ML13029A530
| ML13029A530 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 01/24/2013 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO) |
| References | |
| 50-338/12-302, 50-339/12-302 | |
| Download: ML13029A530 (110) | |
Text
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program INITIAL CONDITIONS Unit 1 tripped from 100% power on 11/30/2012 at 12:00 after operating for 144 consecutive days at 100% power.
Unit 1 is now in Mode 3 preparing for startup with RCS Tavg at 547°F and stable.
INITIATING CUE The Shift Manager has directed you to perform 1-OP-1C, Estimated Critical Position Calculation, ONLY, based on criticality occurring on 12/17/2012 at 18:00 with a critical rod height of 100 Steps on D Bank.
Previous Critical Conditions from the Reactor Data Book are:
- C Bank Position - 230 Steps
- D Bank Position - 230 Steps
- Boron Concentration - 1353 ppm
- Core Burnup - 5650 MWD/MTU Rx Engineering has provided the following information:
- RXMAN and XEMOD are unavailable
- Boron Diff at Prev Crit is 53 ppm
- Ref B-10/B-11 Ratio is 0.2
- B-10/B-11 Ratio at time of ECP is 0.1959 Chemistry has provided the following information:
- PZR Boron Concentration for criticality, First measurement - 1919 ppm @ time 20:20
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program TASK Calculate Estimated Critical Conditions.
TASK STANDARDS Given a copy of 1-OP-1C and a copy of the Plant Curve Book, the candidate will correctly calculate Estimated Critical Conditions IAW Attachment 1 of the procedure.
K/A
REFERENCE:
G2.1.43, Ability to use procedures to determine the effects on reactivity of plant changes, such as reactor coolant system temperature, secondary plant, fuel depletion, etc.
ALTERNATE PATH:
N/A TASK COMPLETION TIMES Validation Time = 50 minutes Start Time = __________
Actual Time = ________ minutes Stop Time = __________
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION Rating [ ] SATISFACTORY [ ] UNSATISFACTORY Candidate (Print)
Evaluator (Print)
Evaluator's Signature / Date EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS Page 2 of 14 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 1.a - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program READ THE APPLICABLE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CANDIDATE Instructions for Simulator JPMs I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.
Instructions for In-Plant JPMs I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All steps, including any required communications, shall be simulated for this JPM. Under no circumstances are you to operate any plant equipment. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.
INITIAL CONDITIONS Unit 1 tripped from 100% power on 11/30/2012 at 12:00 after operating for 144 consecutive days at 100% power.
Unit 1 is now in Mode 3 preparing for startup with RCS Tavg at 547°F and stable.
Page 3 of 14 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 1.a - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program INITIATING CUE The Shift Manager has directed you to perform 1-OP-1C, Estimated Critical Position Calculation, ONLY, based on criticality occurring on 12/17/2012 at 18:00 with a critical rod height of 100 Steps on D Bank.
Previous Critical Conditions from the Reactor Data Book are:
- C Bank Position - 230 Steps
- D Bank Position - 230 Steps
- Boron Concentration - 1353 ppm
- Core Burnup - 5650 MWD/MTU Rx Engineering has provided the following information:
- RXMAN and XEMOD are unavailable
- Boron Diff at Prev Crit is 53 ppm
- Ref B-10/B-11 Ratio is 0.2
- B-10/B-11 Ratio at time of ECP is 0.1959 Chemistry has provided the following information:
- PZR Boron Concentration for criticality, First measurement - 1919 ppm @ time 20:20 Page 4 of 14 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 1.a - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program EVALUATION METHOD Demonstration if conducted in the simulator or in a laboratory (use DEMONSTRATION cues)
Verbal-visual if conducted in the station or on a dead simulator (use VERBAL-VISUAL cues)
TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT
- Copy of 1-OP-1C, Attachment 1
- Copy of 1-OP-1C, Estimated Critical Position Calculation (complete procedure in case candidate desires to reference it while performing the task)
- Copy of Plant Curve Book Evaluators Note:
Additional copies of 1-OP-1C should be available in the event the candidate wishes to perform the attachment more than once prior to submitting it for evaluation.
Page 5 of 14 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 1.a - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program Start Time: __________
Evaluators Note:
Not all items on the key have acceptance criteria listed since some items are provided in the initial conditions and some items are values or calculations that are carried forward from previous steps of the attachment.
Step / Action Notes / Comments 1 Enter data in Attachment 1 based on information provided on the IC sheet Procedure Step Att. 1, items 1-9 SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate completes items 1-9 of attachment 1 IAW the attached key.
Step / Action Notes / Comments 2 Determine Boron Coefficient Procedure Step Att. 1, item 10 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate determines Boron Coefficient IAW the attached KEY.
Page 6 of 14 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 1.a - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program Step / Action Notes / Comments 3 Determine Integral Rod Worth Procedure Step Att. 1, item 11 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate determines Integral Rod Worth IAW the attached KEY.
Step / Action Notes / Comments 4 Determine Xenon Worth Procedure Step Att. 1, item 12 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate determines Xenon Worth IAW the attached KEY.
Page 7 of 14 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 1.a - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program Step / Action Notes / Comments 5 Determine Power Defect Procedure Step Att. 1, item 13 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate determines Power Defect IAW the attached KEY.
Step / Action Notes / Comments 6 Determine Reactivity Change Procedure Step Att. 1, item 14 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate determines Reactivity Change IAW the attached KEY.
Page 8 of 14 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 1.a - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program Step / Action Notes / Comments 7 Determine First Estimated ECP Boron Concentration Procedure Step Att. 1, item 15 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate determines First Estimated ECP Boron Concentration IAW the attached KEY.
Step / Action Notes / Comments 8 Determine Temperature Defect Procedure Step Att. 1, item 16 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate determines Temperature Defect IAW the attached KEY.
Page 9 of 14 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 1.a - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program Step / Action Notes / Comments 9 Determine Net Isotopic Decay Reactivity Procedure Step Att. 1, item 17 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate determines Net Isotopic Decay Reactivity IAW the attached KEY.
Step / Action Notes / Comments 10 Determine Estimated Critical Boron concentration Procedure Step Att. 1, item 18 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate determines Estimated Critical Boron concentration IAW the attached KEY.
Page 10 of 14 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 1.a - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program Step / Action Notes / Comments 11 Adjust Estimated Critical Boron concentration for B-10 depletion Procedure Step Att. 1, item 19 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Note: Values needed to perform calculation are provided in the Initiating Cue.
Standards Candidate determines B-10 depletion ECP Boron IAW the attached KEY.
Step / Action Notes / Comments 12 Record Measured Boron concentration for Criticality Procedure Step Att. 1, item 20 SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Note: Values needed to complete table are provided in the Initiating Cue.
Standards Candidate completes items 20 of attachment 1 IAW the attached key.
Page 11 of 14 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 1.a - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program Step / Action Notes / Comments 13 Determine Boron Concentration Change Procedure Step Att. 1, item 21 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate determines Boron Concentration Change is IAW the attached KEY.
Step / Action Notes / Comments 14 Determine Equivalent Reactivity Change Procedure Step Att. 1, item 22 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate determines Equivalent Reactivity Change IAW the attached KEY.
Page 12 of 14 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 1.a - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program Step / Action Notes / Comments 15 Determine Adjusted HZP Rod Worth Procedure Step Att. 1, item 23 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate determines Adjusted HZP Rod Worth IAW the attached KEY.
Step / Action Notes / Comments 16 Determine Administrative Worth Limits Procedure Step Att. 1, item 24 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate determines Administrative Worth Limits IAW the attached KEY.
Page 13 of 14 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 1.a - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program Step / Action Notes / Comments 17 Record First Applicable Time Interval Procedure Step Att. 1, item 25 SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate records N/A for First Applicable Time Interval Step / Action Notes / Comments 18 Record Control Rod positions Procedure Step Att. 1, item 26 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate completes item 26 IAW the attached key END OF EVALUATION Stop Time: __________
Page 14 of 14 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 1.a - DRAFT
DOMINION 1-0P-1C North Anna Power Station KEY Revision 28
- (Page 1 of 4)
Attachment 1 Calculation of Estimated Critical Conditions Page 26 of 37 Estimated Conditions I. Date : t £. \ " \\L
- 2. Time:
\~OO
- 3. Time Since Shutdown (hours): L\ t..\ *
- 4. Power Before Shutdown (% RTP): l 0%
- N/A
- 5. Core Bumup (MWDIMTU) : Sb5D ** N/A
- 6. C Bank Position (steps): 2-30 * *
- 7. D Bank Po sition (steps): "2...30 * *
- 8. RCS Temperature (OF): N/ A SYi 9.
10 .
Bor on Concentration (ppm):
Boron Coefficient (pem/ppm) :
- SS~
- N/A b.bs
- [b/~ -\-0
-b iJ
- II.
Integral Rod Worth (pem) :
( I-SC-3.5) 1(At-Power or as Appropriate)
~IO (l-SC-! 0.1)
-113 (HZP Worth)
[1>3 to -l C\3J
, t.- LO +" -l-"Z.C J
- 12. [-2.""12D 1-0 -Ll60] - "Z ( ** *
(l-SC-3.9 , (l-SC-3.11, Xen on Worth (pem ):
XEMOD or l-SC-3.12, (See Step 4 .2)
RXMAN) XEMOD or 13 . Power Defect (pem):
[-ll5'S- to - \ '"1 C\ S-J RXMAN)
(Use Previous Critical - '-")
- o Conditions Boron Cone .) ( l -SC-3.8)
- 14. Reactivity Change (pem): - i..-\ 5 is (-"l""3) = - 7>1 4 L pcm
[- 4415 to - lll;r; s] c: ~\ ()t. +0 - 578'i]
Valucs supplicd by Rcactor Enginccr OR NAF if an Initial Cycle Criticality or during a temperature coastdown.
- Mark N/A if an Initial Cycle Criticality or data for ECP is directly supplied by NAF.
- Actual Xenon reactivity worth must be used. The value will normally NOT be zero, but will be some value of ncgative reactivity.
- Admin 1a - KEY o \ '. A- Lc-~0 +v-- c.
S~01-0V\ ~
c r'. kif"! ~
L J
DOMINION 1-0P-1C KEY North Anna Power Station Revision 28 Page 27 of 37 (Page 2 of 4)
Attachment 1 Calculation of Estimated Critical Conditions
- 3! Lt L.. pem Item 14 l3S3 ppm + _I .63 =
Item 9 ----=0=----..::::...-_ pem/ppm Item 10
- 16. Temperature Defect (pcm):
(I-SC-3.7, See Step 5.2.5)
- 17. Net Isotopic Decay Reactivity using RCS Boron Concentration calculated in Item 15: ~b5 pcm I (l-SC-8.6, See Steps 4.3 and 5.2.5) c: '5'5 i:> -1 ~J
- 18. Estimated Critical Boron Concentration (ppm):
l q \1 Item IS ppm - {( t/
Item 16 pcm + - <:, S pem)
Item 17
~ ~ 3 pem/ppm } = , ppm Item 18 Diff at Prey Crit
' \ "\ 5, B-1O/B-II Ratio at ECP B-IO Depletion Adjusted ECP Boron E8 133 \-0 \ C( 03J A-c...L e. p }-tLVLC- e c Iter(~
S ~ o-vu V\. '\ V\. CJ
- Admin 1a - KEY
DOMINION 1-0P-1C North Anna Power Station KEY Revision 28
- (Page 3 of 4)
Attachment 1 Calculation of Estimated Critical Conditions Page 28 of 37
- 20. Do the following for measured Boron Concentrations for Criticality (ppm):
(See Step 4.9 and 4.13.)
First Last Measurement Measurement Mea sured RCS Boron Concentrations for Critic ality (ppm ): I ~O~ 1901 Tim e: )q'-t~ I q 5~
Mea sured PZR Boron Conc entrations for Criticality (ppm ): \~l9 Time: "2. 0 2-0 2 I. Boron Concentration Change:
=
Item 20 First Meas.
- 22. Equivalent Reactivity Change:
= l33 Item 21
[-IS 1-
- 23. Adjusted HZP Rod Worth
-113 pcm+ 53 pcm = -,7.... pcm
[-1 <i{6 ~D bS~
Item II Item 22 Est. Conds. -
- 24. Administrative Worth Limits:
LOW LIMIT= - (LO pcm - 500 pcm -\7.'20 = pcm ]
Item 23 [-\2~G -\0 -1151.\
-770 - z.-z.O 0
r HIGH LIMIT= pcm + 500 pcm = pcm Item 23 2<[G 1 rj;lI
- Admin 1a - KEY
DOMINION 1-0P-1C North Anna Power Station KEY Revision 28 Page 29 of 37 (Page 4 of 4)
Attachment 1 Calculation of Estimated Critical Conditions F multiple ECP calculations on Attachment 2, Adjustment of Estimated Critical Conditions for Changing Xenon Worth, will NOT be performed, THEN mark the Applicable Time Interval as N/A.
- 25. First APPlica::me Interval: ~i 4- CS""""--
(See Step 4.12).
- 26. Control Rod Positions for ECP at Time (<2>00 (Item 2, Estimated Conditions)
ECP LOW HIGH LIMIT LIMIT Control Rod Worth (pcm): -,20 - \7.?O - 7..-20 Item 23 Item 24 Item 24
- N o-t-e ~
f\ ;", e.()
n........... r ~
\ <.... -e. Bank C Position (steps):
(see Note below) '""2... 3> 0 CV'~ +-e-v-i' CA.... Bank D Position (steps)
"> V- \7.. (see Note below) \ D ~ 50 S t-e.-p s
'Q..'X c -e.' + Is ECP greater than La-La Insertion Limit of I-SC-l.7?
L O-LO L\Y\A.-l'
\-5C.-\*1 Is ECP less than the Fully Withdrawn Position for D Bank? ~
\,() tot ((.., t\ YW- NO
\S Y-'2. Is Low Administrative Limit greater than La-La "i"iYp 5 Insertion Limit of I-SC-1.7?
NO N The ECP, Low Limit, and High Limit Bank C and Bank D positions are obtained from I-SC-3.5 on the HZP Integral Worth tables using the current cycle burn up range.
- Admin 1a - KEY
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program INITIAL CONDITIONS
- Today, during rounds, the Auxiliary Building Operator discovered inboard seal leakage on the in-service Charging Pump, 1-CH-P-1A. Previously, there was no seal leakage on any of the Unit 1 Charging Pumps.
- The inboard seal leakage on 1-CH-P-1A has been quantified at 30 drops per minute.
- WO# 1115733-2 was generated for the leak and a CR has been written.
INITIATING CUE The Shift Manager has directed you to perform 1-LOG-20, ECCS Leakage.
The Electronic ECCS Leakage Computer Program is not available and the STA has obtained the following data from the latest hard copy printout, page 1 of 1 (Line #100):
- Unit 1 ECCS Leakage, Unfiltered Total = 100 cc/hr
- Unit 1 ECCS Leakage, Filtered Total = 120 cc/hr
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program TASK Perform 1-LOG-20, ECCS Leakage Log.
TASK STANDARDS Given a copy of 1-LOG-20, the candidate will accurately update the ECCS leakage based on the given newly discovered leakage.
K/A
REFERENCE:
G2.1.18, Ability to make accurate, clear, and concise logs, records, status boards, and reports. (RO 3.6 / SRO 3.8)
ALTERNATE PATH:
N/A TASK COMPLETION TIMES Validation Time = 25 minutes Start Time = __________
Actual Time = ________ minutes Stop Time = __________
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION Rating [ ] SATISFACTORY [ ] UNSATISFACTORY Candidate (Print)
Evaluator (Print)
Evaluator's Signature / Date EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS Page 2 of 10 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 1.b - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program READ THE APPLICABLE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CANDIDATE Instructions for Simulator JPMs I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.
Instructions for In-Plant JPMs I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All steps, including any required communications, shall be simulated for this JPM. Under no circumstances are you to operate any plant equipment. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.
INITIAL CONDITIONS
- Today, during rounds, the Auxiliary Building Operator discovered inboard seal leakage on the in-service Charging Pump, 1-CH-P-1A. Previously, there was no seal leakage on any of the Unit 1 Charging Pumps.
- The inboard seal leakage on 1-CH-P-1A has been quantified at 30 drops per minute.
- WO# 1115733-2 was generated for the leak and a CR has been written.
INITIATING CUE The Shift Manager has directed you to perform 1-LOG-20, ECCS Leakage.
The Electronic ECCS Leakage Computer Program is not available and the STA has obtained the following data from the latest hard copy printout, page 1 of 1 (Line #100):
- Unit 1 ECCS Leakage, Unfiltered Total = 100 cc/hr
- Unit 1 ECCS Leakage, Filtered Total = 120 cc/hr Page 3 of 10 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 1.b - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program EVALUATION METHOD Demonstration if conducted in the simulator or in a laboratory (use DEMONSTRATION cues)
Verbal-visual if conducted in the station or on a dead simulator (use VERBAL-VISUAL cues)
TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT Copy of 1-LOG-20, ECCS Leakage Log Calculator Page 4 of 10 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 1.b - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program Start Time:
Step / Action Notes / Comments 1 Verify ICs and review P&Ls.
Procedure Step 5.1 & 5.2 SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate reviews Section 3.0 &
4.0 Step / Action Notes / Comments 2 Print previous year's log & forward to records.
Procedure Step 5.3 SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate N/As this substep since TODAY is NOT the first entry of a new calendar year.
Page 5 of 10 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 1.b - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program Step / Action Notes / Comments 3 Determine the appropriate subsection to be performed.
Procedure Step 5.4 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate determines Subsection 5.5 applies (first bullet) and N/As remaining bullets.
Step / Action Notes / Comments 4 Initiate Attachment 2.
Procedure Step 5.5.1 Critical Step* SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
- ONLY those items that are circled on the KEY (for unfiltered leakage) are critical.
Standards Candidate enters data on Attachment 2 per the Attached Key.
Page 6 of 10 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 1.b - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program Step / Action Notes / Comments 5 Measure and convert leakage rate.
Procedure Step 5.5.2 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate calculates leakage rate at 180 cc/hr and records the leakage on Attachment 2.
Step / Action Notes / Comments 6 Determine accident leakage.
Procedure Step 5.5.3 Critical Step* SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Note: Substep 4.4 provides guidance for rounding up accident leakage to the next whole number, so either value (439.2 or 440) is acceptable.
Standards Candidate calculates accident leakage at 439.2 (440) cc/hr and records the accident leakage on Attachment 2.
Page 7 of 10 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 1.b - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program Step / Action Notes / Comments 7 Record Line Leakage.
Procedure Step 5.5.4 Critical Step* SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Note: Substep 4.4 provides guidance for rounding up accident leakage to the next whole number, so either value (439.2 or 440) is acceptable.
Standards Candidate records line leakage at +439.2 (+440) cc/hr on Attachment 2.
Step / Action Notes / Comments 8 Calculate Filtered leakage.
Procedure Step 5.5.5 Critical Step* SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Note: Substep 4.4 provides guidance for rounding up accident leakage to the next whole number, so either value (559.2 or 560) is acceptable.
Standards Candidate calculates Filtered leakage at 559.2 (560) cc/hr and records the line leakage on Attachment 2.
Page 8 of 10 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 1.b - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program Step / Action Notes / Comments 9 Calculate Total Leakage.
Procedure Step 5.5.6 Critical Step* SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Note: Substep 4.4 provides guidance for rounding up accident leakage to the next whole number, so either value (659.2 or 660) is acceptable.
Standards Candidate calculates Total leakage at 659.2 (660) cc/hr and records the line leakage on Attachment 2.
Step / Action Notes / Comments 10 Calculate Filtered leakage.
Procedure Step 5.5.7 Critical Step* SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate calculates total percentage of Allowed Leakage as shown on attached key Page 9 of 10 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 1.b - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program Step / Action Notes / Comments 11 Plot point on Attachment 3.
Procedure Step 5.5.8 Note: Because of scaling and small amount of leakage the plot itself is not critical. The relative location of the candidates plot adequately demonstrates the candidate's ability to use the attachment. If desired by the evaluator, a follow-up question on how the data is plotted may be used.
SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate plots point on Attachment 3 as per attached key.
Step / Action Notes / Comments 12 Complete administrative requirements.
Procedure Step 5.5.9 - 5.5.11 SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Cue: Inform candidate that you will perform steps 5.5.9 through 5.5.11 after they have completed all of the previous substeps and are ready to submit the procedure to you.
Standards N/A END OF EVALUATION Stop Time: __________
Page 10 of 10 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 1.b - DRAFT
A Dominion' KEY PROCEDURE NO:
REVISION NO:
1-LOG-20 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION 11 PROCEDURE TYPE : UNIT NO:
LOG 1 PROCEDURE TITLE:
ECCS LEAKAG E LOG REVISION
SUMMARY
A revision or change to this procedure requires a notification of the ECCS Leakage Computer Program Administrator to effect any necessary changes to the computer program prior to posting, AND, upon approval and posting of this procedure, to update the Revision Number in the ECCS Leakage Computer Program. (DO NOT DELETE THIS STATEMENT)
Incorporated TSCR N-061A , ECCS PREACS.
- Added References 2.3.5, 2.3.6, and 2.4.3.
- Added Initial Condition Bullet to Step 3.1 to address TS 3.7.12 verification and walkdown.
- Updated condition in Synopsis page 4.
- Added Step 5.4 Bullet to address Section 5.10 performance.
- Added Condition to Step 5.8.1 and 5.8.2 to addre ss limits exceeded during Section 5.10 performance.
- Changed Step 5.8.l.d to remove condition from TS 3.7.12 and address as applicable.
- Added new Section 5.10, Tech Spec ECCS Leakage verification to ensure required action s of Tech Spec 3.7.12 are met.
- Changed Synop sis page 4 to address apply and removed applicabl e action for Tech Spec 5.5.16 adding noun name. Changed Step 5.8.1 .e to remove applicable action for Tech Spec 5.5.16 and added noun name. There is no action associated with MCR/ESGR Envelope Habitability Program.
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED: D NO DYES Note: If YES , note problems in remarks .
REMAR KS: I ~
, .. I i
, i I I
'\.
(Use back for additional remarks .)
SRO: DATE:
CONTINUOUS USE admin 1b KEY
DOMINION 1-LOG-20 North Anna Power Station KEY Revision 11 Page 2 of 40 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page 1.0 PURPOSE 3
2.0 REFERENCES
5 3.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS 7 4.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 7 5.0 INSTRUCTIONS 9 5.5 Collecting Data for New and Unrecorded Leakage 10 5.6 Collecting Data for Increased Leakage Or Reduced Leakage on an Already Recorded Leak Location 14 5.7 Collecting Data When a Leak Has Been Repaired and Stopped 18 5.8 Actions If Leakage Limit Is Exceeded 21 5.9 Quarterly Walkdown of Previously Recorded Leakage 23 5.10 Tech Spec 3.7.12 ECCS Leakage Verification 24 ATTACHMENTS Sample ECCS Leakage Log Entries 26 2 ECCS Leakage Log 39 3 Allowable ECCS Leakage 40 admin 1b KEY
DOMINION 1-LOG-20 North Anna Power Station KEY Revision 11 Page 3 of 40 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides instructions for making entries in the ECCS Leakage Computer Program or completion of Attachment 2, ECCS Leakage Log.
The ECCS Leakage Log is a means of collecting leakage data in the ECCS recirculation path components and piping outside of Containment. The leakage during normal operation should remain within the Acceptable region of Attachment 3, Allowable ECCS Leakage, which represents the design basis leakage limit.
The leakage limit must be specified below as other procedures obtain the values from this paragraph. The Normal Operational leakage limits are described below:
(Reference 2.3.4)
Leakage Limits are as follows:
- Unfiltered Leakage limit: ~ 1,700 cc/hr
- Filtered Leakage limit: ~ 17,200 cc/hr
- Total Leakage limit:
(% of Filtered Leakage Limit +% of Unfiltered Leakage Limit) limit: ~ 100%
Filtered Leakage is defined as ECCS leakage in the Safeguards Area and the Charging Pump Cubicles. Unfiltered Leakage is defined as ECCS leakage in the Quench Spray Pumphouse or other areas of the Auxiliary Building.
admin 1b KEY
DOMINION 1-LOG-20 North Anna Power Station KEY Revision 11 Page 4 of 40 IF a leakage limit is exceeded, THEN the following Tech Specs and TRM Actions apply:
- Action B of Tech Specs 3.7.10
- Action D of Tech Spec 3.7.12 is conservatively entered on the affected Unit since the PREACS System may not be able to perform its intended function of limiting dose to the Control Room Operators. The Bases for 3.7.12 notes this one aspect of the Applicable Safety Analyses for large break LOCA. The condition of ECCS leakage limit is judged to be similar to having an inoperable boundary in terms of consequence and appropriate actions. Therefore, the above referenced Action should be entered.
- Tech Spec 5.5.16, MCRJESGR Envelope Habitability Program The Design Basis Leakage Limits (the amount of leakage that can be tolerated to maintain Control Room dose < 5 Rem TEDE) contains an NRC mandated safety factor of 2 that can be used to Justify Continued Operation of a degraded but operable PREACS as part of a pre-staged operability determination:
- Maximum Unfiltered Leakage Limit: ~ 3,400 cc/hr (if all leakage is unfiltered)
- Maximum Filtered Leakage Limit: ~ 34,400 cc/hr (if all leakage is filtered)
- Total Leakage (% of Filtered Leakage Limit +% of Unfiltered Leakage Limit)
Limit: ~ 200%
IF a Design Basis Leakage Limit is exceeded, THEN the PREACS is inoperable and an evaluation is performed to determine if a one hour report to the NRC is required.
This evaluation will consider "non-heroic" actions that can be taken to isolate the leak. An example of this would be the ability to isolate Charging Pump leakage by closing the suction and discharge MOVs and verifying the recirc MOV open from the Control Room. Another consideration would be compensatory actions in place that could be completed within 29 minutes to isolate the leakage. (Reference 2.4.2) admin 1b KEY
DOMINION 1-LOG-20 North Anna Power Station KEY Revision 11 Page 5 of 40 The following synopsis is designed as an aid to understanding this procedure and is not intended to alter or take the place of the actual purpose, instructions, or text of the procedure itself.
Ventilation exhaust from the Charging Pump Cubicles and from the Safeguards Area provide a safety-related flow path that will be aligned to the Charcoal Filter Banks. Ventilation exhaust from other areas (i.e., Quench Spray Pumphouse or other areas of the Auxiliary Building) could be released unfiltered. Therefore, the ECCS Leakage log will track Filtered Leakage (leakage within the Charging Pump Cubicles and Safeguards Area) and Unfiltered Leakage (leakage from the Quench Spray Pumphouse and areas of the Auxiliary Building outside the Charging Pump Cubicles). The ECCS Leakage log will also track Total Leakage (Filtered Leakage plus Unfiltered Leakage).
Four conditions that would require an ECCS Leakage Computer Program entry or initiation of Attachment 2, ECCS Leakage Log, for either of the two types of Areas, are new leakage, increased leakage, reduced leakage, and stopped leakage. Separate subsections are provided to address each situation. Increased leakage and reduced leakage will require two line entries; one to negate the original entry, and one to enter the new data.
Attachment I, Sample Eccs Leakage Log Entries, provides definitions, descriptions, and samples for making entries in the ECCS Leakage Computer Program or on Attachment 2, ECCS Leakage Log. Additional confirmation that leakage is within acceptable limits is obtained when leakage is plotted on Attachment 3, Allowable ECCS Leakage.
2.0 REFERENCES
2.1 Source Documents 2.1.1 UFSAR Ch 6.3.3.6; Table 6.2-42 and 6.3-6 2.1.2 UFSAR Ch 15.4; Figure 15.4-67 2.2 Technical Specifications 2.2.1 Tech Spec 3.7.10 admin 1b KEY
DOMINION 1-LOG-20 North Anna Power Station KEY Revision 11 Page 6 of 40 2.2.2 Tech Spec 3.7.12 2.2.3 Tech Spec 5.5.16 2.3 Technical References 2.3.1 ET SE-99-030, Rev. 0, Revised ECCS Leakage Limits 2.3.2 ET N 00-075, Rev. 0, ECCS Leakage Limits North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2 2.3.3 PA-0207 Rev. 0, Radiological Consequences of a LOCA at North Anna Based on the Alternate Source Term 2.3.4 Tech Spec Change N-011, Implementation of Alternate Source Term 2.3.5 l-LOG-6D, Auxiliary Building Log 2.3.6 l-LOG-6F, Safeguard Log 2.4 Commitment Documents 2.4.1 Plant Issue N-2003-0145, l-CH-MOV-1289A, Normal Charging Header Isolation Valve, Packing Leak 2.4.2 Licensing Action LA000951 requires FSRC approval prior to removing the administrative control of 29 minutes stay time for maintenance and testing activities following an accident 2.4.3 TSCR N-061A, ECCS PREACS admin 1b KEY
DOMINION 1-LOG-20 North Anna Power Station KEY Revision 11 Page 7 of 40 Init Verif 3.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS 3.1 Leakage identified as being from ECCS recirculation path components and piping external to Containment meets one of the following criteria:
- The leakage is New and Unrecorded Leakage that can be collected and measured.
- The leakage on an already recorded leak location has increased.
- The leakage on an already recorded leak location has been reduced.
- The leakage on an already recorded leak location has been repaired and stopped.
- A quarterly walkdown of the previously recorded leakage is scheduled.
- Tech Spec 3.7.12 (ECCS PREACS Condition B, C or D) verification and field walkdown is required to verify ECCS leakage is less than the maximum allowable unfiltered leakage.
3.2 ECCS Leakage Computer Program is available. IF the ECCS Leakage Computer Program is NOT available, THEN Attachment 2, ECCS Leakage Log, must be used.
+
4.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 4.1 Comply with the following guidelines when marking steps Nt A:
- IF the conditional requirements of a step do not require the action to be performed, THEN mark the step Nt A.
- IF any other step is marked NtA, THEN have the SRO (or designee) approve the Nt A and submit a Procedure Action Request (PAR).
4.2 IF uncertain that the leakage is from ECCS recirculation path components and piping, THEN the SRO or the ECCS (SI) Engineer should be contacted for resolution.
admin 1b KEY
DOMINION 1-LOG-20 North Anna Power Station KEY Revision 11 Page 8 of 40 4.3 The existence of wetness or Boron accumulation, without a countable drip rate is NOT active leakage.
4.4 "Accident Leakage" is the leakage that could be expected if the ECCS system were in the recirculation mode following a DBA. Some sections of the systems see a greater pressure during post-LOCA time than during normal plant operations. For leaks in those areas, the number entered in the "Leakage" column must be increased by a factor that accounts for the higher pressure during ECCS recirculation. The factor is the square root of the ratio of LHSI system pressure during recirculation to normal operating pressure at the leakage point. The highest expected pressure in the LHSI system is about 160 psig. During normal operations LHSI pressure is about 30 psig, that is, RWST static head. During normal operations, the most conservative pressure seen by the seals of the charging pumps is due to lowest allowed VCT pressure and weight of water due to height. This conservatively equates to the square root of 160.8 (LHSI system pressure during recirculation) divided by 27 (lowest normal operating pressure at the suction of the Charging Pumps due to VCT pressure and weight of water due to height) which provides a conversion factor of 2.44. Only those leaks in the LHSI system from the discharge of the pumps to the LHSI containment penetrations and to the suctions of the Charging Pumps,
~ including Charging Pump seal leakagel require this correction factor and an "accident leakage" entry. All other leaks in the ECCS network should have "N/ A" in the "accident leakage" column. Round all results up to the next whole number of cclhr.
4.5 Seal leakage from LHSI and ORS pumps is not ECCS leakage due to the seal supply and the tandem seal system. This is not appropriate to enter into the ECCS leakage log.
4.6 WHEN the ECCS Leakage Computer Program is NOT available, THEN Attachment 2, ECCS Leakage Log, must be used. Additional copies of Attachment 2 may be made as necessary.
4.7 External leakage from l-CH-MOV-1289A, l-CH-MOV-1289B, and l-CH-FCV-1122 is ECCS leakage since seat leakage through either MOV is unknown. (Reference 2.4.1) admin 1b KEY
DOMINION 1-LOG-20 North Anna Power Station KEY Revision 11 Page 9 of 40 5.0 INSTRUCTIONS 5.1 Verify Initial Conditions are satisfied.
5.2 Review Precautions and Limitations.
5.3 IF this is the first entry of a new calendar year, THEN print the previous year's log and forward to Station Records.
5.4 Determine the appropriate subsection to be performed:
- IF the leakage is new and unrecorded Leakage that can be collected and measured, THEN perform Subsection 5.5, Collecting Data for New and Unrecorded Leakage.
~----------
- IF the leakage is increased leakage or reduced leakage on an already recorded leak location, THEN perform Subsection 5.6, Collecting Data for Increased Leakage Or Reduced Leakage on an Already Recorded Leak Location.
- IF the leak has been repaired and stopped, THEN perform Subsection 5.7, Collecting Data When a Leak Has Been Repaired and Stopped.
- IF a quarterly walkdown of the previously recorded leakage is scheduled, THEN perform Subsection 5.9, Quarterly Walkdown of Previously Recorded Leakage.
- IF Tech Spec 3.7.12 (ECCS PREACS) condition B, CorD has been entered, THEN perform Section 5.10, Tech Spec 3.7.12 ECCS Leakage Verification.
admin 1b KEY
DOMINION 1-LOG-20 North Anna Power Station KEY Revision 11 Page 10 of 40 5.5 Collecting Data for New and Unrecorded Leakage 5.5.1 Perform the following in the ECCS Leakage Computer Program or on Attachment 2, ECCS Leakage Log:
- a. IF the leakage is "Unfiltered Leakage," THEN enter the value for Carried Forward Filtered Leakage AND mark all remaining "Filtered Leakage" spaces Nt A.
- b. IF the leakage is "Filtered Leakage," THEN enter the value for Carried Forward Unfiltered Leakage AND mark all remaining "Unfiltered Leakage" spaces Nt A.
- c. IF performing Attachment 2, THEN record the next sequential line number.
- d. IF performing Attachment 2, THEN record the date leakage found.
b eakage from multiple points must not be combined. This allows for tracking of the reduction t repair of the leak.
- e. Record a description - leak location with equipment mark number.
1
- f. Enter a Condition Report. ~ <:::\-\~ :.- 3" _
o ~--M-o....\ co--J7-h tN'S
¥
- g. Record the Work Request Number/Work Order Number.
admin 1b KEY
DOMINION 1-LOG-20 North Anna Power Station KEY Revision 11 Page 11 of 40 eakage drop count should continue for at least one minute OR timing should continue for at least 20 drops. Stream leaks should be measured using a graduated cylinder.
/
- One drop = 0.1 cc or 0.1 ml i) b )
/* 3785 cc = I gallon 5.5.2 Measure the leakage rate as follows:
- a. Time the leakage.
- b. Convert the leakage rate to cc/hr, as applicable. Round the result up to the next whole number of cc/hr:
3600(Sec) 3 cc/hr (hr) x
- c. Record the Leakage.
NOTE: Measured leakage must be extrapolated to the design accident conditions depending on the location of the leak. The origin of the 2.44 conversion factor is explained on Attachment I, Sample Eccs Leakage Log Entries, Item
- 7. Leakage from piping containing Charging Pump flow and pressure is conservatively assumed to be at design accident conditions. IF Step 5.5.3 is not performed, THEN the Accident Leakage block may be marked N/A.
IF the leakage is from any point between the discharge of the LHSI Pumps and the suction of the Charging Pumps, THEN do the following:
0_ IV
- a. Convert the Measured Leakage to Accident Leakage, as follows:
Accident leakage = tB cc/hr x 2.44 = 4 Lot D cc/hr (measured leakage)
- b. Record the Accident Leakage.
rt
( l..\ "3 q. '2- I.{0
- e~ V)
Se-~ ~,l-\ ')
admin 1b KEY
DOMINION North Anna Power Station KEY 1-LOG-20 Revision 11
~
Page 12of40 5 .4 Record Line Leakage using the algebraic plus (+) sign and the appropriate entry as determined below:
~ IF only Leakage was recorded AND Accident Leakage was marked N/A, THEN record the Leaka e value as positive (+) Line Leakage.
~
- IF Accident Leakage was recorded, THEN record the Accident Leaka ge value as positive (+) Line Leakage.
Do one of the following: Mark other choice N/A.
~ IV
- IF the leakage is "Unfiltered Leakage," THEN calculate Unfiltered Leakage by algebraically adding Line Leakage to Carried Forward Unfiltered Leakage. Record the Unfiltered Leakage in the space c;!
provided.
- IF the leakage is "Filtered Leakage," THEN calculate Filtered Leakage IV by algebraically adding Line Leakage to Carried Forward Filtered d IV Leakage. Record the Filtered Leakage in the space provided.
5.5.6 Calculate Total Leakage by algebraically adding Unfiltered Leakage to Filtered Leakage. Record the Total Leakage in the space provided.
~ 5.5.7 Calculate the Total Percentage of Allowed Leakage:
(a) Unfiltered Leakage: I DO cc/hr X (10011,700) = S.~ %
(b) Filtered Leakage: 5 faD cclhr X (100117,200) = ~,3 %
(c) Total Percentage of Allowed Leakage: (a) + (b) =
admin 1b KEY
DOMINION 1-LOG-20 North Anna Power Station KEY Revision 11 Page 13 of 40 5.5.8 Plot the point where the Filtered Leakage and Unfiltered Leakage intersect on Attachment 3, Allowable ECCS Leakage.
5.5.9 IF the ECCS Leakage Computer Program is NOT available, THEN do the following:
- a. Start a new page of Attachment 2 by entering the following information in the applicable space:
- YEAR: the current year
- PAGE: next sequential number
- UNFILTERED LEAKAGE: enter "Unfiltered Leakage" from the previous page in "Carried Forward Unfiltered Leakage"
- FILTERED LEAKAGE: enter "Filtered Leakage" from the previous page in "Carried Forward Filtered Leakage"
- b. Notify the Code Administrator for the ECCS Leakage Computer Program. Email or voice mail is acceptable.
5.5.10 Record total ECCS leakage in the Narrative Log.
5.5.11 IF at least one of the conditions listed below exists, THEN complete Subsection 5.8, Actions If Leakage Limit Is Exceeded:
- Unfiltered Leakage> 1,700 cc/hr (if all leakage is unfiltered)
- Filtered Leakage> 17,200 cc/hr (if all leakage is filtered)
- The Total Percentage of Allowed Leakage recorded in Step 5.5.7 > 100%
- The point plotted in Step 5.5.8 is in the Unacceptable Leakage region of Attachment 3, Allowable ECCS Leakage.
Completed by: _ Date: _
admin 1b KEY
DOMINION 1-LOG-20 North Anna Power Station KEY Revision 11 Page 39 of 40 (Page 1 of 1)
Attachment 2 ECCS Leakage Log 1 YEAR Z0 i '"t. PAGE '2.
(all Leakage in cc/hr)
UNFILTERED LEAKAGE I i i i i i i i i i:> r?5*1. b Line Number Date Description Carried Forward Unfiltered Leakage (enter 0 if first entry of new year)
Unfiltered Leakage Carried Line Number Date Description Work Request!
Work Order No.
I Leakage IAccident Leakage I Line Leakage I Forward Filtered Leakage I Filtered Leakage I Initial Carried Forward Filtered Leakage (enter 0 if first entry of new year)
I-c.. H -r-(p,.
\'"bc3.:b..vJ S'. ~.J (e~ k Filtered Leakage TOTAL LEAKAGE L__~rL
~- - '~". I ~
I*
J__ ~I_i.__.
1 i Total Description j Leakage I Initial Total Leakage (Unfiltered Leakage + Filtered Leakage)
L---~i--------]CJi-i ---]LJ 060~1 ~
¥ See- 3""P \'-" ~". ~ (o-o-~ C>¢ admin 1b KEY a-a:.e {) ~ce.. c:c',~v~ a.
DOMINION 1-LOG-20 North Anna Power Station KEY Revision 11 Page 40 of 40 (Page 1 of 1)
Attachment 3 Allowable ECCS Leakage Allowable ECCS Leakage Filtered / Unfiltered Combined Flows Which Generate A 5 REM Control Room Dose (When added to the Containment, RWST and filter shine components) 2000
..... Filtered/Unf iltered EGGS Leakage for 250 cfm Gontrol Room Inleakage
'5u ~
-; 1500 0)
"- ...... , IUnacceptable I Unfilt ered Gontrol Room Filtered EGGS Leakage Unfiltered EGGS Leakage ell Leakaqe Inleakage cc/hr cc/hr
~
ell
............ 17,200 0 Q)
...J ~ 250 cfm 8,600 850 (J)
()
............ 0 1,700 trl1000 I(Filtered Total Leakage II
& Unfiltered) "1l...
I Acceptable I ..........
500 "- ,
l°'O -;>
\.:/
o 1001 o
.V 5 b f) -.-J AliowablelFilteredJECCS Leakage (cc/hr)
Note: Data extracted from PA-0207 Rev. D, Radiological Consequences of a LOCA at North Anna based on the Alternate Source Term Graphics No. CS4381 admin 1b KEY
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program INITIAL CONDITIONS With Unit 1 at 50%, returning to 100% following a refueling outage, the A MFRV has demonstrated erratic operation.
- The decision was made to hold power at 50% and notify Senior Management.
- In order to attempt to isolate the cause, Engineering proposes hooking up diagnostic equipment (for the purpose of recording voltages only) to various test points in the racks.
- Westinghouse Process Engineering was consulted and concurs with the plan, but cautions that there is a slight risk of the A MFRV failing closed due to loss of controller output in the event that an erroneous connection occurred during setup.
- Plans are to maintain the current power level and conduct the proposed troubleshooting.
INITIATING CUE The Shift Manager has directed you to determine the Risk and Rigor categories in accordance with MA-AA-103, Conduct of Troubleshooting, and based on those results determine the highest level of review/approval required for the proposed troubleshooting.
(Record your results in the space provided)
Risk Level: __________________
Rigor Category: __________________
Highest level of review/approval required: ___________________________
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program TASK Evaluate proposed troubleshooting activity and correctly apply the requirements of MA-AA-103.
TASK STANDARDS Given a copy of MA-AA-103, the candidate will evaluate a proposed troubleshooting activity and correctly determine the Risk Level, Rigor Category, and Highest Level of review/approval required.
K/A
REFERENCE:
G2.2.20, Knowledge of the process for managing troubleshooting activities (RO 2.6 / SRO 3.8)
ALTERNATE PATH:
N/A TASK COMPLETION TIMES Validation Time = 15 minutes Start Time = __________
Actual Time = ________ minutes Stop Time = __________
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION Rating [ ] SATISFACTORY [ ] UNSATISFACTORY Candidate (Print)
Evaluator (Print)
Evaluator's Signature / Date EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS Page 2 of 6 NAPS 20__ NRC Exam Admin JPM 2 - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program READ THE APPLICABLE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CANDIDATE Instructions for Simulator JPMs I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.
Instructions for In-Plant JPMs I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All steps, including any required communications, shall be simulated for this JPM. Under no circumstances are you to operate any plant equipment. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.
INITIAL CONDITIONS With Unit 1 at 50%, returning to 100% following a refueling outage, the A MFRV has demonstrated erratic operation.
- The decision was made to hold power at 50% and notify Senior Management.
- In order to attempt to isolate the cause, Engineering proposes hooking up diagnostic equipment (for the purpose of recording voltages only) to various test points in the racks.
- Westinghouse Process Engineering was consulted and concurs with the plan, but cautions that there is a slight risk of the A MFRV failing closed due to loss of controller output in the event that an erroneous connection occurred during setup.
- Plans are to maintain the current power level and conduct the proposed troubleshooting.
INITIATING CUE The Shift Manager has directed you to determine the Risk and Rigor categories in accordance with MA-AA-103, Conduct of Troubleshooting, and based on those results determine the highest level of review/approval required for the proposed troubleshooting.
(Record your results in the space provided)
Page 3 of 6 NAPS 20__ NRC Exam Admin JPM 2 - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program EVALUATION METHOD Demonstration if conducted in the simulator or in a laboratory (use DEMONSTRATION cues)
Verbal-visual if conducted in the station or on a dead simulator (use VERBAL-VISUAL cues)
TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT Copy of MA-AA-103, Conduct of Troubleshooting Page 4 of 6 NAPS 20__ NRC Exam Admin JPM 2 - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program Start Time: __________
Evaluators Note:
The possibility the A MFRV failing shut presents the possibility of tripping the plant.
Even at the reduced power level, the Bypass valve is not capable of supplying sufficient feed, thus if the MFRV fails closed the plant will eventually trip (either on SF>FF mismatch w/ Lo SG Level or Lo-Lo SG Level).
Step / Action Notes / Comments 1 Determine Risk Level.
Procedure Step Att. 1, Page 2 of 4 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate determines the proposed troubleshooting activity qualifies as:
Risk Level - I. High Risk Step / Action Notes / Comments 2 Determine Rigor Category.
Procedure Step Att. 1, Page 3 of 4 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate determines the proposed troubleshooting activity qualifies as:
Rigor Category - C Page 5 of 6 NAPS 20__ NRC Exam Admin JPM 2 - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program Step / Action Notes / Comments 3 Determine highest level of review/approval required.
Procedure Step 3.9 (page 13 of 37)
Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate determines, (using the Troubleshooting Approval Matrix), the proposed troubleshooting activity requires approval of:
Plant Manager END OF EVALUATION Stop Time: __________
Page 6 of 6 NAPS 20__ NRC Exam Admin JPM 2 - DRAFT
Nuclear Fleet Administrative Procedure
Title:
Conduct of Troubleshooting Document Number Revision Number Effective Date and MA-AA-103 9 Approvals On File Revision Summary Revision 9 procedure includes the following changes:
- Added Purpose 1.2 bullets for methodology
- Added 3.2 Note information.
- Added new 3.3.1 DOCUMENT...
- Step 3.3.2, Added instruction for Attachment 2
- Deleted old Steps 3.3.4 and 3.3.5
- 3.4 added Note information concerning Complex Troubleshooting.
- Revised Step 3.4.2, to include questions.
- Revised 3.4.4.a concerning troubleshooting training techniques.
- Revised Subsection 3.6 Note, and instructions for using troubleshooting techniques.
- Revised 3.10.2.b. Note
- Revised 5.2.2, Manager Nuclear Maintenance...
- Added 5.2.4.f, Communicating troubleshooting results and engaging with Engineering,...
- Added Ref. 5.4.13 CA228865, NOD Troubleshooting Assessment 11-57-M Recommendations.
- revised Attachment 2, Troubleshooting Sheet
- Revised Attachment 6, Flowchart to reflect changes in body. (NOTE Graphics working annotations)
Functional Area Manager: Manager Nuclear Maintenance INFORMATION USE
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 2 OF 37 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page 1.0 PURPOSE ....................................................................................................................................... 3 2.0 SCOPE ............................................................................................................................................ 3 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS .............................................................................................................................. 4 3.1 General ................................................................................................................................... 4 3.2 Problem Identification .......................................................................................................... 4 3.3 Initial Problem Statement ..................................................................................................... 5 3.4 Determine Level of Support ................................................................................................. 6 3.5 Acquire Information .............................................................................................................. 8 3.6 Determine Potential Failures and Develop Actions to Confirm True Cause ................... 8 3.7 Develop Troubleshooting Plan .......................................................................................... 10 3.8 Develop Instructions........................................................................................................... 12 3.9 Approval of Troubleshooting Plan .................................................................................... 13 3.10 Execute Troubleshooting Plan .......................................................................................... 14 3.11 Analyze Results................................................................................................................... 14 3.12 Failure Identification ........................................................................................................... 15 3.13 Follow-up Actions ............................................................................................................... 15 3.14 Post-Job Brief...................................................................................................................... 16 3.15 Records Retention and Document .................................................................................... 16 4.0 RECORDS ..................................................................................................................................... 16 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION............................................................................................... 16 5.1 Commitments ...................................................................................................................... 16 5.2 Responsibilities................................................................................................................... 17 5.3 Definitions............................................................................................................................ 19 5.4 References ........................................................................................................................... 21 ATTACHMENTS 1 Risk and Rigor Determination Matrix ......................................................................................... 22 2 Troubleshooting Sheet - 730600 (July 2012) ............................................................................. 26 3 Data Gathering Checklist - 730601 (Sep 2007) .......................................................................... 30 4 Complex Troubleshooting Failure Mode/Cause Table - 730602 (Feb 2012) ........................... 31 5 Complex Troubleshooting Failure Mode/Cause Table (Example) ........................................... 34 6 Troubleshooting Flowchart......................................................................................................... 36 INFORMATION USE
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 3 OF 37 1.0 PURPOSE 1.1 This procedure:
- Establishes a standard systematic approach for plant personnel involved in troubleshooting of power plant systems and equipment.
- Decreases the time needed to identify necessary actions and restore the system to operating conditions.
- Increases the probability that the complete cause of the problem will be found, so repair activities can be limited to what is actually needed.
1.2 This procedure provides guidance for a broad spectrum of conditions ranging from simple troubleshooting with a component isolated from service to complex cases that could involve multiple work groups and equipment that remains in operation with potential impact on other equipment.
- For complex troubleshooting, use the Attachment 2, Troubleshooting, along with the Attachment 4, Complex Troubleshooting Failure Mode/Cause Table, AND/OR Kepner-Tregoe (KT) Problem Analysis process and forms.
- Attachment 4, Complex Troubleshooting Failure Mode/Cause Table and Kepner-Tregoe (KT) Problem Analysis and decision making provide a more defined and documented process that is necessary on the more complex cases.
- Use of the Kepner-Tregoe (KT) Problem Analysis process is left up to the discretion of the Troubleshooting Team Lead (TTL). IF the (KT) process is employed, THEN it shall be performed by personnel trained in the (KT) process.
2.0 SCOPE 2.1 The procedure scope includes:
- Power Block equipment failures/malfunctions where there is a potential impact on continued plant operation.
- Power Block equipment failures/malfunctions where previous corrective actions have NOT successfully prevented recurrence.
2.2 Actions taken to correct a specific known problem are NOT considered troubleshooting and are NOT within the scope of this procedure.
2.3 This procedure addresses the physical cause of an equipment failure/malfunction.
This procedure is NOT intended to address Human Performance issues or replace a root cause analysis required by the corrective action program. Although there is overlap between root cause and troubleshooting in determining what to fix, in general, troubleshooting is the process applied to determine What to fix and the corrective action program is used to determine Why it failed.
INFORMATION USE
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 4 OF 37 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS 3.1 General NOTE: Particular attention is required when troubleshooting has the potential to impact design function of any structures, systems, or components that are being relied upon to support plant operation or achieve and maintain safe shutdown.
3.1.1 During each step of systematic approach to troubleshooting, CONSIDER whether it is still acceptable to continue system or plant operations based on significance of deficient condition.
3.1.2 During development of trouble shooting plans, REVIEW WM-AA-301 for operational risk assessment. (Ref. 5.4.12)
NOTE: Subsections 3.2 and 3.3 are typically performed by the Operating crew and those first responding to the concern. After the Troubleshooting Team (TT) has been formed, the TT should ensure Subsections 3.2 and 3.3 satisfactorily completed.
NOTE: The Operating crew and shift personnel may have already completed Subsection 3.2 prior to a Troubleshooting Team Lead (TTL) or a TT. Therefore, the TTL or TT may confirm Subsection 3.2 completion with the Operating crew and go to Subsection 3.3.
3.2 Problem Identification Initiator 3.2.1 CONSIDER the following examples of information during troubleshooting activities, and DOCUMENT initial conditions for use by the Troubleshooting Team (TT) in the WR/CR/WO, as appropriate:
- Evidence or data preserved during the course of the investigation
- Videotape or photographs of the scene as appropriate
- Frame of reference for photographic evidence (ruler, etc.)
- Identifying labels in photographic evidence
- Labeled component saved for future analysis and reference
- Sketches including scale when possible
- Initial and final condition and location/state of all items found
- Conditions in the environment such as spray, heat, direct sunlight or unusual odors
- Out of ordinary conditions
- Description of equipment condition when found including unusual or unexpected conditions of equipment as well as surrounding equipment and area INFORMATION USE
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 5 OF 37 3.2.2 CONTROL the area (i.e., isolate or quarantine area, if possible).
3.2.3 IDENTIFY unusual or unexpected conditions of equipment as well as surrounding equipment and area.
3.2.4 MAINTAIN parts in the area until location, orientation and condition are noted.
3.3 Initial Problem Statement NOTE: It is NOT appropriate at this stage to speculate about the source of the problem or offer corrective actions. Experience suggests that defining the problem is the most important step in the process. Problem definition is essential for implementing the troubleshooting process in an efficient manner, following a structured approach, and finding the right solution to the problem the first time. A preliminary evaluation must be performed to gain a clear understanding of the issues. The problem statement is to address: who, what, when, where and NOT why.
NOTE: Plant Manager will assign the Troubleshooting Team Lead (TTL) on a I-High Risk troubleshooting team. The Maintenance Manager will assign the TTL for a II-Medium Risk troubleshooting team.
NOTE: In most cases, the technical or maintenance expert should NOT serve as the TTL. Such experts should be allowed to apply full attention to plan development and implementation rather than be distracted by coordination details and administrative responsibilities.
NOTE: For the large majority of troubleshooting, which involves simple, non-complex problems, the TTL is the Maintenance First Line Supervisor in charge of the task.
NOTE: For simple troubleshooting the WR/CR/WO may suffice as the initial problem statement.
The scope of the troubleshooting activity may pose a high risk to plant operation. The more risk significant the troubleshooting, the more rigorous the controls applied.
3.3.1 DOCUMENT the WR/CR/WO, system, component ID, operating conditions, initial problem statement and the initial Risk Number and Rigor Category on Attachment 2, Troubleshooting Sheet.
3.3.2 ASSIGN a Troubleshooting Team Lead (TTL) for both simple or complex troubleshooting activities and document the name on Attachment 2, Troubleshooting. DETERMINE if a multi-disciplined troubleshooting team needs to be formed. In most cases the troubleshooting may still be led by Maintenance with support from Engineering or other work groups.
Troubleshooting Team Lead 3.3.3 DEFINE clearly the problem before proceeding with troubleshooting.
(TTL) Understand the scope and nature of the issue, identify the severity of the problem, and establish to what extent the problem has been observed in the plant or system.
INFORMATION USE
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 6 OF 37 3.3.4 DEVELOP a problem statement that is technically correct and detailed as possible. A face-to-face interview with the personnel communicating the performance issue, especially operators, should be performed.
EXAMPLE: Good: On 6/6/98 at 1500 while in Mode 1, Containment Isolation Valve (V-216), located in the Unit 2 penetration room, failed its IST stroke test by 1 second, during a preplanned surveillance. Its design basis closing stroke time is 10 seconds and its tested stroke time was 11 seconds. Failure of the valve to perform its function puts the station in a 72-hour LCO.
Bad: Containment Isolation Valve broke/fix.
TTL 3.3.5 LIST employees who identified or are knowledgeable of the problem on Troubleshooting Sheet (Attachment 2).
3.4 Determine Level of Support NOTE: Complex troubleshooting requires gathering data for extensive engineering analysis, or may significantly affect production/safety risk margins. Step 3.4.2 provides questions that should be used to aid in determining the need for a complex troubleshooting plan.
TTL 3.4.1 DETERMINE if a complex troubleshooting plan is needed to perform the troubleshooting activity and DOCUMENT on the Troubleshooting Sheet (Attachment 2).
3.4.2 IF any of the following questions are answered YES, THEN complex troubleshooting is required or may be deemed complex troubleshooting at management discretion.
- DOES activity require involvement from more than two groups/disciplines?
- WILL the activity require numerous attempts in order to resolve?
- WILL the same component require multiple condition reports in order to resolve the same/similar issue?
- DOES the activity pose a potential operational risk?
- DOES the activity of sufficient complexity require specialized personnel (i.e. vendors, corporate engineering,...)?
- DOES troubleshooting deem complex troubleshooting at management discretion?
3.4.3 IF troubleshooting has been identified as Complex Troubleshooting, THEN OBTAIN manager level approval of the problem statement.
INFORMATION USE
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 7 OF 37 NOTE: A troubleshooting team shall be used for:
- Solving higher risk or complex troubleshooting problems.
- Troubleshooting activities which pose significant challenges to the plant such as short duration LCOs that would result in a unit shutdown.
- Any event which threatens the on-line status of a unit.
- Other significant equipment problems as requested by Engineering, Maintenance, or Operations Managers.
The troubleshooting team can vary from a worker and supervisor (with Outage and Planning support) to a multi-department team, depending on complexity of problem. For the large majority of troubleshooting, which involves simple, non-complex problems, the TTL is the Maintenance First Line Supervisor in charge of the task.
It is recommended that members be assigned from Maintenance, Engineering, and Operations at a minimum. Other groups may be assigned as required for the task.
3.4.4 IF a troubleshooting team needs to be formed, THEN PERFORM the following to form the team:
Operations or a. ENSURE the troubleshooting team's composition includes individuals Maintenance trained and experienced in troubleshooting techniques (e.g., KT problem Manager analysis process, failure mode/cause analysis)
NOTE: The technical lead will normally be the system engineer, component engineer, program engineer, or subject matter expert from maintenance. The TTL should NOT be the technical lead.
- b. IF applicable, THEN ESTABLISH a technical lead.
TTL c. IF the plant challenge is an immediate attention item requiring around the clock work, THEN IDENTIFY relief personnel to support coverage.
- d. CONSIDER involving resources from Operations, Engineering, Maintenance, other stations, Corporate Engineering, Vendors, O&P, etc.,
as required.
- e. DOCUMENT the troubleshooting team composition on Troubleshooting Sheet (Attachment 2).
INFORMATION USE
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 8 OF 37 3.5 Acquire Information CAUTION: Care should be taken when acquiring information to ensure that evidence is not destroyed in the process. The need to quarantine equipment should be considered per OP-AA-1300, Quarantine.
NOTE: To the extent practical, acquiring information should precede any hands on troubleshooting.
TT 3.5.1 COLLECT information pertinent to the problem. REFER to Data Gathering Sheet (Attachment 3) for examples of data from internal sources and external sources.
3.5.2 IF desired, THEN CREATE a timeline of the data associated with the failure and VALIDATE information obtained (e.g., second hand, how obtained, etc.).
3.6 Determine Potential Failures and Develop Actions to Confirm True Cause NOTE: Troubleshooting involves use of a systematic approach to find the cause of a problem. The KT Problem Analysis and Complex Troubleshooting Failure Mode/Cause Table (Attachment
- 4) are tools used with the goal of getting to problem resolution in the quickest and easiest fashion based on the training and experience of the personnel involved. If employing the use of KT Problem Analysis, then Attachment 4, Complex Troubleshooting Failure Mode/
Cause Table of this procedure is NOT required, however both may be used at the discretion of the TTL.
TT 3.6.1 IF NOT complex troubleshooting, THEN GO TO to Section 3.7 3.6.2 IF employing the use of the KT Problem Analysis, THEN proceed to Step 3.6.11.
3.6.3 IF performing Complex Troubleshooting Failure Mode/Cause Table (Attachment 4), THEN DETERMINE ALL possible failure modes and ANALYZE for probable causes.
3.6.4 .LIST on Attachment 4, possible failure modes using appropriate terminology when referring to structures, systems, or components.
INFORMATION USE
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 9 OF 37 NOTE: The team should understand the design and operation of the system/components prior to listing possible failure modes. Correct terminology should be used when referring to structures, systems, or components (Slang terms, abbreviations, and acronyms can be used if defined in the document).
3.6.5 REFER to Complex Troubleshooting Failure Mode/Cause Table Example (Attachment 5) for an example.
3.6.6 RECORD problem statement in top box of failure mode tree (Attachment 4) and OBTAIN approval from the cognizant manager. (Ref. 5.4.12) 3.6.7 LIST possible failure modes in failure mode tree (Attachment 4).
3.6.8 REVIEW available information to determine if any failure modes can be eliminated.
3.6.9 IF any failure modes can be eliminated, THEN DOCUMENT the reasons on the failure mode tree (Attachment 4).
3.6.10 DEVELOP a failure mode/cause table (Attachment 4) for each remaining failure mode as follows:
- a. GENERATE a list of possible causes.
- b. DEVELOP action steps necessary to validate the cause.
3.6.11 IF using KT Problem Analysis Process, THEN perform the following:
- a. ENSURE personnel leading the KT Problem Analysis have received training in the process.
- c. Once actions to confirm true cause have been developed, attach a copy of the KT Problem Analysis form to Attachment 2, Troubleshooting Sheet, Page 1.
INFORMATION USE
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 10 OF 37 3.7 Develop Troubleshooting Plan NOTE: Since troubleshooting plans may require that systems or component remain energized to fully determine the problem, particular attention is required to determine the impact of the troubleshooting on the rest of the plant. Actions necessary to minimize impact on the plant need to be determined to prevent creating an undesired or unanalyzed equipment configuration.
These actions could be as simple as closing a valve to prevent undesired flow changes, placing a component in bypass, or complying with Technical Specification LCOs. The actions could be considerably more complex requiring review of minimum required inputs to a trip channel, identifying interlocks with other components, or assuring that design functions described in the UFSAR are not compromised.
NOTE: Each troubleshooting plan will be different, based on the type of system, the severity of the observed problem, the failure modes identified, and the potential effects of the failure modes on system performance. Level of plan detail and associated approval authority is dependent on risk, the rigor of the troubleshooting activities, and the significance of the failure. Operational risk is assessed in accordance with WM-AA-301, Operational Risk Assessment.
NOTE: Design functions of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) being relied on to support plant operation or achieve and maintain safe shutdown could be adversely impacted by the troubleshooting activity.
3.7.1 DETERMINE if any alterations (i.e. Temp Mod) made during the troubleshooting process or installation of monitoring (M&TE) equipment require additional reviews (i.e. Modification, 50.59 Applicability Review, etc.).
3.7.2 DETERMINE if detailed work instructions already exist for troubleshooting activity in procedures or work order.
3.7.3 IF detailed work instructions are needed, THEN PERFORM the following:
- a. ENSURE there is adequate instructions and precautions taken when the activity is performed to minimize the risk to the reliability to the plant.
- b. Based on the level of detail needed to perform the desired troubleshooting activity, INCLUDE detailed work instructions in Troubleshooting Sheet (Attachment 2), page 2.
INFORMATION USE
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 11 OF 37 TTL 3.7.4 ARRANGE desired actions in logical sequence considering the following:
- Most probable failure mode/cause
- Easiest actions to perform
- Risk and rigor associated with actions.
- Non-intrusive versus intrusive actions (i.e., evaluate impact on the plant)
- Parallel actions
- Use of simulator or mock-ups
- Availability of parts 3.7.5 DEVELOP troubleshooting plan to the level of detail required to control the complexity of the activity.
3.7.6 CONSIDER using a planning tool (e.g., MS Project, P3e).
3.7.7 ENSURE the initial problem statement is accurate and REVISE as necessary on Attachment 2.
3.7.8 REFER to Risk and Rigor Determination Matrix (Attachment 1), and DETERMINE risk and rigor.
INFORMATION USE
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 12 OF 37 3.8 Develop Instructions NOTE: Detailed work instructions may not require a complex troubleshooting plan.
Detailed work instructions are required for activities that pose a specific level of risk to the plant due to the system being worked on and the type of activity. Consider the potential for impact on the design functions of SSCs being relied upon to support plant operations or the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.
If detailed specific instructions are required, develop work instructions based on known evidence with guidance from plant engineer, vendor, or other technical experts as appropriate.
NOTE: The very nature of equipment failures creates the possibility that design logic is no longer valid. Consideration should be given to new or unanticipated design logic that could have been created by the failure.
NOTE: Attachment 2, page 1, is a troubleshooting sheet cover page. If the troubleshooting activity results in the necessity for more than one troubleshooting task, then page 1 may be copied and the risk and rigor determination may be revised as applicable for each task.
TTL 3.8.1 DEVELOP work instructions that describe the troubleshooting actions or steps for which approval is being requested in the Troubleshooting Sheet (Attachment 2).
TTL 3.8.2 DESCRIBE the equipment configuration limits or desirable boundaries of the troubleshooting (e.g., extent of equipment isolated, removed from service, mode inoperability, in bypass, controller in manual, etc.) to bound the effects of the troubleshooting and prevent creating an undesired or unanalyzed equipment configuration. (Attachment 2) 3.8.3 IDENTIFY the impact of the troubleshooting on plant equipment (e.g., alarms, lost indication, lost function, system flow changes, affects on adjacent equipment/systems, potential to affect reactivity by isolation of feedwater heating/control rod movement/boron dilution change or other actions, etc.). (Attachment 2) 3.8.4 DESCRIBE the expected results. (Attachment 2) 3.8.5 INCLUDE actions to address possible negative consequences in troubleshooting instructions (i.e., pump auto-starts, valve opens, breaker trips, ESF actuation, Reactor Trip/SCRAM, potential to affect reactivity by isolation of feedwater heating/control rod movement, etc.). (Attachment 2) 3.8.6 IDENTIFY any decision or stop points to evaluate progress or subsequent actions. (Attachment 2)
INFORMATION USE
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 13 OF 37 3.8.7 REVIEW the risk and rigor determination documented on the Troubleshooting Sheet (Attachment 2). ENSURE the troubleshooting plan is consistent with the rigor requirements (Attachment 1, page 4).
3.8.8 DOCUMENT any required equipment restoration actions. (Attachment 2) 3.9 Approval of Troubleshooting Plan TT 3.9.1 ENSURE PRA risk impact of the troubleshooting has been assessed and entered into the PRA for the applicable dates by Operations or O&P and DOCUMENT on Troubleshooting Sheet (Attachment 2).
TTL 3.9.2 DETERMINE from the troubleshooting approval matrix, the approval required for the troubleshooting plan and DOCUMENT approvals on Troubleshooting Sheet (Attachment 2).
Troubleshooting Approval Matrix Risk Level I (High) II (Medium) III (Low) IV (No)
Plant Manager Maintenance Maintenance N/A A
Rigor and FSRC Manager Manager Category Plant Manager Maintenance Maintenance N/A B
and FSRC Manager Manager C Plant Manager Shift Manager Shift Manager Shift Manager D Plant Manager Shift Manager Shift Manager Shift Manager Note: Matrix to be used to determine the highest level of review/approval required for the troubleshooting.
INFORMATION USE
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 14 OF 37 3.10 Execute Troubleshooting Plan CAUTION: Care should be taken while gathering evidence not to accidentally destroy other evidence.
For example, if a component needs to be disassembled, care should be taken to capture all as found conditions. Do NOT clean or de-contaminate fracture surfaces. Measurements, photographs, videotape, or other methods should be used to preserve evidence.
TT 3.10.1 IF execution of troubleshooting plan requires removal of plant equipment from service, or places the plant in an alternate plant configuration (APC),
THEN ENSURE the effect of execution of the troubleshooting plan upon risk is assessed and managed in accordance with WM-AA-20, Risk Assessment of Maintenance Activities.
3.10.2 EXECUTE the approved troubleshooting plan, as follows:
- a. DOCUMENT the following:
- Results on Troubleshooting Sheet (Attachment 2)
- Test equipment used NOTE: The TTL and troubleshooting team members must be familiar with simple and complex troubleshooting plans in order to identify a need to shift from a simple to complex troubleshooting plan.
- b. IF the need to shift to a complex troubleshooting plan is identified, THEN PERFORM the following:
- 1. STOP fieldwork.
- 2. PLACE system/plant in a safe configuration.
- 3. EVALUATE the troubleshooting plan before proceeding.
- 4. GO TO to Section 3.3.
3.11 Analyze Results TT 3.11.1 COLLECT results, data, outcomes, facts, information, etc., obtained from executing the troubleshooting plan.
3.11.2 COMPARE actual results to the expected results of the plan.
3.11.3 For simple troubleshooting, ENTER the completed results into the work package information.
INFORMATION USE
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 15 OF 37 3.11.4 For Complex Troubleshooting activities, DOCUMENT the completed results and failure mode resolution on Attachment 4, page 3, under each failure mode/cause listed.
3.11.5 IF conditions or data that can NOT be explained OR are NOT clearly understood are identified, THEN ENSURE these conditions or data are specifically identified, reviewed, and addressed by the troubleshooting team.
3.12 Failure Identification TT 3.12.1 IF the failure modes and causes are NOT clearly identified AND the problem is NOT corrected, THEN PERFORM the applicable action:
- DISCUSS problem with Operations and Engineering and APPLY requirements of Dominion Operational Decision-Making Procedure and Guidelines, or equivalent per OP-AA-101, Operational Decision Making.
- REVISE troubleshooting plan as necessary and GO TO Section 3.3.
3.13 Follow-up Actions NOTE: Follow-up actions may include:
- Laboratory analysis of failed components
- Root Cause Evaluation (RCE)
- Apparent Cause Evaluation (ACE)
- Extent of Condition implications for similar equipment
- Common Mode Failure Evaluation
- Operating or maintenance procedure changes
- Additional training or changes to existing training
- Modification or temporary modification to the plant design
- Operational Decision Making for having operated with the problem
- Vendor notification of manufacturing defects TT 3.13.1 IF a component has failed, THEN initiate any required action(s) to determine failure mechanisms.
3.13.2 During the troubleshooting process more than one failure mechanism may be identified, ENSURE all other potential failure mechanisms have been investigated and eliminated/identified prior to completion of the process.
(Ref. 5.4.11) 3.13.3 DOCUMENT follow-up actions on Troubleshooting Sheet (Attachment 2).
INFORMATION USE
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 16 OF 37 3.13.4 ENTER the applicable corrective action process and repair equipment per the Dominion Work Management Process.
3.13.5 SUBMIT Condition Reports for tracking of all unresolved items identified during troubleshooting.
3.14 Post-Job Brief TTL 3.14.1 REFER to Dominion Work Management Procedure, and CONSIDER conducting a post-job brief per WM-AA-100, Work Management.
3.15 Records Retention and Document TT 3.15.1 RETAIN documentation developed during the troubleshooting process.
3.15.2 ORGANIZE retained records in a logical manner to facilitate later review and use.
4.0 RECORDS 4.1 The following record(s) completed as a result of this procedure are required to be transmitted to Nuclear Document Management (NDM). The records have been identified and retention requirements established for the Nuclear Records Retention Schedule (NRRS) per RM-AA-101, Record Creation, Transmittal, and Retrieval.
4.1.1 Quality Assurance Records
- Troubleshooting Sheet (Attachment 2)
- Complex Troubleshooting Failure Mode/Cause Table (Attachment 4) 4.1.2 Non-Quality Assurance Records None 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION 5.1 Commitments None INFORMATION USE
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 17 OF 37 5.2 Responsibilities 5.2.1 Plant Manager The Plant Manager is responsible for:
- a. Assigning the TTL for high risk troubleshooting.
- b. Approving I-High Risk troubleshooting activities.
5.2.2 Manager Nuclear Maintenance
- a. Performing as the site owner of the troubleshooting process.
- b. The Maintenance Manager or designee assigns the Troubleshooting Team Leader (TTL) for Medium risk troubleshooting activities.
- c. Approving II Medium Risk and III Low Risk Category A or B troubleshooting activities.
5.2.3 Engineering
- a. Providing technical and equipment expertise.
- b. Maintaining cognizance of troubleshooting and repair activities.
- c. Supporting the preparation of troubleshooting plans for complex problems. The system/component engineer will most often be the technical lead on multi-discipline teams for complex issues.
- d. Assessing the risk of proposed complex troubleshooting plans and activities and ensuring the requirements of the plants design basis are incorporated, including independent collegial/challenge boards, and third party reviews
- e. Determining whether outside engineering or technical assistance is required.
- f. Maintaining current knowledge of failure mode/cause analysis techniques.
INFORMATION USE
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 18 OF 37 5.2.4 Maintenance
- a. Developing work instructions for field troubleshooting activities, including Troubleshooting Sheet (Attachment 2) as necessary, giving consideration of the ability to isolate or otherwise bound the effects of the troubleshooting from impacting the rest of the plant.
- b. Assessing the operational risk of proposed troubleshooting plans and activities in accordance with WM-AA-301 and ensuring the requirements of Dominion Work Control Process are incorporated, including pre-job and post-job briefs, Engineering reviews and required approval.
- c. Developing and executing the majority of the sites troubleshooting plans, led by a Maintenance First Line Supervisor and workers.
- d. Performing hardware troubleshooting within the skills of the craft.
- e. Ensuring a reassessment of risk is performed if an emergent troubleshooting condition results in a configuration that has not been previously assessed.
- f. Communicating troubleshooting results and engaging with Engineering, Operations, or other support groups as required.
5.2.5 Operations
- a. Evaluating equipment problems in accordance with the event response guidelines.
- b. Documenting equipment problems and initial conditions (e.g., CR/WR/
WO, Troubleshooting Sheet (Attachment 2), etc.).
- c. Reviewing Attachment 2 to ensure adequate bounds on the troubleshooting activities have been established to limit plant impact and authorizing the field troubleshooting activity.
- d. Ensuring a reassessment of PRA risk is performed if an emergent troubleshooting condition results in a configuration that has not been previously assessed.
- e. Ensuring troubleshooting plans adequately address the potential to affect core reactivity.
- f. Ensuring configuration control in accordance with the plants design basis.
- g. Ensuring that PRA risk assessment of planned or emergent troubleshooting is performed.
5.2.6 FSRC Chair Approving I-High Risk troubleshooting activities.
INFORMATION USE
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 19 OF 37 5.2.7 Troubleshooting Team Lead (TTL)
- a. Communicating troubleshooting results and involving Engineering, Operations, or other Maintenance groups when assistance is required.
- b. Coordinating the development of the troubleshooting plan and its field execution.
- c. Ensuring technical and procedural support is provided for the work activity.
- d. Assures information relating to the equipment problem symptom(s) is obtained and recorded.
- e. Checks that information on the equipment response and behavior is documented during troubleshooting activities.
- f. Checks necessary work authorizations.
- g. Ensures technical human performance rigor requirements including risk assessments, pre-job and post-job briefs, and third party reviews are considered and included as appropriate.
5.2.8 Technical Lead (TL)
- a. Supporting development and executing the troubleshooting plan for both simple and complex troubleshooting activities.
- b. Analyzing results.
- c. Identifying failure modes and recommending follow-up actions.
5.3 Definitions 5.3.1 Complex Troubleshooting Troubleshooting that requires gathering data for extensive engineering analysis, may significantly affect production/safety risk margins, or is deemed complex at management discretion.
5.3.2 Intrusive Troubleshooting Troubleshooting that requires physical connection to an electrical circuit or direct contact with the system process fluid (e.g., volt/ohm meter, chart recorder, pressure temperature gauges subjected to process fluid).
5.3.3 Non-intrusive Troubleshooting Troubleshooting that does not require physical connection to an electrical circuit or direct contact with the system process fluid (e.g., vibration diagnostic equipment, thermographic equipment, clamp on ammeter, contact pyrometer, acoustical diagnostic equipment, circuit test points).
INFORMATION USE
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 20 OF 37 5.3.4 Simple Troubleshooting This category of troubleshooting is the most common and should constitute a large fraction of all plant troubleshooting activities. It will normally be led by a Maintenance First Line Supervisor and Maintenance workers.
A troubleshooting plan that requires discovery of information prior to the development of the next step does not constitute a requirement for transition from simple to a complex troubleshooting plan. Simple troubleshooting may address several failure modes or activities due to the type and quantity of information that needs to be obtained to narrow the troubleshooting scope.
5.3.5 Technical Lead (TL)
Individual most knowledgeable or qualified to perform or assist in performance of troubleshooting. The technical lead will normally be the system engineer, component engineer, program engineer, or subject matter expert from maintenance. The TTL should not be the technical lead.
5.3.6 Troubleshooting Team (TT)
Typically a multi-discipline group consisting of personnel from Maintenance, Site Engineering, Design Engineering, and Operations assembled to solve a higher risk or complex troubleshooting problem. A team may also be formed for significant challenges such as a short-duration LCO when initial troubleshooting activities were unsuccessful or at managements discretion.
The size and makeup of the team will be driven by the needs of the station and business decisions of station management.
5.3.7 Troubleshooting Team Lead (TTL)
Individual responsible for overall condition of the troubleshooting activities and communication to the management team. For lower risk activities, the individual is the first-line supervisor. For higher risk activities where a troubleshooting team is assembled, the individual is an engineering supervisor or a maintenance second line supervisor. The Plant manager assigns the TTL for high risk troubleshooting. The Manager Nuclear Maintenance assigns the TTL for medium risk troubleshooting.
5.3.8 Kepner-Tregoes (KT) Problem Analysis A rational process for finding the cause of a negative or positive deviation.
INFORMATION USE
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 21 OF 37 5.4 References 5.4.1 EPRI Technical Report, 1003093, System and Equipment Troubleshooting Guideline 5.4.2 Dominion Cause Evaluation Program 5.4.3 OP-AA-1300, Quarantine 5.4.4 OP-AA-101, Operational Decision Making 5.4.5 WM-AA-20, Risk Assessment of Maintenance Activities 5.4.6 WM-AA-100, Work Management 5.4.7 WM-AA-301, Operational Risk Assessment 5.4.8 DNAP-3004, Dominion Program for 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48 -
Changes, Tests, and Experiments 5.4.9 GNP-04.04.01, 50.59 Applicability Review and Pre-Screening 5.4.10 NAPS CA089553, Add protected train equipment evaluation to troubleshooting sheet (from ACE014023) 5.4.11 ACE 18636, 2J EDG KW became Erratic during 2-PT-82J 5.4.12 CACC000871, Operational Risk Assessment 5.4.13 CA228865, NOD Troubleshooting Assessment 11-57-M Recommendations INFORMATION USE
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 22 OF 37 ATTACHMENT 1 (Page 1 of 4)
Risk and Rigor Determination Matrix Purpose provides an additional tool to measure risk and rigor impact during specific troubleshooting activities and is intended for use during plan development. The information contained in Attachment 1 is based on industry experience and is intended to provide a mental model for the TTL during action step development. This attachment is not designed to replace or alter any risk assessment through PRA. The TTL can use this reference to provide a level of risk and rigor to support minimizing the impact to plant systems and equipment.
Notes
- 1. These are strictly guidelines and cannot capture every troubleshooting activity. The TTL and team will have to exercise judgment to ensure a conservative decision is made during the troubleshooting approval.
- 2. It is acceptable to invoke a different level of rigor based on the plant conditions and other factors.
- 3. Particular attention is required when the troubleshooting has the potential to impact the design function and/or operational status of any structures, systems, or components that are being relied upon to support plant operation or achieve and maintain safe shutdown.
Steps for use of Attachment 1:
- 1. Review troubleshooting scope against guidelines on page 2 to determine troubleshooting risk level.
- 2. Review activity matrix on page 3 to determine the rigor category if the troubleshooting steps fall within examples provided or similar actions.
- 3. If applicable, utilize the category list on page 4 to include the level of rigor in the plan details and involvement of the personnel to minimize the risk to plant systems and personnel.
INFORMATION USE
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 23 OF 37 ATTACHMENT 1 (Page 2 of 4)
Risk and Rigor Determination Matrix based on power level given in JPM Guidelines for Level of RISK Determination this would be high risk; lower power I. HIGH RISK: level would lower risk; see JPM note Equipment is not removed from service. Presents a risk of tripping the plant, actuating a safety system, causing a significant reactivity change, or possible radiation release, either directly or as a result of causing a major plant transient.
II. MEDIUM RISK:
Equipment is not removed from service. Could result in an undesirable plant transient, affect reactivity, or a reportable event, but not a reactor trip or safety system activation.
III. LOW RISK:
Equipment is not removed from service. Could have an affect on plant equipment, but should not present a risk of causing an undesirable plant transient, reactivity change, or reportable event. No unusual personnel safety risk.
IV. NO RISK:
Equipment is removed from service. Troubleshooting activities do not affect the operation or safety of the plant.
EXAMPLE: Removing an instrument loop from service in a high-Risk classification was classified as a Category A activity. Once the loop is out of service and the device is in the shop, it can be moved to a lower risk classification. At this time the changes to the plan affecting the shop activity could be performed IAW the lesser requirements of the above table.
INFORMATION USE
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 24 OF 37 ATTACHMENT 1 As given in jpm connections (Page 3 of 4) are made on test points in rack; Risk and Rigor Determination Matrix Rigor category "A" would apply for equipment without installed TPs Rigor Category Activity I-High Risk II-Medium Risk III-Low Risk IV-No Risk Diagnostic hookup with signal injection on equipment in service which is not performing its intended A B C N/A function without approved procedures.
Diagnostic hookup with signal injection on equipment in service which is performing its intended A A B N/A function without approved procedures.
Diagnostic hookup for monitoring on equipment in service without test A A C N/A points.
Diagnostic hookup for monitoring on C C C N/A equipment in service with test points.
Removal from service without A A C N/A approved procedures.
Return to service without approved A A C N/A procedures.
Voltage/current readings on in service equipment without test A A C N/A points.
Voltage/current readings on in C C C D service equipment with test points.
Pressure/temperature/level changes A B C N/A without approved procedures.
Energized equipment that is out of service without approved C C C C procedures.
Visual inspection with barrier C C D D intrusion.
Visual inspection with no barrier D D D D intrusion.
Current readings on in-service C D D N/A equipment using a clamp-on device.
INFORMATION USE
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 25 OF 37 ATTACHMENT 1 (Page 4 of 4)
Risk and Rigor Determination Matrix Guidelines for Level of RIGOR Determination Category A (Highest degree of rigor; tightest controls)
- 1. Requires a troubleshooting plan with careful attention to risks to plant personnel and plant operation.
The troubleshooting plan may be simple or complex depending on the complexity of the issue.
- 2. Determine the level of plant management (point of contact) that will be required to approve plan changes.
- 3. If unexpected results are noted during the process of troubleshooting, notify point of contact and determine if the original plan is acceptable or should the plan be revised.
- 4. If the troubleshooting results in expanded scope of equipment that was not previously considered, the plan requires revision and re-approval through the point of contact. (i.e., The problem was not the transmitter but is suspected to be a multiple end device power supply).
- 5. SRO/management observer recommended being present during troubleshooting activities.
- 6. Control Room briefing is required.
- 7. Determine communication requirement with site leadership.
Category B
- 1. Same as A1.
- 2. Same as A2.
- 3. Same as A4.
- 4. Same as A5.
- 5. Same as A6.
- 6. Same as A7.
Category C Typically requires a simple troubleshooting plan.
Category D
- 1. Typically requires a simple troubleshooting plan.
- 2. May be performed with very little structured detail.
INFORMATION USE
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 26 OF 37 Troubleshooting Sheet MA-AA-103 - Attachment 2 Page 1 of 4 CR Number Risk Rigor Category I-High II-Medium III-Low IV-No A B C D Work Authorization (CR/WO) System Is a Complex Troubleshooting Plan required?
Yes No Component ID Operating Conditions Initial Problem Statement Name of Personnel Having Knowledge of the Problem Department Phone Number Appointed Troubleshooting Team Leader (TTL):
Troubleshooting Team Members [Identify personnel with failure modes/cause analysis training with an asterisk (*).]
Engineering Operations Maintenance Vendor Corporate O&P Project Manager Other Form No. 730600 (July 2012)
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 27 OF 37 Troubleshooting Sheet MA-AA-103 - Attachment 2 Page 2 of 4 Operations to determine the following: Operations (Initials)
- a. Troubleshooting will cause TS Equipment to become inoperable? Yes No
Describe the troubleshooting actions or steps for which approval is being requested. Include any initial observations and response completed by the Operating crew.
Troubleshooting Limits or Boundaries Describe the equipment configuration during the troubleshooting (extent of equipment isolated, removed from service, made operable, in bypass, controller in manual, etc.) to bound the effects of the troubleshooting and prevent creating an undesirable or unanalyzed equipment configuration. (Refer to MA-AA-103 Attachment 1 for additional risk and rigor consideration.)
Form No. 730600 (July 2012)
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 28 OF 37 Troubleshooting Sheet MA-AA-103 - Attachment 2 Page 3 of 4 Identify the Impact of the Troubleshooting on Plant Equipment (Alarms, Lost Indication, Lost Function, system flow changes, affects on adjacent equipment/systems, potential to affect reactivity by isolation of feedwater heating/control rod movement/boron dilution change or other means, etc. (Refer to MA-AA-103 Attachment 1 for additional risk and rigor consideration.)
Describe the expected results.
Identify any decision or stop points to evaluate progress or subsequent actions.
FSRC review required? Yes No PRA Risk evaluated by Operations or O&P? Yes Troubleshooting Team Lead (TTL) Approval, if required Troubleshooting Team Lead (TTL) Approval, if required Date (Print Name) (Signature)
Maintenance Manager/Designee Review/Approval Maintenance Manager/Designee Review/Approval Date (Mark N/A if Rigor Category C or D) (Print Name) (Mark N/A if Rigor Category C or D) (Signature)
Plant Manager (Nuclear) Approval, if required (Print Name) Plant Manager (Nuclear) Approval, if required (Signature) Date FSRC Chair Approval, if required (Print Name) FSRC Chair Approval, if required (Signature) Date Shift Manager Approval (Print Name) Shift Manager Approval (Signature) Date Form No. 730600 (July 2012)
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 29 OF 37 Troubleshooting Sheet MA-AA-103 - Attachment 2 Page 4 of 4 Results Attained Follow-up Action Required Additional sheets attached? Yes No Worker (Print Name) Worker (Signature) Date Form No. 730600 (July 2012)
INFORMATION USE
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 30 OF 37 Data G athering Checklist MA-A A -103 - A ttachm ent 3 Page 1 of 1 D ata Gathering Checklist (Mark box for data attached)
In ternal Sources:
D ocumentation R ecorded D ata Interview s Operating Logs C orrespondence Maintenance Work Packages and R ecords Internal Sources Inspection Reports Industry Bulletins Equipment H istory R ecords EPIX Records Strip Chart Recordings OE Trend Chart R ecordings Procedures and Instructions Sequence of Events R ecorders Vendor Manuals Radiological Surveys D rawings and Specifications Plant Parameter Readings Sample Analysis and R esults Post Maintenance/Mod Test R esults D esign Basis Information Previous C Rs Extern al Sou rces:
Written Statements C orrespondence PR A Industry Bulletins Part 21 R ecords Vendor Contacts R ecent Mods to SSC N RC Form No. 7 30 60 1(Sep 2 007 )
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 31 OF 37 Complex Troubleshooting Failure Mode/Cause Table MA-AA-103 - Attachment 4 Page 1 of 3 Suggested Topics/Questions To Support Complex Troubleshooting Failure Mode Analysis What is the purpose/function of the system/component? When did the failure(s) occur? How did you know for sure?
How is the system/component designed to work? Could the unwanted energy (e.g., motive power, control power, instrument air, hydraulic fluid, etc.) have been How does the system/component really work? deflected or evaded?
What components are potentially involved? Have all reasonable failure modes been identified?
How is the system/component supposed to be operated? Were adequate human factors considered in the design of the equipment?
How is the system/component really operated? Have similar failures occurred before at Dominion stations or the industry?
Are vendor operation and maintenance recommendations Is the system/component properly labeled for ease of followed? operation?
Is there sufficient technical information for operating the How was the failed component maintained?
component properly?
What is the operating history for the system/component? What is the maintenance history for the system/component?
What form of energy (e.g., motive power, control power, Is there sufficient technical information for maintaining the instrument air, hydraulic fluid, etc.) caused the first component properly?
component/subcomponent to fail?
Was this energy (e.g., motive power, control power, Did the environment (e.g., humidity, vibration, etc.) have an instrument air, hydraulic fluid, etc. supposed to be present effect on the problem?
or was it undesirable?
What failed first? Could the commercial grade dedication process have contributed to the failure(s)?
Could something have failed earlier than the time of the Could this failure affect the opposite train/unit? If not, why?
event?
Did anything else fail as a result of the first failure? Is the failure also on the opposite train/unit? What is the difference? Why is it different?
What barriers existed between the energy (e.g., motive power, control power, instrument air, hydraulic fluid, etc.)
and the first failure?
Form No. 730602(Feb 2012)
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 32 OF 37 Complex Troubleshooting Failure Mode/Cause Table MA-AA-103 - Attachment 4 Page 2 of 3 Problem Statement Manager Approval (Print/Sign) Date Failure Failure Failure Failure Mode 1 Mode 2 Mode 3 Mode 4 Form No. 730602(Feb 2012)
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 33 OF 37 Complex Troubleshooting Failure Mode/Cause Table MA-AA-103 - Attachment 4 Page 3 of 3 Failure Mode No.:
Description:
Refer to MA-AA-103 Attachment 1 for example of Expected results are based on operations risk and rigor determination for blocks below. as designed, NOT as failed.
Owner Cause(s) Validation / Action Steps Expected Actual Status Rigor (A, B, C, D, N/A)
Rigor (A, B, C, D, N/A)
Form No. 730602(Feb 2012)
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 34 OF 37 Complex Troubleshooting Failure Mode/Cause Table (Example)
MA-AA-103 - Attachment 5 Page 1 of 2 Problem Statement 1B Diesel Generator failed to start during its monthly surveillance on 2/2/98 at 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br />. Failure to start outs the station in a 7-day LCO. Its design basis is the start and commence loading within 10 seconds.
Manager Approval (Print/Sign) Date Failure Failure Failure Failure Mode 1 Mode 2 Mode 3 Mode 4 Starter Failure Fuel System Failure Control System Failure This failure mode was See attached Verified from vendor ruled out since it was failure/mode cause manual that electronic observed that the starter table. failure would not was adequately cranking preclude engine start.
the engine Form No. 730602(Feb 2012) - Example
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 35 OF 37 Complex Troubleshooting Failure Mode/Cause Table (Example)
MA-AA-103 - Attachment 5 Page 2 of 2 Failure Mode No.: 2
Description:
Fuel system failure Refer to MA-AA-103 Attachment 1 for example of Expected results are based on operations risk and rigor determination for blocks below. as designed, NOT as failed.
Owner Cause(s) Validation / Action Steps Expected Actual Status
- 1. Fuel filter plugged Run Fuel pump and check pressure drop across filter. 0-5 Psig Ops: OPEN Remove filter element and check for cleanliness. No visual signs of dirt MM: OPEN and debris.
- 2. Fuel pump broke Check discharge pressure while cranking engine. 20-30 Psig Sys Eng: OPEN Disassemble pump and inspect. No visual MM: OPEN degradation.
- 3. Plugged supply line Disconnect line before fuel pump and verify fuel Fuel flow at 1.0 gpm flow.
- 4. Lack of fuel in tank This cause was ruled out since a visual check of level Sys Eng: OPEN in the tank confirmed that adequate fuel level exists.
MM: OPEN Form No. 730602(Feb 20127) - Example INFORMATION USE
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 36 OF 37 ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 1 of 2)
Troubleshooting Flowchart Equipment Control Examples:
Subsection 3.2 - Quarrantine Problem - Document Details Identification - Preserve Materials
- Label and Save
- Environmental Conditions Subsection 3.6 Step 3.3.1 List Failure Modes Assign a TTL Is Plan Complex? Yes per Complex B Troubleshooting activity No From Page 2 Step 3.3.3 Write Problem Statement on Subsection 3.7 MA-AA-103, Att. 2 Develop Plan Step 3.3.4 Determine initial Subsection 3.8 level of Risk and Write troubleshooting If NO, THEN GO TO Subsection 3.7 Rigor instructions Step 3.4.1 Subsection 3.9 Determine if a Obtain required Simple or Complex approvals for Plan Troubleshooting Plan is required Approvals obtained?
Yes Team is required Is Plan Complex?
for Complex Plan Yes No Subsection 3.10 Execute Plan Form Team as needed To A Page 2 Subsection 3.5 Acquire information Graphics No: LP568A TROUBLESHOOTING FLOWCHART INFORMATION USE
DOMINION MA-AA-103 REVISION 9 PAGE 37 OF 37 ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 2 of 2)
Troubleshooting Flowchart From To Page 1 Page 1 A B Need to shift from Simple to Complex Plan If YES, THEN GO TO Subsection 3.3 identified?
No If NO, THEN GO TO Subsection 3.3 Subsection 3.11 Analyze results Operational Failure identified? No Decision Making (ODM) required?
Yes Subsection 3.13 Graphics No: LP568B Initiate follow-up Yes actions TROUBLESHOOTING FLOWCHART INFORMATION USE
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program INITIAL CONDITIONS
- Unit 1 is at 100% power and Unit 2 is in refueling.
- Maintenance has been performed on the actuators of 1-CH-P-1A and 2-CH-P-1A discharge MOVs.
- Prior to releasing, PMT requires each of the four (4) valves to be full stroked electrically for timing and local position indication verifications.
INITIATING CUE You have been assigned to locally observe the stroke of these valves.
Based on this assignment you have been directed to:
- 1) Identify the correct RWP and task number ___________________________________
- 2) Identify the applicable dose and rate alarms __________________________________
- 3) Identify the applicable dosimetry requirements ________________________________
AND
- 4) Assuming that each valve full stroke observation will take 10 minutes, and that you will be in the general area (1-2 feet ) of the valves while performing the task, estimate the total dose you will receive while observing the valves __________________
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program TASK Perform routine observations in the RCA.
TASK STANDARDS Given a choice of RWPs and applicable survey maps, determine correct RWP, dosimetry and associated dose & rate alarms, and estimate dose received.
K/A
REFERENCE:
G2.3.7, Ability to comply with Radiation Work Permit requirements during normal or abnormal conditions. (RO 3.5 / SRO 3.6)
ALTERNATE PATH:
N/A TASK COMPLETION TIMES Validation Time = 15 minutes Start Time = __________
Actual Time = ________ minutes Stop Time = __________
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION Rating [ ] SATISFACTORY [ ] UNSATISFACTORY Candidate (Print)
Evaluator (Print)
Evaluator's Signature / Date EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS Page 2 of 6 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 3 - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program READ THE APPLICABLE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CANDIDATE Instructions for Simulator JPMs I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.
Instructions for In-Plant JPMs I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All steps, including any required communications, shall be simulated for this JPM. Under no circumstances are you to operate any plant equipment. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.
INITIAL CONDITIONS
- Unit 1 is at 100% power and Unit 2 is in refueling.
- Maintenance has been performed on the actuators of 1-CH-P-1A and 2-CH-P-1A discharge MOVs.
- Prior to releasing, PMT requires each of the four (4) valves to be full stroked electrically for timing and local position indication verifications.
INITIATING CUE You have been assigned to locally observe the stroke of these valves.
Based on this assignment you have been directed to:
- 1) Identify the correct RWP and task number ___________________________________
- 2) Identify the applicable dose and rate alarms __________________________________
- 3) Identify the applicable dosimetry requirements ________________________________
AND
- 4) Assuming that each valve full stroke observation will take 10 minutes, and that you will be in the general area (1-2 feet ) of the valves while performing the task, estimate the total dose you will receive while observing the valves __________________
Page 3 of 6 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 3 - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program EVALUATION METHOD Demonstration if conducted in the simulator or in a laboratory (use DEMONSTRATION cues)
Verbal-visual if conducted in the station or on a dead simulator (use VERBAL-VISUAL cues)
TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT Copy of Charging Pump Area Survey Maps Copy of RWPs Calculator Page 4 of 6 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 3 - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program Start Time:
Step / Action Notes / Comments 1 Select RWP.
Procedure Step N/A Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate selects RWP 12-1207, Task #1 Step / Action Notes / Comments 2 Identify the dose and rate alarms.
Procedure Step N/A Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate identifies dose alarm 5, dose rate alarm 90.
Page 5 of 6 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 3 - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program Step / Action Notes / Comments 3 Identify the dosimetry requirements for your task.
Procedure Step N/A Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate identifies ED/SRD and TLD.
Step / Action Notes / Comments 4 Estimate total dose for the activity.
Procedure Step N/A Critical Step* SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Using the attached Survey Maps:
1-CH-P-1A:
3mrem/hr X 1hr/60min X 10min/valve X 2 valves = 1 mrem 2-CH-P-1A:
4mrem/hr X 1hr/60min X 10min/valve X 2 valves = 1.33 mrem 1 + 1.33 = 2.33 mrem Standards Candidate estimates total dose 2.33 mrem (acceptance criteria 2.3 - 2.4 based on rounding)
END OF EVALUATION Stop Time: __________
Page 6 of 6 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 3 - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program INITIAL CONDITIONS
- The Station Emergency Manager has declared a General Emergency.
- The HP Shift Supervisor reports that a release is occurring from Containment, but does not have any estimate of the magnitude.
- Emergency Response Facilities are NOT manned yet.
INITIATING CUE You are directed to perform EPIP-1.06, Protective Action Recommendations up to and including Step 5 (use real time).
Met Data is as follows:
- Average wind direction - 178°
- Average wind speed - 8.3 mph Note: Use the highlighter provided to mark the Affected Sectors Map
-- THIS IS A TIME CRITICAL TASK --
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program TASK Perform EPIP-1.06, Protective Action Recommendations.
TASK STANDARDS Given a copy of EPIP-1.06, the candidate will correctly determine the required PAR based on the information provided.
K/A
REFERENCE:
G2.4.44, Knowledge of emergency plan protective action recommendations. (3.6/3.8)
ALTERNATE PATH:
N/A TASK COMPLETION TIMES Validation Time = 10 minutes* Start Time = __________
Actual Time = ________ minutes Stop Time = __________
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION Rating [ ] SATISFACTORY [ ] UNSATISFACTORY Candidate (Print)
Evaluator (Print)
Evaluator's Signature / Date EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS
- for time critical portion; follow-up requires 2-5 minutes for a total time of ~15 minutes.
Page 2 of 7 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 4 - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program READ THE APPLICABLE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CANDIDATE Instructions for Simulator JPMs I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.
Instructions for In-Plant JPMs I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All steps, including any required communications, shall be simulated for this JPM. Under no circumstances are you to operate any plant equipment. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.
INITIAL CONDITIONS
- The Station Emergency Manager has declared a General Emergency.
- The HP Shift Supervisor reports that a release is occurring from Containment, but does not have any estimate of the magnitude.
- Emergency Response Facilities are NOT manned yet.
INITIATING CUE You are directed to perform EPIP-1.06, Protective Action Recommendations up to and including Step 5 (use real time).
Met Data is as follows:
- Average wind direction - 178°
- Average wind speed - 8.3 mph Note: Use the highlighter provided to mark the Affected Sectors Map
-- THIS IS A TIME CRITICAL TASK --
Page 3 of 7 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 4 - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program EVALUATION METHOD Demonstration if conducted in the simulator or in a laboratory (use DEMONSTRATION cues)
Verbal-visual if conducted in the station or on a dead simulator (use VERBAL-VISUAL cues)
TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT Copy of EPIP-1.06, Protective Action Recommendations Highlighter Page 4 of 7 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 4 - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program Start Time:
Step / Action Notes / Comments 1 Initiate Procedure.
Procedure Step 1 SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate enters information in step 1.
Step / Action Notes / Comments 2 Determine Initial PAR.
Procedure Step 2 Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Standards Candidate determines PAR B.
Page 5 of 7 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 4 - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program Step / Action Notes / Comments 3 Implement Attachment 4.
Procedure Step 3 Critical Step* SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Note: The specific manner used to "mark affected sectors" on attachment 4 is not critical as long as the candidate has clearly identified the correct sectors Standards Candidate completes attachment 4 per attached key Step / Action Notes / Comments 4 Complete Attachment 3.
Procedure Step 5 Critical Step* SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Note: Candidate completes Attachment 3 within 15 minutes of start time; Approval signature is NOT critical Standards Candidate enters data on Attachment 3 per the Attached Key.
Page 6 of 7 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 4 - DRAFT
North Anna Power Station Administrative Job Performance Measure (Evaluation) - Operator Program Evaluators Note:
The follow-up is NOT intended to have the candidate re-enter the procedure and complete all of the paperwork; it is intended solely as a question to solicit the candidate's knowledge of the need for an update, and the content of the update. The candidate may re-enter and perform the steps of the procedure if desired by them, or briefly explain the requirement as listed below in the standard for this element.
Step / Action Notes / Comments 5 Evaluate a change in wind direction.
Procedure Step 84 Follow-up:
When candidate completes the task (ready to submit the procedure to you) inform the candidate that this completes the time critical portion of the JPM and that you have a follow-up question.
Ask candidate assuming 30 minutes have gone by since the PAR was issued and average wind direction has changed and is now from 160°, what if any action would be required?
Critical Step SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ]
Note: Ensure candidate has their procedure to reference when answering/explaining the follow-up.
Standards Candidate explains that the PAR would have to be revised to now include Sectors Q, R, A, B based on the change in wind direction (EPIP-1.06, Step 8).
END OF EVALUATION Stop Time: __________
Page 7 of 7 NAPS 2012 NRC Exam - RETAKE Admin JPM 4 - DRAFT
KEY NORTH ANNA POWER STATION EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE NUMBER PROCEDURE TITLE REVISION 9
EPIP-1.06 PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS (WITH 6 ATTACHMENTS) PAGE 1 of 5 PURPOSE Give guidance to the Station Emergency Manager or Recovery Manager regarding determination of Protective Action Recommendations.
ENTRY CONDITIONS Any one of the following:
- 1) Activation by EPIP-1.05, RESPONSE TO GENERAL EMERGENCY.
- 2) Activation by CPIP-3.1, CERC AND CEOF ACTIVATION.
- 3) Activation by CPIP-6.0, LEOF RECOVERY MANAGER GUIDANCE.
- 4) As directed by the Station Emergency Manager or Recovery Manager.
COMMON REFERENCE USE Admin 4 - KEY
KEY NUMBER PROCEDURE TITLE REVISION 9
EPIP-1.06 PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS PAGE 2 of 5 STEP ACTION/ EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED SFO
____ 1 INITIATE PROCEDURE:
S R Allen
- By: ______________________________
12/17/2012 Date: ____________________________
1200 Time: ____________________________
SFO
____ 2 USE ATTACHMENT 2, PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION MATRIX, TO DETERMINE INITIAL PAR NOTE:
- ATTACHMENT 4, AFFECTED SECTOR(S) MAP, is to be used for all PAR developments. If more than four PARs are developed, consult with Emergency Preparedness Advisor for direction.
- ATTACHMENT 5, DOWNWIND SECTOR TABLE, may be referenced to determine wind direction compass point and affected downwind sectors.
SFO
____ 3 IMPLEMENT ATTACHMENT 4, AFFECTED SECTOR(S) MAP:
a) Record time wind data acquired a) b) Record average wind direction from, in b) degrees and compass point c) Record average wind direction to, in degrees c) and compass point d) Mark affected sectors on map (use any writing d) implement available, e.g., pen, pencil, highlighter, etc.)
e) GO TO Step 5 Admin 4 - KEY
KEY NUMBER PROCEDURE TITLE REVISION 9
EPIP-1.06 PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS PAGE 3 of 5 STEP ACTION/ EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
____ 4 UPDATE ATTACHMENT 4, AFFECTED SECTOR(S) MAP:
a) Record time wind data acquired b) Record average wind direction from, in degrees and compass point c) Record average wind direction to, in degrees and compass point d) Mark new area(s) affected on map (use distinguishable markings from previous markings):
- Include all downwind sectors from previous PARs for this event AND
- All new downwind sectors for the PAR AND
- Any downwind sectors through which the wind shift occurred SFO
____ 5 COMPLETE ATTACHMENT 3, PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION FORM:
a) Fill in Item 1 Protective Action Recommendation:
- 1) Mark appropriate PAR box(s)
- 2) Record Mile radius and Miles downwind
- 3) Record Downwind Sectors b) Sign and date form Admin 4 - KEY
KEY NUMBER PROCEDURE TITLE REVISION 9
EPIP-1.06 PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS PAGE 4 of 5 STEP ACTION/ EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
____ 6 DIRECT EMERGENCY COMMUNICATORS TO NOTIFY OFF-SITE AUTHORITIES OF PAR:
- State Emergency Operations Center notified IAW EPIP-2.01, NOTIFICATION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
- NRC notified IAW EPIP-2.02, NOTIFICATION OF NRC (notification made from Control Room or TSC, when activated)
- NRC notified IAW EPIP-4.33, HEALTH PHYSICS NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS (notifications made from TSC or LEOF/CEOF only after NRC requests HPN be established)
____ 7 HAVE RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT DIRECTOR (RAD) IMPLEMENT EPIP-4.07, PROTECTIVE MEASURES [RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT COORDINATOR (RAC) IF IN LEOF/CEOF]
Admin 4 - KEY
KEY NUMBER PROCEDURE TITLE REVISION 9
EPIP-1.06 PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS PAGE 5 of 5 STEP ACTION/ EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION: Previously issued Protective Action Recommendations should not be reduced until the threat is fully under control and after consulting with Commonwealth of Virginia emergency response organization.
____ 8 CHECK THE FOLLOWING:
IF: THEN do the following:
Protective actions in any new area(s) as RETURN TO Step 4 recommended by radiological-based PAR Average wind direction shifts to any new areas(s)
(refer to ATTACHMENT 4, AFFECTED RETURN TO Step 4 SECTOR(S) MAP)
Implementation of (Commonwealth of Virginia)
Potassium Iodide (KI) strategies for the general RETURN TO Step 5 public as recommended by radiological-based PAR PAR in effect - UNCHANGED GO TO Step 9
____ 9 CHECK EMERGENCY - TERMINATED IF RAD/RAC recommends a PAR change, THEN RETURN TO Step 8.
____ 10 TERMINATE EPIP-1.06:
- Give completed EPIP-1.06, forms, and other applicable records to TSC Emergency Procedures Coordinator or LEOF Services Coordinator
- Completed by:___________________
Date:___________________________
Time:___________________________
- END -
Admin 4 - KEY
KEY NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE ATTACHMENT EPIP-1.06 1 SECTOR MAP REVISION PAGE 9 1 of 1 669 624 651 608 613 629 629 348.75° 11.25° 648 687 608 1726 680 629 651 664 696 A
606 612 10 Miles 703 649 677 630 669 649 687 326.25° R 612 B 33.75° 1725 747 651 601 208 652 606 606 648 669 522 653 612 606 612 652 653 651 669 612 Q
719 719 721 650 C
208 208 728 606 612 659 691 643 733 701 656 651 303.75° 612 718 56.25° 7000 738 620 651 612 601 5 Miles 602 Lake Anna 667 648 612 State Park 712 208 752 669 652 Lake Anna 656 613 P D 738 647 522 208 601 719 Lake Anna 614 614 613 738 647 669 281.25° 613 2 Miles 208 689 78.75° 628 657 623 614 678 625 652 738 605 779 605 605 669 N 624 623 North Anna Power Station 614 601 605 738 605 E 604 522 720 700 628 208 670 625 700 652 622 622 658 22 33 751 605 738 258.75° 208 623 22 658 738101.25° 712 622 669 703 601 671 700 669 Louisa Lake Anna 208 666 679 M
767 Mineral 700 618 618 652 F 671 738 646 738 669 33 665 775 601 689 681 658 669 522 701 123.75° 738 236.25° 605 652 604 689 656 682 618 603 715 644 779 601 601 772 618 646 L 656 704 G
715 605 609 716 658 601 739 684 715 213.75° 612 618 146.25° 697 699 K 612 609 655 701 H673 680 729 South Anna River 680 658 640 605 522 609 J 654 680 763 738 33 191.25° 168.75°608 608 715 774 640 657 655 608 601 Graphics No. SV634A Admin 4 - KEY
KEY NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE ATTACHMENT EPIP-1.06 2 PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION MATRIX REVISION PAGE NAPS 9 1 of 1
- 1. Start with the first statement at top, left side of table below (Refer to Attachment 6, REFERENCE INFORMATION (NAPS), for additional information as needed).
- 2. Go to the COL # that provides the response to this statement (YES or NO).
- 3. IF no other responses are required in that column, THEN use the PAR at the bottom of the column.
IF another response is required in that column, THEN go to next statement at left side of table below AND RETURN TO Step 2 of this attachment.
NOTE: The radiological release related statements below do NOT apply if a radiological release is occurring due to routine, normal plant operations and NOT related to the event.
COL 1 COL 2 COL 3 COL 4 COL 5 COL 6 COL 7 COL 8 Known impediments make YES NO evacuation dangerous Radiological release is in progress or has occurred NO YES related to the event Current Dose Assessment results related to the event - NO YES AVAILABLE Dose at or beyond 2 miles either:
- > 5 Rem Thyroid CDE Dose at or beyond Site Boundary > 5 Rem YES NO Thyroid CDE Dose at or beyond Site YES NO Boundary >1 Rem TEDE Release related to the event YES NO controlled or terminated PAR A PAR B PAR B PAR C PAR D PAR B PAR A PAR B PAR A Shelter-in-place: 2 Mile radius and 5 Miles downwind.
PAR B Evacuate: 2 Mile radius and 5 Miles downwind.
PAR C Expanded Par: Derive from EPIP-4.07, PROTECTIVE MEASURES.
PAR D Evacuate: 2 Mile radius and 5 Miles downwind and recommend implementation of Potassium Iodide (KI) strategies for the general public. The projected dose at the site boundary is > 5 Rem Thyroid CDE.
Admin 4 - KEY
KEY NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE ATTACHMENT EPIP-1.06 3 PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION FORM REVISION PAGE 9 1 of 1
- 1. PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION:
[ ] SHELTER-IN-PLACE: ____ Mile radius (360 ° ) and ____ Miles downwind in the following sectors:______________________________________________.
[ ] EVACUATE: ____ 5 Miles downwind in the following sectors:
2 Mile radius (360 ° ) and ____
R, A, B
[ ] BEYOND 10 MILE EPZ: (Data obtained from Radiological Assessment Director (RAD) or Radiological Assessment Coordinator (RAC)[derived from EPIP-4.07, PROTECTIVE MEASURES])
[ ] Evacuate Area: _____ Centerline in degrees; _____Distance in Miles; _____ Width in feet
[ ] Shelter-in-place: ____ Centerline in degrees; _____Distance in Miles; _____ Width in feet
[ ] POTASSIUM IODIDE:
Recommend implementation of Potassium Iodide (KI) strategies for the general public. The projected dose at the site boundary is > 5 Rem Thyroid CDE.
- 2. S R Allen APPROVED BY: _______________________________________ 12/17/2012 1210
__________/__________
Station Emergency Manager or Date / Time Recovery Manager Admin 4 - KEY
KEY NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE ATTACHMENT EPIP-1.06 4 AFFECTED SECTOR(S) MAP REVISION PAGE 9 1 of 1 Average Wind Direction and Average Wind Speed Data:
1200 At ___________, 178 wind direction from _______________(_________) S 358 into ______________(_________) N 8.3 mph.
at ______
(24-hr time) in degrees (compass pt) in degrees (compass pt)
At ___________, wind direction from _______________(_________) into ______________(_________) at ______ mph.
(24-hr time) in degrees (compass pt) in degrees (compass pt)
At ___________, wind direction from _______________(_________) into ______________(_________) at ______ mph.
(24-hr time) in degrees (compass pt) in degrees (compass pt)
At ___________, wind direction from _______________(_________) into ______________(_________) at ______ mph.
(24-hr time) in degrees (compass pt) in degrees (compass pt) par revised to A
include sector R 348.75° 11.25° B Q based on 326.25° change in wind 33.75° direction Q C 56.25° 303.75° D
P 78.75° 281.25° N E 2
101.25° 258.75° 5
M F 123.75° 236.25° L 10 G 213.75° 146.25° K 191.25° 168.75° H J Graphics No. SB1217E Admin 4 - KEY
KEY NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE ATTACHMENT EPIP-1.06 5 DOWNWIND SECTOR TABLE REVISION PAGE 9 1 of 1 NOTE: Rounding shall be used when determining affected sectors using wind direction.
For example: Wind Direction (degrees from) 11.5 to 11.9 shall be rounded up to 12.0.
Wind Direction (degrees from) 11.1 to 11.4 shall be rounded down to 11.0.
AVERAGE WIND DIRECTION COMPASS AFFECTED (Degrees) POINT SECTORS From To From To 349 - 11 169 - 191 N S H, J, K 12 - 33 192 - 213 NNE SSW J, K, L 34 - 56 214 - 236 NE SW K, L, M 57 - 78 237 - 258 ENE WSW L, M, N 79 - 101 259 - 281 E W M, N, P 102 - 123 282 - 303 ESE WNW N, P, Q 124 - 146 304 - 326 SE NW P, Q, R change in wind 147 - 168 327 - 348 SSE NNW Q, R, A direction 169 - 191 349 - 11 S N R, A, B 192 - 213 12 - 33 SSW NNE A, B, C 214 - 236 34 - 56 SW NE B, C, D 237 - 258 57 - 78 WSW ENE C, D, E 259 - 281 79 - 101 W E D, E, F 282 - 303 102 - 123 WNW ESE E, F, G 304 - 326 124 - 146 NW SE F, G, H 327 - 348 147 - 168 NNW SSE G, H, J Admin 4 - KEY
KEY NUMBER ATTACHMENT TITLE ATTACHMENT EPIP-1.06 6 REFERENCE INFORMATION REVISION PAGE (NAPS) 9 1 of 1 Refers to already known conditions, for example:
- Severe weather such as hurricanes, tornados, flooding, or blizzards.
- Traffic issues such as inadequate roads, major accident(s).
KNOWN EVACUATION
- An attack on an off-site infrastructure such as water, power IMPEDIMENTS: lines, transportation, communication systems, public institutions including schools, post offices and prisons.
It is not expected that Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) development be delayed by attempting to obtain information from outside resources.
The initial PAR must be included with the initial notification of a General Emergency, which must be made to the State within 15 minutes PAR NOTIFICATION following declaration of the General Emergency.
TIMES:
Notification of a revised PAR must be made to the State within 15 minutes of its development.
Downwind sectors may be determined from Attachment 4, Downwind SECTORS/ Sector Table.
WIND DIRECTION:
Wind direction is always given in degrees from.
There is no dose threshold for recommending sheltering-in-place.
Sheltering-in-place may be recommended as a result of controlled releases, evacuation impediments or other known conditions which SHELTERING make evacuation dangerous.
IN PLACE: A controlled release is a short-term release, which is a controlled evolution and the release duration can be accurately determined (such as containment venting).
Previously issued Protective Action Recommendations should not be PREVIOUSLY reduced until the threat is fully under control and after consulting with ISSUED PAR: Commonwealth of Virginia emergency response organization.
Admin 4 - KEY