IR 05000338/2011013

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IR 05000338-11-013 & 05000339-11-013; Virginia Electric and Power Company (Vepco); 11/11-29/2011; North Anna Power Station Units 1 & 2, NRC Startup Monitoring Team Inspection Report
ML113540520
Person / Time
Site: North Anna  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 12/20/2011
From: Gerald Mccoy
NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB5
To: Heacock D
Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
References
IR-11-013
Download: ML113540520 (18)
v • d • e


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ber 20, 2011

SUBJECT:

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - NRC STARTUP MONITORING TEAM INSPECTION REPORT 05000338/2011013 AND 05000339/2011013

Dear Mr. Heacock:

On November 29, 2011, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a startup monitoring inspection at your North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on November 29, 2011, with Mr. Larry Lane and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they related to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your licenses. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified. The team concluded that your processes ensured that the plant licensing bases had not been degraded and the structures, systems, and components (SSC) of the North Anna Power Station could perform their safety functions following the earthquake event on August 23, 2011, and would support a return to safe power operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. The inspection team completed this verification through observation of control room activities and direct inspection of startup activities; including, mode changes, heatup, reactor startup, and power ascension from Mode 5 to rated thermal power. It also included direct inspection of surveillance testing, operability determinations, maintenance risk assessment, emergent work control, modifications, post-maintenance testing, review of corrective action program documents, partial system walkdowns of selected SSCs, including secondary systems, and other activities as applicable.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the

VEPCO 2 NRCs Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Gerald J. McCoy, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-338, 50-339 License Nos. NPF-4, NPF-7

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000338/2011013 and 05000339/2011013 w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket Nos.: 50-338, 50-339 License Nos.: NPF-4, NPF-7 Report No: 05000338/2011013 and 05000339/2011013 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)

Facility: North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2 Location: 1022 Haley Drive Mineral, Virginia 23117 Dates: November 11, 2011 through November 29, 2011 Inspectors: R. Clagg, Resident Inspector, North Anna Power Station (Team Leader)

R. Cureton, Resident Inspector, Catawba Nuclear Station J. Heath, Resident Inspector, McGuire Nuclear Station G. Kolcum, Senior Resident Inspector, North Anna Power Station J. Reece, Senior Resident Inspector, V.C. Summer Nuclear Station C. Scott, Resident Inspector, H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Accompanied By: M. Yoo, Nuclear Safety Professional Development Program (Training)

Approved by: Gerald J. McCoy, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000338/2011013, 05000339/2011013; 11/11/2011 - 11/29/2011; North Anna Power

Station, Units 1 and 2; Startup Monitoring Inspection.

The report covered approximately a 2 week period of inspection by two senior resident and four resident inspectors from the region. No findings were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.

The team concluded that your processes ensured that the plant licensing bases had not been degraded and the structures, systems, and components (SSC) of the North Anna Power Station could perform their safety functions following the August 23, 2011, earthquake event and would support a return to safe power operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. The inspection team completed this verification through observation of control room activities and direct inspection of startup activities; including, mode changes, heatup, reactor startup, and power ascension from Mode 5 to rated thermal power. It also included direct inspection of surveillance testing, operability determinations, maintenance risk assessment, emergent work control, modifications, post-maintenance testing, review of corrective action program documents, partial system walkdowns of selected SSCs, including secondary systems, and other activities as applicable.

NRC Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings were identified.

Licensee Identified Violations

No findings were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 began the report period in a forced outage stemming from an August 23, 2011, seismic event and a loss of all offsite power. Unit 1 commenced reactor startup activities and ended the period at full rated thermal power (RTP).

Unit 2 began the report period in a planned refueling outage that was entered following a forced outage which stemmed from an August 23, 2011, seismic event and a loss of all offsite power.

Unit 2 commenced reactor startup activities and ended the period at full RTP.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted 29 equipment alignment partial walkdowns to evaluate the operability of selected systems. The inspectors reviewed the functional systems descriptions, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), system operating procedures, and Technical Specifications (TS) to determine correct system lineups for the current plant conditions. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the systems to verify that critical components were properly aligned and to identify any discrepancies which could affect operability of the system.

  • Alternate AC Diesel Generator System
  • Unit 1 Safety Injection System
  • Unit 1 Control Room Ventilation System
  • Unit 1 Vital and Emergency Electrical Distribution System
  • Unit 1 Component Cooling Water System
  • Unit 1 Chemical and Volume Control System
  • Unit 2 Safety Injection System
  • Unit 2 Control Room Ventilation System
  • Unit 2 Vital and Emergency Electrical Distribution System
  • Unit 2 Component Cooling Water System
  • Unit 2 Chemical and Volume Control System

b. Findings

No findings were identified

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, the two activities listed below for the following:

(1) effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities were conducted;
(2) management of risk;
(3) upon identification of an unforeseen situation, necessary steps were taken to plan and control the resulting emergent work activities; and
(4) maintenance risk assessments and emergent work problems were adequately identified and resolved. The inspectors verified that the licensee was in compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) and the data output from the licensees safety monitor associated with the risk profile of Units 1 and 2.
  • Emergent maintenance for Unit 1 A Steam Generator Level perturbations on Channels 1 and 3.
  • Emergency maintenance for Unit 2 control rod K8 failure to move during testing

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed two operability evaluations, listed below, affecting risk-significant mitigating systems, to assess, as appropriate:

(1) the technical adequacy of the evaluations;
(2) whether continued system operability was warranted;
(3) whether other existing degraded conditions were considered as compensating measures; (4)whether the compensatory measures, if involved, were in place, would work as intended, and were appropriately controlled; and
(5) where continued operability was considered unjustified, the impact on TS Limiting Conditions for Operation and the risk significance in accordance with the Significant Determination Process. The inspectors review included a verification that operability determinations (OD) were made as specified by procedure OP-AA-102, Operability Determination, Revision 6.
  • OD000460, "Evaluate source range operability with current SR counts difference between two channels"

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a temporary modification TM-1845, Installation of an Uninterruptible Power Supply on Earthquake Monitoring Panel 1-EI-CB-151 to verify that the modification did not impact operability or availability as described by the TS and UFSAR. In addition, the inspectors verified that the temporary modification was in accordance with Virginia Power Administrative Procedure (VPAP)-1403, Temporary Modifications, Revision 13, and the related work package, that adequate controls were in place, procedures and drawings were updated, and post-installation tests verified the operability of the affected systems.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed four post maintenance test procedures and/or test activities for selected risk-significant mitigating systems listed below, to assess whether:

(1) the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and/or engineering personnel;
(2) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; (3)acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents;
(4) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range, and accuracy consistent with the application;
(5) tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied;
(6) jumpers installed or leads lifted were properly controlled;
(7) test equipment was removed following testing; and
(8) equipment was returned to the status required to perform in accordance with VPAP-2003, Post Maintenance Testing Program, Revision 13.
  • WO59102351084, Perform weld build up and machining of seat ring landing for the Unit 1 turbine driven AFW pump steam supply valve, 01-MS-TV-111B

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the Outage Safety Review (OSR) and contingency plans for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 reactor restart, following the unplanned shutdown August 23, 2011, due to a seismic event, to confirm that the licensee had appropriately considered risk, industry experience, and previous site-specific problems in developing and implementing a plan that assured maintenance of defense-in-depth. The inspectors used inspection procedure 71111.20, Refueling and Outage Activities, to observe portions of the start-up activities to verify that the licensee maintained defense-in-depth commensurate with the outage risk plan and applicable TS. The inspectors monitored licensee controls over the outage activities listed below.

  • Licensee configuration management, including daily outage reports, to evaluate maintenance of defense-in-depth commensurate with the OSR for key safety functions and compliance with the applicable TS when taking equipment out of service
  • Implementation of clearance activities and confirmation that tags were properly hung and equipment appropriately configured to safely support work or testing
  • Installation and configuration of reactor coolant pressure, level, and temperature instruments to provide accurate indication and an accounting for instrument error
  • Controls over the status and configuration of electrical systems to ensure that technical specification and outage safety plan requirements were met, including controls over switchyard activities
  • Controls over activities that could affect reactivity
  • Startup and ascension to full power operation, tracking of startup prerequisites, walkdown of the reactor containment and reactor physics testing
  • Licensee control of containment penetrations in accordance with applicable technical specifications
  • Licensee identification and resolution of problems related to refueling outage activities.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

For the 26 surveillance tests listed below, the inspectors examined the test procedures, witnessed testing, or reviewed test records and data packages, to determine whether the scope of testing adequately demonstrated that the affected equipment was functional and operable, and that the surveillance requirements of TS were met. The inspectors also determined whether the testing effectively demonstrated that the systems or components were operationally ready and capable of performing their intended safety functions.

  • 0-PT-82.13, Quarterly Test of 0-AAC-DG-OM, Alternate AC Diesel Generator (SBO Diesel), On F Transfer Bus, Revision 23
  • 1-GEP-21.1, Reactor Core Flux Mapping, Revision 4
  • 1-PT-17.2, Rod Drop Time Measurement, Revision 42
  • 1-PT-20.1, Axial Flux Difference (AFD) - Weekly and Special, Revision 19
  • 1-PT-21.2, Hot Channel Factors, Revision 20
  • 1-PT-21.4, Intermediate Range Trip Setpoint Determination, Revision 15
  • 1-PT-23, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio Determination, Revision 29
  • 1-PT-41.1, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Monitoring Instrumentation - Channel Check, Revision 40
  • 1-PT-41.3, Safe Shutdown Equipment Control Verification, Revision 10
  • 1-PT-52.1, Measurement of RCP Seal Injection Flow, Revision 6
  • 1-PT-56.2, Accumulator Isolation Valve Breaker Position Verification, Revision 7
  • 1-PT-71.2Q, 1-FW-P-3A, A Motor Driven AFW Pump and Valve Test, Revision 39
  • 2-GEP-21.1, Reactor Core Flux Mapping, Revision 6
  • 2-PT-17.2, Rod Drop Time Measurement, Revision 39
  • 2-PT-24.1, Calorimetric Heat Balance (Computer Calculation), Revision 27
  • 2-PT-34.3, Turbine Valve Freedom Test, Revision 42
  • 2-PT-56.2, Accumulator Isolation Valve Breaker Position Verification, Revision 10
  • 2-PT-61.4, RCS Pressure Isolation Valves - Leakage Test, Revision 24
  • 2-PT-61.5, RHR Valves - Leakage Test, Revision 9
  • 2-PT-71.12, AFW System Valve Position Verification, Revision 5
  • 2-PT-71.3Q, 2-FW-P-3B, B Motor Driven AFW Pump and Valve Test, Revision 39
  • 2-PT-213.1, Valve Inservice Inspection (Blowdown System), Revision 19

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

.1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

a. Inspection Scope

As required by inspection procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees corrective action program. This review was accomplished by reviewing daily condition report (CR) summaries and periodically attending daily CR review team meetings.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On November 29, 2011, the team leader presented the inspection results to Mr. Larry Lane and other members of the staff, who acknowledged the results. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

M. Becker, Manager, Nuclear Outage and Planning
M. Crist, Plant Manager
J. Daugherty, Manager, Nuclear Maintenance
R. Evans, Manager, Radiological Protection
C. Gum, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services
E. Hendrixson, Director, Nuclear Engineering
S. Hughes, Manager, Nuclear Operations
L. Lane, Site Vice President
J. Leberstien, Technical Advisor Licensing
P. Kemp, Project Manager, Station Improvement Initiatives
F. Mladen, Director, Nuclear Safety and Licensing
J. Plossl, Supervisor, Nuclear Station Procedures
B. Gaspar, Manager, Nuclear Site Services
J. Schlesser, Manager, Nuclear Organizational Effectiveness
D. Taylor, Supervisor, Station Licensing
R. Wesley, Manager, Nuclear Training
M. Whalen, Technical Advisor Licensing

LIST OF ITEMS

OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None

Opened and Closed

None

Discussed

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

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