ML13309A230
| ML13309A230 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch, Monticello, Dresden, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Nine Mile Point, Fermi, Oyster Creek, Hope Creek, Cooper, Pilgrim, Susquehanna, Columbia, Brunswick, Limerick, Duane Arnold, Quad Cities, FitzPatrick, LaSalle, 05000294 |
| Issue date: | 09/30/2013 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Lamb J | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13309A030 | List: |
| References | |
| G10230229, NRC-277 | |
| Download: ML13309A230 (101) | |
Text
Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
10 CFR Petition Review Board Re[garding]
General Electric Mark I and II [Boiling Water Reactors] BWRs Docket Numbers: (n/a) [50-259, 50-260, 50-296, 50-325, 50-324, 50-397, 50-298, 50-237, 50-249, 50-331, 50-321, 50-366, 50-341, 50-354, 50-333, 50-373, 50-374, 50-352, 50-353, 50-263, 50-220, 50-410, 50-219, 50-277, 50-278, 50-293, 50-254, 50-265, 50-387, 50-388, and 50-271]
Location: telephone conference [Commissioners Hearing Room, One White Flint, Rockville, MD]
Date: Monday, September 30, 2013 Work Order No.: NRC-277 Pages 1-98[100]
NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433
1 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 + + + + +
4 10 CFR 2.206 PETITION REVIEW BOARD (PRB) 5 CONFERENCE CALL 6 RE[GARDING]
7 GENERAL ELECTRIC (GE) MARK I AND II BOILING WATER 8 REACTORS (BWRs) 9 + + + + +
10 MONDAY 11 SEPTEMBER 30, 2013 12 + + + + +
13 The conference call was held, Jack Davis, 14 Chairperson of the Petition Review Board, presiding.
15 PETITIONER[S]: BEYOND NUCLEAR, et. al. [Paul Gunter 16 - Beyond Nuclear (in person) 17 Tim Judson - CAN and NIRS (in person) 18 Jessica Azulay - AGREE (on phone) 19 Wally Taylor - Sierra Club Iowa (on phone) 20 Lewis Culbert - ACE (on phone) 21 Chuck Johnson - WA/OR PSR (on phone) 22 Gretel Johnston - BEST (on phone) 23 David Kraft - NEIS (on phone) 24 Mary Lampert - Pilgrim Watch (on phone) 25 Leslie Sullivan Sachs - SAGE (on phone)
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2 1 Jeff Brown - GRAMMES (on phone)]
2 PETITION REVIEW BOARD MEMBERS 3 JACK DAVIS, Director, Mitigation Strategies 4 Directorate[, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 5 (NRC)]
6 LEE BANIC, [NRC] Petition Manager for 2.206 7 petition 8 ROBERT DENNIG, Branch Chief, Nuclear Reactor 9 Regulation[, NRC]
10 MATTHEW GORDON, Office of the Executive [Director 11 of Operations, NRC]
12 JOHN LAMB, Senior Project Manager, Beaver Valley, 13 Seabrook and Oyster Creek Plants [NRC]
14 ERIC MICHEL, Senior Attorney [Attorney], Office 15 of General Counsel[, NRC]
16 WILLIAM RECKLEY, Japan Lessons Learned 17 Directorate[, NRC]
18 [WAYNE SCHMIDT, Region I, NRC 19 VERONICA RODRIGUEZ, Branch Chief, NRC]
20 NRC HEADQUARTERS STAFF 21 GEORGE SMITH, Facilitator 22 Wayne Smith, Region I 23 [TERRY BELTZ, NRC 24 AHSAN SALLMAN, NRC 25 MOHAN THADANI, NRC NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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3 1 THOMAS STEPHEN, NRC 2 PUBLIC (In Person) 3 JANA BERGMAN, Scientech 4 KEVIN KAMPS, Beyond Nuclear 5 PUBLIC (On Phone) 6 JOHN GIARUSSO, Commonwealth of Massachusetts 7 CHERYL LAATSCH, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 8 LISA MCFARLAND, Nebraska Power District 9 THOMAS HAFERA, Worley Parsons 10 LYNN ALBIN, State of Washington 11 CHRISTINE BARNCARD, Xcel Energy 12 BILL MCTIGUE, PSEG 13 ED DYKES, Constellation 14 MIKE CROWTHERS, PPL 15 KATE NOLAN, Duke 16 STEVIE DUPONT, Constellation 17 DAVE HELKER, Exelon 18 STEVEN HAMRICK, Florida Power and Light 19 TIM DEVIK, PSEG]
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4 1 T-A-B-L-E O-F C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S 2 Welcoming Remarks and Introductions 3 John Lamb......................................4[5]
4 Remarks of the [PRB] Chairman 5 Jack Davis.....................................6[7]
6 Petitioners' Remarks 7 Paul Gunter..................................11[10]
8 Tim Judson.......................................23 9 Jessica Azulay...................................30 10 Lewis Cuthbert...............................38[37]
11 Charles Johnson..................................44 12 Mary Lampert.................................58[57]
13 Linda Lewison................................64[63]
14 Wally Taylor.................................71[70]
15 Gretel Johnson...............................74[73]
16 Leslie Sullivan Sachs........................80[79]
17 Jeff Brown...................................84[83]
18 Questions and Comments........................87[86]
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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5 1
2 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 3 12:59 p.m.
4 MEMBER LAMB: Good afternoon. My name is 5 John Lamb and I an [am] the NRC Beaver Valley, Seabrook 6 and Oyster Creek senior project manager. We are here 7 today to allow the Petitioners represented by Mr. Paul 8 Gunter of Beyond Nuclear to address the Petition Review 9 Board, or PRB, regarding the 2.206 Petition dated March 10 21st, 2013. The ADAMS accession number is ML13085A218.
11 The PRB Chairman is Jack Davis. As part of the PRB's 12 review of this petition Mr. Paul Gunter has requested 13 this second opportunity to address the PRB.
14 This meeting is scheduled from 1:00 p.m. to 15 3:00 p.m. Eastern Time. The meeting is being recorded 16 by the NRC Operations Center and will be transcribed by 17 a court reporter. The transcript will become a 18 supplement to the petition. The transcript will also be 19 made available to the public.
20 I would like to open this meeting with 21 introductions. As we go around the table, please be sure 22 to clearly state your name, your position and t he [the]
23 office you work for within the NRC for the record.
24 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: I'm Jack Davis, Director 25 of Mitigating Strategies Directorate in NRR.
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6 1 MEMBER MICHEL: Eric Michel from the Office 2 of General Counsel.
3 MEMBER GORDON: Matthew Gordon, EDO's 4 Office.
5 MR. SMITH: Again, George Smith. I'll be 6 facilitating the meeting.
7 MR. GUNTER: Paul Gunter, Beyond Nuclear.
8 MR. JUDSON: Tim Judson, and I actually 9 have a change in affiliation to put on the record. I'm 10 on the petition. I was a representative of Citizens' 11 Awareness Network and Alliance for a Green Economy.
12 Still actually affiliated with those organizations, but 13 recently was appointed the associate director for the 14 Nuclear Information and Resource Service.
15 MEMBER RECKLEY: My name is Bill Reckley in 16 the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation [NRR], Japan 17 Lessons Learned Directorate.
18 MEMBER BANIC: Lee Banic, coordinator, 19 NRR.
20 MEMBER DENNIG: Bob Dennig, branch chief in 21 the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
22 MR. LAMB: Okay. We have completed 23 introduction at the NRC Headquarters at this time. Are 24 there any NRC participants from headquarters on the 25 phone?
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7 1 MR. SCHMIDT: John, this is Wayne Schmidt 2 from NRC Region I.
3 MR. LAMB: Okay. Thank you, Wayne. Are 4 there any NRC participants from the region? Wayne is 5 from the region. Anyone else?
6 (No audible response.)
7 MR. LAMB: Okay. Thank you. Due to the 8 large number of people for any of the licensees or members 9 of the public that are on the phone, I would appreciate 10 if you could send an email to john.lamb@nrc.gov as 11 confirmation of your participation by phone. My email 12 address is also located on the public meeting notice 13 under "Meeting Contact."
14 I would like to emphasize that we each need 15 to speak clearly and loudly to make sure that the court 16 reporter can accurately transcribe this meeting. If you 17 do have something that you would like to say, please state 18 your name for the record.
19 At this time[,] I will turn it over to the 20 PRB chairman, Jack Davis.
21 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: Good afternoon. As John 22 said, the purpose of today's meeting is the second 23 opportunity for you all to tell us if you have any 24 additional information, explanation from what we talked 25 about the last time. So it's part of the process.
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8 1 As you already know, I have to go through 2 this anyway, the PRB is made up typically of a chair, 3 which is at the [NRC] SES [Senior Executive Service]
4 level, the PRB project manager for it, and then a 5 coordinator. And then[,] we have technical experts 6 around the room that are associated with this project 7 that can help us with the technical issues.
8 A couple of things.[,] One, [one] is it's 9 not a [hearing] you know, as you know, and so you can't 10 ask us questions of the merits of your petition and so 11 on. No decision will be made during this meeting. And 12 then[,] of course[,] we can ask clarifying questions of 13 you to understand your position better and so on.
14 We will then conduct an internal 15 deliberation on any additional information you gave us 16 that's new since the last time. And of course, as you 17 know[,] from previous times that we provide you 18 information back on what the outcome of that deliberation 19 was.
20 We previously met in May [May 2, 2013], and 21 so it's been a couple of months, so perhaps there is 22 additional information. There's a couple of things that 23 I would just want to get on the record to make sure we 24 do it here properly, and I'm going to read it, so I 25 apologize for that, but it's for those that maybe aren't NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 1 familiar.
2 So[,] I'm going to highlight the scope of 3 your petition that's under review and on March 21st, 2013 4 Mr. Paul Gunter of Beyond Nuclear and several other folks 5 submitted to the NRC a petition under the 2.206 regarding 6 General Electric [GE] Mark I and Mark II boiling water 7 reactors [BWRs]. The petition has requested that the 8 NRC revoke the operating licenses for GE Mark I and two 9 [II] BWRs. And John has already talked about the ADAMS 10 accession number for that, but for those of you that 11 didn't get it, it's ML13084A218. And you can get the 12 exact wording. It's much [more] in depth than what I 13 just gave here.
14 A few of the highlights of NRC significant 15 activity since the last time we met. We internally met 16 on April 8th of 2013 to review the petition to determine 17 if NRC immediate action was needed. As you know, the PRB 18 determined that NRC immediate action was not needed on 19 the basis that there was no immediate safety to licensed 20 facilities or to the health and safety of the public.
21 Mr. Gunter, you were informed of this by an 22 email dated April 17th, 2013. The ML for that is 23 13112A584.
24 On May 2nd of 2013, the PRB met with the 25 Petitioners in the public meeting, and the transcript is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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10 1 available underneath ADAMS accession ML13144A127.
2 On July 8th of 2013, the Petitioners were 3 informed via email of the PRB's initial recommendation, 4 and that is also underneath ML13190A262.
5 So with that, I'll turn it over to you, Paul, 6 and you can introduce your folks.
7 MR. GUNTER: Okay. My name is Paul Gunter 8 and I am director of the Reactor Oversight Project at 9 Beyond Nuclear. I'm going to allow those who are here 10 in the room that plan to speak to introduce themselves 11 and then we'll move to the phone bridge.
12 MR. JUDSON: Tim Judson, NIRS and Citizens' 13 Awareness Network.
14 MR. GUNTER: Okay. We'll move to the phone 15 bridge.
16 MS. LAMPERT: Mary Lampert, Pilgrim Watch.
17 MR. GUNTER: You have to speak up.
18 DR. CUTHBERT: Dr. Lewis Cuthbert, 19 Alliance for a Clean Environment, Pennsylvania, 20 regarding Limerick.
21 MS. AZULAY: Jessica Azulay, Alliance for 22 a Green Economy regarding Nine Mile Point and 23 FitzPatrick.
24 MR. TAYLOR: Wally Taylor with the Sierra 25 Club of Iowa regarding the Cooper Nuclear Station in NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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11 1 Nebraska and the Duane Arnold reactor in Iowa and the Quad 2 Cities nuclear reactor in Illinois.
3 MR. BROWN: Jeff Brown, Grandmothers, 4 Mothers and More for Energy Safety, GRAMMES, regarding 5 Oyster Creek in New Jersey.
6 MR. JOHNSON: Chuck Johnson, Washington 7 and Oregon Physicians for Social Responsibility 8 regarding the Columbia Generating Station Nuclear Plant 9 on the Columbia River in Washington State?[.]
10 MS. JOHNSTON: Gretel Johnston 11 representing BEST/MATRR in North Alabama regarding the 12 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant.
13 MS. SACHS: Leslie Sullivan Sachs, Safe and 14 Green Campaign and the SAGE Alliance regarding Vermont 15 Yankee.
16 MR. GUNTER: Mary Lampert, are you on the 17 line?
18 MS. LAMPERT: Yes, I wasn't I guess 19 speaking loud enough. Mary Lampert, Pilgrim Watch in 20 reference to the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, 21 Plymouth, Massachusetts.
22 MR. GUNTER: Linda Lewison, are you on the 23 line?
24 (No audible response.)
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12 1 all would please mute your lines until I call your name 2 out, I believe we're ready to proceed.
3 Okay. Thank you for the opportunity. The 4 March petition requests the revocation of the operating 5 license for the 31 General Electric Mark I and Mark II 6 [BWRs] in the United States with unreliable pressure 7 suppression containment systems. The Petitioners 8 contend the current containment systems are not in 9 compliance with the general design criteria and 10 therefore they're licensing agreements. The 11 Petitioners further argue that current corrective 12 actions in response to the Fukushima Daiichi Lessons 13 Learned Task Force as proposed by the NRC and the 14 General Electric operators do not provide the public 15 health and safety with timely, adequate and reasonable 16 protection in the event of a loss of coolant accident.
17 The demonstrated failure of the GE Mark I 18 and Mark II containment systems and the uncontrolled 19 release of radioactivity from Fukushima underscore the 20 Petitioner's requested action for the revocation of the 21 unreliable Mark I and Mark II boiling water reactors in 22 the United States.
23 I'd also like to request -- if we have our 24 PowerPoint put up [Slides are in ADAMS Accession No.
25 ML13298A085]. Is it? Is it up, or going up? It's up?
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13 1 Oh, there it is. Thank you. Next slide, please.
2 The former NRC chairman, Gregory Jaczko, 3 recently spoke in Tokyo on a panel before the Foreign 4 Correspondents Club of Japan on September 24th, 2013 on 5 the role of public involvement and the need to rethink 6 nuclear power issues.
7 [Former] Chairman Jaczko said, quote, "One 8 of the things that has become very clear to me and become 9 clear to me after the accident began is that there are 10 these kinds of nuclear accidents that really are 11 economy-wide impact and simply unacceptable in Japanese 12 society, in American society, and I think really all over 13 the world. So it gives us an opportunity to take a step 14 back and figure out ultimately how we go forward in a way 15 that eliminates the possibility of these kinds of 16 accidents. And one of the keys to that certainly is the 17 active involvement and engagement of the public.
18 "Decisions about nuclear technology are 19 often controversial. They are often very difficult 20 involving sometimes science that has limited consensus 21 among technical experts. And so it's incumbent to fully 22 engage the public and be active on the part of government, 23 on the part of utilities and on the part of citizens to 24 be active participants in this endeavor.
25 "We know what the impact of the Fukushima NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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14 1 Daiichi accident was. It's 160,000 people evacuated 2 from their homes, some, most of them still to this day.
3 It's a significant land contamination event and it's an 4 event that at minimum estimates have shown will impact 5 the Japanese economy on the order of $500 billion U.S.
6 I think if I do my math correctly, that's 50 trillion yen.
7 And it's an accident that will leave a legacy of cleanup 8 and decontamination and decommissioning that will last 9 for decades," he said.
10 [Former] Chairman Jaczko continued, quote, 11 "Ultimately we have to change the mind-set about people 12 believing that accidents can happen. Before the 13 accident too many people believed in that mind-set, and 14 that is part of the challenge, part of the important need 15 to change as we go forward. Fundamentally, as I've 16 looked at this accident and as I've talked to people in 17 communities that surround nuclear power plants in the 18 United States, in Japan, it's become clear to me that we 19 need to think about safety in a whole new way. We need 20 to think about nuclear technology being used in a way that 21 cannot lead to evacuations, it cannot lead to land 22 contamination events. This is something that we 23 wouldn't accept in any other kind of technology. And 24 even though these events are anticipated and expected to 25 be extremely rare, they still can happen, and they did NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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15 1 happen at Fukushima Daiichi.
2 "So as we go forward and as we think about 3 nuclear technology and the use of nuclear technology, 4 it's time to completely remove the possibility of severe 5 accidents. That means a whole new way about looking and 6 thinking about nuclear technology and it may mean 7 rethinking about the reactors that are in operation 8 today. This petition has challenged you, the Petition 9 Review Board 'to change the mind-set that accidents 10 cannot happen,' not to weigh continued operation and 11 probabilities but in the demonstrated unacceptable 12 performance and consequences of failure of this 13 containment design.
14 "The Petitioners urge this review board to 15 begin the rethinking by continuing to engage the public 16 through this petition the challenges, the continued 17 operation of this General Electric Fukushima-style 18 reactor with the demonstrated unreliable and 19 non-compliant reactor containment system.
20 "The NRC in its initial drafted 21 determination states that the petition raises issues 22 that have already been reviewed and evaluated by NRC.
23 Therefore, your petition meets the criteria for 24 rejection and requires no further review by the Agency.
25 The Board's determination to discontinue its review of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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16 1 this petition relies on the assertion that the continued 2 operation of the GE Mark I and Mark II with the same 3 reliable containment as Fukushima Daiichi poses 'no 4 imminent risk to public health and safety' without 5 provided its reference documents for its conclusive 6 analysis based in large part on a prediction that a severe 7 accident that challenges the vulnerable containment 8 system will not occur at U.S. reactors.
9 "It relies in part upon NRC document SECY 10 2012-0157 that initially recommended the adoption for a 11 prompt order to install severe accident-capable 12 containment vents with high capacity radiation filters 13 that was then voted down by a majority of the Commission 14 in favor of an order for containment venting 15 modifications for two hardened vents on the containment 16 components without radiation filtration systems that 17 will not be installed as protective features for a 18 minimum of five years on the wet well and six years on 19 the dry well.
20 "The [PRB] Board provides no specific 21 response to any of the challenges raised in the petition 22 or the questions and concerns raised in the May 2nd [2013]
23 public meeting. In other words, the NRC rejects 24 continued public involvement and engagement in this 25 emergency enforcement action where current public health NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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17 1 and safety concerns continue to rely upon the same 2 pressure suppression containment system demonstrated at 3 Fukushima to have a 100 percent failure rate under severe 4 accident conditions while NRC and industry move to 5 exclusively engage to how, to what degree and at what cost 6 they intend to restore some design requirement and 7 licensing agreements that are the focus of this public 8 petition.
9 "Given the evidence of this Agency's strong 10 inclination for failing to meet its own deadlines for 11 closing out decades-old open public health and safety 12 issues such as fire protection for safe reactor shutdown 13 systems and protecting recirculation for emergency core 14 cooling systems following a severe accident, there is no 15 reason for confidence in completion of the hardened 16 containment vents without radiation filtration systems 17 by 2018 and 2019. The public should be allowed to 18 continue to independently and constructively engage the 19 Agency's formal processes."
20 Next slide, please. "As established by 21 Chapter 10 of the United States Code of Federal 22 Regulations, Part 50, Appendix A, the General Design 23 Criteria states, 'these general design criteria 24 establish a minimum requirement for the principal design 25 criteria for water cooled nuclear power plants similar NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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18 1 in design and location to plants for which construction 2 permits had been issued by the United States," end quote.
3 The March petition contends that these 4 minimum requirements include compliance with Criterion 5 16 for the unreliable GE Mark I and Mark II containment 6 system. Criterion 16 reads, "Containment design.
7 Reactor containment and associated systems shall be 8 provided to establish an essentially leak-tight barrier 9 against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity and to 10 assure that the design conditions important to safety are 11 not exceeded as long as the postulated accident 12 continues." In the event of a severe accident the GE 13 Mark I and Mark II pressure suppression systems do not 14 provide with a reasonable level of confidence an 15 essentially leak-tight barrier against the uncontrolled 16 release of radioactivity into the environment.
17 In addition to the widespread land 18 contamination from the initial reactor meltdown and 19 breaches of containment at Fukushima Daiichi[,] numerous 20 news accounts include TEPCO and the Japanese 21 government's failure to stop the ongoing release of 22 radioactive contamination of ground water flowing from 23 the reactor site in what can only be described as the 24 uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the 25 environment.
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19 1 The Petitioners have previously presented 2 a lack of assurance that in the event of a severe accident 3 operator actions in response to such events such as the 4 core breach of the pressure vessel will create pathways 5 for radioactive releases when the dry well is flooded 6 such that the venting through the current hardened wet 7 well system and radioactivity scrubbing is going to be 8 precluded. The Petitioners have also previously 9 presented the issue of containment bypass in both the 10 Mark I and Mark II containments that can lead to 11 unfiltered radioactive releases to the atmosphere, yet 12 the NRC determination to suspend its review provides no 13 response and is silent on how these issues and 14 vulnerabilities impact public health and safety with the 15 current operations today.
16 As the Petitioners have presented, however, 17 the current NRC Enforcement Action 2013-0109, which 18 implements the 2018 and 2019 hardened vent completion 19 schedule for these unreliable Mark I and Mark II 20 containment systems, does not require any implementation 21 or installation of an enhanced radiation filtration 22 system to comport with General Design Criteria 16 other 23 than to pursue it through an indeterminate rulemaking 24 process rooted in a cost benefit analysis.
25 Next slide. Yet in contrast to NRC Order NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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20 1 Enforcement Action 2013-0190, which accommodates the 2 continued operation of U.S. GE boiling water reactors 3 with a minimum six-year timeline for designing and 4 installing a hardened vent system without an enhanced 5 radiation filter as a provision of restart for Japanese 6 boiling water reactors, the nuclear regulatory authority 7 [Japanese Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA)] has issued 8 a specified set of countermeasures to severe accidents 9 that include severe accident-capable hardened 10 containment vents with external high-capacity radiation 11 filtration systems. And this is noted in the outline of 12 the new regulatory requirements for light water 13 reactors, April 2013 severe accident measures 14 requirements as part of the NRA's ongoing enforcement of 15 nuclear regulatory requirements for commercial nuclear 16 power plants.
17 And we also note here; next slide, that the 18 -- what you're looking at is essentially the hardened 19 vent severe accident-capable with a high-capacity 20 radiation filtration system which is now under 21 construction or at ground breaking for 14 boiling water 22 reactors in [Japan] the United States. And this is part 23 of the follow-on effort that AREVA and Hitachi GE have 24 undertaken in a June 2013 press announcement. But it is 25 our understanding that the Shimane nuclear units 1 and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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21 1 2, including the Mark I there, will have a hardened severe 2 accident-capable vent with a radiation filtration system 3 to be completed by 2014. The Shika BWRs, including the 4 Mark I there, is to be completed by 2015 and additional 5 ground breaking activities at Tokai 2, Hamaoka, the 6 Higashidori and Onagawa and the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa units 7 where we have the hardened vents underway as a part of 8 the restart protocol.
9 So while Japanese nuclear reactors are 10 being required to install as countermeasures these 11 hardened filtered containment vents for completion as 12 early as 2014, U.S. reactors continue to operate with NRC 13 permission and allowed to stall for a minimum of six years 14 the same backfit without filters on identical 15 technology. In our view[,] we believe this to be an 16 effort to avoid a safety-related cost consequence on 17 already economically marginal power plants.
18 Next slide, please. We would also draw the 19 [PRB] Board's attention to Criterion 50. You're quite 20 familiar with this as the containment design basis that 21 requires that the reactor containment structure shall be 22 designed so that the containment structure and its 23 internal components can accommodate without exceeding 24 the design leakage rate and without sufficient margin the 25 calculated pressure and temperature conditions NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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22 1 resulting from any loss of coolant accident.
2 The operative word here in Criterion 50 of 3 course is that the containment design shall 4 "accommodate" the pressures and temperatures generated 5 by loss of coolant accident. In any other context[,]
6 "accommodate" is defined to mean to provide and have room 7 for, and in the context of nuclear power and the public 8 health and safety, to provide a place to stay for 9 radioactivity generated in a severe accident and reactor 10 core damage. However, the Mark I and Mark II pressure 11 suppression system is not expected to accommodate the 12 loss of coolant accident pressure and temperature.
13 Without venting the undersized containment, in order to 14 make room for increasing temperature, pressure and 15 explosive hydrogen gas which brings the public's 16 attention back to General Design Criterion 16 and the 17 lack of compliance with the requirement for an 18 essentially leak-tight barrier against the uncontrolled 19 release of radioactivity.
20 Next slide, please. In addition to 21 Fukushima[,] the failure to accommodate public health 22 and safety has another infamous historical context. The 23 White Star Line, the operator of the RMS Titanic, based 24 in a cost-cutting exercise and faulty assumptions that 25 the luxury liner was imperishable and that catastrophe NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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23 1 was so highly improbable that the company decided it 2 would only need to carry 20 lifeboats to accommodate its 3 passengers and crew of 2,207 on the maiden voyage.
4 Practically ever school-aged child is familiar with this 5 example of the failure to accommodate enough public 6 health and safety in the preparation for even the most 7 remote and improbable tragedy.
8 The current NRC Action Order EA 2013-109 9 does not provide for compliance with the general design 10 criteria and minimum requirements do not order or provide 11 for the amplification of the general design criteria in 12 the aftermath and consequence of the Fukushima Daiichi 13 nuclear accident.
14 So we ask who is being accommodated by the 15 Agency's current half-measures and slow walk to address 16 the unreliable containment issue. We urge you not to be 17 part of this mind-set about people believing that 18 accidents can't happen. As your own former NRC Chairman 19 Gregory Jaczko has now warned, we urge you to rethink, 20 reconsider and accept this petition for emergency 21 enforcement action for the requested action to revoke the 22 operating license of all GE Mark I and Mark II boiling 23 water reactors. Thank you.
24 And we'll now hear from Jim [Tim] Judson.
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24 1 to address some broader concerns about the way that the 2 NRC has been treating the questions regarding Mark I and 3 II boiling water reactors in the post-Fukushima 4 environment. And in particular, you know, I think the 5 Petitioners recognize that the industry is -- you know, 6 that these regulatory decisions are not happening in a 7 vacuum, and in fact are happening, you know, in a period 8 of what's, you know, beyond the questions raised by the 9 Fukushima accident, which, you know, really is sort of 10 a historical, you know, sort of financial crisis that the 11 industry is in at the moment. And we're very concerned 12 about the way that the NRC is taking up these issues in 13 that context.
14 In particular, you know, we appreciate that 15 NRC has various directives and imperatives by which it 16 takes regulatory action and balances the need for sort 17 of enhancing public safety and protecting the public 18 health with competing concerns regarding issues, you 19 know, such as regulatory burden to the industry that it 20 regulates.
21 Our concern is that the latter imperative 22 has completely overshadowed the former in the way that 23 the decisions are being made, and in particular[,] the 24 ways in which the issues raised by our petition have been 25 treated. And in regard to that[,] I would like to submit NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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25 1 some new information that's occurred since we initially 2 submitted the petition, which is a February 20th, 2013 3 report issued by UBS Investment Research, which is a 4 financial investment research firm, that covers, you 5 know, among other things the nuclear industry and has 6 been devoting a lot of attention to the economic 7 circumstances of nuclear power plants given the type of 8 market dynamics that we see prevailing across the 9 country, an [and]in particular in states, you know, where 10 the electric markets are deregulated. But I think what 11 we see is these same dynamics spreading into states that 12 are utility regulated on the basis of what they consider 13 reasonable costs for their rate payers to bear.
14 This February 20th [2013] report by UBS, 15 which is entitled, "In Search of Washington's Latest 16 Realities: D.C. Field Trip Take-Aways," [On October 4, 17 2013, NRC contacted Julien Dumoulin-Smith of UBS via 18 phone regarding this UBS report. UBS considers this 19 report proprietary via an email dated October 24, 2013 20 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13304B438). The proprietary UBS 21 report is contained in ADAMS Accssion No. ML13297A117).]
22 was issued after researchers at UBS visited with the 23 Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of 24 Energy regarding a number of the issues that they see as, 25 you know, sort of critical pending issues confronting the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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26 1 nuclear corporations that they monitor investments in.
2 In particular[,] this report talks about 3 the NRC's inclinations in dealing with the hardened 4 containment vent issue in Mark I and Mark IIs, which Paul 5 referenced in his presentation. And they had this to say 6 regarding their anticipations of what NRC's action was 7 going to be on the hardened containment vent issue 8 following this meeting: And I quote here from the 9 summary on the first page of this report.
10 "A nearer-term mild positive is our belief 11 NRC is likely not to require filtered vents given their 12 material expense early next week." As I said[,] this 13 report was issued on February 20th, [2013] and as we 14 know[,] NRC the following week or shortly thereafter did 15 decide to back off on requiring the installation of 16 filters on containment vents in Mark I and IIs.
17 They go on to discuss this in greater detail 18 on page 5 of this report under a section called, "Look 19 for a Decision on Filtered Vents Next Week. Expect 20 Positive for Generators." Quote, "We look forward to 21 [for] a decision from the NRC next week on proposal to 22 require the installation of hardened filtered vents on 23 all Mark I and II units. We increasingly believe the NRC 24 may not require these added precautions given the added 25 stress this places on the incumbent portfolio[,] with NRC NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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27 1 staff initially estimating these vents would cost $15 2 [Mn] million, however, multiple other sources estimate 3 the true cost of such installation costs could be up to 4 $40 [Mn] million per unit. Given the [qualitative]
5 quality of factors cited as part of the cost-benefit 6 analysis used to justify their [the] retrofits, as well 7 as the fragile state of affairs among existing units[,]
8 it appears this [the] effort does not meet the usual rigor 9 of a quantitative cost-benefit analysis used to justify 10 such investments."
11 No [Now,] we recognize that this is not an 12 NRC document; this is a report, you know, by a party that 13 the NRC met with, but we consider, you know, especially 14 given the accuracy of the prediction that UBS had about 15 the NRC's ultimate action on this issue that the 16 underlying rationale for the taking of that action is 17 extremely disturbing. And the reason[,] in 18 particular[,] that it's disturbing is that first of all 19 the figures that are being cited here, whether it's $15 20 million or $40 million, are not in the way of enormous 21 capital investments that are typical in this industry.
22 And in fact[,] given the benefits that would accrue to 23 preventing the uncontrolled release of radiation in an 24 accident like we saw take place multiple times at 25 Fukushima in 2011, this is a very reasonable cost for the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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28 1 expense that's been created as a result of not having such 2 reliable hardened containment filtered vents.
3 But[,] in particular[,] the consideration 4 of the impact that these type of investments might have 5 on the industry at this particular time is extremely 6 troubling and we want the NRC, you know, to be able to 7 reconsider the way that it evaluates regulatory burden, 8 in this matter in particular, but other matters more 9 broadly.
10 What I would like to distribute -- and I'm 11 sorry I didn't make enough copies for everyone at the 12 table. I wasn't sure how many NRC staff would be here.
13 But some charts detailing the exposure of the nuclear 14 industry to the type of financial risks that are present 15 at this time [The handout is contained in ADAMS Accession 16 No. ML13298A098].
17 There's two charts on this paper, you know, 18 looking more generally at the issue of how many nuclear 19 reactors in the U.S. are in states where the electricity 20 markets are deregulated. And in particular, the second 21 chart looks at the number of reactors, you know, that are 22 the subject of this petition that are also operating in 23 deregulated electricity markets.
24 What you see plainly is that the majority 25 of the reactors operating in this country; namely 57 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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29 1 percent, are operating in states with deregulated 2 electricity markets which are experiencing 3 unprecedented low market prices for electricity and 4 placing incredible pressure on the industry financially.
5 What you see in addition is that this 6 pattern is even more pronounced with respect to Mark I 7 and II reactors where 20 of the 31 Mark I and IIs in the 8 U.S. are operating in states where the electricity 9 markets are deregulated, or, in the case of Vermont 10 Yankee, are operating as a merchant reactor in a state 11 that hasn't deregulated.
12 The reason that we raise this is because, 13 you know, if the NRC is making decisions about safety 14 post-Fukushima and considering investments like $15 15 million, $40 million, which as I said are, you know, 16 within the realm of what's typical within the industry 17 -- they're not outrageous costs for capital expenses in 18 the industry, but these are being cited as potential 19 risks for reactor closure, that the NRC really -- you 20 know, I mean it's very troubling if the NRC is actually 21 taking those circumstances into account and deciding not 22 to require safety improvements and to take these kind of 23 enforcement actions [The transcript was forwarded to the 24 NRC Office of Inspector General for review].
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30 1 experiencing large structural deficits in their 2 operating expenses. The cash flow deficits that many of 3 these Mark Is are experiencing, notably Vermont Yankee, 4 which has recently been announced to close, but also 5 other reactors: Fitzpatrick, Pilgrim, Nine Mile Point 6 1, and again these other, you know, 16 other Mark I and 7 II reactors in deregulated states. Sort of the 8 regulatory bar is being lowered to a really frightening 9 level if the NRC is taking into account the economic 10 circumstances of this industry at this time in making 11 these kind of regulatory decisions. And we would urge 12 the NRC to not consider the regulatory burden of these 13 expenses in making these decisions going forward.
14 If the industry, you know, ends up closing 15 reactors because they can't afford to meet basic safety 16 standards like those that are being required in Japan, 17 then in a certain sense that's the gamble the industry 18 accepted by moving into deregulation. I mean operators 19 like Exelon and Entergy entered into deregulated markets 20 and acquired fleets of reactors on that basis and this 21 is the risk that they assumed, and we did not expect when 22 that happened that the NRC would base regulatory 23 standards on the volatility of electricity market which 24 it doesn't even regulate itself.
25 MR. GUNTER: Thank you. Jessica Azulay, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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31 1 AGREE?
2 MS. AZULAY: Yes, can you hear me?
3 MR. GUNTER: Speak a little louder.
4 MS. AZULAY: Can you hear me?
5 MR. GUNTER: Yes.
6 MS. AZULAY: Okay. Great. So my name is 7 Jessica Azulay. I'm calling in from Syracuse, New York 8 where I, along with about a million people, live within 9 50 files [miles] of two Mark I boiling water reactors and 10 one Mark II boiling water reactor, which are all located 11 in Scriba, New York on the shore of Lake Ontario.
12 I represent the Alliance for a Green 13 Economy, a coalition of grassroots organizations in New 14 York who together represent thousands of New Yorkers 15 concerned about the risks posed by the nuclear plants in 16 our state.
17 I'd like to thank the NRC for the 18 opportunity to speak today, and I'd also like to thank 19 Beyond Nuclear and my fellow nuclear watchdogs around the 20 country who are taking part in this very important 21 hearing [This is not a hearing; this is a public PRB 22 meeting under the 2.206 petition process].
23 We[,] at the Alliance for a Green Economy[,]
24 have reviewed the record on the Mark I and Mark II 25 reactors. We've looked at the NRC documents going back NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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32 1 decades. I have personally reviewed over 1,000 pages 2 released through a Freedom of Information Act request 3 about the containment and dangerous venting plans for the 4 FitzPatrick reactor, which is one of the Mark I boiling 5 water reactors in my region. We have carefully reviewed 6 the post-Fukushima reports from the NRC and the orders 7 NRC has given for installing and improving vents on 8 FitzPatrick, Nine Mile 1 and Nine Mile 2, and all the 9 other Mark I and Mark II reactors in the U.S.
10 This record clearly shows that the Mark I 11 and Mark II reactors by their original design do not 12 comply with the NRC's General Design Criterion 16 which 13 requires a reliable leak-proof containment to protect 14 the public from radiation exposure during an accident.
15 The record also clearly shows that this design flaw has 16 never been addressed in the Mark II reactors like Nine 17 Mile Point 2. It was not fully addressed in the Mark I 18 reactors that installed vents in the early '90s like Nine 19 Mile Point 1 and it was not fully addressed at FitzPatrick 20 also here in Central New York, the only Mark I in the U.S.
21 that doesn't have a hardened vent to the stack, and 22 instead has a reckless plan to blow the doors off the 23 standby gas treatment building in order to create a 24 so-called vent cap if it's needed. So in their current 25 state[,] none of the boiling water reactors in Central NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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33 1 New York meet General Design Criterion 16.
2 What's frustrating about this case is that 3 the NRC essentially agrees with us that right now these 4 reactors do not offer adequate protection from an 5 accident. And yet[,] instead of true protection from 6 the very real threats of today[,] we are offered the 7 promise of improvements tomorrow. And by tomorrow[,] I 8 mean five or six years from now, and maybe even longer.
9 In the order EA 13-109 issued on June 6th 10 of this year, NRC states that implementation of new vent 11 requirements are, quote, "necessary to provide 12 reasonable assurance of adequate protection on the 13 public health and safety." The order also states that 14 one of the factors that led to the order is to enhance 15 the Mark I and Mark II containments, quote, "by 16 addressing the relatively high probabilities that those 17 containments would fail should an accident progress to 18 melting the core," unquote.
19 Later in the same document[,] it is again 20 reiterated that, quote, "these modifications are needed 21 to protect public health and minimize danger to life or 22 property because they will give licensees greater 23 capabilities to respond to severe accidents and limit the 24 uncontrolled release of radioactive materials,"
25 unquote.
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34 1 Lest you accuse me of taking these quotes 2 out of context, I will note that in the same order it says, 3 quote, "The NRC staff has determined that continued 4 operation does not pose an imminent risk to public health 5 and safety." But then in the same sentence it says, 6 "However, the additional requirements outlined in EA 7 13-109 are necessary in light of insights gained from the 8 events at Fukushima Daiichi.
9 I'm sure you can understand that these 10 seemingly contradictory statements are incredibly 11 confusing and frustrating to people like me who are 12 trying to understand the risks in our communities. How 13 can you say that these reactors are safe to operate now, 14 but that the new vents you'll require are, quote, 15 "necessary to provide reasonable assurance of adequate 16 protection to the public health and safety in light of 17 the events at Fukushima?" It doesn't make any sense.
18 The first part of this contradictory 19 statement that these reactors don't pose an imminent 20 threat is offered as one of your justifications for 21 denying our petition. The statement is negated by the 22 mountain of evidence going back decades and by the NRC's 23 own justification for requiring yet more upgrades trying 24 to fix the flaws in the design.
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35 1 concerns through another process, the process by which 2 you'll require new vents to be installed on the plants 3 in question. But one of the main reasons we filed this 4 emergency enforcement petition is because the process is 5 allowing dangerous reactors to stay online and continue 6 to threaten us right now and for the foreseeable future, 7 for the several years it will take before the upgraded 8 vents are actually installed, if they even are installed 9 on the scheduled that you've laid out.
10 Meanwhile, there's been a decision by the 11 Commission so far not to require filters on the vents to 12 protect us from radiation if the vents have to be used 13 once they're installed, which means these new vents will 14 not bring the plants up to regulatory compliance on a 15 leak-proof containment.
16 You can also understand that we are 17 skeptical over whether these new so-called reliable 18 vents will be truly reliable since the last round 19 recommended by NRC proved not reliable at Fukushima in 20 their first real world test. These issues are at the 21 heart of your petition.
22 There is a saying that justice delayed is 23 justice denied. I believe similarly protection delayed 24 is protection denied. The NRC's job is to protect us 25 from the possibility that something could go wrong at one NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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36 1 of these reactors. It is not controversial at this point 2 to say that NRC itself admits that nuclear technology is 3 not perfect and that things do sometimes go wrong and that 4 accidents can happen even if they're unlikely. That's 5 why a reliable leak-proof containment is required by law 6 in all operating nuclear reactors.
7 This is not a hypothetical scenario for me 8 and my neighbors. Just last week[,] we found out that 9 due to a fairly small human error and inadequate 10 procedures in April of 2013 [April 16, 2013 - see NRC 11 Integrated Inspection Report, dated September 23, 2013 12 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13266A237) for details] Nine Mile 13 Point lost power to its cooling mechanisms and came 14 within less than two hours of boiling and within nine 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> of fuel exposure that could have led to a meltdown.
16 And because containment was not functional at the time 17 due to refueling activities, NRC was not sure there would 18 have been enough time to evacuate if the accident had 19 progressed. This is a reminder to all of us how 20 important regulation on containment is and how every day 21 we live exposed to the risk of a nuclear accident that 22 could destroy Upstate New York. We're asking you to shut 23 these plants down before that happens.
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37 1 at some point in the future to protect us from accidents.
2 It says reactor containment and associated systems shall 3 be provided to establish an essentially leak-proof 4 barrier against the uncontrolled release of 5 radioactivity to the environment.
6 In recommending that our petition be 7 rejected[,] you have offered no evidence that a 8 leak-proof containment exists for these plants in 9 today's reality, nor have you assured us that we will have 10 truly leak-proof containment in the future. You have 11 only offered us the promise that in several years we might 12 get an improvement to the currently unreliable vents.
13 This is protection delayed and protection denied. I 14 strongly urge you to reconsider your initial 15 recommend[ation] and accept our petition for review.
16 Thank you.
17 MR. GUNTER: Thank you, Jessica. We'll 18 now hear from Lewis Cuthbert.
19 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: Before you do could you 20 ask whoever doesn't have their phone muted to please mute 21 it, because there's a lot of interference on the line 22 right now.
23 MS. LEWISON: And also, Paul, this is Linda 24 Lewison in Chicago, that I am online. Can you --
25 MR. GUNTER: Okay. Very good.
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38 1 MS. LEWISON: Can you hear me?
2 MR. GUNTER: Yes, we can.
3 MS. LEWISON: Okay.
4 MR. GUNTER: But we would like not to hear 5 the background noise. Can you all please mute your 6 lines? Star 6. Star 6, please. Thank you.
7 We still have somebody online without their 8 mute and with background noise. Please mute your line.
9 DR. CUTHBERT: Hi, can you hear me?
10 MR. GUNTER: Is this Lewis?
11 DR. CUTHBERT: Yes, it is, Paul.
12 MR. GUNTER: Go ahead, Lewis. And thank 13 you for whoever muted their line.
14 DR. CUTHBERT: Okay.
15 MR. GUNTER: Proceed.
16 DR. CUTHBERT: Good afternoon. Thank you 17 for the opportunity to share some perspective and 18 comments on behalf of the community that surrounds the 19 Limerick Nuclear Generating Station in Limerick, 20 Pennsylvania. My name is Dr. Lewis Cuthbert. I'm the 21 president of ACE, the Alliance for a Clean Environment.
22 After 14 years of investigating Limerick 23 Nuclear Plant, the Alliance for a Clean Environment has 24 compiled a body of evidence that strongly supports the 25 Beyond Nuclear petition from Paul Gunter --
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39 1 MR. GUNTER: Lewis?
2 DR. CUTHBERT: Yes?
3 MR. GUNTER: Are you still there? Okay.
4 I was just checking.
5 DR. CUTHBERT: Yes, I am. Shall I continue 6 or start again, Paul?
7 MR. GUNTER: Proceed.
8 DR. CUTHBERT: Okay. After 14 years of 9 investigating Limerick Nuclear Plant, the Alliance for 10 a Clean Environment has compiled a body of evidence that 11 strongly supports the Beyond Nuclear petition from Paul 12 Gunter calling for the emergency closure of GE boiling 13 water reactors.
14 Limerick's Mark II reactors have dangerous 15 and unreliable containment structures similar to those 16 that melted down at Fukushima. Limerick clearly 17 presents undue and unacceptable risk to public health, 18 safety and the environment. Radioactivity released in 19 an accident at Limerick could destroy the health and 20 lives of millions of people living in the greater 21 Philadelphia region. Over 8 million people live within 22 50 miles of Limerick. We cannot evacuate safely.
23 NRC's failure to require immediate 24 installation of vents with filters has been negligent 25 beyond belief, especially when NRC's own staff said vents NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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40 1 without filters could become a radioactive fire hose in 2 the sky and that filtered vents should be installed 3 regardless of the cost to industry.
4 Many structural flaws at Limerick Nuclear 5 Plant were defective from the beginning and cannot be 6 fixed. NRC is sweeping serious problems under the rug 7 further risking unnecessary radioactive catastrophe 8 [The transcript was sent to the NRC Allegation Program 9 for review]. NRC is failing to address Limerick's 10 flawed design issues as well as its history of multiple 11 reactor shutdowns, many of which are unexplained, plus 12 other serious problems and violations.
13 [Executive Director of Operations]
14 Commissioner Borchardt's June 25, 2013 [ADAMS Accession 15 No. ML131400044], letter to ACE suggests that the NRC is 16 not taking risk of meltdown at Limerick or threats to 17 public health and safety seriously enough. In a 21-page 18 response letter, 8/5/13, to [Executive Director of 19 Operations] Commissioner Borchardt ACE identified a body 20 of evidence showing why NRC cannot guarantee public 21 safety from Limerick operations and why NRC should close 22 Limerick. NRC repeatedly accommodates Exelon's 23 financial interests but further jeopardizes public 24 health and safety in the process. Major issues for our 25 community include the following: Exelon repeatedly NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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41 1 fails to comply with NRC regulations at Limerick. Then 2 NRC weakens regulations and amends Limerick's operating 3 licenses based on Exelon's outdated and faulty 4 assumptions even though Exelon's self-serving claims are 5 often contraindicated by their own reports to NRC.
6 Exelon did not provide testing that proved Limerick's two 7 reactors have not already become dangerously brittle 8 enough to either crack or shatter.
9 After 28 years of operation[,] there are 10 serious reactor issues not adequately addressed to 11 assure there will not be a loss of coolant accident that 12 could lead to a meltdown. In fact, risks are increasing.
13 Limerick's upgrades have increased reactor dome pressure 14 and corrosion levels, according to GE. Limerick is also 15 using new more powerful GE fuel which produces more 16 radiation, more heat and more stress on aging equipment.
17 Limerick's boiling water reactors involve 18 un-correctable degradation. The nuclear industry 19 itself admitted reactors are too costly to replace. On 20 June 1, 2011 [ADAMS Accession Nos. ML111780308, 21 ML112160612, and ML112410442], a petition was filed 22 against Exelon about Limerick's repeated shutdown 23 problems and serious reactor and system degradation.
24 NRC dismissed it [on September 2, 2011 (ADAMS Accession 25 No. ML112371884)].
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42 1 Limerick's shutdown safety valves and 2 control rods may not operate reliability [reliably] to 3 prevent meltdowns. That is unacceptable. Limerick's 4 spent fuel pools, like those at Fukushima, are 5 dangerously located on top of reactors, but Limerick's 6 radioactive risks are worse. Pools are packed far 7 beyond design capacity and documented to have been 8 constructed with sub-standard cement.
9 NRC documented corrosion and loss of 10 thickness in Limerick's fuel pools at rates far higher 11 than original calculations. Pitting corrosion was 2 to 12 10 times higher than general corrosion. Exelon 13 requested a delay of over a decade to recoat the pools 14 even though NRC told Exelon that to delay fuel pool 15 recoating was unacceptable. Inexplicably[,] NRC caved 16 and revised Limerick's regulations allowing Exelon to 17 delay recoating for more than a decade.
18 There is an earthquake fault under Limerick 19 with four others within 17 miles. The recent Virginia 20 earthquake triggered seismic reactor alarms at Limerick, 21 and the risk to Limerick was misleading because some 22 monitors were not operable.
23 And finally, Limerick is surrounded by one 24 of the most densely populated areas in the nation and 25 cannot be safely evacuated. In 1980, NRC stated that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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43 1 Limerick had double the population density within 30 2 miles considered safe for evacuation even back then.
3 Now population density is four times that number.
4 Montgomery County officials in Pennsylvania expressed 5 concerns to NRC about the impossibility of safe 6 evacuation due to a lack of and inadequate 7 infrastructure. Exelon's 2012 evacuation time estimate 8 for Limerick is both highly unrealistic and unworkable.
9 And in conclusion[,] I'd like to suggest on 10 behalf of millions of residents near and around the 11 Limerick Nuclear Generating Station that we believe the 12 evidence shows why it is imperative for NRC to revoke 13 Limerick Nuclear Plant's operating licenses and we ask 14 that all other Mark I and II reactors currently in 15 operation in the United States also close at the 16 direction of the NRC. Thank you for your consideration.
17 MR. GUNTER: Thank you, Lewis. Let's see, 18 before we hear from the next speaker I have been passed 19 a note that I misspoke in my testimony and that I stated 20 that there were 14 BWRs in the United States that were 21 undergoing the filtered vent [modification]. And my 22 intent is to correct the record to say that those were 23 14 BWRs in Japan. So thank you.
24 Okay. We have background noise on the line 25 again. Can you please mute if you're not on as a speaker?
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44 1 Can you please mute your line? Star 6.
2 Can we hear from Chuck Johnson with 3 Washington/Oregon PSR?
4 MR. JOHNSON: Yes, thank you. My name is 5 Charles K. Johnson and I'm the director of the Joint Task 6 Force on Nuclear Power for the Oregon and Washington 7 chapters of Physicians for Social Responsibility. My 8 comments follow on the previous comments in the May 9 [Public PRB meeting held on May 2,2013] public hearing 10 [that was not a hearing; it was a public PRB meeting held 11 in the 2.206 petition process] of John Pearson, M.D., our 12 Oregon PSR chapter president.
13 Thank you for the opportunity to present to 14 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regarding the issue of 15 the demonstrably inadequate containment structures 16 designed into the GE Mark I and Mark II nuclear power 17 reactors proven to be vulnerable to failure by the 18 multiple accidents in Fukushima, Japan and the plan to 19 allow unfiltered vented radioactive effluent from the 20 reactors to be pipelined into communities surrounding 21 them in the case of a worst case accident.
22 As it's been pointed out by Beyond Nuclear 23 and the rest of the co-signing groups in the petition for 24 revocation of the licenses for these inherently 25 dangerous reactors, this plan for dealing with severe NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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45 1 accident conditions will deliberately defeat the 2 licensed condition for maintaining public health and 3 safety through defense-in-depth protective reactor 4 systems including, quote, "an essentially leak-tight 5 valve against the controlled release of radioactivity to 6 the environment," end quote, associated with the 7 occurrence of reactor core fuel damage.
8 Further, as previously stated, this 9 constitutes violations of these reactors' licensed 10 condition as required under 10 C.F.R., Appendix A, 11 General Design Criteria 10 and 16, and the operating 12 licenses should therefore be revoked.
13 We would like to emphasize three points 14 specific to our own reactor of concern, the Columbia 15 Generating Station, also known as the Washington Nuclear 16 Plant No. 2, located on the Hanford Nuclear Reservation 17 along the Columbia River 10 miles north of Richland, 18 Washington, each of the potential pathway by which an 19 accident could occur that is sufficient to cause the plan 20 for emergency breach of containment envisioned by the NRC 21 policy when it decided to allow the Columbia Nuclear 22 Plant to construct unfiltered vents to its GE BWR Mark 23 II containment design reactor which would intentionally 24 release radionuclides in quantities well beyond what the 25 plant is licensed to release into the surrounding NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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46 1 communities and the Pacific Northwest as a whole.
2 These three points are: (1) Geological 3 knowledge of the region has improved immensely with U.S.
4 Department of Energy studies showing that ground motion 5 in an earthquake is now potentially three times greater 6 than was known and planned for when the Columbia Nuclear 7 Plant was built; (2) volatile nuclear facilities exist 8 nearby on the Hanford Nuclear Reservation that could also 9 release large quantities of radioactive material in an 10 earthquake, a terrorist attack or a human-caused 11 accident which could cause the plant site to become so 12 radioactively hot that operators might be at immediate 13 health risk which could lead to an accident at the 14 Columbia Plant; and (3) a breach of the Grand Coulee Dam 15 would result in power cuts to the site that could last 16 for many days, would include the destruction of power and 17 water intake structure, roads and entire cities in the 18 path of a giant wall of water which would inundate the 19 base of the ultimate heat sink in the Columbia Nuclear 20 Plant itself.
21 Beginning with point No. 1, I would like to 22 note that the Oregon and Washington chapters of 23 Physicians for Social Responsibility sent a letter to the 24 NRC Chairwoman, Allison Macfarlane, on July 4th [19th],
25 2013 [ADAMS Accession No. ML13210A397]. It outlined our NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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47 1 concerns about the adequacy of the Columbia Nuclear Plant 2 to withstand an earthquake in light of geological 3 research for a federal high-level waste treatment 4 facility less than 10 miles from the plant that has now 5 been required to meet ground motion standards three times 6 those that the Columbia Nuclear Plant was designed to 7 meet. The new earthquake data available on the Hanford 8 Nuclear Reservation was not considered during the May 9 2012 relicensing of the Columbia Nuclear Plant because 10 it was said to be part of the, quote, "ongoing regulatory 11 oversight," end quote.
12 We've not had a reply from Chairwoman 13 Macfarlane or the NRC to our request for a meeting with 14 her [Chairman Macfarlane responded by letter dated 15 September 26, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13224A360)].
16 To date, the NRC has not explained their unconscionably 17 lax, quote, "regulatory oversight," end quote, of the 18 impact of new geologic data some of which has been widely 19 known to Washington State geologists for over a decade.
20 The original assessment of the plant site 21 in 1981 found that there was a low annual probability of 22 exceedance [exceeding], 0.00011, of the 0.025 g 23 laboratory ground motion threshold of the safe shutdown 24 earthquake for the Columbia Nuclear Plant. It was 25 licensed on that basis and this assessment has not been NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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48 1 changed since.
2 In the 30 years since the plant was 3 licensed[,] there have been numerous geologic 4 investigations on the Hanford Reservation and 5 surrounding region conducted by the U.S. Geological 6 Survey, federal contractors, PNNL, Pacific Northwest 7 National Laboratory, the State of Washington, and 8 universities. The outcomes of these studies have piled 9 up the geologic evidence that indicates the original 10 Columbia Nuclear Plant's seismic risk assessment 11 significantly underestimated the potential risks to the 12 reactor and associated structures.
13 Among the evidence so far not considered by 14 the NRC regulators to our knowledge is the following:
15 More detailed mapping of folds and faults in the region 16 surrounding the Columbia Nuclear Plant site now exist.
17 The folds and faults considered in the original seismic 18 risk assessment have significantly longer lengths and 19 evidence of being geologically young indicating 20 relatively recent earthquakes. Longer fault lengths 21 also indicate that these longer faults may be capable of 22 producing much larger magnitude earthquakes.
23 Additional Yakima fold and thrust belt structures were 24 identified that could pose an earthquake risk to the 25 Columbia Nuclear Plant, including Frenchman Hills, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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49 1 Manastash Ridge, Toppenish Ridge, Columbia Hills, Hog 2 Ranch-Naneum Ridge and Hite Fault.
3 The potential significance and importance 4 of a magnitude 6.5 to 7.4, quote, "1872 earthquake," end 5 quote, the largest historical earthquake to hit the 6 region, to the seismic risk analysis of the Columbia 7 Nuclear Plant was greatly reduced because the assumed 8 location of the epicenter for this event was more than 9 180 miles away than was determined by Bakun et al in 2002.
10 The revised location for the epicenter at the southern 11 end of Lake Chelan is approximately 99 miles from the 12 Columbia Nuclear Plant, rather than an additional 180 13 miles away as was believed at the time that they set the 14 standards for the plant.
15 Subsequent seismic risk assessments 16 performed by the U.S. Department of Energy for the 17 Hanford site that factored in newly available structural 18 geology data and generated estimates at peak vibratory 19 ground motions were significantly higher than those used 20 to establish the Columbia Nuclear Plant's license in 21 1981. The Geomatrix study in 1996 established peak 22 vibratory ground motion of 0.50 g on the Hanford site 10 23 miles from the Columbia Nuclear Plant, double that of the 24 estimate of the Columbia Nuclear Plant license.
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50 1 since Geomatrix forced the U.S. Department of Energy to 2 suspend work on their waste treatment plant, WTP, 3 facility to allow for new data collection and updated 4 seismic risk assessment. Three studies, Youngs, 2007; 5 Rohay and Brouns, 2007; Rohay and Reidel, 2005, 6 determined that the previous vibratory ground motion 7 estimate needed to be increase [increased] to 0.8 g 8 causing the U.S. Department of Energy to order 9 significant modification to the WTP facility. That's 10 three times larger than the Columbia Nuclear Plant was 11 required to meet. That facility is 10 miles away from 12 that plant.
13 A July 2010 letter from the Nuclear 14 Regulatory Commission to the operator of the Columbia 15 Nuclear Plant, Energy Northwest, requested that they 16 address their concerns that the most recent seismic risk 17 study in 1995 for the Columbia Nuclear Plant failed to 18 address more recent geologic findings and increased 19 seismic risk as determined for the WTP facility. Energy 20 Northwest replied that the Columbia Plant was, quote, "an 21 increased distance from the nearby seismic sources and 22 had different sub-surface geology conditions." These 23 conclusions are not born out by geological observation 24 in any study today, and yet the NRC has not required any 25 modification be made to the Columbia Nuclear Plant to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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51 1 address the increased risk from the strong seismic 2 vibratory ground motion. In 2011, the U.S. Geological 3 Survey published a paper that will likely fundamentally 4 change several key assumptions that past seismic risk 5 assessments were based upon. The USGC found that the 6 maximum length of some of the Yakima fold and thrust belt 7 structures have been previously underestimated. Their 8 paper focused on the Umtanum Ridge which they were able 9 to trace through the Cascade Range where it merges with 10 active faults in the Puget Sound area. The Umtanum Ridge 11 structure, which terminates less than five miles north 12 of the Columbia Nuclear Plant, went from 77 miles to more 13 than 124 miles in length, greatly increasing the known 14 potential for large earthquakes.
15 They found that the structure of the Umtanum 16 Ridge was deeper than previously assumed and can produce 17 larger magnitude quakes as a result. They found 18 evidence that the Umtanum Ridge of trenching surface 19 scarps indicating that this structural feature may be 20 more seismically active than previously believed. This 21 new information will be factored into the new 22 probabilistic seismic hazard analysis being conducted by 23 the U.S. Department of Energy for the Hanford site 24 scheduled to be completed in 2014.
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52 1 Northwest and yet the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2 allows them to continue to operate the Columbia Plant at 3 full power under their clearly inadequate original 4 licensed earthquake standards.
5 So far in response to the post-Fukushima 6 requirements[,] Energy Northwest has in its walk-down in 7 April of 2011 of the Columbia Nuclear Plant determined 8 that they do not even meet these inadequate standards 9 finding that, quote, "the licensee determined that the 10 emergency response facilities, the power makeup system 11 and the fire protection systems were not seismically 12 qualified," end quote. And that, quote, "floor drain 13 isolation valves and sump level switches used to mitigate 14 internal flooding were not seismically qualified," end 15 quote.
16 Another seismic walk-down in November 2012 17 showed a total of 109 potentially seismic adverse 18 conditions. To date[,] we have nothing in writing to 19 show that these problems have been addressed and that 20 they have met the already inadequate 1983 standards.
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53 1 States for government purposes.
2 These site operations also created a large 3 volumes of radioactive and chemical waste. Some 4 contaminants were released into the environment exposing 5 people who live downwind and downstream. Other 6 contaminants were stored. The last reactor was shut 7 down in 1987 and the last reprocessing plant closed in 8 1990. Most of the human-made radioactivity and about 9 half of the chemicals remaining onsite are kept in 10 underground tanks and surface facilities. The rest 11 exist in the soil, groundwater and burial grounds.
12 Hanford contains about 40 percent of all of 13 the radioactivity that exists across the nuclear weapons 14 complex. More than 1,600 waste sites have been 15 identified on Hanford. Contained waste is held inside 16 structures such as underground tanks, buildings and 17 concrete basins. There are more than 500 waste 18 facilities at Hanford.
19 The primary threats of large-scale 20 radioactive contamination that could become an immediate 21 health hazard to Columbia Nuclear Plant workers are:
22 (1) The K basins near the closed K reactors in which a 23 shallow pond prevents deteriorated used fuel rod 24 material from catching fire and sending a cloud of 25 intense radiation across the Hanford site. If the pool NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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54 1 were to crack and drain, it would take minutes for a fire 2 to break out threatening workers throughout the site and 3 citizens beyond it.
4 (2) the waste encapsulation storage 5 facility, WESF, which contains 1,936 stainless steel 6 capsules holding 130 million curies of radioactive 7 cesium and strontium plus their decay products. These 8 are kept in water-filled pools in the WESF adjoining B 9 plant in the 200 area. These capsules have the largest 10 concentration on earth of strontium-90 and cesium-137, 11 are more radioactive than spent fuel and are held in a 12 50-year-old pool with no safety backups and no pretense 13 of containment. This pool is not rated to withstand even 14 a mild earthquake.
15 (3) The waste treatment plant, also 16 referred to as the Vitrification Plant, or Vit Plant, is 17 being built at Hanford to harden chemical and radioactive 18 tank wastes left from the plutonium extraction from spent 19 nuclear fuel. It has been delayed for seismic study, as 20 previously mentioned, but also due to whistle blower 21 complaints that the plant may be subject to hydrogen and 22 criticality explosions that could release large amounts 23 of life-threatening radioactive material onto the site 24 and the surrounding community.
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55 1 330 million curies of total radioactivity, less than the 2 361 million curies of total radioactivity at the Columbia 3 Plant site, but almost double the amount of radioactivity 4 available for release.
5 As mentioned above, some of these curies are 6 contained in materials that are not stored in a way that 7 could guarantee they are not subject to a catastrophic 8 release. If an earthquake, fire, terrorist attack, 9 human or mechanical error caused a catastrophic release, 10 it may force workers to leave the Columbia Nuclear Plant 11 facility in order to prevent an immediate loss of life 12 putting the plant itself at risk for a catastrophic 13 accident.
14 Finally, the threat of flooding at the site 15 must be considered as potential accident pathway. The 16 NRC's own studies, most recently the final safety 17 analysis report of the Columbia Generating Station in 18 December of 2012, of the potential for a catastrophic 19 Grand Coulee Dam terrorist attack scenario would put the 20 city of Richland under a 15-foot wave of swiftly churning 21 water and debris wiping out power infrastructure and all 22 water intake equipment from along the Columbia River.
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56 1 heat sink contained in pools slightly below grade from 2 the reactor and turbines would be grazed by the high water 3 point possibly doing damage to the structural integrity 4 as well. The combination of a lack of off-site power for 5 an extended period of time, the cut off of the primary 6 water source and potential threat to its backup and the 7 massive destruction of local infrastructure, roads, 8 bridges, human organizational systems could lead to a 9 lack of power, water or both to continue the critical 10 cooling of the reactor core. We know from Fukushima what 11 that situation leads to with a GE BWR Mark I or Mark II 12 containment.
13 A letter from NRC employee Richard H.
14 Perkins, PE of the Division Risk Analysis Office of 15 Nuclear Reactor Regulation, dated September 14, 2012 to 16 the NRC's Office of the Inspector General, exposes the 17 concealment of this, quote, "significant nuclear safety 18 information from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 19 Commission." The Columbia Nuclear Plant was one of the 20 plants named as threatened in the suppressed study 21 entitled, quote, "Flooding of U.S. Nuclear Power Plants 22 Following Upstream Dam Failure [ADAMS Accession No.
23 ML12188A239]."
24 As has been observed by many nuclear 25 experts, the location of Fukushima next to the ocean and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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57 1 the fact that the wind carried much of the radioactivity 2 from the explosions there out to sea diluted a large 3 amount of the exposure to humans and terrestrial life.
4 No such protection exists on river-based nuclear plants 5 like the Columbia Nuclear Plant. A Fukushima-style 6 accident there would be born by the wind over land and 7 water-related impacts would be felt by downstream river 8 uses for centuries.
9 In summary, in the case of the Columbia 10 Nuclear Plant there are potential pathways for the same 11 type of catastrophic containment breaching accidents 12 that occurred in Japan in 2011. These pathways are more 13 likely than the NRC and the reactor operator have been 14 willing to officially acknowledge to date. The plan to 15 place unfiltered vents on the Columbia Nuclear Plant's 16 containment system constitutes a basic violation of NRC 17 requirements for viable containment in order to safely 18 operate a nuclear power plant. For this reason[,] the 19 Columbia Nuclear Plant and all other plants with the same 20 or similar containment systems should be closed 21 immediately until they can be shown to have containment 22 systems that do not violate NRC requirements. Thank 23 you.
24 MR. GUNTER: Thank you, Chuck.
25 Mary Lampert? And we are 2:15, so we have NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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58 1 until 3:00. Okay.
2 MS. LAMPERT: Okay. Hi, this is Mary 3 Lampert, Pilgrim Watch, keeping an eye on the Pilgrim 4 Nuclear Power Plant.
5 We strongly object to the preliminary 6 statements that we are in no immediate danger. That is 7 on its face an absurd statement.
8 We know NRC does not have a crystal ball and 9 we can look at the facts brought forward by Tim Judson 10 and the petition I'm a part of that the economic situation 11 of boiling water reactors in deregulated markets is such 12 they cannot --
13 (Technical interruption.)
14 MS. LAMPERT: Hello?
15 MR. GUNTER: Go ahead, Mary.
16 MS. LAMPERT: They cannot compete with 17 cheaper available sources of electricity. And why this 18 presents a particular danger is this: That they're old 19 reactors. Pilgrim went online, for example, in '72.
20 And like old people, they're starting to fall apart.
21 They need replacements that Pilgrim and other old 22 reactors in deregulated markets are not spending the 23 money on, so things are breaking. And the NRC is not doing 24 its job of regulating nor putting in effect orders that 25 respond to the true challenges that we know from the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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59 1 lessons learned at Fukushima.
2 So at Pilgrim[,] they have had 17 event 3 reports this year [From the NRC public webpage for event 4 reports, Pilgrim had 22 event reports from January 1, 5 2013 to September 30, 2013. The Event Report Nos. are 6 48664, 48665, 48685, 48712,48736, 48739, 48743, 48766, 7 48801, 48909, 48923, 48997, 49013, 49053, 49061, 49064, 8 49187, 49189, 49196, 49201, and 49296]. If you look at 9 the 100 reactors across the country, on average, they 10 have less than one shutdown per reactor this year.
11 Pilgrim has had nine times that [From the NRC public 12 webpage for event reports, Pilgrim has had 4 scrams from 13 January 1, 2013 to September 30, 2013. The Event Report 14 Nos. are 48664, 48736, 48923, and 49296]. So this goes 15 --
16 (Technical interruption.)
17 MS. LAMPERT: Hello?
18 MR. GUNTER: -- try and work it out.
19 MS. LAMPERT: Oh, okay. And so I agree 20 with much that has been said so far, and for efficiency 21 of time[,] I'll just add pieces here and there.
22 In regard to electric power, the spent fuel 23 pools do not have a dedicated backup power system now.
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60 1 secondary emergency power capacity is not required in 2 decommissioned plants and licensees are allowed to 3 perform maintenance on emergency diesel generators when 4 reactors are undergoing refueling outages. Those two 5 points puts us at considerable danger for an accident 6 with containment failure.
7 As far as the assumption that mitigation is 8 adequate is also ridiculous. We can look at, for 9 example, the capability to add water to a spent fuel pool.
10 NRC's assumption that operators will be able to add water 11 to the pool mitigation during an accident is certainly 12 overly optimistic.
13 At Pilgrim[,] they are supposedly going to 14 bring truck-mounted cranes or a ladder fire truck to the 15 site on short notice; however, this arrangement has never 16 been realistically tested. An event that initiates or 17 co-initiates the accident; an earthquake, hurricane, ice 18 storm, blizzard or an attack would render a truck 19 unavailable. A radioactive release from a reactor 20 accident could produce radiation fields that render the 21 truck unavailable or preclude its use. And there is no 22 provision for a radiation-resistant TV camera to guide 23 nozzle positioning or for shielding of the truck or spray 24 operators, and there seems to be no recognition that 25 spraying water on exposed spent fuel could in certain NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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61 1 circumstances exacerbate the accident by feeding a zirc 2 steam fire.
3 And you go from one to the other and realize 4 that there is no waste confidence. And it additionally 5 seems counterproductive to make a final decision on this 6 petition before we've gone -- NRC has gone through the 7 process of the waste confidence ordered by the 5th 8 District Court.
9 Furthermore, we've called the game, and I 10 can send you the analyses of the earthquake study that 11 NRC is using to support the fact that relax, be happy, 12 there's no problem. That study is totally bogus. It 13 does not pass the sniff test of scientific integrity.
14 And I will send it to be added to this petition at the 15 end of this conference call [To date, this document has 16 not been provided to the NRC].
17 Further, I note that I had added to the 18 petition a supplement, 9/24/11 [ADAMS Accession No.
19 ML11279A034]; however, the Petition Review Board's 20 acceptance of this petition did not seem to acknowledge 21 that they had read it [The supplement dated September 24, 22 2011, is being addressed as part of 2.206 petition dated 23 April 23, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11104A058), under 24 NRC Green Ticket G20110262]. And the two points brought 25 forward definitely have bearing on containment NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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62 1 integrity.
2 First of all, I brought forward the fact 3 that it appears that NRC is considering detonation, 4 explosions at [Fukushima Dai-ichi] Unit 3 as a result of 5 a detonation. In your analyses[, it] seems to assume a 6 detonation and not consider the possibility of a 7 deflagration which was discussed in reference to 8 [Fukushima Dai-ichi] Unit 3 by Arnold Gundersen as 9 mentioned in my supplement [dated September 24, 2011 10 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11279A034]. It's clear that 11 containments cannot withstand a shockwave that travels 12 faster than the speed of sound, which is the situation 13 in a deflagration.
14 Furthermore, you see that the speed of sound 15 in a relatively warm, moist climate; in other words, 16 reactors near large bodies of water, is around 600 miles 17 per hour. Therefore, he contended that if this is what 18 we think it is, it would cause enormous damage to 19 containment because they certainly, these BWRs, are in 20 now [no] way designed to handle it.
21 The second point which would be 22 consequences that I brought forward in that supplement 23 [dated September 24, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No.
24 ML11279A034),] and I think deserves review by this 25 [Petition Review] Board is the fact of the control rods NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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63 1 being inserted from the bottom in BWRs, where in a PWR 2 they enter from the top. What does this mean? It means 3 in a PWR at the bottom of the core is a very thick 8 to 4 10-inch piece of metal that a nuclear reactor core would 5 have to melt through. But in BWRs[, ]such as Pilgrim and 6 at Fukushima[,] the control rods come up through the 7 bottom. And when the nuclear core lies on the bottom of 8 a boiling water reactor like Fukushima, like Pilgrim and 9 the rest, it's easier for a core to melt through because 10 of those six-feet holes in the bottom of the reactor. It 11 doesn't have to melt through first eight inches of steel.
12 NRC recognized this problem in that they 13 sent and [an] email, which I attached [in the letter dated 14 September 24, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11279A034)]
15 -- by NRC right after the Fukushima accident to Japan.
16 And so[,] I would join with the others that we: (1) Have 17 insufficient mitigation. The amounts of relief are 18 exceedingly and unnecessarily high due to the lack of 19 backbone in four of the five Commissioners in not dealing 20 with filters [ Refer to the Commission Voting Record, 21 dated March 19, 2013, for SECY-12-0157 (ADAMS Accession 22 No. ML13078A012) and Staff Requirements Memorandum, 23 dated March 19, 2013, for SECY-12-0157 (ADAMS Accession 24 No. ML13078A017]. And this, however, is no excuse for 25 the Commission to continue to press for filters because NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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64 1 we are down the road. The option voted on by the [Atomic 2 Safety and Licensing] Board was to kick the filter can 3 down the road, and we're there [By Memorandum and Order, 4 dated January 11, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No.
5 ML12011A045), the NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 6 denied Pilgrim Watchs request for a hearing on a new 7 contention relating to the Fukushima accident]. And 8 there can be no excuse, particularly with a dry well 9 event[,] because there is no way in hell that that is 10 being scrubbed and no rational person will accept that 11 all accidents will be slow, well-behaved and the gases 12 will slowly meander and most of the radionuclides will 13 get stuck on the sides. That is ridiculous on its face.
14 And thank you for the opportunity.
15 MR. GUNTER: Thank you. Okay. Linda 16 Lewison --
17 MS. LEWISON: Yes?
18 MR. GUNTER: -- with NEIS?
19 MS. LEWISON: Can you hear me?
20 MR. GUNTER: Yes. Go ahead, Linda.
21 MS. LEWISON: Okay. This is Linda Lewison 22 in Chicago. I'm speaking on behalf of David Craft, 23 director of Nuclear Energy Information Service. I am a 24 board member.
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65 1 32-year-old safe energy[,] anti-nuclear[,]
2 environmental organization based in Chicago, Illinois.
3 We submit the following additional testimony in support 4 of the 2.206 petition originally filed April 13th, 2011 5 [The petition filed on April 13, 2011 (ADAMS Accession 6 No. ML11104A058) is being addressed under NRC Green 7 Ticket G20110262, and the current petition filed on March 8 21, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13085A218) is being 9 addressed under NRC Green Ticket G20130229], calling for 10 the closure of GE boiling water reactors using Mark I and 11 Mark II containments.
12 NEIS has monitored the activities of 13 Illinois' nuclear reactors and federal and state 14 regulators since 1981. Illinois is the most 15 nuclear-reliant state in the U.S. with 11 operating and 16 3 closed reactors. Within our borders[,] sits 9,660 17 tons of spent reactor fuel, the largest standing amount 18 of high-level radioactive waste of any state.
19 After observing the questionable, 20 inconsistent and at times lackadaisical historic 21 operation and regulation of these reactors, we are 22 extremely concerned about the protection, safety and 23 health of the people and environment in light of the 24 continuing development surrounding the Fukushima 25 nuclear disaster in Japan and NRC's sluggish, imprudent NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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66 1 and unwise decision making regarding implementing 2 prudent lessons learned, corrective actions at U.S.
3 reactors.
4 In light of the continuing and worsening 5 Fukushima disaster, NRC's inadequate treatment and 6 partial denial of issues in our previous conjoined 2.206 7 petition of April [13,] 2011 [See NRC letter dated 8 December 13, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11339A077)] ,
9 and NRC's recent decision to overrule the advice of its 10 own technical staff and further delay prudent 11 installation of filtered hardened vents at 12 Fukushima-type reactors in the U.S. [See Staff 13 Requirements Memorandum, dated March 19, 2013 (ADAMS 14 Accession No. ML13078A017) for SECY-12-0157] , we 15 express grave concerns about the safety of continued 16 operation of the four Mark I BWRs at Dresden and Quad 17 Cities and the two Mark II BWRs at LaSalle Station listed 18 in this petition and request acceptance of the 19 contentions in this petition and closure of these 20 reactors.
21 In addition to the contentions[,] we raised 22 in the 2.2[06] petition of April 13th, 2011 and 23 additional comments of May 2nd, 2013, both of which we 24 attach at the end of this submittal for reference [to date 25 these documents have not been provided to the NRC], we NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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67 1 submit several new contentions for consideration as the 2 additional basis for our request.
3 The high-level radioactive waste 4 inventory. A report prepared for the Department of 5 Energy in 2011 estimates that there exists 1,531 metric 6 tons of heavy metal, 9,029 assemblies of spent reactor 7 fuel at the Dresden Plant; 1,481 MTHM, that's 8,285 8 assemblies at Quad Cities; and 1,237 metric tons of heavy 9 metal, 6,885 assemblies, at the two LaSalle reactors.
10 This gives a total of 4,250 metric tons of heavy metal 11 and 24,199 assemblies stored five stories above ground 12 at the six Mark I and Mark II reactors in Illinois.
13 This accumulation of spent fuel at these 14 seven Illinois reactors is roughly nine times the total 15 accumulation of spent fuel at Fukushima Daiichi Units 1 16 to 4 reactors combined. Not only is this amount far 17 greater than that at Fukushima, but all of the Illinois 18 reactors continue to add new spent fuel pool to their 19 pools, increasing the heat load to each of the pools.
20 All the reactors at Fukushima add no new inventory, and 21 therefore heat load to their pools. Thus[,] the 22 potential risk grows at the Illinois reactors while we 23 await NRC directives to Exelon to implement all of the 24 recommended spent fuel pool improvements.
25 (2) Nuclear safety culture and, quote, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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68 1 "the law." In our May 2nd, 2013 comments[,] we pointed 2 out that NRC claims, quote, "a nuclear safety culture is 3 the core values and behaviors that emphasize safety over 4 competing goals to ensure protection of people and the 5 environment," unquote. We quote former Region III 6 director [Director], Charles Casto[,] in stating it 7 also, quote, "going beyond what's required," unquote.
8 It was our conclusion at the time and 9 remains so today, and as long as General Design Criteria 10 16 for all Mark I and Ii reactors is ignored, that the 11 Nuclear Regulatory Commission lacks a safety culture as 12 it is self-defined.
13 During the Full Committee hearing of the 14 Senate's Energy and Natural Resources Committee to 15 consider the Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2013 16 held on July 30th, 2013, an interesting set of remarks 17 came from two senators asking questions of Secretary of 18 Energy Moniz. Senator Jim Risch of Idaho commented on, 19 quote, "the state of the law." Quote, "We have a law that 20 clearly designates where the permanent storage is. I'm 21 troubled by the fact that we're a nation of laws, and 22 whether we agree with the law or not, when a law is passed, 23 that's pretty much the way it is.
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69 1 to execute the laws the legislature passes. The 2 Executive Branch is indeed commanded to obey court orders 3 when a court orders something. What we have here is a 4 situation where we have a law, which has identified Yucca 5 Mountain for what it is. And whether you agree or 6 disagree, it is the law. And yet for some reason nobody 7 seems to care."
8 Tim Scott, South Carolina, stated to 9 Secretary Moniz, "My concern is why Congress is allowing 10 DOE to break the law of the land as we know it today? The 11 law is very clear: Our nation's spent fuel pool and 12 defense waste should be disposed at Yucca.
13 Unfortunately, ignoring or failing to enforce laws that 14 happen to be politically inconvenient is becoming a 15 regular occurrence with the Obama administration, even 16 with laws they've passed. I understand that some may 17 [have] found Yucca to be politically inconvenient, but 18 that doesn't matter. It's still the law of the land.
19 The nuclear industry, like any other industry has needs 20 certainly, and they need Yucca Mountain. What good are 21 laws passed by Congress if for any reason we can decide 22 to enforce or not enforce them? What good are laws where 23 the mandate is pushed back causing consternation and lack 24 of certainty?[]
25 "The issue as we see it is simple: Mark I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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70 1 and Mark II reactors are not in compliance with GDC 16.
2 The NRC intends to ignore GDC 16 and allow the reactors 3 to continue to operate. The law of the land says that 4 the reactors must be in regulatory compliance to operate.
5 And NRC's regulatory mandate and self-proclaimed nuclear 6 safety culture emphasize safety over competing goals to 7 ensure protection of people and the environment.
8 "The public, like industry, needs 9 certainty, certainty that the NRC will not cherry pick 10 the regulations it will enforce, that it will fully 11 enforce the regulations it has or lose all credibility 12 and public confidence."
13 We would submit to NRC if, quote, "the law 14 of the land is truly a legitimate and not merely 15 convenient and cherry-picked concern of the members of 16 Congress of NRC, it should be executed impartially on all 17 agencies of the Executive Branch." There is no 18 justification to single out DOE's lack of performance 19 according to the law on Yucca Mountain while continuously 20 allowing the NRC the power of enforcement discretion 21 "finding a way out of the laws of the land as opposed to 22 enforcement of the laws of the land," unquote.
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71 1 intended if it does not enforce GDC 16 for all Mark I and 2 II reactors. You do not have a nuclear safety culture 3 at NRC if you merely follow the letter of the regulations, 4 do check box exercises and cherry pick the regulations 5 you enforce.
6 The people of Illinois tell you point blank 7 we have, quote, "no confidence in this style and pattern 8 of regulation and lack of a nuclear safety culture." We 9 feel threatened by your inaction and we do not and will 10 not accept its continuation as valid regulatory 11 practice. If we do not see progress in NRC enforcing its 12 regulations for Illinois reactors, we may have to seek 13 intervention at a higher level.
14 Response to additional contentions of May 15 2013. To date, NEIS has received no response to rebuttal 16 from NRC to the contentions introduced on May 2nd, 2013 17 [ADAMS Accession No. ML13144A127]. We request written 18 rebuttal to the contentions raised. Thank you for this 19 opportunity to speak.
20 MR. GUNTER: Thank you. Wally Taylor?
21 (No audible response.)
22 MR. GUNTER: Are you there, Wally?
23 (No audible response.)
24 MR. GUNTER: Gretel Johnston?
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72 1 name is Gretel Johnston.
2 MR. GUNTER: Go ahead, Gretel, introduce 3 yourself.
4 MS. JOHNSTON: Hello.
5 MR. TAYLOR: -- Wally. Can you hear me?
6 MR. GUNTER: Okay. Let's do Wally and then 7 Gretel.
8 MS. JOHNSTON: Okay.
9 MR. TAYLOR: I apologize. I was on mute 10 and I --
11 MR. GUNTER: Yes, I just want to remind the 12 speakers we have a little less than 20 minutes. So 13 please be concise. Thanks.
14 MR. TAYLOR: Thank you. This is Wally 15 Taylor. I'm with the Iowa Chapter of the Sierra Club and 16 also the National Sierra Club's Nuclear Free Campaign.
17 I'm speaking specifically about the Cooper Nuclear 18 Station along the Missouri River, the Duane Arnold Energy 19 Center in Iowa along the Cedar River, and the Quad Cities 20 Generating Station along the Mississippi River.
21 The first point I want to make is that these 22 reactors, like many or most of the Mark Is and Mark IIs, 23 were put on line in the early '70s. So certainly[,]
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73 1 we know in the past 30 or 40 years.
2 So the filtered vents that we're talking 3 about here are something that we know will work and must 4 be added to the plants, and that this the kind knowledge 5 that we need to keep adding to our nuclear fleet to keep 6 them safe. Other folks have talked about the flooding 7 issues. I want to just add a couple of points.
8 With respect to the Missouri River[,] there 9 have been several studies. One was mentioned already, 10 the Perkins et al study [See NRC Screening Analysis 11 Report for the Proposed Generic Issue on Flooding of 12 Nuclear Power Plant Sites Following Upstream Dam 13 Failures, July 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML113500495)].
14 There was another one done by David -- whose name escapes 15 me. And I've tried to get a copy of that, but the NRC 16 refuses to release that document. And it just seems to 17 me that the public needs to know that information.
18 And the flooding incidents are what will 19 make the filtered vents necessary. On the Missouri 20 River, for example, there are six upstream dams from 21 Montana down to South Dakota. The Fort Peck Dam in 22 Montana has behind it 18.6 million acre feet of water.
23 The Garrison Dam has 23.8 million acre feet of water 24 behind it. And the Oahe Dam has 23.5 million acre feet.
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74 1 a lot of water. And what experts have told me is that 2 if any one or more of those dams breaks, it'll be worse 3 than tsunami and it will impact these nuclear plants and 4 will have the same kind of hazard that we had at 5 Fukushima.
6 The Mississippi River also floods and can 7 cause damage to nuclear plants that we need these 8 filtered vents for. The Cedar River next to the Duane 9 Arnold Plant flooded five years ago with an unprecedented 10 flood. Fortunately[,] the Duane Arnold facility was not 11 impacted, but it came extremely and perilously close.
12 So these and other plants are subject to flooding hazards 13 that need to be addressed. And what really distresses 14 me about the Commission's initial response to this 15 petition is like I've seen in other 2.206 petitions. The 16 response is basically, well, we're working on it and 17 sometime somehow we will get it figured out, so we don't 18 need to do anything now. Well[,] the purpose of a 2.206 19 petition is to ask the Commission to take action that 20 needs to be taken and to just say that somehow some way 21 in the future we'll get it figured out[,] because we're 22 working on it really doesn't answer the question and 23 really doesn't respond to what a 2.206 petition is 24 designed to do. This is the public's only way, absent 25 some sort of proceeding where intervention is allowed, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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75 1 to seek action from the Commission that needs to be taken.
2 And the Commission needs to address this problem and 3 needs to take this petition for review and to grant the 4 relief requested. Thank you.
5 MR. GUNTER: Thank you, Wally. Gretel 6 Johnston?
7 MS. JOHNSTON: Yes, hello. Can you hear me 8 all right?
9 MR. GUNTER: Yes, Gretel. Go ahead.
10 Proceed.
11 MS. JOHNSTON: Okay. Yes, my name is 12 Gretel Johnston and I'm representing BEST/MATRR, the 13 Bellefonte Efficiency & Sustainability Team and Mothers 14 Against Tennessee River Radiation in the Tennessee 15 Valley. We will be specifically addressing issues with 16 the three GE Mark I reactors at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power 17 Plant in North Alabama.
18 Given the recent resignation -- kind of as 19 a prologue, I would like to say the recent resignation 20 of the 26-year veteran engineer at Browns Ferry, we would 21 like to just take a stand in support of her whistle blower 22 protest. The discovery of tampering with root cause 23 safety reports is extremely strong grounds for 24 withdrawal of the Browns Ferry operating license. To 25 doctor safety reports against the will of the trained NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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76 1 specialists who write them is a serious violation of the 2 very foundation of nuclear safety, and we'd call on the 3 NRC to act with definitive strength on this issue [Note:
4 the NRC Allegations process is separate from the 2.206 5 petition process].
6 Browns Ferry Unit 1 has earned NRC's worst 7 rating. And according to NRC records, the BFN reactor 8 Units 1, 2 and 3 have the longest shutdown records of any 9 reactors in the United States and have suffered over 270 10 emergency scrams [a review of the NRC event reports found 11 78 scrams from 1988 to present day for the Brown Ferry 12 units], which undoubtedly add to the type 304 stainless 13 steel vessel degradation, and the control rods cracking 14 further weakening the integrity of the poorly designed 15 Mark I reactor containment and safety.
16 We agree with Beyond Nuclear's petition 17 that not putting filters on these unfiltered vent 18 modifications voids the original licensing agreement[,]
19 which requires an essentially leak-tight containment 20 structure against the uncontrolled release of 21 radioactivity. Without filters to remove a large 22 percentage of radioactive emissions, any release, 23 whether intentional or inadvertent, violates the 24 licensing agreement for these GE reactors. While the 25 NRC is further extending safety retrofit deadlines, our NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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77 1 community has three aged Browns Ferry reactors that 2 appear to be leaking radiation into our air and young 3 people and babies who live here are dying at a rate of 4 21 to 27 percent higher than average U.S. communities.
5 [Note: The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) has 6 started the initial planning step of the NRC-sponsored 7 pilot study of cancer risks in populations around six 8 nuclear power plants and a nuclear fuel cycle facility.
9 The NRC is asking the NAS to carry out this pilot to help 10 the NRC determine whether to extend the study to 11 additional reactors and fuel cycle facilities.]
12 Infant mortality rates in the areas 13 surrounding Browns Ferry seem to be illustrating a 14 bathtub curve effect. The numbers of babies who died in 15 their first year of life jumped when the Mark I reactors 16 first came online here in the mid-1970s. Then[,] the 17 rate declined until the late 1990s. Since then, there 18 has been a steady increase in infant mortality to 21.6 19 percent above the U.S. rate in 2010. The figures are 20 even worse for Hispanics at 40 percent. And white babies 21 are dying at a 32.6 percent higher rate near and downwind 22 of Browns Ferry than in average U.S. communities.
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78 1 weather conditions and found readings from 36 to 600 2 counts per minute for 40 times background radiation 3 levels. The lowest, 1,600 counts per minute at 40 times 4 background radiation levels. The lowest readings were 5 recorded upwind of Browns Ferry and the highest readings 6 were recorded downwind during rain events as far as 70 7 miles from Browns Ferry.
8 This indicates the possibility that the 9 aging Browns Ferry reactors may be leaking radioactivity 10 in our valley and we call on the NRC to require more 11 thorough, frequent and transparent monitoring from 12 reactor operators, if not from the NRC or an independent 13 scientific group[,] up to 100 miles from the plant in 14 seasonal prevailing downwind directions.
15 Our official records show that tritium 16 levels in drinking water measured in Muscle Shoals, some 17 40 miles west of Browns Ferry, and in Scottsboro, some 18 70 miles southeast of Browns Ferry -- those readings are 19 three to four times higher than tritium levels in 20 drinking water in Montgomery, Alabama, which is over 100 21 miles from any nuclear facility. We think there is a 22 very real possibility that large populations in North 23 Alabama are being contaminated with Browns Ferry 24 emissions either from corroded torus wells, leaking 25 valves and/or inadequate filtering and we call on the NRC NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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79 1 to investigate.
2 We also want to bring attention to threats 3 to the raised cooling pool for these reactors. We agree 4 with the Petitioners that these cooling pools holding far 5 more radioactivity than the reactor cores should be 6 required to have dedicated backup power. In the 7 southeast and increasingly in other parts of the 8 country[,] tornados are a severe and repeated threat to 9 these cooling pools and we think that new regulations 10 need to be implemented to categorize tornado safety 11 standards in a way similar to seismic threat categories.
12 At Browns Ferry alone[,] well over 250 13 million curies of radiation is stored in these pools with 14 only sheet metal roofs overhead. The initial studies by 15 GE for tornado safety were conducted in 1968 when it was 16 still thought that opening windows helped reduced 17 tornado damage, thus blowout panels were designed into 18 the metal roofs. In April of 2011[,] the strongest 19 tornado known to man, a category EF5, wreaked havoc about 20 500 meters from the pools twisting a row of power towers 21 into pretzels and cutting power to all of North Alabama 22 and much of Tennessee. Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant was 23 forced to use diesel generators for seven days to keep 24 the three reactors and cooling pools from meltdown.
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80 1 of a tornado sucking contaminated water from the pools 2 and spewing it across our valley. We consider these 3 open-topped cooling pools to be a general design criteria 4 fault along with the lack of dedicated cooling pool 5 backup power and the licensing of these designs to be an 6 error.
7 As long as the faulty design is still 8 allowed to operate, we call on the NRC to: (1) Require 9 a defined and hopefully accelerated schedule for 10 removing fuel from these cooling pools to be stored in 11 onsite hardened dry cask storage bunkers so that only the 12 fuel stored for the necessary five-year period as 13 determined by NRC and the Academy of Sciences in 2005 are 14 retained in the pools rather than the far safer hardened 15 onsite dry cask storage containers; (2) we call on you 16 to require reinforced overhead containment of these 17 cooling pools; and (3) to establish regulations similar 18 to current seismic categories and enforce substantial 19 strengthening of overhead cooling pool containment.
20 At this point[,] I would like to submit for 21 the record our recent report, "Radioactive Emissions and 22 Health Hazards Surrounding Browns Ferry Nuclear Power 23 Plant in Alabama," which will be both emailed and snail 24 mailed with our comments [By email dated October 29, 2013 25 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13304C006), the NRC received NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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81 1 this report and supplemental information]. The report 2 can be downloaded from our Web site at MATTR.org, 3 M-A-T-T-R dot org [The correct website is 4 www.matrr.org]. Thank you for your attention to these 5 issues and for your service to our country and its people 6 living near nuclear facilities.
7 MR. GUNTER: Thank you, Gretel.
8 We'll now hear from Leslie Sullivan Sachs.
9 MS. SACHS: Thank you. I am with the Safe 10 and Green Campaign and the SAGE Alliance, citizens groups 11 from the tri-state area around Vermont Yankee Nuclear 12 Power Plant.
13 A month ago, Entergy announced that they 14 would close Vermont Yankee when it ran out of fuel [In 15 a letter dated September 23, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No.
16 ML13273A204), Entergy notified the NRC that Vermont 17 Yankee will cease operations in the fourth quarter of 18 2014]. We are pleased that Yankee is the fifth reactor 19 closure announced in 2013, but we are very worried that 20 Entergy will not spend what it takes to do the maintenance 21 nor necessary upgrades to keep this reactor running 22 safely until they pull the plug and move the spent fuel 23 out of the fuel pool.
24 Entergy said that it will close Vermont 25 Yankee because of finances. They said it had nothing to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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82 1 do with politics or their legal battles, but their choice 2 to engage in legal battles has everything to do with 3 finances. In addition to the federal preemption 4 lawsuits against the State of Vermont they initiated, 5 Entergy initiated a suit at the Vermont Supreme Court.
6 They are continuing that suit even though the [Vermont]
7 State has said that since Yankee is closing the case is 8 moot. Entergy sued and they're appealing a tax case.
9 They're still in the relicensing permit 10 process before the [Vermont] Public Service Board. And 11 just to show you the kind of harassment types of suits 12 they're doing, last April they even sued the state [State 13 of Vermont] and [in] federal court, because they said the 14 state [State of Vermont] wasn't moving fast enough on 15 approval of a new backup diesel generator for the waste 16 pool even though the state [State of Vermont] publicly 17 stated that it did not oppose the approval [Note: The 18 NRC is not involved in these litigations between the 19 State of Vermont and Energy].
20 The typical legal costs of a license 21 extension is $2 million. According to a source in 22 Yankee's administrative office, Entergy has spent $80 23 million on legal fee[s] since initiation of license 24 extension practice. By comparison, the post-Fukushima 25 costs at Vermont Yankee were estimated in the $40 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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83 1 million-plus range. So[,] Entergy is more interested in 2 setting legal precedents and harassing the state [State 3 of Vermont] than they are investing in post-Fukushima 4 upgrades or on maintenance. We wonder if this litigious 5 pattern will follow them to Pilgrim and FitzPatrick, 6 other Entergy-owned Fukushima-style reactors.
7 In addition, six weeks before the closure 8 announcement Entergy announced company-wide layoffs 9 including 30 workers at Vermont Yankee, 75 at Indian 10 Point, 30 at FitzPatrick and 30 at Pilgrim. For even 11 though we're happy about closure, we are worried more 12 than ever about public safety. The next 14 months will 13 be a dangerous time for those of us in the evacuation 14 zone, especially for those children in the school across 15 the street from the reactor [Note: The NRC has two 16 resident inspectors on-site performing inspections, and 17 inspections are supplemented as needed by other NRC 18 personnel].
19 Radiation leaks are now being reported 20 regularly. Four times in June and July monitors 21 registered false positive for high radiation [See NRC 22 Event Reports Nos. 49211 and 49358]. The day before the 23 closure announcement there was another spurious spike of 24 supposedly false radiation readings in a radiation 25 detector that had been replaced within the last month NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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84 1 according to a letter from the NRC to the state [State 2 of Vermont].
3 On September 19th, a leak occurred in a key 4 safety system, the high-pressure coolant injection 5 system, which released a small amount of radioactivity 6 within the reactor building [See NRC Event Report No. 7 49355].
8 On September 24th through the 25th, low oil 9 levels were discovered due to a loose compression fitting 10 on a [B] recirculation pump motor oil reservoir. The 11 reactor was brought down to 14 percent.
12 So we worry. Will the workers depart a 13 sinking ship that is sporadically leaking radiation into 14 their workplace? Will they leave to find permanent work 15 elsewhere? Will new workers come in who do not know the 16 reactor well enough to stay on top of these constant 17 problems? Will Entergy spend the money necessary to 18 maintain the plant, or will they use reconditioned parts 19 and the equivalent and chewing gum and duct tape to mask 20 the problems?
21 And we will continue to worry after shutdown 22 about the most dangerous part of the plant, all that spent 23 fuel in the fuel pool, more than four times what are in 24 the Fukushima pools. It will be left to cool down for 25 years, perhaps decades, until it can be moved into dry NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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85 1 casks and abandoned on the banks of our Connecticut River 2 [Note: The NRC Decommissioning regulations are found in 3 Chapter I of the Title 10, Energy, of the Code of 4 Federal Regulations (CFR). 10 CFR, Part 20, Subpart E 5 provides the main decommissioning requirements. A 6 great deal of decommissioning information is located on 7 the NRC public website at 8 http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/decommissioni 9 ng.html]. As you know, the BWR Mark I has no protection 10 for the fuel pool. None. A breakaway roof and blowout 11 panels do not protection make.
12 This is why all 23 reactors must be shut down 13 today. The nuclear industry is in a perilous position.
14 I strongly recommend you read Mark Cooper's two reports:
15 "Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Economics" and "The Impacts 16 of Fukushima on Nuclear Economics," and his most recent 17 report, "Renaissance in Reverse: Competition Pushes 18 Aging U.S. Nuke Reactors to the Brink of Economic 19 Abandonment." He lists the reactors most at risk to 20 close because of particularly intense challenges, five 21 of which are Mark I and Mark II reactors: Nine Mile Point 22 No. 2, FitzPatrick, Clinton, Pilgrim, VY [Note: Vermont 23 Yankee is scheduled to cease operations in the fourth 24 quarter of 2014], and Oyster Creek [Note: Oyster Creek 25 is scheduled to cease operation no later than December NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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86 1 31, 2019].
2 Economic pressures and necessary 3 post-Fukushima safety regulations are too much for this 4 industry to bear. They cannot perform safely. Have 5 mercy on this industry. Shut down all the 6 Fukushima-style reactors now. In Vermont[,] we call it 7 death with dignity.
8 MR. GUNTER: Thank you, Leslie.
9 and our final speaker is Jeff Brown. And 10 if we could indulge him to finish is [his] statement.
11 Thank you.
12 Jeff?
13 MR. BROWN: Yes, my name is Jeff Brown.
14 I'm a member of GRAMMES, Grandmothers, Mothers and More 15 for Energy Safety. We're focused on the Oyster Creek 16 Nuclear Generating Station in Lacey Township at the 17 Jersey Shore [Note: Oyster Creek is scheduled to cease 18 operation no later than December 31, 2019].
19 Those of us who live within the potential 20 fallout zone of Oyster Creek do not currently have 21 defense-in-depth against radiation releases from a 22 possible core damage accident or a terrorist attack. As 23 a former Northern New Jersey resident, I remember well 24 the nauseous smell from a smoldering World Trade Center 25 days after 9/11 when the wind shifted in our direction.
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87 1 Whenever we've dealt with NRC, the possibility that a 2 terrorist attack could actually cause a problem is always 3 swept under the rug [Note: In response to the terrorist 4 attacks of September 11, 2001, NRC took immediate action 5 by advising nuclear power plants to go the highest level 6 of security, which all licensees promptly implemented.
7 Shortly afterward, NRC and the industry re-evaluated the 8 physical security at the nations nuclear power plants.
9 In February 2002, the NRC issued Interim Compensatory 10 Measures (ICMs) requiring all U.S. nuclear power plants 11 to perform specific plant design studies, add additional 12 security personnel, enhance physical protection 13 features, improve Emergency Preparedness, and provide 14 additional training. Further information can be found 15 on the NRC website at 16 http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/emerg-preparedness/respo 17 nd-to-emerg/response-terrorism.html].
18 I had the opportunity along with several of 19 my colleagues at GRAMMES to meet with Commissioner 20 Apostolakis at the end of August [August 23, 2013] and 21 one of the questions we asked him is how could it possibly 22 be that the NRC would give industry two refueling outages 23 to even begin to deal with these issues? And he said it 24 was just we've always done this way. He would look into 25 it. I don't think we've heard from him since [Note: The NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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88 1 Office of Commissioner Apostolakis provided an email 2 response to Beyond Nuclear, dated October 4, 2013 (ADAMS 3 Accession No. ML13296A181].
4 But to me[,] it's clear that the way that the NRC 5 is currently operating is with crossed fingers. It's 6 not going to be a problem[,] because we don't think it 7 will be a problem, therefore, we don't really have to 8 treat it seriously [Note: The NRC has taken the Fukushima 9 accident very seriously and has worked diligently since 10 the accident to learn the lessons and implement those 11 lessons. For further information, please see the NRC 12 public website at 13 https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience 14 /japan-dashboard.html]. This wishful thinking 15 approach does not give primary commitment to health and 16 safety for those of us in reactor communities.
17 It seems to me that the illustration of the 18 Japanese response to requiring these hardened and 19 filtered vents gives us a clue of how do we get the 20 industry to want to do it?[.] Where is the pressure 21 coming in Japan for putting on these vents and putting 22 on these filters? It's because they are shut down and 23 in order to operate they've got to get it up and running 24 to do this with the filters, with protection.
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89 1 down all these reactors, those that can't meet the grade 2 will not reopen. Those that possibly can meet the grade 3 for public health and safety would get an opportunity to 4 reopen and we'd have everybody pulling oars in the same 5 direction for a change.
6 Finally[,] in terms of even a kind of a 7 thumbnail cost benefit analysis approach, we were 8 affected by Superstorm Sandy and thus we know that $62 9 billion worth of damage was done to New Jersey and the 10 New York area. New Jersey alone sought $37 billion from 11 the Federal Government for assistance. The Jersey Shore 12 economy, our Ocean and Monmouth Counties alone in 2012 13 accounted for $6 billion.
14 Exelon bought Oyster Creek at a bargain 15 basement price of only $10 million. It seems quite 16 self-apparent that even the cost benefit analysis would 17 say close them down. Thank you.
18 MR. GUNTER: Thank you, Jeff. And that 19 concludes our presentation.
20 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: Okay. Are we going to go 21 to questions?
22 MR. GUNTER: Yes, right.
23 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: Okay.
24 MR. GUNTER: Yes, thanks.
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90 1 or the staff supporting the Board have any questions for 2 the Petitioners today?
3 MEMBER DENNIG: I don't have a question. I 4 just have a comment. As far as public participation is 5 concerned in this particular subject, I assume you're 6 following and are aware of the public meetings on the 7 [NRC] Interim Staff Guidance and the [NRC] rulemaking 8 that's in process and that you're able to participate in 9 that.
10 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: I do want to make a 11 statement, perhaps highly unusual in these kinds of 12 proceedings, but I think it's important to note, you 13 know, my mother and most of my family live within about 14 40 miles of one of these reactors. So[,] if you don't 15 think I take nuclear safety seriously, you're kidding 16 yourself. But I got to tell you that, you know, I take 17 exception to numerous presenters that say that the Agency 18 is doing absolutely nothing or the things that we have 19 done are worthless or laughable. The Agency is working 20 through a lot of these issues, many of the issues that 21 you mentioned. The seismic walk-downs, the flooding 22 walk-downs, the beyond design basis mitigating 23 strategies activities. They are taking actions on a lot 24 of these things. And so[,] I think it's important for 25 the record that I state that and say that, you know, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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91 1 sometimes if you move too quickly, you get unintended 2 consequences. So[,] I think the Agency has an 3 obligation to move in a very judicious manner to make sure 4 they're making the right changes that are necessary to 5 ensure public health and safety.
6 So[,] I know that's unusual. I wanted to 7 make that statement.
8 Okay. Should we go to the phones then?
9 MS. LAMPERT: Yes, I have a comment, Mary 10 Lampert, that the NRC has effectively shut the doors to 11 substantive public involvement. If you take the 2.206 12 petition process, Judge Rosenthal of the [NRC] Atomic 13 Safety Licensing Board reported that[,] with one 14 possible exception[,] the NRC had not granted a 2.206 15 petitioner[,] the substantive relief it sought[,] for at 16 least 37 years. Judge Rosenthal concluded that where 17 truly substantive relief is being sought there should be 18 no room for a belief on the requester's part that the 19 pursuit of such a course is either being encouraged by 20 the Commission or has a fair chance of success.
21 As far as orders go, in reality they are not 22 open to public challenge. The Bilotti decision 23 established that petitioners must show the order in and 24 of itself is harmful. I've said the order is 25 insufficient and does not respond to lessons learned from NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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92 1 Fukushima as has been the case in orders --
2 (Telephone interference.)
3 As of rule change petitions, frankly none 4 of us will live long enough. We need an analysis of 5 substantive relief to public filings of rule change 6 petitions. How many have been accepted in a substantive 7 way in 37 years.[?] The public's perception is zero to 8 none. Participation in open public meetings, there is 9 a distinct difference between being heard and action.
10 Being heard does not provide reasonable assurance of 11 public health and safety.
12 Also[,] I would like to know how many public 13 meetings in addition to those announced has industry had 14 the opportunity for a one-on-one extra meetings with NRC 15 versus how many one-on-one extra meetings the public has 16 had.
17 Last, the specific danger is of NRC not 18 enforcing regulation. GDC 16[,] as discussed today, is 19 an example. And instead of making regulations, there 20 has been a continual habit of late of not making 21 regulations, but instead suggestions. Voluntary 22 compliance. [NRC] Information notices [Notices] that 23 do not require any action.
24 So[,] that's why we are most disturbed and 25 particularly when these BWRs in deregulated markets are NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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93 1 on thin ice, they do not have the money to initiate the 2 fixes that are required, and NRC has not had the staffing 3 or will; I'm not saying which, to be Johnny-on-the-spot 4 and assure that they do. So[,] we are in a very, very 5 dangerous position. And I hope to God[,] it's not my 6 reactor, but it will be one. Thank you for the 7 opportunity.
8 MR. SMITH: Okay. Before we get too far 9 into questions, I just want to remind everyone that only 10 2.206 process-specific questions will be addressed.
11 And also[,] we only have like a limited amount of time 12 that's left, so we may not be able to get to all of the 13 questions that we may have from the public. But we ask 14 that if you ask the questions, introduce yourself and 15 which organization you represent if you are representing 16 the organizations.
17 You guys have any feedback for the last 18 questions that was asked?
19 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: I don't have anything 20 specific to say, no.
21 MR. SMITH: All right. Great. Thanks.
22 Operator, if you can cue the next question that's there 23 then.
24 (No audible response.)
25 MR. SMITH: Okay. So[,] there's no NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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94 1 questions from the operator. Are there any other 2 questions 2.206 process-specific-type questions that 3 would like to address at this time?
4 MR. GUNTER: Yes, Paul Gunter, Beyond 5 Nuclear. Are we going to get a director's decision out 6 of this? If you proceed to dismiss this petition preview 7 process, does it currently elevate to the level of 8 getting a director's decision where a lot of our 9 questions and concerns will be addressed?
10 MEMBER LAMB: This is John Lamb. Once the 11 [PRB] Board makes a decision, if it's accepted, then you 12 get a director's decision. If it's rejected, you just 13 get a letter saying here's why it was rejected. So[,]
14 it's only the acceptance part that you'll get a draft 15 director's decision and then a final director's 16 decision. That's the difference.
17 MR. GUNTER: This is Paul Gunter again.
18 Does the letter that you will send us with your final 19 determination -- what detail does it address some of the 20 concerns and issues and questions that have been raised 21 in this process today?
22 MEMBER LAMB: It will address your petition 23 that you came in with, you know, revoking all BWRs.
24 Basically[,] that you disagree with the Commission SRM 25 about the vent. You want the radiation hardened vent.
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95 1 That's what it will address.
2 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: This is Jack Davis from 3 the [PRB] Board. I think your question goes though 4 -- you're asking how much detail, right, would go to 5 -- correct? You have a comment to that, John?
6 MEMBER LAMB: It provides, you know, a 7 level of detail that will answer the question as much as 8 possible.
9 MR. SMITH: Are there any other questions?
10 MR. JOHNSON: Can we make a statement?
11 MR. SMITH: One moment, please.
12 MR. KAMPS: Hello. Can I go ahead?
13 MR. SMITH: Go ahead.
14 MR. KAMPS: Yes, my name is Kevin Kamps, 15 also with Beyond Nuclear, and I have a question about the 16 2.206 process. This came up at a meeting with 17 Commissioners Magwood and Ostendorff several months ago 18 held at NRDC's office in Washington, D.C. And Tom 19 Cochran from the Nuclear Division at NRDC made a comment 20 that he once had a conversation with the original NRC 21 staff or Office of General Counsel author of the 2.206 22 regulations in the first place, and that person described 23 to him, admitted to him that the entire process was 24 designed as a black hole into which the public would enter 25 and never come out, at least victorious, with substantive NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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96 1 relief, as Mary Lampert put it.
2 So I'm just curious if this Petition Review 3 Board would agree with that characterization that Tom 4 Cochran described with the original author of this 5 regulation.
6 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: I mean I'm not familiar 7 with what you're talking about and the background. I can 8 tell you, as I said before, I will give due diligence to 9 the petition that's before us and to ensure that we arrive 10 at the right decision based upon all the information that 11 we have available to us.
12 MR. KAMPS: I guess my follow-up question 13 is what would explain what Mary Lampert gave as the record 14 of the 2.206 process, perhaps one possible exception, no 15 substantive relief granted the public in nearly four 16 decades.
17 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: Yes, I mean certainly I 18 can't comment on that. I don't know all of the cases that 19 she was referring to. Again[,] I can tell you, as I've 20 told John repeatedly during this process, that I want all 21 of the concerns that are laid out in the petition to be 22 adequately addressed. And I think that's why Paul is 23 getting to how much detail are we getting when we say no 24 immediate concern and then there's nothing further 25 beyond that. We should be able to give you further NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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97 1 information or reference the documents that we're 2 referring to to explain, if that were where we come out.
3 MR. KAMPS: Thank you.
4 MR. SMITH: Someone on the line had a 5 comment. As a reminder, the comment period is over.
6 We're looking for the 2.206 process-specific questions.
7 If you have any questions related to the 2.206 process, 8 you can ask those questions at this time.
9 MS. LAMPERT: Mary Lampert again, Pilgrim 10 Watch. I would add also to 2.206, it is correct that you 11 cannot appeal a decision within the NRC, is that correct?
12 One PRB at the end of August.
13 MEMBER LAMB: This is John Lamb from NRC.
14 Yes, if the petition is rejected, there is no recourse.
15 MS. LAMPERT: That's another problem when 16 you think about it. Now would you like me to send the 17 link to Judge Rosenthal's decision? [Note: To date, 18 this link has not been provided to the NRC.]
19 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: Sure, Mary. That's fine.
20 Absolutely. Any additional information like that would 21 be helpful.
22 MS. LAMPERT: And who should I send it to?
23 MEMBER LAMB: Send it to 24 john.lamb@nrc.gov.
25 MS. LAMPERT: Okay. Thank you very much.
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98 1 MR. SMITH: Okay. I'd like to thank 2 everyone for their time and attention. And this is the 3 end of the meeting. We'd like to reintroduce Mr. Jack 4 Davis at this time to end the meeting.
5 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: I think what I was saying 6 before was actually my closing statement where I am 7 taking this serious as the Chairman of this Board. I am 8 listening to what you're saying and I am trying to balance 9 what the Agency's doing and what you're asking for.
10 And as you know from the May [May 2, 2013]
11 meeting, I asked the question of whether you felt that 12 it was inadequate what the Agency was doing or whether 13 the Agency was on a time scale that you felt was not 14 appropriate. Because I've heard many of your 15 discussions today talking about how long it's taking the 16 Agency to get to that location with EA 109, with the other 17 beyond design basis mitigating measures that I'm 18 currently heading up. We are on a path to making 19 significant amounts of improvements to beyond design 20 basis measures for very extreme natural phenomena.
21 That's an important point to keep in mind. And so[,] we 22 are on a path.
23 You know, whether you believe that path is 24 not past [fast] enough, I hear different things from 25 different folks as they were presenting. Some were NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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99 1 saying, well, I don't think it's happening fast enough 2 and others are saying it's not good enough. So that's 3 what I need to kind of sift through and understand, you 4 know, where the real issue lies with the petition.
5 MS. LAMPERT: I think what we're saying -- I 6 know Pilgrim Watch is saying, because I have multiple 7 2.206s before you, it's not either or, it's both, that 8 2016 -- giving all that time to licensees is not 9 acceptable because then we have no reasonable assurance 10 today or for the next four or five years, number one. And 11 what is being done is insufficient.
12 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: Appreciate that 13 clarification. Thank you.
14 MR. JOHNSON: Another thing I would note is 15 that the Japanese authorities obviously have been shown 16 to be inadequate in enforcing the pre-Fukushima 17 requirements of the plant there, but post-Fukushima[,]
18 I think they've shown a better understanding of the 19 seriousness of that accident in deciding that rather than 20 have plants continue to operate while they figure out 21 what is a safe operating standard that they would close 22 plants and then determine when it would be safe to reopen 23 them. And I think that perhaps the NRC and what saying 24 with this petition is that these particular plants which 25 have proven to be insufficiently safe should be shut NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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100 1 until they can be shown to be safe.
2 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: Thank you for the 3 additional comment. Appreciate it.
4 Are there any others? If someone wants to 5 say something, I'm fine with continuing.
6 (No audible response.)
7 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: Okay. With that then, do 8 we have the court reporter? Yes. And do we need any 9 additional information from anyone?
10 (No audible response.)
11 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: To the court reporter, do 12 we need anything else?
13 COURT REPORTER: Who was the last 14 commenter?
15 MR. JOHNSON: It was Chuck Johnson from 16 Oregon and Washington PRS in Portland, Oregon.
17 COURT REPORTER: Thank you. That's it.
18 MR. JOHNSON: Thank you.
19 CHAIRMAN DAVIS: Okay. Thanks. And then 20 I guess with that we will adjourn the meeting.
21 (Whereupon, the hearing [meeting] in the 22 above-entitled matter was concluded at 3:15 p.m.)
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