel 22 pools do not have a dedicated backup power system now.
23 To say that it's going to be dealt with down the line does 24 not provide reasonable assurance today. Furthermore, a 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 60 secondary emergency power capacity is not required in 1
decommissioned plants and licensees are allowed to 2
perform maintenance on emergency diesel generators when 3
reactors are undergoing refueling outages. Those two 4
points puts us at considerable danger for an accident 5
with containment failure.
6 As far as the assumption that mitigation is 7
adequate is also ridiculous. We can look at, for 8
example, the capability to add water to a spent fuel pool.
9 NRC's assumption that operators will be able to add water 10 to the pool mitigation during an accident is certainly 11 overly optimistic.
12 At Pilgrim[,] they are supposedly going to 13 bring truck-mounted cranes or a ladder fire truck to the 14 site on short notice; however, this arrangement has never 15 been realistically tested. An event that initiates or 16 co-initiates the accident; an earthquake, hurricane, ice 17 storm, blizzard or an attack would render a truck 18 unavailable. A radioactive release from a reactor 19 accident could produce radiation fields that render the 20 truck unavailable or preclude its use. And there is no 21 provision for a radiation-resistant TV camera to guide 22 nozzle positioning or for shielding of the truck or spray 23 operators, and there seems to be no recognition that 24 spraying water on exposed spent fuel could in certain 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 61 circumstances exacerbate the accident by feeding a zirc 1
steam fire.
2 And you go from one to the other and realize 3
that there is no waste confidence. And it additionally 4
seems counterproductive to make a final decision on this 5
petition before we've gone -- NRC has gone through the 6
process of the waste confidence ordered by the 5th 7
District Court.
8 Furthermore, we've called the game, and I 9
can send you the analyses of the earthquake study that 10 NRC is using to support the fact that relax, be happy, 11 there's no problem. That study is totally bogus. It 12 does not pass the sniff test of scientific integrity.
13 And I will send it to be added to this petition at the 14 end of this conference call [To date, this document has 15 not been provided to the NRC].
16 Further, I note that I had added to the 17 petition a supplement, 9/24/11 [ADAMS Accession No.
18 ML11279A034]; however, the Petition Review Board's 19 acceptance of this petition did not seem to acknowledge 20 that they had read it [The supplement dated September 24, 21 2011, is being addressed as part of 2.206 petition dated 22 April 23, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11104A058), under 23 NRC Green Ticket G20110262]. And the two points brought 24 forward definitely have bearing on containment 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 62 integrity.
1 First of all, I brought forward the fact 2
that it appears that NRC is considering detonation, 3
explosions at [Fukushima Dai-ichi] Unit 3 as a result of 4
a detonation. In your analyses[, it] seems to assume a 5
detonation and not consider the possibility of a 6
deflagration which was discussed in reference to 7
[Fukushima Dai-ichi] Unit 3 by Arnold Gundersen as 8
mentioned in my supplement [dated September 24, 2011 9
(ADAMS Accession No. ML11279A034]. It's clear that 10 containments cannot withstand a shockwave that travels 11 faster than the speed of sound, which is the situation 12 in a deflagration.
13 Furthermore, you see that the speed of sound 14 in a relatively warm, moist climate; in other words, 15 reactors near large bodies of water, is around 600 miles 16 per hour. Therefore, he contended that if this is what 17 we think it is, it would cause enormous damage to 18 containment because they certainly, these BWRs, are in 19 now [no] way designed to handle it.
20 The second point which would be 21 consequences that I brought forward in that supplement 22
[dated September 24, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No.
23 ML11279A034),] and I think deserves review by this 24
[Petition Review] Board is the fact of the control rods 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 63 being inserted from the bottom in BWRs, where in a PWR 1
they enter from the top. What does this mean? It means 2
in a PWR at the bottom of the core is a very thick 8 to 3
10-inch piece of metal that a nuclear reactor core would 4
have to melt through. But in BWRs[, ]such as Pilgrim and 5
at Fukushima[,] the control rods come up through the 6
bottom. And when the nuclear core lies on the bottom of 7
a boiling water reactor like Fukushima, like Pilgrim and 8
the rest, it's easier for a core to melt through because 9
of those six-feet holes in the bottom of the reactor. It 10 doesn't have to melt through first eight inches of steel.
11 NRC recognized this problem in that they 12 sent and [an] email, which I attached [in the letter dated 13 September 24, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11279A034)]
14
-- by NRC right after the Fukushima accident to Japan.
15 And so[,] I would join with the others that we: (1) Have 16 insufficient mitigation. The amounts of relief are 17 exceedingly and unnecessarily high due to the lack of 18 backbone in four of the five Commissioners in not dealing 19 with filters [ Refer to the Commission Voting Record, 20 dated March 19, 2013, for SECY-12-0157 (ADAMS Accession 21 No. ML13078A012) and Staff Requirements Memorandum, 22 dated March 19, 2013, for SECY-12-0157 (ADAMS Accession 23 No. ML13078A017]. And this, however, is no excuse for 24 the Commission to continue to press for filters because 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 64 we are down the road. The option voted on by the [Atomic 1
Safety and Licensing] Board was to kick the filter can 2
down the road, and we're there [By Memorandum and Order, 3
dated January 11, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No.
4 ML12011A045), the NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 5
denied Pilgrim Watchs request for a hearing on a new 6
contention relating to the Fukushima accident]. And 7
there can be no excuse, particularly with a dry well 8
event[,] because there is no way in hell that that is 9
being scrubbed and no rational person will accept that 10 all accidents will be slow, well-behaved and the gases 11 will slowly meander and most of the radionuclides will 12 get stuck on the sides. That is ridiculous on its face.
13 And thank you for the opportunity.
14 MR. GUNTER: Thank you. Okay. Linda 15 Lewison --
16 MS. LEWISON: Yes?
17 MR. GUNTER: -- with NEIS?
18 MS. LEWISON: Can you hear me?
19 MR. GUNTER: Yes. Go ahead, Linda.
20 MS. LEWISON: Okay. This is Linda Lewison 21 in Chicago. I'm speaking on behalf of David Craft, 22 director of Nuclear Energy Information Service. I am a 23 board member.
24 Nuclear Energy Information Services is a 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 65 32-year-old safe energy[,]
anti-nuclear[,]
1 environmental organization based in Chicago, Illinois.
2 We submit the following additional testimony in support 3
of the 2.206 petition originally filed April 13th, 2011 4
[The petition filed on April 13, 2011 (ADAMS Accession 5
No. ML11104A058) is being addressed under NRC Green 6
Ticket G20110262, and the current petition filed on March 7
21, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13085A218) is being 8
addressed under NRC Green Ticket G20130229], calling for 9
the closure of GE boiling water reactors using Mark I and 10 Mark II containments.
11 NEIS has monitored the activities of 12 Illinois' nuclear reactors and federal and state 13 regulators since 1981. Illinois is the most 14 nuclear-reliant state in the U.S. with 11 operating and 15 3 closed reactors. Within our borders[,] sits 9,660 16 tons of spent reactor fuel, the largest standing amount 17 of high-level radioactive waste of any state.
18 After observing the questionable, 19 inconsistent and at times lackadaisical historic 20 operation and regulation of these reactors, we are 21 extremely concerned about the protection, safety and 22 health of the people and environment in light of the 23 continuing development surrounding the Fukushima 24 nuclear disaster in Japan and NRC's sluggish, imprudent 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 66 and unwise decision making regarding implementing 1
prudent lessons learned, corrective actions at U.S.
2 reactors.
3 In light of the continuing and worsening 4
Fukushima disaster, NRC's inadequate treatment and 5
partial denial of issues in our previous conjoined 2.206 6
petition of April [13,] 2011 [See NRC letter dated 7
December 13, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11339A077)],
8 and NRC's recent decision to overrule the advice of its 9
own technical staff and further delay prudent 10 installation of filtered hardened vents at 11 Fukushima-type reactors in the U.S. [See Staff 12 Requirements Memorandum, dated March 19, 2013 (ADAMS 13 Accession No. ML13078A017) for SECY-12-0157], we 14 express grave concerns about the safety of continued 15 operation of the four Mark I BWRs at Dresden and Quad 16 Cities and the two Mark II BWRs at LaSalle Station listed 17 in this petition and request acceptance of the 18 contentions in this petition and closure of these 19 reactors.
20 In addition to the contentions[,] we raised 21 in the 2.2[06] petition of April 13th, 2011 and 22 additional comments of May 2nd, 2013, both of which we 23 attach at the end of this submittal for reference [to date 24 these documents have not been provided to the NRC], we 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 67 submit several new contentions for consideration as the 1
additional basis for our request.
2 The high-level radioactive waste 3
inventory. A report prepared for the Department of 4
Energy in 2011 estimates that there exists 1,531 metric 5
tons of heavy metal, 9,029 assemblies of spent reactor 6
fuel at the Dresden Plant; 1,481 MTHM, that's 8,285 7
assemblies at Quad Cities; and 1,237 metric tons of heavy 8
metal, 6,885 assemblies, at the two LaSalle reactors.
9 This gives a total of 4,250 metric tons of heavy metal 10 and 24,199 assemblies stored five stories above ground 11 at the six Mark I and Mark II reactors in Illinois.
12 This accumulation of spent fuel at these 13 seven Illinois reactors is roughly nine times the total 14 accumulation of spent fuel at Fukushima Daiichi Units 1 15 to 4 reactors combined. Not only is this amount far 16 greater than that at Fukushima, but all of the Illinois 17 reactors continue to add new spent fuel pool to their 18 pools, increasing the heat load to each of the pools.
19 All the reactors at Fukushima add no new inventory, and 20 therefore heat load to their pools. Thus[,] the 21 potential risk grows at the Illinois reactors while we 22 await NRC directives to Exelon to implement all of the 23 recommended spent fuel pool improvements.
24 (2) Nuclear safety culture and, quote, 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 68 "the law." In our May 2nd, 2013 comments[,] we pointed 1
out that NRC claims, quote, "a nuclear safety culture is 2
the core values and behaviors that emphasize safety over 3
competing goals to ensure protection of people and the 4
environment," unquote. We quote former Region III 5
director [Director], Charles Casto[,] in stating it 6
also, quote, "going beyond what's required," unquote.
7 It was our conclusion at the time and 8
remains so today, and as long as General Design Criteria 9
16 for all Mark I and Ii reactors is ignored, that the 10 Nuclear Regulatory Commission lacks a safety culture as 11 it is self-defined.
12 During the Full Committee hearing of the 13 Senate's Energy and Natural Resources Committee to 14 consider the Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2013 15 held on July 30th, 2013, an interesting set of remarks 16 came from two senators asking questions of Secretary of 17 Energy Moniz. Senator Jim Risch of Idaho commented on, 18 quote, "the state of the law." Quote, "We have a law that 19 clearly designates where the permanent storage is. I'm 20 troubled by the fact that we're a nation of laws, and 21 whether we agree with the law or not, when a law is passed, 22 that's pretty much the way it is.
23 "The Executive Branch is commanded to 24 execute the laws backed by our Constitution, is commanded 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 69 to execute the laws the legislature passes. The 1
Executive Branch is indeed commanded to obey court orders 2
when a court orders something. What we have here is a 3
situation where we have a law, which has identified Yucca 4
Mountain for what it is. And whether you agree or 5
disagree, it is the law. And yet for some reason nobody 6
seems to care."
7 Tim Scott, South Carolina, stated to 8
Secretary Moniz, "My concern is why Congress is allowing 9
DOE to break the law of the land as we know it today? The 10 law is very clear: Our nation's spent fuel pool and 11 defense waste should be disposed at Yucca.
12 Unfortunately, ignoring or failing to enforce laws that 13 happen to be politically inconvenient is becoming a 14 regular occurrence with the Obama administration, even 15 with laws they've passed. I understand that some may 16
[have] found Yucca to be politically inconvenient, but 17 that doesn't matter. It's still the law of the land.
18 The nuclear industry, like any other industry has needs 19 certainly, and they need Yucca Mountain. What good are 20 laws passed by Congress if for any reason we can decide 21 to enforce or not enforce them? What good are laws where 22 the mandate is pushed back causing consternation and lack 23 of certainty?[]
24 "The issue as we see it is simple: Mark I 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 70 and Mark II reactors are not in compliance with GDC 16.
1 The NRC intends to ignore GDC 16 and allow the reactors 2
to continue to operate. The law of the land says that 3
the reactors must be in regulatory compliance to operate.
4 And NRC's regulatory mandate and self-proclaimed nuclear 5
safety culture emphasize safety over competing goals to 6
ensure protection of people and the environment.
7 "The
- public, like
- industry, needs 8
certainty, certainty that the NRC will not cherry pick 9
the regulations it will enforce, that it will fully 10 enforce the regulations it has or lose all credibility 11 and public confidence."
12 We would submit to NRC if, quote, "the law 13 of the land is truly a legitimate and not merely 14 convenient and cherry-picked concern of the members of 15 Congress of NRC, it should be executed impartially on all 16 agencies of the Executive Branch." There is no 17 justification to single out DOE's lack of performance 18 according to the law on Yucca Mountain while continuously 19 allowing the NRC the power of enforcement discretion 20 "finding a way out of the laws of the land as opposed to 21 enforcement of the laws of the land," unquote.
22 The NRC is bound by the law of the land to 23 enforce General Design Criteria 16 for all Mark I and II 24 reactors. NRC is not following the law as Congress 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 71 intended if it does not enforce GDC 16 for all Mark I and 1
II reactors. You do not have a nuclear safety culture 2
at NRC if you merely follow the letter of the regulations, 3
do check box exercises and cherry pick the regulations 4
you enforce.
5 The people of Illinois tell you point blank 6
we have, quote, "no confidence in this style and pattern 7
of regulation and lack of a nuclear safety culture." We 8
feel threatened by your inaction and we do not and will 9
not accept its continuation as valid regulatory 10 practice. If we do not see progress in NRC enforcing its 11 regulations for Illinois reactors, we may have to seek 12 intervention at a higher level.
13 Response to additional contentions of May 14 2013. To date, NEIS has received no response to rebuttal 15 from NRC to the contentions introduced on May 2nd, 2013 16
[ADAMS Accession No. ML13144A127]. We request written 17 rebuttal to the contentions raised. Thank you for this 18 opportunity to speak.
19 MR. GUNTER: Thank you. Wally Taylor?
20 (No audible response.)
21 MR. GUNTER: Are you there, Wally?
22 (No audible response.)
23 MR. GUNTER: Gretel Johnston?
24 MS. JOHNSTON: Yes, thank you. Hello, my 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 72 name is Gretel Johnston.
1 MR. GUNTER: Go ahead, Gretel, introduce 2
yourself.
3 MS. JOHNSTON: Hello.
4 MR. TAYLOR: -- Wally. Can you hear me?
5 MR. GUNTER: Okay. Let's do Wally and then 6
Gretel.
7 MS. JOHNSTON: Okay.
8 MR. TAYLOR: I apologize. I was on mute 9
and I --
10 MR. GUNTER: Yes, I just want to remind the 11 speakers we have a little less than 20 minutes. So 12 please be concise. Thanks.
13 MR. TAYLOR: Thank you. This is Wally 14 Taylor. I'm with the Iowa Chapter of the Sierra Club and 15 also the National Sierra Club's Nuclear Free Campaign.
16 I'm speaking specifically about the Cooper Nuclear 17 Station along the Missouri River, the Duane Arnold Energy 18 Center in Iowa along the Cedar River, and the Quad Cities 19 Generating Station along the Mississippi River.
20 The first point I want to make is that these 21 reactors, like many or most of the Mark Is and Mark IIs, 22 were put on line in the early '70s. So certainly[,]
23 technology changes in the past almost 40 years and 24 certainly the lessons learned hopefully are added to what 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 73 we know in the past 30 or 40 years.
1 So the filtered vents that we're talking 2
about here are something that we know will work and must 3
be added to the plants, and that this the kind knowledge 4
that we need to keep adding to our nuclear fleet to keep 5
them safe. Other folks have talked about the flooding 6
issues. I want to just add a couple of points.
7 With respect to the Missouri River[,] there 8
have been several studies. One was mentioned already, 9
the Perkins et al study [See NRC Screening Analysis 10 Report for the Proposed Generic Issue on Flooding of 11 Nuclear Power Plant Sites Following Upstream Dam 12 Failures, July 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML113500495)].
13 There was another one done by David -- whose name escapes 14 me. And I've tried to get a copy of that, but the NRC 15 refuses to release that document. And it just seems to 16 me that the public needs to know that information.
17 And the flooding incidents are what will 18 make the filtered vents necessary. On the Missouri 19 River, for example, there are six upstream dams from 20 Montana down to South Dakota. The Fort Peck Dam in 21 Montana has behind it 18.6 million acre feet of water.
22 The Garrison Dam has 23.8 million acre feet of water 23 behind it. And the Oahe Dam has 23.5 million acre feet.
24 The other three dams are smaller, but you can see that's 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 74 a lot of water. And what experts have told me is that 1
if any one or more of those dams breaks, it'll be worse 2
than tsunami and it will impact these nuclear plants and 3
will have the same kind of hazard that we had at 4
Fukushima.
5 The Mississippi River also floods and can 6
cause damage to nuclear plants that we need these 7
filtered vents for. The Cedar River next to the Duane 8
Arnold Plant flooded five years ago with an unprecedented 9
flood. Fortunately[,] the Duane Arnold facility was not 10 impacted, but it came extremely and perilously close.
11 So these and other plants are subject to flooding hazards 12 that need to be addressed. And what really distresses 13 me about the Commission's initial response to this 14 petition is like I've seen in other 2.206 petitions. The 15 response is basically, well, we're working on it and 16 sometime somehow we will get it figured out, so we don't 17 need to do anything now. Well[,] the purpose of a 2.206 18 petition is to ask the Commission to take action that 19 needs to be taken and to just say that somehow some way 20 in the future we'll get it figured out[,] because we're 21 working on it really doesn't answer the question and 22 really doesn't respond to what a 2.206 petition is 23 designed to do. This is the public's only way, absent 24 some sort of proceeding where intervention is allowed, 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 75 to seek action from the Commission that needs to be taken.
1 And the Commission needs to address this problem and 2
needs to take this petition for review and to grant the 3
relief requested. Thank you.
4 MR. GUNTER: Thank you, Wally. Gretel 5
Johnston?
6 MS. JOHNSTON: Yes, hello. Can you hear me 7
all right?
8 MR. GUNTER: Yes, Gretel. Go ahead.
9 Proceed.
10 MS. JOHNSTON: Okay. Yes, my name is 11 Gretel Johnston and I'm representing BEST/MATRR, the 12 Bellefonte Efficiency & Sustainability Team and Mothers 13 Against Tennessee River Radiation in the Tennessee 14 Valley. We will be specifically addressing issues with 15 the three GE Mark I reactors at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power 16 Plant in North Alabama.
17 Given the recent resignation -- kind of as 18 a prologue, I would like to say the recent resignation 19 of the 26-year veteran engineer at Browns Ferry, we would 20 like to just take a stand in support of her whistle blower 21 protest. The discovery of tampering with root cause 22 safety reports is extremely strong grounds for 23 withdrawal of the Browns Ferry operating license. To 24 doctor safety reports against the will of the trained 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 76 specialists who write them is a serious violation of the 1
very foundation of nuclear safety, and we'd call on the 2
NRC to act with definitive strength on this issue [Note:
3 the NRC Allegations process is separate from the 2.206 4
petition process].
5 Browns Ferry Unit 1 has earned NRC's worst 6
rating. And according to NRC records, the BFN reactor 7
Units 1, 2 and 3 have the longest shutdown records of any 8
reactors in the United States and have suffered over 270 9
emergency scrams [a review of the NRC event reports found 10 78 scrams from 1988 to present day for the Brown Ferry 11 units], which undoubtedly add to the type 304 stainless 12 steel vessel degradation, and the control rods cracking 13 further weakening the integrity of the poorly designed 14 Mark I reactor containment and safety.
15 We agree with Beyond Nuclear's petition 16 that not putting filters on these unfiltered vent 17 modifications voids the original licensing agreement[,]
18 which requires an essentially leak-tight containment 19 structure against the uncontrolled release of 20 radioactivity. Without filters to remove a large 21 percentage of radioactive emissions, any release, 22 whether intentional or inadvertent, violates the 23 licensing agreement for these GE reactors. While the 24 NRC is further extending safety retrofit deadlines, our 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 77 community has three aged Browns Ferry reactors that 1
appear to be leaking radiation into our air and young 2
people and babies who live here are dying at a rate of 3
21 to 27 percent higher than average U.S. communities.
4
[Note: The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) has 5
started the initial planning step of the NRC-sponsored 6
pilot study of cancer risks in populations around six 7
nuclear power plants and a nuclear fuel cycle facility.
8 The NRC is asking the NAS to carry out this pilot to help 9
the NRC determine whether to extend the study to 10 additional reactors and fuel cycle facilities.]
11 Infant mortality rates in the areas 12 surrounding Browns Ferry seem to be illustrating a 13 bathtub curve effect. The numbers of babies who died in 14 their first year of life jumped when the Mark I reactors 15 first came online here in the mid-1970s. Then[,] the 16 rate declined until the late 1990s. Since then, there 17 has been a steady increase in infant mortality to 21.6 18 percent above the U.S. rate in 2010. The figures are 19 even worse for Hispanics at 40 percent. And white babies 20 are dying at a 32.6 percent higher rate near and downwind 21 of Browns Ferry than in average U.S. communities.
22 Our group of concerned citizens took 23 radiation readings with a quality calibrated Geiger 24 counter from 50 sites surrounding Browns Ferry in varying 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 78 weather conditions and found readings from 36 to 600 1
counts per minute for 40 times background radiation 2
levels. The lowest, 1,600 counts per minute at 40 times 3
background radiation levels. The lowest readings were 4
recorded upwind of Browns Ferry and the highest readings 5
were recorded downwind during rain events as far as 70 6
miles from Browns Ferry.
7 This indicates the possibility that the 8
aging Browns Ferry reactors may be leaking radioactivity 9
in our valley and we call on the NRC to require more 10 thorough, frequent and transparent monitoring from 11 reactor operators, if not from the NRC or an independent 12 scientific group[,] up to 100 miles from the plant in 13 seasonal prevailing downwind directions.
14 Our official records show that tritium 15 levels in drinking water measured in Muscle Shoals, some 16 40 miles west of Browns Ferry, and in Scottsboro, some 17 70 miles southeast of Browns Ferry -- those readings are 18 three to four times higher than tritium levels in 19 drinking water in Montgomery, Alabama, which is over 100 20 miles from any nuclear facility. We think there is a 21 very real possibility that large populations in North 22 Alabama are being contaminated with Browns Ferry 23 emissions either from corroded torus wells, leaking 24 valves and/or inadequate filtering and we call on the NRC 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 79 to investigate.
1 We also want to bring attention to threats 2
to the raised cooling pool for these reactors. We agree 3
with the Petitioners that these cooling pools holding far 4
more radioactivity than the reactor cores should be 5
required to have dedicated backup power. In the 6
southeast and increasingly in other parts of the 7
country[,] tornados are a severe and repeated threat to 8
these cooling pools and we think that new regulations 9
need to be implemented to categorize tornado safety 10 standards in a way similar to seismic threat categories.
11 At Browns Ferry alone[,] well over 250 12 million curies of radiation is stored in these pools with 13 only sheet metal roofs overhead. The initial studies by 14 GE for tornado safety were conducted in 1968 when it was 15 still thought that opening windows helped reduced 16 tornado damage, thus blowout panels were designed into 17 the metal roofs. In April of 2011[,] the strongest 18 tornado known to man, a category EF5, wreaked havoc about 19 500 meters from the pools twisting a row of power towers 20 into pretzels and cutting power to all of North Alabama 21 and much of Tennessee. Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant was 22 forced to use diesel generators for seven days to keep 23 the three reactors and cooling pools from meltdown.
24 We think another threat is the possibility 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 80 of a tornado sucking contaminated water from the pools 1
and spewing it across our valley. We consider these 2
open-topped cooling pools to be a general design criteria 3
fault along with the lack of dedicated cooling pool 4
backup power and the licensing of these designs to be an 5
error.
6 As long as the faulty design is still 7
allowed to operate, we call on the NRC to: (1) Require 8
a defined and hopefully accelerated schedule for 9
removing fuel from these cooling pools to be stored in 10 onsite hardened dry cask storage bunkers so that only the 11 fuel stored for the necessary five-year period as 12 determined by NRC and the Academy of Sciences in 2005 are 13 retained in the pools rather than the far safer hardened 14 onsite dry cask storage containers; (2) we call on you 15 to require reinforced overhead containment of these 16 cooling pools; and (3) to establish regulations similar 17 to current seismic categories and enforce substantial 18 strengthening of overhead cooling pool containment.
19 At this point[,] I would like to submit for 20 the record our recent report, "Radioactive Emissions and 21 Health Hazards Surrounding Browns Ferry Nuclear Power 22 Plant in Alabama," which will be both emailed and snail 23 mailed with our comments [By email dated October 29, 2013 24 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13304C006), the NRC received 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 81 this report and supplemental information]. The report 1
can be downloaded from our Web site at MATTR.org, 2
M-A-T-T-R dot org
[The correct website is 3
www.matrr.org]. Thank you for your attention to these 4
issues and for your service to our country and its people 5
living near nuclear facilities.
6 MR. GUNTER: Thank you, Gretel.
7 We'll now hear from Leslie Sullivan Sachs.
8 MS. SACHS: Thank you. I am with the Safe 9
and Green Campaign and the SAGE Alliance, citizens groups 10 from the tri-state area around Vermont Yankee Nuclear 11 Power Plant.
12 A month ago, Entergy announced that they 13 would close Vermont Yankee when it ran out of fuel [In 14 a letter dated September 23, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No.
15 ML13273A204), Entergy notified the NRC that Vermont 16 Yankee will cease operations in the fourth quarter of 17 2014]. We are pleased that Yankee is the fifth reactor 18 closure announced in 2013, but we are very worried that 19 Entergy will not spend what it takes to do the maintenance 20 nor necessary upgrades to keep this reactor running 21 safely until they pull the plug and move the spent fuel 22 out of the fuel pool.
23 Entergy said that it will close Vermont 24 Yankee because of finances. They said it had nothing to 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 82 do with politics or their legal battles, but their choice 1
to engage in legal battles has everything to do with 2
finances. In addition to the federal preemption 3
lawsuits against the State of Vermont they initiated, 4
Entergy initiated a suit at the Vermont Supreme Court.
5 They are continuing that suit even though the [Vermont]
6 State has said that since Yankee is closing the case is 7
moot. Entergy sued and they're appealing a tax case.
8 They're still in the relicensing permit 9
process before the [Vermont] Public Service Board. And 10 just to show you the kind of harassment types of suits 11 they're doing, last April they even sued the state [State 12 of Vermont] and [in] federal court, because they said the 13 state [State of Vermont] wasn't moving fast enough on 14 approval of a new backup diesel generator for the waste 15 pool even though the state [State of Vermont] publicly 16 stated that it did not oppose the approval [Note: The 17 NRC is not involved in these litigations between the 18 State of Vermont and Energy].
19 The typical legal costs of a license 20 extension is $2 million. According to a source in 21 Yankee's administrative office, Entergy has spent $80 22 million on legal fee[s] since initiation of license 23 extension practice. By comparison, the post-Fukushima 24 costs at Vermont Yankee were estimated in the $40 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 83 million-plus range. So[,] Entergy is more interested in 1
setting legal precedents and harassing the state [State 2
of Vermont] than they are investing in post-Fukushima 3
upgrades or on maintenance. We wonder if this litigious 4
pattern will follow them to Pilgrim and FitzPatrick, 5
other Entergy-owned Fukushima-style reactors.
6 In addition, six weeks before the closure 7
announcement Entergy announced company-wide layoffs 8
including 30 workers at Vermont Yankee, 75 at Indian 9
Point, 30 at FitzPatrick and 30 at Pilgrim. For even 10 though we're happy about closure, we are worried more 11 than ever about public safety. The next 14 months will 12 be a dangerous time for those of us in the evacuation 13 zone, especially for those children in the school across 14 the street from the reactor [Note: The NRC has two 15 resident inspectors on-site performing inspections, and 16 inspections are supplemented as needed by other NRC 17 personnel].
18 Radiation leaks are now being reported 19 regularly. Four times in June and July monitors 20 registered false positive for high radiation [See NRC 21 Event Reports Nos. 49211 and 49358]. The day before the 22 closure announcement there was another spurious spike of 23 supposedly false radiation readings in a radiation 24 detector that had been replaced within the last month 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 84 according to a letter from the NRC to the state [State 1
of Vermont].
2 On September 19th, a leak occurred in a key 3
safety system, the high-pressure coolant injection 4
system, which released a small amount of radioactivity 5
within the reactor building [See NRC Event 6 49355].
7 On September 24th through the 25th, low oil 8
levels were discovered due to a loose compression fitting 9
on a [B] recirculation pump motor oil reservoir. The 10 reactor was brought down to 14 percent.
11 So we worry. Will the workers depart a 12 sinking ship that is sporadically leaking radiation into 13 their workplace? Will they leave to find permanent work 14 elsewhere? Will new workers come in who do not know the 15 reactor well enough to stay on top of these constant 16 problems? Will Entergy spend the money necessary to 17 maintain the plant, or will they use reconditioned parts 18 and the equivalent and chewing gum and duct tape to mask 19 the problems?
20 And we will continue to worry after shutdown 21 about the most dangerous part of the plant, all that spent 22 fuel in the fuel pool, more than four times what are in 23 the Fukushima pools. It will be left to cool down for 24 years, perhaps decades, until it can be moved into dry 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 85 casks and abandoned on the banks of our Connecticut River 1
[Note: The NRC Decommissioning regulations are found in 2
Chapter I of the Title 10, Energy, of the Code of 3
Federal Regulations (CFR). 10 CFR, Part 20, Subpart E 4
provides the main decommissioning requirements. A 5
great deal of decommissioning information is located on 6
the NRC public website at 7
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/decommissioni 8
ng.html]. As you know, the BWR Mark I has no protection 9
for the fuel pool. None. A breakaway roof and blowout 10 panels do not protection make.
11 This is why all 23 reactors must be shut down 12 today. The nuclear industry is in a perilous position.
13 I strongly recommend you read Mark Cooper's two reports:
14 "Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Economics" and "The Impacts 15 of Fukushima on Nuclear Economics," and his most recent 16 report, "Renaissance in Reverse: Competition Pushes 17 Aging U.S. Nuke Reactors to the Brink of Economic 18 Abandonment." He lists the reactors most at risk to 19 close because of particularly intense challenges, five 20 of which are Mark I and Mark II reactors: Nine Mile Point 21 No. 2, FitzPatrick, Clinton, Pilgrim, VY [Note: Vermont 22 Yankee is scheduled to cease operations in the fourth 23 quarter of 2014], and Oyster Creek [Note: Oyster Creek 24 is scheduled to cease operation no later than December 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 86 31, 2019].
1 Economic pressures and necessary 2
post-Fukushima safety regulations are too much for this 3
industry to bear. They cannot perform safely. Have 4
mercy on this industry.
Shut down all the 5
Fukushima-style reactors now. In Vermont[,] we call it 6
death with dignity.
7 MR. GUNTER: Thank you, Leslie.
8 and our final speaker is Jeff Brown. And 9
if we could indulge him to finish is [his] statement.
10 Thank you.
11 Jeff?
12 MR. BROWN: Yes, my name is Jeff Brown.
13 I'm a member of GRAMMES, Grandmothers, Mothers and More 14 for Energy Safety. We're focused on the Oyster Creek 15 Nuclear Generating Station in Lacey Township at the 16 Jersey Shore [Note: Oyster Creek is scheduled to cease 17 operation no later than December 31, 2019].
18 Those of us who live within the potential 19 fallout zone of Oyster Creek do not currently have 20 defense-in-depth against radiation releases from a 21 possible core damage accident or a terrorist attack. As 22 a former Northern New Jersey resident, I remember well 23 the nauseous smell from a smoldering World Trade Center 24 days after 9/11 when the wind shifted in our direction.
25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 87 Whenever we've dealt with NRC, the possibility that a 1
terrorist attack could actually cause a problem is always 2
swept under the rug [Note: In response to the terrorist 3
attacks of September 11, 2001, NRC took immediate action 4
by advising nuclear power plants to go the highest level 5
of security, which all licensees promptly implemented.
6 Shortly afterward, NRC and the industry re-evaluated the 7
physical security at the nations nuclear power plants.
8 In February 2002, the NRC issued Interim Compensatory 9
Measures (ICMs) requiring all U.S. nuclear power plants 10 to perform specific plant design studies, add additional 11 security personnel, enhance physical protection 12 features, improve Emergency Preparedness, and provide 13 additional training. Further information can be found 14 on the NRC website at 15 http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/emerg-preparedness/respo 16 nd-to-emerg/response-terrorism.html].
17 I had the opportunity along with several of 18 my colleagues at GRAMMES to meet with Commissioner 19 Apostolakis at the end of August [August 23, 2013] and 20 one of the questions we asked him is how could it possibly 21 be that the NRC would give industry two refueling outages 22 to even begin to deal with these issues? And he said it 23 was just we've always done this way. He would look into 24 it. I don't think we've heard from him since [Note: The 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 88 Office of Commissioner Apostolakis provided an email 1
response to Beyond Nuclear, dated October 4, 2013 (ADAMS 2
Accession No. ML13296A181].
3 But to me[,] it's clear that the way that the NRC 4
is currently operating is with crossed fingers. It's 5
not going to be a problem[,] because we don't think it 6
will be a problem, therefore, we don't really have to 7
treat it seriously [Note: The NRC has taken the Fukushima 8
accident very seriously and has worked diligently since 9
the accident to learn the lessons and implement those 10 lessons. For further information, please see the NRC 11 public website at 12 https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience 13
/japan-dashboard.html].
This wishful thinking 14 approach does not give primary commitment to health and 15 safety for those of us in reactor communities.
16 It seems to me that the illustration of the 17 Japanese response to requiring these hardened and 18 filtered vents gives us a clue of how do we get the 19 industry to want to do it?[.] Where is the pressure 20 coming in Japan for putting on these vents and putting 21 on these filters? It's because they are shut down and 22 in order to operate they've got to get it up and running 23 to do this with the filters, with protection.
24 If you would accept our petition and shut 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 89 down all these reactors, those that can't meet the grade 1
will not reopen. Those that possibly can meet the grade 2
for public health and safety would get an opportunity to 3
reopen and we'd have everybody pulling oars in the same 4
direction for a change.
5 Finally[,] in terms of even a kind of a 6
thumbnail cost benefit analysis approach, we were 7
affected by Superstorm Sandy and thus we know that $62 8
billion worth of damage was done to New Jersey and the 9
New York area. New Jersey alone sought $37 billion from 10 the Federal Government for assistance. The Jersey Shore 11 economy, our Ocean and Monmouth Counties alone in 2012 12 accounted for $6 billion.
13 Exelon bought Oyster Creek at a bargain 14 basement price of only $10 million. It seems quite 15 self-apparent that even the cost benefit analysis would 16 say close them down. Thank you.
17 MR. GUNTER: Thank you, Jeff. And that 18 concludes our presentation.
19 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: Okay. Are we going to go 20 to questions?
21 MR. GUNTER: Yes, right.
22 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: Okay.
23 MR. GUNTER: Yes, thanks.
24 MR. SMITH: So does any of the Board Members 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 90 or the staff supporting the Board have any questions for 1
the Petitioners today?
2 MEMBER DENNIG: I don't have a question. I 3
just have a comment. As far as public participation is 4
concerned in this particular subject, I assume you're 5
following and are aware of the public meetings on the 6
[NRC] Interim Staff Guidance and the [NRC] rulemaking 7
that's in process and that you're able to participate in 8
that.
9 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: I do want to make a 10 statement, perhaps highly unusual in these kinds of 11 proceedings, but I think it's important to note, you 12 know, my mother and most of my family live within about 13 40 miles of one of these reactors. So[,] if you don't 14 think I take nuclear safety seriously, you're kidding 15 yourself. But I got to tell you that, you know, I take 16 exception to numerous presenters that say that the Agency 17 is doing absolutely nothing or the things that we have 18 done are worthless or laughable. The Agency is working 19 through a lot of these issues, many of the issues that 20 you mentioned. The seismic walk-downs, the flooding 21 walk-downs, the beyond design basis mitigating 22 strategies activities. They are taking actions on a lot 23 of these things. And so[,] I think it's important for 24 the record that I state that and say that, you know, 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 91 sometimes if you move too quickly, you get unintended 1
consequences. So[,] I think the Agency has an 2
obligation to move in a very judicious manner to make sure 3
they're making the right changes that are necessary to 4
ensure public health and safety.
5 So[,] I know that's unusual. I wanted to 6
make that statement.
7 Okay. Should we go to the phones then?
8 MS. LAMPERT: Yes, I have a comment, Mary 9
Lampert, that the NRC has effectively shut the doors to 10 substantive public involvement. If you take the 2.206 11 petition process, Judge Rosenthal of the [NRC] Atomic 12 Safety Licensing Board reported that[,] with one 13 possible exception[,] the NRC had not granted a 2.206 14 petitioner[,] the substantive relief it sought[,] for at 15 least 37 years. Judge Rosenthal concluded that where 16 truly substantive relief is being sought there should be 17 no room for a belief on the requester's part that the 18 pursuit of such a course is either being encouraged by 19 the Commission or has a fair chance of success.
20 As far as orders go, in reality they are not 21 open to public challenge. The Bilotti decision 22 established that petitioners must show the order in and 23 of itself is harmful. I've said the order is 24 insufficient and does not respond to lessons learned from 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 92 Fukushima as has been the case in orders --
1 (Telephone interference.)
2 As of rule change petitions, frankly none 3
of us will live long enough. We need an analysis of 4
substantive relief to public filings of rule change 5
petitions. How many have been accepted in a substantive 6
way in 37 years.[?] The public's perception is zero to 7
none. Participation in open public meetings, there is 8
a distinct difference between being heard and action.
9 Being heard does not provide reasonable assurance of 10 public health and safety.
11 Also[,] I would like to know how many public 12 meetings in addition to those announced has industry had 13 the opportunity for a one-on-one extra meetings with NRC 14 versus how many one-on-one extra meetings the public has 15 had.
16 Last, the specific danger is of NRC not 17 enforcing regulation. GDC 16[,] as discussed today, is 18 an example. And instead of making regulations, there 19 has been a continual habit of late of not making 20 regulations, but instead suggestions. Voluntary 21 compliance. [NRC] Information notices [Notices] that 22 do not require any action.
23 So[,] that's why we are most disturbed and 24 particularly when these BWRs in deregulated markets are 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 93 on thin ice, they do not have the money to initiate the 1
fixes that are required, and NRC has not had the staffing 2
or will; I'm not saying which, to be Johnny-on-the-spot 3
and assure that they do. So[,] we are in a very, very 4
dangerous position. And I hope to God[,] it's not my 5
reactor, but it will be one. Thank you for the 6
opportunity.
7 MR. SMITH: Okay. Before we get too far 8
into questions, I just want to remind everyone that only 9
2.206 process-specific questions will be addressed.
10 And also[,] we only have like a limited amount of time 11 that's left, so we may not be able to get to all of the 12 questions that we may have from the public. But we ask 13 that if you ask the questions, introduce yourself and 14 which organization you represent if you are representing 15 the organizations.
16 You guys have any feedback for the last 17 questions that was asked?
18 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: I don't have anything 19 specific to say, no.
20 MR. SMITH: All right. Great. Thanks.
21 Operator, if you can cue the next question that's there 22 then.
23 (No audible response.)
24 MR. SMITH: Okay. So[,] there's no 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 94 questions from the operator. Are there any other 1
questions 2.206 process-specific-type questions that 2
would like to address at this time?
3 MR. GUNTER: Yes, Paul Gunter, Beyond 4
Nuclear. Are we going to get a director's decision out 5
of this? If you proceed to dismiss this petition preview 6
process, does it currently elevate to the level of 7
getting a director's decision where a lot of our 8
questions and concerns will be addressed?
9 MEMBER LAMB: This is John Lamb. Once the 10
[PRB] Board makes a decision, if it's accepted, then you 11 get a director's decision. If it's rejected, you just 12 get a letter saying here's why it was rejected. So[,]
13 it's only the acceptance part that you'll get a draft 14 director's decision and then a final director's 15 decision. That's the difference.
16 MR. GUNTER: This is Paul Gunter again.
17 Does the letter that you will send us with your final 18 determination -- what detail does it address some of the 19 concerns and issues and questions that have been raised 20 in this process today?
21 MEMBER LAMB: It will address your petition 22 that you came in with, you know, revoking all BWRs.
23 Basically[,] that you disagree with the Commission SRM 24 about the vent. You want the radiation hardened vent.
25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 95 That's what it will address.
1 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: This is Jack Davis from 2
the [PRB] Board. I think your question goes though 3
-- you're asking how much detail, right, would go to 4
-- correct? You have a comment to that, John?
5 MEMBER LAMB: It provides, you know, a 6
level of detail that will answer the question as much as 7
possible.
8 MR. SMITH: Are there any other questions?
9 MR. JOHNSON: Can we make a statement?
10 MR. SMITH: One moment, please.
11 MR. KAMPS: Hello. Can I go ahead?
12 MR. SMITH: Go ahead.
13 MR. KAMPS: Yes, my name is Kevin Kamps, 14 also with Beyond Nuclear, and I have a question about the 15 2.206 process. This came up at a meeting with 16 Commissioners Magwood and Ostendorff several months ago 17 held at NRDC's office in Washington, D.C. And Tom 18 Cochran from the Nuclear Division at NRDC made a comment 19 that he once had a conversation with the original NRC 20 staff or Office of General Counsel author of the 2.206 21 regulations in the first place, and that person described 22 to him, admitted to him that the entire process was 23 designed as a black hole into which the public would enter 24 and never come out, at least victorious, with substantive 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 96 relief, as Mary Lampert put it.
1 So I'm just curious if this Petition Review 2
Board would agree with that characterization that Tom 3
Cochran described with the original author of this 4
regulation.
5 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: I mean I'm not familiar 6
with what you're talking about and the background. I can 7
tell you, as I said before, I will give due diligence to 8
the petition that's before us and to ensure that we arrive 9
at the right decision based upon all the information that 10 we have available to us.
11 MR. KAMPS: I guess my follow-up question 12 is what would explain what Mary Lampert gave as the record 13 of the 2.206 process, perhaps one possible exception, no 14 substantive relief granted the public in nearly four 15 decades.
16 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: Yes, I mean certainly I 17 can't comment on that. I don't know all of the cases that 18 she was referring to. Again[,] I can tell you, as I've 19 told John repeatedly during this process, that I want all 20 of the concerns that are laid out in the petition to be 21 adequately addressed. And I think that's why Paul is 22 getting to how much detail are we getting when we say no 23 immediate concern and then there's nothing further 24 beyond that. We should be able to give you further 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 97 information or reference the documents that we're 1
referring to to explain, if that were where we come out.
2 MR. KAMPS: Thank you.
3 MR. SMITH: Someone on the line had a 4
comment. As a reminder, the comment period is over.
5 We're looking for the 2.206 process-specific questions.
6 If you have any questions related to the 2.206 process, 7
you can ask those questions at this time.
8 MS. LAMPERT: Mary Lampert again, Pilgrim 9
Watch. I would add also to 2.206, it is correct that you 10 cannot appeal a decision within the NRC, is that correct?
11 One PRB at the end of August.
12 MEMBER LAMB: This is John Lamb from NRC.
13 Yes, if the petition is rejected, there is no recourse.
14 MS. LAMPERT: That's another problem when 15 you think about it. Now would you like me to send the 16 link to Judge Rosenthal's decision? [Note: To date, 17 this link has not been provided to the NRC.]
18 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: Sure, Mary. That's fine.
19 Absolutely. Any additional information like that would 20 be helpful.
21 MS. LAMPERT: And who should I send it to?
22 MEMBER LAMB:
Send it to 23 john.lamb@nrc.gov.
24 MS. LAMPERT: Okay. Thank you very much.
25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 98 MR. SMITH: Okay. I'd like to thank 1
everyone for their time and attention. And this is the 2
end of the meeting. We'd like to reintroduce Mr. Jack 3
Davis at this time to end the meeting.
4 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: I think what I was saying 5
before was actually my closing statement where I am 6
taking this serious as the Chairman of this Board. I am 7
listening to what you're saying and I am trying to balance 8
what the Agency's doing and what you're asking for.
9 And as you know from the May [May 2, 2013]
10 meeting, I asked the question of whether you felt that 11 it was inadequate what the Agency was doing or whether 12 the Agency was on a time scale that you felt was not 13 appropriate. Because I've heard many of your 14 discussions today talking about how long it's taking the 15 Agency to get to that location with EA 109, with the other 16 beyond design basis mitigating measures that I'm 17 currently heading up. We are on a path to making 18 significant amounts of improvements to beyond design 19 basis measures for very extreme natural phenomena.
20 That's an important point to keep in mind. And so[,] we 21 are on a path.
22 You know, whether you believe that path is 23 not past [fast] enough, I hear different things from 24 different folks as they were presenting. Some were 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 99 saying, well, I don't think it's happening fast enough 1
and others are saying it's not good enough. So that's 2
what I need to kind of sift through and understand, you 3
know, where the real issue lies with the petition.
4 MS. LAMPERT: I think what we're saying -- I 5
know Pilgrim Watch is saying, because I have multiple 6
2.206s before you, it's not either or, it's both, that 7
2016 -- giving all that time to licensees is not 8
acceptable because then we have no reasonable assurance 9
today or for the next four or five years, number one. And 10 what is being done is insufficient.
11 CHAIRMAN DAVIS:
Appreciate that 12 clarification. Thank you.
13 MR. JOHNSON: Another thing I would note is 14 that the Japanese authorities obviously have been shown 15 to be inadequate in enforcing the pre-Fukushima 16 requirements of the plant there, but post-Fukushima[,]
17 I think they've shown a better understanding of the 18 seriousness of that accident in deciding that rather than 19 have plants continue to operate while they figure out 20 what is a safe operating standard that they would close 21 plants and then determine when it would be safe to reopen 22 them. And I think that perhaps the NRC and what saying 23 with this petition is that these particular plants which 24 have proven to be insufficiently safe should be shut 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 100 until they can be shown to be safe.
1 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: Thank you for the 2
additional comment. Appreciate it.
3 Are there any others? If someone wants to 4
say something, I'm fine with continuing.
5 (No audible response.)
6 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: Okay. With that then, do 7
we have the court reporter? Yes. And do we need any 8
additional information from anyone?
9 (No audible response.)
10 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: To the court reporter, do 11 we need anything else?
12 COURT REPORTER: Who was the last 13 commenter?
14 MR. JOHNSON: It was Chuck Johnson from 15 Oregon and Washington PRS in Portland, Oregon.
16 COURT REPORTER: Thank you. That's it.
17 MR. JOHNSON: Thank you.
18 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: Okay. Thanks. And then 19 I guess with that we will adjourn the meeting.
20 (Whereupon, the hearing [meeting] in the 21 above-entitled matter was concluded at 3:15 p.m.)
22 23 24