Text

Initial Exam 2011-301 Final Simulator Scenarios
	ML112280110
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	08/10/2011
From:	; NRC/RGN-II/DRS/OLB
To:	; Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
	05-424/11-301, 05-425/11-301
	Download: ML112280110 (114)
	v • d • e

Appendix D.

Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:

Voqtle Scenario No.:

5 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Examiners:

Capehart Operators:

Meeks Hopkins Initial Conditions: The plant is at 2 X 10-% power, EOL, Reactor startup in progress per 12003-C.

Equipment OOS: CCW pump # 5, Air Compressor # 3.

Turnover: Raise power to beyond the POAH and continue power ascension per 12004-C. Containment mini-purge is in service for a Containment entry on the next shift.

Preloaded Malfunctions:

ES 08 I ES 16 Train A and B SI auto actuation failure.

ES 10 I ES 11 Train A and Train B SLI Auto Actuation Failure Overrides HS-1 0469 Red OFF HS-1 0469 Yellow ON HS-1 0469 Green ON HS-10469 OFF ALB33-C03 480v SWGR INBOI Trouble ON NOTE to Simulator Instructor-After IC reset, cycle N31 and N32 Shutdown monitors from OFF to ON.

Event MaIf.

Event Event No.

No.

Type*

Description 1

N/A R-OATC Raise power from 2 X 10% to beyond the POAH per 12003-C.

R-SS N-UO Unblocks SR Channels N31 and N32.

2 NSO2E C-UO NSCW pump #4 trips with NSCW pump # 6 auto start failure.

NSO7F C-SS 3

N/A TS-SS Pressurizer Heater Group A Trip LCO 3.4.9 Pressurizer, Condition B (72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ) 4 MSO3D C-UO Steam Generator ARV Loop # 4 fails open.

C-SS 5

RM-005 TS-SS Cont. Building-Rad Monitor-Hi Range, RE-005 fails to 100%.

LCO 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation, FU14 Condition B (30 days)

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event Maif.

Event Event No.

No.

Type*

Description 6

AC01 D C-OATC Loss of ACCW to RCP #4 C-SS NO LCOs to Enter.

7 MSO4D M-ALL SG #4 Faulted IRC 040%

over 60 seconds ESO8 C-OATC Train A and B Auto SI Failure 8

ES16 C-SS ESIO C-UO Train A and B Auto SLI Failure 9

ES11 C-SS (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Event 1:

Power is at 2 X 10-3% power and critical data has been taken. The crew should raise reactor power from the present level to beyond the POAH and continue power ascension.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC

- Withdraw control rods to establish a positive SUR and raise power to between 1 to 3% as read on the Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation, then stabilize reactor power using control rods.

UO Raise AFW flow as the POAH is reached to maintain SG levels to preclude Reactor trip on SG levels.

Event 2:

NSCW pump # 4 locked rotor (pump trips) with failure of NSCW pump # 6 to auto start.

Verifiable Actions:

UO Manually starts NSCW pump # 6 per AOP-1 8021, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW) direction to prevent pump runout of NSCW pump # 2.

Technical Specifications:

NONE

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 3:

Pressurizer Heater Group A Trips Technical Specifications:

LCD 3.4.9 Pressurizer, Condition B, One required group of Pressurizer Heaters Inoperable Event 4:

Steam Generator # 4 ARV PV-3030 pressure transmitter fails high resulting in PV-3030 opening causing a reactor power excursion and entry in AOP-18008-C, Secondary Steam Leak.

Verifiable Actions:

UO Manually closes PV-3030 to isolate the secondary coolant steam release, stopping the power excursion.

OATC Manually inserts/withdraws rods as necessary to limit the power rise.

Technical Specifications:

None Event 5:

Containment Building Radiation Monitor Hi Range, RE-005 fails to 100%.

Technical Specifications:

LCD 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation, EU 14, Condition B Event 6:

Loss of ACCW to RCP #4. SS initiates 18022-C to address loss of ACCW, trips reactor when RCP bearing Temp exceeded and stops RCP #4 Verifiable Actions:

OATC Manually Trips Reactor OATC

- Stops RCP #4 by opening the non-i E hand-switches first.

Technical Specifications:

NO LCOs.

Event 7:

A fault will occur on Steam Generator #4 IRC with failure of both trains of SLI to automatically isolate, and failure of automatic Safety Injection. E-0 shall be performed until a transition step to E-2 Faulted Steam Generator Isolation is made. The crew will be required to manually actuate Safety Injection, and manually actuate an SLI. The crew will also be required to manually isolate AFW flow to the faulted SG from both the MDAFW and TDAFW pumps.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Manually actuates SI to add negative reactivity to RCS to limit Reactor power excursion.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 U0 Manually actuate steam line isolation using either SLI manual hand switch to limit power excursion due to positive reactivity addition and to limit Containment pressure rise to prevent exceeding design pressure limits.

CRITICAL TASKS:

1) Manually actuates Safety Injection from either SI hand switch to add negative reactivity to offset positive reactivity addition from uncontrolled cool down prior to receiving an Orange path on CSFST Integrity Status Tree.

2) Isolates Main Steam Lines and SG #4 in E-O andlor E-2 to limit Reactor power excursion, RCS uncontrolled cool down to limit positive reactivity addition and limit PTS concerns prior to receiving an Orange path on CSFST Integrity Status Tree.

Manually actuates SLl from either SLI hand switch.

Isolates MDAFW and TDAFW discharge throttle valves to SO #4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 1 of 3 Event No.:

I Event

Description:

The Control Room Crew will perform actions necessary to continue the Reactor startup until criticality is achieved using procedure 12003-C. The OATC will need to withdraw control rods to establish a positive SUR and raise power to the POAH and continue power ascension.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS NOTE The Avg!Tref Deviation alarm, ALBI2AO5, provides actions to maintain Tavg above 551°F, the minimum temperature for criticality.

OATC 4.2.27 Monitor Tavg/Tref Deviation alarm, ALB12-A05, during the SS remainder of the startup and take corrective action as directed to maintain Tavg at 557°F +/-2°F. (TS SR 3.4.2.1)

UO 4.2.28 Unblock both Source Range channels HFASA circuits per 13501, Nuclear Instrumentation System.

(1)

Source Range Channel N31 (2)

Source Range Channel N32 13501-1 Nuclear Instrumentation System To unblock the HF@SD Alarm:

a.

At the N31(N32) SHUTDOWN MONITOR, reset the HF@SD as follows:

(1)

E source range indication is off scale high, push and release the TEST Pushbutton.

(2)

IF source range indication is on scale, reset the HF@SD ALARM SETPOINT per Step 4.2.1.1.

b.

At the N31(N32) Signal Processor Drawer:

(1)

Place the SR HF@SD Switch in NORMAL.

(2)

Check SR HFSD red lamp not lit.

c.

At the QMCB, check the following annunciators extinguished:

Appendix D Regufred Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 2 of 3 Event No.:

I Event

Description:

The Control Room Crew will perform actions necessary to continue the Reactor startup until criticality is achieved using procedure 12003-C. The OATC will need to withdraw control rods to establish a positive SUR and raise power to the POAH and continue power ascension.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior (I)

ALB1O-B01 SOURCE RNG HI SHUTDOWN FLUX ALARM BLOCKED (2)

ALB1O-C01 SOURCE RANGE HI FLUX LEVEL AT SHUTDOWN d.

Verify 14423-1(14424-1), N31/N35(N32/N36)

Signal Processor Channel Operational Test, has been performed satisfactorily in the last 92 days.

e.

Notify the SS that the HF@SD alarm has been returned to OPERABLE and to exit TS LCO 3.3.8 and TS LCO 3.9.2, IF entered.

I 2003-C SS 4.2.29 IF this Reactor startup was a dilution to criticality for LPPT, perform LPPT-GAE/GBE-01.

This Step is N/A OATC 4.2.30 Verify Power Range Channels indicating properly on recorder NR-45.

SS NOTE OATC A spike in startup rate (SUR) will occur when intermediate range nuclear instruments (N35 and N36) automatically swap from pulse counting to MSV mode at about 3 X 10-2% power (rising).

SS OATC CAUTION Ensure alternate indications of Reactor power level are observed to back up nuclear instrumentation readings.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 3 of 3 Event No.:

I Event

Description:

The Control Room Crew will perform actions necessary to continue the Reactor startup until criticality is achieved using procedure 12003-C. The OATC will need to withdraw control rods to establish a positive SUR and raise power to the POAH and continue power ascension.

__Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.2.31 Raise power to approximately 1% to 3%.

NOTE:

OATC WILL WITHDRAW CONTROL RODS TO OBTAIN AN IR SUR BETWEEN 0.10 AND 0.25 DPM.

UO 4.2.32 Verify steam dumps or, if applicable, S/G atmospheric relief valves, maintain Tavg at 557 0

F +/-2°F.

SS 4.2.33 Continue to power operation per 12004-C,Power Operation (Mode 1).

END OF EVENT I

Appendix_D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 1 of 3 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

Trip of B train NSCW pump #4 due to locked rotor. The standby NSCW pump #6 will fail to automatically start. The crew will enter AOP 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water System to take the corrective actions to restore the train B NSCW system to normal 2 pump operation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Diagnose degraded NSCW conditions:

Trip of NSCW pump #4(1 HS-1635A)

GreenON Amber-ON RedOFF Alarms:

ALBO3-B01, NSCW TRAIN B LO HDR PRESS ALBO3-C03, NSCW TRAIN B DG CLR LO FLOW ALBO3-C04, NSCW TRAIN B RHR PMP & MTR CLR LO FLOW ALBO3-D02, NSCW TRAIN B CNMT CLR 3 & 4 LO FLOW ALBO3-E02, NSCW TRAIN B CNMT CLR 7 & 8 LO FLOW ALBO3-F02, NSCW TRN B RX CVTY CLG COIL LOW FLOW ALBO4-E01, TRAIN B SYS STATUS MON PNL ALERT ALB37-A01, 416OVSWGR 1BAO3 TROUBLE Indications:

NSCW HDR PRESS 1PI-1636 drops to 50 psig.

NSCW Train B flow:

SUPPLY 1FI-1641B drops to 12,000 GPM.

RETURN 1FI-1641A drops to 12,000 GPM.

SS Enters AOP 18021-1, Loss of NSCW System (Crew Update)

UO 1.

Check if catastrophic leakage from NSCW system EXISTS.

SS RNO 1.

GotoStep6.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 2 of 3 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

Trip of B train NSCW pump #4 due to locked rotor. The standby NSCW pump #6 will fail to automatically start. The crew will enter AOP 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water System to take the corrective actions to restore the train B NSCW system to normal 2 pump operation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 6.

Verify NSCW pumps in affected train TWO OR MORE OPERATING:

NOTE: UO SHOULD START NSCW PUMP 6 PER STEP 6 ACTION VERB VERIFY.

Supply header pressure greater than 70 psig. (Yes)

Train B: P1-1637 Supply header flow approximately 17,000 gpm.

Train B: Fl-1641B UO 7.

Check the following on the affected train:

NSCW pumps THREE RUNNING.

-AND Low header pressure annunciator EXTINGUISHED.

RNO 7.

Go to Step 9.

UO 9.

Verify the following on the affected NSCW train:

Supply header pressure GREATER THAN 70 PSIG:

Train B: P1-1637 Supply header temperature computer indication LESS THAN 90°F:

Train B: TE-1 643 Supply header flow APPROXIMATELY 17,000 GPM:

Train B: FI-1641B

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 3 of 3 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

Trip of B train NSCW pump #4 due to locked rotor. The standby NSCW pump #6 will fail to automatically start. The crew will enter AOP 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water System to take the corrective actions to restore the train B NSCW system to normal 2 pump operation.

Time Position Appilcants Action or Behavior UO 10.

Check NSCW cooling tower basin levels on affected NSCW train GREATER THAN 73%:

Train B: Ll-1607 UO 1 1.

Check proper operation of affected NSCW train:

Two pumps running.

Supply header pressure GREATER THAN 70 PSIG:

Train B: P1-1637 Supply header temperature computer indication LESS THAN 90°F:

Train B: TE-1643 Supply header flow APPROXIMATELY 17,000 GPM:

Train B: Fl-1641B SS 12.

GotoStep2l.

UD 21.

Check NSCW return temperature on affected train LESS THAN 95°F:

Train B:

TI-i 677A SS 22.

Return to procedure and step in effect.

SS NOTE:

NO TECH SPECS.

END OF EVENT 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 1 of 4 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Heater Group A Trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Alarm/Indications SS ALB33-C03 480v SWGR 1NBO1 TROUBLE Green-Amber light on HS-1 0469, PRZR HTR Back-Up Group A UO 17033-C03 480v SWGR 1NBO1 TROUBLE PROBABLE CAUSE 1

One of the breakers on Switchgear 1 NB01 tripped due to a fault.

2.

Bus ground fault.

3.

Potential transformer/fuse failure.

4.

Transformer 1 NBO1X winding temperature high.

5.

Loss of bus voltage from Switchgear 1AAO2.

6.

Loss of 125V DC control power from Panel 1ND31.

7.

Loss of power to transformer temperature monitors fed from 1NBO1.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS NOTES Containment Building Cavity Cooling Fan 1 or40v swgr 1NBO1 incoming breaker trip, starts sequencer if breaker tripped due to a loss of off-site power.

Containment Building Cavity Cooling Fan 1 will be restarted by the Sequencer on a loss of power sequence.

1.

Bus undervoltage will trip the following loads on 1 NBO1:

a.

Containment Building Cavity Cooling Fan Motor 1.

b.

Pressurizer Heater Panel Backup 1NBPB1.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 2 of 4 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Heater Group A Trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior U0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE UO SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS 1.

Check for associated alarms and indications.

2.

Dispatch an operator to Switchgear 1NBO1 to check for:

a.

Breakers tripped.

b.

Ground fault indications.

c.

Transformer winding high temperatures.

d.

Other abnormal conditions.

3.

IL alarm is due to a breaker tripping on fault or undervoltage:

NOTE Loss of DG Lube Oil Keep-Warm Pump may render DG inoperable. If power to Lube Oil Keep-Warm Pump is unavailable, reference guidance in 17035-1 A01/A02.

a.

Determine loads that are affected.

b.

Start redundant loads, if applicable.

c.

Return to service WHEN cause has been corrected.

NOTE Loss of 125V DC control power results in loss of breaker remote/local-remote operating capabilities and associated control circuit trip features.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 3 of 4 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Heater Group A Trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 4.

IF alarm is due to loss of DC control power:

a.

Attempt to restore DC power.

b.

Dispatch an operator to the switchgear to manually operate the breakers, under the direction of the Control Room until DC power is restored.

5.

jf a bus ground fault is indicated, selectively shift to redundant loads and de-energize components to locate the ground.

6.

E alarm is due to transformer winding high temperature, selectively shift to redundant loads to reduce bus loading.

7.

IE alarm is due to potential transformer failure or fuse failure, initiate maintenance as required to correct cause of alarm.

8.

Verify two CRDM fans are running.

9.

Verify a Reactor Makeup Water Pump is running.

10.

Initiate maintenance as required to correct cause of alarm.

11.

Restore 1NBO1 to service per 13430-1, 480V AC Non 1 E Electrical Distribution System.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011 -301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 4 of 4 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Heater Group A Trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Initiate the applicable actions of:

TS: 3.4,9 Pressurizer Condition B One required group of pressurizer heaters inoperable.

ss LCO 3.3.4 Pressurizer CONDITION B CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One required group of B.1 Restore required group of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months pressurizer heaters pressurizer heaters to inoperable.

OPERABLE status.

End of Event 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 1 of 3 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

SG #4 ARV Pressure Transmitter Fails High resulting in a fully opened ARV. The crew will respond by performing the actions of AOP 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage. The UO will be able to isolate the leak with manual operation of the ARV controller on the main control board.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Diagnoses opening of SG ARV Loop 4 by the following indications:

ALB15-F01 MNSTMSFTYVLVSLEAKING ALB61-C01 MNSTMSFTYVLVS LEAKING High ARV tailpipe temperature (back panel indication)

SG #4 ARV position indicating lights Red ON, Green

- OFF Lowering RCS temperature Rising Reactor power SG #4 ARV controller indication (RED UP ARROW LIT)

SS Enters AOP 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage (Crew Update)

SS 1.

Perform the following as necessary:

UO Reduce Turbine load if any of the following indications exceed 100%

power:

OATC UQ1 1 18 (GREATER THAN 100% MWT for the applicable unit)

NIs Ts UO Isolate the leak. (UO closes SG ARV)

IF leakage is such that significant hazard to personnel equipment exists OR leakage rate is unstable and is worsening, THEN:

1)

Trip the reactor.

2)

WHEN reactor trip is verified, THEN close MSIVs and BSIVs.

3)

Go to 19000-C, E 0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.

OATC/UO 2.

Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011 -301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 2 of 3 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

SG #4 ARV Pressure Transmitter Fails High resulting in a fully opened ARV. The crew will respond by performing the actions of AOP 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage. The UO will be able to isolate the leak with manual operation of the ARV controller on the main control board.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO

3*

Monitor steam leakage characteristics:

Small in magnitude such that no significant hazard to personnel or equipment exists.

Leakage rate is relatively stable and is not rapidly worsening.

OATC 4.

Check the following:

a.

Tavg MATCHED WITH TREF b.

PRZR level IN PROGRAM BAND uO c.

PRZR pressure BETWEEN 2220 AND 2250 PSIG d.

SG levels IN PROGRAM BAND UO 5.

Check containment conditions

- NORMAL:

Pressure Temperature Moisture Sump level UO 6.

Close SG blowdown isolation valves if the source of leakage is unknown.

uQ

7 Check CSTs level GREATER THAN 80%.

UO

8.

Monitor hotwell makeup rate SUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN LEVEL.

SS 9.

Review applicable Technical Specification requirements.

No LCOs.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.:

5 Page 3 of 3 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

SG #4 ARV Pressure Transmitter Fails High resulting in a fully opened ARV. The crew will respond by performing the actions of AOP 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage. The UO will be able to isolate the leak with manual operation of the ARV controller on the main control board.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 10.

Perform one of the following:

plant operation. q

-OR a unit shutdown by initiating 12004 C, POWER OPERATION (MODE 1),

END OF EVENT 4

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 1 of 3 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Containment Rad Monitor RE-005 Fails High Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Alarm/Indications UO ALB05-B03 INTMD RADIATION ALARM SS ALBO5-C03 HIGH RADIATION ALARM Safety Related Display Consol (SRDC)-RE-005, Intermediate & High Alarm IPC RE-005 Step Change to High Rad UO 17005-1 B03 INTMD RADIATION ALARM OATC PROBABLE CAUSE An alert condition on one or more of the Radiation Monitor Channels.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS NONE INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS 1.

Check the Safety Related Display Console (QRM2), the RMS Communications Console (QRM1) and the Plant Computer to determine the monitor in alarm and Go To 17100-1, Annunciator Response Procedure For The Process And Effluent Radiation Monitor System (RMS) or 17102-1, Annunciator Response Procedure For The Safety Related Display Control QRM2 as appropriate.

17005-1 C03 HIGH RADIATION ALARM OATC UO PROBABLE CAUSE A high alarm on one or more of the Radiation Monitor Channels.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS None for RE-005

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 2 of 3 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Containment Rad Monitor RE-005 Fails High Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS 1.

Check the Safety Related Display Console (QRM2), the RMS Communications Console (QRM1) and the Plant Computer to determine the monitor in alarm and Go To 171 00-1, Annunciator Response Procedure For The Process And Effluent Radiation Monitor System (RMS) or 17102-1, Annunciator Response Procedure For The Safety Related Display Console QRM2 as appropriate UO 17102-1 RE-0005 (RED LAMP LIT) (HIGH)

UO PROBABLE CAUSE SS High radiation in Containment.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS NONE INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS 1.

Initiate evacuation of Containment IF the alarm is due to unexpected or unexplained radiation increases, OR IF appropriate HP controls are NOT in place for the radiological conditions indicated.

2.

IF the alarm is due to expected radiation increases from preplanned evolutions AND appropriate HP controls are in place, THEN request HP and Chemistry to investigate the cause of alarm and sample Containment atmosphere. if required, initiate evacuation of Containment.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 3 of 3 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Containment Rad Monitor RE-005 Fails High Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS 1.

If required, verify that the Containment has been evacuated and all personnel accounted for.

2.

Refer to-Q-1-Q1G NMP-EP-1 10, Emergency Classification And Implementing Instructions.

3.

Notify Chemistry to independently determine radiation level on the operating deck in the Containment.

4.

IF sampling and analysis determine that channel has malfunctioned:

a.

Comply with Technical Specifications LCO 3.3.3.

b.

Request Chemistry to deactivate the channel.

COMPENSATORY OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE SS Initiate the applicable actions of:

TS: 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation Condition B One required channel inoperable.

SS LCO 3.3.3 PAMS FU 14 CONDITION B SS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One required B.1 Restore the channel 30 days Channel inoperable.

To OPERABLE status.

End of Event 5

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No: 5 Page 1 of 4 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

Loss of ACCW to RCP #4 Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Alarms:

ALBO4-D03 ACCW RCP 4 CLR LO FLOW ALBO4-D04 ACCW RCP 4 CLR OUTLET HI TEMP ALBO2-E06 PRIMARY EQUIPMENT HI TEMP References ALBO2-E06, ALBO4-D03 AND ALBO4-D04 directs SS to initiate 13003-C RCP Operation or may go to 18022-C Loss of ACCW.

SS If Crew Initiates 1 8022-C, Loss of Auxiliary Component Cooling Water (Crew Update), the following steps apply.

NOTE: If crew Initiates 13003-1 to Monitor RCP Trip Parameters, go to page 2 of 4 for operator actions performed:

18022-C OATC 1

Check ACCW pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING.

SS SS 2.

Check ACCW SPLY HDR PRESS P1-i 977 GREATER THAN 135 psig.

3.

Check if ACCW flow exists through the letdown heat exchanger.

. TV-130 OPEN

. ALBO7-D03 LTDN HX OUT HI TEMP EXTINGUISHED.

4.

Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

5.

Check ACCW Surge Tank Level (IPC L2700)

GREATER THAN 20%

AND STABLE OR RISING.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 2 of 4 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

Loss of ACCW to RCP # 4

__Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 6.

Check if RCPs should be stopped:

a.

Check the following RCp parameters (using plant computer):

Motor bearing (upper or lower radial or thrust)

- GREATER THAN 195°F Motor stator winding

- GREATER THAN 31 1°F Seal water inlet - GREATER THAN 230°F.

Loss of ACCW

- GREATER THAN 10 MINUTES.

RNO 6a.

Perform the following:

1) i.E any parameter limit is exceeded, THEN perform Step 6.b.

2)

Go to Step 7.

6.

b.

Perform the following:

1)

Trip the reactor.

2)

WHEN Reactor is verified tripped, THEN stop affected RCP(s).

3)

Initiate 19000-C, E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.

SS 3.

Initiates 13003-1, RCP Operation. (Crew Update)

NOTE:

If crew Initiates 13003-1 to Monitor RCP Trip Parameters, the following steps apply:

13003-1 OATC References Limitation 2.2.10 of 13003-1 for RCP Trip Conditions.

OATC Performs Section 4.3.1 of 13003-1 for RCP Shutdown after determining RCP 4 Motor bearing temperature is about to or has exceeded 195°F.

4.3.1.1 jf RCP #1 or #4 is to be stopped, place the associated spray valve in MANUAL and close the valve:

RCP 4:

1-PIC-0455B

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 3 of 4 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

Loss of ACCW to RCP #4 Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.3.1.2 IF in Modes 1 or 2, perform an RCP shutdown as follows:

a.

Start the RCP Oil Lift Pump for affected RCP, if available.

Starts RCP oil lift pump using 1 HS-0558.

RedON Green OFF Blue ON b.

IF Reactor Power is Greater than 15% Rated Thermal Power:

OATC NOTE: THIS STEP IS N/A.

c.

IF Reactor Power is less than 15% Rated Thermal Power:

OATC (1)

Stop the RCP by placing its Non-1E Control Switch in STOP and then placing its 1E Control Switch in STOP:

RCP Non-i E Control Switch 1 E Control Switch Loop 4 i-HS-0498B 1-HS-0498A (2)

Initiate 18005-C, Partial Loss Of Flow.

NOTE:

OATC NOTIFIES SS TO INITIATE 18005-C.

OATC 4.3.1.3 IF in Mode 3 or below, perform an RCP shutdown as follows:

NOTE TO EXAMINER: PLANT IS IN MODE 2.

OATC 4.3.1.4 WHEN the RCP has coasted to a stop (as indicated by reverse flow),

stop the RCP Oil Lift Pump.

Stops RCP lift oil pump by placing 1 HS-0558 in stop.

SS Initiates AOP 18005-C, Partial Loss of Flow (Crew Update).

18005-C OATC 1.

Check Reactor power LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 15%

UD 2.

Stop any power changes in progress

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011 -301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 4 of 4 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

Loss of ACCW to RCP # 4 Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC/UO 3.

Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

UO

4.

Check affected loop SG NR Level

- TRENDING TO 65%

RNO:

4 Control feed flow to maintain affected loop SG NR level between 60%

and 70%.

OATC/UO 5.

Check Tavg TRENDING TO PROGRAM OATC 6.

Verify PRZR level TRENDING TO PROGRAM OATC 7.

Verify PRZR pressure TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG OATC 8.

Check RCP 1 and RCP 4 RUNNING SS 9.

Initiate shutdown to Mode 3 by initiating 12004-C, POWER OPERATION (MODE 1). (TS 3.4.4)

CUE: Operations Manager calls SS and directs Reactor be Tripped from present power level instead of Shutdown per 12004-C if Crew does not decide to perform a reactor trip on their on:

SS 10.

Determine and correct the cause of the pump trip.

1 1.

Check shutdown to Mode 3 COMPLETE NOTE: Initiate Event 5 prior to shutdown USING 12004-C.

END OF EVENT 6

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 1 of 10 Event No.:

7, 8, 9 Event

Description:

A Steam line break develops on SG #4 IRC with a failure of both trains of SLI to automatically isolate and failure of automatic SI. The crew will enter the EOP 19000-C and transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG Isolation. The OATC will have to manually actuate SI and the UO will have to manually actuate SLI. The crew will be required to manually isolate AFW flow to SG #4.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnoses Event SS Directs OATC and UO to perform Immediate Actions of E-0 CREW IMMEDIATE ACTIONS of 19000-C, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1.

Verifies Reactor Trip

. Rod Bottom Lights

- LIT

. Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers

- OPEN

. Neutron Flux LOWERING RNO OATC 1.

Trip Reactor using both Reactor trip hand switches. IE Reactor tLQI tripped, THEN go to 19211-C, FR-S.1 RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION / ATWT.

UO 2.

Verifies Turbine Trip All Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED UO 3.

Checks Power to AC Emergency Buses:

a.

AC Emergency Busses AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED.

b.

AC Emergency Busses ALL ENERGIZED:

4l6OVAClEBusses 480V AC 1 E Busses OATC 4.

Checks if SI / Actuated:

Any SI annunciator

- LIT (No)

SI BPLP status light

- LIT (No) 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 2 of 10 Event No.:

7, 8, 9 Event

Description:

A Steam line break develops on SG #4 IRC with a failure of both trains of SLI to automatically isolate and failure of automatic SI. The crew will enter the EOP 19000-C and transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG Isolation. The OATC will have to manually actuate SI and the UO will have to manually actuate SLI. The crew will be required to manually isolate AFW flow to SG #4.

Time__II Position Applicants Action or Behavior 4.cont.

RNO OATC 4.

Check if SI is required:

jf one or more of the following conditions has occurred:

PRZR pressure less than or equal to 1870 psig.

Steam line pressure less than or equal to 585 psig.

Containment pressure greater than or equal to 3.8 psig.

Automatic alignment of ECCS equipment to injection phase.

CRITICAL THEN actuate SI and go to Step 6.

TASK SS Makes Plant page announcement for Reactor Trip / Safety injection.

OATC / UO 6.

Initiates Foldout Page SS 7.

Perform the following:

OATC OATC Initial Actions Page.

uo UO Initial Actions Page.

NOTE: AT SOME POINTA CREW UPDATE ON ADVERSE CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS WILL BE MADE:

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 3 of 10 Event No.:

7, 8, 9 Event

Description:

A Steam line break develops on SG #4 IRC with a failure of both trains of SLI to automatically isolate and failure of automatic SI. The crew will enter the EOP 19000-C and transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG Isolation. The OATC will have to manually actuate SI and the UO will have to manually actuate SLI. The crew will be required to manually isolate AFW flow to SG #4.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC PERFORMS OATC INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS OF E-0 1.

Checks both Trains of ECCS aligning per MLBs.

2.

Checks Containment Isolation Phase A actuated per MLBs 3.

Checks ECCS pumps and NCP status.

a.

CCPs running b.

SI Pumps running c.

RHR pumps running d.

NCP.tripped 4.

CCW pumps only two running per train 5a.

NSCW pumps only two running per train 5b.

NSCW tower return / bypass valves in auto 6a.

Containment coolers running in LOW speed per MLBs 6b.

NSCW cooler isolation valves open per MLBs 7.

CVI dampers and valves shut per MLBs OATC 8.

Containment pressure remained < 21.5 RNO 8.

Verify the following:

a.

Containment Spray actuated.

b.

Containment Spray Pump discharge valves open.

c.

Containment Spray Pumps running.

OATC 9.

Checks ECCS flows:

a.

BIT Flow On scale b.

RCS pressure < 1625 psig (If NOT go to step 10) c.

SI pump flow d.

RCS pressure < 300 psig e.

RHRpumpflow OATC 10.

Checks ECCS valve alignment proper on MLBs 3

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 4 of 10 Event No.:

7, 8, 9 Event

Description:

A Steam line break develops on SG #4 IRC with a failure of both trains of SLI to automatically isolate and failure of automatic SI. The crew will enter the EOP 19000-C and transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG Isolation. The OATC will have to manually actuate SI and the UO will have to manually actuate SLI. The crew will be required to manually isolate AFW flow to SG #4.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 11.

Checks at least one ACCW pump running 12.

Adjusts seal injection flow to RCPs 8 to 13 gpm.

OATC INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS COMPLETE.

UO PERFORMS UO INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS OF E-0 1.

Check AFW pumps running:

MDAFW Pumps TDAFW Pump, if required.

2.

Checks NR SG levels

- one> 10%, If not ensures at least 570 GPM flow 3.

Check if Main Steam lines should be isolated:

a.

Check for one or more of the following conditions:

Any SL Pressure < 585 psig CNMT Pressure> 14.5 psig Low Steam Pressure SI/SLI BLOCKED AND High Steam Pressure Rate ON TWO OR MORE CHANNELS OF ANY STEAM LINE.

CRITICAL b.

Verify Main Steam line Isolation and Bypass Valves CLOSED.

TASK UO 4.

Verifies FWI:

MFRV, BFRV, MFIV, BFIVs all shut UO 5.

Verifies SGBD isolated:

Places hand switches for SGBD isolation valves to close Verify SGBD sample isolations closed.

6.

Verify Diesel Generators running.

UO 7.

Throttle AFW flow to control SG levels 10 65% NR 4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 5 of 10 Event No.:

7, 8, 9 Event

Description:

A Steam line break develops on SG #4 IRC with a failure of both trains of SLI to automatically isolate and failure of automatic SI. The crew will enter the EOP 19000-C and transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG Isolation. The OATC will have to manually actuate SI and the UO will have to manually actuate SLI. The crew will be required to manually isolate AFW flow to SG #4.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 8.

Verify both MFPs tripped.

9.

Check Main Generator Output breakers open.

UO INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS COMPLETE.

SS 19000-C, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION OATC / UO 8.

Initiate Continuous Actions pages.

OATC 9.

Checks RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557 °F:

With RCPs running-RCS Tavg.

OR uO Without RCPs running-RCS WR Cold Leg Temperatures.

RNO 9.

IF temperature is less than 557°F and lowering, THEN perform the following as necessary:

a.

Stop dumping steam.

b.

Perform the following as appropriate:

IF at least one SG NR level greater than 10% [32% ADVERSE]

THEN lower total feed flow.

-OR IF all SG NR levels less than 10% [32% ADVERSE] THEN lower total feed flow to NOT less than 570 gpm.

c.

IF cooldown continues, THEN close MSIVs and BSIVs.

d.

IF temperature greater than 557°F and rising, THEN dump steam.

5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 6 of 10 Event No.:

7, 8, 9 Event

Description:

A Steam line break develops on SG #4 IRC with a failure of both trains of SLI to automatically isolate and failure of automatic SI. The crew will enter the EOP 19000-C and transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG Isolation. The OATC will have to manually actuate SI and the UO will have to manually actuate SLI. The crew will be required to manually isolate AFW flow to SG #4.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 10.

Check PRZR PORVs, Block Valves, and Spray Valves:

a.

PRZR PORVs - CLOSED AND IN AUTO.

b.

Normal PRZR Spray Valves CLOSED.

c.

Power to at least one Block Valve AVAILABLE.

d.

PRZR PORV Block Valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN.

RNO

10d Verify open at least one PRZR PORV Block Valve when PRZR pressure is greater than 2185 psig.

OATC 11.

Check if RCPs should be stopped.

a.

ECCS Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING.

CCPorSIPump b.

RCS pressure LESS THAN 1375 psig.

c.

Stop all RCPs.

RNO ilab. Go to Step 12.

UO I SS 12.

Check SGs secondary pressure boundaries:

a.

SG Pressures:

Any lowering in an uncontrolled manner.

-OR Any completely depressurized.

b.

Go to 19020-C, E-2 FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION.

6

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 7 of 10 Event No.:

7, 8, 9 Event

Description:

A Steam line break develops on SG #4 IRC with a failure of both trains of SLI to automatically isolate and failure of automatic SI. The crew will enter the EOP 19000-C and transition to 1 9020-C, Faulted SG Isolation. The OATC will have to manually actuate SI and the UO will have to manually actuate SLI. The crew will be required to manually isolate AFW flow to SG #4.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Transitions to 19020-C, Faulted SG Isolation (Crew Update) 19020-C FAULTED SG ISOLATION ACTIONS OATC 1.

Initiate critical safety function status trees per 19200-C, F-0 CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES.

SS 2.

Initiate NMP-EP-110. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION AND INITIAL ACTION SS CAUTION At least one SG should be maintained available for RCS Cooldown.

UO 3.

Verify Main Steamline Isolation and Bypass Valves CLOSED UO 4.

Check SGs secondary pressure boundaries:

a.

Identify intact SG(s):

SG pressures

- ANY STABLE OR RISING b.

Identify faulted SG(s):

ANY SG PRESSURE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (SG 4)

-OR ANY SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED 7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 8 of 10 Event No.:

7, 8, 9 Event

Description:

A Steam line break develops on SG #4 IRC with a failure of both trains of SLI to automatically isolate and failure of automatic SI. The crew will enter the EOP 19000-C and transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG Isolation. The OATC will have to manually actuate SI and the UO will have to manually actuate SLI. The crew will be required to manually isolate AFW flow to SG #4.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 5.

Isolate Main Feedwater to the faulted SG(s):

Close affected MFIVs:

HV-5230 (SG 4)

Close affected BFIVs:

HV-15199(SG4)

UO 6.

Isolate Auxiliary Feedwater to the faulted SG(s):

CRITICAL Close affected MDAFW Pump Throttle Valves:

TASKS HV-5137 - SG 4 FROM MDAFW PMP-A Close affected TDAFW Pump Throttle Valves:

HV-5120 - SG 4 FROM TDAFW UO 7.

Check at least one MDAFW Pump

- RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF FEEDING SG(s) NEEDED FOR RCS COOLDOWN UO 8.

Shut affected TDAFW Pump Steam Supply Valve(s): (N/A)

HV-3009 (SG 1) LP-1 MS SPLY TO AUX FW TD PM P-i HV-3019 (SG 2) LP-2 MS SPLY TO AUX FW TD PMP-i 9.

Verify affected SG ARV(s)

- CLOSED:

PV-3030 (SG 4)

UO 10.

Align SGBD valves:

Place SG Blowdown Isolation Valve hand switches in CLOSE position.

Close Sample valves:

HV-9451 (SG 1)

HV-9452 (SG 2)

HV-9453 (SG 3)

HV-9454 (SG 4) 8

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 9 of 10 Event No.:

7, 8, 9 Event

Description:

A Steam line break develops on SG #4 IRC with a failure of both trains of SLI to automatically isolate and failure of automatic SI. The crew will enter the EOP 19000-C and transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG Isolation. The OATC will have to manually actuate SI and the UO will have to manually actuate SLI. The crew will be required to manually isolate AFW flow to SG #4.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 1 1.

Verify faulted SG(s) remains isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS cooldown or SG activity sampling.

UO 12.

Check CST level

- GREATER THAN 15% (Yes)

UO 13.

Initiate checking SG tubes intact:

a.

Direct Chemistry to take periodic activity samples of all SGs one at a time.

b.

Secondary radiation

- NORMAL:

1)

MAIN STM LINE MONITORS:

RE-13120(SG1)

RE-13121 (SG 2)

RE-13122 (SG 3)

RE-13119(SG4) 2)

CNDSR AIR EJCTR/STM RAD MONITORS:

RE-i 2839C RE-12839D (if on scale)

RE-12839E (if on scale) 3)

STM GEN LIQ PROCESS RAD:

RE-00i9 (Sample)

RE-002i (Blowdown) c.

Check SG levels ANY RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER RNO 13c.

Go to Step 14.

9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario NoW: 5 Page 10 of 10 Event No.:

7, 8, 9 Event

Description:

A Steam line break develops on SG #4 IRC with a failure of both trains of SLI to automatically isolate and failure of automatic SI. The crew will enter the EOP 19000-C and transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG Isolation. The OATC will have to manually actuate SI and the UO will have to manually actuate SLI. The crew will be required to manually isolate AFW flow to SG #4.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC I UO 14.

Check if ECCS flow should be reduced:

a.

RCS Subcooling

- GREATER THAN 24°F [38°F ADVERSE]

b.

Secondary Heat Sink:

Total feed flow to intact SGs

- GREATER THAN 570 GPM

-OR Narrow range level in at least one intact SG

- GREATER THAN 10% [32% ADVERSE]

c.

RCS pressure

- STABLE or RISING RNO SS 14c. Go to Step 15.

d.

PRZR level

- GREATER THAN 9% [37% ADVERSE]

RNO 14d. Go to Step 15.

e.

GoTo 19011-C, ES-1.1 SI TERMINATION SS 15.

Go to 19010-C, E-1 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.

END OF SCENARIO 10

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: VOGTLE Scenario No.:

4 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Examiners Capehart Operators Meeks Hopkins Initial Conditions: 33% Rated Thermal Power Equilibrium Xenon EOL. UOP 12004-C, Power Operation Step 4.1.39.b in effect.

Turnover: The 1 3.8 kV busses have been transferred to their normal power supply. Transfer the 4160V AC Non-1E buses to the normal incoming source shift turnover. Continue power ascension at less than 8% per hour.

CCW pump 5 and Air Compressor # 3 tagged out, Containment Mini-purge in service.

Preloaded Malfunctions:

ES 01 Failure of Automatic Reactor Trip ES 02 Failure of Manual Reactor Trip TU 18 Failure of Automatic Turbine Trip RD 07 Failure of Automatic Rod Motion AF 02B MDAFW A Trips on Start OR HS-5130A to STOP (MDAFW pump B)

Event MaIf. No.

Event Event No.

Type*

Description I

N/A N-UO Transfer 4160V AC buss 1NAO5 to the Normal Incoming Source N-SS per 13425C-1, 416OVAC Non 1E Bus 1NAO5 Electrical Distribution System 2

N/A R-OATC Continues power ascension.

R-SS N-UO 3

CV 13 I-OATC CVCS VCT level transmitter LV-1 12 fails high.

100%

I-SS 4

PR 03A l-OATC Pressurizer Controlling Level Channel LT-459 fails high.

(35%

- 100%)

l-SS Ramp 600 Sec TS-SS LCO 3.3.1 5

MS 1 1A I-UO I PT-507 Steam Line Header Pressure slowly fails to 0 psig.

(67%

- 0%)

I-SS Ramp 60 Sec (I.

â4 4

iS. Cc

-(.S Lo k:1&

Event Maif. No.

Event Event No.

Type*

Description

% 7 FW 15A M-ALL MFPT A Sheared Shaft Failure of Automatic Reactor Trip (ATWT) with LOHS Failure of Manual Reactor Trip I

TU 18 C-UO Auto Turbine Trip Failure C.-SS

)c RD 07 C-OATC Control Banks Fail to Move on Auto Demand C-SS (c

AF 02A C-UO TDAFW pump Overspeed Trip C-SS (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor EVENT 1:

Transfers 1NAO5 to Normal Incoming Source (UAT).

Verifiable Actions:

UO

- Turns on sync switch, verifies incoming and bus voltages matched and closes normal incoming breaker onlNAO5 4160V Non 1E switchgear. Matches flag on tripped alternate incoming breaker to clear alarm.

EVENT 2:

Crew continues power ascension at less than 8% per hour.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Withdraws control rods and or dilutes as necessary to maintain Tavg matched with T-ref during power ascension.

UO Increases turbine load using load increase pushbutton.

EVENT 3:

CVCS Volume Control Tank (VCT) level transmitter LT-1 12 fails high.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Places VCT divert valve HV-1 12 to the VCT position using HS-1 12A.

Initiates 13009-C, Places CVCS VCT makeup system to off and sets up for manual makeup operation.

EVENT 4:

Pressurizer Controlling Level Channel LT-459 fails high.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Places Charging control valve FV-121 in manual and returns PRZR level to program.

Selects alternate controlling channel and returns charging FCV-121 in auto.

Technical Specifications LCO 3.3.1, FU 9 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation, LCO 3.3.4 FU 8 Remote Shutdown System EVENT 5:

1 PT-507 Steam Line Header Pressure input to SG speed controller(s) slowly fails to 0 psig.

Verifiable Actions:

UO Places MFPT(s) master controller in manual to control MFPT speed and places all SG MFRVs in manual as necessary and adjusts as necessary to maintain SG NR level between 60% and 70%.

Technical Specifications:

NONE:

cjc. (

1.3. C EVENTS 7 and 8:

MFPT Train A Sheared shaft I Loss of all feedwater I ATVVT I Loss of Heat Sink.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Turns both reactor trip hand switches to the reactor trip position.

Manually inserts control rods to reduce reactor power.

Starts an emergency boration by starting a Boric Acid Pump and opening HV-81 04 and adjusts CVCS charging and Seal flow.

UO Manually trips the main turbine Manually closes CVI dampers and valves.

Starts piping penetration units.

Establishes feed water flow to at least one steam generator.

EVENT 9:

TDAFW Pump Trips on Overspeed.

Verifiable Actions:

UO coordinates with Operator Area Operator in Restarting TDAFW Pump using 13610-1 AFW System after Trip and Throttle Valve Trip Mechanism repaired.

CRITICAL TASKS:

1. OATC

- Manually inserts control rods to reduce reactor power.

2. UO Manually Trips main turbine to conserve steam generator inventory.

3. UO Establishes AFW flow to at least one steam generator from the TDAFW Pump.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 1 of I Event No.:

I Event

Description:

The UO Transfers Non 1E 4160V AC Bus INAO5 from the Alternate Incoming Source (RAT) to the Normal Incoming Source (UAT), per 13425C -1, 4160V AC Non-i E Electrical Distribution System..

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS UOP 12004-C Step 4.1.39b. SS directs UO to transfer the 4160V AC Non-IE Bus INAO5 to Normal Incoming Source per 13425C-1, 4160V AC Non-i E Electrical Distribution System.

UO 13425C-I 4.2.1 Transferring 4160V Bus INAO5 from Alternate Incoming Source (RAT or SAT) To Normal Incoming Source (UAT).

a. Verify incoming voltage across phase A-B is approximately 4160 volts on Bus 1NAO5 Normal Incoming Voltmeter.

b.

Verify bus voltage across all three phases is approximately 4160 volts on Bus 1 NAO5 Voltmeter.

c.

Place Breaker 1 NA0503 Synchronization Switch to ON.

N OTE Synchronization can be observed by dimming of the sync lights and no motion of the sync scope.

ALB-33-A05 4160V SWGR 1NAO5 TROUBLE d.

Close Normal Incoming Breaker 1NA0503.

e.

Verify Alternate Incoming Breaker 1 NAO5O1 tripped.

f.

Place 1-HS-1NAO5O1 in the NORMAL AFTER TRIP position to match the breaker target.

g.

Check bus voltage across all three phases is approximately 4160 volts on Bus 1NAO5 Voltmeter.

h.

Place Breaker 1 NA0503 Synchronization Switch to OFF.

END OF EVENT I

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 1 of 3 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

Reactor Power Ascension from 33% RTP to 100% RTP.

Time Position

]

Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Uses 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System Section 4.7 Frequent Dilutions While Controlling Reactor Power, as necessary to maintain Tavg matched with Tref during power ascension.

UO Increases turbine load in increments of 15 Mwe to 30 Mwe using load increase pushbutton at direction of OATC. Monitors Generator Output 13009-1, Section 4.7:

NOTES This section can be used during power changes when necessary to frequently dilute the RCS for temperature control. The use of this section shall be authorized by the SS.

Frequent dilutions can raise VCT level to the point where VCT pressure reaches 40 psig. 1-LIC-0185 may be adjusted to allow divert to the RHT at a lower level to limit VCT pressure increase.

OATC 4.7 FREQUENT DILUTIONS WHILE CONTROLLING REACTOR POWER 4.7.1 Determine the amount of Reactor Makeup Water necessary to accomplish the power change or accommodate the expected impact of Xenon. (Uses Reactivity Briefing Sheet to Determine # gallons Dilution)

Gals H20 NOTE: EACH OATC WILL USE NUMBER HEISHE IS COMFORTABLE WITH.

(100 1000 Gallons)

OATC 4.7.2 Verify the Reactor Makeup System is aligned for automatic operation.

OATC 4.7.3 Start one Reactor Makeup Water Pump:

RX MU WTR PMP-1 1-HS-7762 RX MU WTR PMP-2 1-HS-7763

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 2 of 3 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

Reactor Power Ascension from 33% RTP to 100% RTP.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.7.4 Place VCT MAKEUP CONTROL 1-HS-40001B in STOP.

OATC 4.7.5 As directed by the SS, place VCT MAKEUP MODE SELECT 1-HS-40001A in either the ALT DIL or DIL position.

OATC 4.7.6 As directed by the SS, lower pot setting on 1-LIC-0185, to limit VCT pressure increase.

Initial Pot Setting:_______ New Pot Setting:_______

OATC 4.7.7 Set TOTAL MAKEUP Integrator 1-FQI-01 11 for the desired amount of Reactor M/U Water.

Gals H2O OATC NOTE If VCT MAKEUP MODE SELECT 1-HS-40001A was placed in the DIL position in Step 4.7.5, Step 4.7.8 may be marked N/A.

4.7.8 If required, close 1-FV-O11OB as necessary to raise or maintain RCS hydrogen concentration. (N/A)

SS / OATC 4.7.9 At SS direction, dilution flow may be adjusted to desired flow using 1 -FIC-Ol 1 1 (record in AUTO LOG).

Initial Pot Setting:

New Pot Setting:

NOTE:

EXPECTED NOT TO CHANGE DESIRED FLOW:

OATC 4.7.10 Place VCT MAKEUP CONTROL 1-HS-40001B in START and verify flow is indicated on 1-FI-O11OB.

Appendix P Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 3 of 3 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

Reactor Power Ascension from 33% RTP to 100% RTP.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.7.11 WHEN TOTAL MAKEUP Integrator 1-FQI-0111 reaches its setpoint, verify dilution stops and the following valves close:

1-FV-01 1 IA RX MU WTR TO BA BLENDER 1-FV-O111B BLENDER OUTLET TO VCT 1-FV-O11OB BLENDER OUTLET TO CHARGING PUMPS SUCT OATC 4.7.12 Operate the Pressurizer Back-up Heaters as necessary to equalize Cb between the RCS and the Pressurizer.

OATC 4.7.13 Monitor RCS temperature, Control Bank position, or power levels as applicable.

CAUTION If frequent dilutions are to be continued past the end of the shift, step 4.7.14 should be marked N/A and this section completed to include realignment to the normal configuration. The new on coming shift can then initiate the section from the beginning to continue frequent dilution.

OATC 4.7.14 Repeat Steps 4.7.10 through 4.7.13 as necessary to continue power ramp and/or compensate for Xenon.

NOTE:

OATC WILL LEAVE CVCS MAKEUP SYSTEM ALIGNED PER 4.7 FOR FREQUENT DILUTIONS WHILE CONTROLLING REACTOR POWER DURING POWER ASCENSION.

NOTE:

EVENT 3 IS INITIATED WHILE OATC AND UO ARE PERFORMING ACTIONS IN EVENT 2 FOR POWER ASCENSION AT EXAMINERS DISCRETION.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 1 of 9 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

In the process of continuing the power ascension CVCS VCT Level Transmitter 1LT-112 Fails High causing CVCS Auto Makeup Failure toVCT.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnoses that CVS VCT level transmitter 1LT-112 failed high.

Indications:

ALBO7-E05 VCT HI/LO LEVEL Annunciator NOTE:

IF OATC HAS A DILUTION IN PROGRESS IT MAY BE STOPPED IN ORDER TO RESPOND TO ALARM.

OATC References ARP 17007-1 Window E05, VCT Hl!LO LEVEL AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

NOTE VCT automatic makeup should have started at 30 percent or stopped at 50 percent.

1.

Letdown flow diverts to the HUT WHEN 1-HS-0112A is in AUTO with VCT high level of 97 percent. /

2.

Charging Pump suction auto swaps to the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) upon a Lo-Lo VCT level of 5.7 percent.

3.

. A summary of instrument setpoints associated with the VCT levels include:

OATC LI-0112?

VCT LEVEL Ll-0185 Trip open 1 12A 97%

Modulate 1 12A full divert (if LIC-0185 pot @8.70)

Hi level alarm 92%

1 1 2A Trip Open signal 87%

11 2A starts to divert (if Resets LIC-0185 pot @8.70)

Auto Makeup stops 50%

Auto Makeup starts 30%

Low level alarm 20%

Low level alarm RWST auto swapover 5.7% (2 of 2)

RWST auto swapover

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 2 of 9 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

In the process of continuing the power ascension CVCS VCT Level Transmitter 1LT-112 Fails High causing CVCS Auto Makeup Failure to VCT.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS ALBO7-E05:

Step 1:

Check VCT level using 1-LI-0185 on the QMCB AND compare to 1-Ll-0112 on the IPC OR on Trend Recorder XR-40053.

OATC Step 2:

if equipment failure is indicated by EITHER LT-0185 QE LT 0112 failed high, perform the following: /

a.

Place 1HS-112A to the VCT position NOTE Pump cavitation may be indicated by fluctuating discharge pressure and/or erratic flow.

b.

Monitor charging pump(s) for signs of cavitation.

IF cavitation is observed: (NO)

(1)

Isolate letdown, (2) Stop any running charging pumps, (3)

Initiate 18007-C Section B.

c.

Initiate Manual VCT Makeup per 13009-C.

d.

Contact maintenance to initiate repairs.

NOTE: 18007-C, CVCS Loss of Charging Flow behind tab.

NOTE: 13009-C CVCS MU System Actions begin on page 4 of 9.

OATC Step 3.

IF level is low AND makeup is lost, initiate 1 8007-C, Chemical And Volume Control System Malfunction. (see tab 1 for actions of procedure 18007-C)

OATC Step 4:

IF level is low due to system leakage, initiate 18004-C, Reactor Coolant System Leakage. (N/A)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 3 of 9 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

In the process of continuing the power ascension CVCS VCT Level Transmitter 1 LT-1 12 Fails High causing CVCS Auto Makeup Failure to VCT.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS ALBO7-E05:

Step 1:

if VCT level is high:

(N/A Step 1) a.

Stop Makeup.

b.

Divert letdown flow to the Recycle Holdup Tank (HUT position) using 1-HS-01 12A on the QMCB.

c.

Operate makeup per 13009-1, CVCS.

d.

Reactor Makeup Control System.

SS Step 2:

if equipment failure is indicated, initiate maintenance as required.

Contacts SSS to perform the following:

Notify l&C to initiate repairs Write a Condition Report Notify OPS Duty Manager OATC Step 3:

IF an operating charging pump fails due to suspected gas binding (fluctuating discharge pressure fjQ flow), THEN the standby pump SHALL NQ] be started UNTIL the cause of the gas binding is understood AND all effected piping and components have been vented.

NOTE: This Step Does Not Apply To Failure of LT-112.

SS Directs OATC to Initiate Manual VCT Makeup per 13009-1 as Required to Maintain VCT Level Between 30 and 50%.

OATC 13009-1, CVCS REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL SYSTEM NOTE:

OA TC MAY REFERENCE 13009-1 SECTION 4.6 AND HAVE IT A VAILABLE FOR MANUAL MAKEUP BUT MAY CHOSE TO CONTINUE IN SECTION 4.7 FREQUENT DILUTIONS WHILE CONTROLLING REACTOR POWER.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 4 of 9 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

In the process of continuing the power ascension CVCS VCT Level Transmitter 1LT-112 Fails High causing CVCS Auto Makeup Failure to VCT.

Time ]

Position Applicants Action or Behavior 13009-1 Section 4.6 Manual Makeup CAUTIONS If Manual Makeup is being performed to maintain VCT level when letdown is being diverted, letdown should not exceed 75 gpm.

BAST concentration is inaccurate until sampled following batching.

Temperature and power should be closely monitored following manual makeup to the VCT with the BAST concentration inaccurate.

OATC Step 4.6.1 Manual Makeup At 100 GPM Total Flow NOTE Volumetric change in VCT is equal to 19.2 gallons per percent change in level.

OATC Step 4.6.1.1 Set TOTAL MAKEUP Integrator 1-FQI-0111 to the desired amount of Total Makeup Water.

CAUTION Digital counters and thumbwheel settings on BORIC ACID TO BLENDER integrator 1-FQ-0110 read in tenth-gallon increments.

OATC Step 4.6.1.2 Set BORIC ACID TO BLENDER Integrator 1-FQI-0110 to the amount of boric acid calculated using the following formula:

Total M/U x RCS Cb Gallons of Boric Acid

=

BAST Cb

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 5 of 9 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

In the process of continuing the power ascension CVCS VCT Level Transmitter 1 LT-1 12 Fails High causing CVCS Auto Makeup Failure to VCT.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Step 4.6.1.3 Adjust BORIC ACID Flow Controller 1-FIC-0110 pot setting using the following formula and verify controller is in AUTO:

RCS CL,x25 1 -FIC-01 10 pot setting

=

BAST Cb OATC Step 4.6.1.4 Place VCT MAKEUP CONTROL 1-HS-40001B in STOP.

OATC Step 4.6.1.5 Place VCT MAKEUP MODE SELECT 1-HS-40001A in MAN.

OATC Step 4.6.1.6 Verify the following:

BATO BLENDER 1-HS-O11OA in AUTO.

RX MU WTR TO BA BLENDER 1-HS-01 1 1A in AUTO.

One Boric Acid Transfer Pump in AUTO or START.

One Reactor Makeup Water Pump in AUTO or START.

Verify TOTAL MAKEUP Flow controller 1-FIC-OllI is in AUTO with pot is set for 100 gpm (approximately 6.25) total flowrate.

OATC N OTE While letdown is configured for 120 gpm, the preferred flow path for Manual Makeup is through 1-FV-O11OB BLENDER OUTLET TO CHARGING PUMPS SUCT. The design capacity of the VCT spray nozzles would be challenged with 120 gpm letdown in service and the addition of the makeup flow upstream of the VCT (1X6AHO4-00024).

This could prevent makeup from reaching the desired flow rate. Thus, 1-FV-OI1IB should only be used if 1-FV-O11OB is not available.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 6 of 9 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

In the process of continuing the power ascension CVCS VCT Level Transmitter 1 LT-1 12 Fails High causing CVCS Auto Makeup Failure to VCT.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CAUTION With either Blender Outlet valve handswitch in the open position, an automatic isolation will not occur due to a Boric Acid and/or Total Makeup Flow Deviations OATC Step 4.6.1.7 Open one of the following valves:

BLENDER OUTLET TO CHARGING PUMPS SUCT 1-FV-01 lOB

-OR-BLENDER OUTLET TO VCT 1-FV-O111B OATC NOTES

. Manual makeup can be stopped at any time by placing 1-HS-40001B in STOP.

. VCT level should be maintained between 30 and 87 percent. (1-LIC-0185 controller pot should normally be set to 8.7.)

. VCT Pressure 1-Pl-115 should be maintained between 20 and 45 psig.

Step 4.6.1.8 Place VCT MAKEUP CONTROL 1-HS-40001B in START and perform the following:

Verify Boric Acid Transfer Pump is running.

Verify Reactor Makeup Water Pump is running.

Verify BORIC ACID TO BLENDER 1-FV-O11OA throttles open to provide the correct flow of boric acid.

Verify REACTOR MU WTR TO BLENDER 1-FV-O1 1 1A throttles open to provide correct total flow.

If desired, control Boric Acid Flow controller 1-FIC-OllO by adjusting potQ using up/down pushbuttons to control boric acid at the desired flowrate.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 7 of 9 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

In the process of continuing the power ascension CVCS VCT Level Transmitter 1 LT-l 12 Fails High causing CVCS Auto Makeup Failure to VCT.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Step 4.6.1.9 Monitor counters on BORIC ACID TO BLENDER Integrator 1-FQI-0110 and TOTAL MAKEUP Integrator 1 -FQI-01 1 1 and perform the following:

WHEN counter on 1-FQI-0110 BORIC ACID TO BLENDER Integrator reaches its setpoint, verify 1-FV-O11OA BORIC ACID TO BLENDER is closed.

WHEN counter on 1-FQI-0111 TOTAL MAKEUP Integrator reaches its setpoint, verify 1FV-01 1 1A REACTOR MAKEUP WATER TO BLENDER is closed.

OATC Step 4.6.1.10 If desired, flush approximately 15 gallons of Reactor Makeup Water through 1-FV-O11OB by performing the following:

a.

Place VCT MAKEUP MODE SELECT 1-HS-40001A to ALT DIL.

b.

Set TOTAL MAKEUP Integrator 1-FQI-0111 for 13 to 15 gals.

C.

Place BLENDER OUTLET TO VCT 1-HS-OI1IB in CLOSE.

d.

Place VCT MAKEUP CONTROL 1-HS--40001B in START.

e.

Verify flow is indicated on 1-FI-O11OB.

f.

WHEN TOTAL MAKEUP Integrator 1-FQI-0111 reaches the desired setpoint, verify 1-FV-O111A RX MU WTR TO BA BLENDER is closed.

OATC Step 4.6.1.1 1 Verify Boric Acid Flow controller 1 -FIC-Ol 10 is in AUTO and potentiometer is set for current RCS Cb.

Appendix_D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 8 of 9 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

In the process of continuing the power ascension CVCS VCT Level Transmitter 1 LT-112 Fails High causing CVCS Auto Makeup Failure to VCT.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Step 4.6.1.12 Align Reactor Makeup Control system for automatic operation as follows: (Not until repaired)

COMPONENT NAME POSITION a.

1-HS-O1 11 B BLENDER OUTLET TO VCT AUTO b.

1-HS-O11OB BLENDEROUTLETTO CHARGING PUMPS SUCTION AUTO C.

1-HS-40001A VCT MAKEUP MODE SELECT AUTO d.

1-HS-40001B VCT MAKEUP CONTROL START OATC Step 4.6.1.13 Verify the following valves are closed:

1-FV-O1 11 B BLENDER OUTLET TO VCT.

1-FV-O11OB BLENDER OUTLET TO CHARGING PUMPS SUCT.

OATC Step 4.6.1.14 if Boric Acid Transfer Pump was placed in START at Step 4.6.1.6, return to AUTO or as directed by SS.

OATC Step 4.6.1.15 IF Reactor Makeup Water Pump was placed in START at Step 4.6.1.6, return to AUTO or as directed by SS.

OATC Step 4,6.1.16 Operate the Pressurizer Back-up Heaters as necessary to equalize Cb between the RCS and the Pressurizer.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 9 of 9 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

In the process of continuing the power ascension CVCS VCT Level Transmitter 1LT-112 Fails High causing CVCS Auto Makeup Failure to VCT.

Time Position

}

Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE Automatic Control Rod withdrawal function has been disabled.

The only function enabled when Control Rod handswitch is placed in AUTO is automatic insertion when Tavg is at least 1.5 degrees above Tref.

OATC Step 4.6.1.17 Monitor RCS Tavg, control bank position, or power level as applicable.

SS Return to step and procedure in effect, UOP 12004-C.

END OF EVENT 3.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 1 of 4 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

Controlling PZR level channel 1LT-0459 fails high causing a reduction in charging flow. This will require the crew to enter AOP 18001-C, Section D, Failure of PRZR Level Instrumentation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Diagnoses that PZR level channel LI-459 has failed high and informs SS of the failure:

Indications:

PZR level channel I (459) goes to 100%

Charging flow lowers from 132 gpm Possible flashing in CVCS letdown line (flow oscillations)

Alarms:

ALB11-COl PRZR CONTROL HI LEVEL DEVAND HEATERS ON ALB1 1-FOl PRZR HI LEVEL CHANNEL ALERT ALBO7-A05 REGEN HX LTDN HI TEMP ALBO7-A06 NC PUMP LO FLOW ALBO8-F08 RCP SEAL WATER NJ LO FLOW REFERENCES ARP 17011-1 ALB1I-C01 OATC 2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS Pressurizer Backup Heaters energize.

OATC 3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS Check pressurizer level using 1-LR-0459 recorder and if a Pressurizer Level Control System malfunction is indicated, initiate 18001 -C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction.

OATC 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS IF Pressurizer Level Control System is not correcting level, take manual control and adjust as required.

SS Enters AOP 18001-C, Section D (Crew Update)

OATC / UO Dl.

Initiates the Continuous Actions Page.

1

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 2 of 4 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

Controlling PZR level channel 1 LT-0459 fails high causing a reduction in charging flow. This will require the crew to enter AOP 18001-C, Section D, Failure of PRZR Level Instrumentation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC

D2 Check PRZR level TRENDING TO PROGRAM LEVEL.

RNO

D2 E PRZR level instrument fails high, THEN perform the following as necessary: /

Adjusts charging to prevent letdown from flashing NOTE:

TAKES MANUAL CONTROL OF FIC-121 AND RAISES CHARGING FLOW.

-OR Isolate letdown IF PRZR level instrument fails low, THEN maintain charging flow approximately 10 gpm greater than total seal injection flow. (N/A)

OATC

D3.

Maintains seal injection flow to all RCPs 8 to 13 gpm.

NOTE:

DEPRESSES UP OR DOWN ARROW ON SEAL INJECTION CONTROLLER HV-182, AND ADJUSTS SEAL INJECTION AS REQUIRED.

OATC D4.

Select an unaffected channel on LS-459D PRZR LVL CNTL SELECT.

Note: Should select 461 / 460 D5.

Select same channel on LS-459E PRZR LVL REC SEL as selected on LS-459D.

Note: Should select 461 OATC

D6 Restore letdown flow by initiating 13006, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM, if required. (N/A) 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 3 of 4 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

Controlling PZR level channel 1 LT-0459 fails high causing a reduction in charging flow. This will require the crew to enter AOP 18001-C, Section D, Failure of PRZR Level Instrumentation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC D7.

Check if PRZR heaters should be restored to service:

PRZR level controlling channel FAILED LOW.

RNO D7.

GotoStepD9 OATC D9.

Return PRZR level control to AUTO.

NOTE:

Places F1C-121 in AUTO.

OATC

D1o Check PRZR level is maintained at program by auto control.

SS Dl 1.

Notify l&C to initiate repairs.

Contacts SSS to perform the following:

Notify I&C to initiate repairs Write a Condition Report Notify OPS Duty Manager of AOP entry SS D12.

Bypass the affected instrument channel using 13509 C, BYPASS TEST INSTRUMENTATION (BTI) PANEL OPERATION, if desired.

NOTE: Not expected to BTI affected instrument channels.

SS D13.

Trip affected channel bistable and place associated MASTER TEST switch in TEST position per TABLE Dl within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . (TS 3.3.1)

NOTE: Not expected to TRIP affected channel bistables.

3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 4 of 4 Event No.:

4 Event Description; Controlling PZR level channel 1 LT-0459 fails high causing a reduction in charging flow. This will require the crew to enter AOP 18001-C, Section D, Failure of PRZR Level Instrumentation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS D14.

Initiate the applicable actions of Technical Specification 3.3.1.

LCO 3.3.1 FU 9 Condition M PZR HI LEVEL TRIP> P-7 LCO 3.3.4 FU 8

- Condition A Remote Shutdown TS LCO 3.3.1 CONDITION M PZR HI LEVEL TRIP> P-7 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME M. One channel M.1 Place channel in trip.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months inoperable.

M.2 Reduce Thermal Power to < P-7.

78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months TS LCO 3.3.4 CONDITION A REMOTE SHUTDOWN CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more A.1 Restore required Function to 30 days required OPERABLE status.

Functions inoperable.

SS D15.

Check repairs and surveillances

- COMPLETE.

NOTE: Repairs and surveillances not expected to be complete.

RNO

D15 Perform the following; a.

WHEN repairs and surveillances are complete, THEN perform step D16.

b.

Return to procedure and step in effect.

END OF EVENT 4 4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 1 of 3 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

PT-507 Steam Header Pressure Transmitter fails downscale low. This will result in MFPT controls seeing a high delta P and causes MFPT controls to reduce the speed of the MFPT(s). The crew will be required to enter AOP-1 8016-C Section E for Failure of MFP Speed Control to mitigate the event.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Diagnoses failure of PT-507 Steam Header Pressure transmitter PT-507:

Symptoms / alarms:

UO /

STM GEN 1 (2, 3, 4) FLOW MISMATCH CREW STM GEN 1 (2, 3, 4) HI / LO LVL DEVIATION Indications:

P1-507 lowering Unexplained steam/feed flow mismatch indication on all SGs.

Diagnoses FAILURE OF MFP SPEED CONTROL I PT-507 UO PERFORMS IOAS OF AOP 18016-C SECTION E IOA El.

Checks steam and feed flows matched on all SGs RNO El.

Take manual control of the followinci as necessary to restore NR level between 60% and 70%:

SG feed flow valves MFP(s) speed UO places MFPT master controller 1SIC-509A in manual and adjusts feed pump speed to maintain Feedwater Pressure 100 psig to 225 psig greater than Steamline Pressure.

UO places MFRV(s) FV-510, FV-520, FV-530, FV-540 in manual as necessary to adjust feed flow to maintain SG NR level(s).

SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS SS I UO E2.

Initiates the Continuous Actions Page

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 2 of 3 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

PT-507 Steam Header Pressure Transmitter fails downscale low. This will result in MFPT controls seeing a high delta P and causes MFPT controls to reduce the speed of the MFPT(s). The crew will be required to enter AOP-1 8016-C Section E for Failure of MFP Speed Control to mitigate the event.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO

E3.

Maintain SC NR levels GREATER THAN 40%

RNO

E3.

Perform the following:

a.

Trip the reactor b.

Go to 19000-C, E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.

UO E4.

Check SIC-509A, B, and C MFPT SPEED CONTROL

OPERATING PROPERLY.

ALB15-C05 MFPT LOSS OF FW SIGNAL

- EXTINGUISHED.

Controller(s) maintaining stable MFPT speed.

Controller(s) maintaining MFP discharge pressure/SG pressure differential

- BETWEEN 100 AND 225 PSI.

RNO E4.

Perform one of the following:

Adjust MFPT speed as necessary to maintain MFP discharge pressure/SC pressure differential between 100 and 225 psig.

-OR-Transfer control to the GE Pot by performing the following:

a.

Adiust SC-3151(3152) MFPT A(B) SPEED CHANGER to obtain zero deviation on 51-3153(31 54).

b.

Transfer control by placing MFPT-A(B) MOTOR SPEED CHANGER HS-3151(3152) in MANUAL.

c.

Adiust SC-3151(3152) to maintain MFP discharge pressure/SG pressure differential between 100 and 225 p-.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 3of3 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

PT-507 Steam Header Pressure Transmitter fails downscale low. This will result in MFPT controls seeing a high delta P and causes MFPT controls to reduce the speed of the MFPT(s). The crew Will be required to enter AOP-1 8016-C Section E for Failure of MFP Speed Control to mitigate the event.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO E5.

Check PT-507 OPERATING PROPERLY RNO E5.

Verify Steam Dumps in TAvG Mode by initiating 13601, STEAM GENERATOR AND MAIN STEAM SYSTEM OPERATION.

SS E6.

Notify l&C to initiate repairs.

Contacts SSS to perform the following:

Notify I&C to initiate repairs Write a Condition Report Notify OPS Duty Manager of AOP entry UO E7.

Return feed flow controls to AUTO as necessary.

NOTE: UO MAINTAINS SIC-509A IN MANUAL TO CONTROL MFPT SPEED

E8.

Check repairs and surveillances COMPLETE.

RNO

E8.

Perform the following:

a.

WHEN repairs and surveillances are complete, THEN perform Step E9.

b.

Return to procedure and step in effect.

END OF EVENT5

Appendix 0 ReqJred Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 1 of 16 Event No.:

6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 Event

Description:

During power ascension, MFPT Train A will develop a sheared shaft resulting in a loss of all FW. The Reactor will fail to automatically trip (ATWT) and will not manually trip causing an ATWT condition. The Main Turbine fails to auto trip and must be manually tripped. The Auto Rod insertion is inoperable and must be manually inserted to shutdown the reactor. A Loss of All AFW will cause a RED Path on Heat Sink which must be addressed by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnoses Loss of Feedwater Flow:

Symptoms/Indications:

ALB15-B05 MFPT DISCH HDR LO PRESS ALB13-A01(BO1, C01, D01) STM GEM 1 (2,3,4) FLOW MISMATCH ALB13-A06(B06, C06, D06) STM GEN 1 (2,3,4) HI/LO LVL DEVIATION Unexpected Change in MFP Speed of AP CREW Recognizes Failure of Reactor To AUTO TRIP SS Orders OATC and UO to perform Immediate Operator Action for 19000-C E-0 CREW 19000-C, E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION IMMEDIATE OPERATORACTIONS OATC 1.

Check Reactor Trip

a. Rod Bottom Lights

- LIT

b. Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers

- OPEN

c. Neutron Flux LOWERING RNO 1.

Trip Reactor using both Reactor trip handswitches.

IF Reactor NOT tripped, THEN goto 19211-C, FR-S.1 RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION / ATWT.

SS Transitions to 19211-C, FR-S.1 RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWT (Crew Update)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 2 of 16 Event No.:

6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 Event

Description:

During power ascension, MFPT Train A will develop a sheared shaft resulting in a loss of all FW. The Reactor will fail to automatically trip (ATWT) and will not manually trip causing an ATWT condition. The Main Turbine fails to auto trip and must be manually tripped. The Auto Rod insertion is inoperable and must be manually inserted to shutdown the reactor. A Loss of All AFW will cause a RED Path on Heat Sink which must be addressed by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW 19211-C, FR-S.1 RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION!

ATWT IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS CAUTION RCPs should not be tripped with Reactor power greater than 5%.

OATC 1.

Verify Reactor Trip:

. Rod Bottom Lights

- LIT

. Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers

- OPEN

. Neutron Flux LOWERING RNO CRITICAL 1.

Trip Reactor using both Reactor trip handswitches.

TASK

IF Reactor tripped, THEN insert Control Rods.

UO 2.

Verify Turbine Trip:

a.

All Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED.

CRITICAL RNO TASK 2a.

Trip Turbine

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 3 of 16 Event No.:

6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 Event Description; During power ascension, MFPT Train A will develop a sheared shaft resulting in a loss of all FW. The Reactor will fail to automatically trip (ATWT) and will not manually trip causing an ATWT condition. The Main Turbine fails to auto trip and must be manually tripped. The Auto Rod insertion is inoperable and must be manually inserted to shutdown the reactor. A Loss of All AFW will cause a RED Path on Heat Sink which must be addressed by the crew.

Time__[

Position Applicants Action or Behavior SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS UO 3.

CheckAFWPumpsRUNNING.

. MDAFW Pumps RNO Start Pumps SS / UO

TDAFW Pump, if required.

RNO Open Steam Supply valve HV-5106.

Dispatches personnel to investigate MDAFW pumps and TDAFW pump failure.

NOTE TO EXAMINER: MDAFW PUMP A RUNNING WITH SHEARED SHAFT.

MDAFWPUMP B WILL NOT START (AUTO OR MANUAL). TDAFW PUMP WILL OVERSPEED WHEN STARTED (AUTO OR MANUAL).

OATC 4.

Emergency borate the RCS:

a.

Start at least one Boric Acid Transfer Pump.

b.

Verify a Charging Pump is running.

c.

Open EMERGENCY BORATE valve HV-8104.

d.

Verify charging flow GREATER THAN 42 GPM.

e.

Verify boric acid flow GREATER THAN 30 GPM.

f.

Check RCS pressure LESS THAN 2335 PSIG.

SS 5.

Check Containment Ventilation Isolation; OATC a.

Dampers and Valves CLOSED; CVI MLB indication.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 1 of 3 Event No.:

6 Event

Description:

RCS loop #2 flow transmitter 1FT-0424 will fail downscale low. This will require an entry into AOP-1 8001-C, section A to address the failed flow instrument.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Diagnose RCS loop # 2 flow channel Fl-0424 low failure:

Symptoms I alarms I indications:

ALB12-B01 RCP LOOP 2 LOW FLOW ALERT RCS Loop 2 FLOW TRIP 90% bistable status light lit.

RCS Loop 2 flow indicates down scale low (< 90%)

OATC References ARP 17012-1 Window 801 RCP LOOP 2 LOW FLOW ALERT OATC 1.0 PROBABLE CAUSE 1.

Instrument malfunction or test.

2.

Trip of Reactor Coolant Pump 2 OATC 2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS 1.

Reactor trip will occur due to low flow in one reactor Coolant loop if above 48% rated thermal power. (NO) 2.

Reactor trip will occur due to low flow on 2 of 4 Reactor Coolant Pump loops if above 10% rated thermal power.

(NO)

OATC 2.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS 1.

Check Loop 2 flow indications using indicators 1-FI-0424, 0425, and 0426 on the QMCB. (NO) 2.

jf a loss of flow in Loop 2 is indicated, initiate 18005-C, Partial Loss of Flow. (NO) 3.

IF instrument failure is indicated, Initiate 18001-C, Primary System Instrumentation. (Yes)

SS Enters AOP-1 8001-C, section A for Failure of RCS Loop Flow Instrumentation.

(Crew Update)

RO Al.

Check actual RCS flow GREATER THAN 90% IN ALL LOOPS.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 2 of 3 Event No.:

6 Event

Description:

RCS loop # 2 flow transmitter 1 FT-0424 will fail downscale low. This will require an entry into AOP-1 8001-C, section A to address the failed flow instrument.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC A2.

Identify the affected flow instrument.

NOTE: Identifies IFI-0424 Loop 2 RCS Flow Instrument Failure.

SS A3.

Notify l&C to Initiate repairs.

Contacts SSS to perform the following:

Notify l&C to initiate repairs.

Write a Condition report.

Notify OPS duty Manager of AOP Entry.

SS A4.

Bypasses the affected instrument channel using 1 3509-C if desired.

NOTE: Will not desire to Bypass Channel.

OATC A5.

Checks power level> P-7. (Not Lit)

SS A6.

Trip affected channel bistable and place associated MASTER TEST switch in TEST position per TABLE Al within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . (TS 3.3.1)

NOTE: Not expected to trip affected Bistabie.

SS A7.

Initiate the applicable actions of Technical Specification 3.3.1 LCO 3.3.1 EU lOa.

Condition N Reactor Coolant Flow Low Single Loop SS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME N. One reactor N.1 Place channel in trip.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Coolant Flow-Low (single loop)

OR channel inoperable.

N.2 Reduce THERMAL 76 hours8.796296e-4 days 0.0211 hours 1.256614e-4 weeks 2.8918e-5 months POWER_to_<_P-8

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 3 of 3 Event No.:

6 Event

Description:

RCS loop # 2 flow transmitter 1 FT-0424 will fail downscale low. This will require an entry into AOP-1 8001-C, section A to address the failed flow instrument.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC I UO A8.

Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

SS

A9.

Check repairs and surveillances COMPLETE.

RNO

A9.

Perform the following:

a.

WHEN repairs and surveillances are complete, THEN perform step AlO.

b.

Return to procedure and step in affect.

END OF EVENT 6

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 4 of 16 Event No.: fr 7, 8, 9 and 10 Event

Description:

During power ascension, MFPT Train A will develop a sheared shaft resulting in a loss of all FW. The Reactor will fail to automatically trip (ATWT) and will not manually trip causing an ATWT condition. The Main Turbine fails to auto trip and must be manually tripped. The Auto Rod insertion is inoperable and must be manually inserted to shutdown the reactor. A Loss of All AFW will cause a RED Path on Heat Sink which must be addressed by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior

5. cont.

CVI VALVES CVI VALVE DESCRIPTION HV-2624A CTB POST LOCA PURGE EXH IRC ISO VLV HV-2624B CTB POST LOCA PURGE EXH IRc ISO VLV HV-2626A CTB NORM PURGE SPLY IRc ISO VLV MAIN HV-2626B CTB NORM PURGE SPLY IRC ISO VLV MINI HV-2627A CTB NORM PURGE SPLY oRc ISO VLV MAIN HV-2627B CTB NORM PURGE SPLY ORc ISO VLV MINI HV-2628A CTB NORM PURGE EXH IRc ISO VLV MAIN HV-2628B CTB NORM PURGE EXH IRC ISO VLV MINI HV-2629A CTB NORM PURGE EXH ORC ISO VLV MAIN HV-2629B CTB MINI PURGE EXH oRc ISO VLV MINI HV-12604 PIP PEN RM OUTLET ISO DAMPER HV-1 2605

PIP PEN RM INLET ISO DAMPER HV-1 2975 CNMT AIR RAD MONITOR RTN ISO IRC HV-1 2976 CNMT AIR RAD MONITOR SPLY ISO - ORc HV-1 2977 CNMT AIR RAD MONITOR RTN ISO

- ORc HV-1 2978 CNMT AIR RAD MONITOR SPLY ISO - IRC HS-2548 PIPING PEN FILTER EXH FAN 1561-N7-001 HS-2549 PIPING PEN FILTER EXH FAN 1561-N7-002 HV-12596 RECYCLE HOLD-UP TK-1 ISO VENT VALVE TRAIN A HV-12597 RECYCLE HOLD-UP TK-1 SO VENT VALVE TRAIN B SS 6.

Initiate the following:

OATC I UO

Continuous Action Page.

SS

NMP-EP-11O, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION AND INITIAL ACTION.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 5 of 16 Event No.: f, 7, 8, 9 and 10 Event

Description:

During power ascension, MFPT Train A will develop a sheared shaft resulting in a loss of all FW. The Reactor will fail to automatically trip (ATWT) and will not manually trip causing an ATWT condition. The Main Turbine fails to auto trip and must be manually tripped. The Auto Rod insertion is inoperable and must be manually inserted to shutdown the reactor. A Loss of All AFW will cause a RED Path on Heat Sink which must be addressed by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS

7 CheckforSl:

OATC a.

SlsignalEXISTSORACTUATED.

(NO)

RNO a.

an SI signal is actuated during this procedure, THEN initiate ATTACHMENT A.

SS 8.

Check the following trips have occurred:

OATC a.

Reactor Trip.

RNO 8a.

Locally trip the RTBs and Bypass Breakers.

uo b.

Turbine Trip.

NOTE:

WHEN CALLED TO LOCALLY OPEN UNIT I REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS, WAIT 5 MINUTES, THEN DELETE ES 01 MALFUNCTION.

SS

9*

Check Reactor power:

OATC a.

LESS THAN 5%

RNO 9a.

Go to Step 10 UO 10.

Check Main Generator Output Breakers OPEN.

Appendix D Re_qjedOperator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 6 of 16 Event No.:

7, 8, 9 and 10 Event

Description:

During power ascension, MFPT Train A will develop a sheared shaft resulting in a loss of all FW. The Reactor will fail to automatically trip (ATWT) and will not manually trip causing an AT\\VT condition. The Main Turbine fails to auto trip and must be manually tripped. The Auto Rod insertion is inoperable and must be manually inserted to shutdown the reactor. A Loss of All AFW will cause a RED Path on Heat Sink which must be addressed by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO

11.

Check SG levels:

a.

NR level AT LEAST ONE GREATER THAN 10% [32%

ADVERSE].

b.

Maintain NR levels between 10% [32% ADVERSE] and 65%.

UO

12.

Check CST level GREATER THAN 15%.

SS 13.

Verify all dilution paths ISOLATED:

OATC RX MU WTR TO BA BLENDER, FV-111A-CLOSED Dispatch operator to verify CVCS RX M/U WTR TO COP A ISOL, 1209-U4-183 LOCKED CLOSED.

SS 10.

Check for reactivity insertion from uncontrolled RCS cooldown:

OATC RCS temperature LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER.

-OR UO Any SG pressure LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER.

SS CAUTION At least one SG should be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

UO 15.

Verify Main Steamline Isolation and Bypass Valves CLOSED.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 7 of 16 Event No.:

7, 8, 9 and 10 Event

Description:

During power ascension, MFPT Train A will develop a sheared shaft resulting in a loss of all FW. The Reactor will fail to automatically trip (ATWT) and will not manually trip causing an ATWT condition. The Main Turbine fails to auto trip and must be manually tripped. The Auto Rod insertion is inoperable and must be manually inserted to shutdown the reactor. A Loss of All AFW will cause a RED Path on Heat Sink which must be addressed by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 16.

Check SGs secondary pressure boundaries:

a.

Identify intact SG(s):

SG pressures

- ANY STABLE QE RISING.

b.

Identify faulted SG(s)

ANY SG PRESSURE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER.

-OR ANY SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED.

RNO 16b.

Go to Step 22.

OATC 22.

Check Core Exit TCs LESS THAN 1200°F.

OATC 23.

Check Reactor Power:

a.

LESS THAN 5%.

(YES) b.

IR SUR LESS THAN 0 DPM.

(YES)

OATC

24.

Maintain emergency boration to provide adequate shutdown margin for subsequent plant conditions.

OATC 25.

Initiate CSFS Trees per 19200-C, F-0 CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREE.

NOTE TO EXAMINER: A DELAY OF ENTRYINTO EOP 19231-C FR-HI MAY OCCUR UPON EXIT OF 19211-C FR-S.1 TO E-O WHILE THE CSFSTS ARE BEING EVALUA TED.

Appendix D Reguiredpator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 8 of 16 Event No.:

7, 8, 9 and 10 Event

Description:

During power ascension, MFPT Train A will develop a sheared shaft resulting in a loss of all FW. The Reactor will fail to automatically trip (ATWT) and will not manually trip causing an ATWT condition. The Main Turbine fails to auto trip and must be manually tripped. The Auto Rod insertion is inoperable and must be manually inserted to shutdown the reactor. A Loss of All AFW will cause a RED Path on Heat Sink which must be addressed by the crew.

Time J Position Applicants Action or Behavior 26.

Return to procedure and step in effect. (19000-C)

NOTE: SO DISPATCHED TO THE TDAFW PUMP REPORTS THAT THE TRIP AND THROTTLE VALVE MECHANICAL LINKAGE IS BENT AND MAINTENANCE IS RETRIEVING THE SPARE FROM THE WAREHOUSE.

SS Transitions to EOP 19231-C FR-Hi RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK. (Crew Update) 19231-C FR-HI RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK.

ss CAUTION Feed flow should NOT be re-established to any faulted SG if a non-faulted SG is available.

SS / UO Step 1.

Check total feed flow capability to SG(s)

Greater than 570 gpm available.

(NO)

-AND Less than 570 gpm due to Operator action.

RNO i.

GotoStep3.

SS Step 3.

Initiatethefollowing:

OATC / UO Continuous Actions Page for Prior to Establishing Feed and Bleed.

SS NMP-EP-i10, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION AND INITIAL ACTION.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form E-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 9 of 16 Event No.:

7, 8, 9 and 10 Event

Description:

During power ascension, MFPT Train A will develop a sheared shaft resulting in a loss of all FW. The Reactor will fail to automatically trip (ATWT) and will not manually trip causing an ATWT condition. The Main Turbine fails to auto trip and must be manually tripped. The Auto Rod insertion is inoperable and must be manually inserted to shutdown the reactor. A Loss of All AFW will cause a RED Path on Heat Sink which must be addressed by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Step 4.

Check if secondary heat sink is required:

OATC a.

RCS pressure GREATER THAN ANY NON-FAULTED SG PRESSURE.

b.

RCS WR temperature GREATER THAN 350°F.

SS

Step 5.

Check CCP status AT LEAST ONE AVAILABLE.

SS

Step 6.

Check if RCS bleed and feed is required:

a.

Check the following:

WR level in any 3 SGs LESS THAN 29%[44% ADVERSE]?

RCS pressure GREATER THAN 2335 PSIG DUE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK.

RNO Step 6a.

WHEN criteria for bleed and feed are met, THEN perform Steps 6b. and 6c.

Go to Step 7.

b.

Trip all RCPs.

c.

Go to Step 35 and perform bleed and feed actions.

SS / UO Step 7.

Place Containment Hydrogen Monitors in service by initiating 13130, POSTACCIDENT HYDROGEN CONTROL.

NOTE: NOT EXPECTED FOR UO TO PERFORM. CALLS SSS AT C&T.

UO Step *8.

Check CST level GREATER THAN 15%.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 10 of 16 Event No.:

7, 8, 9 and 10 Event

Description:

During power ascension, MFPT Train A will develop a sheared shaft resulting in a loss of all FW. The Reactor will fail to automatically trip (ATWT) and will not manually trip causing an ATWT condition. The Main Turbine fails to auto trip and must be manually tripped. The Auto Rod insertion is inoperable and must be manually inserted to shutdown the reactor. A Loss of All AFW will cause a RED Path on Heat Sink which must be addressed by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Step 9.

Verify SG Blowdown Isolated:

SG Blowdown Isolation Valves CLOSED WITH HANDSWITCHES IN CLOSE POSITION.

SG Sample Isolation Valves CLOSED.

UO Step *10 Try to establish MDAFW flow to at least one SG:

a.

Check MDAFW Pump AVAILABLE.

(NO)

Power available Suction Pressure Discharge pressure RNO 10.a Perform the following:

Initiate actions to restore an MDAFW Pump Goto Step 11.

UO Step *1 1.

Try to establish TDAFW flow to at least one SG:

a.

Check TDAFW Pump AVAILABLE:

(NO)

Steam admission valve HV-5106 OPEN.

Trip & Throttle valve PV-15129 OPEN (HS-15111). (NO)

Governor valve SV-1 5133 OPERATING PROPERLY PDIC-5180a.

RNO

1 l.a Perform the following:

Initiate 13610, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM to operate TDAFW Pump as necessary.

When TDAFW Pump is Started, THEN go to Step 1 lb.

GotoStepl2.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 11 of 16 Event No.:

7, 8, 9 and 10 Event

Description:

During power ascension, MFPT Train A will develop a sheared shaft resulting in a loss of all FW. The Reactor will fail to automatically trip (ATWT) and will not manually trip causing an ATWT condition. The Main Turbine fails to auto trip and must be manually tripped. The Auto Rod insertion is inoperable and must be manually inserted to shutdown the reactor. A Loss of All AFW will cause a RED Path on Heat Sink which must be addressed by the crew.

Time Position

]

Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Step 12.

Stop all RCPs.

OATC Step *13.

Check if SI actuation is required.

PRZR level CANNOT BE MAINTAINED GREATER THAN 9%

[37% ADVERSE].

-OR RCS Subcooling LESS THAN 24°F [38°F ADVERSE].

RNO Step*13:

WHEN criteria for SI is met, THEN perform the following:

a.

Verify SI Actuated.

b.

After 60 seconds, reset SI.

c.

Cycle Reactor Trip Breakers.

d.

Reset FWI.

GotoStepl5.

NOTE: PRIOR TO STEP 15, C&T WILL PAGE UO AND REPORT TDAFW PUMP TRIPAND THROTTLE VALVEHAS BEEN REPAIRED.

UO Reviews 1361 0-1 with System Operator stationed at the TDAFW Pump:

4.4.7.8 Place TDAFW Pump Steam Admission Valve 1-HV-5106 handswitch 1HS-5106A (QMCB) in CLOSE.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 12 of 16 Event No.:

7, 8, 9 and 10 Event

Description:

During power ascension, MFPT Train A will develop a sheared shaft resulting in a loss of all FW. The Reactor will fail to automatically trip (ATWT) and will not manually trip causing an ATWT condition. The Main Turbine fails to auto trip and must be manually tripped. The Auto Rod insertion is inoperable and must be manually inserted to shutdown the reactor. A Loss of All AFW will cause a RED Path on Heat Sink which must be addressed by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE Holding 1 HS-51 06A in the CLOSE position allows the speed controller startup logic to reset when the T&T valve is electrically opened.

UO 4.4.7.9 IF AFW Actuation signal is present, hold 1HS-5106A in the CLOSE position until completion of Step 4.4.7.10.

NOTE When Handswitch 1HS-15111 is placed in OPEN, the Trip And Throttle Valve latches and then opens.

uo 4.4.7.10 Place Handswitch IHS-15111 (QMCB) in OPEN, THEN release.

CAUTIONS Steam Admission Valve 1-HV-5106 will open when 1HS-5106A is released if an open signal is present.

If pump speed can not be controlled or overspeed trip occurs again when I HS-51 06 is released in the next step, do not attempt to reset again until the speed control problem has been corrected.

UO 4.4.7.11 WHEN the Trip And Throttle Valve is fully open as indicated at MLBI3-4.2OR 1HS-15111 (QMCB), release 1HS-5106A1F applicable.

NOTE: CONTINUOUS ACTION STEP lib of 19231-C SHOULD BE PERFORMED NEXT:

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 13 of 16 Event No.:, 7, 8, 9 and 10 Event

Description:

During power ascension, MFPT Train A will develop a sheared shaft resulting in a loss of all FW. The Reactor will fail to automatically trip (ATWT) and will not manually trip causing an ATVVT condition. The Main Turbine fails to auto trip and must be manually tripped. The Auto Rod insertion is inoperable and must be manually inserted to shutdown the reactor. A Loss of All AFW will cause a RED Path on Heat Sink which must be addressed by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS I UO Step *15.

Try to establish main FW flow to at least one SG:

a.

Check condensate system IN SERVICE.

NOTE TO EXAMINER: WHEN TDAFW PUMP IS STARTED CONTINUE WITH STEP

llb NEXT BELOW!

Step *1 1. cont.

SS / UO b.

Verify TDAFW pump throttle valves open:

UO HV-5122 TDAFW Pump to SG I CRITICAL HV-5125 TDAFW Pump to SG 2 TASK HV-5I27TDAFWPumptoSG3 HV-5120 TDAFW Pump to SG 4 c.

Check total flow to SG(s)

GREATER THAN 570 GPM.

RNO

1 1.c IE feed flow to at least one SG verified, THEN perform the following:

1)

Maintain flow to restore NR level to greater than 10% [32%

ADVERSE].

ss 2)

WHEN NR LEVEL GREATER THAN 10% [32% ADVERSE],

THEN return to procedure and step in effect. (19000-C, E-0)

END OF SCENARIO UNLESS BLEED AND FEED STEPS REQUIRED:

BLEED AND FEED STEPS IF REQUIRED (STEPS 35 70):

OATC Step 35.

Verify SI actuated.

OATC Step 36.

Verify RCS feed path:

a.

Verify ECCS Pump status:

CCPs AT LEAST ONE RUNNING.

OR SI Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 14 of 16 Event No.:

, 7, 8, 9 and 10 Event

Description:

During power ascension, MFPT Train A will develop a sheared shaft resulting in a loss of all FW. The Reactor will fail to automatically trip (ATWT) and will not manually trip causing an ATWT condition. The Main Turbine fails to auto trip and must be manually tripped. The Auto Rod insertion is inoperable and must be manually inserted to shutdown the reactor. A Loss of All AFW will cause a RED Path on Heat Sink which must be addressed by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Step 36 cont.

b.

Verify ECCS valve alignment PROPER INJECTION LINEUP INDICATED ON MLBs.

CAUTION During bleed and feed operation the PRT may rupture.

Step 37.

Establish RCS bleed path:

a.

Place all PRZR Heaters in OFF/PTL.

b.

Check power to PRZR PORV Block Valves AVAILABLE.

c.

Arm COPS and check PRZR PORV Block Valves BOTH OPEN.

d.

Open both PRZR PORVs.

Step 38.

Verify adequate RCS bleed path.

COPSARMED.

PRZR PORV Block Valves BOTH OPEN.

PRZR PORVs BOTH OPEN.

Step 39.

Initiate ATTACHMENT D while continuing with this procedure.

Step 40.

Initiate CONTINUOUS ACTIONS AFTER ESTABLISHING BLEED AND FEED.

Step 41.

Maintain RCS heat removal:

ECCS flow.

PRZR PORVs BOTH OPEN.

Appendix D Reqred Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 15 of 16 Event NoV: %, 7, 8, 9 and 10 Event

Description:

During power ascension, MFPT Train A will develop a sheared shaft resulting in a loss of all FW. The Reactor will fail to automatically trip (ATWT) and will not manually trip causing an ATWT condition. The Main Turbine fails to auto trip and must be manually tripped. The Auto Rod insertion is inoperable and must be manually inserted to shutdown the reactor. A Loss of All AFW will cause a RED Path on Heat Sink which must be addressed by the crew.

Time

]

Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Step 42.

Resets SI.

OATC Step 43.

Resets CIA.

UO Step 44.

Establishes Instrument Air to Containment.

a Instrument Air Pressure GREATER THAN 100 PSIG.

b Open INSTR AIR CNMT ISO VLV HV-9378.

c Verify PRZR Spray Valves operating as required.

UO Step 45.

Places Containment H2 Monitors in service by initiating 13130, POST-ACCIDENT HYDROGEN CONTROL.

OATC Step 46.

Check Containment pressure

- REMAINED LESS THAN 21.5 PSIG BY PRESSURE RECORDING.

SS to Step 48 OATC Step 48.

Check RWST level

- GREATER THAN 29%.

UO Step 49.

Try to establish MDAFW flow to at least one SG:

a.

Check MDAFW Pump AVAILABLE:

RNO:

a.

Initiate actions to restore an MDAFW Pump.

SS

Go to Step 53.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior

Appendix D Recired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 16 of 16 Event No.:, 7, 8, 9 and 10 Event

Description:

During power ascension, MFPT Train A will develop a sheared shaft resulting in a loss of all FW. The Reactor will fail to automatically trip (ATWT) and will not manually trip causing an ATWT condition. The Main Turbine fails to auto trip and must be manually tripped. The Auto Rod insertion is inoperable and must be manually inserted to shutdown the reactor. A Loss of All AFW will cause a RED Path on Heat Sink which must be addressed by the crew.

SS I UO Step 53.

Try to establish TDAFW flow to at least one SG.

a.

Check TDAFW Pump Available.

Steam admission valve HV-5106 OPEN.

Trip & Throttle valve PV-15129

- OPEN (HS-151 11).

Governor valve SV-15133

- OPERATING PROPERLY (PDIC-51 80A).

b.

Select SG(s) to feed:

1)

All SG WR levels

- LESS THAN 9% [31% ADVERSE].

c.

Check Core Exit TCs

- STABLE OR LOWERING.

d.

Restore feed flow to selected SG

- BETWEEN 30 GPM AND 100 GPM:

IPC Point UF5403.

e.

Check Dry SG WR level

- GREATER THAN 9%

[31% ADVERSE].

f.

Raise feed flow to restore NR level greater than 10%

[32% ADVERSE] and go to Step 70.

SS / UO Step 70.

Check for adequate secondary heat sink.

a NR level in at least one SG

- GREATER THAN 10%

[32% ADVERSE].

RNO a.

IF feed flow to at least one SG verified, THEN do NOT continue until NR level is restored to greater than 10% [32% ADVERSE].

NOTE: THE CREW WILL REMAIN AT STEP 70 UNTIL ONE SG NR LEVEL> 10%.

END OF THE SCENARIO

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: VOGTLE Scenario No.:!

Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Examiners:

Capehart Operators Meeks Hopkins Initial Conditions: 100 % Power BOL.

Equipment OOS: COW Pump 5, Air Compressor 3 Turnover:

INFO LCO 3,7.7 CCW Train A, Containment mini-purge in service.

Preloaded Malfunctions:

ES 01 Failure of Automatic Reactor Trip ES 08 Train A Auto SI Failure SI 06A SIP A Auto Start Failure SI 03B SIP B Trips on Start AF 05A MDAFW Pump Train A Auto Actuation Failure AF 05B MDAFW Pump Train B Auto Actuation Failure AF 05C TDAFW Pump Auto Actuation Failure CV 16A CCP Train A Auto Start Failure CV 0GB CCP Train B Trip Event Maif. No.

Event Event No.

Type*

Description 1

RC-1 OB I (OATC)

RCS LOOP 2 NR TCOLD RTD TE-421 B Fails High I (SS)

TS (SS)

LCO 3.3.1 FU 6,7 Condition E and LCO 3.3.2 Fu 5b Condition I

2 SG-03A1 I (UO)

Steam Generator Pressure Channel PT-514 Fails High (100%)

I (SS)

TS (SS)

LCO 3.3.2 FU le, 4d(1) Condition D, and LCO 3.3.4 FU13 Condition A 3

CV-07 C (OATC)

Normal Charging Pump (NCP) TRIPS C (SS) 4 NI-1OD I (OATC)

PR NIS N-42 Lower Detector Fails High I (SS)

TS (SS)

LCO 3.3.1 FU 2a, 3, 6, and 16c, d, e.

5 N/A N (UO)

Return Charging and Letdown to Service (Call from Management to have UO N (SS) perform this task).

Event Maif. No.

Event Event No.

Type*

Description RD-16 M

Ejected Rod H-8 6

(CREW)

ES-Cl C

- OATC Failure of Automatic Reactor Trip ES-08 C

- SS Train A Auto SI Failure With SIP A Auto Start Failure and Trip of SIP SI-06A C

- OATC B.

7 SI-03B CV-16A CCP A Auto Start Failure, with CCP B Trips on Start.

CV-06 B 8

AFO5A, C

- UD AFW Pumps Auto Actuation Failure (all 3 pumps) With Manual Starts B, C C

- SS Available (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

]

Event 1:

RCS Loop 2 NR TCOLD RDT TE-421 B Fails High.

Verifiable actions:

OATC Places Rods in manual Technical specifications:

LCD 3.3.1 EU 6, 7 and LCD 3.3.2 Function 5b Event 2:

Steam Generator# 1 Pressure Channel Transmitter PT-514 Fails High Verifiable actions:

UO Places Main Feed Water Pumps Master Controller in manual and affected SG Main Feed Regulating Valve to manual and returns SG NR level to program level of 65%.

Technical specifications:

LCD 3.3.2 FU le, 4d(l) and LCD 3.3.4 EU 13

Event 3:

Normal Charging Pump (NCP) TRIPS Verifiable actions:

OATC Closes letdown orifice isolation valves and letdown isolation valves.

Technical specifications:

NONE Event 4:

PR NIS N-42 Lower Detector Fails High Verifiable actions:

OATC Places Rods in Manual (Immediate Operator Action)

UO Defeats failed NI channel N-42 at the NIS racks by placing the Upper and Lower Sections, Power Mismatch, Rod Stop Bypass, and Comparator Channel Defeat switches to the N42 position.

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.3.1 EU 2a, 2b 3, 6, and 16 Event 5:

Return Normal Charging and Letdown to Service.

UO Charging and Letdown placed back in service per 13006-1, CVCS, following the loss of the NCP.

Event 6:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip.

Verifiable actions:

OATC Manually trips reactor by placing one or both reactor trip hand switches to the trip position.

Event 7:

Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence.

Verifiable actions:

OATC Manually actuates Safety Injection, manually starts SI Pump A.

OATC Manually trips RCPs no later than step 11 of E-0.

3

Event 8:

AFW pump auto actuation failures (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Verifiable actions:

UO Manually starts both MDAFW pumps and TDAFW pumps per UO Initial Actions Page of E-O.

CRITICAL TASKS:

1. Manually trips reactor in response to an automatic reactor trip failure. OATC trips Reactor during performance of immediate operator actions of E-O.

2. Manually starts SIP A (Step 3b OATC Initial Actions) due to auto start failure with SIP B tripping during safety injection train B loading sequence to provide intermediate head ECCS injection flow into the core by the end of the OATC Initial Actions.

OR Manually starts CCP A (Step 3a OATC Initial Actions) due to auto start failure with CCP B tripping during safety injection train B loading sequence to provide high head ECCS injection flow to prevent a loss or degraded core cooling condition by the end of the OATC Initial Actions.

3. Trips all reactor coolant pumps due to criteria being met on foldout page or no later than step 11 of E-O, 19000-C. Tripping reactor coolant pump when required prevents uncovering the core if tripped later in the scenario.

4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: I Page 1 of 3 Event No.:

I Event

Description:

RCS NR Temperature Instrument TE-421 B Fails High (Tcold) on loop # 2.

This will require the OATC to perform lOAs to stop inward control rod motion by placing rods in MANUAL.

The crew will then enter AOP-1 8001 section B Failure of RCS Narrow Range Temperature Instrumentation to complete the corrective actions for this failure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Diagnose NR Temperature Instrument Failure:

(Loop 2 TcOLD TE-421B fails high)

Symptoms I alarms:

OATC ALB12-A03 RC LOOP AT/AUCT DELTA T HI-LO DEV ALB12-A04 RC LOOP TAVG/AUCT TAVG HI-LO DEV ALB12-A05 TAVG TREF DEVIATION ALB12-A06 OVERTEMP tiT ALERT ALB12-B06 OVERPOWER tT ALERT ALB12-B04 AUCT TAVG HIGH ALB1O-C03 OVERPOWER tiT ROD BLOCK AND RUNBACK ALERT ALB1O-E03 OVERTEMP £T ROD BLOCK AND RUN BACK ALERT Indications:

Rapid inward control rod motion.

Loop 2 Tavg / Delta T indications deviating from other loops.

18001-C Section B OATC IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION B1.

Place ROD BANK SELECTOR SWITCH in MAN position.

SS Verifies immediate operator action step B1 with OATC SS Enters AOP 18001-C, Section B. (Crew Update)

OATC Subsequent Actions B2.

Restore TAVG to program band.

OATC B3.

Select affected loop on TS-412T TAVG DEFEAT SEL Defeats 422 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: I Page 2 of 3 Event NoV:

1 Event

Description:

RCS NR Temperature Instrument TE-421 B Fails High (Tcold) on ioop # 2.

This will require the OATC to perform IOAs to stop inward control rod motion by placing rods in MANUAL.

The crew will then enter AOP-1 8001 section B Failure of RCS Narrow Range Temperature Instrumentation to complete the corrective actions for this failure.

__Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior B4.

Select affected loop on TS-41 1 F DELTA T DEFEAT SEL.

Defeats 421 OATC B5.

Place ROD BANK SELECTOR SWITCH in AUTO position, if desired.

NOTE: Crew will probably return rods to 228 steps SS B6.

Notify I & C to initiate repairs.

Calls SS to perform the following:

. Notify Operations Duty of AOP entry

. Write a Condition Report

. Notify Maintenance of the failure SS B7.

Bypass the affected instrument channel using 1 3509-C, BYPASS TEST INSTRUMENTATION (BTI) PANEL OPERATION, if desired.

NOTE: Expect the SS will NOT bypass the channel.

SS B8.

Trip the affected channel bistables and place the associated MASTER TEST switches in TEST position per TABLE Bi within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . (TS 3.3.1 & 3.3.2)

NOTE: The SS is expected to leave bistables untripped during the allowed out of service time to facilitate i&C trouble shooting of the failed channel.

SS B9.

Initiate the applicable actions of:

TS3.3.1 TS 3.3.2 2

AppendixD Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.:

I Page 3 of 3 Event No.:

I Event

Description:

RCS NR Temperature Instrument TE-421 B Fails High (Tcold) on loop # 2.

This will require the OATC to perform lOAs to stop inward control rod motion by placing rods in MANUAL.

The crew will then enter AOP-18001 section B Failure of RCS Narrow Range Temperature Instrumentation to complete the corrective actions for this failure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS LCO 3.3.1 Function 6, 7 Condition E OTT Trip, OPT CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. One channel E.1 Place channel in trip.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Inoperable.

OR E.2 Be in MODE 3.

78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months SS LCO 3.3.2 Function 5b.

Condition I FWI CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I. One channel 1.1 Place channel in trip.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Inoperable.

OR 1.2 Be in MODE 3.

78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months OATC I UO BlO.

Initiate the Continuous Actions Page SS B1 1.

Check repairs and surveillances COMPLETE. (NO)

RNO

B1 1.

Perform the following:

a.

WHEN repairs and surveillances are complete, THEN perform Step B12.

b.

Return to procedure and step in effect.

END OF EVENT I 3

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: I Page 1 of 3 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Loop I Controlling Pressure Channel PT-514 Fails High.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Diagnose failure of main steam pressure channel Loop 1 PT-514:

Alarms:

ALB11-F01 SG Flow Mismatch (Loop 1)

Indications:

All 4 SG levels rising All 4 SG feed rates below steam rates Both MFP speeds increasing MFP discharge pressure rising UO IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

AOP 18001-C, Section F, Failure of Steam Generator Pressure Instrumentation Fl.

Check steam and feed flows MATCHED on ALL SGs RNO Fl.

Takes manual control of the following as necessary to restore NR level between 60% and 70%:

Affected SG feed flow valves SG 1 MFRV 1 FV-51 0 MFP(s) speed Master Speed Controller SIC-509A SS Directs actions of UO / OATC using AOP 18001-C, Section F, Failure of Steam Generator Pressure Instrumentation (Crew Update)

UO F2.

Check controlling steam flow channel AFFECTED BY PRESSURE CHANNEL FAILURE (Yes) 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: I Page 2 of 3 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Loop 1 Controlling Pressure Channel PT-514 Fails High.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS/UO P3.

Select an unaffected channel using Table Fl.

TABLE Fl AFFECTED SG ASSOCIATED SELECTOR SG PRESSURE SG FLOW SWITCH INSTRUMENT CHANNEL PT-514 F512 PT-515 F513 FS-512C I

NOTE: ALBO6-F01 CSFSTALARMS ON SUBCRITILITY 10 MINUTE AVG UQ1130. CLEARS AFTER UNAFFECTED CHANNEL SELECTED AND 10 MINUTE AVG UPDATES.

SS/UO F4.

Return MFP(s) speed controls to AUTO SIC-509A.

SS/UO F5.

Return SG feed flow valves to AUTO SG 1 MFRV 1-FV-510.

OATC/UO F6.

Initiate the Continuous Actions Page SS/UO

F7.

Check SG level control maintains NR level AT 65%.

RNO Take manual control of the following as necessary to maintain NR level between 60% and 70%:

Affected SG feed flow valves.

MFP(s) speed (No action should be required at this point)

SS F8.

Notify l&C to initiate repairs.

Contacts SSS to perform the following:

Notify l&C to initiate repairs Write a Condition Report Notify OPS Duty Manager of AOP entry 2

AppendixD Required Operator Actions

- Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: I Page 3 of 3 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Loop 1 Controlling Pressure Channel PT-514 Fails High.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS F9.

Bypass the affected instrument channel using 13509-C,Bypass Test Instrumentation (BTI) Panel Operation, if desired.

NOTE: Not Desired SS FlO. Trip affected channel bistable and place associated MASTER TEST switch in TEST position per Table F2 within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months (TS 3.3.2)

NOTE: NOT EXPECTED.

SS Fil.

Initiate the applicable actions of Technical Specification 3.3.2, 3.3.3, and 3.3.4. (3.3.3 FU8INFQ LCO ONLY)

LCO 3.3.2 EU le Condition D Steam Line Pressure Low LCO 3.3.2 EU 4d(1)

Condition D SLI Steam Line Pressure Low CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. One channel D.1 Place channel in trip.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months inoperable OR D.2.1 Be in MODE 3.

78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months AND D.2.2 Be in MODE 4.

84 hours9.722222e-4 days 0.0233 hours 1.388889e-4 weeks 3.1962e-5 months LCO 3.3.4 EU 13 Condition A Steam Generator Pressure CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more A.1 Restore required Function to 30 days required OPERABLE status Functions inoperable Check repairs and surveillances complete.

RNO.

Perform the following:

a.

WHEN repairs and surveillances are complete, THEN perform Step F13.

b.

Return to procedure and step in effect.

END OF EVENT 2 3

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: I Page 1 of 5 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

Normal Charging Pump (NCP) TRIPS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Diagnose NCP trip:

Indications:

NCP breaker trips:

Red OFF Green ON Amber-ON Charging line flow (Fl-121) drops to 0 GPM RCP seal injection flows drop to 0 GPM Alarms:

ALB07-A05 REGEN HX LTDN HI TEMP ALBO7-B06 CHARGING LINE HI/LO FLOW ALBO7-C06 CHARGING PUMP OVERLOAD TRIP ALBO8-F06 RCP SEAL WATER INJ LO FLOW ALB33-A05 4160V SWGR INAO5 TROUBLE 18007-C IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS OATC Bi.

Isolate letdown:

IOA

a. Close letdown orifice isolation valves:

HV-8149A HV-8149B HV-8149C

b. Close letdown isolation valves:

LV-459 LV-460 NOTE: ALB 07 E01 CSFST TROUBLE will annunciate when CVCS Letdown is isolated, because UQ-1118 Reactor Total Thermal Power turns magenta BAD on isolation of letdown.

SS Enters 18007-C, Section B (Crew update)

Verifies Immediate Operator Actions Bi With OATC

Appendix_D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: I Page 2 of 5 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

Normal Charging Pump (NCP) TRIPS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC/UO 82.

Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

OATC

B3 Trend RCP Seal Parameters listed in ATTACHMENT A.

ATTACHMENT A RCP SEAL PARAMETER INDICATION NOTE The following points are accessible under IPC Group 62.

PARAMETER IPC POINT RCP Seal Injection Flow:

RCP1 F0131 RCP2 F0129 RCP3 F0127 RCP4 F0125 RCP Seal Injection Temperature:

T0140 (Measured at VCT Outlet)

Number 1 Seal Leakoff High Flow:

RCP1 F0161 RCP2 F0160 RCP3 F0159 RCP4 F0158 Number 1 Seal Inlet Temperature:

RCP 1 T0181

/ T0417 RCP2 T0182 / T0437 RCP3 T0183 / T0457 RCP4 T0184 / T0477 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: I Page 3 of 5 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

Normal Charging Pump (NCP) TRIPS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC B4.

Check charging pump(s)

- OPERATING NORMALLY:

Discharge flow trend STABLE.

Discharge pressure trend STABLE.

VCT level

- IN NORMAL BAND.

Bus current STABLE.

Suction pressure

- STABLE SO will report after dispatched for the NCP and its breaker:

NCP pump bearings hot and over current relays tripped for breaker 1NAO5-08.

The crew may perform this RNO RNO OATC B4.

Perform the following:

a.

Stop charging pumps.

b.

Determine and correct cause of charging pump abnormal operations.

c.

IF loss of suction to charging pumps has occurred, THEN do JLQI start charging pumps until the cause of the loss of suction is understood and all affected piping and components are vented.

d.

IF gas binding of charging pumps occurred, THEN do iLQI start charging pumps until the cause of the gas binding is understood and all affected piping and components are vented.

OATC B5.

Locate and isolate any charging system leakage.

3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: I Page 4of 5 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

Normal Charging Pump (NCP) TRIPS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC/UO B6.

Check ACCW system

- IN SERVICE.

OATC B7.

Check normal charging valves

- OPEN:

HV-8105 HV-8106 HV-8146 HV-8485A and B FV-121 OATC

B8.

Check normal charging flow ESTABLISHED.

RNO

B8.

Perform the following:

a)

WHEN normal charging flowpath can be established, THEN place normal charging and letdown in service by initiating 13006, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM.

b)

GotoStepBlo.

CUE: Management call to SS:

Have OA TC monitor Reactor Panel due to prior event (RCS Tcold failure) and have the UO place Charging and Letdown back in service. (Event 5) 4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.:

I Page 5 of 5 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

Normal Charging Pump (NCP) TRIPS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC AOP 18007-C Section B

810, Establish Seal Injection flow to all RCPs

- 8 TO 13 GPM.

OATC Bli.

Check RCP seal injection flow ESTABLISHED.

SS NOTE Operation of the excess letdown flowpath will bypass the OATC CVCS demineralizers. This may impact RCS chemistry control.

B12 Control PRZR level

- IN PROGRAM BAND.

SS 813.

Initiate the following Technical Specifications and/or Technical Requirements as necessary:

NOTE: (NO TECH SPECS APPLY FOR NCP INOP)

OATC B14.

Check normal charging flow ESTABLISHED.

SS B15.

Return to procedure and step in effect.

END OF EVENT 3 5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No: 2011-301 Scenario No.: I Page 1 of 5 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

PR NIS N-42 Lower Detector Fails High requiring entry into AOP-1 8002-C, Section B for PR NIS Malfunction.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnose failure of PR NI 42 channel II:

Alarms ALB1O-A03 PR HI NEUTRON FLX HI STPT ALERT ALB1O-C02 POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVIATION ALB1O-D03 OVERPOWER ROD STOP ALB1O-E02 PR LOWER DETECTOR HI FLUX DEV (Delayed alarm if not blocked)

ALB1O-E06 RADIAL TILT ALB1O-F02 PR HIGH NEUTRON FLUX RATE ALERT Control Board Nl-42C AFD at 16%

NI-42B Power at 110%

Trip Status Light Board (TSLB)

NI-42 Hi Set Hi flux bistable ON NI-42 Hi rate bistable

- ON OATC AOP 18002-C IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION Bi.

Place rods in manual SS Enters AOP 18002-C, Section B, POWER RANGE DRAWER N41, N42, N43, N44 MALFUNCTION (Crew Update)

OATC Bi.

Place rods are in manual.

UO B2.

Terminate any load change in progress.

OATC B3.

Checks THERMAL POWER GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 75%.

1

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario No.: I Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

PR NIS N-42 Lower Detector Fails High requiring entry into AOP-1 8002-C, Section B for PR NIS Malfunction.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS B4.

Directs Engineers to perform 88015-C, QUADRANT POWER TILT MEASUREMENT USING MOVEABLE INCORE DETECTOR SYSTEM as required by Tech Spec SR 3.2.4.2 UO B5.

Perform the following:

a.

Selects the affected channel for the following at the NIS racks:

. ROD STOP BYPASS switch.

N-42

COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT switch.

N-42

. POWER MISMATCH BYPASS switch.

N-42

. UPPER SECTION switch.

N-42

. LOWER SECTION switch.

N-42 b.

Reset rate trip.

N-42 OATC B6.

Restore Tavg to program OATC B7.

Place rods in AUTO if desired OATC B8.

Check the operable Power Range Channel(s) indicating properly on NR-45.

SS B9.

Notify l&C to initiate repairs Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Page 2 of 5 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: I Page 3 of 5 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

PR NIS N-42 Lower Detector Fails High requiring entry into AOP-18002-C, Section B for PR NIS Malfunction.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS BlO.

Bypass affected channel NIS and NSSS grouping using 13509-C, BYPASS TEST INSTRUMENTATION (BTI) PANEL OPERATION NOTE: ( WILL NOTPERFORMJ SS /

Bi I.

Within one hour, check the following interlocks are in their OATC required state for existing unit conditions. (TS 3.3.1)

P-7 (Not Lit)

P-8 (Not Lit)

P-9 (Not Lit)

P-b (Lit)

SS I UO B12.

Within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months place the inoperable Power Range Channel in trip by performing the following: (TS 3.3.1) a.

Remove the AC Control Power Fuses on the affected drawer.

b.

Trip overtemperature delta-T bistables for affected channel CHANNEL CAB FRAME!

B/S SWITCHES CARD N-41 1

8/22 3

TS-411C 1

8/22 4

TS-411D N-42 2

8/22 3

TS-421C 2

8/22 4

TS-421D N-43 3

8/22 3

TS-431C 3

8/22 4

TS-431 D N-44 4

8/22 3

TS-441C 4

8/22 4

TS-441 D 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: I Page 4 of 5 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

PR NIS N-42 Lower Detector Fails High requiring entry into AOP-1 8002-C, Section B for PR NIS Malfunction.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS B13.

Initiate 14915, SPECIAL CONDITIONS SURVEILLANCE LOGS.

(Data Sheet 7 for QPTR is the applicable portion of this procedure since reactor power is > 75 %.)

SS B14.

Initiate the applicable actions of the following Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation 3.3.1 FU 2a Condition D PR Hi Flux Trip 3.3.1 FU 3 condition E PR Positive Rate 3.3.1 FU 6 Condition E OThT 3.3.1 FU 16c Condition S Interlock P-8 3.3.1 FU16d Condition S Interlock P-9 3.3.1 FU 16e Condition R Interlock P-1O Input Into P-7 3.2.4 N/A Condition A QPTR (SR 3.2.4.2)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. One Power Range NOTES Neutron Flux High channel inoperable 1.

A channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for surveillance testing and setpoint adjustment.

2.

Refer to LCO 3.2.4 for an inoperable power range channel.

D.1 Place channel in trip.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR D.2 Be in MODE 3 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months E.

One channel E.1 Place channel in trip.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Inoperable.

OR E.2 Be in MODE 3 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months S. One or more S.1 Verify interlock is in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months channels required state for existing inoperable conditions OR S.2 Be in MODE 2 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months 4

Appendix_D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: I Page 5 of 5 Event No.: 4 Event Description; PR NIS N-42 Lower Detector Fails High requiring entry into AOP-1 8002-C, Section B for PR NIS Malfunction.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME R. One or more channels R.1 Verify interlock is in required state for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months SS inoperable existing conditions OR R.2 Be in MODE 2.

7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months 55! UO B15.

If necessary to calibrate the remaining OPERABLE Power range NI channels; a.

Restore failed channel to normal alignment by performing 1 3501 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM, Sections 4,1.4 and 4.1.5 b.

Perform 14030, NUCLEAR INSTRUMENT CALORIMETRIC CALIBRATION, for the OPERABLE Power Range NI Channels.

c.

When all required OPERABLE Power Range NI channel adjustments are complete, repeat Step B5 for the failed channel.

NOTE: ( WILL NOTPERFORMJ UO B16.

Initiate 13501-C, NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM, when repairs and surveillances are Complete.

NOTE: f REPAIRS NOT EXPECTED TO BE COMPLETE)

SS B17.

Return to procedure and step in effect END OF EVENT 4 5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: I Page 1 of 7 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

Return Normal Charging and Letdown to Service.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE to Examiner: Student may go to Section 4.42 first, but it will send him to the following section with no Charging Pump running.

UO 13006-1, CVCS Section 4.4.13, Restart of CCP or NCP following Loss of a Charging Pump.

CAUTIONS At BOL, while borating to maintain Tavg, the calculated delta boron concentration between the RCS and the last time the CCP/NCP was placed in service may be incorrect. Experience has shown that high concentrations of borated water tend to collect in the suction piping of the idle

pumps, resulting in a

higher boron concentration in the CCP/NCP than the RCS. This may cause and unexpected boration and temperature reduction, when the pump is placed in service or tested.

Restart of a charging pump should not be delayed in order to flush the pump prior to start.

UO 4.4.13.1 PRIOR to starting the pump and based on the conditions described in the first caution above, a slight boration should be anticipated and a briefing on compensatory actions to offset the boration should be conducted.

CAUTION A determination should be made that loss of the Charging Pump was not due to air/gas binding before starting the same or another pump.

UO 4.4.13.2 Dispatch an Operator to perform pump pre-start checks.

UO 4.4.13.3 Verify VCT LEVEL iLl-i 85 indicates between 30 and 80%.

UO 4.4.13.4 Verify OPEN VCT OUTLET ISOLATION Valves:

1-LV-01 12B i-LV-01 12C 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: I Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

Return Normal Charging and Letdown to Service.

Page 2 of 7 Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 4.4.13.5 Verify OPEN CCP-A & B COMMON MINIFLOW 1-HV-8110.

UO NOTE CCP-1A is only capable of flows up to 102 gpm at NOPT. It may not be used with 120 gpm letdown. At higher than normal RCS pressure, the flow will be reduced even more.

UO 4.4.13.6 IF starting a CCP perform the following:

jf starting CCP-A:

a.

Open CCP-A SUCTION 1-HV-8471A.

b.

Open CCP-A MINIFLOW 1-HV-8111A.

c.

Verify OPEN CCP-A & B COMMON MINIFLOW 1-HV-81 10.

d.

Close CCP-A SAFETY GRADE CHG 1-HV-0190A.

e.

Open CCP-A DISCHARGE ISOLATION 1-HV-8485A.

jf starting CCP-B:

a.

Open CCP-B SUCTION 1-HV-8471B.

b.

Open CCP-B MINIFLOW 1-HV-8111B.

c.

Verify OPEN CCP-A & B COMMON MINIFLOW 1-HV-81 10.

d.

Close CCP-B SAFETY GRADE CHG 1-HV-01 90B.

e.

Open CCP-B DISCHARGE ISOLATION 1-HV-8485B.

f.

Open CCP DISCHARGE HEADER CROSSCONNECT I -HV-8438.

NOTE and step 4.4.13.7 are N/A 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: I Page 3 of 7 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

Return Normal Charging and Letdown to Service.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 4.4.13.8 Set 1HC-182 for Maximum Seal Flow (0% demand).

UO 4.4.13.9 Verify Charging Flow Control 1FIC-121 in MAN and set to minimum.

UO NOTE Normal and Alternate charging paths should be alternated over plant life to equalize thermal stress. The transfer should be performed at cold shutdown conditions to avoid thermal transients. Normal charging should be in service during even-numbered fuel cycles. Alternate charging should be in service during odd-numbered fuel cycles.

Swapping nozzles at NOPT should be avoided.

Charging path should remain the same for the current cycle.

UO 4.4.13.10 Verify OPEN one of the following:

NORMAL CHARGING TO LOOP 1 1-HV-8146 OR ALTERNATE CHARGING TO LOOP 4 1-HV-8 147 UO 4.4.13.11 Verify OPEN CHARGING TO RCS ISOLATION Valves:

1 -HV-81 05 1 -HV-81 05 UO 4.4.13.12 Verify the ALOP of the CCP to be started is running as indicated by the QMCB red indicating lamp lit.

UO 4.4.13.13 Start the desired CCP or NCP:

CCP-A 1HS-273A OR CCP-B 1HS-274A 3

AppendixD Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011 -301 Scenario No.:

1 Page 4 of 7 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

Return Normal Charging and Letdown to Service.

UO 4.4.13.14 IF a CCP was started, verify the selected COP ALOP red indicating lamp goes off (on QMCB) shortly after the pump is started.

4.4.13.15 is N/A UO 4.4.13.16 Simultaneously perform the following:

Adjust Seal Flow Control 1HC-182 to obtain between 8 and 13 gpm to each RCP.

Adjust Charging Flow Control 1FIC-121 to obtain the desired charging flow.

UO 4.4.13.17 Return To Section 4.4.2 to establish Normal Letdown and Charging.

13006-1, CVCS Section 4.4.2 Returning Normal Charging and UO Letdown to Service UO 4.4.2.1 jf a Charging Pump is LQI in service, Go To Section 4.4.13 to start the NCP OR an available Centrifugal Charging Pump, THEN Return To this section.

UO NOTES This section also applies to returning normal charging and letdown to service following termination of safety injection.

Letdown is to be established as soon as possible after initiating flow through a Charging Nozzle.

UO 4.4.2.2 IF NCP is in service, verify NCP MINIFLOW 1-HV-8109 is open.

4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: I Page 5of7 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

Return Normal Charging and Letdown to Service.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 4.4.2.3 Perform the following:

a.

Close LETDOWN ORIFICE Isolation Valves:

1 -HV-81 49A I -HV-81 49A 1 -HV-81 49A b,

Close LETDOWN ISOLATION VLV UPSTREAM AND DOWNSTREAM Valves:

1 -LV-460 1-LV-459 c.

Close PZR AUX SPRAY VALVE 1-HV-8145.

d.

Open CVCS LETDOWN PIPE BREAK PROT ISOLATION 1-HV-15214.

e.

Open RCS LETDOWN LINE ISO VLV IRC 1-HV-8160.

f.

Open RCS LETDOWN LINE ISO VLV ORC 1-HV-8152.

g.

Place Letdown Pressure Controller 1PIC-131 in MAN and adjust output to between 50% and 75%.

h.

Place LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP 1TIC-130 in MAN and adjust output to the most current position as recorded on the Control Room Rounds Sheets.

Verify PRESSURIZER LEVEL 1 LR-459 greater than 17%.

NOTE If Normal Charging and Letdown are being returned to service as directed from Section 4.4.15, one of the valves in Substepj. and both valves in Step 4.4.2.4 will already be open.

j.

Verify one of the following are OPEN:

NORMAL CHARGING TO LOOP 1 1-HV-8146 (even-numbered fuel cycle)

OR ALTERNATE CHARGING TO LOOP 4 1-HV-8147 (odd-numbered fuel cycle) 5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: I Page 6 of 7 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

Return Normal Charging and Letdown to Service.

UO 4.4.2.4 Verify CHARGING TO RCS ISOLATION Valves are OPEN:

1-HV-81 06 1 -HV-81 05 UO 4.4.2.5 Simultaneously perform the following:

Adjust 1 HC-1 82 output to maintain between 8 and 13 gpm to each RCP, Adjust 1FIC-121 to raise CHG FLOW 1FI-l2lAto between 80 and 90 gpm.

UO 4.4.2.6 Open LETDOWN ISOLATION VLV UPSTREAM Q DOWNSTREAM Valves by holding their handswitches in OPEN UNTIL the valves are fully open:

1-LV-460 1HS-460 1-LV-459 1HS-459 UO 4.4.2.7 Establish Letdown flow:

a.

Simultaneously open a Letdown Orifice and maintain pressure by performing the following:

Open one LETDOWN ORIFICE Isolation Valve by holding its handswitch in the OPEN position until fully open:

1HS-81498 (75 gpm

- odd fuel cycles)

OR 1 HS-8149C (75 gpm even fuel cycles)

OR 1HS-8149A (45 gpm)

Adjust IPIC-l3lAto maintain LETDOWN PRESS lPl-131A between 360 and 380 psig.

b.

Record the letdown orifice that was placed in service in the Unit Control Log.

6

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: I Page 7 of 7 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

Return Normal Charging and Letdown to Service.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior U0 4.4.2.8 WHEN LETDOWN PRESS 1PI-131A stabilizes between 360 and 380 psig, place 1PIC-131 in AUTO.

UO 4.4.2.9 Place LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP 1TIC-130 in AUTO and verify it maintains temperature less than or equal to 1 15°F.

UO 4.4.2.10 Verify LETDOWN REGEN HX OUT 1TI-127 indicates less than 380°F.

UO 4.4.2.11 Monitor 1LR-459 Pressurizer Level and Pressurizer Level Setpoint.

UO 4.4.2.12 Maintain Pressurizer Level within 1% of Level Setpoint using 1 FIC-121.

UO 4.4.2.13 Place Pressurizer Level Control in automatic UNLESS it is to remain in Manual under Tagout or Caution tag:

a.

Verify PRZR Level Controller 1LIC-459 in AUTO.

b.

AFTER level has been stable within 1% of setpoint for approximately 3 minutes, place 1FIC-121 in AUTO.

UO 4.4.2.14 IF this section was performed to restore normal charging and letdown to service following termination of Safety Injection, Return To 19011-C, ES-l.l SI Termination.

End ofEvent5 7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.:

I Page 1 of 11 Event Nofl:

6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnoses LOCA (Ejected Rod) with an ATWT CREW Performs Immediate Operator Actions Per E-0, 19000-C, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.

SS SS Makes Page Announcement of Reactor Trip.

CREW IMMEDIATE ACTIONS of 19000-C, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection OATC 1.

Check Reactor Trip Rod Bottom Lights

- LIT Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers

- OPEN Neutron Flux LOWERING RNO CRITICAL 1.

Trip Reactor using both Reactor trip handswitches.

TASK IF Reactor QI tripped, THEN go to 19211-C, FR-S.1 RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION I ATWT.

UO 2.

Check Turbine Trip:

All Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED uo 3.

Check Power to AC Emergency Buses:

a.

AC Emergency Busses AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED.

416OVAC 1E Busses b.

AC Emergency Buses ALL ENERGIZED:

4l6OVAClEBusses 480V AC 1 E Busses OATC 4.

Check if SI is actuated:

Any SI annunciator LIT SI ACTUATED BPLP window LIT SS GotoStep6

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Page 2 of 11 Event No.:

6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS / CREW 6.

Initiate the Foldout Page.

OATC RCP TRIP CRITERIA:

Trip all RCPs if BOTH conditions listed below occur:

CRITICAL TASK a.

CCPs or SI pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING.

b.

RCP Trip Parameter RCS PRESSURE LESS THAN 1375 PSIG.

Recognizes RCP TRIP CRITERIA met per foldout page and trips ALL RCPs between now and PRIOR to step 12 of E-O.

7.

Perform the following:

OATC OATC Initial Actions Page uo UO Initial Actions Page s

NOTE: SS Initiates Step 8 After OATCIUO Initial Actions Completed.

NOTE: Crew Update Announced when Adverse Containment recognized.

PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OF E- 0.

OATC Step 1.

Check both Trains of ECCS equipment-ALIGNING FOR INJECTION PHASE MLB indication.

NOTE TO EXAMINER: SI Train A Fails to Auto Actuate RNO Step 1.

ActuateS!.

PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OF E- 0.

OATC Step 2.

Check Containment Isolation Phase A ACTUATED CIA MLB indication Scenario No.: I 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: I Event No.:

6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OF E- 0.

OATC Step 3.

Check ECCS Pumps and NCP status:

a.

CCPsRUNNING.

b.

SI Pumps RUNNING.

NOTE TO EXAMINER: SI Pump A / CCP A Fails to Auto Start. SI Pump B /

CCP B Trip on start.

RNO CRITICAL.

Step 3a.

Perform the following for available CCP(s):

TASK

1) Place alternate miniflow valve Handswitch in ENABLE PTL:

HS-8508 A 2)

Start CCP A.

Step 3b.

Start SI Pump A.

c.

RHR Pumps RUNNING.

d.

NCPTRIPPED.

PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OF E- 0.

OATC Step 4.

Verify CCW Pumps ONLY TWO RUNNING PER TRAIN.

PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OF E- 0.

OATC Step 5.

Verify proper NSCW system operation:

a.

NSCW Pumps

- ONLY TWO RUNNING PER TRAIN.

b.

NSCW TOWER RTN HDR BYPASS BASIN handswitches IN AUTO:

HS-1668A Page 3 of 11 3

AppendixD Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: I Page 4 of 11 Event No.:

6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

HS-1669A Time

}

Position Applicants Action or Behavior PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OF E- 0.

OATC Step 6.

Verify Containment Cooling Units:

a.

ALL RUNNING IN LOW SPEED MLB indication b.

NSCW Cooler isolation valves OPEN:

MLB indication PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OF E- 0.

OATC Step 7.

Check Containment Ventilation Isolation:

a.

Dampers and Valves

- CLOSED CVI MLB indication PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OF E- 0.

OATC Step 8.

Check Containment pressure REMAINED LESS THAN 21.5 PSIG.

PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OF E- 0.

OATC Step 9.

Check ECCS flows:

a.

BIT Flow.

b.

RCS pressure LESS THAN 1625 PSIG.

c.

SI Pump flow.

ci.

RCS pressure LESS THAN 300 PSIG RNO 4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.:

I Event No.:

6, 7 and B Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Step 9d.

Go to Step 10.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OF E- 0.

OATC Step 10.

Check ECCS Valve alignment PROPER INJECTION LINEUP INDICATED ON MLBs.

PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OF E- 0.

OATC Step 11.

Check ACCW Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OF E- 0.

OATC Step 12.

Adjust Seal Injection flow to RCPs 8 to 13 GPM.

NOTE TO EXAMINER: END OF OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OF E-O.

RETURNS TO MAIN BODY OFE-O CONTINUING AT STEP 8 PERFORMS UO INITIAL ACTIONS OF E- 0.

UO Step 1.

Check AFW Pumps RUNNING MDAFW Pumps TDAFW Pump, if required RNO UO Start MDAFW Pumps.

Open Steam Supply valve HV-5106 to TDAFW Pump PERFORMS UO INITIAL ACTIONS OF E- 0.

UO Step 2.

Check NR level in at least one SG GREATER THAN 10% [32% ADVERSE]

Page 5 of 11 5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.:

I Event No.:

6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump 8 trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior PERFORMS UO INITIAL ACTIONS OF E- 0.

uo Step 3.

Check if main steamlines should be isolated:

a.

Check for one or more of the following conditions:

Any steam line pressure LESS THAN Q.

EQUAL TO 585 PSIG.

Containment pressure GREATER THAN 14.5 PSIG.

Low Steam Pressure SI/SLI BLOCKED AND High Steam Pressure Rate ONTWO OR MORE CHANNELS OF ANY STEAMLINE.

RNO Step 3a.

Go to Step 4 PERFORMS UO INITIAL ACTIONS OF E- 0.

UO Step 4.

Verify FW Isolation Valves closed:

MFIVs BFIVs MFRVs BFRVs Page 6 of 11 6

Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Event No.:

6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior PERFORMS UO INITIAL ACTIONS OF E- 0.

uo Step 5.

Verify SG B lowdown isolated:

Place SG Blowdown Isolation Valve handswitches HS-7603A, B, C, and D in the CLOSE position.

SG Sample Isolation Valves CLOSED.

PERFORMS UO INITIAL ACTIONS OF E- 0.

uo Step 6.

Verify Diesel Generators RUNNING.

PERFORMS UO INITIAL ACTIONS OF E- 0.

UO Step 7.

Throttle total AFW flow as necessary to maintain SG NR levels between 10% [32% ADVERSE] and 65%.

PERFORMS UO INITIAL ACTIONS OF E- 0.

UO Step 8.

Verify both MFPs TRIPPED.

PERFORMS UO INITIAL ACTIONS OF E- 0.

UO Step 9.

Check Main Generator Output Breakers OPEN.

NOTE TO EXAMINER: END OF UO INITIAL ACTIONS OF E-O.

C REW RETURNS TO MAIN BODY OF E-O CONTINUING AT STEP 8.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario No.: I Page 7 of 11 7

AppendixD Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: I Page 8 of 11 Event No.:

6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC I UO 8.

Initiate the Continuous Actions Page

9 Check RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557°F:

OATC With RCP(s) running RCS AVERAGE TEMPERATURE

-OR-Without RCP(s) running RCS WR COLD LEG TEMPERATURES RNO LJO Step *9 IF temperature is less than 557°F and lowering, THEN perform the following as necessary: \\

a.

Stop dumping steam.

b.

Perform the following as appropriate:

if at least one SG NR level greater than 10% [32%

ADVERSE], THEN lower total feed flow.

-OR

IF all SG NR levels less than 10% [32%

ADVERSE], THEN lower total feed flow to NOT less than 570 GPM.

c.

IF cooldown continues THEN close MSIVs and BSlVs.

d.

jf temperature greater than 557°F and rising THEN dump steam.

8

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: I Page 9 of 11 Event No.:

6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 10.

Check PRZR PORVs, Block Valves, and Spray Valves:

OATC a.

PRZR PORVs - CLOSED AND IN AUTO.

b.

Normal PRZR Spray Valves CLOSED.

c.

Power available to at least one Block Valve AVAILABLE.

d.

PRZR PORV Block Valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN RNO Step 1 0*d.

Verify open at least one PRZR PORV Block Valve when PRZR pressure is greater than 2185 psig.

SS 11.

Check if RCPs should be stopped:

OATC a.

ECCS Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING.

CCP or SI Pump.

b.

RCS pressure LESS THAN 1375 PSIG.

CRITICAL c.

Stop all RCPs.

TASK NOTE TO EXAMINER: ALL RCPs should be stopped prior to initiating next step.

SS 12.

Check SGs secondary pressure boundaries:

UO a.

SG Pressures:

Any lowering in an uncontrolled manner.

-OR Any completely depressurized.

RNO SS Step 12a.

Go to Step 13.

9

Appendix D

- Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Page 10 of 11 Event No.:

6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 13.

Check SG Tubes intact:

a.

Direct Chemistry to take periodic activity samples of all SGs one at a time.

b.

Secondary radiation NORMAL:

MAIN STM LINE MONITORS:

RE-13120(SG1)

RE-13121 (SG2)

RE-13122 (5G3)

RE-13119(5G4)

CNDSR AIR EJCTR/STM RAD MONITORS:

RE-12839C RE-12838D (if on scale)

RE-12839E (if on scale)

STM GEN LIQ PROCESS RAD:

RE-0019 (Sample)

RE-0021 (Blowdown)

SG sample radiation.

c.

Check SG levels ANY RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER RNO Step 13c.

Go to Step 14.

Scenario No.: I SS UO SS 10

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: I Page 11 of 11 Event No.:

6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 14.

Check if RCS is intact inside Containment:

Containment radiation NORMAL.

Containment pressure NORMA.L Containment Emergency Recirculation Sump levels NORMAL RNO Step 14.

Go to 19010-C, E-1 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT SS Transitions to 19010-C, E-1 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT (Crew Update) 19010-C, E-1 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT SS 1.

Initiate the following:

OATC/UO Continuous Actions and Foldout Page.

OATC Critical Safety Function Status Trees per 19200-C, F-0 CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREE.

END OF SCENARIO 11

ML112280110

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