ML113260577

Issuance of Amendment 128 Regarding Containment Spray Nozzles Surveillance Requirement

ML113260577
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	01/30/2012
From:	John Lamb Plant Licensing Branch 1
To:	Freeman P, O'Keefe M NextEra Energy Seabrook
Lamb J, NRR/DORL, 301-415-3100
References
TAC ME6726
Download: ML113260577 (15)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 January 30, 2012 Mr. Paul Freeman Site Vice President clo Michael O'Keefe Seabrook Station NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC P.O. Box 300 Seabrook, NH 03874

SUBJECT:

SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO.1-ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT REGARDING CONTAINMENT SPRAY NOZZLES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (TAC NO. ME6726)

Dear Mr. Freeman:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 128 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-86 for the Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1 (Seabrook). This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) surveillance requirement 4.6.2.1.d in response to your application dated July 14, 2011, as supplemented November 11,2011.

The amendment replaces the TS surveillance 4.6.2.1.d 1 O-year surveillance frequency for testing the containment spray nozzles with an event-based frequency.

A copy of our safety evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

G. Lamb, Senior Project Manager t Licensing Branch 1-2 Di sion of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-443

Enclosures:

1. Amendment NO.128 to NPF-86

2. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 NEXTERA ENERGY SEABROOK, LLC, ET AL.*

DOCKET NO. 50-443 SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO.1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 128 License No. NPF-86

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment filed by NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC, et ai.,

(the licensee) dated July 14, 2011, as supplemented November 11,2011, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

• NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC is authorized to act as agent for the: Hudson Light & Power Department, Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company, and Taunton Municipal Light Plant and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation and maintenance of the facility.

- 2

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-86 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2)

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 128, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B are incorporated into the Facility License No. NPF-86.

NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 90 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Meena Khanna, Chief Plant Licensing Branch 1-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the License and Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: January 30, 2012

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO'128 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-86 DOCKET NO. 50-443 Replace the following page of Facility Operating License No. NPF-86 with the attached revised page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains a marginal line indicating the area of change.

Remove 3

3 Replace the following page of the Appendix A. Technical Specifications, with the attached revised page as indicated. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove 3/46-14 3/46-14

- 3 (4)

NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR 30, 40, and 70, to receive, possess, and use at any time any byproduct, source, and special nuclear material as sealed neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed sources for reactor instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibration, and as fission detectors in amounts as required; (5)

NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR 30, 40, and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source, or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; (6)

NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR 30, 40, and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility authorized herein; and (7)

DELETED C.

This license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:

(1)

Maximum Power Level NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC, is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of 3648 megawatts thermal (100% of rated power).

(2)

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 128 *, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B are incorporated into the Facility License No. NPF-86. NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

(3)

License Transfer to FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC**

a.

On the closing date(s) of the transfer of any ownership interests in Seabrook Station covered by the Order approving the transfer, FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC**, shall obtain from each respective transferring owner all of the accumulated decommissioning trust funds for the facility, and ensure the deposit of such funds and additional funds, if necessary, into a decommissioning trust or trusts for Seabrook Station established by FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC**, such that the amount of such funds deposited meets or exceeds the amount required under 10 CFR 50.75 with respect to the interest in Seabrook Station FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC**,

acquires on such dates(s).

• Implemented

• • On April 16, 2009, the name "FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC" was changed to "NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC".

AMENDMENT NO.128

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR 3.6.2.1 Two independent Containment Spray Systems shall be OPERABLE with each Spray System capable of taking suction from the RWST* and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one Containment Spray System inoperable, restore the inoperable Spray System to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore the inoperable Spray System to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.2.1 Each Containment Spray System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position;

b.

By verifying OPERABILITY of each pump when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5;

c.

At least once per 18 months during shutdown. by:

1)

Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Containment Pressure-Hi-3 test signal, and

2)

Verifying that each spray pump starts automatically on a Containment Pressure-Hi-3 test signal.

d.

By verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed following activities that could result in nozzle blockage.

• In MODE 4, when the Residual Heat Removal System is in operation, an OPERABLE flow path is one that is capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank upon being manually realigned.

SEABROOK - UNIT 1 3/46-14 Amendment No. 30, QO, 128

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 128 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-86 SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO.1 DOCKET NO. 50-443

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated July 14, 2011,1 as supplemented November 11, 2011,2 NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC (NextEra or the licensee) submitted license amendment request (LAR) LAR 11 03 to revise the technical specifications (TSs) for Seabrook Station, Unit No.1 (Seabrook). The proposed LAR would replace the 1 O-year surveillance frequency for testing the containment spray nozzles in accordance with TS surveillance requirement (SR) 4.6.2.1.d with an event based frequency.

The supplemental letter provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register on September 6, 2011 (76 FR 55130).

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

The NRC's regulatory requirements related to the content of the TSs are set forth in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.36, "Technical specifications." This regulation requires that the TSs include items in the following five specific categories: (1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings; (2) limiting conditions for operation (LeOs); (3) SRs; (4) design features; and (5) administrative controls. The regulation does not specify the-particular requirements to be included in a plant's TSs.

Seabrook design and construction was in conformance with 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix A, "General Design Criteria (GDC) for Nuclear Plants," as described in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).

General Design Criterion 38, "Containment heat removal," states a system to remove heat from the reactor containment shall be provided. The system safety function shall be to reduce rapidly, consistent with the functioning of other associated systems, the containment pressure and temperature following any loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) and maintain them at acceptably low levels.

1Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML11203A020.

2 ADAMS Accession No. ML11320A279.

- 2 General Design Criterion 39, "Inspection of containment heat removal system," states the containment heat removal system shall be designed to permit appropriate periodic inspection of important components, such as the torus, sumps, spray nozzles, and piping to assure the integrity and capability of the system.

General Design Criterion 40, "Testing of containment heat removal system," states the containment heat removal system shall be designed to permit appropriate periodic pressure and functional testing to assure (1) the structural and leaktight integrity of its components, (2) the operability and performance of the active components of the system, and (3) the operability of the system as a whole, and under conditions as close to the design as practical the performance of the full operational sequence that brings the system into operation, including operation of applicable portions of the protection system, the transfer between normal and emergency power sources, and the operation of the associated cooling water system.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

3.1 System Information The containment is maintained below design pressure following a primary or secondary system line rupture by the parallel action of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and the containment building spray (CBS) system, which comprise the containment heat removal system discussed in the Seabrook UFSAR. The CBS system is designed to remove the energy discharged to the containment following a LOCA or main steam line break (MSLB) to prevent the containment pressure from exceeding design pressure and to reduce and maintain containment temperature and pressure within acceptable limits. The ECCS system and CBS system are comprised of two identical trains, each train independent of the other and fully redundant. Failure of a single active component will not cause the loss of more than half of either system's 200-percent heat removal capacity.

The CBS system is comprised of the CBS pumps, heat exchangers, spray headers and nozzles, the refueling water storage tank (RWST), the spray additive tank (SAT), and the containment recirculation sumps along with the interconnecting piping and valves and associated instrumentation and controls. The CBS spray headers and nozzles are positioned in the containment dome to maximize coverage of the containment volume. Four separate headers (two for each train) are utilized to obtain distribution of the flow. Each train contains 198 nozzles with each nozzle providing a design flow of 15.2 gallons per minute. The containment spray headers and nozzles are fabricated of austenitic stainless steel.

The CBS system is actuated by a containment spray actuation signal, which is initiated by high pressure in the containment. The CBS system pumps deliver water from the RWST to the spray nozzles located high in the containment building. Throughout the injection phase, the CBS pumps deliver water from the RWST through the CBS heat exchangers to the spray nozzles in containment. A low-low level signal from the RWST initiates the recirculation mode of operation, and the suctions of the residual heat removal (RHR) and the CBS pumps automatically realign to the containment recirculation sumps. Throughout the recirculation mode, the CBS pumps take suction from the water in the containment recirculation sumps and discharge through the CBS heat exchangers to the containment spray nozzles and into the containment.

- 3 3.2 Proposed Change The proposed change revises the TS for the containment CBS system. The current SR 4.6.2.1.d requires performing an air or smoke test through each containment spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed at least once every 10 years. NextEra proposes to replace the fixed 10-year interval with an event-based frequency.

The current SR 4.6.2.1.d states:

At least once per 10 years by performing an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.

The proposed SR 4.6.2.1.d states:

By verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed following activities that could result in nozzle blockage.

3.2 NUREG-1024 In August 1983. an NRC task group was formed to investigate problems with surveillance testing required by TSs, and to recommend approaches to effect improvements. NUREG-1024.

"Technical Specifications - Enhancing Safety Impact." resulted. and it contained recommendations to review the basis for test frequencies; to ensure that the tests promote safety and do not degrade equipment; and to review surveillance tests so that they do not unnecessarily burden personnel.

3.3 NUREG-1366 The proposed TS change is also based on the information contained in NUREG-1366, "Improvements to Technical SpeCifications Surveillance Requirements," dated December 1992.

NUREG-1366 documents the review of containment spray system experience throughout the industry with the conclusion that nearly all spray nozzle obstruction events were related to original construction foreign material left in the system. Periodic testing. as of the date of NUREG-1366. revealed the legacy of foreign material within the containment spray systems.

3.4 Generic Letter 1993-05 The proposed change to the TSs expands on the earlier extension of the test interval from 5 to 10 years based on Generic Letter (GL) 1993-05. "Line-Item Technical Specifications Improvements to Reduce Surveillance Requirements for Testing During Power Operation,"

dated September 27. 1993.3 GL 1993-05 recommended. "[t]he surveillance interval [air or smoke flow test] should be extended to 10 years [for the Containment Spray System].

3 ADAMS Accession No. ML031070342.

-4 3.5 NUREG-1431 In addition, the proposed SR is similar to SR 3.6.6.8 of NUREG-1431, "Standard Technical Specifications - Westinghouse Plants," that states:

Verify each spray nozzle is unobstructed.

Performing the nozzle tests involves personnel radiation dose, industrial safety hazards, potential for inadvertent introduction of foreign material into the systems, and potential for improper realignment of the systems after a test. These consequences or the potential for adverse consequences could be reduced if very low value testing is avoided.

3.6 Precedents The NRC staff has approved similar license amendments including:

(1)

Clinton Power Station, Unit 1, issued March 28,2002;4 (2)

H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2, issued September 19, 2002;5 (3)

Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, issued September 22,2003;6 (4)

Millstone Power Station, Unit 3, issued May 31, 2005;7 (5)

Millstone Power Station, Unit 2, issued March 31, 2008;8 (6)

Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1, issued July 9, 2008;9 (7)

Prairie Island Units, 1 and 2, issued November 6, 2008; 10 and, (8)

Catawba, McGuire, and Oconee Stations, issued August 24,2010. 11 3.7 Industry Experience An NRC staff review of industry experience by searches of the Licensee Event Report databases indicates that spray systems of similar design are highly reliable (Le., not susceptible to spray nozzle obstructions). The NRC staff found that, with a few exceptions, once successfully tested after construction, containment spray nozzles have not been subject to blockage. There have been very few exceptions.

In October 1973 at Rancho Seco, painters who were painting the reactor building, covered up nozzles of the reactor building spray system and did not subsequently remove tape from 16 of 199 nozzles. Only 4 nozzles had tape over spray openings.

• In August 1978 at Turkey Point 4, while preparing for a spray nozzle test, the licensee discovered that the restricting orifices were not installed in the branch connections from 4 ADAMS Accession No. ML021080020.

5 ADAMS Accession No. ML022690767.

6 ADAMS Accession No. ML032470096.

7ADAMS Accession No. ML050670028.

8 ADAMS Accession No. ML080720304.

9 ADAMS Accession No. ML081540218.

10 ADAMS Accession No. ML082740226.

11 ADAMS Accession No. ML100690007.

- 5 the containment spray headers to the emergency filter spray system. The Unit 3 orifices were verified in place.

In January 1982 at Farley 1, certain containment spray header nozzles were found to be oriented incorrectly or positioned on the header incorrectly. Also, two nozzles were not installed due to interference. Analysis showed that peak containment temperature would not have been affected.

In June 1991 at San Onofre Unit 1, the licensee reported that a containment spray system (CSS) air flow test indicated that several nozzles were blocked. The licensee investigated and found that seven nozzles were clogged with sodium silicate, a coating material that was applied to the carbon steel CSS piping in 1977. The licensee conducted air flow tests in 1980, 1983, and 1988 and obtained acceptable results.

3.8 Seabrook Operating Experience The licensee stated that the containment and reactor building spray system nozzles of these facilities have been pre-operationally inspected and tested in 1986 and subsequently periodically tested twice (in August 1991 and May 2002) with no indication of obstruction.

The licensee stated in the application that their foreign material exclusion (FME) controls provide assurance that the potential for nozzle obstruction will continue to be low. The licensee also indicated that should foreign material with the potential for spray nozzle obstruction be discovered, their corrective action program would direct that the extent of condition be evaluated, and would lead to restoration of cleanliness and a determination as to the need for nozzle testing.

NextEra performed a review of maintenance performed on the CBS system since the last containment spray nozzle test in refueling outage 8 in May 2002. The NextEra review identified one issue involving FME that impacted the CBS system. During installation of a new vent valve (CBS-V-178) by NextEra personnel, the purge dam pipe became detached from the argon hose and fell into the piping. This issue was documented in the Seabrook corrective action program, and in accordance with the FME program, a recovery plan was developed. The purge dam pipe was retrieved, and an internal FME inspection was performed by NextEra personnel.

Identification of the FME issue, development of a recovery plan, and successful retrieval of the purge dam pipe indicates that NextEra has an effective FME program.

3.9 Nozzle Blockage Mechanisms NUREG-1366, "Improvements to Technical Specifications Surveillance Requirements," reported the results of an NRC staff review of industry experience related to problems with CBS systems.

The report found that, in general, once the systems are tested after construction, they are not subject to blockage. The problems regarding nozzle blockage identified in the report were related to construction activities.

If system materials of construction do not support accumulation of corrosion or coating products within the system, the spray nozzles are unlikely to become obstructed as a result of passive weathering with the passage of time. Periodic testing is unlikely to reveal obstructions, without:

(1) a loss of foreign material control during maintenance; or (2) a system actuation and water

- 6 flow that could entrain, and transport the foreign material to the headers, or nozzles, or deposit boric acid crystal residue in the headers.

One postulated mechanism for blockage of spray nozzles is corrosion products. Another mechanism for nozzle blockage is accumulation of solid boric acid in the spray lines or nozzles due to evaporated borated water.

3.10 Foreign Material Exclusion (FME) Program According to the licensee, the Seabrook FME program is governed by Fleet Procedure MA-AA 101-1000, "Foreign Material Exclusion Procedure." This procedure ensures that appropriate precautions are taken to minimize inadvertent and uncontrolled introduction of foreign materials into plant systems and components. Breached fluid or piping systems shall be covered where possible, except when the specific opening is attended or work, inspection, testing, sampling, or surveying is in progress that requires the removal of the FME cover.

The procedure also includes FME practices for maintaining cleanliness of plant systems and components during Seabrook maintenance activities that create debris, such as welding and grinding. Final cleanliness inspections by NextEra personnel verify the system, component, or process is free of foreign material prior to final closure.

NextEra's corrective action process is used in the event of a loss of FME integrity. If FME integrity is lost through the intrusion or discovery of foreign material, the procedure directs the worker to notify the work group supervisor or designee to develop a recovery plan for the foreign material. The recovery plan includes the following considerations: methods to save recovered materials for further analysis, determination of the source, location, and quantity of foreign material; determination of the need for additional inspections; and evaluation of possible equipment damage already caused or that may be caused by the foreign material.

During maintenance activities on the CBS system since the last containment spray nozzles test, work practices and post work inspections maintained system cleanliness according to NextEra.

There have been no work activities on any of the containment spray nozzles or headers since the last containment spray nozzle test according to the licensee.

NextEra's administrative controls for FME ensure that foreign material is excluded from systems during maintenance activities, and these controls would be in place with the CBS system open for maintenance. Therefore, the Seabrook FME program provides reasonable assurance that debris or foreign matter that could adversely affect the CBS system's ability to perform its safety function would not be left in the system as a result of maintenance activities.

3.11 NRC Staff Technical Review Summarv One postulated mechanism for blockage of spray nozzles is corrosion products. The containment spray headers and nozzles, however, are fabricated of austenitic stainless steel at Seabrook. Therefore, blockage of the spray nozzles from corrosion products is unlikely.

- 7 Another mechanism for nozzle blockage is accumulation of solid boric acid in the spray lines or nozzles due to evaporated borated water. The CBS spray headers are normally maintained dry and isolated from water by normally closed containment isolation valves that are subject to Type C leakage testing. During refueling outages, the spray ring manual isolation valves are locked closed to ensure that inadvertent spray actuation cannot take place. Consequently, blockage of the CBS spray nozzles from solid boric acid accumulation is unlikely.

Another mechanism for nozzle blockage is construction-related activities. The licensee has successfully tested the nozzles in 1986, 1991, and 2002. NUREG-1366 found that, in general, once the systems are tested after construction, they are not subject to blockage. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that construction-related activities will cause nozzle blockage at Seabrook.

A final mechanism for nozzle blockage is activities that could result in nozzle blockage, such as maintenance-related activities. The licensee has an FME program to ensure that appropriate precautions are taken to minimize inadvertent and uncontrolled introduction of foreign materials into plant systems and components. The licensee's corrective action program is used in the event of a loss of FME integrity.

The NRC staff finds the licensee's proposed change to the Seabrook TS SR 4.6.2.1.d to be acceptable based on operating experience at Seabrook, industry experience at other pressurized-water reactor units, and the licensee's FME program and the corrective action program.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New Hampshire and Massachusetts State officials were notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State officials provided no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to the installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes SRs.

The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no Significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (76 FR 55130). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

- 8

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner; (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: John G. Lamb Date: January 30, 2012

January 30,2012 Mr. Paul Freeman Site Vice President c/o Michael O'Keefe Seabrook Station NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC P.O. Box 300 Seabrook, NH 03874

SUBJECT:

SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO.1-ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT REGARDING CONTAINMENT SPRAY NOZZLES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (TAC NO. ME6726)

Dear Mr. Freeman:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 128 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-86 for the Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1 (Seabrook). This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) surveillance requirement 4.6.2.1.d in response to your application dated July 14, 2011, as supplemented November 11, 2011.

The amendment replaces the TS surveillance 4.6.2.1.d 10-year surveillance frequency for testing the containment spray nozzles with an event-based frequency.

A copy of our safety evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/ra!

John G. Lamb, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 1-2 Division of Operating Reactor licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-443

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 128 to NPF-86

2. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv DISTRIBUTION:

PUBLIC LPLI-2 R/F RidsAcrsAcnw_MailCTR Resource RidsNrrDorlDpr Resource RidsNrrDorlLpl1-2 Resource RidsRgn 1 MailCenter Resource RidsNrrDirsltsb Resource RidsNrrPMSeabrook Resource RidsNrrLAABaxter Resource RidsOgcRp Resource RidsNrrCvib Resource REnnis, NRR/DORL ADAMS Accession No'.. ML113260577 OFFICE LPL1-2/PM LPL1-2/LA SCVB/BC IITSBIBe OGC LPL1-2/BC NAME JLamb ABaxter RDennig BMizuno MKhanna DATE 1212912011 12/7/2011 12/13/2011 12/22/2011 12/28/2011 113012012 Official Record Copy