Text

Rev K to Operating Procedure E-0-06, Fire in Alternate Fire Zone
	ML111861752
Person / Time
Site:	Kewaunee
Issue date:	08/04/1998
From:	; Wisconsin Public Service Corp
To:	;
Shared Package
ML111861753	List: ML111861752; ML111861756;
References
	E--6, E-0-06, NUDOCS 9809300346
	Download: ML111861752 (87)
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WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION NO.

E 06 REV K

KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE OPERATING PROCEDURE DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 1 of 50 REVIEWED BY /0(3 APPROVED BY NUCLEAR YES PORC REVIEW YES SRO APPROVAL OF YES SAFETY RELATED -

REQUIRED TEMPORARY CHANGES MNO O

No REQUIRED El NO

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The purpose of this procedure is to PLACE the plant in Hot Shutdown and cooldown to Cold Shutdown using the Dedicated Shutdown System, in the event a fire removes the ability to monitor or control plant operation from the Control Room. Only train "A" equipment can be controlled from the Dedicated Shutdown Panel. Train "B" equipment will be inoperable or unreliable so will NOT be addressed. Offsite power will be lost or unreliable and all controls/instrumentation routed through the relay room will be inaccurate and/or unreliable.

2.0 SYMPTOMS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS 2.1 A fire that causes the inability to monitor or control major plant parameters from the Control Room necessary for safe shutdown.

(i.e..

RCS pressure, temperature, power level, pressurizer level, etc.)

2.2 This procedure will be entered from E-FP-08.

3.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS 3.1 NO automatic actions are assumed to occur.

9809300346 980928 T

PDR ADOCK 05000305 P

PDR

ATTACHMENT 1 Letter from M. L. Marchi (WPSC)

To Document Control Desk (NRC)

Dated September 28, 1998 GBNUCI N:\\GROUP\\NUCLEAR\\WPFILES\\LIC\\NRC\\IPERAI.WPD

Document Control Desk September 28, 1998, Page 1 Answers to Supplemental Request for Additional Information FIRE QUESTION

1. In the October 13, 1995, response to the Kewaunee Fire PRA question F.1, it is stated that:

"All circuits within the control room are fused. It is therefore assumed that a fire would cause the fuse to blow and the equipment to fail in its normal mode."

This does not take into consideration the fact that hot shorts in control cables can simulate the closing of control switches, leading, for example, to the repositioning of valves, spurious operation of motors and pumps, or the shutdown of operating equipment. Such hot shorts would not cause a fuse to blow. These types of faults might, for example, lead to a LOCA, diversion of flow within various plants systems, deadheading and failure of important pumps, premature or undesirable switching of pump suction sources, undesirable equipment operations, and unrecoverable damage in motor-operated valves.

The analysis of a fire in Mechanical Control Console C (see p.5 of the October 13, 1995, submittal) assumes that a fire can cause spurious opening of PORV, but that the PORV will close when the fuse blows. But, since the fire may simulate the closing of a switch, there is no reason to assume the fuse will blow.

It appears that the actual emergency operating procedures for the plant may take into consideration the possibility that hot shorts in a control room fire may have adverse effects, and that as a result emergency operating procedure E-0-06 or E-0-07 are invoked for control room fires. However, it is not clear that these procedures were properly incorporated into the accident sequence delineation and quantification for control room fires, in the October 13, 1995 submittal.

In particular, because these operating procedures E-0-06 and E-0-07 require the isolation of offsite power, and perhaps the isolation of one train of equipment (either the dedicated train or the alternate train), then almost any control room fire requires, by the procedures, to consider a reactor trip with loss of offsite power. In addition, one train of AC electric power (either train A or train B) may be isolated. Examples where offsite power and one train of electric power may be isolated are fires in Mechanical Console C, which could potentially affect the pressurizer PORVs, and a fire in Mechanical Control Console B, which could affect the charging pumps and their associated valves. It is not clear from the submittal whether, because of the concern about hot shorts in the control room, control of plant will be transferred to points outside the control room, for a control room fire, even when the control room can still be occupied. Accordingly, please provide the following information:

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Document Control Desk September 28, 1998, Page 2

1. According to plant operating procedures, for what control room fires are either procedures E-0-06 or E-0-07 invoked? For what control room fires will offsite power be isolated? For what control room fires will offsite power and one train of electric power be isolated? For what control room fires will control be transferred from the control room to the dedicated shutdown panel, or to other locations outside the control room?

2. For those control room fires in which control is transferred to outside the control room, and the dedicated train ofshutdown equipment is not available (as a consequence of the control room fire), describe the actions required to bring the plant to safe shutdown.

3. For those control room fires in which E-0-06 or E-0-07 are invoked, or offsite power is isolated, delineate the accident sequences and provide the details of their quantification.

4. If there are any control room fires where offsite power and a train of electric power is not isolated, but a hot short is possible which simulates the closing of a switch (and therefore does not blow a fuse), delineate and quantify the accident sequences. For example, a fire in Mechanical Control Console C may open a POR V because of a hot short, and a fuse may not blow.

5. Provide a copy ofprocedures E-0-06 and E-0-07.

WPSC REPLY

1. When operators determine that a fire exists in the plant, they enter procedure E-FP-08 "Emergency Operating Procedure - Fire." Step 4.11 of E-FP-08 reads:

IE fire causes the inability to monitor and control major plant parameters from the Control Room necessary for safe shutdown (i.e., RCS pressure, temperature, power level, pressurizer level, etc.), REFER to E-0-06.

Step 4.12 of E-FP-08 reads:

IE fire causes inability to monitor or control Dedicated System components (Train A Safeguards, DSP equipment, A D/G, etc.), REFER to E-0-07.

Step 4.11 gives the operators flexibility so they do not need to evacuate the control room for minor fires. Only fires that cause the inability to monitor and control major plant parameters would result in evacuation. None of the control room fires evaluated are of this severity. In each scenario, only one train is affected and operators are able to shut the plant down with the opposite train. Offsite power and one train of power are only isolated if E-0-06 is invoked.

Similarly, the dedicated shutdown panel is only used if E-0-06 is invoked.

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Document Control Desk September 28, 1998, Page 3 The October 13, 1995 submittal erroneously states that for a fire in the bus 5 switches, procedure E-0-07 would be invoked. Procedure E-0-07 only applies to a fire in a dedicated zone. Since the control room is an alternate fire zone, E-0-07 is never invoked for a control room fire. The revised quantification, correcting this error, is in Attachment 2.

2. The control room is considered part of the alternate train. As required by 10CFR50 Appendix R, the alternate train is separated from dedicated train equipment. Procedure E-0-06 requires switches to be manipulated and fuses to be pulled, thus electrically isolating dedicated and alternate train equipment. Thus no shutdown procedures taking into account failures of both trains are necessary. In the event that the operator action to isolate dedicated train equipment from the control room fails, core damage is assumed.

3. As stated above, none of the evaluated control room fires result in transfer to E-0-06. E-0-07 is not applicable to control room fires.

4. The only areas for which fuses were credited are the steam generator PORV controllers on mechanical control console A and the pressurizer PORV switches on mechanical control console C. These sequences were quantified and the results of all four control room fires analyzed are in Attachment 2. The net result of adding the two additional sequences is a less than 0.1%

increase in fire core damage frequency.

5. Attachment 3 contains procedures E-0-06 and E-0-07.

HIGH WINDS, FLOODS, AND OTHER EXTERNAL EVENTS (HFO) QUESTION

1. This question concerns the resolution of GI-103, Design for Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP). The IPEEE submittal (see p. 5-25ff) calculates, using NOAA Hydrometerological Report (HMR) No. 52, a runoff of 1.9 inches (see p. 5-50 of the IPEEE submittal). The submittal then states (see p. 5-29) that "due to the immense size of Lake Michigan and its normal water level (approximately 23 feet below the plant elevation) no flooding of Lake Michigan from a combination of rain collection and runoff will ever endanger Kewaunee." But this is not the issue. The issue is whether ponding on the site can affect safety-related equipment, and whether roof ponding can fail roofs, with attendant failure of safety-related equipment. The roof ponding issue is adequately addressed, in a response dated August 29, 1995, to a request for additional information. However, the site ponding issue is not addressed adequately. Moreover, the runoff was calculated with a runoff coefficient of 0.15. Considering the fact that the soil has high clay content (see p. F-6 of the Point Beach A-45 study, NUREG/CR-4458, and see also Section 3.1.3.6 of the Kewaunee IPEEE submittal), and that the ground may be frozen in the spring (when it is most likely the PMP event would occur), the runoff coefficient should likely be considerably higher. We note that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Engineer Manual, EM 1110-2-1417, Flood-Runoff Analysis, p.

13-7, states that for Probable Maximum Storms (PMSs), ground conditions that affect losses should be the most severe that can reasonably exist in conjunction with a PMS, and that, where it is possible for the ground to be frozen, zero or near GBNTJCI N.\\GROUP\\NUCLEAR\\WPFILES\\LIC\\NRC\\IPERAILWPD

Document Control Desk September 28, 1998, Page 4 zero loss rates should be used.

Accordingly, a runoff coefficient C=0.9 may be more appropriate. Moreover the PMP estimates in the submittal were based on a 10 sq. mi area; a 1 sq. mi area would give a greater depth. From Fig. 24 of HMR 52, a 1 hr, 1 sq. mi PMP corresponds to a rainfall intensity 1=16.5 in/hr, as opposed to the 13 in/hr used in the IPEEE submittals (for a 10mi 2 area). The drainage area A is stated to be not greater than 640 acres (=1 sq. mi) in Rev. 12 of the Kewaunee Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) on p. 2.6-8.

Using the rational formula, the peak flow Q is given by Q=CIA, with C=0.9, 1=16.5 in/hr, and A = 1 mi 2, from which one obtains Q=9583 cubit feet per sec. But the peak flow that the drainage ditch can handle is 467 cubic feet per sec, from the UFSAR, p. 2.6-9. Thus the drainage ditch does not appear to be able to handle the runoff, and there may be some site flooding and ponding, from a PMP event.

Furthermore, it should be noted that one cannot determine the level of flooding at the site from computing a rate of increase of water level from Q/A=CIA/A, as is done on p. 5-29 of the PEEE submittal. Here, A is the drainage area; the water from this area collects on the site, but the amount of water that collects in a particular area on the site depends on the topography of the site. Portions of the area A may not be on the site, but the water from these portions can run off onto the site. Some areas of the site may experience sheet runoff and there may be ponding of water in other areas.

Please address the issue ofsite flooding and ponding from the PMP. Please provide an analysis of the PMP which demonstrates the extent to which site flooding and ponding from the PMP results in water ingress into buildings housing safety-related equipment. Have any storms that have occurred resulted in water ingress into buildings housing safety-related equipment?

WPSC REPLY Based on a review of section 5.2, External Floods, of the IPEEE submittal, WPSC agrees that the application of the "Rational Formula" and the related calculation are in error. In order to evaluate the impact of local precipitation at the site, the following description is offered.

The property on which the plant is located is graded from a high point (635' elevation) at Wisconsin State Highway 42 to the west down to the shore of Lake Michigan to the east. Any runoff would therefore flow eastward towards Lake Michigan (585' elevation).

The section of the site property on which the plant is located occupies approximately 60 acres which is bounded to the north and south by natural drainage channels that drain storm water away from the plant to Lake Michigan.

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Document Control Desk September 28, 1998, Page 5 The plant electric substation (612' elevation) is located between the plant and Highway 42. An intervening ditch exists on the west side of the substation. This ditch is designed to collect runoff from the small section of land between the substation and Highway 42 including runoff directed via culverts from a large section on the west side of the highway. The ditch directs runoff water through culverts located under the main access road to the south channel. The peak flow to the ditch is approximately 336 CFS based on the one hundred year hourly rain intensity of 2.5 inches. The peak flow to the ditch based on the new PMP (16.5 inches/hour) is approximately 9580 CFS which exceeds the capacity of the ditch. The peak flow that this drainage ditch can handle without overflowing is approximately 467 CFS. Runoff that exceeds the capacity of the ditch results in ditch overflow that runs down and across the main access road and into the lake via the south drainage channel. The capacity of this channel at its mid-point (approximate entry point for ditch overflow) is approximately 11,000 CFS, which is more than adequate to handle trench overflow.

The land surrounding the main power block (605' elevation) is graded such that runoff from building roofs is diverted to low areas surrounding the plant. These areas are equipped with storm drains that direct runoff directly to the lake or to the south drainage channel. If runoff exceeds the capacity of the storm drains, some small ponding would occur, and would be relieved by sheet runoff to the lake due to the natural grade at those points. Therefore, the water level in these low areas is not expected to rise to the point where plant buildings would be affected.

In the 24 years that the plant has been in operation no ponding due to excessive rainfall has occurred.

No storms have occurred at the site that resulted in significant water ingress into plant buildings other than minor roof leakage.

The PMP is an estimate of the theoretically greatest depth of precipitation for a given duration that is physically possible over a particular drainage area. It is intended to be an estimate of the maximum precipitation that can be generated. There is, however, no frequency of occurrence associated with rainfall events of this intensity. The PMP estimates do not consider local area historical rainfall data. The revised PMP greatly exceeds the maximum expected rainfall for the plant that formed the basis for the design of the site.

As detailed above, the site has adequate design capability to address the 100 year hourly rain intensity which historical experience has not challenged, and provisions to address the revised PMP, therefore no additional actions are required.

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ATTACHMENT 2 Letter from M. L. Marchi (WPSC)

To Document Control Desk (NRC)

Dated September 28, 1998 GBNUCI N:\\GROUPUCLEAR\\WPFILES\\LIC\\NRClJPERAI.WPD

Document Control Desk September 28, 1998, Page 1 REVISED CONTROL ROOM FIRE ANALYSIS A. FIRE GROWTH AND PROPAGATION: CONTROL ROOM (AX35)

Due to its unique features, the control room was not evaluated with COMPBRN, but a qualitative screening was performed. There are eight major control cabinets in the control room. Each cabinet was examined to determine what components are controlled from that cabinet and what effect loss of those components would have on core damage frequency.

The following assumptions were made:

1. The initiating frequency for a fire in the control room cabinets is 9.5x10-3. These cabinets have been divided into 47 regions of approximately equal area for the purpose of this study.

The initiating frequency for each region is then 9.5x10-3/47 or 2.02x10-4. The initiating frequency for each fire is then 2.02xlO times the fraction of switches that could initiate the fire, plus an additional 2.02x10-4 for each adjacent region that could propagate a fire into the region being considered.

2. Switches for redundant trains of safety related equipment that are within 6 inches of each other are separated by metal barriers. It is assumed that a fire in one train can not cross these barriers and propagate to the other train. The existence of these barriers was verified in cases in which this assumption was made. Propagation from one component to another in the same train was considered.

3. It is assumed that a fire would begin at a contact associated with a switch or indicator. There are very sensitive ionization detectors in each cabinet that would detect any smoke very early. Operators would then receive an alarm, examine the inside of the affected cabinet and apply CO 2 from easily accessible fire extinguishers. An insulation fire would be a slow smoldering fire and, with no operator action, would propagate to the cable bundle entering the cabinet. Operators would have ample time to prevent this from occurring. Such obvious operator actions are generally given very low error probabilities; in this case 1.0x10-4 is used. The frequency of a control room fire that spreads to the cable bundle is then 9.5x10 7,

which is below the screening criterion. It is therefore assumed that a fire is detected and extinguished and would not spread to other components beyond the immediate vicinity of the source.

4. Consistent with the screening methodology used for other zones, equipment failures that would not result in a reactor trip are not considered.

5. Fires disabling gauges, alarms, and indicating lights are not considered because their failures would not cause a reactor trip.

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Document Control Desk September 28, 1998, Page 2

6. If a fire would have no other effect than to cause a reactor trip, with or without main feedwater, it is not considered further because the fire frequency is more than two orders of magnitude below the frequencies for these events due to other causes. If a reactor trip were due to a fire in the control room, it would be considered part of the transient initiating event frequency. These fires are therefore not considered further because they are bounded by the internal events analysis.

7. It is assumed that, since Foxboro controllers are completely enclosed, a fire in one does not spread to adjacent equipment.

Following is an evaluation of each control room cabinet.

Electrical Control Console A: This panel contains switches for all 4160V and 480V electrical buses as well as both emergency diesel generators. The switches for each source breaker for 4160V safeguards bus 5 are adjacent. It is therefore possible that a fire in one switch could propagate to the others. It is assumed that a single fire could make bus 5 and all its potential sources (diesel generator A, reserve auxiliary transformer, tertiary auxiliary transformer) unavailable. Likewise for bus 6, a single fire could affect diesel generator B, the reserve auxiliary transformer and the tertiary auxiliary transformer. These fires are therefore retained for further analysis.

Electrical Vertical Panel A: This panel contains switches for the substation and offsite power sources. A fire in this panel could cause a loss of offsite power, but no additional failures. Since the initiating frequency for a fire in this panel, (six regions x 2.02x10-4 or 1.21x10-3 ) is a factor of 36 smaller than the loss of offsite power frequency from the internal events PRA, the core damage frequency due to a fire in this panel is bounded by that from the internal events PRA.

This panel is therefore not considered further.

Mechanical Control Console A: This panel contains a reactor trip pushbutton and switches for the turbine, main feedwater, auxiliary feedwater, steam dump, and other miscellaneous secondary side equipment, such as heater drain pumps.

A fire in the non-safeguards portion of this panel (turbine, feedwater, other secondary side equipment) or the reactor trip pushbutton, could cause at worst a transient without main feedwater. Therefore, according to assumption 6, these fires are not considered further.

A fire in the auxiliary feedwater area of this panel can not propagate from one train to the other due to the barriers discussed in assumption 2. Furthermore, since the auxiliary feedwater switches are separated from the non-safeguards portion by barriers, a fire in this area of the panel would not cause a reactor trip.

The steam dump system must be armed in order for the steam dump to occur. This requires a turbine trip or load rejection. A spurious operation of the steam dump controllers would therefore not result in opening of steam dump valves. Steam generator power operated relief GBNUCI N:\\GROUP\\NUCLEAR\\WPFILES\\LICNRCIPERAI.WPD

Document Control Desk September 28, 1998, Page 3 valve (PORV) manual control stations are also on this panel. Spurious opening of the PORVs would cause a reactor trip. This fire is therefore retained for further analysis.

Mechanical Vertical Panel A: This panel contains switches for service water, air compressors, and other miscellaneous equipment not modeled in the IPE.

A fire in the service water area of this panel could affect two service water pumps. Since there is a barrier between the switches for the A train pumps (Al and A2) and the B train pumps (BI and B2), a single fire is not capable of disabling both trains. If the fire disables the train that supplies cooling to the turbine building, operator action is necessary to restore cooling to the main feedwater pumps and therefore prevent a reactor trip. This is a simple operator action, there is ample time, and there is an alarm alerting the operator to the condition. The service water pump switches are separated from any switches that could cause a reactor trip by distance or barriers. It is therefore assumed that a fire in the service water area of this panel would not cause a reactor trip.

Of the five station and instrument air compressors at Kewaunee, only two have control room control. A fire disabling these two compressors would not cause a reactor trip because the other air compressors would be available.

There are other switches on this panel that are not modeled in the Level 1 IPE. Some of these, such as circulating water pumps, are capable of causing a reactor trip if they fail. Since, as explained above, a fire in the switches for these components could not propagate to the service water pump, the effect would be the same as that of the transient with main feedwater available modeled in the IPE and, in accordance with assumption 6, this area is not considered further.

Since there are no areas of this panel that could both cause a reactor trip and seriously affect the recovery from the trip, this panel is not considered further.

Mechanical Control Console B: This panel contains switches for control rod control and the chemical and volume control system (CVCS).

A fire in the control rod control area, including the manual reactor trip pushbutton, could cause a reactor trip. There is separation, however, between this area of the panel and the switches for the portion of the CVCS modeled in the IPE. Therefore, in accordance with assumption 6, this area is not considered further.

The only components in the CVCS that are modeled in the IPE for a transient are the charging pumps and associated valves. The charging pump switches are separated by barriers, so a fire in one switch would not propagate to the others. Even if a fire did cause the unavailability of the CVCS, it would not cause a reactor trip. A fire in this area is therefore not considered.

Since there are no areas of this panel that could both cause a reactor trip and seriously affect the recovery from the trip, this panel is not considered further.

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Document Control Desk September 28, 1998, Page 4 Mechanical Vertical Panel B: This panel contains the nuclear instrumentation (NI) drawers and some switches for miscellaneous equipment that is not modeled in the IPE and could not cause a reactor trip. Each channel of the NI system is in a separate drawer, so that a fire in one drawer could not propagate to another. Since one channel by itself can not cause a reactor trip at power, a single fire in this panel would not trip the reactor. This panel is therefore not considered further.

Mechanical Control Console C: This panel contains switches for the pressurizer sprays, pressurizer PORVs, reactor coolant pumps, and pressurizer heaters. It also contains switches for the component cooling, residual heat removal, containment spray, and safety injection systems.

The pressurizer heaters and reactor coolant pumps are not modeled in the IPE. The sprays are not modeled for transients, but only for loss of coolant accidents and steam generator tube ruptures. The failure of these components could cause a reactor trip, but would not significantly affect the mitigation of the transient. Therefore, in accordance with assumption 6, this area is not considered further.

The pressurizer PORV switches are separated by a barrier, so a single fire could only affect one valve. A spurious opening of a pressurizer PORV would probably result in a reactor trip.

The switch for PORV PR-2A is separated from its block valve PR-lA by a barrier. Therefore, if it does open, it can be easily closed and a transient with main feedwater available results. The initiating event frequency for this event is more than four orders of magnitude below the internal events frequency for the transient with main feedwater available. Therefore, the event is bounded by the internal events analysis.

A fire in the PR-2A switch combined with a failure to close the block valve would result in a small break loss of coolant accident. Of the 16 switches in this region; only 3 could result in a fire in the PR-2A switch. The initiating event frequency for this fire is 9.5x10-3 x 1/47 x 3/16

= 3.79 x 10-'. This coupled with the human error probability for failure to close the block valve, 1.2x10-2 using the increased human error values discussed in Section 9.8.7.D, results in an initiating event frequency of 4.55x1 0-7, which is below the screening criterion. Therefore, this area is not considered further.

A fire in the PR-2B switch is, however, retained for further analysis.

The two trains of component cooling are separated by barriers so a single fire could not disable both trains. Each pump is capable of supplying all component cooling loads during normal operations. This area is separated from switches that could cause a reactor trip by barriers and/or distance. Therefore, a fire disabling one train of component cooling would not cause a reactor trip, in accordance with assumption 6, this area is not considered further.

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Document Control Desk September 28, 1998, Page 5 The safety injection manual initiation pushbuttons would cause a reactor trip if they actuated spuriously. They are separated from any switches whose failure would hinder the mitigation of a transient by barriers and/or distance.

Residual heat removal, containment spray, and the rest of safety injection, are standby systems that are not capable of causing a reactor trip. Their areas in this panel is separated from systems that could cause a reactor trip by barriers and/or distance.

Since there are no areas of this panel that could both cause a reactor trip and seriously affect the mitigation of a transient, this panel is not considered further.

Mechanical Vertical Panel C: This panel contains radiation equipment, flux mapping equipment and the inadequate core cooling monitoring system. None of these systems is capable of causing a reactor trip, and therefore this panel is not considered further.

B. DETERMINATION OF INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY IN EACH ZONE REQUIRING QUANTIFICATION Figures 1 through 4 show the derivation of the initiating event frequency for each control room scenario. The loss of offsite power, small break loss of coolant accident or steam line break event sequence is used depending on the scenario.

C. FIRE-INDUCED CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY QUANTIFICATION Core damage frequencies are computed for each control room scenario. Tables 1 through 3 show results from the four scenarios that require quantification of core damage frequency (CDF).

1. FT 10: Fire in Control Room Bus 5 Switches Bus 5 is disabled in this scenario. The loss of offsite power event tree (Figure 5) is used in this scenario.

Since the fire does not prohibit operation of train B safe shutdown equipment from the control room, it is assumed that operators do not use procedure E-0-06, Fire in Alternate Zone, which requires manual isolation of offsite power and evacuation of the control room.

2. FIl 1: Fire in Control Room Bus 6 Switches Bus 6 is disabled in this scenario. The loss of offsite power event tree (Figure 5) is used in this scenario.

Since the fire does not prohibit operation of train A safe shutdown equipment from the control room, it is assumed that operators do not use procedure E-0-06, Fire in Alternate Zone, which requires manual isolation of offsite power and evacuation of the control room.

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Document Control Desk September 28, 1998, Page 6

3. FTI 2: Fire in Steam Generator PORV Switches One Steam Generator power operated relief valve (PORV) (SD-3A or SD-3D) is disabled in this scenario. Scalars FAULT-A and FAULT-B represent the opening of SD-3A and SD-3B respectively. A revised steam line break event tree, which does not assume a return to criticality (Figure 6), is used in this scenario. This is because return to criticality is a issue that only applies to large pipe breaks, not to stuck open PORVs.

Since the fire does not prohibit operation of Train A safe shutdown equipment from the control room, it is assumed that operators do not use procedure E-0-06, Fire in Alternate Zone, which requires manual isolation of offsite power and evacuation of the control room.

4. Fl 13: Fire in Pressurizer PORV Switches Pressurizer PORV PR-2B and block valve PR-2A are disabled in this scenario. The small break loss of coolant accident event tree (Figure 7) is used in this scenario.

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Document Control Desk September 28, 1998, Page 7 Figure 1: AX-35 (FI10) INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY CONTROL ROOM BUS 5 SWITCHES Fire Initiation Frequency Automatic Detection Manual Suppression End State Frequency (per year)

(per year)

I 1

A OK (2.02E-04) I B

DAMAGE C

DAMAGE Total Frequency Active Fire Protection

=

2.02E-04/yr

=

Automatic detection (ionization detector), manual suppression (fire extinguishers)

=

Credit is not granted for manual fire suppression because the fire would spread very quickly. Therefore, the total frequency is equal to the fire initiating frequency Fire Initiation Frequency Applicable Event Sequence

=

(Compartment Fire Frequency) * (1/Number of Sections)

=

(9.5E-03) * (1/47) = 2.02E-04/yr

=

Loss of offsite power GBNUCI N:\\GROUP\\NUCLEAR\\WPFILES\\LICNRCIPERAWPD I

Document Control Desk September 28, 1998, Page 8 Figure 2: AX-35 (Fl 1) INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY CONTROL ROOM BUS 6 SWITCHES Fire Initiation Frequency Automatic Detection Manual Suppression End State Frequency (per year)

(per year)

I 1

A OK B

DAMAGE C

DAMAGE Total Frequency Active Fire Protection

=

2.02E-04/yr

=

Automatic detection (ionization detector), manual suppression (fire extinguishers)

=

Credit is not granted for manual fire suppression because the fire would spread very quickly. Therefore, the total frequency is equal to the fire initiating frequency.

Fire Initiation Frequency Applicable Event Sequence

=

(Compartment Fire Frequency) * (1/Number of Sections)

=

(9.5E-03) * (1/47) 2.025E-04/yr

=

Loss of offsite power GBNUCI N:\\GROUP\\NUCLEAR\\WPFILES\\LIC\\NRC\\IPERAI.WPD (2.02E-04)

Document Control Desk September 28, 1998, Page 9 Figure 3: AX-35 (F112) INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY CONTROL ROOM SG PORV SWITCHES Fire Initiation Frequency Automatic Detection Manual Suppression End State Frequency (per year)

(per year)

I I

I 1

A OK B

DAMAGE C

DAMAGE Total Frequency Active Fire Protection Fire Initiation Frequency Applicable Event Sequence

=

1.76E-05/yr

=

Automatic detection (ionization detector), manual suppression (fire extinguishers)

=

Credit is not granted for manual fire suppression because the fire would spread very quickly. Therefore, the total frequency is equal to the fire initiating frequency.

=

(Compartment Fire Frequency) * (1/Number of Sections) * (No. of PORV switches/Total number of switches)

=

(9.5E-03) * (1/47) x (2/23) = 1.76E-5/yr

=

Steam line break GBNUCI N:\\GROUP\\NUICLEAR\\WPFILES\\LICNRC\\IPERAI.WPD (1.76E-05)

Document Control Desk September 28, 1998, Page 10 Figure 4: AX-35 (FIl13) INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY CONTROL ROOM PRZR PORV SWITCHES Fire Initiation Frequency Automatic Detection Manual Suppression End State Frequency (per year)

(per year)

I 1

1 1

A OK (2.02e-04)

B DAMAGE C

DAMAGE Total Frequency Active Fire Protection Fire Initiation Frequency Applicable Event Sequence

=

2.02E-04/yr

= Automatic detection (ionization detector), manual suppression (fire extinguishers)

= Credit is not granted for manual fire suppression because the fire would spread very quickly. Therefore, the total frequency is equal to the fire initiating frequency.

=

(Compartment Fire Frequency) * (1/Number of Sections) * (No. of switches within boundary/Total number of switches)

=

(9.5E-03) * (1/47) x (11/16) = 1.39x10-4

=

Small break LOCA GBNUCI N:\\GROUP\\NUCLEAR\\WPFILES\\LIC\\NRClPERAI.WPD I

S Document Control Desk September 28, 1998, Page 11 FIGURE 5 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT TREE LSP OSP AF7 OB5

HR11 CIP ] CCP I.SUCCESS 2.SUCCESS 3.HL 4.SUCCESS 5.LL 6.HE 7.SBO

THIS NODE IS USED IN OTHER EVENT TREES. IT IS CONDITIONAL HERE DUE TO THE INITIATOR.

GBNUCI N:\\GROUP\\NUCLEAR\\WPFILES\\LIC\\NRC\\IPERAILWPD

Document Control Desk September 28, 1998, Page 12 FIGURE 5 QITOCR4Z. CPTTRIA AnR1 TO.O OF OnFiITE POWFI Top Event Description System Success Criteria Necessary Operator Actions Mission Time (hrs)

OSP-POWER AVAILABLE AF7-AUXILIARY FEEDWATER OB5-OPERATOR ACTION BLEED AND FEED HR1-HIGH PRESSURE RECIRCULATION Emergency AC Power available to at least 1 of 2 4.16kV safeguards buses.

1 of 3 AFW pumps delivering at least 200 gpm to at least 1 of 2 steam generators.

1 of 2 high pressure SI trains delivering flow to 1 of 2 RCS cold legs, 1 of 2 pressurizer PORVs open (bleed and feed initiated prior to secondary dryout - assume at 30 minutes).

1 of 2 SI/RHR trains delivering flow from containment sump to 1 of 2 RCS cold legs, sump valve on operable recirculation train open.

Confirm operation of system.

Manually open PORVs and block valves, start SI pumps.

Manually align high pressure containment sump recirculation on low RWST level, align CCW to RHR Hx, confirm operation of system.

GBNUCI N:\\GROUP\\NUCLEAR\\WPFILES\\LIC\\NRC11PERAWPD 24 24 24 20.5

Document Control Desk September 28, 1998, Page 13 FIGURE 5 SUCCESS CRITERIA FOR LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER Top Event System Description Success Criteria Necessary Operator Actions Mission Time (hrs)

CHP-CHARGING PUMP OPERATION CCP-COMPONENT COOLING WATER 1 of 3 charging pumps started within 30 minutes after reactor trip for RXCP seal injection.

1 of 2 CCW pumps delivering flow to the RXCP thermal barrier.

Manually start at least 1 charging pump, if none operating, within 30 minutes after rector trip and establish RXCP seal injection.

Confirm operation of system.

GBNUCI N:\\GROUP\\NUCLEAR\\WPFILES\\LIC\\NRC\\lPERAILWPD 24 24

Document Control Desk September 28, 1998, Page 14 FIGURE 6 STEAM LINE BREAK EVENT TREE SLB HI3 AF1 OM1 OB1 HR1 ORI

1. SUCCESS

2. SUCCESS

3. SUCCESS

4. SUCCESS

5. LL

6. HE

7. SUCCESS

8. SUCCESS

9. HE GBNUCI N:\\GROUP\\NUCLEAR\\WPFILES\\LICNRCPERAI.WPD

Document Control Desk September 28, 1998, Page 15 FIGURE 6 SUCCESS CRITERIA FOR LARGE STEAMLINE/FEEDLINE BREAK Top Event Description System Success Criteria Necessary Operator Actions Mission Time (hrs)

H13-RCS BORATION WITH BAT AF 1-AUXILIARY FEEDWATER OM1-OPERATOR ACTION ESTABLISH MAIN FEEDWATER OB 1-OPERATOR ACTION BLEED AND FEED 1 of 2 high pressure SI trains inject the contents of one RWST into 1 of 2 RCS cold legs.

1 of 2 AFW pumps delivering at least 200 gpm to intact steam generator.

1 of 2 MFW trains delivering at least 200 gpm to intact generator.

1 of 2 high pressure SI trains delivering flow to 1 of 2 RCS cold legs; 1 of 2 pressurizer PORVs open (bleed and feed initiated prior to secondary dryout - assume at 30 minutes).

Confirm operation of system.

Manually open PORVs and block valves, verify SI pumps running.

GBNUCI N:\\GROUP\\NUCLEAR\\WPFILES\\LIC\\NRC\\IPERAI.WPD 3.5 24 24 24

S Document Control Desk September 28, 1998, Page 16 FIGURE 6 SUCCESS CRITERIA FOR LARGE STEAMLINE/FEEDLINE BREAK Top Event Description System Success Criteria Necessary Operator Actions Mission Time (hrs)

HR1-HIGH PRESSURE RECIRCULATION ORI-OPERATOR ACTION LIMIT SI FLOW AND REFILL RWST 1 of 2 SI/RHR trains delivering flow from the containment sump to 1 of 2 RCS cold legs, sump valve on operable recirculation train open.

1 of 2 reactor makeup water pumps delivering flow from the RMSTs to the RWST. I of 2 boric acid transfer pumps delivering flow from the BATs to the RWST.

1 of 2 SI pumps delivering flow from RWST Manually align high pressure containment sump recirculation on low RWST level, align CCW to RHR Hx, confirm operation of system 20.5 Open local valves to supply makeup 20.5 flow to RWST, start makeup. Stop one SI pump, throttle SI flow.

GBNUCI N:\\GROUP\\NUCLEAR\\WPFILES\\LIC\\NRC\\IPERAI.WPD

Document Control Desk September 28, 1998, Page 17 FIGURE 7 SMALL LOCA EVENT TREE

1. SUCCESS

2. SUCCESS

3. SUCCESS

4. SUCCESS

5. LL

6. SUCCESS

7. SUCCESS

8. SUCCESS

9. SUCCESS

10. LL

11. SUCCESS

12. SUCCESS

13. SUCCESS

14. LL

15. HE

16. SUCCESS

17. LL

18. SUCCESS

19. LL

20. HE

21. LE

22. LE

23. HE GBNUCI N:\\GROUP\\NUCLEAR\\WPFILES\\LICNRC\\PERAI.WPD

Document Control Desk September 28, 1998, Page 18 FIGURE 7 SUCCESS CRITERIA FOR SMALL LOCA Top Event Description System Success Criteria Necessary Operator Actions Mission Time (hrs)

HIl-HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION OPI-OPERATOR ACTION COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZE RCS IN FR-C.2 ACC-ACCUMULATOR INJECTION L12-LOW PRESSURE INJECTION AF3-AUXILIARY FEEDWATER 1 of 2 high pressure SI trains injecting contents of RWST to 1 of 2 RCS cold legs Operator initiated cooldown started within 30 minutes using at least one SG supplied with feedwater.

1 of 1 accumulator injecting into intact RCS cold leg.

1 of 2 low pressure SI trains injecting flow into reactor vessel.

1 of 3 AFW pumps delivering to at least 1 of 2 steam generators, total flow of at least 200 gpm.

Confirm operation of system. If pumps not automatically started, manually start.

Cool down RCS by dumping steam at max 1000 F/hr. Depressurize RCS to inject accumulators and permit initiation of low pressure SI.

Confirm operation of system.

Manually initiate low pressure SI following RCS cooldown and depressurization, confirm operation of system.

Confirm operation of system.

3.5 Approximately 1 (until break flow anc low-head SI flow are able to remove deca' heat.

None 1

24 GBNUCI N:\\GROUP\\NUCLEAR\\WPFILES\\LIC\\NRC\\IJPERAILWPD

Document Control Desk September 28, 1998, Page 19 FIGURE 7 STICCESS CRITERTA FOR SMALL LOCA Top Event Description System Success Criteria Necessary Operator Actions Mission Time (hrs)

OMO-OPERATION ACTION ESTABLISH MAIN FEEDWATER OB 1-OPERATOR ACTION BLEED AND FEED ES1-OPERATION ACTION COOL DOWN AND DEPRESSURIZE RCS FOR CHARGING FLOW 1 of 2 MFW trains delivering at least 200 gpm to 1 of 2 steam generators.

1 of 2 high pressure SI trains delivering flow to 1 of 2 RCS cold legs; 1 of 2 pressurizer PORVs open (bleed and feed initiated prior to secondary dryout - assume at 15 minutes).

Cool down and depressurize RCS to near atmospheric pressure to avoid depleting RWST Manually align and initiate MFW.

Confirm operation of system.

Manually open PORVs and block valves, verify SI pumps running.

Cool down RCS using SGs, depressurize RCS using spray or one pressurizer PORV, reduce SI by stopping high pressure SI pumps, operate 2 of 3 charging pumps for makeup, align RHR system for cooldown to cold shutdown.

GBNUCI N:\\GROUP\\NUCLEAR\\WPFILES\\LIC\\NRC\\IPERAILWPD 24 24 24

Document Control Desk September 28, 1998, Page 20 FIGURE 7 SUCCESS CRITERIA FOR SMALL LOCA Top Event Ilescription System Success Criteria Necessary Operator Actions Mission Time (hrs)

HR1-HIGH PRESSURE RECIRCULATION LR1-LOW PRESSURE RECIRCULATION LR2-LOW PRESSURE RECIRCULATION 1 of 2 SI/RHR trains delivering flow from containment sump to 1 of 2 RCS cold legs, sump valve on operable recirculation train open.

1 of 2 low pressure SI trains in recirc from containment sump to reactor vessel via RHR heat exchangers, sump valve on operable recirculation train open 1 of 2 low pressure SI trains in recirc from containment sump to reactor vessel via RHR heat exchangers, sump valve on operable recirculation train open Manually align high pressure containment sump recirculation on low RWST level, align CCW cooling to RHR Hx, confirm operation of system.

Manually align low pressure containment sump recirc on low RWST level, align CCW cooling to RHR Hx, confirm operation of system.

GBNUCI N:\\GROUP\\NUCLEAR\\WPFILES\\LIC\\NRC\\IPERAILWPD 20.5 24 24

Document Control Desk September 28, 1998, Page 21 FIGURE 7 SUCCESS CRITERIA FOR SMALL LOCA Top Event Description System Success Criteria Necessary Operator Actions Mission Time (hrs)

ORI-OPERATOR ACTION LIMIT SI FLOW AND REFILL RWST OR2-OPERATOR ACTION LIMIT SI FLOW AND REFILL RWST 1 of 2 reactor makeup water pumps delivering flow from the RMSTs to the RWST. 1 of 2 boric acid transfer pumps delivering flow from the BATs to the RWST. 1 of 2 SI pumps delivering flow from RWST.

1 of 2 reactor makeup water pumps delivering flow from the RMSTs to the RWST. 1 of 2 boric acid transfer pumps delivering flow from the BATs to the RWST. 1 of 2 SI pumps delivering flow from RWST. RCS cooldown and depressurization successful.

Open local valves to supply makeup flow to RWST, start makeup. Stop one SI pump, throttle SI flow.

Open local valves to supply makeup flow to RWST, start makeup. Stop one SI pump, throttle SI flow. Cool down and depressurize the RCS.

GBNIJCI N:\\GROUP\\NUCLEAR\\WrPFILES\\LIC\\NRC\\IPERAI.WPD 20.5 20.5

Table 1:

Core Damage Frequency Results by Control Room Fire Zone CONTRIBUTION OF INITIATING EVENTS TO PLANT COREMELT FREQUENCY INITIATING EVENT CATEGORY IN BUS 5 SWITCHES IN ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS IN BUS 6 SWITCHES IN ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS IN PZR PORV PR-2B SWITCHES IN MECH. CONTROL CONSOLE C IN SG PORV SWITCHES IN MECHANICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS I-EVENT

OF FREQUENCY CUTSETS

2. 0E -04 2.OE-04 1.4E-04 1.8E-05 454 325 106 87 COREMELT FREQUENCY 1.6E-05 1.3E-05 8.5E-08 2.OE-09 FIRE FIRE FIRE FIRE

- - - - DOMINANT SEQUENCES *****

ie: Table 2:

Fire Results We:

CONTFIRE.LST ( File created by Linking CONTFIRE.IN WLINK ** Ver. 3.11 **)

Reduced Sum of Sequence Probabilities: 2.9272E-05 SEQUENCE NUMBER PROBABILITY SEQUENCE DESCRIPTION 1

1.59E-05 FIRE IN BUS 5 EQUIPMENT FAILS CHARGING FAILS COMPONENT 2

1.30E-05 FIRE IN BUS 6 EQUIPMENT FAILS CHARGING FAILS COMPONENT SWITCHES IN DUE TO FIRE DURING LOSS OF COOLING FAILS SWITCHES IN DUE TO FIRE DURING LOSS OF COOLING FAILS 3

9.54E-08 FIRE IN BUS 5 SWITCHES IN EQUIPMENT FAILS DUE TO FIRE AFW FAILS DURING LOSS OF OFFSITE HIGH PRESSURE RECIRCULATION 4

8.97E-08 FIRE IN BUS 6 SWITCHES IN EQUIPMENT FAILS DUE TO FIRE AFW FAILS DURING LOSS OF OFFSITE BLEED AND FEED FAILS DURING 5

8.88E-08 FIRE IN BUS 5 SWITCHES IN EQUIPMENT FAILS DUE TO FIRE AFW FAILS DURING LOSS OF OFFSITE BLEED AND FEED FAILS DURING 6

8.10E-08 FIRE IN BUS 6 SWITCHES IN EQUIPMENT FAILS DUE TO FIRE AFW FAILS DURING LOSS OF OFFSITE HIGH PRESSURE RECIRCULATION 7

6.96E-08 FIRE IN PZR PORV COOLDOWN AND HIGH PRESSURE LOW PRESSURE RWST REFILL AND 8

7.66E-09 FIRE IN PZR PORV HIGH PRESSURE COOLDOWN AND 6.93E-09 10 1.98E-09 FIRE IN PZR PORV HIGH PRESSURE LOW PRESSURE FIRE IN SG PORV AFW TO INTACT SG MAIN FEEDWATER PR-2B SWITCHES DEPRESSURIZATION RECIRCULATION RECIRCULATION SI FLOW PR-2B SWITCHES INJECTION FAILS DEPRESSURIZATION PR-2B SWITCHES INJECTION FAILS RECIRCULATION SWITCHES IN STEAM GENERATOR TO INTACT STEAM ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS OFFSITE POWER DURING LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS OFFSITE POWER DURING LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS POWER FAILS AFTER BLEED AND FEED ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS POWER LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS POWER LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS POWER FAILS AFTER IN MECH. CONTROL FOR CHARGING FAILS AFTER FAILS AFTER HPI LIMITATION FAILS IN MECH. CONTROL DURING SMALL FOR LOW PRESSURE IN MECH. CONTROL DURING SMALL FAILS AFTER LPI MECHANICAL CONT.

FAILS GENERATOR FAILS BLEED AND FEED CONSOLE C OCCURS FAILS BLEED AND FEED SUCCESSFUL (BLEED & FEED)

CONSOLE C OCCURS LOCA OR SGTR INJECTION FAILS CONSOLE C OCCURS LOCA OR SGTR SUCCESSFUL CONSOLE A OCCURS SEQUENCE IDENTIFIER IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE SYS-CHP SYS-CCP IEV-FI11 FIRE-DAMAGE SYS-CHP SYS-CCP IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE SYS-AF7 SYS-HR1 IEV-FIll FIRE-DAMAGE SYS-AF7 SYS-OB5 IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE SYS-AF7 SYS-OB5 IEV-FIll FIRE-DAMAGE SYS-AF7 SYS-HR1 IEV-F 113 SYS-ES1 SYS-HR1 SYS-LR2 SYS-0R2 IEV-F 113 SYS-HI1 SYS-OP1 IEV-F 113 SYS-HI 1 SYS-LR1 IEV-FI12 SYS-AFT SYS-0M1 9

Page:

1

DOMINANT SEQUENCES *****

ie: Table 2:

Fire Results le:

CONTFIRE.LST ( File created by Linking CONTFIRE.IN WLINK ** Ver. 3.11 **)

Reduced Sum of Sequence Probabilities: 2.9272E-05 SEQUENCE NUMBER PROBABILITY SEQUENCE DESCRIPTION BLEED AND FEED FAILS DURING 11 1.15E-09 FIRE IN PZR PORV AFW FAILS DURING MAIN FEEDWATER BLEED AND FEED 12 O.OOE+00 FIRE IN PZR PORV AFW FAILS DURING MAIN FEEDWATER HIGH PRESSURE LOW PRESSURE RWST REFILL AND PR-2B SWITCHES TRANSIENT FAILS DURING FAILS DURING PR-2B SWITCHES TRANSIENT FAILS DURING RECIRCULATION RECIRCULATION SI FLOW 13 O.OOE+00 FIRE IN PZR PORV PR-2B SWITCHES HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION FAILS AFW FAILS DURING TRANSIENT MAIN FEEDWATER FAILS DURING 14 O.OOE+00 FIRE IN PZR PORV PR-2B SWITCHES HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION FAILS LOW PRESSURE INJECTION FAILS 15 O.OOE+00 FIRE IN PZR PORV PR-2B SWITCHES HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION FAILS ACCUMULATOR INJECTION 16 O.OOE+00 FIRE IN SG PORV AFW TO INTACT SG MAIN FEEDWATER HIGH PRESSURE RWST REFILL AND 17 O.OOE+00 FIRE IN SG PORV HIGH PRESSURE AFW TO INTACT SG MAIN FEEDWATER SWITCHES IN STEAM GENERATOR TO INTACT STEAM RECIRCULATION SI FLOW SWITCHES IN INJECTION FAILS STEAM GENERATOR TO INTACT STEAM LOCA OR STEAM LINE BREAK IN MECH. CONTROL CONSOLE C OCCURS LOCA LOCA OR STEAM LINE BREAK IN MECH. CONTROL CONSOLE C OCCURS LOCA FAILS AFTER BLEED AND FEED FAILS AFTER HPI SUCCESSFUL LIMITATION FAILS DURING LOCA IN MECH. CONTROL CONSOLE C OCCURS DURING SMALL LOCA OR SGTR LOCA IN MECH. CONTROL DURING SMALL DURING MEDIUM CONSOLE C OCCURS LOCA OR SGTR OR SMALL LOCA IN MECH. CONTROL CONSOLE C OCCURS DURING SMALL LOCA OR SGTR FAILS MECHANICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS FAILS GENERATOR FAILS FAILS AFTER LIMITATION FAILS MECHANICAL CONT.

DURING STEAM FAILS GENERATOR FAILS BLEED AND FEED DURING LOCA CONSOLE A OCCURS LINE BREAK SEQUENCE IDENTIFIER SYS-OB1 IEV-FI13 SYS-AF3 SYS-OMO SYS-OB1 IEV-FI13 SYS-AF3 SYS-OMO SYS-HR1 SYS-LR2 SYS-OR1 IEV-FI13 SYS-HIT SYS-AF3 SYS-OMO IEV-FI13 SYS-HI1 SYS-L12 IEV-FI13 SYS-HI1 SYS-ACC IEV-FI12 SYS-AF1 SYS-OMi SYS-HR1 SYS-OR1 IEV-FI12 SYS-H13 SYS-AF1 SYS-OMi Page:

2

- - - - DOMINANT CUTSETS *****

Title:

Table 3:

Fire Results e: CONTFIRE.OUT ( File created by linking CONTFIRE.IN WLINK ** Ver. 3.11 **)

ced Sum of Cutsets: 2.9280E-05 NUMBER CUTSET PROB BASIC EVENT NAME EVENT PROB.

IDENTIFIER 1

4.24E-06 FIRE IN BUS 5 EQUIPMENT FAILS FEEDER BREAKERS 2

4.24E-06 FIRE IN BUS 6 EQUIPMENT FAILS FEEDER BREAKERS 3

3.33E-06 FIRE IN BUS 5 EQUIPMENT FAILS DIESEL GENERATOR 4

3.33E-06 FIRE IN BUS 6 EQUIPMENT FAILS DIESEL GENERATOR 5

2.06E-06 FIRE IN BUS 5 EQUIPMENT FAILS DIESEL GENERATOR 6

1.07E-06 FIRE IN BUS 5 EQUIPMENT FAILS AOV SW-301B 17 1.07E-06 FIRE IN BUS 6 EQUIPMENT FAILS AOV SW-301A 8

1.01E-06 FIRE IN BUS 5 EQUIPMENT FAILS OPERATOR FAILS 9

1.01E-06 FIRE IN BUS.6 EQUIPMENT FAILS OPERATOR FAILS 10 6.10E-07 FIRE IN BUS 5 EQUIPMENT FAILS BREAKER 1-603 11 6.10E-07 FIRE IN BUS 6 EQUIPMENT FAILS BREAKER 1-509 12 6.06E-07 FIRE IN BUS 5 SWITCHES IN DUE TO FIRE ON 4160V BUS 6 SWITCHES IN DUE TO FIRE ON 4160V BUS 5 SWITCHES IN DUE TO FIRE B FAILS TO START SWITCHES IN DUE TO FIRE A FAILS TO START SWITCHES IN DUE TO FIRE B UNAVAILABLE SWITCHES IN DUE TO FIRE FAILS TO OPEN OR SWITCHES IN DUE TO FIRE FAILS TO OPEN OR SWITCHES IN DUE TO FIRE TO RESTORE SWITCHES IN DUE TO FIRE TO RESTORE SWITCHES IN DUE TO FIRE FAILS TO CLOSE SWITCHES IN DUE TO FIRE FAILS TO CLOSE SWITCHES IN EQUIPMENT FAILS DUE TO FIRE ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS FAIL TO OPEN (NO SI SIGNAL)

ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS FAIL TO OPEN (NO SI SIGNAL)

ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS AND RUN ELECTRICAL CONT.

AND RUN ELECTRICAL CONT.

DUE TO TEST OR ELECTRICAL CONT.

TRANSFERS CLOSED ELECTRICAL CONT.

DIESEL GENERATOR ELECTRICAL CONT.

OR TRANSFERS ELECTRICAL CONT.

CONSOLE A OCCURS CONSOLE A OCCURS MAINTENANCE CONSOLE A OCCURS CONSOLE A OCCURS CONSOLE A OCCURS B AFTER TEST CONSOLE A OCCURS A AFTER TEST CONSOLE A OCCURS OPEN CONSOLE A OCCURS OPEN CONSOLE A OCCURS 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 2.10E-02 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 2.1OE-02 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 1.65E-02 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 1.65E-02 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 1.02E-02 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 5.32E-03 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 5.32E-03 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 5.OE-03 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 5.OOE-03 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 3.02E-03 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 3.02E-03 2.02E-04 IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE 39-CB-BUS6FB-FO IEV-FIll FIRE-DAMAGE 39-CB-BUS5FB-FO IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE 10-GE-DG1B---PS IEV-FIll FIRE-DAMAGE 10-GE-DG1A---PS IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE 10-GE-DG1B---TM IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE 02-AVSW301B--CC IEV-FIll FIRE-DAMAGE 02-AVSW301A--CC IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE 10-GE-DG1B---AE IEV-FIll FIRE-DAMAGE 10-GE-DG1A---AE IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE 39-CB-1-603--00 IEV-FIll FIRE-DAMAGE 39-CB-1-509--00 IEV-FI10 1.OOE+00 FIRE-DAMAGE 3.OOE-03 39-CB-1-601--FO Page:

1 BREAKER 1-601 FAILS TO OPEN

DOMINANT CUTSETS *****

Le: Table 3:

Fire Results e: CONTFIRE.OUT ( File created by Linking CONTFIRE.IN WLINK ** Ver. 3.11 **)

luced Sum of Cutsets: 2.9280E-05 NUMBER CUTSET PROB BASIC EVENT NAME EVENT PROB.

IDENTIFIER FIRE IN BUS 6 EQUIPMENT FAILS BREAKER 1-501 14 5.66E-07 FIRE IN BUS 5 EQUIPMENT FAILS DAMPER TAV-60B 15 5.66E-07 FIRE IN BUS 6 EQUIPMENT FAILS DAMPER TAV-63A 16 5.66E-07 FIRE IN BUS 6 EQUIPMENT FAILS DAMPER TAV-60A 17 5.09E-07 FIRE IN BUS 5 EQUIPMENT FAILS DIESEL ROOM B 18 5.09E-07 FIRE IN BUS 6 EQUIPMENT FAILS DIESEL ROOM A 19 4.47E-07 FIRE IN BUS 5 EQUIPMENT FAILS SERVICE WATER OPERATOR FAILS 20 4.47E-07 FIRE IN BUS 5 EQUIPMENT FAILS SERVICE WATER OPERATOR FAILS 21 1.55E-07 FIRE IN BUS 5 EQUIPMENT FAILS OPERATOR FAILS MOV SW-720B 22 1.55E-07 23 9.52E-08 FIRE IN BUS 6 EQUIPMENT FAILS OPERATOR FAILS MOV SW-720A FIRE IN BUS 5 EQUIPMENT FAILS OPERATOR FAILS SWITCHES IN DUE TO FIRE FAILS TO OPEN ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS SWITCHES IN ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS DUE TO FIRE FAILS TO OPEN OR TRANSFERS CLOSED SWITCHES IN ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS DUE TO FIRE FAILS TO OPEN OR TRANSFERS CLOSED SWITCHES IN ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS DUE TO FIRE FAILS TO OPEN OR TRANSFERS CLOSED SWITCHES IN ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS DUE TO FIRE SUPPLY FAN FAILS TO START AND RUN SWITCHES IN ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS DUE TO FIRE SUPPLY FAN FAILS TO START AND RUN SWITCHES IN ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS DUE TO FIRE PUMP B2 FAILS TO START AND RUN TO SWITCH TURBINE BUILDING SW HEADER (FIRE)

SWITCHES IN ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS DUE TO FIRE PUMP Bl FAILS TO START AND RUN TO SWITCH TURBINE BUILDING SW HEADER (FIRE)

SWITCHES IN DUE TO FIRE ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS TO OPEN BATTERY ROOM DOORS FOR VENTILATION-FIRE FAILS TO OPEN OR TRANSFERS CLOSED SWITCHES IN DUE TO FIRE TO OPEN BATTERY FAILS TO OPEN OR SWITCHES IN DUE TO FIRE TO OPEN BATTERY BATTERY ROOM FAN COIL UNIT B ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS ROOM DOORS FOR TRANSFERS CLOSED VENTILATION-FIRE ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS ROOM DOORS FOR FAILS TO START VENTILATION-FIRE AND RUN 13 6.06E-07 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 3.OOE-03 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 2.80E-03 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 2.80E-03 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 2.80E-03 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 2.52E-03 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 2.52E-03 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 1.40E-02 1.58E-01 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 1.40E-02 1.58E-01 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 1.02E-01 7.50E-03 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 1.02E-01 7.50E-03 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 1.02E-01 4.62E-03 24 9.19E-08 FIRE IN BUS 5 SWITCHES IN IEV-F 111 FIRE-DAMAGE 39-CB-1-501--FO IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE 16-DM-TAV60B-CC IEV-FIll FIRE-DAMAGE 16-DM-TAV63A-CC IEV-FIll FIRE-DAMAGE 16-DM-TAV60A-CC IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE 16-FN-DGBF---PS IEV-FIll FIRE-DAMAGE 16-FN-DGAF---PS IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE 02-PM-SW1B2--PS 02-TURB-HDR-FHE IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE 02-PM-SW1B1--PS 02-TURB-HDR-FHE IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE 38--DOOR-EDCFHE 16-MV-SW720B-CC IEV-Fill FIRE-DAMAGE 38--DOOR-EDCFHE 16-MV-SW720A-CC IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE 38--DOOR-EDCFHE 16-FN-BRFC1B-PS Page:

2 2.02E-04 IEV-FI10 ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS

- - - - DOMINANT CUTSETS *****

le: Table 3:

Fire Results e: CONTFIRE.OUT ( File created by Linking CONTFIRE.IN WLINK ** Ver. 3.11 **)

duced Sum of Cutsets: 2.9280E-05 NUMBER CUTSET PROB BASIC EVENT NAME EQUIPMENT FAILS DUE TO FIRE SERVICE WATER TRAIN B FAILS DURING LOSP DUE TO COMMON CAUSE 1.00E+00 FIRE-DAMAGE 4.55E-04 02--SWP-----BCM 25 9.19E-08 FIRE IN BUS 6 EQUIPMENT FAILS SERVICE WATER 26 5.81E-08 FIRE IN BUS 6 EQUIPMENT FAILS OPERATOR FAILS BATTERY ROOM FAN SWITCHES IN DUE TO FIRE TRAIN A FAILS SWITCHES IN DUE TO FIRE TO OPEN BATTERY COIL UNIT A ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS DURING LOSP DUE TO COMMON CAUSE ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS ROOM DOORS FOR FAILS TO START VENTILATION-FIRE AND RUN 27 5.38E-08 FIRE IN PZR PORV PR-2B SWITCHES IN MECH. CONTROL CONSOLE C OCCURS LPR FAILS DUE TO COMMON CAUSE OPERATOR FAILS TO LIMIT SI FLOW AND REFILL RWST-COOLDOWN NEEDED 28 3.99E-08 FIRE IN BUS 5 SWITCHES IN EQUIPMENT FAILS DUE TO FIRE SERVICE WATER PUMP B2 FAILS SW-4B AIR ACCUMULATOR AIR COMPRESSOR B FAILS TO START 29 3.99E-08 FIRE IN BUS 5 SWITCHES IN EQUIPMENT FAILS DUE TO FIRE SERVICE WATER PUMP B1 FAILS SW-4B AIR ACCUMULATOR AIR COMPRESSOR B FAILS TO START 30 3.96E-08 FIRE IN BUS 5 SWITCHES IN EQUIPMENT FAILS DUE TO FIRE SERVICE WATER PUMP B1 FAILS SERVICE WATER PUMP B2 FAILS 31 3.96E-08 32 2.26E-08 FIRE IN BUS 6 EQUIPMENT FAILS SERVICE WATER SERVICE WATER FIRE IN BUS 5 EQUIPMENT FAILS AFW PUMP B FAILS TURBINE DRIVEN OPERATOR FAILS 33 2.26E-08 FIRE IN BUS 6 EQUIPMENT FAILS AFW PUMP A FAILS TURBINE DRIVEN OPERATOR FAILS SWITCHES IN DUE TO FIRE PUMP Al FAILS PUMP A2 FAILS SWITCHES IN DUE TO FIRE TO START AND R AFW PUMP FAILS TO ESTABLISH SWITCHES IN DUE TO FIRE TO START AND RUN AFW PUMP FAILS TO ESTABLISH ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS TO START AND RUN LEAKS AND RUN EXCESSIVELY ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS TO START AND RUN LEAKS AND RUN EXCESSIVELY ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS TO START AND RUN TO START AND RUN ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS TO START AND RUN TO START AND RUN ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS UN TO START AND RUN BLEED AND FEED (LOSP AND FIRE)

ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS TO START AND RUN BLEED AND FEED (LOSP AND FIRE) 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 4.55E-04 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 1.02E-01 2.82E-03 1.39E-04 1.60E-03 2.42E-01 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 1.40E-02 1.67E-01 8.44E-02 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 1.40E-02 1.67E-01 8.44E-02 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 1.40E-02 1.40E-02 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 1.40E-02 1.40E-02 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 1.63E-02 1.37E-01 5.OOE-02 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 1.63E-02 1.37E-01 5.OOE-02 IEV-F Ill FIRE-DAMAGE 02--SWP-----ACM IEV-FIll FIRE-DAMAGE 38--DOOR-EDCFHE 16-FN-BRFC1A-PS IEV-FI13 34R-LPR------CM 27A-0R2------HE IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE 02-PM-SW1B2--PS 01-AC-SW4B---LK 01-CMSIAC1B--PS IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE 02-PM-SW1B1--PS 01-AC-SW4B---LK 01-CMSIAC1B--PS IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE 02-PM-SW1B1--PS 02-PM-SW1B2--PS IEV-FIll FIRE-DAMAGE 02-PM-SW1A1--PS 02-PM-SW1A2--PS IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE 05BPM--AFW1B-PS 05BPT--AFW1C-PS 36--0B5-----FHE IEV-FIll FIRE-DAMAGE 05BPM--AFW1A-PS 05BPT--AFW1C-PS 36--0B5-----FHE EVENT PROB.

IDENTIFIER Page:

3

DOMINANT CUTSETS *****

Le: Table 3:

Fire Results e: CONTFIRE.OUT ( File created by linking CONTFIRE.IN WLINK ** Ver. 3.11 **)

.duced Sum of Cutsets: 2.9280E-05 BASIC EVENT NAME 34 2.02E-08 FIRE IN BUS 5 EQUIPMENT FAILS FAILURE OF 35 2.02E-08 FIRE IN BUS 6 EQUIPMENT FAILS FAILURE OF 36 1.75E-08 FIRE IN BUS 5 EQUIPMENT FAILS OPERATOR FAILS CCW PUMP B FAILS 37 1.75E-08 38 1.50E-08 FIRE IN BUS 6 EQUIPMENT FAILS OPERATOR FAILS CCW PUMP A FAILS FIRE IN BUS 5 EQUIPMENT FAILS SW-4B AIR SWITCHES IN ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS DUE TO FIRE DIESEL GENERATOR B SPEED SENSITIVE SWITCH SWITCHES IN ELECTRI DUE TO FIRE DIESEL GENERATOR A SPEED SWITCHES IN DUE TO FIRE TO START ONE TO START AND RUN CAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS SENSITIVE SWITCH ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS CHARGING PUMP (FIRE)

SWITCHES IN ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS DUE TO FIRE TO START ONE CHARGING PUMP (FIRE)

TO START AND RUN SWITCHES IN DUE TO FIRE ACCUMULATOR ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS LEAKS EXCESSIVELY RELAY TDR-BLS/B6 FAILS TO OPERATE 39 1.50E-08 FIRE IN BUS 5 SWITCHES IN EQUIPMENT FAILS DUE TO FIRE SW-4B AIR ACCUMULATOR RELAY TDR-B1X/B6 FAILS TO OPERATE 40 1.42E-08 FIRE IN BUS 5 EQUIPMENT FAILS OPERATOR FAILS SWITCHES IN DUE TO FIRE TO SWITCH RELAY TDR-BLS/B6 FAILS TO OPERATE 41 1.42E-08 FIRE IN BUS 5 SWITCHES IN EQUIPMENT FAILS DUE TO FIRE OPERATOR FAILS TO SWITCH RELAY TDR-B1X/B6 FAILS TO OPERATE 42 8.77E-09 FIRE IN BUS 5 SWITCHES IN EQUIPMENT FAILS DUE TO FIRE SERVICE WATER PUMP B2 FAILS TO AOV SW-4B FAILS TO CLOSE 43 8.77E-09 FIRE IN BUS 5 SWITCHES IN EQUIPMENT FAILS DUE TO FIRE SERVICE WATER PUMP B1 FAILS TO AOV SW-4B FAILS TO CLOSE 44 8.20E-09 FIRE IN BUS 6 SWITCHES IN EQUIPMENT FAILS DUE TO FIRE ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS LEAKS EXCESSIVELY ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS TURBINE BUILDING SW HEADER (FIRE)

ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS TURBINE BUILDING SW HEADER (FIRE)

ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS START AND RUN ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS START AND RUN ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS NUMBER CUTSET PROB IDENTIFIER EVENT PROB.

2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 1.OOE-04 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 1.OOE-04 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 8.40E-03 1.03E-02 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 8.40E-03 1.03E-02 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 1.67E-01 4.44E-04 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 1.67E-01 4.44E-04 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 1.58E-01 4.44E-04 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 1.58E-01 4.44E-04 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 1.40E-02 3.10E-03 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 1.40E-02 3.10E-03 2.02E-04 IEV-FIll 1.OOE+00 FIRE-DAMAGE IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE 10-SS-28266--OP IEV-FIll FIRE-DAMAGE 10-SS-28265--OP IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE 35--CHP-----FHE 31-PM--CCW1B-PS IEV-FIll FIRE-DAMAGE 35--CHP-----FHE 31-PM--CCW1A-PS IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE 01-AC-SW4B---LK 42-RE-TDBSB6-RF IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE O1-AC-SW4B---LK 42-RE-TDB1X6-RF IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE 02-TURB-HDR-FHE 42-RE-TDBSB6-RF IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE 02-TURB-HDR-FHE 42-RE-TDB1X6-RF IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE 02-PM-SW1B2--PS 02-AV-SW4B---FC IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE 02-PM-SW1B1--PS 02-AV-SW4B--- FC Page:

4

- - - - DOMINANT CUTSETS *****

Le: TabLe 3:

Fires e: CONTFIRE.OUT ( eated by Linking CONTFIRE.IN WLINK ** Ver. 3.11 **)

duced Sum of Cutset80E-05 NUMBER CUTSET PROB BASIC EVENT NAME SW PUMP Al SERVICE WATER 45 7.35E-09 FIRE IN PZR PORV HPI FAILS DUE TO OPERATOR FAILS 46 7.OOE-09 FIRE IN BUS 5 EQUIPMENT FAILS BATTERY ROOM MOV SW-720B 47 7.OOE-09 FIRE IN BUS 6 EQUIPMENT FAILS BATTERY ROOM MOV SW-720A 48 6.68E-09 FIRE IN BUS 5 EQUIPMENT FAILS SW-4B AIR RELAY BLS/B6 49 6.68E-09 FIRE IN BUS 5 EQUIPMENT FAILS SW-4B AIR RELAY 52CT/1-603 50 6.68E-09 FIRE IN BUS 5 EQUIPMENT FAILS SW-4B AIR RELAY BS/B6 EVENT PROB.

IDENTIFIER UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TEST OR MAINTENANCE PUMP A2 FAILS TO START AND RUN PR-2B SWITCHES COMMON CAUSE TO COOL DOWN AND SWITCHES IN DUE TO FIRE EXHAUST FAN B FAILS TO OPEN OR IN MECH. CONTROL CONSOLE C OCCURS DEPRESSURIZE RCS FOR LPI (FIRE)

ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS FAILS TO START AND RUN TRANSFERS CLOSED SWITCHES IN ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS DUE TO FIRE EXHAUST FAN A FAILS TO START AND RUN FAILS TO OPEN OR TRANSFERS CLOSED SWITCHES IN DUE TO FIRE ACCUMULATOR FAILS TO OPERATE SWITCHES IN DUE TO FIRE ACCUMULATOR FAILS TO OPERATE SWITCHES IN DUE TO FIRE ACCUMULATOR FAILS TO OPERATE ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS LEAKS EXCESSIVELY ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS LEAKS EXCESSIVELY ELECTRICAL CONT. CONSOLE A OCCURS LEAKS EXCESSIVELY 2.90E-03 1.40E-02 1.39E-04 1.70E-04 3.1 1E-01 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 4.62E-03 7.50E-03 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 4.62E-03 7.50E-03 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 1.67E-01 1.98E-04 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 1.67E-01 1.98E-04 2.02E-04 1.OOE+00 1.67E-01 1.98E-04 02-PM-SW1Al--TM 02-PM-SW1A2--PS IEV-FI13 331-HPI------CM 06--OP1-----FHE IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE 16-FNBREXFlB-PS 16-MV-SW720B-CC IEV-FIll FIRE-DAMAGE 16-FNBREXF1A-PS 16-MV-SW720A-CC IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE 01-AC-SW4B---LK 42-RE--BLSB6-RF IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE 01-AC-SW4B---LK 42-RE-52C603-RF IEV-FI10 FIRE-DAMAGE 01-AC-SW4B---LK 42-RE--- BSB6-RF Page:

5

ATTACHMENT 3 Letter from M. L. Marchi (WPSC)

To Document Control Desk (NRC)

Dated September 28, 1998 GBNUCI N:\\GROUP\\NUCLEAR\\WPFILES\\LIC\\NRC\\IPERAILWPD

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION NO.

E-0 -06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 2

of 50 I

OPERATOR ACTIONS I I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 4.0 DETAILED PROCEDURE CAUTION A hydrogen fire/explosion hazard may exist at generator due to loss of seal oil system.

NOTE:

The Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures should be reviewed to evaluate if the emergency response organization should be activated.

1 MANUALLY TRIP REACTOR:

a. Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers -

OPEN

b. Neutron flux - DECREASING 2

MANUALLY TRIP TURBINE:

a. Both Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED 3

INITIATE TRAIN A AND TRAIN B MAIN STEAM ISOLATION

a. MS-1A(B), SG A(B) Main Steam Isolation Valves -

CLOSED

b. MS-2A(B). SG A(B) MSIV Bypass Valves -

CLOSED 4

CLOSE BT-3A AND BT-3B, S/G BLOWOOWN ISOLATION VALVES 5

STOP BOTH RXCP's AND PLACE IN PULLOUT

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION NO.

E 06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 3

of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 6

PLACE THE CONTROL SWITCHES FOR BOTH EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS IN PULLOUT 7

REQUEST CAS OPERATOR TO FAIL OPEN ALL SECURITY AND VITAL AREA DOORS AND INITIATE COMPENSATORY ACTIONS (Control Room Supervisor)

a. DISTRIBUTE key rings and two way radios 8

EVACUATE CONTROL ROOM

a. ANNOUNCE Control Room Evacuation and declaration of Site Emergency over Gai-tronics 9

PROCEED TO RESPECTIVE AREAS:

a. Shift Supervisor:

TSC. for Emergency Plan implementation

b. Control Room Supervisor:

GO TO Step 13

c. Control Operator A:

GO TO Step 10

d. Control Operator B:

GO TO Step 11

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION NO.

E-0-06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 4

of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS I

10 PERFORM FOLLOWING LOCAL ACTIONS (Control Operator A):

a. REMOVE fuses in RR-176:

1) Ckt 6 (PR-2B alt control)

2) Ckt 12 (PR-2A)

3) Ckt 37 (RC-45B)

4) Ckt 38 (PR-33B)

5) Ckt 39 (RC-49)

b. REMOVE fuses in RR-174:

1) Ckt 9 (LD-300)

2) Ckt 27 (SI-101.A/B)

c. REMOVE fuses in RR-171:

1) Ckt 13 (PR-2B norm control)

d. OPEN bkrs in Battery Room A:

1) BRA-104. Ckt 21 (BT-3B)

2) BRA-113. Ckt 12 (NI Rack)

e. OPEN bkrs on Proprietary Panel in Battery Room B:

1) Ckt 3 (MUX-2)

2) Ckt.5 (MUX-3)

3) Ckt 6 (MUX-4)

4) Ckt 8 (MUX-1)

f. GO TO Step 12 I1 CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

a. OPEN BRB-104, Ckt 12 Bkr.

b. OPEN BRD-103, Ckt 15 Bkr.

c. OPEN BRA-104. Ckt 13 Bkr.

I

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION NO.

E-0-06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 5

of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS 11 PERFORM FOLLOWING LOCAL ACTIONS (Control Operator B):

a. IF Turbine did 4OT trip. TRIP Turbine at Governor End Pedestal

b. IF Reactor did NOT trip, locally TRIP both Reactor Trip Breakers

c. POSITION MS-18 Trip Lever to TRIP

d. CLOSE SD-3B/CV-31174, S/G B PORV:

1) INSERT pin to engage SD-3B manual handwheel

2) OPEN SD-3B Diaphragm Bypass Valve

3) CLOSE NG-225. N2 Supply to SD-3B

4) CLOSE IA-330, IA to SD-3B

5) VERIFY SD-3B. CLOSED

e. CLOSE MU-2A and MU-2B.

Condenser Normal and Emergency Make-up valves

f. ISOLATE 1B S/G Blowdown line:

1) CLOSE BT-3B-1

2) CLOSE BT-15

3) CLOSE BT-1000B I

CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

d. CLOSE SD-28, S/G B PORV Isolation Valve CONTINUED

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION NO.

E-0-06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 6

of 50

g. ISOLATE RXCP seal injection:

1) CLOSE CVC-202A and CVC-202B, Seal Water Injection Filter 1A/1B Outlet (Filter room)

2) NOTIFY Control Operator A seal injection is isolated

h. DE-ENERGIZE buses 1 and 2:

1) PERFORM the following for Bus 1 and 2 Source Breakers:

Bkr 1-101

Bkr 1-104

Bkr 1-201

Bkr 1-204 I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS J

1).CLOSE CVC-201A and CVC-201B.

Seal Water Injection Filter 1A/1B Inlet (Filter room) a) POSITION breaker control switch to TRIP a) IF breaker does NOT TRIP, CONTINUE with Step 1.b and VERIFY breaker TRIPS after performing Step 1.d b) OPEN Close knife switch c) OPEN Pump Motor knife swi tch d) Discharge closing spring by ROTATING lever to RACKING POSITION e) OPEN Trip knife switch OPERATOR ACTIONS 11 CONTINUED

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION NO.

E 06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 7

of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE:

SD-100 will NOT receive power until Diesel 1-52.

12 ACTIVATE DEDICATED SHUTDOWN PANEL (Control Operator A):

a. POSITION all Local/Remote switches to LOCAL

b. POSITION all On/Remote switches to ON (3 switches)

NOTE:

The following step does NOT include

. SD-101.

c. VERIFY all SD-101 indicating lights ON

d. VERIFY Service Water Pump 1A1 and 1A2 green lights ON I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS Generator 1A is supplying Bus ckts 6, 7, 13, 24, & 27-50 on

c. REPLACE fuses for circuits with lights OFF on SD-101 (Source from BRA-104. bkr 6).

d. PERFORM following at applicable supply breaker (1-506 and 1-507):

1) OPEN Control Power knife switches.

2) REPLACE Close and Trip control power fuses.

3) CLOSE Control Power knife switches.

e. CLOSE Service Water Pump 1A1 breaker by HOLDING control switch in START for 5 seconds

f. ASSIST Control Room Supervisor until AC power is restored

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION NO.

E-0-06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 8

of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS I I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE:

Positioning 4160V Local/Remote switches to Local will disable automatic breaker operation in response to the voltage restoration logic for that particular breaker.

13 ISOLATE DEDICATED SHUTDOWN ELECTRICAL SYSTEM (Control Room Supervisor):

a. POSITION following Local/Remote switches to LOCAL:

1) 1A Diesel Engine and Governor (east wall)

2) Tertiary Aux Transformer Bkr 1-501

3) Reserve Aux Transformer Bkr 1-503

4) Station Service Transf 1-51

& 1-52 Bkr 1-505

5) Diesel Gen 1-A Bkr 1-509

b. STOP Diesel Generator 1A

c. POSITION breaker control switch to TRIP for following breakers:

1) 1-509

2) 1-503

3) 1-501

c. IF breaker does NOT open, PERFORM the following:

1) OPEN Control Power knife switches

2) REPLACE Trip control power fuses

3) CLOSE Control Power knife switches

4) POSITION breaker control switch to TRIP CONTINUED I

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION NO.

E-0-06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 9

of 50 13 OPERATOR ACTIONS i I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CONTINUED

d. PERFORM following for Bus 5 breakers:

Main Aux Transformer /1-511

Bus Tie Bkr to 1-602 /1-510

Safety Injection Pump/1-508

1) POSITION breaker control switch to TRIP

2) OPEN Close knife switch

3) OPEN Charge Motor knife switch

4) DISCHARGE closing spring by positioning lever to Cell Entry position.

5) OPEN Trip knife switch

e. POSITION Bkr 1-505. Station Service Transf 1-51 & 1-52.

control switch to CLOSE

1) IF breaker does NOT TRIP.

CONTINUE with Step 13.d.2 and VERIFY bkr TRIPS after performing Step 13.d.4

e. IF breaker does NOT close.

PERFORM the following:

1) OPEN Control Power knife switches

2) REPLACE Close and Trip control power fuses

3) CLOSE Control Power knife switches

4) POSITION breaker control switch to CLOSE CONTINUED

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION NO.

E 06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 10 of 50

f. POSITION followi-ng Local/Remote switches to LOCAL

Breaker 15201, Main Breaker Bus 1-52

Breaker 15101, Main Breaker Bus 1-51

g. CLOSE following breakers:

Bkr 15201, Bus 52 Supply

Bkr 15101, Bus 51 Supply CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

g. IF breaker does NOT close.

PERFORM the following:

1) OPEN Control Power knife switches

2) REPLACE Control Power fuses

3) CLOSE Control Power switches

4) CLOSE breaker using control switch knife local

h. PERFORM following for Bus 51 and 52 breakers:

Bkr 15111. Bus 51 & 61 Tie

Bkr 15108. Containment Spray Pump A

Bkr 15211, Bus 52 & 62 Tie

1) POSITION breaker control switch to TRIP

2) POSITION charging motor Control toggle switch to OFF NOTE:' Knife switch for Bkr 15111 is located inside top left cubicle of Bus 51.

3) OPEN Circ Bkr Close knife switch OPERATOR ACTIONS 13 CONTINUED

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION NO.

E-0-06 KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 11 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 14 ENERGIZE 4160V AND 480V DEDICATED SHUTDOWN ELECTRICAL SYSTEM (Control Room Supervisor):

a. POSITION 1A Diesel Generator Voltage Control Local/Remote Switch to LOCAL

b. REPLACE following fuses:

1) Diesel Generator Control and Excitation Cabinet:

a) Fuse F-4 b) Fuse F-5

2) 1A Diesel Engine Control Panel:

a) Fuse F-4 b) Fuse F-5

c. VERIFY Engine Control Panel

c. CHECK light bulb.

IF light green Power On light, ON bulb is good, RESET supply breaker (BRA-104, ckt 10).

NOTE:

Overspeed Trip is reset by moving reset lever counterclockwise until it latches.

NOTE:

Detectors for Vibration and Hi Crankcase Pressure must be manually reset before alarms will clear.

d. DEPRESS Engine Control Panel Failure Reset pushbutton to clear any local alarms CONTINUED

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION NO.

E-0-06 KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 12 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION IF cooling water is NOT established in 2-3 minutes after Diesel start, damage will occur.

e. START Diesel Generator 1A by POSITIONING Engine Control switch to START

f. At Diesel Generator Control and Excitation Cabinet:

1) VERIFY output Frequency 60 Hz

2) VERIFY output Voltage - 4160V

g. CLOSE Diesel Gen 1A Bkr 1-509 using control switch on breaker cubicle

h. VERIFY service water cooling to Diesel Generator 1A

i. REOUEST Control Operator A load equipment as necessary

1) ADJUST using Governor control switch.

2) ADJUST using Voltage control switch.

14 CONTINUED

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION NO.

E 06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 13 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS I

15 ESTABLISH SERVICE WATER (Control Operator A):

a. START Service Water Pump 1A2

b. VERIFY SW-3A/CV-31038, Service Water Header 1A Isol CV CLOSED

c. VERIFY SW-4A/CV-31084, Service Water Header 1A CV CLOSED

d. Complete activation of DSP:

1) POSITION Annunciator Power switch to ON

2) TEST alarms

3) VERIFY all indicating lights ON and ALIGNED per control switch position

e. POSITION MS-1A/CV-31015. Main Steam Hdr 1A Isolation Valve.

key switch to TRIP

f. VERIFY SW-10A/MV-32011.

Auxiliary Building SW Header 1A MV OPEN

g. OPEN SW-903A/MV-32060, Cont Fan Coil Unit 1A SW Return MV

h. OPEN SW-9038/MV-32061, Cont Fan Coil Unit lB SW Return MV

i. START Containment Fan Coil Unit 1A

j.

START Containment Fan Coil Unit 18

k. VERIFY SW Hdr Press 1A >60 psig I

CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

b. CLOSE SW-3A.

c. CLOSE SW-4A.

2) INSPECT source fuse.

(SD-100, ckts 12 & 13)

3) Continue with step 14.e and REPLACE fuses in SD-100 for circuits with lights OFF.

(SO-100 source is BRA-105, bkr 10)

f. OPEN SW-10A.

I

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION NO.

E-0-06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 14 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE:

WHEN AFW Pump 1A starts, AFW automatically.

16 ESTABLISH AUX FEEDWATER (Control Operator A):

a. START Aux FW Pump 1A

b. VERIFY AFW-1OA/MV-32027, Aux FW Pump 1A Crossover MV CLOSED

c. VERIFY AFW-2A/CV-31315. 1A AFW Pump Flow CV. at 0% (full open) until Stm Gen 1A WR Level >60%

I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS Pump 1A Fan Coil Unit will start

a. REPLACE control power fuses at bkr 1-504:

1) OPEN Control Power knife switches.

2) REPLACE Close and Trip control power fuses.

3) CLOSE Control Power knife switches.

4) START Aux FW Pump 1A using control switch on DSP.

b. CLOSE AFW-10A.

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION NO.

E 06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 15 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS 1

17 ESTABLISH INSTRUMENT AIR (Control Room Supervisor):

CONTINUED CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION The following control valves are supplied with dedicated air via local air accumulators and have limited air capacity. Accumulators will NOT refill until normal instrument air is restored.

Dedicated Accumulator Valve Minimum Design Cycles 15 gallons -

LD2 Letdown Isolation 6 cycles of LD-2 AND LD3 Letdown Isolation 6 cycles of LD-3 CVC11 Charging Isolation 5 cycles of CVC11 CVC15 Pressurizer Aux Spray OR 5 cycles of CVC15 80 gallons -

AND LD4A Ltdn Orifice Isolation 5 cycles of LD4A.

LD4B Ltdn Orifice Isolation LD4B OR LD4C LD4C Ltdn Orifice Isolation 8 gallons TAV62A D-G 1A Room Air Exhaust 10 cycles 18 gallons SW4A Turb Bldg Sw Hdr Isolation 1 close/open cycle 40 gallons -

SW30A1 SW Strn 1A1 Backwash 7 cycles of SW30A1 AND SW30A2 SW Strn 1A2 Backwash 7 cycles of SW30A2 I

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E 06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 16 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS I F CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 17 CONTINUED

a. At Air Compressor IC:

1) OPEN SA-70, 1 1/2" Dedicated IA Hdr Isol

2) OPEN SA-71, 1 1/2" Dedicated IA Hdr Fltr Outl

3) CLOSE SA-100B, Cmpr 1C Out1 to IA Dyr 1B

4) CLOSE SA-2C. Cmpr 1C Rcvr Outl

5) POSITION 1C Air Compressor local control switch to CS

b. CLOSE IA-401. 1 1/2" Dedicated IA Isol (N of 1A TB Bsmt F/C Unit)

c. VERIFY 1C Air Compressor receiver pressure (PI-11344)

>60 psig CONTINUED I

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E 06 KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 17 of 50

d. IF air accumulators for valves.

located inside Containment become depleted, INITIATE maintenance actions to ALIGN Dedicated Air Header to Containment:

1) LOOSEN jam nut on handwheel for IA-101/CV-31309, IA to Cntmt Isol (BAST Room)

2) Locally CLOSE IA-101

3) OPEN IA-101-1, Ded & Alt IA Hdr to Cntmt Isol (BAST Room)

4) OPEN IA-480. Dedicated IA Hdr to Cntmt Isol (Stairwell below SFP Hx Rm) 18 ESTABLISH S/G 1A PRESSURE CONTROL (Control Operator A):

a. VERIFY BT-2A/MV-32077. Stm Gen 1A Blowdown 1A1 MV CLOSED

b. VERIFY Reac Coolant LP A Cold Leg Temp Ind - stable at or trending to 5500F 19 VERIFY PRZR COLD CAL LEVEL > 10%

(Control Operator A)

I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

a. CLOSE BT-2A.

b. OPERATE S-3A/CV-31170, Stm Gen 1A Pwr Op Rlf, to maintain RCS Cold Leg temperature at 550 0 F.

IF level falls below 10%. POSITION Przr Heater Backup Group 1A Normal Supply Bkr control switch to OFF.

OPERATOR ACTIONS 17 CONTINUED

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E-0-06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 18 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 20 ESTABLISH COMPONENT COOLING FLOW (Control Operator A):

a. START Component Cooling Water

a. REPLACE control power fuses at Pump 1A Bkr 15109:

1) OPEN Control Power knife switches.

2) REPLACE control power fuses.

3) CLOSE Control Power knife switches.

4) START CCW Pump 1A using control switch on DSP.

b. VERIFY CC-6A/MV-32121,

b. OPEN CC-6A.

Component Clg Wtr Ht Exgr 1A Otlt MV OPEN

c. VERIFY CC Hx CCW Return Flow Indication indicates FLOW

d. REOUEST Control Operator B to FAIL OPEN SW-1306A. SW From CC Hx A Temp CV:

1) CLOSE IA-31406, IA Supply to SW-1306A

2) BLEED OFF air pressure at pressure regulator

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E-0-06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 19 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 21 ESTABLISH CHARGING FLOW (Control Operator A):

a. VERIFY following:

1) RXCP seal supply line valves CLOSED per Step 11.g.

2) CVC-301/MV-32056, Refueling Water Reac Emerg Makeup LCV OPEN

3) CVC-1/MV-32057, Volume Control Tank Otlt Isol Mv CLOSED

4) CVC-7/CV-31103. Chg Line Flow Cont Vlv OPEN

2) OPEN CVC-301.

3) CLOSE CVC-1.

4) OPEN CVC-7.

NOTE:

IF CVC-11 does NOT open. CVC-14 Bypass check will provide adequate flow path.

5) CVC-11/CV-31229, Chg Line to Cold Leg LP-B RCS Isol Vlv OPEN valve around CVC-11

5) OPEN CVC-11.

CONTINUED

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E 06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE -IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 20 of 50

b. START Charging Pump 1C:

1) CLOSE supply breaker by POSITIONING Charging Pump 1C control switch to START

2) DEPRESS Reset pushbutton and VERIFY annunciator, CHG PMP 1C DRIVE CONT TROUBLE (87220-24), OFF

'3) START Charging Pump IC by POSITIONING control switch to START

c. ADJUST Chg Pump IC Speed Control to increase Pzr Cold Cal Level to 20-50%

d. REOUEST Control Operator B VERIFY 195 gpm CC return flow from each RXCP (FI-613/26620 and FI-609/26621 by 1B SI Pump)

I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

1) REPLACE control power fuses at Bkr 15203:

a) OPEN Control Power knife switches.

b) REPLACE control power fuses.

c) CLOSE Control Power knife switches.

d) CLOSE bkr using pump control switch on OSP.

2) IDENTIFY cause at local fault monitor and INITIATE maintenance action.

3) REPLACE control power fuses (50-100, Ckt 39 & 40).

d. OPEN CVC-201A/B or CVC-202A/B to establish seal injection flow to RXCPs (whichever were closed in step 11.g.)

IF local flow indicators are energized, THROTTLE CVC 7 to establish 8 gpm seal injection flow to each RXCP.

OPERATOR ACTIONS 21 CONTINUED

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E-0-06 KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 21 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS 22 VERIFY RCS SUBCOOLING > 50aF (Control Operator A)

a. REFER to Table E-O-06-1

b. Use Reac Coolant LP A Hot Temp Ind 23 ESTABLISH PRESSURIZER WATER LEVEL CONTROL (Control Operator A):

a. VERIFY Pzr Cold Cal Level > 10%

I' CONTINGENCY ACTIONS GO TO Step 18.

Leg

a. PERFORM following:

1) VERIFY Letdown, NOT IN SERVICE.

2) VERIFY Przr Heater Backup Group 1A Normal Supply Bkr control switch. OFF.

3) INCREASE Charging Flow.

b. VERIFY Charging, IN SERVICE

b. GO TO Step 21.

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E 06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 22 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS 24 CHECK PRESSURIZER PRESSURE STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 2235 psig (Control Operator A):

25 CHECK S/G LEVEL (Control Operator A):

a. VERIFY Stm Gen 1A WR Level >60%

b. THROTTLE AFW-2A to maintain Stm Gen 1A WR Level >60%

a. MAINTAIN maximum AFW flow until Stm Gen 1A WR Level >60%.

CONTINGENCY ACTIONS IF pressure is <2235 psig and DECREASING:

a. CLOSE RC-46/SV-33663, Rx Head/Przr Vent to PRT.

b. CLOSE PR-33A/SV-33660, Przr Head Vent Train A.

c. CLOSE CVC-15/CV-31230, Chrg Line to Przr Aux Spray.

d. IF Przr Cold Cal Level is >10%.

ENERGIZE Pressurizer Heater Backup Group 1A.

IF pressure is >2385 psig and INCREASING:

a. VERIFY Pressurizer Heater Backup Group 1A Normal Supply Bkr control switch. OFF.

b. OPEN-RC-46/SV-33663, Rx Head/Przr Vent to PRT.

c. CYCLE OPEN PR-33A/SV-33660, Przr Head Vent Train A, to reduce RCS pressure.

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E 06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 23 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS 26 VERIFY CONDENSATE STORAGE TANKS LEVEL >4% (3000 gal)

(Control Operator A):

a. REQUEST Control Operator B report levels from local indicators I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS IF level is NOT >4% (3000 gal).

PERFORM following:

a-.

LOCALLY OPEN DW-20, RMST to CST Crossconnect Isol OR

b. Locally OPEN SW-601A/MV-32029 supply bkr (MCC-52C, B2). THEN OPEN SW-601A, Service Water to Aux FW Pump 1A.

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION NO.

E-0-06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 24 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 27 DE-ENERGIZE BUSES 3. 4. and 6 (Control Room Supervisor):

NOTE:

Bus 1. 2, 3, 4 and 6 should remain de-energized until an evaluation is performed by Plant Management.

a. STOP Diesel Generator 1B.

b. PERFORM following for source breakers listed below:

Bus 3 MAT RAT Bus 4 1-301 1-401 1-307 1-407

1) POSITION breaker control switch to TRIP -

1) IF breaker does NOT TRIP, CONTINUE with Step 27.b.2 and VERIFY bkr TRIPS after performing Step 27.b.4.

2) OPEN Close knife switch

3) OPEN Pump Motor knife switch

4) Discharge closing spring by ROTATING lever to Cell Entry Position.

5) OPEN Trip knife switches CONTINUED

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E-0-06 KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 25 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS 27 I1 CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CONTINUED

c. PERFORM following for source breakers listed below:

Bus 6 TAT 1-611 MAT 1-610 RAT 1-601 B D/G 1-603

1) POSITION breaker contro

1) IF breaker does NOT TRIP, switch to TRIP CONTINUE with Step 27.c.2 and VERIFY bkr TRIPS after performing Step 27.c.4.

2) OPEN Close knife switch

3) OPEN Charge Motor knife switch

4) Discharge closing spring by POSITIONING lever to Cell Entry Position.

5) OPEN Trip knife switches

d. REQUEST plant electrician OPEN G-1 Bkr and DE-ENERGIZE G-1 Control Power CONTINUED

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E-0-06 KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 26 of 50

e. MONITOR status of each battery:

1) VERIFY 1A Battery, NOT grounded

2) VERIFY Battery Charger BRA-108 OPERATING and 1A Battery terminal voltage

>105 VDC

3) VERIFY lB Battery terminal voltage >105 VDC CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

1) MAINTAIN power to SO-101 and INITIATE action to clear ground.

2) REQUEST maintenance assistance.

3) REQUEST maintenance action to prevent battery damage.

28 VERIFY RXCP COMPONENT COOLING FLOW AND ESTABLISH SEAL INJECTION FLOW (Control Operator A):

a. REQUEST Control Operator B VERIFY 195 gpm CC return flow from each RXCP (FI-613/26620 and FI-609/26621 by 18 SI Pump)

b. VERIFY CC flow to RXCP thermal barriers has been established for 30 minutes

c. REQUEST Control Operator B OPEN CVC-201A/B or CVC-202A/B (whichever were closed in Step 11.g)

d. IF local flow indicators are ENERGIZED, THROTTLE CVC-7 to establish 8 gpm seal injection flow to each RXCP.

a. GO TO step 28.c.

b. CONTINUE with procedure.

WHEN 30 minutes has elapsed. PERFORM Steps 28.c and 28.d.

OPERATOR ACTIONS 27 CONTINUED I

II

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E 06 KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 27 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 29 ESTABLISH LETDOWN FLOW (Control Operator A):

a. VERIFY Przr Cold-Cal Level, >20%

b. INITIATE Letdown:

1) ADJUST CC-302/CV-31100, Non-Rgn Hx Otlt Temp Cont, to 50% OPEN

2) ADJUST LD-1O/CV-31099. Low Pressure Letdown Line PCV, to 50% OPEN

3) VERIFY LD-27/CV-31096, Ltdn Flow to Hldup/VC Tank 3-Way CV, in DIVERT

4) VERIFY LD-14/CV-31093, Ltdn Flow to Demin/VC Tank 3-Way CV, in V.C. TNK

5) Locally INSERT fuses in SD-101 FUG-7 and FUG-6 (for LD-3 and LD-6)

6) POSITION LD-6/CV-31234, Letdown Flow to Ltdn Hx Isol CV, key switch to OPEN

7) OPEN LD-2/CV-31108, Ltdn Line From LP-B Cold Leg RCS Isol VlV

8) POSITION LD-3/CV-31104. Ltdn Line From LP-B Cold Leg RCS Isol Vlv, key switch to OPEN

9) OPEN LD-4A/CV-31231 OR LD-4B/CV-31232, Regen Hx Ltdn Otlt Orif 1A/1B 1Sol CV

a. INCREASE charging.flow MAXIMUM rate and GO TO WHEN pressurizer level GO TO Step 29.b.

to Step 31.

is >20%,

9) ADJUST Chg Pump 1C Speed Control to MINIMUM. WHEN Pzr Cold Cal Level reaches 70%, OPEN LD-4C.

CONTINUED

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E-0-06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 28 of 50 CONTINUED

10) ADJUST LD-10 to maintain Ltdn Ht Xgh Otit Press at 250 psig and POSITION controller to AUTO

11) ADJUST CC-302 to maintain Ltdn Ht Xgh Otlt Temp at 1200-140OF and POSITION Controller to AUTO

c. REOUEST Control Operator B MONITOR CVC Holdup Tank on fill and ALIGN letdown to an empty tank when necessary.

d. ADJUST Charging Pump 1C Speed to maintain Pzr Cold Cal Level, 20-50%

30 ESTABLISH RCS PRESSURE CONTROL (Control Operator A):

a. OPERATE Przr Heater Backup Group 1A to maintain Reactor Coolant LP A Cold Leg Temp and Przr Press - Within limits of Figure E-0-06-1 F

CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

a. IF pressure is >2385 psig and INCREASING:

1) VERIFY Przr Heater Backup Group 1A Normal Supply Skr control switch, OFF.

2) OPEN RC-46/SV-33663, Rx Head/Przr Vent to PRT.

3) CYCLE OPEN PR-33A/SV-33660.

Przr Head Vent Train A. to reduce RCS pressure.

29 OPERATOR ACTIONS I

-I

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E 06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 29 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS I

31 VERIFY NATURAL CIRCULATION (Control Operator A):

a. Reac Coolant LP A Hot Leg Temp STABLE or DECREASING

b. RCS Subcooling based on Reac Coolant LP A Hot Leg Temp and Pzr Press -

>50aF

c. Stm Gen 1A Outlet Press STABLE or DECREASING

d. Reac Coolant LP A Cold Leg Temp

- at saturation temperature for Stm Gen 1A Outlet Press 32 ESTABLISH COLD SHUTDOWN BORON CONCENTRATION (Control Operator A):

a. VERIFY letdown. IN SERVICE CONTINGENCY ACTIONS Increase dumping steam from Steam Generator 1A, by OPENING S-3A, Stm Gen 1A Pwr Op Rlf.

a. GO TO Step 29.

b. ADJUST Chg Pump 1C Speed Control to maintain Pzr Cold Cal Level, 20-50%

NOTE:

12,700 gal corresponds to 5% decrease in RWST level or charging flow at maximum speed (60 gpm) for 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months .

c. WHEN 12,700 gallons has been added from RWST. 1% Cold Shutdown boron concentration should be attained

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E-0-06 KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 30 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS I

CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION IF S/G 18 WR Level is<'<10%

AND S/G lB Pressure is < S/G 1A Pressure, OR > 1030psig, THEN DO NOT initiate AFW flow to Steam Generator lB.

NOTE:

Cables for Steam Generator lB level and pressure indication are NOT

. protected.

Indication may NOT be available.

33 ESTABLISH S/G lB LEVEL CONTROL (Control Operator A):

a. Locally OPEN supply bkr for Aux FWP 1B Disch X-over MV, AFW-1OB

b. Locally CLOSE AFW-10B

c. At DSP, OPEN AFW-10A

d. Locally THROTTLE AFW-10B to establish 25 gpm on FI-13202, AFW to 1B S/G (Aux bldg bsmt)

e. ADJUST AFW-1OB to maintain Stm Gen 1B WR Level >60%

IF S/G 1B is NOT available, GO TO Step 35.

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E-0-06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 31 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS 34 ESTABLISH 1B S/G PRESSURE CONTROL (Control Operator A):

a. ESTABLISH communications with Control Operator B

b. REOUEST Control Operator B locally OPEN SD-3B to reduce Stm Gen lB Otlt Press to the existing value for Stm Gen 1A.

THEN CLOSE SD-3B

c. WHEN Stm Gen lB Otlt Press is 100 psig > Stm Gen 1A Otlt Press, REPEAT Steps 34.a and 34.b 35 MAINTAIN STABLE PLANT CONDITIONS (Control Operator A):

a. Reac Coolant LP A Cold Leg Temp Ind - 550 0 F

b. Reac Coolant LP A Cold Leg Temp and Pzr Press - Within limits of Figure E-0-06-1

c. Pzr Cold Cal Level -

20%-50%

d. Stm Gen 1A WR Level

>60%

e. Stm Gen 18 WR Level (if available) - >60%

CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

b. GO TO Step 22.

c. GO TO Step 23.

d. GO TO Step 25.

e. GO TO Step 33.

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E-0-06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 32 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS 36 VERIFY STATUS OF SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (Control Operator A):

a. Screenhouse Exha-ust Fan 1A and Diesel Generator Vent Supply Fan 1A, ON I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS aI. Locally START fans.

b. Fire Pump 1A.

RUNNING

c. Aux Bldg Mezz Sfgrd Fan Coil 1A, ON

d. Turbine Bldg Fan Coil Unit 1A.

ON

e. Battery Room Fan Coil Unit 1A, ON 37 VERIFY COLD SHUTDOWN BORON CONCENTRATION (Control Operator A):

NOTE:

WHEN 12,700 gallons has been added from the RWST (5% level change),

1% Cold Shutdown boron concentration should be attained.

a. RCS Boron Sample > Cold Shutdown Boron Concentration

a. GO TO Step 32.

38 REQUEST Plant Electricians determine feasibility of returning both CROM Cooling Fans to service.

NOTE:

IF plant can be maintained in a stable Hot Shutdown condition, plant management should be consulted to determine the feasibility of restoring off-site power prior to commencing any further plant status changes.

39 RCS COOLDOWN TO COLD SHUTDOWN DESIRED

a. GO TO to Step 35.

a. GO TO Step 40

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E 06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 33 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS F

CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 7 CAUTION WHEN cooling down using Loop A. do NOT cool down too rapidly: S/G 1B may become a heat source.

IF S/G 1B pressure control and AFW flow are NOT established, Loop B will stagnate and only means of heat removal will be losses to ambient.

40 INITIATE RCS COOLDOWN:

a. MAINTAIN cooldown rate

<250 F/hr

b. ADJUST SD-3A to achieve required cooldown rate

c. MAINTAIN Stm Gen 1A WR Level

>60%

d. MAINTAIN Reac Coolant LP A Cold Leg Temp and Pzr Press - Within limits of Figure E-0-06-1

e. IF Stm Gen lB is available, MAINTAIN temperature difference between Loop A and Loop B <200F by locally OPENING 50-38 to equalize Stm Gen 1A and lB Outlet Pressures 41 VERIFY REAC COOLANT LOOP A TEMPERATURES

<5500F

e. MAINTAIN 50aF RCS Subcooling based on Stm Gen lB saturation temperature. IF Stm Ger 1B Outlet Press indication is NOT available, REQUEST maintenance assistance to establish alternate indication.

GO TO Step 38.

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E-0-06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 34 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS 42 DEPRESSURIZE RCS TO 1950 PSIG:

a. DE-ENERGIZE Pressurizer Heater Backup Group 1A

b. ESTABLISH Auxiliary Spray

1) VERIFY letdown in service

2) VERIFY at least one Charging Pump RUNNING.

3) OPEN CVC-15/CV-31230. Chrg Line to Przr Aux Spray

c. WHEN Pzr Press is equal to 1950 psig, STOP RCS depressurization

d. ENERGIZE Pressurizer Heater Backup Group 1A as necessary to maintain 1950 psig 43 MAINTAIN THE FOLLOWING RCS CONDITIONS:

a. Pzr Press -

1950 psig

b. Pzr Cold Cal Level -

20-50%

c. RCS cooldown rate -

<250F/hr

d. Reac Coolant LP A Cold Leg Temp and Pzr Press - Within limits of Figure E-0-06-1 I

CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

b. IF Auxiliary Spray can NOT be established, DEPRESSURIZE using Przr Head Vent System:

1) OPEN RC-46/SV-33663, Rx Head/Przr Vent to PRT

2) CYCLE OPEN PR-33A/SV-33660.

Przr Head Vent Train A. to control RCS pressure

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION NO.

E-0-06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 35 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 44 MONITOR RCS COOLDOWN:

a. Reac Coolant LP A Hot Leg Temp

- DECREASING

b. Stm Gen lB Outlet Press STABLE or DECREASING C. RCS subcooling - >50 0 F and INCREASING

1) REFER to Table E-0-06-1

2) Use Reac Coolant LP A Hot Leg Temp Ind

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E 06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 36 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS 45 INITIATE RCS DEPRESSURIZATION:

a. VERIFY CRDM Fans BOTH RUNNING

b. MAINTAIN RCS subcooling - >50aF

1) REFER to Table E-0-06-1

2) Use Reac Coolant LP A Hot Leg Temp Ind

c. MAINTAIN Reac Coolant LP A Cold Leg Temp and Pzr Press - Within Limits'of Figure E-0-06-2

d. DE-ENERGIZE Pressurizer Heater Backup Group 1A

e. ESTABLISH Auxiliary Spray

1) VERIFY letdown in service.

2) VERIFY at least one Charging Pump RUNNING.

3) OPEN CVC-15/CV-31230. Chrg Line to Przr Aux Spray I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

a. Until 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months soak is completed, MAINTAIN RCS subcooling - > 200OF and GO TO Step 45.d.

1) REFER to Table E-0-06-1

2) Use Reac Coolant LP A Hot Leg Temp Ind

e. IF Auxiliary Spray can NOT be.

established. DEPRESSURIZE using Przr Head Vent System:

1) OPEN RC-46/SV-33663. Rx Head/Przr Vent to PRT

2) CYCLE OPEN PR-33A/SV-33660, Przr Head Vent Train A. to control RCS pressure

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION NO.

E-0-06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 37 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 46 CONTINUE RCS COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION:

a. MAINTAIN RCS cooldown rate

<250 F/hr

b. MAINTAIN subcooling requirements of Step 45

b. STOP depressurization AND RE-ESTABLISH subcooling

c. MAINTAIN Reac Coolant LP A Cold Leg Temp and Pzr Press -

Within limits of Figure E-0-06-1 OR E-0-06-2

d. MAINTAIN Pzr Cold Cal Level 20-50%

e. MAINTAIN Stm Gen 1A WR Level

>60%

47 VERIFY PZR COLD CAL LEVEL -

NO UNEXPECTED LARGE VARIATIONS 48 DETERMINE IF SOAK IS REOUIRED

a. CRDM Fans -

Less than both running

b. Reac Coolant LP A Cold Leg Temp Ind < 3900F c..MAINTAIN following conditions for at least 18 hour2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months s:

1) Pzr Press > 1400 psig

2) Reac Coolant LP A Cold Leg Temp - Between 3900F and minimum temperature allowed per E-0-06-1 PRESSURIZE RCS within limits of Figure E-0-06-1 to collapse potential voids in system and CONTINUE cooldown.

a. Soak NOT required. GO TO Step 49

b. MAINTAIN Pzr Press > 1400 psig GO TO Step 46

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E-0-06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 38 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE:

IF Stm Gen 1B is NOT depressurized periodically, Stm Gen 18 U-Tubes will void during depressurization. This will result in a rapidly increasing Pzr Level.

49 DEPRESSURIZE RCS TO 950 PSIG:

a. DE-ENERGIZE Pressurizer Heater Backup Group 1A

b. ESTABLISH Auxiliary Spray

1) VERIFY letdown in service

2) VERIFY at least one Charging Pump RUNNING.

3) OPEN CVC-15/CV-31230, Chrg Line to Przr Aux Spray

c. WHEN Pzr Press is equal to 950 psig, STOP RCS depressurization

d. ENERGIZE Pressurizer Heater Backup Group 1A as necessary to maintain 950 psig

b. IF Auxiliary Spray.can NOT be established. DEPRESSURIZE using Przr Head Vent System:

1) OPEN RC-46/SV-33663, Rx Head/Przr Vent to PRT

2) CYCLE OPEN PR-33A/SV-33660, Przr Head Vent Train A, to control RCS pressure LII

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION NO.

E-0-06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 39 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS I

CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION Any valve manipulation requiring Containment -entry will require coordination with Health Physics and approval per EP-AD-11.

50 CHECK IF ACCUMULATORS SHOULD BE ISOLATED:

a. Pzr Press - < 1000 psig

b. ISOLATE SI Accumulators A/B and ALIGN SI for <1000 psig:

1) REOUEST plant electrician CLOSE the following valves from respective MCCs and LOCK OPEN supply breakers:

a) SI-20B/MV-32096. SI Accumulator 18 Disch Isol (MCC-628) b) SI-20A/MV-32091. SI Accumulator 1A Disch Isol (MCC-52B) c) SI-302A/MV-32100, Reactor Vessel Safety Injection (MCC-52B) d) SI-300A/MV-32111. RHR Pump Suction Isol (MCC-52E) e) SI-351A/MV-32113. Cntmt Sump B Isol (MCC-52E) f) SI-351B/MV-32114. Cn.tmt Sump B Isol (MCC-62H)

a. DO NOT isolate accumulators.

GO TO Step 49.

1) IF power is NOT available, LOCK OPEN supply breakers and locally CLOSE valves.

___A

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E-0-06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 40 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 51 MAINTAIN LETDOWN FLOW:

a. VERIFY adequate volume remains in CVC Holdup Tank on fill

b. OPEN additional letdown orifice isolation valves, as necessary, to maintain letdown flow

c. ADJUST LD-10 to maintain Ltdn Ht Xgh Otlt Press at 250 psig 52 MAINTAIN REQUIRED RXCP SEAL INJECTION FLOW:

a. IF local flow indicators are ENERGIZED, THROTTLE CVC-7 to establish 8 gpm seal injection flow to each RXCP

a. REQUEST Control Operator B ALIGN letdown to empty CVC Holdup Tank.

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION NO.

E-0-06 KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 41 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE:

IF Stm Gen 18 is NOT depressurized periodically. Stm Gen lB U-Tubes will void during depressurization. This will result in a rapidly increasing Pzr Level.

53 DEPRESSURIZE RCS TO 420 PSIG:

a. DE-ENERGIZE Pressurizer Heater Backup Group 1A

b. ESTABLISH Auxiliary Spray

1) VERIFY letdown in service

2) VERIFY at least one Charging Pump RUNNING.

3) OPEN CVC-15/CV-31230, Chrg Line to Przr Aux Spray

b. IF Auxiliary Spray can NOT be established. DEPRESSURIZE using Przr Head Vent System:

1) OPEN RC-46/SV-33663. Rx Head/Przr Vent to PRT

2) CYCLE OPEN PR-33A/SV-33660, Przr Head Vent Train A. to control RCS pressure

c. WHEN Pzr Press is equal to 420 psig, STOP RCS depressurization

d. ENERGIZE Pressurizer Heater Backup Group 1A as necessary to maintain 420 psig 54 CHECK IF RHR SYSTEM CAN BE PLACED IN SERVICE:

a. Reac Coolant LP A Hot Leg Temp

< 400 0F

b. Pzr Press < 425 psig

a. GO TO Step 46.

b. GO TO Step 53.

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E 06 KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 42 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS I

CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 55 PLACE RHR TRAIN A IN SERVICE:

a. CLOSE supply breakers for following valves-:

1) RHR-1A/MV-32116, Loop A Hot Leg to RHR Pump (MCC-52B Ext)

2) RHR-2A/MV-32117. Loop A Hot Leg to RHR Pump (MCC-52B Ext)

3) RHR-11/MV-32118, RHR to Loop B Cold Leg Isol (MCC-52B)

b. Locally VERIFY following valves CLOSED. THEN OPEN supply breakers:

1) RHR-300A/MV-32134, RHR Hx Outlet to SI Pmp 1A (MCC-52E)

2) RHR-400A/MV-32125, RHR Hx Outlet to ICS Pmp 1A (MCC-52E)

c. Locally POSITION RHR-8A/CV-31114, RHR Hx 1A Outlet CV, as follows:

1) CLOSE IA-31114-2

2) CLOSE IA-31114-1

3) BLEED OFF air pressure at pressure regulators

4) LOOSEN jam nut on valve stem

5) Manually POSITION RHR-8A to 10% OPEN

d. OPEN CC-400A/MV-32119. CC Water to Rsdl Hx 1A MV CONTINUED

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E-0-06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 43 of 50

e. VERIFY CC Hx CCW-Return Flow indication <3650 gpm

f. ADJUST LD-10 to increase Ltdn Ht Xgh Otit Press to 420 psig (equal to Pzr Press)

g. OPEN RHR-1A/MV-32116 and RHR-2A/MV-32117, Loop A Hot Leg RHR Init Isol MVs

h. CLOSE LD-4A, LD-4B, and LD-4C, Regen Hx Ltdn Otit Orif Isol CVs

i. POSITION LD-10 Controller to MANUAL and OPEN LD-10

j.

START RHR Pump 1A 11 CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

.,e. Locally CLOSE CC-400B.

g. REPLACE fuses at MCC-52B Ext.

k. VERIFY RHR Pump Pit Fan Coil 1A, ON

1. Locally VERIFY 1A RHR Ht Exch Outlet Temperature (TI-12075) increases to within 50aF of Reac Coolant LP A Hot Leg Temp

m. VERIFY RHR System Boron Concentration within 100 ppm of RCS

n. OPEN RHR-11/MV-32118. RHR Return to LP-B Cold Leg Isol MV

o. Locally LOCK OPEN supply breaker to SW-1300A/MV-32009 (MCC-52B), THEN OPEN SW-1300A, CC Hx 1A Outlet

p. ADJUST LD-10 to maintain Pzr Cold Cal Level 20-50%

k. Locally START RHR Pump Pit Fan Coil 1A.

n. REPLACE fuses at MCC-52B.

CONTINUED E~I OPERATOR ACTIONS 55 CONTINUED

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION NO.

E-0-06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 44 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS 55 CONTINUED

q. VERIFY integrity-of RHR System by MONITORING Pzr Cold Cal Level and Chg Pump 1C Speed versus LD-10 position.

]

I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION NO.

E-0-06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 45 of 50 I OPERATOR ACTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 56 CONTINUE RCS COOLDOWN TO BELOW 200 0 F WITH RHR SYSTEM:

a. MAINTAIN RCS cooldown rate

<250 F/hr

b. Locally THROTTLE RHR-8A to

b. Locally THROTTLE RHR-9A. RHR Hx achieve cooldown rate 1A Outlet.

c. Locally ADJUST RHR-101/CV-31116, RHR Hx Bypass CV, as follows:

1) Fail RHR-101 closed:

a) CLOSE IA-31116-2 b) CLOSE IA-31116-1 c) BLEED OFF air pressure at pressure regulator

2) VERIFY RHR-110, RHR Return to RWST, CLOSED

3) OPEN RHR-1OA, Cross Connect Valve

4) OPEN RHR-100A, Heat Exchanger Bypass Line

5) LOOSEN jam nut on RHR-101 valve stem

6) OPEN RHR-101 to establish 1000-2000 gpm RHR flow

d. MAINTAIN Reac Coolant LP A Cold Leg Temp and Pzr Press - Within limits of Figure E-0-06-1

e. MAINTAIN Pzr Cold Cal Level -e.

ADJUST Chg Pump C Speed and 20-50%

LD-10 position.

f. WHEN Reac Coolant LP A Hot Leg Temp is <2000F, ALIGN Containment Spray System as follows:

1) Locally LOCK CLOSED ICS-7A and ICS-7B.

Cntmt Spray Pump 1A/1B to Cntmt Vessel (N and E Pen room)

2) REOUEST plant electrician RACK OUT 18 ICS Pump breaker

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION NO.

E-0-06 KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 46 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION Depressurizing the RCS before entire RCS-is <2000F may result in additional void formation in RCS.

57 CONTINUE COOLDOWN OF INACTIVE PORTION OF RCS:

a. Steam Generator U-Tubes CONTINUE dumping steam from both Steam Generators

b. Upper head region - Both CRDM cooling fans, RUNNING

b. WAIT 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months after RCS temperature reaches 2000F before depressurizing RCS to

<350 psig.

58 DETERMINE IF RCS DEPRESSURIZATION IS PERMITTED:

a. Entire RCS - <200 0 F

a. DO NOT depressurize RCS.

GO TO Step 56.

Eli

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION NO.

E-0-06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 47 of 50 OPERATOR ACTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 59 60 STABILIZE PLANT AT 1800F AND 100 psig

-END-DEPRESSURIZE RCS TO 100 PSIG

a. DE-ENERGIZE Pressurizer Heater Backup Group 1A

b. OPEN RC-46/SV-33663, Rx Head/Przr Vent to PRT

c. OPEN PR-33A/SV-33660. Przr Head Vent Train A, to reduce RCS pres'sure

d. WHEN Pzr Press is equal to 100 psig, STOP RCS depressurization

e. ENERGIZE Pressurizer Heater Backup Group 1A as necessary to maintain 100 psig

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION NO.

E 06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 48 of 50 TABLE E-0-06-1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SUBCOOLING PRESSURIZER T-SAT 50 DEG 200 DEG PRESSURE SUBCOOLING SUBCOOLING PSIG DEG F DEG F DEG F 2300 2250 2200 2150 2100 2050 2000 1950 1900 1850 1800 1750 1700 1650 1600 1550 1500 1450 1400 1350 1300 1250 1200 1150 1100 1050 1000 950 900 850 800 750 700 650 600 550 500 657 654 650 647 644 640 637 633 630 626 622 618 614 610 606 602 598 593 588 584 579 574 569 563 558 552 546 540 534 527 520 513 505 497 489 480 470 607 604 600 597 594 590 587 583 580 576 572 568 564 560 556 552 548 543 538 534 529 524 519 513 508 502 496 490 484 477 470 463 455 447 439 430 420 457 454 450 447 444 440 437 433 430 426 422 418 414 410 406 402 398 393 388 384 379 374 369 363 358 352 346 340 334 327 320 313 305 297 289 280 270 LOOP TEMPERATURE

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E 06 KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 49 of 50 RCS PRESSURE (PSIG) 2400 F/HR

-F

/HI 2200 -MAYTMIMN--

2000 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0

700 0

100 200 300 400 500 600 RCS COLD LEG TEMPERATURE (OF)

Figure E-0-06-1 Cooldown Operating Region WITHOUT Full CRDM Cooling

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION NO.

E 06 KEWAUNEENUCLEARPOWERPLANT TITLE FIRE IN ALTERNATE FIRE ZONE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES DATE AUG 04 1998 PAGE 50 of 50 RCS PRESSURE (PSIG) 2100 25OF/HR 2200 MAXIMUM COOLDOWN RATE 2000 -_

iij

~

, jj ACCEPTABLE 1800 n

oATT r

1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0

700 0

100 200 300 400 500 600 RCS COLD LEG TEMPERATURE (-F)

Figure E-0-06-2 Cooldown Operating Region With Full CRDM Cooling

ML111861752

Text

1.0 INTRODUCTION

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