RS-11-067, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Storage Racks

Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Storage Racks

ML111090258
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	04/18/2011
From:	Simpson P Exelon Nuclear, Exelon Generation Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML111090256	List: RS-11-067, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Storage Racks
References
RS-11-067, TAC ME2376, TAC ME2377 ANP-2578(NP), Rev 1, EC0000383637
Download: ML111090258 (84)

Text

T RS-1 1-067 April 18, 2011 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 NRC Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374

Subject:

Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Storage Racks

References:

1.

Letter from P. R. Simpson (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) to U.S. NRC, "License Amendment Regarding the Use of Neutron Absorbing Inserts in Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Storage Racks," dated October 5, 2009 2.

Letter from E. A. Brown (U.S. NRC) to M. J. Pacilio (Exelon Nuclear),

"LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, Issuance of Amendments Concerning Spent Fuel Neutron Absorbers (TAC Nos. ME2376 and ME2377)

(RS-09-133)," dated January 28, 2011 3.

Letter from E. A. Brown (U.S. NRC) to M. J. Pacilio (Exelon Nuclear),

"LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 -- Request for Additional Information Related to the Use of Neutron Absorbing Inserts (TAC Nos. ME2376 and ME2377)," dated March 4, 2011 In Reference 1, Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC) requested an amendment to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 for LaSalle County Station (LSCS), Units 1 and 2, respectively. The proposed change revised Technical Specifications (TS) Section 4.3.1, "Criticality," to address a non-conservative IS. Specifically, the proposed change addressed the BORAFLEXT"" degradation issue in the Unit 2 spent fuel storage racks by revising TS Section 4.3.1 to allow the use of NETCO-SNAP-lN rack inserts in Unit 2 spent fuel storage rack cells as a replacement for the neutron absorbing properties of the existing BORAFLEXT" panels.

The NRC approved EGC's license amendment request in Reference 2. However, in Reference 2, the NRC noted that concerns regarding the long-term crediting of BORAFLEXTM in the LSCS spent fuel pools (SFPs) have yet to be resolved. As such, Reference 2 included

April 18, 2011 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 license conditions that establish a three-tiered SFP BORAFLEXTM credit configuration that is valid until October 28, 2011. After this date, credit for BORAFLEXTM is limited to a more restricted-tiered configuration until completion of the NETCO-SNAP-IN insert campaign.

In Reference 3, the NRC requested additional information that is needed to support resolution of concerns regarding the long-term crediting of BORAFLEXTM in the Unit 2 SFP. In response to this request, EGC is providing the attached information. contains information proprietary to AREVA NP Inc. Attachment 3 contains information proprietary to Holtec International. Attachments 3 through 6 contain information proprietary to NETCO (i.e., a business unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Service Company).

These companies request that the information be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public inspections, exemptions, requests for withholding," paragraph (a)(4).

Affidavits supporting these requests are contained in Attachments 7 and 8. The affidavits set forth the basis on which the information may be withheld from public disclosure by the NRC and addresses with specificity the considerations listed in 10 CFR 2.390(b)(4). Attachment 7 includes a non-proprietary version of Attachment 2, and Attachment 8 includes a non -

proprietary version of Attachment 3. Non-proprietary versions of Attachments 4, 5, and 6 are not being submitted since they would be of no value due to the extent of the proprietary information in these documents.

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter. Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mr. Kenneth M. Nicely at (630) 657-2803.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 18th day of April 2011.

Re ectfully, Patrick R. Simpson Manager - Licensing Attachments:

1.

Response to Request for Additional Information 2.

AREVA NP Inc. Report No. ANP-2578(P), "Criticality Safety Analysis for ATRIUMTM-10 Fuel, LaSalle Unit 2 Spent Fuel Storage Pool (50% Degraded Boraflex Rack),"

Revision 1 (PROPRIETARY INFORMATION) 3.

EC0000383637, "Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Analyses Impact from Boraflex BADGER Testing" (PROPRIETARY INFORMATION) 4.

NETCO Report No. NET-149-01, "BADGER Test Campaign at LaSalle County Nuclear Station Unit 2," Revision 1 (PROPRIETARY INFORMATION) 5.

NETCO Report No. NET-269-01, "BADGER Test Campaign at LaSalle County Station Unit 2," Revision 1 (PROPRIETARY INFORMATION) 6.

NETCO Report No. NET-331-01, "BADGER Test Campaign at LaSalle County Station Unit 2," Revision 2 (PROPRIETARY INFORMATION)

April 18, 2011 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3

7. AREVA NP Inc. Affidavit and Non-Proprietary Version of Attachment 2

8. Holtec International Affidavit, NETCO Affidavit, and Non-Proprietary Version of cc:

NRC Regional Administrator, Region III NRC Senior Resident Inspector - LaSalle County Station Illinois Emergency Management Agency - Division of Nuclear Safety

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Request for Additional Information Page 1 NRC Request 1 On page 5 of Attachment 1 to a letter dated November 23, 2010, the licensee indicated that the

'current criticality analysis' had a discussion justifying why deviating from the analyses of record is acceptable. Provide the referenced analysis.

Response

The requested analysis is provided in Attachment 2.

NRC Request 2 On page 5 of Attachment 1 to the November 23, 2010 letter, the licensee stated that the analyses, performed to estimate the penalty to in-rack keff, are based on a certain amount of panel thinning. Provide the referenced analyses.

Response

The requested analysis is provided in Attachment 3.

NRC Request 3 Provide all of the reports of BADGER measurement campaigns that have been completed for LaSalle Unit 2.

Response

The requested reports are provided in Attachments 4, 5, and 6.

ATTACHMENT 7 AREVA NP Inc. Affidavit and Non-Proprietary Version of Attachment 2

AFFIDAVIT STATE OF WASHINGTON )

as.

COUNTY OF BENTON

)

I.

My name is Alan B. Meginnis. I am Manager, Product Licensing, for AREVA NP Inc, and as such I am authorized to execute this Affidavit.

2.

I am familiar with the criteria applied by AREVA NP to determine whether certain AREVA NP information is proprietary. I am familiar with the policies established by AREVA NP to ensure the proper application of these criteria.

3.

I am familiar with the AREVA NP information contained in the report ANP-2578(P) Revision 1, entitled, "Criticality Safety Analysis for ATRIUM-10 Fuel LaSalle Unit 2 Spent Fuel Storage Pool (50% Degraded Boraflex Rack)," dated March 2011 and referred to herein as "Document." Information contained in this Document has been classified by AREVA NP as proprietary in accordance with the policies established by AREVA NP for the control and protection of proprietary and confidential information.

4.

This Document contains information of a proprietary and confidential nature and is of the type customarily held in confidence by AREVA NP and not made available to the public. Based on my experience, I am aware that other companies regard information of the kind contained in this Document as proprietary and confidential.

5.

This Document has been made available to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in confidence with the request that the information contained in this Document be withheld from public disclosure. The request for withholding of proprietary information is made in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390. The information for which withholding from disclosure is

requested qualifies under 10 CFR 2.390(a)(4) "Trade secrets and commercial or financial information,"

6.

The following criteria are customarily applied by AREVA NP to determine whether information should be classified as proprietary:

(a)

The information reveals details of AREVA NP's research and development plans and programs or their results.

(b)

Use of the information by a competitor would permit the competitor to significantly reduce its expenditures, in time or resources, to design, produce, or market a similar product or service.

(c)

The information includes test data or analytical techniques concerning a process, methodology, or component, the application of which results in a competitive advantage for AREVA NP.

(d)

The information reveals certain distinguishing aspects of a process, methodology, or component, the exclusive use of which provides a competitive advantage for AREVA NP in product optimization or marketability.

(e)

The information is vital to a competitive advantage held by AREVA NP, would be helpful to competitors to AREVA NP, and would likely cause substantial harm to the competitive position of AREVA NP.

The information in the Document is considered proprietary for the reasons set forth in paragraphs 6(b), 6(d) and 6(e) above.

7.

In accordance with AREVA NP's policies governing the protection and control of information, proprietary information contained in this Document have been made available, on a limited basis, to others outside AREVA NP only as required and under suitable agreement providing for nondisclosure and limited use of the information.

8, AREVA NP policy requires that proprietary information be kept in a secured file or area and distributed on a need-to-know basis.

9.

The foregoing statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

SUBSCRIBED before me this

`f' Susan K. McCoy NOTARY PUBLIC, STATE OF WASHINGTON MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:

1/10/12

ANP-2578(NP)

Revision 1 Criticality Safety Analysis for ATRIUM'-10 Fuel LaSalle Unit 2 Spent Fuel Storage Pool (50% Degraded Boraflex Rack)

March 2011 Controlled Document

AREVA NP Inc.

ANP-2578(NP)

Revision 1 Criticality Safety Analysis for ATRIUM'-10 Fuel LaSalle Unit 2 Spent Fuel Storage Pool (50% Degraded Boraflex Rack)

Prepared:

R. E. Fowles, Engineer BWR Neutronics Date Approved:

O. C. Brown, Manager BWR Neutronics Date Approved:

J. S. Holm, Manager Product Licensing Date Controlled Document

AREVA NP Inc.

ANP-2578(NP)

Revision 1 Copyright © 2011 AREVA NP Inc.

All Rights Reserved sja Controlled Document

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Nature of Changes Item Page Description and Justification

1.

2-1 Correction of the second bullet item and a clarification that top and bottom natural blankets were assumed in the analysis.

This is a prescribed action in CR 2011-485-FA.

2.

Throughout AREVA NP proprietary information has been identified.

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Contents 1.0 Introduction....................................................................................................................1-1 2.0 Summary........................................................................................................................2-1 3.0 Criticality Safety Design Criteria.....................................................................................3-1 4.0 Fuel and Storage Array Description...............................................................................4-1 4.1 Fuel Assembly Design (ATRIUM-10).................................................................4-1 4.2 Fuel Storage Rack..............................................................................................4-1 5.0 Calculation Methodology................................................................................................5-1 6.0 Criticality Safety Analysis...............................................................................................6-1 6.1 Geometry Model.................................................................................................6-2 6.2 Storage Array Reactivity.....................................................................................6-2 6.3 Uncertainties......................................................................................................6-3 6.4 Reactivity Effects of Boraflex Degradation.........................................................6-4 6.5 Determination of Maximum Array Reactivity......................................................6-4 6.6 Abnormal and Accident Conditions....................................................................6-5 7.0 Conclusions....................................................................................................................7-1 8.0 References.....................................................................................................................8-1 Appendix A Sample CASMO-4 Input.................................................................................. A-1 Appendix B Accuracy of the Boraflex Panel Thickness Adjustment Equation.................... B-1 Tables 4.1 ATRIUM-10 Fuel Assembly Parameters........................................................................4-2 6.1 Summary of Criticality Safety Analysis...........................................................................6-7 6.2 CASMO-4 In-Core vs. In-Rack Data for ATRIUM-10 Fuel.............................................6-8 6.3 CASMO Reactivity Uncertainties Due to Manufacturing Tolerances.............................6-9 Figures 4.1 ATRIUM-10 Fuel Assembly............................................................................................4-3 4.2 Nominal Storage Cell Description..................................................................................4-4 6.1 Relationship Between the Maximum k In-Rack and the k in Standard Core Geometry for ATRIUM-10 Fuel...........................................................................6-10 Controlled Document

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Nomenclature Boraflex trademark name of the Bisco company for a polymer neutron absorbing material comprised of boron carbide and dimethyl polysiloxane REBOL reactivity equivalent at beginning of life Controlled Document

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1.0 Introduction This report presents the results of a Criticality Safety Evaluation performed for the storage of AREVA NP Inc. ATRIUM' -10* fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool of the LaSalle Unit 2 Nuclear Power Station. Previous analysis for the LaSalle Unit 2 spent fuel storage pool are documented in References 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. Results included in this report provide a procedure for demonstrating that ATRIUM-10 fuel assemblies of different enrichments and gadolinia loadings meet USNRC requirements relative to criticality safety in the spent fuel storage racks. This report also provides an application method to include the reactivity effects of between 0 and 80% degradation of the Boraflex absorber relative to the storage of ATRIUM-10 fuel assemblies in the racks.

ATRIUM is a trademark of AREVA NP.

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2.0 Summary The evaluation summarized in this report provides a means to show that under worst credible conditions (including uncertainties) the ATRIUM-10 fuel design meets the acceptance criterion of k-eff  0.95 (Reference 9). The ATRIUM-10 fuel design with or without a fuel channel can be safely stored in the LaSalle Unit 2 spent fuel storage pool as described in References 1 and 2 by assessing each design relative to this evaluation. The maximum storage array reactivity of the ATRIUM-10 design can be determined using the maximum CASMO-4 in-core k value at 20°C for the actual lattice design, the lattice average initial enrichment, and the reactivity conversion shown in Figure 6.1. The in-rack maximum k values displayed in these curves include the baseline conditions of axial cutouts in the Boraflex panel, a 10% reduction in panel width, a 50% reduction in panel thickness (or areal density), and a 1 horizontal gap in the Boraflex on each wall of the rack. The k values are also included for the limiting accident scenario, the most limiting water box orientation, manufacturing tolerance uncertainties, and the KENO V.a to CASMO-4 adjustment. Sections 6.4 and 6.5 present example cases of how to evaluate the maximum reactivity for the storage racks with different levels of degradation of the Boraflex absorber material. Reactivity effects of abnormal and accident conditions are included to assure that under credible abnormal conditions, the reactivity will be less than the limiting design basis value. The conditions assumed in this analysis are described in Section 6.0. This evaluation is valid for both top and bottom lattices of the ATRIUM-10 fuel design.

To assure that the actual reactivity will always be less than the calculated reactivity, the following conservative assumptions were made:



Moderator and fuel temperature is assumed to be 4C, the temperature corresponding to the highest in-rack reactivity.



Fuel assemblies are assumed to be comprised of the maximum reactivity lattice for the enriched length of all of the assemblies.*



The lattice average enrichment is assumed in all rods (uniform) compared to actual BWR fuel designs which have a distribution of different rod enrichments. This gives a higher bundle reactivity and is therefore a conservative assumption (Reference 8).



Each fuel assembly in the array is assumed to be at the peak reactivity in its lifetime.

Natural uranium blankets are assumed on the top (12) and bottom (6) of the 150 assembly model.

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Criticality safety analyses are based upon the reactivity of an infinite array of storage cells, i.e., no credit is taken for neutron leakage (except as necessary in the assessment of abnormal/accident conditions).



Neutron absorption in fuel structural components is neglected, i.e., spacer grids are ignored.



The maximum reactivity values include all significant manufacturing and calculational uncertainties.

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3.0 Criticality Safety Design Criteria The criticality safety design criteria defined in the following documents were assumed to be applicable for the LaSalle Unit 2 spent fuel storage facility evaluation:

A.

Section 9.1.2 (Spent Fuel Storage) of the Standard Review Plan (Reference 9);

B.

Regulatory Guide 1.13 (Spent Fuel Storage Facility Design Basis) issued by the NRC (Reference 10);

C.

ANSI/ANS American National Standard 57.2-1983 (Design Requirements for Light Water Reactor Spent Fuel Storage Facilities at Nuclear Power Plants) issued by the American Nuclear Society (Reference 11);

D.

ANSI/ANS American National Standard 8.17-1984 (Criticality Safety Criteria for the Handling, Storage and Transportation of LWR Fuel Outside Reactors) issued by the American Nuclear Society, January 1984 (Reference 12);

E.

OT Position for the Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling Applications, issued by the NRC in 1978 (Reference 13).

These documents define the assumptions and acceptance criteria used in this evaluation. In descending order (from A to E) these documents go from least to most detail relative to explicitly defining what needs to be addressed in the criticality safety evaluation. In general, the criticality safety acceptance criterion applicable to this evaluation is as defined by Section 9.1.2 of the Standard Review Plan (Reference 9):

The k-eff of the array shall not exceed 0.95 under worst credible storage array conditions,*

including uncertainties, or under accident conditions, e.g., dropped or misplaced assembly.

Worst credible conditions include minimum storage rack dimensions, worst fuel assembly position in racks, peak reactivity fuel at most reactive pool moderator temperature condition, including boiling.

Uncertainties include allowances for statistical uncertainty associated with the analytical method and benchmark calculation uncertainties.

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4.0 Fuel and Storage Array Description 4.1 Fuel Assembly Design (ATRIUM-10)

The design basis fuel assembly assumed for this analysis is the ATRIUM-10 assembly which is a 10x10 fuel assembly with an internal square water channel offset in the center of the assembly (taking the place of nine fuel rod locations). Table 4.1 summarizes the mechanical design parameters which define the assembly and Figure 4.1 depicts the assembly design. For the design basis assembly, the enrichment, and gadolinia loadings were varied to produce the curves given in Figure 6.1. The enrichments were chosen to be inclusive of possible future ATRIUM-10 fuel loadings for the LaSalle Units. The fuel channel for ATRIUM-10 fuel is a uniform wall 0.100-inch-thick channel.

4.2 Fuel Storage Rack The design basis storage rack cell specifications are from Reference 1. The calculational model of the storage cell and fuel assembly is shown in Figure 4.2. The storage rack consists of an egg-crate structure with fixed neutron absorber material (Boraflex) of 0.0238 g/cm2 Boron-10 nominal areal density positioned between the fuel assembly storage cells. Each Boraflex panel has eight cutouts. Each cutout is 1.76 inches wide and 1.44 inches deep with a semi-circular shape (0.88-inch radius) on the inner edge.

This arrangement provides a nominal center-to-center lattice spacing of 6.255 inches. The 0.09-inch stainless steel box which defines the fuel assembly storage cell has a nominal inside dimension of 6 inches. Storage cell and fuel manufacturing tolerances, used in evaluating uncertainties in reactivity were previously calculated for the ATRIUM-9B fuel and the Boraflex racks (Reference 4, Page 6-3). The effect of the storage cell manufacturing tolerances on reactivity is independent of fuel design (see Section 6.3). A reactivity uncertainty for ATRIUM-10 water box orientation is included in the total uncertainty (see Section 6.3).

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Table 4.1 ATRIUM-10 Fuel Assembly Parameters Fuel Assembly Fuel rod array 10x10 Fuel rod pitch, inch 0.510 Number of fuel rods per assembly 83 (top) or 91 (bottom)

Number of water rods per assembly Internal Channel Fuel Rods Fuel material UO2 Pellet density, % of theoretical 96.26 Pellet diameter, inch 0.3413 Pellet void volume, %

Enriched UO2 1.2*

UO2 Gd2O3 1.2*

Cladding material Zircaloy-2 With Zirconium Liner Cladding OD, inch 0.3957 Cladding ID, inch 0.3480 Internal Water Channel Outside dimension, inch 1.378 Inside dimension, inch 1.321 Channel material Zircaloy-2 or Zircaloy-4 Depending on pellet L/D, the pellet void volume can vary. A nominal value of 1.2 was assumed for the criticality safety analysis. Variations of the void volume are not significant relative to impact on storage array criticality safety.

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Figure 4.1 ATRIUM-10 Fuel Assembly Controlled Document

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ANP-2578(NP)

Revision 1 Page 4-4 Zr FUEL CHANNEL 5.478" OD 5.278" ID INTERNAL WATER CHANNEL 1.378" OD 1.321" ID BORAFLEX 0.0238 gm B-10/sgcm 5.25" WIDE 0.075" THICK 0000000000 1

0000000000 0000000000 0000000000 0000 000 0000 000 NOT TO SCALE REFLECTING BOUNDARY CONDITIONS THROUGH CENTERLINE OF BORAFLEX PANELS - 4 SIDES Figure 4.2 Nominal Storage Cell Description k

SS BOX 000 0000000000 0000000000 1

0000000000 6.255" LATTICE SPACING 0.090 +/- 0.009" THICK 6.00 +1- 0.02" I D AREVA NP Inc.

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5.0 Calculation Methodology The CASMO-4* bundle depletion code was used to calculate k values for the ATRIUM-10 fuel assembly as a function of exposure and void, for both the in-core and in-rack geometry.

CASMO-4 is a multigroup, two-dimensional transport theory code with an in-rack geometry option where the storage array geometry can be defined. The CASMO-4 computer code is widely used throughout the nuclear industry for core physics and criticality safety calculations. It has been benchmarked by Studsvik against cold critical data for both PWR and BWR fuel assemblies.

The KENO V.a Monte Carlo criticality program was used to calculate neutron multiplication factors for the spent fuel storage racks at the baseline conditions as well as with Boraflex panel thickness values ranging between zero and 80% degradation. This version of KENO V.a has been extensively benchmarked to the results of standard criticality experiments.

CASMO-4 version 1.14.05 with the 70 group L neutron library and 18 group gamma library.

Part of the SCALE 4.4a1 computer code collection from Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

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6.0 Criticality Safety Analysis This analysis presents a set of curves for the ATRIUM-10 fuel by which the maximum in-rack k

with uncertainties can be determined using the initial enrichment and in-core maximum cold k.

Calculations were made at several average enrichments and gadolinia loadings for both the in-core and in-rack geometries. These calculations were made using the nominal conditions for the fuel lattice and the storage rack.

From these calculations, a series of curves (shown in Figure 6.1) give the in-rack k as a function of in-core k and initial lattice average enrichment. The in-rack k values in the figure include reactivity adjustments for the baseline conditions of: axial cutouts in the Boraflex panel, a 10% reduction in panel width, a 50% reduction in panel thickness (or areal density), and a 1 horizontal gap in each panel. In addition, these results account for the most limiting accident scenario (missing Boraflex panel), the most limiting water box orientation, manufacturing tolerance uncertainties, and the KENO V.a to CASMO-4 adjustment. Figure 6.1 allows the user to determine the in-rack k given the lattice average enrichment and the in-core k of the limiting lattice. The in-core k values are the actual lattice cold (20 C) k values from the CASMO-4 cross section library generation calculations. Thus, no additional calculations will be required to assess the effect of placing a given lattice design in the spent fuel storage racks. This analysis may also be used to evaluate the maximum in-rack k for different degrees of degradation of the Boraflex absorber material as defined in Section 6.4 of this report.

The CASMO-4 calculations are based on uncontrolled lattice depletion calculations performed at hot operating [

] void conditions. Cold, xenon-free restart calculations are then performed at various exposures and void histories to establish the maximum in-core and in-rack reactivity. The in-core restarts were done at 20 C, and the in-rack restarts were done at 4 C. Table 6.1 summarizes the parameters for this analysis. Table 6.2 includes the in-core and in-rack k values as a function of enrichment and gadolinia loading for the ATRIUM-10 fuel. The in-rack results in the table labeled with uncertainties includes a

k adder of [

] (see Table 6.1) to account for the effects of the baseline Boraflex model, manufacturing tolerance uncertainties, the limiting accident and water box orientation scenarios, and the KENO V.a to CASMO-4 adjustment.

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6.1 Geometry Model The design basis storage rack cell consists of an egg-crate structure, illustrated in Figure 4.2, with fixed neutron absorber material (Boraflex) of 0.0238 g/cm2 Boron-10 nominal areal density, positioned between the fuel assembly storage cells. This arrangement provides a nominal center-to-center lattice spacing of 6.255 inches. The 0.09-inch stainless steel box which defines the fuel assembly storage cell has a nominal inside dimension of 6 inches. Manufacturing tolerances, used in evaluating uncertainties in reactivity are from Reference 4, Page 6-3.

The design basis fuel assembly assumed in this analysis is an ATRIUM-10 assembly which is a 10x10 fuel assembly with an internal square water channel offset in the center of the assembly (taking the place of nine fuel rod locations). The CASMO calculations were done at nominal dimensions for both the fuel assembly and the storage rack. The cold, in-rack restarts were done at 4C - this temperature corresponds to the highest reactivity. The analyses included a 100-mil fuel channel - this is conservative since removing the fuel channel decreases the reactivity of the fuel for in-rack conditions. The use of an advanced channel with thicker corners than sidewalls will negligibly change the in-rack k. The CASMO in-rack calculations include a region for the stainless-steel box structure and a region for the Boraflex and water between the stainless steel of adjacent cells.

A representative CASMO-4 input for in-core and in-rack calculations is shown in Appendix A.

6.2 Storage Array Reactivity Table 6.2 and Figure 6.1 summarize in-rack versus in-core reactivities for ATRIUM-10 fuel assemblies at initial enrichments of 3.8 wt%, 4.2 wt%, and 4.6 wt% U-235. The 4.2 wt% and 4.6 wt% data can be used to extrapolate to a higher enrichment if a lattice in the future is over 4.6 wt% U-235. The curves were generated for, but not limited to, designs of 6, 8, and 10 gadolinia rods at 2.5 to 8.0 wt% Gd2O3. The in-rack k data reported in the table labeled with uncertainties includes the baseline conditions of axial cutouts, a 10% reduction in width, a 50% reduction in thickness (or areal density), and a 1" horizontal gap in each Boraflex panel. In addition, these results account for the most limiting accident scenario (missing Boraflex panel), the most limiting water box orientation, manufacturing tolerance uncertainties, and the KENO V.a to CASMO-4 Controlled Document

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adjustment. This leads to a total adder of [

] k as shown in Table 6.1. Typical gadolinia rod locations were selected for the analysis and the results are independent of gadolinia rod location within the assembly.

Neutron absorption in fuel structural components such as spacers is neglected in the k results.

The in-rack analyses are based upon the reactivity of an infinite array of storage cells, i.e., no credit is taken for neutron leakage (except as necessary in the assessment of abnormal/accident conditions). Thus, the k-eff values for the Boraflex fuel storage racks will be less than or equal to the reported k values.

A bottom ATRIUM-10 lattice with an enrichment of 2.80 wt% in all rods and no gadolinia was used to calibrate the CASMO-4 results to the KENO V.a results for these Boraflex spent fuel racks at the baseline conditions. The calculated CASMO-4 in-rack k value at 4°C was increased by 0.0187 to account for the axial cutouts, the 1 gap, and the 10% panel width reduction. In addition, an adjustment of 0.0098 has been added to the CASMO-4 cases so the CASMO-4 results will be comparable to the KENO V.a results. This adjustment factor includes the KENO bias from the benchmark calculation and is included because KENO is a higher order method.

6.3 Uncertainties The reactivity impact of uncertainties due to storage cell and fuel manufacturing tolerances were calculated and reported for the ATRIUM-9B fuel and the LaSalle Boraflex racks in Reference 4, Page 6-9. The calculated uncertainties are shown in Table 6.3. The calculated uncertainty value of [

] is rounded up to [

]. The uncertainties due to the fuel manufacturing process include variations in enrichment, fuel density, and fuel dimensions. The AREVA manufacturing tolerances are identical for the ATRIUM-9B and ATRIUM-10 fuel. Thus, the manufacturing reactivity uncertainty value of [

]k reported in Reference 4 for the ATRIUM-9B fuel is applicable to the ATRIUM-10 fuel. The storage cell manufacturing uncertainties are independent of fuel design. The reactivity uncertainty values are tabulated in Table 6.1.

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The offset water box in the ATRIUM-10 fuel assembly can be oriented in any direction in the fuel rack. To account for possible reactivity effects associated with the water box orientation, a reactivity uncertainty value of 0.0031 is added to the other uncertainty values as shown in Table 6.1.

6.4 Reactivity Effects of Boraflex Degradation The Boraflex absorber material used in the LaSalle Unit 2 spent fuel storage racks and other installations has been observed to contain gaps and other signs of degradation. This evaluation accounts for the cutouts shown in Figure 10 of Reference 2 and the following baseline assumptions on the Boraflex panels:



The panel thickness (equivalent to areal density) has degraded to 50% of the original thickness



The panel width has been reduced to 90% of the original width



There is a 1" horizontal gap in the Boraflex on each wall of the rack It is projected that the boron worth of the Boraflex panels will continue to diminish. Therefore, the change in multiplication factor has been evaluated as a function of the change in panel thickness.

The following polynomial relationship is most accurate between 10% and 70% thickness degradation, (see Figure B.1).

k (thickness) = (1.1E-5) T2 + (2.6E-4) T - 0.040 where T = the absolute % loss in Boraflex panel thickness

(% panel thickness reduction is equivalent to the % loss in Boron-10 areal density)

The incremental reactivity effect (k) for each level of Boraflex degradation can be added to the in-rack k from Figure 6.1 (or Table 6.2) to give the maximum in-rack k for the racks containing ATRIUM-10 fuel.

6.5 Determination of Maximum Array Reactivity Assume an ATRIUM-10 assembly with a maximum CASMO-4 cold, in-core k of 1.275 occurring in a 4.41 wt% U-235 lattice. For the baseline condition, this corresponds to an in-rack k of 0.941 as read using the 4.6 wt% U235 curve in Figure 6.1. (Alternately, a value of 0.9406 can be Controlled Document

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calculated using the fit equation for the 4.6 wt% U235 case shown in Figure 6.1). As demonstrated in the following examples for 47% and 56% thickness degradation, this k can be adjusted for more or less than 50% Boraflex degradation using the equation from Section 6.4.

Reference in-rack k at 50%

Boraflex Degradation 0.941 (Figure 6.1)

Adjustment for 47% Boraflex Degradation

- 0.0035 k (Section 6.4)

Maximum in-rack k

0.938 With conservative rounding Reference in-rack k at 50%

Boraflex Degradation 0.9406 (Figure 6.1)

Adjustment for 56% Boraflex Degradation

+ 0.0091 k (Section 6.4)

Maximum in-rack k

0.9497 6.6 Abnormal and Accident Conditions In addition to the nominal conditions, several abnormal or accident conditions were considered in Reference 2.

The accidental misplacement of a fuel assembly outside and adjacent to a storage module filled with fuel was analyzed for 8x8 fuel in Reference 2 and found to have a negligible reactivity effect because of the high neutron leakage along the periphery of the racks. The calculated increase in reactivity due to the extraneous 8x8 fuel assembly was 0.0004 k. Because the ATRIUM-10 assembly is dimensionally the same size as the 8x8 assembly, i.e., about 5.2" on a side, its contribution to the array reactivity will likewise be minimal. Hence, the Reference 2 result for this accident is applicable to ATRIUM-10 fuel.

The only accident condition with a significant positive reactivity effect was the consequence of a missing Boraflex panel which was calculated in Reference 2 to result in a 0.0027 k increase in reactivity. The loss of a Boraflex panel is a small change to rack conditions external to the fuel.

Thus, the results are not sensitive to the fuel assembly design and are applicable to ATRIUM-10 Controlled Document

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fuel. The missing Boraflex panel reactivity effect of 0.0027 k is included in the results labeled with uncertainties.

For the case of a fuel assembly resting horizontally on top of the storage racks, the reactivity of the racks is not impacted because the dropped assembly will be neutronically isolated from the fuel in the racks, i.e., greater than 12 inches of water between the assembly and the top of the active fuel zone of the fuel in the racks.

Similarly, the reactivity consequence of a dropped fuel assembly or fuel assembly bowing or eccentric positioning has been found to be negligible or negative for BWR rack installations (Reference 2). These results are applicable to the ATRIUM-10 fuel at LaSalle Unit 2.

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Table 6.1 Summary of Criticality Safety Analysis Fuel enrichment (average), wt% U-235 3.8% to 4.6%*

Gadolinia content, wt% Gd2O3 6 rods at 2.5 wt% to 10 rods at 8.0 wt%

In-rack temperature assumed for analysis, C 4

CASMO-4 Uncertainty Value Adder for 10% width degradation, 1 horizontal gap, and axial cutouts at 50%

Boraflex degradation conditions, k 0.0187 KENO V.a to CASMO-4 Adjustment, k 0.0098 Uncertainty due to manufacturing tolerances, k

[

]

ATRIUM-10 Water box orientation, k 0.0031 Accident Conditions, k Total uncertainty, k 0.0027

[

]

Lattice designs are not limited to this enrichment range relative to criticality storage.

This value has been included in the maximum in-rack k values shown in Table 6.2 and Figure 6.1.

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Table 6.2 CASMO-4 In-Core vs. In-Rack Data for ATRIUM-10 Fuel Enrichment Wt% U-235 Number of Gadolinia Rods Gadolinia wt%

In-Core k, 20°C In-Rack k

• with Uncertainties at 4°C 3.8 6

2.5 1.29807 0.9470 3.8 6

3.0 1.28767 0.9396 3.8 6

4.0 1.26803 0.9255 3.8 6

5.0 1.24962 0.9123 3.8 6

6.0 1.23218 0.8998 3.8 6

7.0 1.21573 0.8880 3.8 6

8.0 1.19997 0.8767 4.2 8

3.5 1.29337 0.9499 4.2 8

4.0 1.28356 0.9428 4.2 8

4.5 1.27400 0.9358 4.2 8

5.0 1.26462 0.9290 4.2 8

6.0 1.24682 0.9161 4.2 8

7.0 1.22984 0.9039 4.2 8

8.0 1.21366 0.8921 4.6 10 4.5 1.28615 0.9487 4.6 10 5.0 1.27646 0.9416 4.6 10 5.5 1.26719 0.9348 4.6 10 6.0 1.25821 0.9283 4.6 10 6.5 1.24939 0.9218 4.6 10 7.0 1.24069 0.9154 4.6 10 7.5 1.23238 0.9093 4.6 10 8.0 1.22409 0.9032 Models the axial cutouts and assumes that the Boraflex contains a 1 horizontal gap and has degraded to 50% of the original thickness and 90% of the original width.

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Table 6.3 CASMO Reactivity Uncertainties Due to Manufacturing Tolerances

[

]

Square root of the sum of squares of all independent tolerance effects.

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k Relationship for ATRIUM-10 Fuel Assemblies (Based upon 50% Thickness, 90% Width, 1" Horizontal Gap, Axial Cutouts) 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.95 1.20 1.21 1.22 1.23 1.24 1.25 1.26 1.27 1.28 1.29 1.30 Maximum In-Core k at 20°C (CASMO-4)

Maximum In-Rack k with Uncertainties at 4°C 4.60 wt% U235 In-Rack k = 0.0057k^2 + 0.7189k + 0.0147 4.20 wt% U235 In-Rack k = 0.0476k^2 + 0.6056k + 0.0870 3.80 wt% U235 In-Rack k = -0.0288k^2 + 0.7889k - 0.0285 Figure 6.1 Relationship Between the Maximum k In-Rack and the k

in Standard Core Geometry for ATRIUM-10 Fuel Controlled Document

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7.0 Conclusions This evaluation provides a procedure for demonstrating that ATRIUM-10 fuel may be safely stored in the LaSalle Unit 2 high density spent fuel storage racks, i.e., meets the USNRC guidelines (k-eff  0.95) for a range of enrichment and gadolinia loadings. The possibility of degradation of the Boraflex panels due to cracks in the panels, loss of thickness (Boron-10 areal density), or loss of panel width also has been addressed. With the data from Table 6.2 and Figure 6.1 and using the equation in Section 6.4, it is possible to evaluate the maximum reactivity (see Section 6.5) for the ATRIUM-10 fuel in the LaSalle Unit 2 spent fuel racks.

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8.0 References

1.

8601-00-0084 Revision 8, Commonwealth Edison LaSalle Station Unit 2 Spent Fuel Storage Capacity Modification Safety Analysis Report, August 1986.

2.

Holtec Report HI-931060, Criticality Safety Evaluation of Spent Fuel Storage Racks With Postulated Degradation of Boraflex, LaSalle County Station, February 1994.

3.

EMF-95-088(P), Criticality Safety Analysis for ATRIUM'-9B Fuel LaSalle Unit 2 Spent Fuel Storage Pool (Boraflex Rack), Siemens Power Corporation, February 1996.

4.

EMF-97-086(P) Revision 0, Criticality Safety Analysis for LaSalle Unit 2 Spent Fuel Storage Pool (Boraflex Rack) Degraded Boraflex, Siemens Power Corporation, December 1997.

5.

EMF-98-010(P) Revision 1, Criticality Safety Analysis for LaSalle Unit 2 Spent Fuel Storage Pool with Degraded Boraflex and Maximum ATRIUM'-9B REBOL, Siemens Power Corporation, September 2000.

6.

EMF-2650(P) Revision 0, Criticality Safety Analysis for ATRIUM'-10 Fuel LaSalle Unit 2 Spent Fuel Storage Pool (Boraflex Rack), Framatome ANP, November 2001.

7.

EMF-2808(P) Revision 0, Criticality Safety Analysis for LaSalle Unit 2 Spent Fuel Storage Pool with Degraded Boraflex and Maximum ATRIUM'-10 REBOL, Framatome ANP, November 2002.

8.

EMF-94-098(P) Revision 1, Criticality Safety Analysis for ATRIUM'-9B Fuel Dresden Units 2 and 3 Spent Fuel Storage Pool, Siemens Power Corporation, January 1996.

9.

NUREG-0800, Section 9.1.2 (Spent Fuel Storage), Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 1981.

10.

Spent Fuel Storage Facility Design Basis, Regulatory Guide 1.13, Proposed Revision 2, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, December 1981.

11.

Design Requirements for Light Water Reactor Spent Fuel Storage Facilities at Nuclear Power Plants, ANSI/ANS American National Standard 57.2-1983, American Nuclear Society, October 1983.

12.

Criticality Safety Criteria for the Handling, Storage and Transportation of LWR Fuel Outside Reactors, ANSI/ANS American National Standard 8.17-1984, American Nuclear Society, January 1984.

13.

Letter, Brian K. Grimes, Assistant Director for Engineering and Projects Division of Operating Reactors, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to All Power Reactor Licensees, OT Position for the Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling Applications, April 14, 1978. (Enclosed with NRC generic letter 78911)

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Appendix A Sample CASMO-4 Input Table A.1 presents a sample CASMO-4 input for the ATRIUM-10 top lattice depletion, cold in-core, and cold in-rack calculation. The input shown is for the 4.60 wt% U-235 lattice with ten gadolinia rods at 5.0 wt% Gd2O3.

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Table A.1

[

]

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Appendix B Accuracy of the Boraflex Panel Thickness Adjustment Equation Figure B.1 demonstrates that the panel thickness adjustment equation listed in Section 6.4 is accurate between 10% and 70% panel thickness degradation conditions. As an alternative to the reactivity results from this analysis, Reference 6 remains applicable for panel thickness degradation conditions less than 40%.

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k Relationship for Boraflex Panel Thickness Changes (Boraflex Model: 90% Width, Axial Cutouts)

-0.06

-0.04

-0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Boraflex Panel Thickness Reduction (%)

KENO V.a k (Relative to 50% Degradation)

Delta k Data (KENO V.a)

Delta k = 1.1E-5T^2 + 2.6E-4T - 0.04 Figure B.1 Relationship Between the Maximum k In-Rack and the k in Standard Core Geometry for ATRIUM-10 Fuel ontrolled Document

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Distribution Controlled Distribution Richland RJ DeMartino RE Fowles R

Fundak SW Jones CD Manning DB McBurney (2)

AB Meginnis EE Riley AW Will PD Wimpy Controlled Document

ATTACHMENT 8 Holtec International Affidavit, NETCO Affidavit, and Non-Proprietary Version of Attachment 3

EMENE HOL T EC INTERNATIONAL.

Holtec Center, 555 Lincoln Drive West, Marlton, NJ 08053 Telephone (856) 797-0900 Fax (856) 797-0909 Holtec International Document ID 1678071 RI-aff AFFIDAVIT PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 2.390

, Tammy S. Morin, being duly sworn, depose and state as follows:

(1)

I have reviewed the information described in paragraph (2) which is sought to be withheld, and am authorized to apply for its withholding.

(2)

The information sought to be withheld is any excerpted information from Holtec Report HI-931060, Revision 3 which supports the LaSalle County Station spent fuel criticality analysis submitted with EC 383637.

In making this application for withholding of proprietary information of which it is the owner, Holtec International relies upon the exemption from disclosure set forth in the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 USC Sec. 552(b)(4) and the Trade Secrets Act, 18 USC Sec. 1905, and NRC regulations 10CFR Part 9.17(a)(4), 2.390(a)(4), and 2.390(b)(1) for "trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential" (Exemption 4). The material for which exemption from disclosure is here sought is all "confidential commercial information",

and some portions also qualify under the narrower definition of "trade secret", within the meanings assigned to those terms for purposes of FOIA Exemption 4 in, respectively, Critical Mass Energy Proiect v. Nuclear Reg_ulatoly Commission, 975F2d871 (DC Cir. 1992), and Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704F2d1280 (DC Cir. 1983).

(3) 1 of 5

Holtec International Document ID 1678071 R1-aff AFFIDAVIT PURSUANT TO 10 CPR 2.390 (4)

Some examples of categories of information which fit into the definition of proprietary information are:

a.

Information that discloses a process, method, or apparatus, including supporting data and analyses, where prevention of its use by Holtec's competitors without license from Holtec International constitutes a competitive economic advantage over other companies; b.

Information which, if used by a competitor, would reduce his expenditure of resources or improve his competitive position in the design, manufacture, shipment, installation, assurance of quality, or licensing of a similar product.

c.

Information which reveals cost or price information, production, capacities, budget levels, or commercial strategies of Holtec International, its customers, or its suppliers; Information which reveals aspects of past, present, or future Holtec International customer-funded development plans and programs of potential commercial value to Holtec International; Information which discloses patentable subject matter for which it may be desirable to obtain patent protection.

The information sought to be withheld is considered to be proprietary for the reasons set forth in paragraph 4.b, above.

(5)

The information sought to be withheld is being submitted to the NRC in confidence. The information (including that compiled from many sources) is of a sort customarily held in confidence by Holtec International, and is in fact so held. The information sought to be withheld has, to the best of my knowledge and belief, consistently been held in confidence by Holtec International. No public disclosure has been made, and it is not available in public sources. All disclosures to third parties, including any required transmittals to the NRC, have been made, or must be made, pursuant to regulatory provisions or proprietary agreements which provide for maintenance of the information in confidence. Its initial designation as 2 of 5

Holtec International Document ID 1678071 RI-aff AFFIDAVIT PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 2.390 proprietary information, and the subsequent steps taken to prevent its unauthorized disclosure, are as set forth in paragraphs (6) and (7) following.

(6)

Initial approval of proprietary treatment of a document is made by the manager of the originating component, the person most likely to be acquainted with the value and sensitivity of the information in relation to industry knowledge. Access to such documents within Holtec International is limited on a "need to know" basis.

The procedure for approval of external release of such a document typically requires review by the staff manager, project manager, principal scientist or other equivalent authority, by the manager of the cognizant marketing function (or his designee), and by the Legal Operation, for technical content, competitive effect, and determination of the accuracy of the proprietary designation.

Disclosures outside Holtec International are limited to regulatory bodies, customers, and potential customers, and their agents, suppliers, and licensees, and others with a legitimate need for the information, and then only in accordance with appropriate regulatory provisions or proprietary agreements.

The information classified as proprietary was developed and compiled by Holtec International at a significant cost to Holtec International. This information is classified as proprietary because it contains detailed descriptions of analytical approaches and methodologies not available elsewhere.

This information would provide other parties, including competitors, with information from Holtec International's technical database and the results of evaluations performed by Holtec International. A substantial effort has been expended by Holtec International to develop this information. Release of this information would improve a competitor's position because it would enable Holtec's competitor to copy our technology and offer it for sale in competition with our company, causing us financial injury.

(7)

(8) 3 of 5

Holtec International Document ID 1678071 RI-aff AFFIDAVIT PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 2.390 Public disclosure of the information sought to be withheld is likely to cause substantial harm to Holtec International's competitive position and foreclose or reduce the availability of profit-making opportunities. The information is part of Holtec International's comprehensive spent fuel storage technology base, and its commercial value extends beyond the original development cost. The value of the technology base goes beyond the extensive physical database and analytical methodology, and includes development of the expertise to determine and apply the appropriate evaluation process.

The research, development, engineering, and analytical costs comprise a substantial investment of time and money by Holtec International.

The precise value of the expertise to devise an evaluation process and apply the correct analytical methodology is difficult to quantify, but it clearly is substantial.

Holtec International's competitive advantage will be lost if its competitors are able to use the results of the Holtec International experience to normalize or verify their own process or if they are able to claim an equivalent understanding by demonstrating that they can arrive at the same or similar conclusions.

The value of this information to Holtec International would be lost if the information were disclosed to the public. Making such information available to competitors without their having been required to undertake a similar expenditure of resources would unfairly provide competitors with a windfall, and deprive Holtec International of the opportunity to exercise its competitive advantage to seek an adequate return on its large investment in developing these very valuable analytical tools.

4of5

Holtec International Document ID 1678071 RI-aff AFFIDAVIT PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 2.390 STATE OF NEW JERSEY

}

}

ss:

COUNTY OF BURLINGTON )

Ms. Tammy S. Morin, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

That she has read the foregoing affidavit and the matters stated therein are true and correct to the best of her knowledge, information, and belief.

Executed at Marlton, New Jersey, this 12`h day of April, 2011.

Tammy S. Morin Holtec International Subscribed and sworn before me this I

day of tlP1SAC 1N JERSEY My0b^imWon F^Xpjm Apr! 25, 2015

,2011.

5 of 5

NETCO 731 Grant Avenue Lake Katine, NY 12449 Phone: 845,382.6912 Fax: 845.382.6917 AFFIDAVIT I, Matthew L. Eyre, Director of NETCO, a business unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Service Company, do hereby affirm and state:

1. I am the Director of NETCO, a business unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Service Company (NETCO), authorized to execute this affidavit on its behalf. I am further authorized to review information submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and apply to the NRC for the withholding of information from disclosure.

2. The information sought to be withheld is contained in the "Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Analyses Impact from Boraflex BADGER Testing", Exelon ID EC 0000383637 and in the NETCO technical reports, "BADGER Test Campaign at LaSalle County Nuclear Station Unit 2," designated as NET-149-01, Rev 1; "BADGER Test Campaign at LaSalle County Station Unit 2," designated as NET -

269-01, Rev 1; and "BADGER Test Campaign at LaSalle County Station Unit 2,"

designated as NET-331-01, Rev 2.

3. In making this application for withholding of proprietary information of which it is the owner, NETCO relies on provisions of NRC regulation 10 CFR 2.390(a) 4. The information for which exemption from disclosure is sought is confidential commercial information.

4. Some categories of information which fit into the definition of proprietary information are:

a) Information that discloses a process or a method including data and supporting analysis and use of such information by a competitor would constitute a competitive advantage over other companies; b) Information if used by a competitor would reduce the competitor's expenditure of resources or improve his competitive position in the implementation of a similar product.

5. Initial approval of proprietary treatment of a document is made by the Director of NETCO, the person most likely to be familiar with the value and sensitivity of the information and its relation to industry knowledge. Access to such information within NETCO is on a "need to know" basis.

Page 2 of 2

6. The information referred to in paragraph (2) above is classified as proprietary because it contains details of NETCO's spent fuel pool criticality analysis methodology. The development of methods used in these analyses was achieved at significant cost.

7. Public disclosure of the information sought to be withheld may cause harm to NETCO's competitive position and may reduce profit-making opportunities.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing affidavit and statements therein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

Matthew L. Eyre Director NETCO, a business unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Service Company April 12, 2011 NETCO 731 Grant Avenue

• Lake Katrine, NY 12449. Phone 845.382.6912

• Fax: 845.382.6917

EC 383637 1 of 36 EC0000383637 Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Analyses Impact from Boraflex BADGER Testing REASON FOR EVALUATION / SCOPE The purpose of this evaluation is to document Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) criticality analyses compliance with the Reference 1 requirements (below) projected through October 28, 2011 and consistent with Boraflex degradation observed during Boron-10 Areal Density Gage for Evaluation of Racks (BADGER) testing (Reference 24). This evaluation provides an update to the previous evaluation performed in response to coupon test results (Reference 15).

The spent fuel storage racks are designed and shall be maintained with keff 0.95 if full flooded with unborated water, which includes an allowance for uncertainties as described in Section 9.1.2 of the UFSAR; and The Unit 2 SFP fuel storage racks contain panels of boron carbide impregnated silicon rubber known by the trade name Boraflex. The ~8000 Boraflex panels (139 inches X 5.25 inches X 0.075 inches) contain the neutron poison Boron-10 (B-10), which helps maintain compliance with the above requirement. The licensing basis criticality analyses are contained in:

Fuel Type Licensing Basis Documents Legacy GE (8X8) Fuel Reference 2 ATRIUM-9B Fuel References 2 and 3 ATRIUM-10 Fuel Reference 4 GE14 Fuel Reference 5 These reports contain the results of Unit 2 SFP criticality analyses and provide methods for evaluating Boraflex degradation. This evaluation utilizes the referenced licensing basis criticality analyses to determine the maximum allowed Boraflex degradation while maintaining Unit 2 SFP keff 0.95.

This evaluation determines which Unit 2 SFP locations will become degraded to the point of no longer being able to maintain keff 0.95 prior to October 28, 2011. In addition, License Conditions specified by the NRC regarding SFP cell operability will be included in this analysis.

DETAILED EVALUATION Boraflex Degradation Reference 24 In September 2009, LaSalle completed neutron blackness testing (Boron-10 Areal Density Gauge for Evaluating Racks (BADGER)). The BADGER test results indicated that the maximum Boraflex panel degradation was 50.4% with respect to the un-irradiated panels.

Reference 24 reports the results of the recently (September 2009) completed BADGER test campaign where 30 Boraflex panels in the Unit 2 SFP were tested using a neutron attenuation technique. The purpose of the testing was to evaluate the extent and mechanism of Boraflex degradation.

EC 383637 2 of 36 Boraflex degradation manifests itself in one of three ways: 1) Gap formation; 2) Edge dissolution; and,

3) Panel thinning.

Gap Formation:

Boraflex shrinks in a high radiation environment. This causes panel cracking with gaps opening at the crack locations. The largest observed gap was 0.7 inches. The BADGER test resolution for gap formation is approximately [ ] inches. This evaluation will use a one (1) inch gap size.

Edge Dissolution:

No significant edge dissolution was observed in the BADGER test. Previous Boraflex coupon test results indicated that 10% edge dissolution could be expected.

The resolution of the BADGER detectors would allow observation of edge dissolution greater than 10%. The Boraflex coupon edges are directly exposed to the SFP environment, rather than being enclosed in the SFP racks. The better containment in the actual racks may be mitigating the effects of flow past the coupon edges. To be conservative, this evaluation will use 10% edge dissolution, consistent with coupon test results.

Panel Thinning:

The lowest observed panel Boron-10 areal density was 0.0099 gm/cm2. This represents a panel loss (thinning) of 50.4% with respect to the un-irradiated panel test results. Discounting testing on un-irradiated panels and results that indicated an increase in Boron-10 loading (probably due to manufacturing differences) average panel loss was 24.31% with respect to the un-irradiated panel test results. This evaluation will determine the maximum allowed panel thinning.

Peak Reactor Lattice kinf The first step in determining the Unit 2 SFP reactivity is to determine the peak fuel assembly lattice cold uncontrolled kinf in a reactor lattice geometry for each fuel type that could be potentially stored in the Unit 2 SFP. References 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 were reviewed to determine the peak fuel assembly lattice cold kinf and lattice enrichment for each fuel type in each reactor in each operating cycle. The results are provided below:

Fuel Type Reference Enrichment kinf Legacy GE (8X8) Fuel 6

3.90%*

1.2421 ATRIUM-9B Fuel 7, 9, 12 4.59%*

1.2398 ATRIUM-10 Fuel 8, 12, 13, 14 4.40%

1.2751 GE14 Fuel 10, 11 4.51%

1.2045

• Per Reference 2, higher lattice enrichments yield higher SFP in-rack keff. To be conservative, the maximum enrichment and maximum kinf were independently chosen, even if they were not the same lattice.

Boraflex Degradation Penalties This section of the evaluation will determine the maximum amount of panel thinning allowed for each fuel type while still maintaining SFP reactivity at or below the 0.95 limit. The bounding values of one (1) inch co-planar gap and 10% width reduction are used in all calculations.

EC 383637 3 of 36 The criticality analyses of record for each fuel type are: Reference 2 for Legacy GE 8X8 fuel; Reference 3 for Atrium-9B fuel; Reference 4 for Atrium-10 fuel; and, Reference 5 for GE14 fuel. Reference 28 is a special analysis performed to show that Cycle 1 GE 8x8 fuel remains sufficiently subcritical even with significant (>80%) Boraflex degradation. Each report included algorithms for determining SFP reactivity as a function of in reactor lattice kinf and initial enrichment. In addition, each report provided a method for determining in-rack reactivity penalties for three modes of Boraflex degradation: 1) Gap formation; 2) Width reduction; and 3) Thickness reduction (panel thinning). For panel thinning, the original licensing reports only considered thinning up to 40%. Recent (September 2009) BADGER testing indicated that the peak panel thinning was at 50.4%. As part of the re-introduction of Atrium-10 fuel, AREVA re-performed the Unit 2 SFP criticality using 50% panel thinning as the base case and established adders for Boraflex degradation between 0 and 80% thinning.

The graph below shows a comparison of the penalties from the three parametric studies on panel thinning. (Note: The reported results for degradation beyond 40% for the earlier reports were obtained by extrapolation.) For Atrium-10 fuel, the penalties from Reference 4 will be used. For GE 8X8, Atrium-9B and GE14 fuel, the more conservative of the Reference 4 and earlier analyses will be used.

[

]

EC 383637 4 of 36 GE14 Fuel at Maximum Allowed Panel Thinning [79.8%]

The base case Unit 2 SFP criticality analysis results (Reference 5, page number given below) for a GE14 fuel assembly with a peak reactor lattice kinf = 1.2045 and a lattice average enrichment of 4.51% are:

Base keff = kin-rack nom + biases + [stat. Roll-up]

Page 5-17 kin-rack nom = 0.7131

• kinf - 0.0475 = 0.7131

• 1.2045 - 0.0475 = 0.8114 Page 5-18 Base keff = 0.8114 + 0.0113 + 0.0104 = 0.8331 Page 5-18 kgap(1 inches) = 0.0012

• 1

• 1 + 0.0051

• 1 - 0.0004 = 0.0059 Page 5-17 kwidth(10% reduction) = 4.0E-06

• 10

• 10 + 0.0018

• 10 + 0.0017 = 0.0201 Page 5-17 kthickness(79.8% reduction) = 1.1E-05

• 79.8

• 79.8 + 2.6E-04

• 79.8 = 0.0908 Reference 4 Thickness Reduction Base keff kgap kthickness kwidth SFP Rack keff 79.8%

0.8331 0.0059 0.0908 0.0201 0.9499 ATRIUM-9B Fuel at Maximum Allowed Panel Thinning [68.1%]

The base case Unit 2 SFP criticality analysis results (Reference 3, page number given below) for an ATRIUM-9B fuel assembly with a peak reactor lattice kinf = 1.2398 and a lattice average enrichment of 4.59% are:

Base keff = 0.8650 (including applicable uncertainties)

Figure 6.1 Atrium-9B utilizes Reference 2 for Boraflex degradation penalties.

kthickness(68.1% reduction) = [ ]

Page 5 Thickness Reduction Base keff kgap kthickness kwidth SFP Rack keff 68.1%

0.8650

[ ]

[ ]

[ ]

0.9500

EC 383637 5 of 36 Legacy GE (8X8) Fuel at Maximum Allowed Panel Thinning [65.3%]

The base case Unit 2 SFP criticality analysis results (Reference 2, page number given below) for a legacy GE fuel assembly with a peak reactor lattice kinf = 1.2421 and a lattice average enrichment of 4.00% (conservative wrt the actual 3.90%) (including applicable uncertainties) are:

Base keff = [ ]

Page 7 kgap(1 inches) = [ ]

Page 5 kwidth(10% reduction) = [ ]

Page 5 kthickness(65.3% reduction) = [ ]

Page 5 Thickness Reduction Base keff kgap kthickness kwidth SFP Rack keff 65.3%

[ ]

[ ]

[ ]

[ ]

0.9499 ATRIUM-10 Fuel at Maximum Allowed Panel Thinning [57.5%]

The base case Unit 2 SFP criticality analysis results (Reference 4, page number given below) for an ATRIUM-10 fuel assembly with a peak reactor lattice kinf = 1.2751 and a lattice average enrichment of 4.40% are:

Base keff = 0.9386 (@ 50% Panel Thinning and including applicable uncertainties)

Page 6-10 kthickness(57.5% reduction) = 1.1E-05

• 57.5

• 57.5 + 2.6E-04

• 57.5 - 0.04 = 0.0113 Page B-2 Thickness Reduction Base keff @ 50%

Thickness kgap kthickness kwidth SFP Rack keff 57.5%

0.9386 Included 0.0113 Included 0.9499 Results Summary A special analysis was performed for Cycle 1 GE 8x8 fuel (Reference 28). From this analysis, it was shown that Cycle 1 fuel has a maximum in-rack keff of 0.7953 at 50% panel thinning. This value is less than GE14 at 0% thinning (0.8331), and there fore GE14 bounds all Cycle 1 fuel.

Fuel Type Maximum Allowable Thickness Reduction Resultant In-Rack keff Cycle 1 GE 8X8

>79.8%

0.8721*

GE14 (10X10) 79.8%

0.9499 ATRIUM-9B (9X9) 68.1%

0.9500 Legacy GE (8X8) 65.3%

0.9499 ATRIUM-10 (10X10) 57.5%

0.9499

• At 79.8% thickness reduction The most limiting fuel design is the ATRIUM-10.

EC 383637 6 of 36 Qualitative Discussion in the Conservatism of the Evaluation Results There is significant conservatism in these values due to:

This evaluation assumes that every fuel node in the SFP is at its maximum reactivity. Generally, fuel in the SFP is significantly depleted and in a lower reactive condition. The major exception to this condition is when once-burned fuel assemblies are temporarily discharged to the SFP during refueling outages. Even then, few (if any) nodes are actually at their peak reactivity.

These results are reported at the 95/95 confidence level and include anticipated events and accidents.

The 10% width reduction and one-inch co-axial gaps are double counted in the panel thinning.

RackLife Evaluation of Unit 2 SFP Cells Actual Boraflex degradation is modeled using the industry standard, EPRI developed RackLife computer code (Reference 19). RackLife was normalized against actual BADGER test results and SFP silica level. BADGER testing was conducted at LaSalle in September 2009 (Reference 24). The following table provides a comparison between the BADGER test results and the final adjusted RackLife results. Thirty (30) individual BADGER tests were conducted. Two (2) of the tests were conducted on un-irradiated panels. The results for the remaining 28 panels are presented below. (Note:

There is a conservative bias to the final normalized RackLife results when compared to the BADGER results.)

Panel Absorbed Dose September 2009 BADGER Measured Boron Carbide

% Loss September 2009 RackLife Predicted Boron Carbide %

Loss

< 1 x 1010 rad 10.5%

12.5%

> 1 x 1010 rad 24.2%

39.3%

Using the normalized RackLife code, Boraflex losses were projected to October 28, 2011. Peak panel loss is projected to be 100.0% and the average panel loss of all panels is projected to be 32.44%.

Therefore, some Boraflex panels will exceed the minimum requirement of 57.5% panel thinning. As a result, the ability to comply with the Technical Specification 4.3 requirement to maintain reactivity in the SFP to less than or equal to 0.95 will no longer be assured. LaSalle will proactively remove fuel assemblies stored in locations exceeding 57.5% degradation and install robust physical barriers and/or establish administrative controls to prevent inadvertent fuel assembly insertion.

EC 383637 7 of 36 Determination of Cells Exceeding the Acceptance Criteria During the interval over which the projection in this EC is used (May 1 to October 28, 2011), there are three different sets of acceptance criteria for Racklife predicted Boraflex degradation. The first is valid until July 1, 2011 and is the same criteria as used in previous projections. The second and third are based on NRC supplied License Conditions for NETCO rack inserts.

May 1, 2011 to July 1, 2011 Due to uncertainties in: 1) BADGER testing; and, 2) RackLife projections, additional margin must be established to assure that actual Boraflex panel degradation does not exceed the acceptance limit. As discussed above, panels showing no degradation in the BADGER testing were excluded in the RackLife normalization procedure. Additionally, a small conservative bias between the LaSalle BADGER test results and the RackLife simulation remains. This bias is ignored. BADGER testing accuracy is reported to be [ ] (1 ) (Reference 18). To bound this uncertainty, each RackLife calculated panel degradation is increased by 10% and is then compared with the acceptance criterion. Nine hundred twenty-five (925) locations do not meet the 57.5% degradation limit.

Even though RackLife results are conservative with respect to the peak cell and average cell BADGER results, individual cell results vary significantly from BADGER test results (Table 2). To provide further assurance that no SFP cell locations have sufficient Boraflex degradation that challenge the ability of the SFP to meet the Technical Specification limit of keff 0.95, an additional conservative acceptance criterion is established. The calculated average degradation (with allowance for uncertainty) in the Boraflex panels (typically four) surrounding the cell of interest must also meet the acceptance criterion. The uncertainty in the average of four values, each with a 10% uncertainty, is 20% [SQRT (102 + 102 + 102 + 102)]; therefore, the average RackLife calculated degradation of the four panels is increased by 20% and is then compared with the acceptance criterion. Six hundred three (603) locations do not meet the 57.5% degradation limit.

There are a total of 927 SFP locations that do not meet one (or both) of the acceptance criteria. Since these locations are bounded by the requirements set forth in the next section, these locations are not listed.

The above discussion considers all fuel types currently on-site residing in either pool.

EC 383637 8 of 36 July 1, 2011 to October 28, 2011 Amendment 186, dated 1/28/11 of the Unit 2 facility operating license (Reference 30) states:

(30) Beginning 120 days after the LSCS Unit 2 refueling outage 13 (L2R13) and until October 28, 2011, the storage cells in the rack modules without NETCO-SNAP-IN inserts will be placed into one of three categories: Unrestricted, Restricted and Unusable.

(a) Unrestricted will be cells whose minimum panel B10 areal density is greater than or equal to 0.0167 g/cm2, Unrestricted cells may contain fuel assemblies up to the maximum reactivity identified in TS 4.3.1.1.d.

(b) Restricted will be cells whose minimum panel B10 areal density is between 0.0167 g/cm2 and 0.0115 g/cm2. Restricted cells will only contain LSCS Units 1 and 2 Cycle 1 General Electric (GE) and GE14 fuel assemblies.

(c) Unusable will be cells whose minimum panel B10 areal density is less than or equal to 0.0115 g/cm2. Unusable cells will be administratively controlled to remain empty of any fuel assembly.

Based on a nominal Boron-10 areal density in Boraflex racks of 0.0238 g/cm2, the above areal densities may be represented as percent degradation. The table below summarizes the thresholds from item (30):

License Condition Criteria (July 1, 2011 to October 28, 2011)

Unrestricted Restricted Unusable Areal Density 0.0167 g/cm2 0.0167 - 0.0115 g/cm2 0.0115 g/cm2 Percent Degradation 29.83%

29.83 - 51.68%

51.68%

These thresholds are established for the minimum panel areal density in a given SFP cell, and thus no separate criteria exist for a cell average degradation.

Based on these criteria - there will be 1114 unique restricted cells, and 947 unusable (INOP) cells in the U2SFP on July 1, 2011 (assuming no new rack insert installation). These locations are listed in Table 3 and 4.

EC 383637 9 of 36 After October 28, 2011 Amendment 186, dated 1/28/11 of the Unit 2 facility operating license (Reference 30) states:

(31) After October 28, 2011, for the storage cells in the rack modules without NETCO-SNAP-IN inserts in the LSCS Unit 2 SFP, the following categories will apply: Unrestricted, Restricted, and Unusable.

(a) Unrestricted will be cells whose minimum panel B10 areal density is greater than or equal to 0.0200 g/cm2, Unrestricted cells may contain fuel assemblies up to the maximum reactivity identified in TS 4.3.1.1.d.

(b) Restricted will be cells whose minimum panel B10 areal density is between 0.0200 g/cm2 and 0.0167 g/cm2. Restricted cells will only contain LSCS Units 1 and 2 Cycle 1 GE and GE14 fuel assemblies.

(c) Unusable will be cells whose minimum panel B10 areal density is less than or equal to 0.0167 g/cm2. Unusable cells will be administratively controlled to remain empty of any fuel assembly.

Based on nominal Boron-10 areal density in Boraflex racks of 0.0238 g/cm2, the above areal densities may be represented as percent degradation. The table below summarizes the thresholds from item (31):

License Condition Criteria (after October 28, 2011)

Unrestricted Restricted Unusable Areal Density 0.0200 g/cm2 0.0200 - 0.0167 g/cm2 0.0167 g/cm2 Percent Degradation 15.97%

15.97 - 29.83%

29.83%

These thresholds are established for the minimum panel areal density in a given SFP cell, and thus no separate criteria exist for a cell average degradation.

Based on these criteria - there will be 804 unique restricted cells, and 2061 unusable (INOP) cells in the U2SFP on October 28, 2011 (assuming no new rack insert installation). These locations are listed in Table 5 and 6.

EC 383637 10 of 36 CONCLUSIONS /

SUMMARY

The following table summarizes the results of the Racklife projection for the three sets of operability criteria from May 1, 2011 to October 28, 2011:

Restricted Cells Unusable (INOP) cells Date criteria in effect Threshold

1. Cells Threshold

1. Cells May 1, 2011 N/A N/A 52.27% (panel) 47.91% (average)

Total 925 603 927 July 1, 2011 (Table 3 and 4) 29.83-51.68%

1114 51.68%

947 October 28, 2011 (Table 5 and 6) 15.97-29.83%

804 29.83%

2061 For the license condition criteria (reference 30), fuel types that may reside in "Restricted" cells are GE14 and low enriched GE 8x8 (Cycle 1 fuel). No fuel may reside in "Unusuable" (INOP) locations. The SFP must be configured to comply with each criteria listed above by the dates listed above.

As rack modules are recovered using NETCO rack inserts, the affected cells will no longer be covered under any criteria outlined above - recovered cells will be completely operable. The above projections assume that no rack modules are recovered during the projection time period (5/1/11 to 10/28/11). This EC covers the degradation projection to October 28, 2011, and thus is not required to be revised as rack modules are recovered and declared operable during this interval. ECs based on subsequent projections, however, will have any rack modules recovered during the previous interval removed from the population of affected cells. This EC does, however, account for the 3 rack modules recovered prior to L2R13.

The results of previous Racklife projections may be found in the References section of this EC.

Prepared by: Karl H. Hachmuth 3/22/11 Reviewed by: Rosanne L. Carmean 3/25/11 Independent Review by: Philip W. Hansett 4/11/11 Approved by: Philip W. Hansett 4/15/11

EC 383637 11 of 36 REFERENCES

1.

Technical Specification 4.3.1.1.a.

2.

Holtec Report HI-931060, Criticality Safety Evaluation of the Spent Fuel Storage Racks with Postulated Degradation of Boraflex LaSalle County Station, dated February 1994.

3.

Framatome ANP Report EMF-95-088(P), Criticality Safety Analysis for ATRIUM-9B Fuel LaSalle Unit 2 Spent Fuel Storage Pool (Boraflex Rack), dated February 1996.

4.

AREVA NP Report ANP-2578(P), Revision 0, Criticality Safety Analysis for ATRIUM-10 Fuel LaSalle Unit 2 Spent Fuel Storage Pool (50% Degraded Boraflex Rack), dated November 2006.

5.

Global Nuclear Fuel Report 0000-0028-6844-SFP, Revision 0, GE14 - Boraflex Spent Fuel Storage Rack Criticality Analysis for LaSalle Unit 2, dated September 2004.

6.

Nuclear Fuels (NF) Report BNDL: 97-007, Determine Lattice with Highest Cold Uncontrolled k-infinite for all Cycles at LaSalle, dated March 27, 1997.

7.

NF Report NFM0000113, LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 New Fuel Storage, dated August 24, 2000.

8.

NF Report NFM0200117, LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 10 ATRIUM 10 Reload Fuel Shipping and Fuel Storage Criticality Compliance, dated December 20, 2002.

9.

NF Report NF0400009, LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 11 POWERPLEX III Deck and BOC Restart File For Core Monitoring - Revision 1, dated August 30, 2004.

10.

NF Report NF300078, Revision 1, LaSalle 1 Cycle 11 GE14 Reload Fuel Shipping and Fuel Storage Criticality Compliance, dated October 8, 2004.

11.

NF Report NF0400202, LaSalle 2 Cycle 11 GE14 Reload Fuel Shipping and Fuel Storage Criticality Compliance, dated October 8, 2004.

12.

NF TODI NF0400274, LaSalle 1 Cycle 11 Assembly Type Descriptions, dated January 5, 2005.

13.

NF TODI NF0500166, LaSalle 1 Cycle 12 ATRIUM 10 Reload Fuel Shipping and Fuel Storage Criticality Compliance, dated October 24, 2005.

14.

AREVA letter FAB06-2185, Transmittal of Fuel Storage Criticality safety Evaluation for LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 12 (LSA2-12) ATRIUM-10 Fuel, dated November 17, 2006.

15.

EC0000357424, Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Analyses Impact from Boraflex Degradation, dated October 19, 2005.

16.

NETCO Report NET-269-01, BADGER Test Campaign at LaSalle County Station Unit 2, dated July 19, 2006.

17.

IR 510999, U2 SFP Boraflex BADGER Test Results, dated July 19, 2006.

18.

EPRI Report TR-107335, BADGER, a Probe for Nondestructive Testing of Residual Boron-10 Absorber Density in Spent-Fuel Storage Racks: Development and Demonstration, dated October 1997.

19.

EPRI Report TR-107333, The Boraflex Rack Life Extension Computer Code - RACKLIFE:

Theory and Numerics, dated September 1997.

EC 383637 12 of 36

20.

EC0000370481, U2 SFP Boraflex Degradation Operability Criteria Through 12/31/2008, dated April, 24, 2008.

21.

AREVA letter FAB08-2507, Transmittal of Fuel Storage Criticality Safety Evaluation for LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 13 (LSA2-13) ATRIUM-10 and ATRIUM 10XM LTA Fuel, dated July 30, 2008.

22.

AREVA letter FAB08-2507, Transmittal of Fuel Storage Criticality Safety Evaluation of Reload LSA2-13 in the LaSalle Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool with Degraded Boraflex, dated September 19, 2008.

23.

EC0000372834, U2 SFP Boraflex Degradation Operability Criteria Through 7/1/2009, dated April, 24, 2008.

24.

NETCO Report NET-331-01, BADGER Test Campaign at LaSalle County Station Unit 2, Rev 1 dated September 2009.

25.

AREVA document 51-9123357-000, Fuel Storage Criticality Evaluation of LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 13 (LSA1-13) and Cycle 14 (LSA1-14) for Storage at LaSalle Station, dated October 1, 2009.

26.

EC0000378971, U2 SFP Boraflex Degradation Operability Criteria Through 7/1/2010, dated February 2010.

27.

EC0000379418, "U2 SFP Boraflex Degradation Operability Criteria Through 12/31/2010," dated May 2010.

28.

AREVA document AWW:10:048 / FAB10-2429, "LaSalle Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool - CASMO-4 k Comparison with 50% Boraflex Degradation." Dated November 8, 2010.

29.

EC0000382118, "U2 SFP Boraflex Degradation Operability Criteria Through 5/1/2011," dated November 2010.

30.

Amendment 186 to License No. NPF-18, dated January 28, 2011.

EC 383637 13 of 36 Table 1 DELETED

EC 383637 Table 2 Individual Cell Results versus Racklife Calculations G74 North I

10E+00 2

DD37 West E37 East FF37 South EE37 ^,'4r"est DD33 South DD37 East FF35South CC34ltlo t EE34 South DD35 North DD35 South FF34 South DD37 South DD33 East FF33 South FF36 South 1.3E+10 1.4E+10 1.4E+10 1.4E+10 1.4E+10 1.4E+10 1.4E+10 1.5E+10 1.5E+10 1.6E+10 RACKLIFE Predicted B4C Loss 37.4 38.1 38.8 38.8 42.4 42.1 43.6 Measured Areal Density (gicm"2) 2.8 Panel G74 South DD37 North CC34 South CC34 West DD35 East EE34 East EEE36 South CC34 East DD35 West EE36 West DD33 West EE34 West Absorbed Dose (Bads) 0.0E+00 1.2E+10 1.2E+10 1.2E+10 1.2E+10 1.2E+10 DD33 North 0.01 0.0166 0.0126 0.018 0.0141 0.0153 0.0206 0.0119 Total Inches of Dissolution 4

-3.44

-27.9%

0.0207 0.0220 1.015'1 0.0186

-12.9%

0.0162 0.0091 0.0152 0.0149

.0165

-57.6°x6

-24.1%

-29.0'

-30.2%

-22.6%

0-00971 0.012'9

.0154+

14 of 36

EC 383637 15 of 36 Table 3 List of Restricted Cells for Criteria in Effect on July 1, 2011 1

A-10 2

B-6 3

B-10 4

C-6 5

D-9 6

D-25 7

D-26 8

D-27 9

D-28 10 E-10 11 E-26 12 E-27 13 E-28 14 E-29 15 F-7 16 F-10 17 F-12 18 F-21 19 F-24 20 F-27 21 F-28 22 F-29 23 F-32 24 F-33 25 F-34 26 F-43 27 F-46 28 F-48 29 F-49 30 F-51 31 F-52 32 F-53 33 F-64 34 F-65 35 F-67 36 G-6 37 G-7 38 G-11 39 G-13 40 G-20 41 G-21 42 G-22 43 G-23 44 G-24 45 G-25 46 G-26 47 G-27 48 G-31 49 G-32 50 G-33 51 G-34 52 G-35 53 G-36 54 G-42 55 G-43 56 G-44 57 G-45 58 G-46 59 G-47 60 G-48 61 G-49 62 G-52 63 G-64 64 G-65 65 G-66 66 G-67 67 H-6 68 H-7 69 H-11 70 H-13 71 H-20 72 H-21 73 H-22 74 H-23 75 H-24 76 H-25 77 H-27 78 H-30 79 H-36 80 H-37 81 H-39 82 H-40 83 H-43 84 H-44 85 H-45 86 H-46 87 H-47 88 H-48 89 H-49 90 H-50 91 H-51 92 H-52 93 H-53 94 H-60 95 H-63 96 H-64 97 H-65 98 J-5 99 J-6 100 J-7 101 J-11 102 J-20 103 J-25 104 J-29 105 J-30 106 J-31 107 J-35 108 J-36 109 J-40 110 J-41 111 J-42 112 J-45 113 J-46 114 J-47 115 J-48 116 J-49 117 J-52 118 J-59 119 J-60 120 J-63 121 J-64 122 J-66 123 J-67 124 K-3 125 K-6 126 K-7 127 K-10 128 K-11 129 K-13 130 K-14 131 K-17 132 K-18 133 K-19 134 K-20 135 K-21 136 K-23 137 K-29 138 K-30 139 K-35 140 K-36 141 K-39 142 K-40 143 K-45 144 K-46 145 K-47 146 K-48 147 K-60 148 K-64 149 L-3 150 L-5 151 L-6 152 L-7 153 L-9 154 L-10 155 L-14 156 L-17 157 L-18 158 L-19 159 L-20 160 L-21 161 L-22 162 L-23 163 L-24 164 L-25 165 L-30 166 L-33 167 L-35 168 L-36 169 L-38 170 L-39 171 L-41 172 L-42 173 L-44 174 L-45 175 L-46 176 L-47 177 L-48 178 L-49 179 L-54 180 L-55 181 L-56 182 L-57 183 L-58 184 L-59 185 L-60 186 L-61 187 L-62 188 L-63 189 L-64 190 L-65 191 L-67 192 M-3 193 M-5 194 M-6 195 M-7 196 M-11 197 M-13 198 M-18 199 M-19 200 M-23 201 M-30 202 M-32 203 M-37 204 M-38 205 M-40 206 M-42 207 M-43 208 M-44 209 M-45 210 M-46 211 M-47 212 M-48 213 M-49 214 M-54 215 M-55 216 M-56 217 M-60 218 M-61 219 M-62 220 M-63 221 M-64 222 M-65 223 M-66 224 M-67 225 M-68

EC 383637 16 of 36 226 N-2 227 N-3 228 N-6 229 N-9 230 N-10 231 N-27 232 N-29 233 N-42 234 N-43 235 N-44 236 N-45 237 N-46 238 N-47 239 N-48 240 N-49 241 N-55 242 N-56 243 N-57 244 N-58 245 N-59 246 N-60 247 N-61 248 N-63 249 N-64 250 N-65 251 N-66 252 N-67 253 P-2 254 P-3 255 P-6 256 P-11 257 P-13 258 P-26 259 P-27 260 P-28 261 P-29 262 P-31 263 P-32 264 P-40 265 P-41 266 P-42 267 P-43 268 P-45 269 P-46 270 P-47 271 P-48 272 P-49 273 P-50 274 P-54 275 P-55 276 P-56 277 P-58 278 P-59 279 P-60 280 P-61 281 P-64 282 P-65 283 P-66 284 P-67 285 R-2 286 R-3 287 R-6 288 R-7 289 R-10 290 R-11 291 R-13 292 R-22 293 R-23 294 R-24 295 R-25 296 R-26 297 R-27 298 R-28 299 R-30 300 R-31 301 R-33 302 R-34 303 R-35 304 R-36 305 R-37 306 R-40 307 R-41 308 R-42 309 R-46 310 R-47 311 R-48 312 R-49 313 R-54 314 R-55 315 R-56 316 R-59 317 R-60 318 R-65 319 R-66 320 R-67 321 S-2 322 S-3 323 S-7 324 S-13 325 S-16 326 S-17 327 S-18 328 S-19 329 S-20 330 S-21 331 S-22 332 S-24 333 S-25 334 S-26 335 S-27 336 S-28 337 S-29 338 S-30 339 S-34 340 S-35 341 S-36 342 S-37 343 S-39 344 S-40 345 S-41 346 S-43 347 S-44 348 S-55 349 T-3 350 T-9 351 T-13 352 T-21 353 T-27 354 T-28 355 T-30 356 T-36 357 T-38 358 T-39 359 T-44 360 T-45 361 T-46 362 T-47 363 T-48 364 T-49 365 T-54 366 T-55 367 T-56 368 T-57 369 T-58 370 T-59 371 T-60 372 T-61 373 T-65 374 T-66 375 T-67 376 U-7 377 U-9 378 U-13 379 U-17 380 U-18 381 U-26 382 U-29 383 U-30 384 U-61 385 U-63 386 V-7 387 V-13 388 V-16 389 V-27 390 V-28 391 V-29 392 V-30 393 V-69 394 W-6 395 W-7 396 W-8 397 W-14 398 W-16 399 W-19 400 W-20 401 W-24 402 W-26 403 W-27 404 W-28 405 W-30 406 W-69 407 X-5 408 X-6 409 X-7 410 X-8 411 X-13 412 X-17 413 X-18 414 X-19 415 X-20 416 X-23 417 X-24 418 X-28 419 X-63 420 X-68 421 X-69 422 Y-4 423 Y-6 424 Y-8 425 Y-17 426 Y-18 427 Y-20 428 Y-24 429 Y-28 430 Y-30 431 Y-69 432 Z-3 433 Z-4 434 Z-7 435 Z-8 436 Z-13 437 Z-17 438 Z-19 439 Z-22 440 Z-25 441 Z-69 442 AA-1 443 AA-3 444 AA-6 445 AA-8 446 AA-11 447 AA-13 448 AA-17 449 AA-22 450 AA-24 451 AA-25 452 AA-63 453 AA-68 454 AA-69 455 AA-70 456 BB-1 457 BB-3 458 BB-9 459 BB-11 460 BB-13 461 BB-16 462 BB-22 463 CC-2 464 CC-7 465 CC-9 466 CC-11 467 CC-13 468 CC-21 469 CC-23 470 CC-62

EC 383637 17 of 36 471 CC-65 472 CC-69 473 CC-70 474 DD-9 475 DD-11 476 DD-13 477 DD-21 478 DD-23 479 DD-26 480 DD-62 481 DD-69 482 EE-2 483 EE-5 484 EE-9 485 EE-11 486 EE-13 487 EE-17 488 EE-19 489 EE-21 490 EE-23 491 EE-62 492 EE-63 493 EE-69 494 FF-5 495 FF-8 496 FF-9 497 FF-11 498 FF-12 499 FF-16 500 FF-19 501 FF-21 502 FF-23 503 FF-26 504 FF-62 505 FF-63 506 FF-69 507 GG-1 508 GG-13 509 GG-16 510 GG-19 511 GG-21 512 GG-23 513 GG-25 514 HH-1 515 HH-3 516 HH-5 517 HH-12 518 HH-13 519 HH-39 520 HH-40 521 HH-41 522 HH-43 523 HH-48 524 HH-49 525 HH-50 526 HH-51 527 HH-53 528 HH-54 529 HH-59 530 HH-60 531 HH-61 532 HH-62 533 JJ-1 534 JJ-5 535 JJ-7 536 JJ-12 537 JJ-38 538 JJ-39 539 JJ-40 540 JJ-41 541 JJ-42 542 JJ-44 543 JJ-45 544 JJ-46 545 JJ-48 546 JJ-49 547 JJ-53 548 JJ-58 549 JJ-63 550 JJ-67 551 JJ-68 552 JJ-69 553 KK-7 554 KK-9 555 KK-10 556 KK-12 557 KK-34 558 KK-38 559 KK-39 560 KK-41 561 KK-43 562 KK-44 563 KK-45 564 KK-46 565 KK-47 566 KK-49 567 KK-51 568 KK-54 569 KK-55 570 KK-61 571 KK-62 572 KK-67 573 KK-69 574 LL-10 575 LL-12 576 LL-35 577 LL-38 578 LL-39 579 LL-40 580 LL-41 581 LL-42 582 LL-43 583 LL-44 584 LL-45 585 LL-47 586 LL-48 587 LL-49 588 LL-50 589 LL-51 590 LL-55 591 LL-60 592 LL-61 593 LL-62 594 LL-63 595 LL-64 596 LL-65 597 LL-66 598 LL-67 599 LL-68 600 MM-3 601 MM-9 602 MM-10 603 MM-11 604 MM-12 605 MM-15 606 MM-34 607 MM-35 608 MM-37 609 MM-39 610 MM-40 611 MM-41 612 MM-42 613 MM-43 614 MM-46 615 MM-47 616 MM-48 617 MM-53 618 MM-54 619 MM-59 620 MM-64 621 MM-66 622 MM-69 623 NN-7 624 NN-15 625 NN-36 626 NN-37 627 NN-40 628 NN-44 629 NN-47 630 NN-48 631 NN-49 632 NN-52 633 NN-53 634 NN-57 635 NN-59 636 NN-60 637 NN-62 638 NN-67 639 NN-68 640 NN-69 641 PP-7 642 PP-9 643 PP-35 644 PP-36 645 PP-37 646 PP-45 647 PP-46 648 PP-51 649 PP-56 650 PP-58 651 PP-60 652 PP-67 653 PP-69 654 RR-7 655 RR-10 656 RR-43 657 RR-44 658 RR-45 659 RR-46 660 RR-47 661 RR-55 662 RR-56 663 RR-60 664 RR-61 665 RR-62 666 RR-65 667 RR-67 668 RR-69 669 SS-1 670 SS-4 671 SS-7 672 SS-8 673 SS-11 674 SS-33 675 SS-34 676 SS-35 677 SS-40 678 SS-41 679 SS-43 680 SS-46 681 SS-48 682 SS-49 683 SS-56 684 SS-57 685 SS-59 686 SS-60 687 SS-68 688 SS-70 689 TT-1 690 TT-7 691 TT-8 692 TT-11 693 TT-14 694 TT-15 695 TT-33 696 TT-35 697 TT-36 698 TT-52 699 TT-54 700 TT-56 701 TT-57 702 TT-58 703 TT-59 704 TT-60 705 TT-62 706 TT-63 707 TT-66 708 TT-70 709 UU-1 710 UU-7 711 UU-8 712 UU-13 713 UU-15 714 UU-38 715 UU-40

EC 383637 18 of 36 716 UU-48 717 UU-49 718 UU-54 719 UU-62 720 UU-63 721 UU-64 722 UU-66 723 UU-67 724 VV-1 725 VV-5 726 VV-7 727 VV-8 728 VV-13 729 VV-35 730 VV-36 731 VV-40 732 VV-41 733 VV-50 734 VV-51 735 VV-52 736 VV-53 737 VV-54 738 VV-56 739 VV-60 740 VV-64 741 VV-69 742 WW-2 743 WW-5 744 WW-7 745 WW-8 746 WW-13 747 WW-33 748 WW-34 749 WW-35 750 WW-36 751 WW-37 752 WW-38 753 WW-39 754 WW-52 755 WW-53 756 WW-54 757 WW-57 758 WW-62 759 WW-63 760 WW-64 761 WW-65 762 WW-67 763 XX-1 764 XX-7 765 XX-9 766 XX-12 767 XX-21 768 XX-23 769 XX-24 770 XX-25 771 XX-30 772 XX-31 773 XX-32 774 XX-36 775 XX-37 776 XX-38 777 XX-41 778 XX-42 779 XX-43 780 XX-46 781 XX-51 782 XX-54 783 XX-57 784 XX-62 785 XX-63 786 XX-64 787 YY-5 788 YY-7 789 YY-10 790 YY-12 791 YY-16 792 YY-23 793 YY-24 794 YY-25 795 YY-29 796 YY-30 797 YY-31 798 YY-32 799 YY-33 800 YY-34 801 YY-35 802 YY-36 803 YY-40 804 YY-41 805 YY-46 806 YY-47 807 YY-48 808 YY-57 809 YY-58 810 YY-59 811 YY-64 812 YY-67 813 YY-68 814 YY-69 815 ZZ-4 816 ZZ-7 817 ZZ-10 818 ZZ-16 819 ZZ-23 820 ZZ-25 821 ZZ-27 822 ZZ-28 823 ZZ-29 824 ZZ-30 825 ZZ-31 826 ZZ-32 827 ZZ-34 828 ZZ-35 829 ZZ-36 830 ZZ-38 831 ZZ-46 832 ZZ-47 833 ZZ-52 834 ZZ-59 835 ZZ-63 836 ZZ-67 837 AAA-5 838 AAA-7 839 AAA-10 840 AAA-12 841 AAA-25 842 AAA-27 843 AAA-28 844 AAA-29 845 AAA-31 846 AAA-34 847 AAA-35 848 AAA-40 849 AAA-47 850 AAA-52 851 AAA-58 852 AAA-66 853 AAA-70 854 BBB-7 855 BBB-9 856 BBB-10 857 BBB-12 858 BBB-19 859 BBB-25 860 BBB-28 861 BBB-29 862 BBB-31 863 BBB-32 864 BBB-33 865 BBB-34 866 BBB-35 867 BBB-36 868 BBB-37 869 BBB-38 870 BBB-39 871 BBB-40 872 BBB-45 873 BBB-46 874 BBB-47 875 BBB-48 876 BBB-57 877 BBB-58 878 BBB-59 879 BBB-61 880 BBB-64 881 BBB-66 882 BBB-67 883 BBB-70 884 CCC-4 885 CCC-7 886 CCC-8 887 CCC-10 888 CCC-12 889 CCC-15 890 CCC-18 891 CCC-24 892 CCC-26 893 CCC-27 894 CCC-29 895 CCC-38 896 CCC-39 897 CCC-40 898 CCC-41 899 CCC-46 900 CCC-47 901 CCC-48 902 CCC-49 903 CCC-50 904 CCC-53 905 CCC-54 906 CCC-55 907 CCC-60 908 CCC-62 909 CCC-63 910 CCC-68 911 DDD-4 912 DDD-7 913 DDD-8 914 DDD-12 915 DDD-15 916 DDD-17 917 DDD-19 918 DDD-24 919 DDD-25 920 DDD-30 921 DDD-34 922 DDD-35 923 DDD-36 924 DDD-39 925 DDD-40 926 DDD-56 927 DDD-60 928 DDD-61 929 DDD-64 930 DDD-65 931 DDD-68 932 EEE-1 933 EEE-4 934 EEE-7 935 EEE-8 936 EEE-12 937 EEE-15 938 EEE-17 939 EEE-18 940 EEE-19 941 EEE-24 942 EEE-28 943 EEE-31 944 EEE-32 945 EEE-33 946 EEE-36 947 EEE-40 948 EEE-41 949 FFF-1 950 FFF-4 951 FFF-7 952 FFF-8 953 FFF-15 954 FFF-17 955 FFF-18 956 FFF-19 957 FFF-20 958 FFF-29 959 FFF-30 960 FFF-32

EC 383637 19 of 36 961 FFF-35 962 FFF-36 963 FFF-37 964 FFF-38 965 FFF-39 966 FFF-50 967 FFF-51 968 FFF-52 969 FFF-53 970 FFF-56 971 FFF-59 972 FFF-63 973 FFF-66 974 FFF-67 975 FFF-68 976 FFF-69 977 GGG-1 978 GGG-4 979 GGG-7 980 GGG-11 981 GGG-15 982 GGG-17 983 GGG-18 984 GGG-19 985 GGG-26 986 GGG-32 987 GGG-34 988 GGG-37 989 GGG-38 990 GGG-39 991 GGG-52 992 GGG-53 993 GGG-54 994 GGG-58 995 GGG-59 996 GGG-62 997 GGG-63 998 GGG-64 999 GGG-65 1000 GGG-66 1001 GGG-68 1002 HHH-4 1003 HHH-7 1004 HHH-8 1005 HHH-11 1006 HHH-15 1007 HHH-16 1008 HHH-18 1009 HHH-19 1010 HHH-20 1011 HHH-27 1012 HHH-28 1013 HHH-29 1014 HHH-32 1015 HHH-34 1016 HHH-38 1017 HHH-39 1018 HHH-40 1019 HHH-48 1020 HHH-49 1021 HHH-50 1022 HHH-52 1023 HHH-55 1024 HHH-57 1025 HHH-60 1026 HHH-61 1027 HHH-62 1028 HHH-63 1029 HHH-64 1030 HHH-67 1031 HHH-68 1032 HHH-70 1033 JJJ-1 1034 JJJ-4 1035 JJJ-8 1036 JJJ-10 1037 JJJ-15 1038 JJJ-16 1039 JJJ-19 1040 JJJ-20 1041 JJJ-23 1042 JJJ-27 1043 JJJ-28 1044 JJJ-33 1045 JJJ-34 1046 JJJ-35 1047 JJJ-36 1048 JJJ-37 1049 JJJ-39 1050 JJJ-49 1051 JJJ-52 1052 JJJ-53 1053 JJJ-55 1054 JJJ-57 1055 JJJ-61 1056 JJJ-62 1057 JJJ-63 1058 JJJ-66 1059 KKK-1 1060 KKK-7 1061 KKK-8 1062 KKK-10 1063 KKK-11 1064 KKK-15 1065 KKK-16 1066 KKK-18 1067 KKK-19 1068 KKK-21 1069 KKK-23 1070 KKK-24 1071 KKK-54 1072 KKK-55 1073 KKK-56 1074 KKK-61 1075 KKK-65 1076 KKK-66 1077 KKK-68 1078 LLL-1 1079 LLL-4 1080 LLL-12 1081 LLL-17 1082 LLL-19 1083 LLL-21 1084 LLL-55 1085 LLL-57 1086 MMM-5 1087 MMM-7 1088 MMM-8 1089 MMM-12 1090 MMM-19 1091 NNN-5 1092 NNN-8 1093 NNN-10 1094 NNN-12 1095 PPP-1 1096 PPP-2 1097 PPP-3 1098 PPP-4 1099 PPP-6 1100 PPP-8 1101 PPP-10 1102 PPP-11 1103 RRR-2 1104 RRR-4 1105 RRR-6 1106 RRR-8 1107 RRR-10 1108 SSS-3 1109 SSS-4 1110 SSS-5 1111 SSS-8 1112 SSS-10 1113 TTT-4 1114 TTT-8

EC 383637 20 of 36 Table 4 List of Unusable Cells for Criteria in Effect on July 1, 2011 1

E-9 2

F-9 3

G-9 4

G-10 5

G-12 6

H-9 7

H-10 8

H-12 9

H-31 10 H-32 11 H-33 12 H-34 13 H-35 14 H-38 15 J-9 16 J-10 17 J-12 18 J-32 19 J-33 20 J-34 21 J-37 22 J-38 23 J-39 24 J-43 25 J-44 26 K-9 27 K-12 28 K-31 29 K-32 30 K-33 31 K-34 32 K-38 33 K-41 34 K-42 35 K-43 36 K-44 37 L-12 38 L-31 39 L-32 40 L-43 41 M-9 42 M-10 43 M-12 44 M-31 45 M-33 46 M-34 47 M-35 48 M-36 49 M-39 50 M-41 51 M-57 52 M-58 53 M-59 54 N-12 55 N-31 56 N-32 57 N-33 58 N-34 59 N-35 60 N-36 61 N-37 62 N-38 63 N-39 64 N-40 65 N-41 66 P-12 67 P-33 68 P-34 69 P-35 70 P-36 71 P-37 72 P-38 73 P-39 74 R-12 75 R-38 76 R-39 77 S-10 78 S-11 79 S-12 80 S-38 81 S-42 82 T-10 83 T-11 84 T-12 85 T-40 86 T-41 87 T-42 88 T-43 89 U-10 90 U-11 91 U-12 92 U-27 93 U-28 94 U-62 95 U-64 96 U-65 97 U-66 98 U-67 99 U-68 100 V-9 101 V-10 102 V-11 103 V-12 104 V-17 105 V-18 106 V-61 107 V-62 108 V-63 109 V-64 110 V-65 111 V-66 112 V-67 113 V-68 114 W-9 115 W-10 116 W-11 117 W-12 118 W-13 119 W-17 120 W-18 121 W-61 122 W-62 123 W-63 124 W-64 125 W-65 126 W-66 127 W-67 128 W-68 129 X-9 130 X-10 131 X-11 132 X-12 133 X-26 134 X-27 135 X-61 136 X-62 137 X-64 138 X-65 139 X-66 140 X-67 141 Y-9 142 Y-10 143 Y-11 144 Y-12 145 Y-13 146 Y-26 147 Y-27 148 Y-61 149 Y-62 150 Y-63 151 Y-64 152 Y-65 153 Y-66 154 Y-67 155 Y-68 156 Z-2 157 Z-9 158 Z-10 159 Z-11 160 Z-12 161 Z-18 162 Z-20 163 Z-21 164 Z-23 165 Z-26 166 Z-27 167 Z-28 168 Z-29 169 Z-30 170 Z-61 171 Z-62 172 Z-63 173 Z-64 174 Z-65 175 Z-66 176 Z-67 177 Z-68 178 AA-2 179 AA-4 180 AA-5 181 AA-7 182 AA-9 183 AA-10 184 AA-12 185 AA-18 186 AA-19 187 AA-20 188 AA-21 189 AA-23 190 AA-26 191 AA-27 192 AA-28 193 AA-29 194 AA-30 195 AA-61 196 AA-62 197 AA-64 198 AA-65 199 AA-66 200 AA-67 201 BB-2 202 BB-4 203 BB-5 204 BB-6 205 BB-7 206 BB-10 207 BB-12 208 BB-17 209 BB-18 210 BB-19 211 BB-20 212 BB-21 213 BB-23 214 BB-26 215 BB-27 216 BB-28 217 BB-29 218 BB-30 219 BB-61 220 BB-62 221 BB-63 222 BB-64 223 BB-65 224 BB-66 225 BB-67

EC 383637 21 of 36 226 CC-3 227 CC-4 228 CC-5 229 CC-6 230 CC-10 231 CC-12 232 CC-16 233 CC-17 234 CC-18 235 CC-19 236 CC-20 237 CC-22 238 CC-26 239 CC-27 240 CC-28 241 CC-29 242 CC-30 243 CC-61 244 CC-63 245 CC-64 246 CC-66 247 CC-67 248 CC-68 249 DD-2 250 DD-3 251 DD-4 252 DD-5 253 DD-6 254 DD-7 255 DD-10 256 DD-12 257 DD-17 258 DD-18 259 DD-19 260 DD-20 261 DD-22 262 DD-27 263 DD-28 264 DD-29 265 DD-30 266 DD-61 267 DD-63 268 DD-64 269 DD-65 270 DD-66 271 DD-67 272 EE-3 273 EE-4 274 EE-6 275 EE-7 276 EE-10 277 EE-12 278 EE-18 279 EE-20 280 EE-22 281 EE-26 282 EE-27 283 EE-28 284 EE-29 285 EE-30 286 EE-61 287 EE-64 288 EE-65 289 EE-66 290 EE-67 291 EE-68 292 FF-2 293 FF-3 294 FF-4 295 FF-6 296 FF-7 297 FF-10 298 FF-17 299 FF-18 300 FF-20 301 FF-22 302 FF-27 303 FF-28 304 FF-29 305 FF-30 306 FF-61 307 FF-64 308 FF-65 309 FF-66 310 FF-67 311 GG-2 312 GG-3 313 GG-4 314 GG-5 315 GG-6 316 GG-7 317 GG-9 318 GG-10 319 GG-11 320 GG-17 321 GG-18 322 GG-22 323 GG-26 324 GG-27 325 GG-28 326 GG-29 327 GG-30 328 GG-61 329 GG-62 330 GG-63 331 GG-64 332 GG-65 333 GG-66 334 GG-67 335 GG-68 336 GG-69 337 HH-2 338 HH-4 339 HH-6 340 HH-9 341 HH-10 342 HH-11 343 HH-31 344 HH-32 345 HH-33 346 HH-34 347 HH-35 348 HH-36 349 HH-37 350 HH-38 351 HH-42 352 HH-44 353 HH-45 354 HH-47 355 HH-55 356 HH-56 357 HH-57 358 HH-58 359 HH-63 360 HH-64 361 HH-65 362 HH-66 363 HH-67 364 HH-69 365 JJ-2 366 JJ-3 367 JJ-4 368 JJ-6 369 JJ-9 370 JJ-10 371 JJ-11 372 JJ-31 373 JJ-32 374 JJ-33 375 JJ-34 376 JJ-35 377 JJ-36 378 JJ-37 379 JJ-47 380 JJ-54 381 JJ-55 382 JJ-56 383 JJ-57 384 JJ-59 385 JJ-60 386 JJ-61 387 JJ-62 388 JJ-64 389 JJ-65 390 JJ-66 391 KK-1 392 KK-2 393 KK-3 394 KK-4 395 KK-5 396 KK-6 397 KK-11 398 KK-31 399 KK-32 400 KK-33 401 KK-35 402 KK-36 403 KK-37 404 KK-56 405 KK-57 406 KK-58 407 KK-59 408 KK-60 409 KK-63 410 KK-64 411 KK-65 412 KK-66 413 LL-1 414 LL-2 415 LL-3 416 LL-4 417 LL-5 418 LL-6 419 LL-7 420 LL-11 421 LL-31 422 LL-32 423 LL-33 424 LL-34 425 LL-36 426 LL-37 427 LL-57 428 LL-58 429 LL-59 430 MM-1 431 MM-2 432 MM-4 433 MM-5 434 MM-6 435 MM-31 436 MM-32 437 MM-33 438 MM-55 439 MM-61 440 MM-62 441 MM-63 442 MM-67 443 MM-68 444 NN-1 445 NN-2 446 NN-3 447 NN-4 448 NN-5 449 NN-6 450 NN-31 451 NN-32 452 NN-33 453 NN-38 454 NN-39 455 NN-41 456 NN-42 457 NN-43 458 NN-55 459 NN-61 460 NN-63 461 PP-1 462 PP-2 463 PP-3 464 PP-4 465 PP-5 466 PP-6 467 PP-31 468 PP-32 469 PP-33 470 PP-34

EC 383637 22 of 36 471 PP-38 472 PP-39 473 PP-40 474 PP-43 475 PP-44 476 PP-57 477 PP-59 478 PP-64 479 PP-65 480 RR-1 481 RR-2 482 RR-3 483 RR-4 484 RR-5 485 RR-6 486 RR-9 487 RR-31 488 RR-32 489 RR-33 490 RR-34 491 RR-35 492 RR-36 493 RR-37 494 RR-39 495 RR-40 496 RR-41 497 RR-42 498 RR-50 499 RR-51 500 RR-57 501 RR-58 502 RR-59 503 SS-2 504 SS-3 505 SS-5 506 SS-6 507 SS-9 508 SS-10 509 SS-31 510 SS-32 511 SS-36 512 SS-53 513 SS-54 514 SS-55 515 SS-61 516 SS-62 517 SS-63 518 SS-67 519 SS-69 520 TT-2 521 TT-3 522 TT-4 523 TT-5 524 TT-6 525 TT-9 526 TT-10 527 TT-31 528 TT-32 529 TT-53 530 TT-55 531 TT-61 532 TT-67 533 TT-68 534 TT-69 535 UU-2 536 UU-3 537 UU-4 538 UU-5 539 UU-6 540 UU-9 541 UU-10 542 UU-11 543 UU-31 544 UU-32 545 UU-33 546 UU-39 547 UU-55 548 UU-56 549 UU-57 550 UU-58 551 UU-59 552 UU-65 553 UU-68 554 UU-69 555 VV-2 556 VV-3 557 VV-4 558 VV-6 559 VV-9 560 VV-10 561 VV-11 562 VV-31 563 VV-32 564 VV-33 565 VV-34 566 VV-39 567 VV-57 568 VV-58 569 VV-59 570 VV-65 571 VV-66 572 VV-67 573 VV-68 574 WW-3 575 WW-4 576 WW-6 577 WW-9 578 WW-10 579 WW-11 580 WW-31 581 WW-32 582 WW-55 583 WW-56 584 WW-58 585 WW-59 586 XX-2 587 XX-3 588 XX-4 589 XX-5 590 XX-6 591 XX-10 592 XX-11 593 XX-16 594 XX-17 595 XX-18 596 XX-19 597 XX-20 598 XX-22 599 XX-26 600 XX-27 601 XX-28 602 XX-29 603 XX-33 604 XX-34 605 XX-35 606 XX-52 607 XX-53 608 XX-55 609 XX-56 610 XX-59 611 XX-60 612 XX-65 613 XX-67 614 XX-68 615 YY-1 616 YY-2 617 YY-3 618 YY-4 619 YY-6 620 YY-11 621 YY-17 622 YY-18 623 YY-19 624 YY-20 625 YY-21 626 YY-22 627 YY-26 628 YY-27 629 YY-28 630 YY-39 631 YY-52 632 YY-53 633 YY-54 634 YY-55 635 YY-60 636 YY-61 637 YY-62 638 YY-65 639 YY-66 640 ZZ-1 641 ZZ-2 642 ZZ-3 643 ZZ-5 644 ZZ-6 645 ZZ-11 646 ZZ-17 647 ZZ-18 648 ZZ-19 649 ZZ-20 650 ZZ-21 651 ZZ-22 652 ZZ-24 653 ZZ-26 654 ZZ-33 655 ZZ-39 656 ZZ-53 657 ZZ-54 658 ZZ-55 659 ZZ-56 660 ZZ-57 661 ZZ-58 662 ZZ-60 663 ZZ-61 664 ZZ-62 665 ZZ-64 666 ZZ-65 667 ZZ-66 668 ZZ-69 669 AAA-1 670 AAA-2 671 AAA-3 672 AAA-4 673 AAA-6 674 AAA-11 675 AAA-16 676 AAA-17 677 AAA-18 678 AAA-19 679 AAA-20 680 AAA-21 681 AAA-22 682 AAA-23 683 AAA-24 684 AAA-26 685 AAA-32 686 AAA-33 687 AAA-53 688 AAA-54 689 AAA-55 690 AAA-57 691 AAA-59 692 AAA-60 693 AAA-61 694 AAA-62 695 AAA-63 696 AAA-64 697 AAA-65 698 AAA-67 699 AAA-68 700 AAA-69 701 BBB-1 702 BBB-2 703 BBB-3 704 BBB-4 705 BBB-5 706 BBB-6 707 BBB-11 708 BBB-16 709 BBB-17 710 BBB-18 711 BBB-20 712 BBB-21 713 BBB-22 714 BBB-24 715 BBB-26

EC 383637 23 of 36 716 BBB-27 717 BBB-30 718 BBB-51 719 BBB-52 720 BBB-54 721 BBB-55 722 BBB-56 723 BBB-60 724 BBB-62 725 BBB-63 726 BBB-68 727 BBB-69 728 CCC-1 729 CCC-2 730 CCC-3 731 CCC-5 732 CCC-6 733 CCC-9 734 CCC-11 735 CCC-16 736 CCC-17 737 CCC-19 738 CCC-20 739 CCC-21 740 CCC-22 741 CCC-23 742 CCC-30 743 CCC-31 744 CCC-32 745 CCC-33 746 CCC-51 747 CCC-56 748 CCC-57 749 CCC-58 750 CCC-59 751 CCC-64 752 CCC-65 753 CCC-66 754 CCC-67 755 DDD-1 756 DDD-2 757 DDD-3 758 DDD-5 759 DDD-6 760 DDD-9 761 DDD-10 762 DDD-11 763 DDD-16 764 DDD-20 765 DDD-21 766 DDD-22 767 DDD-23 768 DDD-26 769 DDD-29 770 DDD-31 771 DDD-32 772 DDD-33 773 DDD-52 774 DDD-53 775 DDD-54 776 DDD-55 777 DDD-58 778 DDD-59 779 DDD-62 780 DDD-63 781 DDD-66 782 DDD-67 783 EEE-2 784 EEE-3 785 EEE-5 786 EEE-6 787 EEE-9 788 EEE-10 789 EEE-11 790 EEE-16 791 EEE-20 792 EEE-21 793 EEE-22 794 EEE-23 795 EEE-25 796 EEE-26 797 EEE-27 798 EEE-29 799 EEE-30 800 EEE-52 801 EEE-53 802 EEE-54 803 EEE-55 804 EEE-60 805 EEE-61 806 EEE-62 807 EEE-63 808 EEE-66 809 EEE-67 810 FFF-2 811 FFF-3 812 FFF-5 813 FFF-6 814 FFF-9 815 FFF-10 816 FFF-11 817 FFF-16 818 FFF-21 819 FFF-22 820 FFF-23 821 FFF-24 822 FFF-25 823 FFF-26 824 FFF-27 825 FFF-28 826 FFF-33 827 FFF-34 828 FFF-54 829 FFF-55 830 FFF-60 831 FFF-61 832 FFF-62 833 GGG-2 834 GGG-3 835 GGG-5 836 GGG-6 837 GGG-8 838 GGG-9 839 GGG-10 840 GGG-16 841 GGG-20 842 GGG-21 843 GGG-22 844 GGG-23 845 GGG-24 846 GGG-25 847 GGG-27 848 GGG-28 849 GGG-29 850 GGG-30 851 GGG-31 852 GGG-33 853 GGG-55 854 GGG-56 855 GGG-57 856 GGG-60 857 GGG-61 858 GGG-69 859 HHH-1 860 HHH-2 861 HHH-3 862 HHH-5 863 HHH-6 864 HHH-9 865 HHH-10 866 HHH-17 867 HHH-21 868 HHH-22 869 HHH-23 870 HHH-24 871 HHH-25 872 HHH-26 873 HHH-30 874 HHH-31 875 HHH-33 876 HHH-53 877 HHH-54 878 HHH-56 879 HHH-58 880 HHH-59 881 HHH-65 882 HHH-66 883 HHH-69 884 JJJ-2 885 JJJ-3 886 JJJ-5 887 JJJ-6 888 JJJ-9 889 JJJ-17 890 JJJ-18 891 JJJ-21 892 JJJ-22 893 JJJ-24 894 JJJ-25 895 JJJ-26 896 JJJ-29 897 JJJ-30 898 JJJ-31 899 JJJ-32 900 JJJ-56 901 JJJ-58 902 JJJ-59 903 JJJ-60 904 JJJ-68 905 JJJ-69 906 KKK-2 907 KKK-3 908 KKK-4 909 KKK-5 910 KKK-6 911 KKK-9 912 KKK-17 913 KKK-22 914 KKK-25 915 KKK-26 916 KKK-57 917 KKK-58 918 KKK-60 919 KKK-69 920 LLL-2 921 LLL-3 922 LLL-5 923 LLL-6 924 LLL-8 925 LLL-9 926 LLL-10 927 LLL-11 928 LLL-22 929 MMM-1 930 MMM-2 931 MMM-3 932 MMM-4 933 MMM-6 934 MMM-9 935 MMM-10 936 MMM-11 937 NNN-1 938 NNN-2 939 NNN-3 940 NNN-4 941 NNN-6 942 NNN-9 943 NNN-11 944 PPP-9 945 RRR-9 946 SSS-9 947 TTT-9

EC 383637 24 of 36 Table 5 List of Restricted Cells for Criteria in Effect on October 28, 2011 1

A-3 2

A-4 3

A-5 4

A-6 5

A-7 6

A-8 7

A-9 8

A-11 9

B-3 10 B-4 11 B-5 12 B-7 13 B-9 14 B-11 15 C-3 16 C-4 17 C-5 18 C-7 19 C-10 20 C-25 21 C-26 22 C-27 23 C-28 24 D-3 25 D-4 26 D-5 27 D-6 28 D-7 29 D-10 30 D-24 31 E-3 32 E-4 33 E-5 34 E-6 35 E-7 36 E-8 37 E-11 38 E-12 39 E-13 40 E-14 41 E-15 42 E-16 43 E-17 44 E-18 45 E-19 46 E-20 47 E-24 48 E-25 49 E-30 50 F-3 51 F-4 52 F-5 53 F-8 54 F-15 55 F-17 56 F-18 57 F-19 58 F-20 59 F-22 60 F-23 61 F-25 62 F-26 63 F-30 64 F-31 65 F-35 66 F-36 67 F-37 68 F-38 69 F-39 70 F-40 71 F-41 72 F-42 73 F-44 74 F-45 75 F-47 76 F-50 77 F-54 78 F-55 79 F-56 80 F-57 81 F-59 82 F-60 83 F-63 84 F-66 85 F-68 86 G-4 87 G-5 88 G-8 89 G-28 90 G-29 91 G-30 92 G-37 93 G-38 94 G-39 95 G-40 96 G-41 97 G-50 98 G-51 99 G-53 100 G-54 101 G-55 102 G-56 103 G-57 104 G-58 105 G-59 106 G-60 107 G-61 108 G-62 109 G-63 110 G-68 111 H-3 112 H-4 113 H-5 114 H-8 115 H-19 116 H-26 117 H-28 118 H-29 119 H-41 120 H-42 121 H-54 122 H-55 123 H-56 124 H-57 125 H-59 126 H-61 127 H-62 128 H-66 129 H-67 130 J-3 131 J-4 132 J-8 133 J-13 134 J-14 135 J-17 136 J-18 137 J-19 138 J-21 139 J-22 140 J-23 141 J-24 142 J-26 143 J-27 144 J-28 145 J-50 146 J-51 147 J-53 148 J-54 149 J-56 150 J-58 151 J-61 152 J-62 153 J-65 154 J-68 155 K-4 156 K-5 157 K-8 158 K-15 159 K-16 160 K-22 161 K-24 162 K-25 163 K-26 164 K-27 165 K-28 166 K-37 167 K-49 168 K-50 169 K-51 170 K-52 171 K-53 172 K-54 173 K-55 174 K-56 175 K-57 176 K-58 177 K-59 178 K-61 179 K-62 180 K-63 181 K-65 182 K-66 183 K-67 184 L-4 185 L-8 186 L-11 187 L-13 188 L-15 189 L-16 190 L-26 191 L-27 192 L-28 193 L-29 194 L-34 195 L-37 196 L-40 197 L-50 198 L-51 199 L-52 200 L-53 201 L-66 202 M-2 203 M-4 204 M-8 205 M-17 206 M-20 207 M-21 208 M-22 209 M-25 210 M-27 211 M-28 212 M-29 213 M-50 214 M-51 215 M-52 216 M-53 217 N-4 218 N-5 219 N-7 220 N-8 221 N-11 222 N-13 223 N-18 224 N-19 225 N-26

EC 383637 25 of 36 226 N-28 227 N-30 228 N-50 229 N-51 230 N-52 231 N-53 232 N-54 233 N-62 234 P-4 235 P-5 236 P-7 237 P-8 238 P-10 239 P-22 240 P-23 241 P-24 242 P-25 243 P-30 244 P-44 245 P-51 246 P-52 247 P-53 248 P-57 249 P-62 250 P-63 251 P-68 252 R-4 253 R-5 254 R-8 255 R-9 256 R-17 257 R-19 258 R-21 259 R-29 260 R-32 261 R-43 262 R-44 263 R-45 264 R-50 265 R-51 266 R-52 267 R-53 268 R-57 269 R-58 270 R-61 271 R-63 272 R-64 273 R-68 274 S-4 275 S-5 276 S-6 277 S-8 278 S-9 279 S-15 280 S-23 281 S-31 282 S-32 283 S-33 284 S-45 285 S-46 286 S-47 287 S-49 288 S-54 289 S-56 290 S-57 291 S-58 292 S-59 293 S-60 294 S-61 295 S-62 296 S-64 297 S-65 298 S-66 299 S-67 300 T-2 301 T-4 302 T-5 303 T-6 304 T-7 305 T-8 306 T-14 307 T-16 308 T-17 309 T-18 310 T-19 311 T-20 312 T-22 313 T-24 314 T-25 315 T-29 316 T-31 317 T-32 318 T-33 319 T-34 320 T-35 321 T-37 322 T-50 323 T-51 324 T-52 325 T-53 326 T-62 327 T-63 328 T-64 329 T-68 330 U-1 331 U-2 332 U-3 333 U-4 334 U-5 335 U-6 336 U-8 337 U-14 338 U-15 339 U-16 340 U-19 341 U-20 342 U-21 343 U-22 344 U-23 345 U-24 346 U-25 347 U-69 348 U-70 349 V-2 350 V-3 351 V-4 352 V-5 353 V-6 354 V-8 355 V-14 356 V-19 357 V-20 358 V-21 359 V-22 360 V-24 361 V-25 362 V-26 363 W-1 364 W-2 365 W-3 366 W-4 367 W-5 368 W-21 369 W-22 370 W-23 371 W-25 372 W-29 373 W-70 374 X-2 375 X-3 376 X-4 377 X-14 378 X-15 379 X-16 380 X-21 381 X-22 382 X-25 383 X-70 384 Y-1 385 Y-2 386 Y-3 387 Y-5 388 Y-7 389 Y-14 390 Y-16 391 Y-19 392 Y-21 393 Y-23 394 Y-25 395 Y-29 396 Y-70 397 Z-5 398 Z-6 399 Z-14 400 Z-16 401 Z-24 402 AA-16 403 BB-8 404 BB-15 405 BB-24 406 BB-25 407 BB-68 408 BB-69 409 CC-15 410 CC-24 411 CC-25 412 DD-1 413 DD-8 414 DD-14 415 DD-16 416 DD-24 417 DD-25 418 DD-68 419 DD-70 420 EE-14 421 EE-15 422 EE-16 423 EE-24 424 EE-25 425 EE-70 426 FF-1 427 FF-13 428 FF-14 429 FF-24 430 FF-25 431 FF-68 432 FF-70 433 GG-8 434 GG-12 435 GG-14 436 GG-20 437 GG-24 438 GG-70 439 HH-7 440 HH-8 441 HH-14 442 HH-46 443 HH-52 444 HH-68 445 HH-70 446 JJ-8 447 JJ-14 448 JJ-15 449 JJ-43 450 JJ-50 451 JJ-51 452 KK-14 453 KK-15 454 KK-40 455 KK-42 456 KK-48 457 KK-50 458 KK-68 459 KK-70 460 LL-9 461 LL-14 462 LL-15 463 LL-46 464 LL-52 465 LL-53 466 LL-54 467 LL-56 468 LL-69 469 MM-7 470 MM-8

EC 383637 26 of 36 471 MM-36 472 MM-38 473 MM-45 474 MM-49 475 MM-50 476 MM-51 477 MM-52 478 MM-56 479 MM-57 480 MM-58 481 MM-60 482 MM-65 483 NN-9 484 NN-10 485 NN-11 486 NN-12 487 NN-34 488 NN-35 489 NN-45 490 NN-46 491 NN-50 492 NN-51 493 NN-54 494 NN-56 495 NN-64 496 NN-65 497 NN-66 498 PP-10 499 PP-15 500 PP-41 501 PP-42 502 PP-47 503 PP-49 504 PP-50 505 PP-52 506 PP-53 507 PP-55 508 PP-61 509 PP-63 510 PP-66 511 PP-68 512 PP-70 513 RR-8 514 RR-13 515 RR-15 516 RR-38 517 RR-48 518 RR-49 519 RR-52 520 RR-53 521 RR-54 522 RR-63 523 RR-64 524 RR-66 525 RR-68 526 SS-13 527 SS-14 528 SS-15 529 SS-37 530 SS-38 531 SS-39 532 SS-42 533 SS-45 534 SS-47 535 SS-50 536 SS-51 537 SS-52 538 SS-58 539 SS-64 540 SS-66 541 TT-12 542 TT-13 543 TT-34 544 TT-37 545 TT-38 546 TT-39 547 TT-40 548 TT-41 549 TT-42 550 TT-43 551 TT-44 552 TT-49 553 TT-51 554 TT-64 555 TT-65 556 UU-12 557 UU-14 558 UU-34 559 UU-35 560 UU-36 561 UU-37 562 UU-41 563 UU-42 564 UU-44 565 UU-45 566 UU-46 567 UU-47 568 UU-51 569 UU-52 570 UU-53 571 UU-60 572 UU-61 573 UU-70 574 VV-12 575 VV-14 576 VV-15 577 VV-38 578 VV-42 579 VV-43 580 VV-44 581 VV-45 582 VV-46 583 VV-49 584 VV-55 585 VV-61 586 VV-62 587 VV-63 588 VV-70 589 WW-1 590 WW-12 591 WW-15 592 WW-41 593 WW-42 594 WW-43 595 WW-44 596 WW-45 597 WW-46 598 WW-47 599 WW-51 600 WW-60 601 WW-61 602 WW-66 603 WW-68 604 WW-69 605 XX-8 606 XX-13 607 XX-15 608 XX-39 609 XX-44 610 XX-45 611 XX-47 612 XX-48 613 XX-49 614 XX-50 615 XX-58 616 XX-61 617 XX-66 618 XX-69 619 YY-8 620 YY-9 621 YY-13 622 YY-14 623 YY-15 624 YY-37 625 YY-38 626 YY-42 627 YY-49 628 YY-50 629 YY-51 630 YY-56 631 YY-63 632 YY-70 633 ZZ-9 634 ZZ-12 635 ZZ-13 636 ZZ-15 637 ZZ-37 638 ZZ-40 639 ZZ-41 640 ZZ-42 641 ZZ-43 642 ZZ-44 643 ZZ-49 644 ZZ-50 645 ZZ-51 646 ZZ-68 647 ZZ-70 648 AAA-9 649 AAA-13 650 AAA-15 651 AAA-30 652 AAA-37 653 AAA-39 654 AAA-41 655 AAA-42 656 AAA-43 657 AAA-48 658 AAA-49 659 AAA-50 660 AAA-51 661 AAA-56 662 BBB-8 663 BBB-13 664 BBB-15 665 BBB-23 666 BBB-41 667 BBB-49 668 BBB-50 669 BBB-53 670 BBB-65 671 BBB-71 672 CCC-25 673 CCC-28 674 CCC-35 675 CCC-36 676 CCC-37 677 CCC-42 678 CCC-52 679 CCC-61 680 CCC-69 681 DDD-18 682 DDD-27 683 DDD-28 684 DDD-37 685 DDD-38 686 DDD-43 687 DDD-44 688 DDD-45 689 DDD-46 690 DDD-50 691 DDD-51 692 DDD-57 693 EEE-34 694 EEE-35 695 EEE-37 696 EEE-38 697 EEE-39 698 EEE-42 699 EEE-43 700 EEE-45 701 EEE-48 702 EEE-49 703 EEE-50 704 EEE-51 705 EEE-56 706 EEE-58 707 EEE-59 708 EEE-64 709 EEE-65 710 EEE-68 711 EEE-69 712 FFF-12 713 FFF-31 714 FFF-40 715 FFF-43

EC 383637 27 of 36 716 FFF-44 717 FFF-45 718 FFF-46 719 FFF-47 720 FFF-48 721 FFF-49 722 FFF-57 723 FFF-64 724 FFF-65 725 FFF-70 726 GGG-13 727 GGG-14 728 GGG-35 729 GGG-36 730 GGG-40 731 GGG-43 732 GGG-47 733 GGG-48 734 GGG-50 735 GGG-51 736 GGG-67 737 GGG-70 738 HHH-12 739 HHH-13 740 HHH-37 741 HHH-41 742 HHH-44 743 HHH-47 744 HHH-51 745 JJJ-7 746 JJJ-12 747 JJJ-13 748 JJJ-14 749 JJJ-38 750 JJJ-40 751 JJJ-41 752 JJJ-42 753 JJJ-43 754 JJJ-44 755 JJJ-45 756 JJJ-47 757 JJJ-48 758 JJJ-50 759 JJJ-51 760 JJJ-54 761 JJJ-64 762 JJJ-65 763 JJJ-67 764 JJJ-70 765 KKK-12 766 KKK-13 767 KKK-20 768 KKK-52 769 KKK-59 770 KKK-62 771 KKK-63 772 KKK-67 773 KKK-70 774 LLL-7 775 LLL-13 776 LLL-14 777 LLL-15 778 LLL-16 779 LLL-18 780 LLL-20 781 LLL-58 782 LLL-60 783 LLL-61 784 LLL-65 785 LLL-66 786 LLL-68 787 LLL-69 788 MMM-13 789 MMM-16 790 MMM-18 791 NNN-7 792 PPP-5 793 PPP-7 794 RRR-3 795 RRR-5 796 RRR-7 797 SSS-1 798 SSS-2 799 SSS-6 800 SSS-7 801 TTT-1 802 TTT-2 803 TTT-3 804 TTT-6

EC 383637 28 of 36 Table 6 List of Unusable Cells for Criteria in Effect on October 28, 2011 1

A-10 2

B-6 3

B-10 4

C-6 5

D-9 6

D-25 7

D-26 8

D-27 9

D-28 10 E-9 11 E-10 12 E-26 13 E-27 14 E-28 15 E-29 16 F-7 17 F-9 18 F-10 19 F-12 20 F-21 21 F-24 22 F-27 23 F-28 24 F-29 25 F-32 26 F-33 27 F-34 28 F-43 29 F-46 30 F-48 31 F-49 32 F-51 33 F-52 34 F-53 35 F-64 36 F-65 37 F-67 38 G-6 39 G-7 40 G-9 41 G-10 42 G-11 43 G-12 44 G-13 45 G-20 46 G-21 47 G-22 48 G-23 49 G-24 50 G-25 51 G-26 52 G-27 53 G-31 54 G-32 55 G-33 56 G-34 57 G-35 58 G-36 59 G-42 60 G-43 61 G-44 62 G-45 63 G-46 64 G-47 65 G-48 66 G-49 67 G-52 68 G-64 69 G-65 70 G-66 71 G-67 72 H-6 73 H-7 74 H-9 75 H-10 76 H-11 77 H-12 78 H-13 79 H-20 80 H-21 81 H-22 82 H-23 83 H-24 84 H-25 85 H-27 86 H-30 87 H-31 88 H-32 89 H-33 90 H-34 91 H-35 92 H-36 93 H-37 94 H-38 95 H-39 96 H-40 97 H-43 98 H-44 99 H-45 100 H-46 101 H-47 102 H-48 103 H-49 104 H-50 105 H-51 106 H-52 107 H-53 108 H-60 109 H-63 110 H-64 111 H-65 112 J-5 113 J-6 114 J-7 115 J-9 116 J-10 117 J-11 118 J-12 119 J-20 120 J-25 121 J-29 122 J-30 123 J-31 124 J-32 125 J-33 126 J-34 127 J-35 128 J-36 129 J-37 130 J-38 131 J-39 132 J-40 133 J-41 134 J-42 135 J-43 136 J-44 137 J-45 138 J-46 139 J-47 140 J-48 141 J-49 142 J-52 143 J-59 144 J-60 145 J-63 146 J-64 147 J-66 148 J-67 149 K-3 150 K-6 151 K-7 152 K-9 153 K-10 154 K-11 155 K-12 156 K-13 157 K-14 158 K-17 159 K-18 160 K-19 161 K-20 162 K-21 163 K-23 164 K-29 165 K-30 166 K-31 167 K-32 168 K-33 169 K-34 170 K-35 171 K-36 172 K-38 173 K-39 174 K-40 175 K-41 176 K-42 177 K-43 178 K-44 179 K-45 180 K-46 181 K-47 182 K-48 183 K-60 184 K-64 185 L-3 186 L-5 187 L-6 188 L-7 189 L-9 190 L-10 191 L-12 192 L-14 193 L-17 194 L-18 195 L-19 196 L-20 197 L-21 198 L-22 199 L-23 200 L-24 201 L-25 202 L-30 203 L-31 204 L-32 205 L-33 206 L-35 207 L-36 208 L-38 209 L-39 210 L-41 211 L-42 212 L-43 213 L-44 214 L-45 215 L-46 216 L-47 217 L-48 218 L-49 219 L-54 220 L-55 221 L-56 222 L-57 223 L-58 224 L-59 225 L-60

EC 383637 29 of 36 226 L-61 227 L-62 228 L-63 229 L-64 230 L-65 231 L-67 232 M-3 233 M-5 234 M-6 235 M-7 236 M-9 237 M-10 238 M-11 239 M-12 240 M-13 241 M-18 242 M-19 243 M-23 244 M-30 245 M-31 246 M-32 247 M-33 248 M-34 249 M-35 250 M-36 251 M-37 252 M-38 253 M-39 254 M-40 255 M-41 256 M-42 257 M-43 258 M-44 259 M-45 260 M-46 261 M-47 262 M-48 263 M-49 264 M-54 265 M-55 266 M-56 267 M-57 268 M-58 269 M-59 270 M-60 271 M-61 272 M-62 273 M-63 274 M-64 275 M-65 276 M-66 277 M-67 278 M-68 279 N-2 280 N-3 281 N-6 282 N-9 283 N-10 284 N-12 285 N-27 286 N-29 287 N-31 288 N-32 289 N-33 290 N-34 291 N-35 292 N-36 293 N-37 294 N-38 295 N-39 296 N-40 297 N-41 298 N-42 299 N-43 300 N-44 301 N-45 302 N-46 303 N-47 304 N-48 305 N-49 306 N-55 307 N-56 308 N-57 309 N-58 310 N-59 311 N-60 312 N-61 313 N-63 314 N-64 315 N-65 316 N-66 317 N-67 318 P-2 319 P-3 320 P-6 321 P-11 322 P-12 323 P-13 324 P-26 325 P-27 326 P-28 327 P-29 328 P-31 329 P-32 330 P-33 331 P-34 332 P-35 333 P-36 334 P-37 335 P-38 336 P-39 337 P-40 338 P-41 339 P-42 340 P-43 341 P-45 342 P-46 343 P-47 344 P-48 345 P-49 346 P-50 347 P-54 348 P-55 349 P-56 350 P-58 351 P-59 352 P-60 353 P-61 354 P-64 355 P-65 356 P-66 357 P-67 358 R-2 359 R-3 360 R-6 361 R-7 362 R-10 363 R-11 364 R-12 365 R-13 366 R-22 367 R-23 368 R-24 369 R-25 370 R-26 371 R-27 372 R-28 373 R-30 374 R-31 375 R-33 376 R-34 377 R-35 378 R-36 379 R-37 380 R-38 381 R-39 382 R-40 383 R-41 384 R-42 385 R-46 386 R-47 387 R-48 388 R-49 389 R-54 390 R-55 391 R-56 392 R-59 393 R-60 394 R-65 395 R-66 396 R-67 397 S-2 398 S-3 399 S-7 400 S-10 401 S-11 402 S-12 403 S-13 404 S-16 405 S-17 406 S-18 407 S-19 408 S-20 409 S-21 410 S-22 411 S-24 412 S-25 413 S-26 414 S-27 415 S-28 416 S-29 417 S-30 418 S-34 419 S-35 420 S-36 421 S-37 422 S-38 423 S-39 424 S-40 425 S-41 426 S-42 427 S-43 428 S-44 429 S-55 430 T-3 431 T-9 432 T-10 433 T-11 434 T-12 435 T-13 436 T-21 437 T-27 438 T-28 439 T-30 440 T-36 441 T-38 442 T-39 443 T-40 444 T-41 445 T-42 446 T-43 447 T-44 448 T-45 449 T-46 450 T-47 451 T-48 452 T-49 453 T-54 454 T-55 455 T-56 456 T-57 457 T-58 458 T-59 459 T-60 460 T-61 461 T-65 462 T-66 463 T-67 464 U-7 465 U-9 466 U-10 467 U-11 468 U-12 469 U-13 470 U-17

EC 383637 30 of 36 471 U-18 472 U-26 473 U-27 474 U-28 475 U-29 476 U-30 477 U-61 478 U-62 479 U-63 480 U-64 481 U-65 482 U-66 483 U-67 484 U-68 485 V-7 486 V-9 487 V-10 488 V-11 489 V-12 490 V-13 491 V-16 492 V-17 493 V-18 494 V-27 495 V-28 496 V-29 497 V-30 498 V-61 499 V-62 500 V-63 501 V-64 502 V-65 503 V-66 504 V-67 505 V-68 506 V-69 507 W-6 508 W-7 509 W-8 510 W-9 511 W-10 512 W-11 513 W-12 514 W-13 515 W-14 516 W-16 517 W-17 518 W-18 519 W-19 520 W-20 521 W-24 522 W-26 523 W-27 524 W-28 525 W-30 526 W-61 527 W-62 528 W-63 529 W-64 530 W-65 531 W-66 532 W-67 533 W-68 534 W-69 535 X-5 536 X-6 537 X-7 538 X-8 539 X-9 540 X-10 541 X-11 542 X-12 543 X-13 544 X-17 545 X-18 546 X-19 547 X-20 548 X-23 549 X-24 550 X-26 551 X-27 552 X-28 553 X-61 554 X-62 555 X-63 556 X-64 557 X-65 558 X-66 559 X-67 560 X-68 561 X-69 562 Y-4 563 Y-6 564 Y-8 565 Y-9 566 Y-10 567 Y-11 568 Y-12 569 Y-13 570 Y-17 571 Y-18 572 Y-20 573 Y-24 574 Y-26 575 Y-27 576 Y-28 577 Y-30 578 Y-61 579 Y-62 580 Y-63 581 Y-64 582 Y-65 583 Y-66 584 Y-67 585 Y-68 586 Y-69 587 Z-2 588 Z-3 589 Z-4 590 Z-7 591 Z-8 592 Z-9 593 Z-10 594 Z-11 595 Z-12 596 Z-13 597 Z-17 598 Z-18 599 Z-19 600 Z-20 601 Z-21 602 Z-22 603 Z-23 604 Z-25 605 Z-26 606 Z-27 607 Z-28 608 Z-29 609 Z-30 610 Z-61 611 Z-62 612 Z-63 613 Z-64 614 Z-65 615 Z-66 616 Z-67 617 Z-68 618 Z-69 619 AA-1 620 AA-2 621 AA-3 622 AA-4 623 AA-5 624 AA-6 625 AA-7 626 AA-8 627 AA-9 628 AA-10 629 AA-11 630 AA-12 631 AA-13 632 AA-17 633 AA-18 634 AA-19 635 AA-20 636 AA-21 637 AA-22 638 AA-23 639 AA-24 640 AA-25 641 AA-26 642 AA-27 643 AA-28 644 AA-29 645 AA-30 646 AA-61 647 AA-62 648 AA-63 649 AA-64 650 AA-65 651 AA-66 652 AA-67 653 AA-68 654 AA-69 655 AA-70 656 BB-1 657 BB-2 658 BB-3 659 BB-4 660 BB-5 661 BB-6 662 BB-7 663 BB-9 664 BB-10 665 BB-11 666 BB-12 667 BB-13 668 BB-16 669 BB-17 670 BB-18 671 BB-19 672 BB-20 673 BB-21 674 BB-22 675 BB-23 676 BB-26 677 BB-27 678 BB-28 679 BB-29 680 BB-30 681 BB-61 682 BB-62 683 BB-63 684 BB-64 685 BB-65 686 BB-66 687 BB-67 688 CC-2 689 CC-3 690 CC-4 691 CC-5 692 CC-6 693 CC-7 694 CC-9 695 CC-10 696 CC-11 697 CC-12 698 CC-13 699 CC-16 700 CC-17 701 CC-18 702 CC-19 703 CC-20 704 CC-21 705 CC-22 706 CC-23 707 CC-26 708 CC-27 709 CC-28 710 CC-29 711 CC-30 712 CC-61 713 CC-62 714 CC-63 715 CC-64

EC 383637 31 of 36 716 CC-65 717 CC-66 718 CC-67 719 CC-68 720 CC-69 721 CC-70 722 DD-2 723 DD-3 724 DD-4 725 DD-5 726 DD-6 727 DD-7 728 DD-9 729 DD-10 730 DD-11 731 DD-12 732 DD-13 733 DD-17 734 DD-18 735 DD-19 736 DD-20 737 DD-21 738 DD-22 739 DD-23 740 DD-26 741 DD-27 742 DD-28 743 DD-29 744 DD-30 745 DD-61 746 DD-62 747 DD-63 748 DD-64 749 DD-65 750 DD-66 751 DD-67 752 DD-69 753 EE-2 754 EE-3 755 EE-4 756 EE-5 757 EE-6 758 EE-7 759 EE-9 760 EE-10 761 EE-11 762 EE-12 763 EE-13 764 EE-17 765 EE-18 766 EE-19 767 EE-20 768 EE-21 769 EE-22 770 EE-23 771 EE-26 772 EE-27 773 EE-28 774 EE-29 775 EE-30 776 EE-61 777 EE-62 778 EE-63 779 EE-64 780 EE-65 781 EE-66 782 EE-67 783 EE-68 784 EE-69 785 FF-2 786 FF-3 787 FF-4 788 FF-5 789 FF-6 790 FF-7 791 FF-8 792 FF-9 793 FF-10 794 FF-11 795 FF-12 796 FF-16 797 FF-17 798 FF-18 799 FF-19 800 FF-20 801 FF-21 802 FF-22 803 FF-23 804 FF-26 805 FF-27 806 FF-28 807 FF-29 808 FF-30 809 FF-61 810 FF-62 811 FF-63 812 FF-64 813 FF-65 814 FF-66 815 FF-67 816 FF-69 817 GG-1 818 GG-2 819 GG-3 820 GG-4 821 GG-5 822 GG-6 823 GG-7 824 GG-9 825 GG-10 826 GG-11 827 GG-13 828 GG-16 829 GG-17 830 GG-18 831 GG-19 832 GG-21 833 GG-22 834 GG-23 835 GG-25 836 GG-26 837 GG-27 838 GG-28 839 GG-29 840 GG-30 841 GG-61 842 GG-62 843 GG-63 844 GG-64 845 GG-65 846 GG-66 847 GG-67 848 GG-68 849 GG-69 850 HH-1 851 HH-2 852 HH-3 853 HH-4 854 HH-5 855 HH-6 856 HH-9 857 HH-10 858 HH-11 859 HH-12 860 HH-13 861 HH-31 862 HH-32 863 HH-33 864 HH-34 865 HH-35 866 HH-36 867 HH-37 868 HH-38 869 HH-39 870 HH-40 871 HH-41 872 HH-42 873 HH-43 874 HH-44 875 HH-45 876 HH-47 877 HH-48 878 HH-49 879 HH-50 880 HH-51 881 HH-53 882 HH-54 883 HH-55 884 HH-56 885 HH-57 886 HH-58 887 HH-59 888 HH-60 889 HH-61 890 HH-62 891 HH-63 892 HH-64 893 HH-65 894 HH-66 895 HH-67 896 HH-69 897 JJ-1 898 JJ-2 899 JJ-3 900 JJ-4 901 JJ-5 902 JJ-6 903 JJ-7 904 JJ-9 905 JJ-10 906 JJ-11 907 JJ-12 908 JJ-31 909 JJ-32 910 JJ-33 911 JJ-34 912 JJ-35 913 JJ-36 914 JJ-37 915 JJ-38 916 JJ-39 917 JJ-40 918 JJ-41 919 JJ-42 920 JJ-44 921 JJ-45 922 JJ-46 923 JJ-47 924 JJ-48 925 JJ-49 926 JJ-53 927 JJ-54 928 JJ-55 929 JJ-56 930 JJ-57 931 JJ-58 932 JJ-59 933 JJ-60 934 JJ-61 935 JJ-62 936 JJ-63 937 JJ-64 938 JJ-65 939 JJ-66 940 JJ-67 941 JJ-68 942 JJ-69 943 KK-1 944 KK-2 945 KK-3 946 KK-4 947 KK-5 948 KK-6 949 KK-7 950 KK-9 951 KK-10 952 KK-11 953 KK-12 954 KK-31 955 KK-32 956 KK-33 957 KK-34 958 KK-35 959 KK-36 960 KK-37

EC 383637 32 of 36 961 KK-38 962 KK-39 963 KK-41 964 KK-43 965 KK-44 966 KK-45 967 KK-46 968 KK-47 969 KK-49 970 KK-51 971 KK-54 972 KK-55 973 KK-56 974 KK-57 975 KK-58 976 KK-59 977 KK-60 978 KK-61 979 KK-62 980 KK-63 981 KK-64 982 KK-65 983 KK-66 984 KK-67 985 KK-69 986 LL-1 987 LL-2 988 LL-3 989 LL-4 990 LL-5 991 LL-6 992 LL-7 993 LL-10 994 LL-11 995 LL-12 996 LL-31 997 LL-32 998 LL-33 999 LL-34 1000 LL-35 1001 LL-36 1002 LL-37 1003 LL-38 1004 LL-39 1005 LL-40 1006 LL-41 1007 LL-42 1008 LL-43 1009 LL-44 1010 LL-45 1011 LL-47 1012 LL-48 1013 LL-49 1014 LL-50 1015 LL-51 1016 LL-55 1017 LL-57 1018 LL-58 1019 LL-59 1020 LL-60 1021 LL-61 1022 LL-62 1023 LL-63 1024 LL-64 1025 LL-65 1026 LL-66 1027 LL-67 1028 LL-68 1029 MM-1 1030 MM-2 1031 MM-3 1032 MM-4 1033 MM-5 1034 MM-6 1035 MM-9 1036 MM-10 1037 MM-11 1038 MM-12 1039 MM-15 1040 MM-31 1041 MM-32 1042 MM-33 1043 MM-34 1044 MM-35 1045 MM-37 1046 MM-39 1047 MM-40 1048 MM-41 1049 MM-42 1050 MM-43 1051 MM-46 1052 MM-47 1053 MM-48 1054 MM-53 1055 MM-54 1056 MM-55 1057 MM-59 1058 MM-61 1059 MM-62 1060 MM-63 1061 MM-64 1062 MM-66 1063 MM-67 1064 MM-68 1065 MM-69 1066 NN-1 1067 NN-2 1068 NN-3 1069 NN-4 1070 NN-5 1071 NN-6 1072 NN-7 1073 NN-15 1074 NN-31 1075 NN-32 1076 NN-33 1077 NN-36 1078 NN-37 1079 NN-38 1080 NN-39 1081 NN-40 1082 NN-41 1083 NN-42 1084 NN-43 1085 NN-44 1086 NN-47 1087 NN-48 1088 NN-49 1089 NN-52 1090 NN-53 1091 NN-55 1092 NN-57 1093 NN-59 1094 NN-60 1095 NN-61 1096 NN-62 1097 NN-63 1098 NN-67 1099 NN-68 1100 NN-69 1101 PP-1 1102 PP-2 1103 PP-3 1104 PP-4 1105 PP-5 1106 PP-6 1107 PP-7 1108 PP-9 1109 PP-31 1110 PP-32 1111 PP-33 1112 PP-34 1113 PP-35 1114 PP-36 1115 PP-37 1116 PP-38 1117 PP-39 1118 PP-40 1119 PP-43 1120 PP-44 1121 PP-45 1122 PP-46 1123 PP-51 1124 PP-56 1125 PP-57 1126 PP-58 1127 PP-59 1128 PP-60 1129 PP-64 1130 PP-65 1131 PP-67 1132 PP-69 1133 RR-1 1134 RR-2 1135 RR-3 1136 RR-4 1137 RR-5 1138 RR-6 1139 RR-7 1140 RR-9 1141 RR-10 1142 RR-31 1143 RR-32 1144 RR-33 1145 RR-34 1146 RR-35 1147 RR-36 1148 RR-37 1149 RR-39 1150 RR-40 1151 RR-41 1152 RR-42 1153 RR-43 1154 RR-44 1155 RR-45 1156 RR-46 1157 RR-47 1158 RR-50 1159 RR-51 1160 RR-55 1161 RR-56 1162 RR-57 1163 RR-58 1164 RR-59 1165 RR-60 1166 RR-61 1167 RR-62 1168 RR-65 1169 RR-67 1170 RR-69 1171 SS-1 1172 SS-2 1173 SS-3 1174 SS-4 1175 SS-5 1176 SS-6 1177 SS-7 1178 SS-8 1179 SS-9 1180 SS-10 1181 SS-11 1182 SS-31 1183 SS-32 1184 SS-33 1185 SS-34 1186 SS-35 1187 SS-36 1188 SS-40 1189 SS-41 1190 SS-43 1191 SS-46 1192 SS-48 1193 SS-49 1194 SS-53 1195 SS-54 1196 SS-55 1197 SS-56 1198 SS-57 1199 SS-59 1200 SS-60 1201 SS-61 1202 SS-62 1203 SS-63 1204 SS-67 1205 SS-68

EC 383637 33 of 36 1206 SS-69 1207 SS-70 1208 TT-1 1209 TT-2 1210 TT-3 1211 TT-4 1212 TT-5 1213 TT-6 1214 TT-7 1215 TT-8 1216 TT-9 1217 TT-10 1218 TT-11 1219 TT-14 1220 TT-15 1221 TT-31 1222 TT-32 1223 TT-33 1224 TT-35 1225 TT-36 1226 TT-52 1227 TT-53 1228 TT-54 1229 TT-55 1230 TT-56 1231 TT-57 1232 TT-58 1233 TT-59 1234 TT-60 1235 TT-61 1236 TT-62 1237 TT-63 1238 TT-66 1239 TT-67 1240 TT-68 1241 TT-69 1242 TT-70 1243 UU-1 1244 UU-2 1245 UU-3 1246 UU-4 1247 UU-5 1248 UU-6 1249 UU-7 1250 UU-8 1251 UU-9 1252 UU-10 1253 UU-11 1254 UU-13 1255 UU-15 1256 UU-31 1257 UU-32 1258 UU-33 1259 UU-38 1260 UU-39 1261 UU-40 1262 UU-48 1263 UU-49 1264 UU-54 1265 UU-55 1266 UU-56 1267 UU-57 1268 UU-58 1269 UU-59 1270 UU-62 1271 UU-63 1272 UU-64 1273 UU-65 1274 UU-66 1275 UU-67 1276 UU-68 1277 UU-69 1278 VV-1 1279 VV-2 1280 VV-3 1281 VV-4 1282 VV-5 1283 VV-6 1284 VV-7 1285 VV-8 1286 VV-9 1287 VV-10 1288 VV-11 1289 VV-13 1290 VV-31 1291 VV-32 1292 VV-33 1293 VV-34 1294 VV-35 1295 VV-36 1296 VV-39 1297 VV-40 1298 VV-41 1299 VV-50 1300 VV-51 1301 VV-52 1302 VV-53 1303 VV-54 1304 VV-56 1305 VV-57 1306 VV-58 1307 VV-59 1308 VV-60 1309 VV-64 1310 VV-65 1311 VV-66 1312 VV-67 1313 VV-68 1314 VV-69 1315 WW-2 1316 WW-3 1317 WW-4 1318 WW-5 1319 WW-6 1320 WW-7 1321 WW-8 1322 WW-9 1323 WW-10 1324 WW-11 1325 WW-13 1326 WW-31 1327 WW-32 1328 WW-33 1329 WW-34 1330 WW-35 1331 WW-36 1332 WW-37 1333 WW-38 1334 WW-39 1335 WW-52 1336 WW-53 1337 WW-54 1338 WW-55 1339 WW-56 1340 WW-57 1341 WW-58 1342 WW-59 1343 WW-62 1344 WW-63 1345 WW-64 1346 WW-65 1347 WW-67 1348 XX-1 1349 XX-2 1350 XX-3 1351 XX-4 1352 XX-5 1353 XX-6 1354 XX-7 1355 XX-9 1356 XX-10 1357 XX-11 1358 XX-12 1359 XX-16 1360 XX-17 1361 XX-18 1362 XX-19 1363 XX-20 1364 XX-21 1365 XX-22 1366 XX-23 1367 XX-24 1368 XX-25 1369 XX-26 1370 XX-27 1371 XX-28 1372 XX-29 1373 XX-30 1374 XX-31 1375 XX-32 1376 XX-33 1377 XX-34 1378 XX-35 1379 XX-36 1380 XX-37 1381 XX-38 1382 XX-41 1383 XX-42 1384 XX-43 1385 XX-46 1386 XX-51 1387 XX-52 1388 XX-53 1389 XX-54 1390 XX-55 1391 XX-56 1392 XX-57 1393 XX-59 1394 XX-60 1395 XX-62 1396 XX-63 1397 XX-64 1398 XX-65 1399 XX-67 1400 XX-68 1401 YY-1 1402 YY-2 1403 YY-3 1404 YY-4 1405 YY-5 1406 YY-6 1407 YY-7 1408 YY-10 1409 YY-11 1410 YY-12 1411 YY-16 1412 YY-17 1413 YY-18 1414 YY-19 1415 YY-20 1416 YY-21 1417 YY-22 1418 YY-23 1419 YY-24 1420 YY-25 1421 YY-26 1422 YY-27 1423 YY-28 1424 YY-29 1425 YY-30 1426 YY-31 1427 YY-32 1428 YY-33 1429 YY-34 1430 YY-35 1431 YY-36 1432 YY-39 1433 YY-40 1434 YY-41 1435 YY-46 1436 YY-47 1437 YY-48 1438 YY-52 1439 YY-53 1440 YY-54 1441 YY-55 1442 YY-57 1443 YY-58 1444 YY-59 1445 YY-60 1446 YY-61 1447 YY-62 1448 YY-64 1449 YY-65 1450 YY-66

EC 383637 34 of 36 1451 YY-67 1452 YY-68 1453 YY-69 1454 ZZ-1 1455 ZZ-2 1456 ZZ-3 1457 ZZ-4 1458 ZZ-5 1459 ZZ-6 1460 ZZ-7 1461 ZZ-10 1462 ZZ-11 1463 ZZ-16 1464 ZZ-17 1465 ZZ-18 1466 ZZ-19 1467 ZZ-20 1468 ZZ-21 1469 ZZ-22 1470 ZZ-23 1471 ZZ-24 1472 ZZ-25 1473 ZZ-26 1474 ZZ-27 1475 ZZ-28 1476 ZZ-29 1477 ZZ-30 1478 ZZ-31 1479 ZZ-32 1480 ZZ-33 1481 ZZ-34 1482 ZZ-35 1483 ZZ-36 1484 ZZ-38 1485 ZZ-39 1486 ZZ-46 1487 ZZ-47 1488 ZZ-52 1489 ZZ-53 1490 ZZ-54 1491 ZZ-55 1492 ZZ-56 1493 ZZ-57 1494 ZZ-58 1495 ZZ-59 1496 ZZ-60 1497 ZZ-61 1498 ZZ-62 1499 ZZ-63 1500 ZZ-64 1501 ZZ-65 1502 ZZ-66 1503 ZZ-67 1504 ZZ-69 1505 AAA-1 1506 AAA-2 1507 AAA-3 1508 AAA-4 1509 AAA-5 1510 AAA-6 1511 AAA-7 1512 AAA-10 1513 AAA-11 1514 AAA-12 1515 AAA-16 1516 AAA-17 1517 AAA-18 1518 AAA-19 1519 AAA-20 1520 AAA-21 1521 AAA-22 1522 AAA-23 1523 AAA-24 1524 AAA-25 1525 AAA-26 1526 AAA-27 1527 AAA-28 1528 AAA-29 1529 AAA-31 1530 AAA-32 1531 AAA-33 1532 AAA-34 1533 AAA-35 1534 AAA-40 1535 AAA-47 1536 AAA-52 1537 AAA-53 1538 AAA-54 1539 AAA-55 1540 AAA-57 1541 AAA-58 1542 AAA-59 1543 AAA-60 1544 AAA-61 1545 AAA-62 1546 AAA-63 1547 AAA-64 1548 AAA-65 1549 AAA-66 1550 AAA-67 1551 AAA-68 1552 AAA-69 1553 AAA-70 1554 BBB-1 1555 BBB-2 1556 BBB-3 1557 BBB-4 1558 BBB-5 1559 BBB-6 1560 BBB-7 1561 BBB-9 1562 BBB-10 1563 BBB-11 1564 BBB-12 1565 BBB-16 1566 BBB-17 1567 BBB-18 1568 BBB-19 1569 BBB-20 1570 BBB-21 1571 BBB-22 1572 BBB-24 1573 BBB-25 1574 BBB-26 1575 BBB-27 1576 BBB-28 1577 BBB-29 1578 BBB-30 1579 BBB-31 1580 BBB-32 1581 BBB-33 1582 BBB-34 1583 BBB-35 1584 BBB-36 1585 BBB-37 1586 BBB-38 1587 BBB-39 1588 BBB-40 1589 BBB-45 1590 BBB-46 1591 BBB-47 1592 BBB-48 1593 BBB-51 1594 BBB-52 1595 BBB-54 1596 BBB-55 1597 BBB-56 1598 BBB-57 1599 BBB-58 1600 BBB-59 1601 BBB-60 1602 BBB-61 1603 BBB-62 1604 BBB-63 1605 BBB-64 1606 BBB-66 1607 BBB-67 1608 BBB-68 1609 BBB-69 1610 BBB-70 1611 CCC-1 1612 CCC-2 1613 CCC-3 1614 CCC-4 1615 CCC-5 1616 CCC-6 1617 CCC-7 1618 CCC-8 1619 CCC-9 1620 CCC-10 1621 CCC-11 1622 CCC-12 1623 CCC-15 1624 CCC-16 1625 CCC-17 1626 CCC-18 1627 CCC-19 1628 CCC-20 1629 CCC-21 1630 CCC-22 1631 CCC-23 1632 CCC-24 1633 CCC-26 1634 CCC-27 1635 CCC-29 1636 CCC-30 1637 CCC-31 1638 CCC-32 1639 CCC-33 1640 CCC-38 1641 CCC-39 1642 CCC-40 1643 CCC-41 1644 CCC-46 1645 CCC-47 1646 CCC-48 1647 CCC-49 1648 CCC-50 1649 CCC-51 1650 CCC-53 1651 CCC-54 1652 CCC-55 1653 CCC-56 1654 CCC-57 1655 CCC-58 1656 CCC-59 1657 CCC-60 1658 CCC-62 1659 CCC-63 1660 CCC-64 1661 CCC-65 1662 CCC-66 1663 CCC-67 1664 CCC-68 1665 DDD-1 1666 DDD-2 1667 DDD-3 1668 DDD-4 1669 DDD-5 1670 DDD-6 1671 DDD-7 1672 DDD-8 1673 DDD-9 1674 DDD-10 1675 DDD-11 1676 DDD-12 1677 DDD-15 1678 DDD-16 1679 DDD-17 1680 DDD-19 1681 DDD-20 1682 DDD-21 1683 DDD-22 1684 DDD-23 1685 DDD-24 1686 DDD-25 1687 DDD-26 1688 DDD-29 1689 DDD-30 1690 DDD-31 1691 DDD-32 1692 DDD-33 1693 DDD-34 1694 DDD-35 1695 DDD-36

EC 383637 35 of 36 1696 DDD-39 1697 DDD-40 1698 DDD-52 1699 DDD-53 1700 DDD-54 1701 DDD-55 1702 DDD-56 1703 DDD-58 1704 DDD-59 1705 DDD-60 1706 DDD-61 1707 DDD-62 1708 DDD-63 1709 DDD-64 1710 DDD-65 1711 DDD-66 1712 DDD-67 1713 DDD-68 1714 EEE-1 1715 EEE-2 1716 EEE-3 1717 EEE-4 1718 EEE-5 1719 EEE-6 1720 EEE-7 1721 EEE-8 1722 EEE-9 1723 EEE-10 1724 EEE-11 1725 EEE-12 1726 EEE-15 1727 EEE-16 1728 EEE-17 1729 EEE-18 1730 EEE-19 1731 EEE-20 1732 EEE-21 1733 EEE-22 1734 EEE-23 1735 EEE-24 1736 EEE-25 1737 EEE-26 1738 EEE-27 1739 EEE-28 1740 EEE-29 1741 EEE-30 1742 EEE-31 1743 EEE-32 1744 EEE-33 1745 EEE-36 1746 EEE-40 1747 EEE-41 1748 EEE-52 1749 EEE-53 1750 EEE-54 1751 EEE-55 1752 EEE-60 1753 EEE-61 1754 EEE-62 1755 EEE-63 1756 EEE-66 1757 EEE-67 1758 FFF-1 1759 FFF-2 1760 FFF-3 1761 FFF-4 1762 FFF-5 1763 FFF-6 1764 FFF-7 1765 FFF-8 1766 FFF-9 1767 FFF-10 1768 FFF-11 1769 FFF-15 1770 FFF-16 1771 FFF-17 1772 FFF-18 1773 FFF-19 1774 FFF-20 1775 FFF-21 1776 FFF-22 1777 FFF-23 1778 FFF-24 1779 FFF-25 1780 FFF-26 1781 FFF-27 1782 FFF-28 1783 FFF-29 1784 FFF-30 1785 FFF-32 1786 FFF-33 1787 FFF-34 1788 FFF-35 1789 FFF-36 1790 FFF-37 1791 FFF-38 1792 FFF-39 1793 FFF-50 1794 FFF-51 1795 FFF-52 1796 FFF-53 1797 FFF-54 1798 FFF-55 1799 FFF-56 1800 FFF-59 1801 FFF-60 1802 FFF-61 1803 FFF-62 1804 FFF-63 1805 FFF-66 1806 FFF-67 1807 FFF-68 1808 FFF-69 1809 GGG-1 1810 GGG-2 1811 GGG-3 1812 GGG-4 1813 GGG-5 1814 GGG-6 1815 GGG-7 1816 GGG-8 1817 GGG-9 1818 GGG-10 1819 GGG-11 1820 GGG-15 1821 GGG-16 1822 GGG-17 1823 GGG-18 1824 GGG-19 1825 GGG-20 1826 GGG-21 1827 GGG-22 1828 GGG-23 1829 GGG-24 1830 GGG-25 1831 GGG-26 1832 GGG-27 1833 GGG-28 1834 GGG-29 1835 GGG-30 1836 GGG-31 1837 GGG-32 1838 GGG-33 1839 GGG-34 1840 GGG-37 1841 GGG-38 1842 GGG-39 1843 GGG-52 1844 GGG-53 1845 GGG-54 1846 GGG-55 1847 GGG-56 1848 GGG-57 1849 GGG-58 1850 GGG-59 1851 GGG-60 1852 GGG-61 1853 GGG-62 1854 GGG-63 1855 GGG-64 1856 GGG-65 1857 GGG-66 1858 GGG-68 1859 GGG-69 1860 HHH-1 1861 HHH-2 1862 HHH-3 1863 HHH-4 1864 HHH-5 1865 HHH-6 1866 HHH-7 1867 HHH-8 1868 HHH-9 1869 HHH-10 1870 HHH-11 1871 HHH-15 1872 HHH-16 1873 HHH-17 1874 HHH-18 1875 HHH-19 1876 HHH-20 1877 HHH-21 1878 HHH-22 1879 HHH-23 1880 HHH-24 1881 HHH-25 1882 HHH-26 1883 HHH-27 1884 HHH-28 1885 HHH-29 1886 HHH-30 1887 HHH-31 1888 HHH-32 1889 HHH-33 1890 HHH-34 1891 HHH-38 1892 HHH-39 1893 HHH-40 1894 HHH-48 1895 HHH-49 1896 HHH-50 1897 HHH-52 1898 HHH-53 1899 HHH-54 1900 HHH-55 1901 HHH-56 1902 HHH-57 1903 HHH-58 1904 HHH-59 1905 HHH-60 1906 HHH-61 1907 HHH-62 1908 HHH-63 1909 HHH-64 1910 HHH-65 1911 HHH-66 1912 HHH-67 1913 HHH-68 1914 HHH-69 1915 HHH-70 1916 JJJ-1 1917 JJJ-2 1918 JJJ-3 1919 JJJ-4 1920 JJJ-5 1921 JJJ-6 1922 JJJ-8 1923 JJJ-9 1924 JJJ-10 1925 JJJ-15 1926 JJJ-16 1927 JJJ-17 1928 JJJ-18 1929 JJJ-19 1930 JJJ-20 1931 JJJ-21 1932 JJJ-22 1933 JJJ-23 1934 JJJ-24 1935 JJJ-25 1936 JJJ-26 1937 JJJ-27 1938 JJJ-28 1939 JJJ-29 1940 JJJ-30

EC 383637 36 of 36 1941 JJJ-31 1942 JJJ-32 1943 JJJ-33 1944 JJJ-34 1945 JJJ-35 1946 JJJ-36 1947 JJJ-37 1948 JJJ-39 1949 JJJ-49 1950 JJJ-52 1951 JJJ-53 1952 JJJ-55 1953 JJJ-56 1954 JJJ-57 1955 JJJ-58 1956 JJJ-59 1957 JJJ-60 1958 JJJ-61 1959 JJJ-62 1960 JJJ-63 1961 JJJ-66 1962 JJJ-68 1963 JJJ-69 1964 KKK-1 1965 KKK-2 1966 KKK-3 1967 KKK-4 1968 KKK-5 1969 KKK-6 1970 KKK-7 1971 KKK-8 1972 KKK-9 1973 KKK-10 1974 KKK-11 1975 KKK-15 1976 KKK-16 1977 KKK-17 1978 KKK-18 1979 KKK-19 1980 KKK-21 1981 KKK-22 1982 KKK-23 1983 KKK-24 1984 KKK-25 1985 KKK-26 1986 KKK-54 1987 KKK-55 1988 KKK-56 1989 KKK-57 1990 KKK-58 1991 KKK-60 1992 KKK-61 1993 KKK-65 1994 KKK-66 1995 KKK-68 1996 KKK-69 1997 LLL-1 1998 LLL-2 1999 LLL-3 2000 LLL-4 2001 LLL-5 2002 LLL-6 2003 LLL-8 2004 LLL-9 2005 LLL-10 2006 LLL-11 2007 LLL-12 2008 LLL-17 2009 LLL-19 2010 LLL-21 2011 LLL-22 2012 LLL-55 2013 LLL-57 2014 MMM-1 2015 MMM-2 2016 MMM-3 2017 MMM-4 2018 MMM-5 2019 MMM-6 2020 MMM-7 2021 MMM-8 2022 MMM-9 2023 MMM-10 2024 MMM-11 2025 MMM-12 2026 MMM-19 2027 NNN-1 2028 NNN-2 2029 NNN-3 2030 NNN-4 2031 NNN-5 2032 NNN-6 2033 NNN-8 2034 NNN-9 2035 NNN-10 2036 NNN-11 2037 NNN-12 2038 PPP-1 2039 PPP-2 2040 PPP-3 2041 PPP-4 2042 PPP-6 2043 PPP-8 2044 PPP-9 2045 PPP-10 2046 PPP-11 2047 RRR-2 2048 RRR-4 2049 RRR-6 2050 RRR-8 2051 RRR-9 2052 RRR-10 2053 SSS-3 2054 SSS-4 2055 SSS-5 2056 SSS-8 2057 SSS-9 2058 SSS-10 2059 TTT-4 2060 TTT-8 2061 TTT-9