ML092120022

Initial Exam 2009-301 Final Simulator Scenarios

ML092120022
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	07/31/2009
From:	NRC/RGN-II
To:	Progress Energy Carolinas
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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: 05000400 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

• IC-19, MOL, 100% power

• "8" RHR Pump is under clearance for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> for breaker inspection.

• 4 GPD tube leak on '8' Steam Generator Turnover:

• Plant is lowering power lAW GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown, in preparation for Turbine Valve Testing <<90%)

Critical Task:

• Shut 'A' MSIV prior to exiting EPP-014, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation

• Isolate AFW flow to 'A' Steam Generator prior to exiting EPP-014 Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 N/A N-BOP, Lower Power SRO R-RO 2 RMSOO7, 1- BOP, SRO Radiation Monitor high alarm, Containment Purge fails to isolate MFZCR744 TS-SRO automatically 3 CRFOO3 C- RO, SRO Dropped Control Rod (0-12)

TS - SRO 4 PT:444 1- RO, SRO Controlling PZR Pressure Channel (PT-444) fails high TS-SRO 5 EPS02 C-BOP, Loss of Instrument Bus S-III SRO TS-SRO 6 MSS01 M-ALL 'A' Steam Generator faulted inside Containment 7 ZRPK504A, C-BOP, Automatic MSLI fails ZRPK504B SRO 8 ZRPK615A, C-BOP, AFW automatic isolation fails ZRPK615B SRO 9 XA21127 C- RO, SRO CSIP 'B' fails to start from Load Sequencer

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)om ponent, (M)ajor Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Scenario Event Description Shearon-Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 Scenario Summary:

The plant is at 100% power in middle of life. The 'B' RHR Pump is out of service for breaker inspection and there is a 4 GPD tube leak on the 'B' Steam Generator. The crew has been directed to lower power using GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown, to <90% power in preparation for OPT-1014, Turbine Valve Test, Semi-Annual Interval Modes 1-5.

The first event is the power reduction. For this reactivity manipulation it is expected that the SRO will conduct a reactivity brief, the RO will borate per the reactivity plan and the BOP will operate the DEH Controls as necessary to lower power.

The second event, a failure of REM-01 LT-3502ASA, Cnmt RCS Leak Detection Radiation Monitor, can be inserted once the power reduction has been observed to the extent necessary.

This failure will cause the output to immediately fail high and the RM-11 will go into high alarm.

The automatic response to isolate Normal Containment Purge fails to occur due to a failed relay. The crew should respond to the alarms and enter AOP-005, Radiation Monitoring.

Attachment 1 of AOP-005 will direct verifying that the automatic response for this alarm has occurred (other procedure options are available and detailed in exercise guide). This will also require the SRO to evaluate Tech Spec 3.4.6.1, Leakage Detection Systems.

The third event, a dropped control rod, is inserted once Normal Containment Purge has been isolated. Control Rod D-12 will drop to the bottom of the core. The crew should diagnose the event in progress and enter AOP-001, Malfunction of Rod Control and Indication System. The RO should place Rod Control in Manual as an immediate action of AOP-001. Once the crew's response has been observed to the extent necessary and the Negative Rate Alarms at the NI Panels have been cleared then the next event can occur. (NOTE: If these alarms are not cleared then the fifth event in this scenario will cause a reactor trip.) This event will also require the SRO to evaluate Tech Spec 3.1.3.1, Moveable Control Assemblies, for the dropped control rod.

The fourth event, the controlling Pressurizer Pressure Channel (PT-444) failing high, can be inserted once the Negative Rate Alarms at the NI Panels have been cleared. The crew should respond to multiple alarms and enter AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control. The RO should complete the immediate actions by closing the open Pressurizer PORV (PCV-444B) and gaining control of the Pressurizer Spray Valves. Depending on crew response time, a short OT~T turbine runback may occur. RCS pressure may drop below the DNB limit depending on how fast the operator responds to the failure. If so, the SRO should evaluate Tech Spec 3.2.5, DNB Parameters. The crew should be allowed to complete AOP-019 to stabilize the plant, but the channel does not have to be removed from service to continue the scenario.

The fifth event, a loss of Instrument Bus S-III, can be inserted once plant pressure has been restored and stabilized. The loss will occur due to a blown fuse on the 7.5kVA Inverter. This Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Scenario Event Description Shearon-Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 will require entry into AOP-024, Loss of Uninterruptible Power Supply. This procedure has immediate actions. The RO should verify Rod Control in Manual (already done due to previous AOP-001 entry) and the BOP should take manual control of all three Main FW Regulating Valves. This malfunction will also cause an auto start of the 'A' ESW pump due to a loss of PT-9101A and a loss of the running ESCWS Chiller due to loss of FT-9209A. The instrument bus can be restored by transferring to the alternate power supply. SRO should evaluate Tech Specs 3.7.4 (Emergency Service Water), 3.7.13 (Essential Services Chilled Water System), and 3.B.1.1 (AC Sources - Operating).

Once power has been restored to Instrument Bus S-III via the alternate power supply, a Main Steam Line Break inside Containment on the 'A' SG will occur and progressively worsen over the next five minutes. The crew should enter and carry out actions of PATH-1. The crew should diagnose that there is no LOCA in progress and transition to EPP-014, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

The automatic Main Steam* Line Isolation signal (which should occur at 3 psig in Containment) is failed. The crew will have to manually isolate the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs). Once the crew has manually shut the MSIVs, it will be identifiable that the 'A' Steam Generator is faulted inside Containment.

The AFW Auto Isolation will not occur and the crew will have to manually isolate AFW flow to the 'A' Steam Generator. In addition, the 'B' CSIP will fail to start automatically from the 'B' Sequencer. The pump can be started by the operator. The scenario ends when Safety Injection has been terminated and the crew transitions to EPP-OOB, SI Termination.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: 05000400 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

• IC-28, MOL, 39% power

• 'B' RHR Pump Out of Service for inspection

• 'B' Containment Spray Pump out of service to replace its motor

• 4 GPD tube leak on 'B' Steam Generator Turnover:

• Normal shutdown is in progress lAW with GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown, due to elevated vibrations on Main Turbine at 100% power. Vibrations have subsided but Shutdown is to continue to perform inspection on Turbine.

Currently in progress on Step 15 of GP-006 with Step 16 com pleted.

Critical Task:

• Trip RCPs once RCP Trip Foldout Criteria is met and prior to exiting PATH-1

• Align 'A' Containment Spray System for operation prior to containment pressure exceeding 35 psig Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 N/A N - BOP, Lower Power SRO R-RO 2 HVA04 C-BOP, Trip of the running ESCWS Chiller r.yvC-2 A-SA)

SRO TS-SRO 3 TI:144, I-RO, Letdown TI-144 fails low and the Letdown Divert Valve, TCV-144, fails to JTB143B SRO operate automatically 4 LT:476 I-BOP, SG 'A' Controlling Level Transmitter fails high SRO TS-SRO 5 RCS14C C-RO, RCP 'C' #1 Seal fails SRO TS-SRO 6 RCS18A M-ALL SBLOCA inside containment (100% severity) 7 RHR01A C-RO, 'A' RHR Pump trips on overcurrent on start SRO 8 ZRPK645A C-RO, Cnmt Spray Pump 'A' Discharge Valve, 1CS-50, and CSAT Additive SRO Valve, 1CS-12, fail to OPEN automatically on a CSAS

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Scenario Event Description Shearon-Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 Scenario Summary:

The plant is at 39% power in middle of life. The crew is lowering power in accordance with GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown, due to elevated vibrations observed on the Main Turbine at 100%

power. Vibrations have subsided since power has been reduced, but shutdown is to continue so that an inspection of the Main Turbine can be performed. Currently the 'B' RHR pump is out of service, the 'B' Containment Spray Pump is out of service, and there is a 4 GPO tube leak on

'B' Steam Generator.

The first event is for the crew to continue lowering power in accordance with their turnover. It is expected that the SRO will conduct a reactivity brief, the RO will borate as necessary to lower power, and the BOP will operate the DEH controls as necessary to reduce turbine load.

The second event, a trip of the running A-SA ESCWS Chiller, can be inserted once the downpower has been observed to the extent necessary. The crew will respond to various alarms, diagnose the event, and enter AOP-026, Loss of Essential Chill Water System. This will direct starting the 'B' Train ESCWS Chiller. The SRO should evaluate Tech Spec 3.7.13, Essential Services Chilled Water System. Note that the 'A' Chiller will be inoperable for the remainder of the scenario and this will impact plant response during the Major Event in that this failure will prevent Load Block 9 from energizing.

The third event, a failure of the Letdown Temperature Transmitter, TT-144, can be inserted once the 'B' ESCWS Chiller has been started and ventilation properly aligned. The transmitter fails low which causes the system to attempt to increase temperature by reducing Component Cooling Water flow. As cooling flow reduces, actual temperature will increase. The automatic divert to protect the demineralizers fails to operate. Operators should take action to restore temperature and divert letdown around the demins. From the initiation of the trigger it takes

-2.5 minutes to cause an alarm.

The-fourth event is the 'A' Steam Generator Controlling Level Transmitter, LT-476, failing high and can be inserted once the crew has control of letdown temperature. This will require operator action to take manual control of 'A' Main Feedwater Regulating Valve and stabilize level. The SRO should evaluate Tech Specs 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation, and 3.3.2, ESF Instrumentation.

The fifth event, a failure of the 'C' RCP #1 Seal, can be inserted once 'A' Steam Generator Level has stabilized and is under control of the crew. The crew should enter AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions, and evaluate the seal malfunction. The crew should identify the 'C' RCP #1 seal as failed. Since power is less than 49%, they should stop the 'C' RCP and shut 1CS-437, 'C' RCP #1 Seal Water Return valve, between three and five minutes after securing the RCP. Once the RCP is stopped and its seal water return valve is shut, then the major event will be initiated. The SRO should evaluate Tech Spec 3.4.1.1, Reactor Coolant Loops and Coolant Circulation.

The major event is a SBLOCA (100% severity) from the 'A' Loop. The crew should carry out immediate actions of PATH-1. The earlier failure of A-SA ESCWS Chiller will prevent the 'A' Sequencer from reaching Load Block 9. The BOP should manually actuate the MAN PERM switch to enable manual loading on the A-SA bus (due to the earlier trip of the A-SA ESCWS Chiller). Shortly after entering PATH-1, the crew should recognize that the Foldout Criteria for Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Scenario Event Description Shearon-Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 securing all RCPs has been met and carry out that action. Pressure in containment will continue to rise due to the LOCA and a Containment Spray Actuation will be required.

The 'A' Cnmt Spray Pump will start automatically, but 1CS-50, 'A' Cnmt Spray Pump Discharge valve, and 1CS-12, Cnmt Spray Additive valve, will fail to open automatically. The crew should identify this failure and manually open both valves. Since '8' Cnmt Spray Pump is under clearance, there will be no spray flow to containment until the 'A' Cnmt Spray Pump Discharge valve is manually opened.

The 'A' RHR Pump will start automatically from the sequencer and then immediately trip on overcurrent. The RO should identify this failure but the pump cannot be manually started. The loss of RHR will result in the crew exiting PATH-1 and going to EPP-012, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, to address the loss of RHR capability. The '8' RHR Pump is under clearance for routine maintenance and can be made available by the booth operator once the crew has entered EPP-012 (or if FRP-P.1 entry was required prior to EPP-012 entry) and the request has been made to restore '8' RHR Pump to service. Due to the rapid cooldown an Orange conditions will occur for Core Cooling. This will require the crew to implement FRP-P.1.

The crew will progress through FRP-P.1 until they are required to perform a soak for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

Terminate the scenario once the crew determines a soak is required and start to carry out actions of other procedures that do NOT cause an RCS cooldown OR increase pressure.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: 05000400 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

• IC-27, MOL, 4% power

• Plant startup to full power in progress lAW GP-005, Power Operation, step 95

• 4 GPD tube leak on '8' Steam Generator Turnover:

• The previous shift continued a plant startup following a short maintenance outage. GP-005 is in progress with Step 94 completed. Continue the startup.

Critical Task:

• Initiate insertion of negative reactivity to bring reactor subcritical (emergency boration or manual rod insertion) prior to exiting FRP-S.1

• Energize at least AC emergency bus prior to commencing SG depressurization of EPP-001 Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description .

1 N/A N-BOP, Shift to the Main Feedwater Regulating Valves SRO R-RO Raise Power 2 PT:455 TS-SRO Pressurizer Pressure Channell, PT-455, fails high 3 PRS14A C-RO, Pressurizer Spray Valve fails OPEN (AUTO failure only)

SRO TS-SRO 4 I-RO, LT:459 SRO Controlling Pressurizer Level Channel, LT-459, fails high TS-SRO 5 LT:476 I-BOP, Controlling 'A' Steam Generator Level Transmitter, LT-476 , fails low SRO TS-SRO 6 TURMT1 C-BOP, High Vibration on Turbine (increases to trip setpoint over 2 min)

SRO 7-8-9 CRF003A M-ALL 1 Control Rod drops then 2nd Control Rod drops requiring a Reactor Trip CRF003B ATWS RPS01B 10 EPS01A, M-ALL Loss of Offsite Power 11 DG05A, C-BOP, EDG 'A' failure leaves Emergency Bus 1A-SA de-energized DG06B SRO EDG 'B' breaker fails to shut automatically (can eventually be restored by operator)

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

_ 1 _ r::II\IA I

Scenario Event Description Shearon-Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 Scenario Summary:

The plant is at 4% power in end of life. There is a 4 GPO tube leak on the 'B' Steam Generator. A plant startup is in progress lAW GP-005, Power Operation. The first priority will be to raise power from 4% to 7% - 9% so that they can transfer control from Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass FCVs to the Main Feedwater Regulating Valves. Once the first Main Feedwater Regulating Valve is placed in service then the scenario will proceed to the next event. They will continue to work at placing FRV's in auto during the scenario.

Once the increase in power has been observed to the extent necessary and 'A' Main FRV is in auto, then event #2 can be inserted. This event is Pressurizer Pressure Channell, PT-455, failing high. This will cause a MCB annunciator to alarm. The RO will report that PT -455 pressure indication is high and the crew will implement OWP-RP-02 to remove the failed channel from service. The SRO should evaluate Tech Specs 3.3.1 (Reactor Trip Instrumentation), 3.3.2 (ESF Instrumentation), and 3.3.3.5.a (Remote Shutdown System), for the failed channel and request assistance from the WCC.

Event #3, Pressurizer Spray Valve PCV-444C failing open, can be initiated once Tech Specs for PT-455 have been evaluated. Pressurizer pressure will decease and all pressurizer heaters will energize.

Annunciators for pressurizer low pressure will alarm. The crew should respond by entering AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control, and place the malfunctioning spray valve in manual per the immediate actions. RCS pressure may drop below the DNB limit depending on how fast the operator responds to the failure. If so, the SRO should evaluate Tech Spec 3.2.5, DNB Parameters.

Event #4 is initiated once RCS pressure has recovered. It is the ContrOlling Pressurizer Level Instrument, LT -459, failing high. The crew should respond in accordance with alarm response procedure APP-ALB-009. The crew should take Charging FCV-122 to Manual and maintain pressurizer level within the control band and shift level control to an alternate channel. The SRO should evaluate Tech Spec 3.3.3.5.a (Remote Shutdown System), for the failed channel and request assistance from the WCC.

Event #5 is the Controlling Steam Generator Level Channel on SG 'A', LT-476, failing low. The BOP should respond to multiple 'A' Steam Generator alarms on ALB-014 and take manual control of the 'A' FRV in accordance with the alarm response procedures and OMM-001 , Conduct of Operations. The SRO should evaluate Tech Specs 3.3.1 (Reactor Trip Instrumentation), 3.3.2 (ESF Instrumentation), and 3.3.3.6 (ACCident Monitoring Instrumentation). The OWP is not required to be implemented in order to continue with the scenario.

Event #6 is High Vibration on the Main Turbine. Vibrations will continue to rise over two minutes to the point that a Turbine Trip is required. Since power is <P-7 the crew trip the turbine only and continue on in AOP-006, Turbine Generator Trouble. Crew should continue on in the procedure to the point that they isolate and break vacuum. Once this action has been performed continue on with Event 7.

Event #7 is the dropping of one control rod. The RO should report the drop of a single control rod. The crew will enter AOP-001 and perform the immediate actions.

(NOTE: a component failure for Event # 7 is NOT credited for the RO during this malfunction due to the rod control system being placed in Manual prior to the failure occurring.)

Event #8 is the dropping of the second control rod. Event 8 will occur 1.5 minutes after the drop of the first control rod. The RO should report the two dropped control rods. The crew will enter AOP-001 and the first immediate action will direct a Reactor Trip.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Scenario Event Description Shearon-Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 Event #9 The crew should recognize that the reactor has failed to trip and enter FRP-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. The Reactor Trip breakers will be opened locally three minutes after a field operator has been dispatched to perform those actions. Once the crew has initiated the emergency boration in FRP-S.1, they should exit FRP-S.1 and return to PATH-1.

Events # 10 and 11 Once the crew has entered PATH-1, the Lead Examiner can cue the loss of off-site power. The 'A' EDG will fail to start and the 'B' EDG Output Breaker will fail to shut automatically. The crew should enter EPP-001, Loss of AC Power to 1A-SA and 1B-SB Buses. Manual operation of the 'B' EDG Output breaker is available and the crew should restore power to the 'B' Safety Bus using the 'B' EDG. Terminate the scenario when the crew transitions out of EPP-001. (Note there is no exit available from EPP-001 without restoring power to at least one of the Safety Buses.)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: 05000400 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

• IC-11, MOL, 89% power

• Restore power to 100%

• '8' RHR Pump is out of service for breaker inspection

• 4 GPD tube leak on '8' Steam Generator Turnover:

• Return to 100% power in accordance with GP-005, Power Operation, step 137.

Critical Task:

• Isolate ruptured 'B' Steam Generator from the intact Steam Generators prior to Gommensin~ the sooldown

• Isolate AFVV flow to the ruptured 'B' Steam Generator prior to sommencin~ the sooldo',.,'n Event No. Malf. No. Event Event Description Type*

-+ NIA t>1 8GP, ~aise l3ewer SRG

~

2 PT:308A I-BOP, SG PORV Pressure Instrument fails high SRO TS-SRO d GGWG1,~ G ~G, +ril3 af rl:lAAiA§ GGW Pl:lml3 (',A,'),

GGWG47 SRG StaAdby GGV'l I3l:1ml3 ('8') fails ta Al:lta Start

+S S~G 4 C-BOP, HVAOO9 SRO Trip of running AH-85A fan, standby fails to Auto Start TS -SRO

a. ~ ~ +l:IrbiAa First Sta§e Pressl:lre +raAsmitter Faill:lre SRG

+S S~G e SGt>JG138 M Abb '8' Steam GeAeratar tl:l9a rl:ll3tl:lre (42G 113m) 7 MSS11 M-ALL Main Steam Header break outside Containment (downstream of MSIVs) g MSSG138 G 8GP, '8' MSIV fails te SRl:lt SRG

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Scenario Event Description Shearon-Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 Scenario Summary:

I The plant is at 89% power in middle of life. The 'B' RHR pump is out of service for ini3pection and there is a 4 GPO tube leak on 'B' Steam Generator.

1st Event: The crew has been directed to raise power to 100% using GP-005, Power:Operation, following startup. OnGe the powor inGrease has been observed to the extent desired the next event Gan bo inserted.

2 nd Event: 'A' Steam Generator PORV Pressure Instrument failing high. This will req~ire the BOP to take manual control of the PORV to shut it. The SRO sho\;lld eval\;late TeGh SpeGs 3.3.3.9, Remote Sh\;ltdown System, and 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves.

afEI Event: The running 'A' CC\A,.' Pump will trip, whiGh Gan be inserted onGe the plant ras stabilized. The standby 'B' COA' Pump fails to A\;lto Start due to a press\;lre transmitter fail\;lre. The '.9' CCW *.... iII start man\;lally *...'hen operated from the MCB. The Grew sho\;lld reGognize the loss and enter AOP 014, Loss of Component Cooling \plater. AOP 014 will direGt the restoration of the COl'.' system. The SRO should also e"lal\;late TeGh SpeG 3.7.3, Component Cooling \"later System.

4th Event: The running AH-85A fan will trip, Gan be inserted onGe CCW has been restored and AOP 014

~. This trip will provide alarms at the MCB and the crew will enter the appropriate APP. This trip should auto start the standby AH-85 fan, however the auto start has failed. The stan~by fan can be started manually from the MCB. The SRO sho\;lld eval\;late TeGh SpeGs 3.8.1.1, AC ~eurGes Operating, and 3.3.3.ab, Remote Sh\;ltdo*.... n System.

§IR E',lent: Is a fail\;lre of the Gontrolling Main T\;lrbine First Stage Pressure Transmitter, PT 446, is inserted onGe the standby AI=! 8a fan has been plaGed in serviGe. PT 446 fails low Ga\;lsing the Rod Control GiFGuitry to believe power is lowering. Rods '.... iI! begin to step in to reduGe temperat\;lro down to rio load Tavg. The Grew sho\;lld reGognize that rod motion is not required and enter AOP 001, MalfunGtion of Rod Control and Instmmentation System. The Grew sho\;lld Garry O\;lt the immediate aGtions of .A.OP 001 and plaGe Rod Control in Man\;lal. The SRO shO\;lld eval\;late TeGh SpeG 3.3.1, ReaGtor Trip System Instrumentation.

aIR Event: The first major event is a tube r\;lpt\;lre in the 'B' Steam Generator (SGTR) at 420 gpm. The Grew should reGognize the presenGe of a large leak in the primary. After determining that this leak is greater than make\;lp Gapability they shO\;lld trip the roaGtor, manually initiate safety injeGtion, and Garry O\;lt aGtions per PATI=! 1.

7IR Event: SeGond major event, once the reactor is tripped a A main steam line break on the 'B' Steam Generator on the main steam header outside containment will occur. It is expected that the crew trip and Safety Inject and enter transition from PATH-1. to PATI=! 2 to address the rupt\;lred steam generator. At some point the fa\;llted steam generator will beGome apparent and the Gre*.... may use the SeGondary Integrity Foldo\;lt Criteria to address the At step 15 on PATH-1 the crew will transition ,to EPP-014 based on 'B' SG pressure decreasing in an uncontrolled manner.

8th Event: 'B' MSIV fails to operate due to the automatically generated Main Steam Line Isolation Signal (MSIS) and will not shut due to a manual MSIS. 'B' MSIV cannot be shut manually from the Main Control Board by the operators. Terminate the scenario once the crew enters EPP 020, SGTR with Loss of ReaGtor Coolant: SubGooled Recovery and initiates the RCS Cooldown. exits EPP-0'14 and transitions to EPP-008, "SI Termination".

NOTE: This event will not count as a component failure during the spare scenario because the operator will not be able to close the valve. There will be no gradable action.

, Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Turnover Plant Status

• The unit is at 100 percent power steady state conditions.

• OPT-1D14, Turbine Valve Test, Semi-Annual Interval Modes 1-5, is scheduled to be performed on the next shift. The Load Dispatcher has given permission to reduce power to 89 percent in preparations for the testing.

• Middle of life conditions

• RCS Boron is 1024 ppm

• "A" Train equipment is in service

• Motivating air is isolated per,OP-133

• Normal Dayshift

• Status Board is updated Equipment Out of Service:

• "B" SG has a 4 Gallon Per Day tube leak

• "B" RHR Pump is under clearance for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> for breaker inspection.

OWP-RH-02 completed; T.S. 3.S.2.a(72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO). "A" RHR Pump is protected.

Reactivity PlanlBrief:

• Use attached Reactivity Plan to reduce power to <90 percent at 4 DEH Units/Min.

Risk Assessment:

• Qualitative YELLOW due to downpower HARRIS 2009A- NRC Simulator Scenario 1 Turnover FINAL.doc

This is the reactivity plan for the Cycle 15 MOL Shutdown at 4MWe/minute.

The times listed on the POWERTRAX output shown below correspond to elapsed time for the modeled power transient.

POWERTRAX Operating Strategy Generator Module Cy15MOC/Shtdwna/shtdwnc Date: Today Time: Now Page: 1 Step Date Time Power ppm B Gal Bor Gal Dil RStep AFD AO-XE KEffective 1 000201 060000 100.0 1025 103 0 218 -4.7 1.5 0.99533 2 000201 061000 95.8 1037 94 0 210 -4.0 1.5 0.99535 3 000201 062000 91.7 1048 83 0 205 -3.3 1.5 0.99534 4 000201 063000 87.5 1058 77 0 200 -2.8 1.5 0.99535 5 000201 064000 83.3 1067 64 0 195 -2.4 1.4 0.99535 6 000201 065000 79.2 1074 62 0 190 -2.2 1.3 0.99535 7 000201 070000 75.0 1082 55 0 185 -2.1 1.2 0.99535 8 000201 071000 70.8 1088 48 0 180 -2.1 1.1 0.99534

(.~.

9 000201 072000 66.7 1093 45 0 175 -2.2 1.0 0.99534 10 000201 073000 62.5 1098 42 0 170 -2.3 0.9 0.99534 11 000201 074000 58.3 1103 39 0 165 -2.3 0.8 0.99534 12 000201 075000 54.0 1108 29 0 160 -2.3 0.7 0.99534 13 000201 080000 50.0 1111 30 0 155 -2.4 0.6 0.99534 14 000201 081000 45.8 1115 25 0 150 -2.3 0.5 0.99533 15 000201 082000 41.7 1117 24 0 145 -2.2 0.4 0.99534 16 000201 083000 37.5 1120 22 0 140 -2.1 0.4 0.99533 17 000201 084000 33.3 1123 18 0 135 -1.8 0.3 0.99533 18 000201 085000 29.2 1125 58 0 130 -1.4 0.2 0.99533 19 000201 090000 25.0 1131 11 0 130 -0.7 0.1 0.99532 20 000201 091000 21.0 1132 12 0 125 -0.4 -0.0 0.99533 21 000201 092000 17.0 1134 10 0 120 0.0 -0.1 0.99533 22 000201 093000 13.0 1135 15 0 115 0.3 -0.2 0.99533 23 000201 094000 9.0 1137 20 0 110 0.6 -0.4 0.99533 24 000201 095000 5.0 1139 62 0 105 0.6 -0.5 0.99533 25 000201 100000 0.0 1146 100 0.0 -0.6 0.99533 1048 0 HARRIS 2009A- NRC Simulator Scenario 1 Turnover FINAL.doc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: SH EARON-HARRIS Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: 05000400 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

• IC-19, MOL, 100% power

• "8" RHR Pump is under clearance for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> for breaker inspection.

• 4 GPO tube leak on '8' Steam Generator Turnover:

• Plant is lowering power lAW GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown, in preparation for Turbine Valve Testing <<90%)

Critical Task:

• Shut 'A' MSIV prior to exiting EPP-014, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation

• Isolate AFW flow to 'A' Steam Generator prior to exiting EPP-014 Event Malt. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 N/A N-BOP, Lower Power SRO R-RO 2 RMSOO7, I-BOP, SRO Radiation Monitor high alarm, Containment Purge fails to isolate MFZCR744 TS-SRO automatically 3 CRFOO3 C- RO, SRO Dropped Control Rod (0-12)

TS -SRO 4 PT:444 I-RO,SRO Controlling PZR Pressure Channel (PT-444) fails high TS-SRO 5 EPS02 C-BOP, Loss of Instrument Bus S-III SRO TS-SRO 6 MSS01 M-ALL 'A' Steam Generator faulted inside Containment 7 ZRPK504A, C-BOP, Automatic MSLI fails ZRPK504B SRO 8 ZRPK615A, C-BOP, AFW automatic isolation fails ZRPK615B SRO 9 XA21127 C- RO, SRO CSIP 'B' fails to start from Load Sequencer

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Scenario Event Description Shearon-Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 Scenario Summary:

The plant is at 100% power in middle of life. The 'B' RHR Pump is out of service for breaker inspection and there is a 4 GPD tube leak on the 'B' Steam Generator. The crew has been directed to lower power using GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown, to <90% power in preparation for OPT-1014, Turbine Valve Test, Semi-Annual Interval Modes 1-5.

The first event is the power reduction. For this reactivity manipulation it is expected that the SRO will conduct a reactivity brief, the RO will borate per the reactivity plan and the BOP will operate the DEH Controls as necessary to lower power.

The second event, a failure of REM-01 LT -3502ASA, Cnmt RCS Leak Detection Radiation Monitor, can be inserted once the power reduction has been observed to the extent necessary.

This failure will cause the output to immediately fail high and the RM-11 will go into high alarm.

The automatic response to isolate Normal Containment Purge fails to occur due to a failed relay. The crew should respond to the alarms and enter AOP-005, Radiation Monitoring. of AOP-005 will direct verifying that the automatic response for this alarm has occurred (other procedure options are available and detailed in exercise guide). This will also require the SRO to evaluate Tech Spec 3.4.6.1, Leakage Detection Systems.

The third event, a dropped control rod, is inserted once Normal Containment Purge has been isolated. Control Rod D-12 will drop to the bottom of the core. The crew should diagnose the event in progress and enter AOP-001, Malfunction of Rod Control and Indication System. The RO should place Rod Control in Manual as an immediate action of AOP-001. Once the crew's response has been observed to the extent necessary and the Negative Rate Alarms at the NI Panels have been cleared then the next event can occur. (NOTE: If these alarms are not cleared then the fifth event in this scenario will cause a reactor trip.) This event will also require the SRO to evaluate Tech Spec 3.1.3.1, Moveable Control Assemblies, for the dropped control rod.

The fourth event, the controlling Pressurizer Pressure Channel (PT-444) failing high, can be inserted once the Negative Rate Alarms at the NI Panels have been cleared. The crew should respond to multiple alarms and enter AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control. The RO should complete the immediate actions by closing the open Pressurizer PORV (PCV-444B) and gaining control of the Pressurizer Spray Valves. Depending on crew response time, a short OT~T turbine runback may occur. RCS pressure may drop below the DNB limit depending on how fast the operator responds to the failure. If so, the SRO should evaluate Tech Spec 3.2.5, DNB Parameters. The crew should be allowed to complete AOP-019 to stabilize the plant, but the channel does not have to be removed from service to continue the scenario.

The fifth event, a loss of Instrument Bus S-III, can be inserted once plant pressure has been restored and stabilized. The loss will occur due to a blown fuse on the 7.5kVA Inverter. This Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Scenario Event Description Shearon-Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 will require entry into AOP-024, Loss of Uninterruptible Power Supply. This procedure has immediate actions. The RO should verify Rod Control in Manual (already done due to previous AOP-001 entry) and the BOP should take manual control of all three Main FW Regulating Valves. This malfunction will also cause an auto start of the "A' ESW pump due to a loss of PT-9101A and a loss of the running ESCWS Chiller due to loss of FT-9209A. The instrument bus can be restored by transferring to the alternate power supply. SRO should evaluate Tech Specs 3.7.4 (Emergency Service Water), 3.7.13 (Essential Services Chilled Water System), and 3.8.1.1 (AC Sources - Operating).

Once power has been restored to Instrument Bus S-III via the alternate power supply, a Main Steam Line Break inside Containment on the "A' SG will occur and progressively worsen over the next five minutes. The crew should enter and carry out actions of PATH-1. The crew should diagnose that there is no LOCA in progress and transition to EPP-014, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

The automatic Main Steam Line Isolation signal (which should occur at 3 psig in Containment) is failed. The crew will have to manually isolate the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs). Once the crew has manually shut the MSIVs, it will be identifiable that the "A' Steam Generator is faulted inside Containment.

The AFW Auto Isolation will not occur and the crew will have to manually isolate AFW flow to the "A' Steam Generator. In addition, the "B' CSIP will fail to start automatically from the "B' Sequencer. The pump can be started by the operator. The scenario ends when Safety Injection has been terminated and the crew transitions to EPP-008, SI Termination.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Scenario Event Description Shearon-Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 SIMULATOR SETUP SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

• Provide a Reactivity Plan to candidates for lowering power to <90%

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

• IC-19, MOL, 100% power

• Place CIT on '8' RHR Pump and Protected Train Placard on 'A' RHR Pump switch

• Place OWP-RH-02 in OWP book

• Place appropriate coding on lit annunciators PRE-LOAD:

• Automatic MSLI failure (imf zrpk504a FAIL_ASIS, imf zrpk504b FAIL_ASIS)

• Automatic 'A' AFW Isolation failure (imf zrpk615a FAIL_ASIS, imf zrpk615b FAIL_ASIS)

• '8' CSIP fails to start automatically (imf dsg04a 2 2)

• '8' RHR pump Out of Service (irf rhr023 RACK_OUT)

TRIGGERS:

• ET-2: irf rms007 (2 00:00:00 00:00:00) 7.2900:00:00) imf zcr744 (2 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS)

RMS and Interlock failure

• ET-3: Control Rod 012 drops imf crf03a (3 00:00:00 00:00:00) 2 38)

• ET-4: imf pt:444 (400:00:0000:00:00) 2500.0 00:00:10)

PT-444 Fails HIGH

• ET-5: imf eps02 (5 00:00:00 00:00:00) 1A-SIII Loss of Instrument Bus 11/

• ET-6: (imf mss01a (6 00:00:00 00:00:00) 4.2e+006 00:05:00 0)

MSL Break Inside Containment on 'A' SG, ramps in over 5 min Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Scenario Event Description Shearon-Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 CAEP

!Description of NRC1 CAEP

!lC-19, MOL, 100% power

!'8' RHR pump is Out of Service

!4 GPD tube leak on '8' Steam Generator

!Preloads Automatic MSLI failure imf zrpk504a (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS imf zrpk504b (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS Automatic 'A' AFW Isolation failure imf zrpk615a (n 00:00:0000:00:00) FAIL_ASIS imf zrpk615b (n 00:00:0000:00:00) FAIL_ASIS

'8' CSIP fails to start automatically imf dsg04a (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) 2 2

'8' RHR pump Out of Service for Oil Replacement irf rhr023 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) RACK_OUT

!Event Triggers

!Event 1, Lower power to <90% for Turbine Valve Testing

! Reactivity - RO

!Event 2, RMS and Interlock failure Component - 80P irf rms007(2 00:00:00 00:00:00) 7.2900:00:00 imf zcr744 (2 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS

!Event 3, Control Rod D12 drops

! Component - RO Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Scenario Event Description Shearon-Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 imf crf03a (3 00:00:00 00:00:00) 2 38

!Event 4, PT-444 Fails HIGH Instrument - RO imf pt:444 (400:00:0000:00:00) 2500.000:00:10

!Event 5, Loss of Instrument Bus III Instrument - BOP imf eps02 (5 00:00:00 00:00:00) 1A-SIII

!Event 6, MSL Break Inside Containment, ramps in over 5 min Major - ALL imf mss01 a (6 00:00:00 00:00:00) 4.2e+006 00:05:00 0 Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # Page Z of 52 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time ~ Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior LEAD EVALUATOR: Cue Event 2 (Radiation Monitor Failure) when the evaluating team has completed their evaluation of the power change. It is not necessary to reach 90% power to continue the scenario.

EVALUATOR NOTE: The crew has been directed to lower power using GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown, to <90% power in preparation for Turbine Valve Testing.

EVALUATOR NOTE: The crew may elect to manually crack open a PRZ Spray Valve to establish PRZ Surge line flow and thereby maintain PRZlRCS boron concentrations within limits.

PROCEDURE NOTE: When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK-444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a PI controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows:

• PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected pressure.

• ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure.

• Increased probability for exceeding Tech 'Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # Page §. ill 52 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior II RO ENERGIZE all available Pressurizer Backup Heaters.

PROCEDURE NOTE: Routine load changes should be coordinated with the Load Dispatcher to meet system load demands.

INFORMS Load Dispatcher that a load reduction to 90% will SRO begin. (N/A, per Initial Conditions)

PROCEDURE CAUTION: A failure of the Vidar in the DEH computer has resulted in a plant trip in the past. This failure would affect operation in Operator Auto, and can be detected in either of the following ways:

• If OSI-PI is available, the process book PLANTSTATUS.PIW, DEH Trends function of the Plant Process Computer: DEH (menu) contains a point for DEH MEGAWATTS. With a failure of the Vidar, this point will not be updating.

• If OSI-PI is NOT available, accessing the ANALOG INPUTS screen on the Graphics display computer (in the Termination Cabinet room near the ATWS panel) will show several pOints, most of which should be updating if the Vidar is functioning properly.

EVALUATOR NOTE: There is no procedural guidance directing when the boration to lower power is required. The crew may elect to perform the boration prior to place the Turbine in GO. The boration steps are located on page 11 of this guide.

I J Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # Page ~ of 52 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior DIRECTS BOP to start power reduction at 4 DEH Units/Min.

SRO May direct initiation of a boration before the power reduction begins.

BOP Requests PEER check prior to manipulations of DEH Control BOP DEPRESS the LOAD RATE MW/MIN push-button.

ENTER the desired rate, NOT to exceed 5 MW/MIN, in the BOP DEMAND display. (4 DEH Units/minute)

BOP DEPRESS the ENTER push-button.

BOP DEPRESS the REF push-button.

ENTER the desired load (800-850MW per SCO) in the BOP DEMAND display.

DEPRESS the ENTER push-button. The HOLD push-button BOP should illuminate.

PROCEDURE NOTE: The unloading of the unit can be stopped at any time by depressing the HOLD push-button. The HOLD lamp will illuminate and the GO lamp will extinguish. The load reduction can be resumed by depreSSing the GO push-button. The HOLD lamp will extinguish and the GO lamp will illuminate.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # Page 10 of 52 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior DEPRESS the GO push-button to start the load reduction and BOP inform crew through 'Shift Update' Turbine in 'GO'.

BOP VERI FY the number in the REFERENCE display decreases.

BOP VERIFY Generator load is decreaSing.

WHEN Turbine load is less than 95%, THEN VERIFY the 3A BOP and 3B Feedwater Vents have been opened per OP-136, Section 7.2.

BOOTH OPERATOR: Acknowledge direction. No simulator response actions are required.

RO MONITORS primary systems response.

INITIATES boration, as necessary (with SRO concurrence) per RO OP-107.01.

DETERMINE the reactor coolant boron concentration from RO chemistry OR the Main Control Room status board.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # Page .11 of 52 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior DETERMINE the magnitude of boron concentration increase RO required.

DETERMINE the volume of boric acid to be added using the RO reactivity plan associated with the IC.

EVALUATOR NOTE: FIS-113, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, has a tenths position.

PROCEDURE CAUTION: If the translucent covers associated with the Boric Acid and Total Makeup Batch counters FIS-113 and FIS-114, located on the MCB, are not closed, the system will not automatically stop at the preset value.

SET FIS-113, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, to obtain the RO desired quantity.

PROCEDURE NOTE: Boration of the RCS will be dependent on charging and letdown flow rate. Placing additional letdown orifices in service will increase the boric acid delivery rate to the RCS.

SET controller 1CS-283, FK-113 BORIC ACID FLOW, for the RO desired flow rate.

VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in the RO STOP position.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # Page jg of 52 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit.

PLACE control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the BOR RO position.

PROCEDURE NOTE: When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK 444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a PI controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows:

• PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected pressure.

• ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure.

• Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure.

OPERATE the pressurizer backup heaters as required to limit RO the difference between the pressurizer and RCS boron concentration to less than 10 ppm.

• MAKE boron concentration adjustments as dictated from sample results.

PROCEDURE NOTE: Boration may be manually stopped at any time by turning control switch RMW CONTROL to STOP.

RO START the makeup system as follows:

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # Page 13 of 52 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to S7ART momentarily.

• VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT.

PROCEDURE CAUTION: The operation should be stopped if an unanticipated reactivity effect is seen. Do not resume the operation until the cause has been corrected.

RO VERIFY Tavg responds as desired.

IF rod control is in AUTO, THEN VERIFY the control rods are RO  !

stepping out to the desired height.

VERIFY boration automatically terminates when the desired RO quantity of boron has been added.

RO PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1.

EVALUATOR NOTE: Additional steps are included in section 5.1 but none will be applicable since the system just c:ame out of Automatic. The only steps included here are the ones with verifiable action.

RO VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch:

• Is in the STOP position .

• The GREEN light is LIT.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # Page 14 of 52 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO PLACE the RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO.

RO START the makeup system as follows:

• TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

• VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT .

LEAD EVALUATOR: ' Once the power reductions have been observed to the extent necessary, Cue Event 2 (Radiation Monitor High Alarm, Containment Purge fails to Isolate Automatically).

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 2 Page 15 of 52 Event

Description:

Radiation Monitor high alarm, Containment Purge fails to isolate Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior II II BOOTH OPERATOR: Actuate Trigger 2 (Radiation Monitor high alarm, Containment Purge fails to isolate) on cue from the Lead Evaluator.

Indications Available:

• ALB-10-4-5, RAD MONITOR SYSTEM TROUBLE Responds to ALB-10-4-5, RAD MONITOR SYSTEM RO TROUBLE.

CONFIRM alarm using:

CREW

• RM-23, Radiation Monitoring Panel BOOTH OPERATOR: If HP contacted to validate alarm wait one minute and then report that the monitor has failed.

If someone other than HP is dispatched to investigate, wait three minutes and then report REM-3502 Gas Channel failed - no power, no indication.

EVALUATOR NOTE: There are automatic actions associated with the failed channel that have been blocked by malfunction. The BOP may take the actions to place equipment in the interlock position from directions in AOP-005 or do so in accordance with the OWP.

The first section of the guide is written to the response of the APP and then AOP-005, the second part is written as if it will be done in the OWP which provides minor additional actions not contained in the AOP.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 2 Page 16 of 52 Event

Description:

Radiation Monitor high alarm, Containment Purge fails to isolate Time Applicant's Actions or Behavior II Position I VERIFY Automatic Functions:

BOP

• Automatic Actions are dependent upon which RM-23 Radiation Monitor is in ALARM CREW PERFORM Corrective Actions:

• IF the alarm is a Fuel Handling Building High Radiation alarm, THEN MANUALLY START the Spent Fuel Pool Purification System, using OP-116.01, Fuel Pool Cooling Purification System.

• IF the alarm is RM-21 AV-3509-1 SA or an Area Monitor in the vicinity of the VCT Valve Gallery and air is being purge SRO from the VCT to the plant vent per OP-120.07, THEN MANUALLY SECURE the air purge from the VCT to the plant vent per OP-120.07.

• IF any radiation monitor is in alarm condition, THEN GO SRO TO AOP-005, Radiation Monitoring System.

• IF maintenance is to be performed, THEN REFER TO SRO OWP-RM, Radiation Monitoring.

SRO (May diagnose early) Diagnoses as a failure of Channel 3502A CHECK radiation levels NOT in HIGH ALARM:

• Area Radiation Monitors (YES - Not in high Alarm)

SRO

• In-Plant Airborne Radiation Monitors (YES - Not in high Alarm)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 2 Page 17 Qf 52 Event

Description:

Radiation Monitor high alarm, Containment Purge fails to isolate Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior II II NOTIFY Health Physics to perform the following:

a. EVALUATE ANY alarm received using HPP-780, Radiation SRO Monitoring Systems Operator's Manual.

b. IF necessary, THEN SURVEY the affected area.

CHECK ALL Stack Monitor radiation levels NOT in ALARM.

SRO (YES - Not in Alarm)

CHECK ALL Process Monitors NOT in ALARM. (YES - Not in SRO Alarm)

REFER TO the following:

SRO

• Tech Spec Section 3.3.3.1

• Tech Spec Section 3.3.3.6 REFER TO the applicable attachment based on the affected SRO area or system monitors:

Containment Monitors - Attachment 1 p. 8 (Attachment 1)

SRO IF the plant is in Mode 5 or 6, THEN PERFORM the following:

(N/A plant in Mode 1)

IF Containment Ventilation Isolation has actuated, THEN SRO VERIFY proper equipment alignment using OMM-004, Post-Trip/Safeguards Actuation Review. (NO)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 2 Page 18 of 52 Event

Description:

Radiation Monitor high alarm, Containment Purge fails to isolate Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior II II IF REM-01 LT-3502ASA, Cnmt RCS Leak Detection Monitor, is in HIGH ALARM, THEN VERIFY Normal Containment Purge is ISOLATED, as follows:

a. VERIFY BOTH Cnmt Normal Purge Supply Fans are STOPPED:

• AH-82 A SRO

• AH-82 B

b. VERIFY ALL Cnmt Normal Purge Inlet/Discharge Dampers are SHUT:

• 1CP-5 SA

• 1CP-9 SA

• 1CP-3 SB

• 1CP-6 SB BOP

• Places AH-82A, Normal Containment Supply Fan, in STOP and releases.

• Places AH-82B, Normal Containment Supply Fan, in STOP and releases.

• Verifies 1CP-5, Normal Purge Inlet - CLOSED.

• Verifies 1CP-9, Normal Purge Inlet - CLOSED.

• Verifies 1CP-3, Normal Purge Discharge - CLOSED.

• Verifies 1CP-6, Normal Purge Discharge - CLOSED.

Notes that no further actions in AOP-005 Att. 1 are applicable.

SRO Reviews the remainder of the section and reaches step to EXIT procedure.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# _1_ Event # 2 Page ~ of 52 Event

Description:

Radiation Monitor high alarm, Containment Purge fails to isolate Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior II II Enters TS 3.3.3.1 , Action b Table 3.3.3-6:

Action 26 - Must satisfy the ACTION requirement for Specification 3.4.6.1 and; SRO Action 27 - With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, operation may continue provided the containment purge makeup and exhaust isolation valves are maintained closed).

Enters TS 3.4.6.1, Action a - With a. and c. of the above SRO required Leakage Detection Systems inoperable:

• Restore either Monitoring System (a. or c . 1 t 0 OPERABLE status within 30 days and

• Obtain and analyze a grab sample of the containment atmosphere for gaseous and particulate radioactivity at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

BOP Performs OWP-RM component lineup.

PROCEDURE CAUTION: The control switches for AH-82A and AH-82B must be taken to STOP momentarily to ensure they will not AUTO start.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 2 Page 20 of 52 Event

Description:

Radiation Monitor high alarm, Containment Purge fails to isolate Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior II II BOP

• Places AH-82A, Normal Containment Supply Fan, in STOP and releases.

• Places AH-82B, Normal Containment Supply Fan, in STOP and releases.

• Verifies 1CP-6, Normal Purge Inlet - CLOSED.

• Verifies 1CP-9, Normal Purge Inlet - CLOSED.

• Verifies 1CP-3, Normal Purge Discharge - CLOSED.

• Verifies 1CP-5, Normal Purge Discharge - CLOSED.

• Contact AO to place 1D21-2B, AH-82 (1A-NNS) Normal Containment Purge Makeup Air Handler breaker in OFF

• Contact AO to place 1E21-2F, AH-82 (1 B-NNS) Normal Containment Purge Makeup Air Handler breaker in OFF Completes an Equipment Problem Checklist and contacts SRO WCC for assistance.

EVALUATOR NOTE: The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 3 (Dropped Control Rod, 0-12) after the TS entries and the OWP has been completed.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 3 Page 21 of 52 Event

Description:

Dropped Control Rod (0-12)

Time i Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: Actuate Trigger-3 (Dropped Control Rod, 0-12) on cue from the Lead Evaluator.

Indications Available:

• ALB-13-8-5, COMPUTER ALARM ROD DEVlSEQ NIS PWR RANGE TILTS

• Multiple Rod Control Alarms - ALB-13-4-2, 4-5, 7-4, 8-5 RO Perform AOP-001 Immediate Actions.

Immediate RO CHECK that LESS THAN TWO control rods are dropped (YES)

Action Immediate RO POSITION Rod Bank Selector Switch to MAN.

Action Immediate RO CHECK Control Bank motion STOPPED. (YES)

Action PROCEDURE NOTE: Throughout this procedure, "Westinghouse Rod Control System Troubleshooting Guidelines" refers to Section 6.0 of EPRI document TR-1 08152, Rod Control System Maintenance - Westinghouse PWRs.

SRO GO TO Section 3.1, Dropped Control Rod SRO RECORD the time at which the rod dropped:

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 3 Page 22 of 52 Event

Description:

Dropped Control Rod (0-12)

Time II Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior ADJUST ONE of the following to equalize Tavg with Tref:

BOP/RO

• Turbine load

• Boron concentration CHECK ALL Rod Control Power and Logic Cabinets for normal operation, as follows:

CREW

• NO blown fuses

• NO other visible malfunctions BOOTH OPERATOR: If dispatched to investigate, wait three minutes and then report a blown fuse indication for Rod 0-12.

DETERMINE if the Westinghouse Rod Control System SRO Troubleshooting Guidelines should be initiated. (Priority E Work Request is required) (YES)

PROCEDURE CAUTION: If ALB-13-7-1, ROD CONTROL URGENT ALARM, is alarming due to a logic error, resetting the alarm before correcting the cause could result in dropping rods supplied from the affected power cabinet.

CHECK that ALB-13-7-1, ROD CONTROL URGENT ALARM, RO is CLEARED. (YES)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 3 Page 23 of 52 Event

Description:

Dropped Control Rod (0-12)

Time I Position  ! Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE NOTE:

• Surveillance requirement 4.1.1.1.1.a requires performing a shutdown margin calculation upon detecting an inoperable control rod. [C.1]

• Technical Specification 3.1.3.1 Action d.3.d) will be limiting if there is any chance that the dropped rod cannot be recovered within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> of event initiation. This Action Statement also requires a power reduction to 75% within two hours of event initiation.

• If ALB 13-7-1, ROD CONTROL URGENT ALARM, is causing multiple control rods to be inoperable, Tech Spec 3.1.3.1 Action c is applicable.

REVIEW Technical Specifications:

3.1.1.1 - 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> action to determine shutdown margin SRO 3.1.3.1.d.3 - 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> action from initiation to be <75% power (12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, and 5 day actions also apply)

NOTI FY the following:

SRO

• Manager - Operations

• Reactor Engineering Completes an Equipment Problem Checklist and contacts SRO WCC for assistance.

RO CHECK Reactor Power AT OR ABOVE P-10 (10%) [C.3] (YES)

CHECK ALL negative rate trip alarms at the NIS cabinets RO CLEARED. (NO)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 3 Page 24 of 52 Event

Description:

Dropped Control Rod (0-12)

Time  ! Position  ! Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO RESET the negative rate trip alarms at the NIS cabinets.

LEAD EVALUATOR: Cue Event 4 (Controlling PZR Pressure Channel (PT-444) Fails High) Booth Operator when rate trips are reset.

NOTE THAT IF THESE TRIPS ARE NOT RESET THEN EVENT 5 WILL CAUSE A REACTOR TRIP.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 4 Page 25 of 52 Event

Description:

Controlling PZR Pressure Channel (PT-444) Fails High Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: Actuate Trigger 4 (Controlling PZR Pressure Channel, PT-444, fails HIGH).

Indications Available:

• ALB-09-3-2 PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL

• ALB-09-5-1 PRESSURIZER HIGH-LOW PRESS

• ALB-09-8-1 PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK HIGH-LOW LEVEL PRESS OR TEMP

• ALB-09-8-2 PRESSURIZER RELIEF DISCHARGE HIGH TEMP RO Responds to ALB-09 alarms.

Reports channel failure or malfunction of RCS Pressure RO control.

RO Perform AOP-019 Immediate Actions.

Immediate RO CHECK that a bubble exists in the PRZ. (YES)

Action Immediate VERIFY ALL PRZ PORVs AND associated block valves Action RO properly positioned for current PRZ pressure and plant conditions. (NO)

Immediate IF ANY PRZ PORV will NOT shut when required, THEN SHUT Action its associated block valve.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 4 Page 26 of 52 Event

Description:

Controlling PZR Pressure Channel (PT-444) Fails High Time II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Immediate CHECK Both PRZ spray valves properly positioned for current Action RO PRZ pressure and plant conditions. (NO)

Immediate CONTROL PRZ spray valves in MANUAL using ONE of the Action following (listed in order of preference):

RO

• PK-444A, Master Pressure Controller OR

• Both individual spray valve controllers GO TO Section 3.1, Pressure Control Malfunctions While SRO Operating With a Pressurizer Bubble.

EVALUATOR NOTE: Dependent on crew response time, the PRT rupture disk may fail causing containment radiation monitor alarms.

Inform SSO to REFER to PEP-110, Emergency Classification SRO and Protective Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Network at entry point x.

RO MONITOR PRZ pressure by observing other reliable indication.

SRO CHECK plant in MODE 1 OR 2. (YES)

RO CHECK PRZ pressure CONTROLLED. (YES)

RO CHECK PRZ pressure 2335 PSIG OR LESS. (YES)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 4 Page 27 of 52 Event

Description:

Controlling PZR Pressure Channel (PT-444) Fails High Time II Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior CHECK ALL of the following PRZ PORV block valves OPEN:

RO

• 1RC-117 (for PCV-445A SA) (YES)

• 1RC-115 (for PCV-445B) (YES)

• 1RC-113 (for PCV-44B SB) (YES)

CHECK that a malfunction of one or more of the following has occurred:

• PT-444 (YES)

RO

• PK-444A (NO)

• PRZ heater(s) (NO)

• PRZ spray valve(s) or controller(s) (NO)

RO CHECK PK-444A controlling properly in AUTO. (NO)

PERFORM the following:

RO

• VERIFY PK-444A in MANUAL

• ADJUST PK-444A output as necessary, to attempt to restore and maintain PRZ pressure.

RO CONTROL PRZ pressure as follows:

PROCEDURE NOTE: If individual spray valve controllers are already in MAN, do NOT return to AUTO.

CHECK BOTH PRZ spray valve controllers in AUTO AND RO BOTH spray valves operating as desired. (YES)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 4 Page 28 of 52 Event

Description:

Controlling PZR Pressure Channel (PT-444) Fails High Time II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO CHECK ALL PRZ heaters operating as desired. (YES)

• Manually OPERATE control switches for heater groups as necessary to control PRZ pressure. (N/A)

CHECK at least one of the following conditions present:

RO

• PRZ pressure is UNCONTROLLED (NO)

• Status of a normal spray valve or a PRZ heater bank is UNCONTROLLED (NO)

REFER TO Tech Spec 3.2.5 (DNB Parameters) AND SRO IMPLEMENT action where appropriate.

(Limit is 2185 psig - restore within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />)

Completes an Equipment Failure Checklist and contacts WCC SRO for assistance.

EVALUATOR'S NOTE: The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 5 (Loss of Instrument Bus S-III) after the negative rate trip alarms have been reset. DO NOT INITIATE NEXT EVENT UNTIL THESE ALARMS ARE RESET OR A REACTOR TRIP WILL OCCUR.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 5 Page 29 of 52 Event

Description:

Loss of Instrument Bus S-III Time II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTE: A REACTOR TRIP COULD OCCUR FROM COMPLICATIONS DURING THE LOSS OF THE INSTRUMENT BUS. THE SCENARIO HAS BEEN VALIDATED ASSUMING THE INSTRUMENT BUS ALTERNATE POWER IS RESTORED. IF A TRIP OCCURS RESTORE POWER TO THE BUS ASAP.

BOOTH OPERATOR: VERIFY NEGATIVE RATE TRIP ALARMS ARE CLEAR PRIOR TO INITIATION OF THIS EVENT.

BOOTH OPERATOR: Actuate Trigger 5 (Loss of Uninterruptible Power Supply S-III) on cue from the Lead Evaluator.

Indications Available: Multiple alarms associated with Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill.

• Key Indicator is Row 3 of TSLB LIT Immediate RO PLACE Rod Control in MANUAL.

Action Immediate BOP CHECK Instrument Bus Sill ENERGIZED. (NO)

Action PERFORM the following:

• PLACE Main FW Regulator Valves in MANUAL.

Immediate Action BOP

• VERIFY Main FW Regulator Bypass Valves in MANUAL.

• CONTROL SG levels between 52% and 62%

(OMM-001 Att. 13 trip limits 30% and 73%)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 5 Page 30 of 52 Event

Description:

Loss of Instrument Bus S-III Time II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE NOTE: Loss of electrical power may require initiation of the SHNPP Emergency Plan.

REFER TO PEP-110, Emergency Classification and Protective SRO Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Network at entry point X.

DETERMINE the affected bus (S-III) and GO TO appropriate SRO section (Section 3.1)

PLACE the affected NI Rod Stop Bypass switch to BYPASS at RO the Detector Current Comparator Drawer.

RO RESTORE Tavg as necessary.

SRO CHECK the plant in Modes 1 through 4. (YES)

PROCEDURE NOTE: SG PORVs may be controlled locally if needed.

Manually CONTROL the following based on the Instrument Bus lost: (for S-III)

• Rod Control CREW

• 'C' SG PORV

• Main FW Reg Valves

• Main FW Reg Bypass Valves GO TO the applicable step based on the Instrument Bus lost.

SRO (step 7)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 5 Page 31 of 52 Event

Description:

Loss of Instrument Bus S-III Time II Position i Applicant's Actions or Behavior VERIFY PRZ Level Controller Selector Switch in CHAN RO 459/460. (YES)

PROCEDURE NOTE: If power is lost to instrument bus Sill (A Train), the associated ESW header pressure instrument will read low and the ESW pump will start on sensed low pressure. ESW Screen Wash will be inoperable due to loss of the ESW Screen Wash Pump discharge header pressure permissive for starting the screen, causing the associated EDG to be inoperable. Tech Specs 3.7.4 and 3.8.1.1 will apply.

EVALUATOR NOTE: This event will also cause an ESW Pump to start. This start will increase the cooling to containment and likely cause an alarm due to low pressure in containment.

REFER TO the following Tech Specs:

• 3.7.4, Emergency Service Water SRO

• 3.8.1.1, AC Sources - Operating

• 3.8.3.1 action c, Onsite Power Distribution

• (optional) 3.6.5, Vacuum Relief System PERFORM OST-1023, Offsite Power Availability Verification CREW Weekly Interval Modes 1 - 6.

SRO GO TO Step 9.

RO CHECK Letdown in service. (YES)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 5 Page 32 of 52 Event

Description:

Loss of Instrument Bus S-III Time II Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO CHECK ALL PRZ heaters in service. (YES)

BOP CHECK ANY WC-2 Essential Chiller RUNNING. (NO)

EVALUATOR NOTE: The crew may decide to NOT start the standby Chiller based on getting alternate power restored to S-III which will cause the 'A' Chiller to automatically start.

If the crew elects to start the 'B' chiller OP-148 section 5.1 and 5.2 are included in the back pages of this guide.

START the standby chiller per OP-148, Essential Services BOP Chilled Water System.

CONTACT Maintenance to perform the following:

CREW

• CHECK the inverter and vital bus for indications of grounds or other faults.

• CORRECT ANY problems found.

DISPATCH an operator to perform the following:

• CHECK the affected instrument inverter (7.5 KVA UPS PANEL Sill for ANY of the following:

CREW 0 Red OVERCURRENT I-IL light LIT (NOTE: I-IL stands for Current indicating light) 0 Obvious signs of damage BOOTH OPERATOR: When dispatched to investigate UPS Panel Sill, wait 1 minute and then report that the Red OVERCURRENT I-IL light is LIT and there is a faint acrid odor in the area.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 5 Page 33 of 52 Event

Description:

Loss of Instrument Bus S-III Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct the TRANSFER of Instrument Bus to the alternate power CREW supply per OP-156.02, Section 8.7, AC Electrical Distribution.

BOOTH OPERATOR: When directed by the Main Control Room to transfer Instrument Bus III to its alternate power supply.

(If not already done) Inform crew that the ATWS panel Bypass switch needs to be placed in BYPASS.

Run APP eps INSTR_BUS_UPS_IILALT. This APP takes approximately 3 minutes to complete. Once the

. APP is complete, report transfer complete to the MCR .

EVALUATOR NOTE: Once the transfer to the alternate power supply is performed the tripped WC-2 Essential Chiller will automatically restart.

PROCEDURE NOTE: Loss of power to PIC CAB-4 (fed from Instrument Bus SIV) will result in bistables P-476B, P-486B and P-496B (differential pressure bistables used in AFW isolation logic) being inoperable. Tech Spec Table 3.3-3, Action 19, requires the associated channels to be placed in a tripped conditions within six hours. These bistables are energized to trip. If power is not restored within six hours, Action 19 cannot be carried out and Tech Spec 3.0.3 will be applicable.

SRO REFER to Tech Specs BOOTH OPERATOR: IF SRO is not evaluating Tech Specs call as the MSO and ask what Tech Spec the plant is currently in.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 5 Page 34 of 52 Event

Description:

Loss of Instrument Bus S-III Time II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO CHECK the affected Instrument Bus ENERGIZED. (YES)

LEAD EVALUATOR: Lead Evaluator can cue Event 6 (MSLB on 'A' SG Inside Containment) AFTER alternate power has been restored to Instrument Bus S-lli.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 6,7,8,9 Page 35 Qf 52 Event

Description:

MSLB on 'A' SG Inside Containment Automatic MSLI fails AFW Automatic Isolation fails CSIP 'B' fails to start from Load Sequencer Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior II EVALUATOR NOTE: A Main Steam Line Break inside Containment will occur and progressively worsen over the next five minutes. The crew should enter and carry out actions of PATH-1. The crew should diagnose that there is no LOCA in progress and transition to EPP-014, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

The automatic Main Steam Line Isolation signal (which should occur at 3 psig in Containment) is failed. The crew will have to manually isolate the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs). Once the crew has manually shut the MSIVs, it will be identifiable that the 'A' Steam Generator is faulted inside Containment.

The AFW Auto Isolation will not occur and the crew will have to manually isolate AFW flow to the 'A' Steam Generator. In addition, the 'B' CSIP will fail to start automatically from the 'B' Sequencer. The pump can be started by the operator. The scenario ends when Safety Injection has been terminated and the crew transitions to EPP-OOS, SI Termination BOOTH OPERATOR: On cue from the Lead Evaluator, insert Trigger 6 (MSLB on 'A' SG Inside Containment)

Indications Available:

• ALB-02S-5-1 CONTAINMENT AIR HIGH VACUUM will unexpectedly clear (in due to earlier ESW Pump start)

• ALB-02S-S-5 COMPUTER ALARM VENTILATION SYSTEM

• Rising pressure in containment

• Rising temperature in containment Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 6,7,8,9 Page 36 Qf 52 Event

Description:

MSLB on 'A' SG Inside Containment Automatic MSLI fails AFW Automatic Isolation fails CSIP 'B' fails to start from Load Sequencer I Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior II SRO Enters PATH-1 RO VERIFY Reactor Trip:

• AUTO or MANUAL Reactor Trip successful:

• CHECK for any of the following:

• Trip breakers RTA and BYA OPEN (YES)

• Trip breakers RTB and BYB OPEN (YES)

• ROD Bottom lights LIT (YES)

• NEUTRON flux decreasing (YES)

BOP VERIFY Turbine Trip:

• CHECK for any of the following:

• ALL turbine throttle valves - SHUT (YES)

• ALL turbine governor valves - SHUT (YES)

BOP VERIFY power to AC Emergency Buses

• 1A-SA AND 1B-SB Buses energized by off-site power or EOG's. (YES)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 6,7,8,9 Page 37 of 52 Event

Description:

MSLB on 'A' SG Inside Containment Automatic MSLI fails AFW Automatic Isolation fails CSIP 'B' fails to start from Load Sequencer Time ~ Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO CHECK SI Actuation:

CHECK for any of the following - LIT

• SI Actuated bypass permissive light (NO)

• ALB-11-2-2(NO)

• ALB-11-5-1 (NO)

• ALB-11-5-3 (NO)

• ALB-12-1-4 (NO)

CHECK SI Actuation criteria:

RO

• CNMT pressure - GREATER THAN 3.0 PSIG (YES)

• PRZ pressure - LESS THAN 1850 PSIG (NO)

• Steam pressure - LESS THAN 601 PSIG (NO)

RO SI Actuation - REQUIRED (YES)

RO Verifies SI auto actuation SRO Perform the following:

• Initiate monitoring the Critical Safety Function Status Trees.

• Evaluate EAL Network using entry point X .

CREW Foldout A Applies.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 6,7,8,9 Page 38 of 52 Event

Description:

MSL8 on 'A' SG Inside Containment Automatic MSLI fails AFW Automatic Isolation fails CSIP '8' fails to start from Load Sequencer Time ~ Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Verify All CSIPs AND RHR pumps - RUNNING (NO)

RO START 'B' CSI P RO Check SI Flow:

• SI flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM (YES)

• RCS pressure - LESS THAN 230 PSIG (NO)

BOP Check Main Steam Isolation:

Main Steam Isolation - ACTUATED (NO)

Check Main Steam Isolation actuation criteria:

• Steam line pressure - LESS THAN 601 PSIG (YES/NO)

• CNMT pressure - GREATER THAN 3,0 PSIG (YES)

• Manual closure of all MSIVs AND bypass valves is desired, BOP Main Steam Isolation - REQUIRED (YES)

BOP Verify all MSIVs and bypass valves - SHUT Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 6,7,8,9 Page 39 Qf 52 Event

Description:

MSLB on 'A' SG Inside Containment Automatic MSLI fails AFW Automatic Isolation fails CSIP 'B' fails to start from Load Sequencer Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Check CNMT Pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG (NO)

NOTE: Crew may set an early manual actuation setpoint and manually align spray prior to an auto actuation set RO point being reached.

• Verify Containment Spray actuated

• Secure RCP's (based on Phase B or RCS Press <1400 psig and SI flow> 200 gpm)

CREW Identifies Containment Adverse Conditions BOP Check AFW Status:

• AFW flow - AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAILABLE Verify Alignment Of Components From Actuation of ESFAS BOP Signals Using Attachment 6, Safeguards Actuation Verification, While Continuing With This Procedure.

RO/BOP Control RCS Temperature:

• Stabilize AND maintain temperature between 555°F AND 559°F using Table 1.

RO/BOP Check PRZ PORVs AND Spray Valves:

• Verify AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1 - ENERGIZED

• Check PRZ PORVs - SHUT Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 6,7,8,9 Page 40 of 52 Event

Description:

MSLB on 'A' SG Inside Containment Automatic MSLI fails AFW Automatic Isolation fails CSIP 'B' fails to start from Load Sequencer Time ~ Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• Check block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN

• PRZ spray valves - SHUT RO/BOP Identify Any Faulted SG:

Check for any of the following:

• Any SG pressures - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES)

• Any SG - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED (NO)

GO TO EPP-014, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR SRO ISOLATION, Step 1 iI~f":i1;f~~~;""'>: <' ....' ...............*.....**.*.*. ' .*...* '.": *......*.. ~

. ...

E.~P"Q:t~, FAULTI~l:),$l'EAM~.fENe:ffi;~t~R{e()IiAT,fO~,i,' .'

"""':/'.  : ....: ....... > .... ';'.".:::""  ;,::';: >. .' .hi .:f:<'7',,"'::;Y"";' . ',',., ',' . ".' '.

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

• At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown,

• Any faulted SG OR secondary break should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS cooldown.

SRO Implement Function Restoration Procedures As Required.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 6.7.8.9 Page 41 Qf 52 Event

Description:

MSL8 on 'A' SG Inside Containment Automatic MSLI fails AFW Automatic Isolation fails CSIP '8' fails to start from Load Sequencer Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior II II Critical BOP/RO Check MSIVs AND Bypass Valves:

Task

• Verify all MSIVs - SHUT (YES) 0 MSIV A 1 MS-SO 0 MSIV B 1 MS-S2 0 MSIV C 1 MS-S4

• Verify all MSIV bypass valves - SHUT (YES) 0 MSIV A 1 MS-S1 0 MSIV B 1 MS-S3 0 MSIV C 1 MS-S5 BOP/RO Check Any SG NOT Faulted:

• Any SG pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)

BOP/RO Identify Any Faulted SG:

• Check for any of the following:

• Any SG pressure - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

• Any SG - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED BOP/RO Isolate Faulted SG(s):

• Verify faulted SG(s) PORV - SHUT

• Verify main FW isolation valves - SHUT Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 6,7,8,9 Page 42 of 52 Event

Description:

MSLB on 'A' SG Inside Containment Automatic MSLI fails AFW Automatic Isolation fails CSIP 'B' fails to start from Load Sequencer Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior II

• Shut faulted SG(s) steam supply valve to TDAFW pump -

SHUT

• SG B: 1MS-70

• SG C: 1MS-72

• Verify main steam drain isolation(s) before MSIVs - SHUT:

• SG A: 1MS-231

• SG B: 1MS-266

• SG C: 1MS-301

• Verify SG blowdown isolation valves - SHUT

• Verify main steam analyzer isolation valves - SHUT BOP/RO Check CST Level- GREATER THAN 10%

PROCEDURE NOTE: A SG may be suspected to be ruptured if it fails to dry out following isolation of feed flow. Local checks for radiation can be used to confirm primary-to-secondary leakage.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario*1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 6,7,8,9 Page 43 of 52 Event

Description:

MSLB on 'A' SG Inside Containment Automatic MSLI fails AFW Automatic Isolation fails CSIP 'B' fails to start from Load Sequencer Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior II II BOP/RO Check Secondary Radiation:

• Check for all of the following:

• SG blowdown radiation - NORMAL

• Main steamline radiation - NORMAL BOP/RO Check SG Levels:

• Any level - INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (NO)

BOP/RO Check If SI Has Been Terminated:

• SI flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM EVALUATOR NOTE: Adverse values apply since containment pressure has exceeded 3 psig. Adverse values are in brackets and bolded where applicable.

BOP/RO Check SI Termination Criteria:

• Check Subcooling - GREATER THAN 10°F [40°FJ- C 20°F [50°FJ- M (YES)

Note the 'C' and 'M' above refers to how subcooling is calculated. 'C' is by the Computer, 'M' is Manual Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 6,7,8,9 Page 44 Qf 52 Event

Description:

MSLB on 'A' SG Inside Containment Automatic MSLI fails AFW Automatic Isolation fails CSIP 'B' fails to start from Load Sequencer Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior II Check secondary heat sink by observing any of the following:

• Level in at least one intact SG - GREATER THAN 25%

[40%] (YES)

• Total feed flow to SGs - GREATER THAN 210 KPPH (YES)

• RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)

• PRZ level- GREATER THAN 10% [30%] (YES)

BOP/RO Reset SI.

Manually Realign Safeguards Equipment Following A Loss Of CREW Offsite Power. (Refer to PATH-1 GUIDE, Attachment 2.)

BOP/RO Reset Phase A AND Phase B Isolation Signals.

BOP/RO Establish Instrument Air AND Nitrogen To CNMT:

• Open the following valves:

• 11A-819

• 1SI-287 BOP/RO Stop All But One CSIP.

BOP/RO Check RCS Pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 6.7.8.9 Page 45 ill 52 Event

Description:

MSLB on 'A' SG Inside Containment Automatic MSLI fails AFW Automatic Isolation fails CSIP 'B' fails to start from Load Sequencer Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior II BOP/RO Isolate High Head SI Flow:

• Check CSIP suction - ALIGNED TO RWST (YES)

• Open normal miniflow isolation valves:

• 1CS-182

• 1CS-196

• 1CS-210

• 1CS-214

• Shut BIT outlet valves:

• 1SI-3

• 1SI-4

• Verify cold leg AND hot leg injection valves - SHUT

• 1SI-52

• 1SI-86

• 1SI-107

• Observe CAUTION prior to Step 21 AND GO TO Step 21.

PROCEDURE CAUTION: High head 51 flow should be isolated before continuing.

BOP/RO Establish Charging lineup:

• Shut charging flow control valve: FK-122.1 Open charging line isolation valves:

• 1CS-235

• 1CS-238 Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _1_ Event # 6,7,8,9 Page 46 of 52 Event

Description:

MSLB on 'A' SG Inside Containment Automatic MSLI fails AFW Automatic Isolation fails CSIP 'B' fails to start from Load Sequencer Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior II II PROCEDURE NOTE: RCS temperature must be stabilized to allow evaluation of PRZ level trend.

BOP/RO Monitor RCS Hot Leg Temperature:

• Check RCS hot leg temperature - STABLE (YES)

PROCEDURE CAUTION: Charging flow should NOT exceed 150 GPM to prevent damage to the regenerative heat exchanger.

BOP/RO Control Charging Flow To Maintain PRZ Level:

• Control charging using charging flow control valve:

• FK-122.1

• Maintain charging flow less than 150 GPM.

• PRZ Level- CAN BE MAINTAINED STABLE OR INCREASING TERMINATE THE SCENARIO Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 501) STARTUP 5.1. Startup TraIn A-SA (B-SB) frorn Main Control Room or local Panel 5.. 1.1:. tnitialConoitions NOTE: Section :i2, Placing; Standby Train in Operation. should be used when swapping lcalns of ESC"lVS.

1. No Chiller Train is in ser'lice.

2. Systemii!ll8dand vented per Section 8.1.

3. System !ilfleup,A.ttachments 1: and 2 are complete.

4. For non-emergency starts the prestart cnetfr.s of

Attachment:

have been

~)erformed and an cq::Jerator should ~)e present to observe start of chilrer.

5. Section R 12: Manual Chiller Reset has been performed, if necessary due to oMler

6. lhe L O. heaters VUlve i)ean in service for twelve hours. (See. PreealJtion and Umitation 4. (1.3 for appllcai)ility of this :lniUal CondITion)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 5.1.2. Procedural Steps NOTE: Whenever an "'A'" Trrun component is referred to in the body of ttlis proeOOure it's"B" Train cOI.mterpart 'Mit immedate~ foiIlow, em:!osed by parentheses.

NOTE: ESR 99-00142 has evaluated and determined ttlat oog-'teml closure of tile ro supply and rerum valves the NNS AH lmits will oot affect 1JijJerabiiity of the Essernial Services Chilter system. The next two steps 'MN adign the NNS AH ltniits however, If it is desired to mrumafunttle NNS isolation wIVes Shllt, then steps 5.1.2.1 aM :5.1.2.1 may be Skipped.

1. ISOLATE tile supply and return vawes tattle NNS AH units from the train tliat will not be placed in service by shutting tile following valves:

1CH-125 SB (1CH-100 SB) CHIlLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN ClRSISOL 1CH-126 SA (1CH-197 SA) CHillED WATER FROM NESSR FAN CLRS ISOL 1CH-115 SA (1CH-148 SB) CHIllED WATER TO NESSR FANS CLR

!SOL .

1CH-116 SB (1CH-i49 SA) CHIllED WATER TO NESSR FAN ClRS iSOL

2. ALIGN the supply am retum valves to the NNS AH units associated with the train tl1~ wiN be placed insel'Viice by opefiifig the foiIlowing wlves:

1CH-125 SB {1CH-100 SB) CHilLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN CLRSiSOL 1CH-126 SA (1CH-191 SA) CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN ClRSiSOL 1CH-115 SA (1CH-i48 SB) CHIllED WATER TO NESSR FANS CLR

!SOL 1CH-116 SB (1CH-149 SA) CHIllED WATER TO NESSR FAN CLRS ISOL Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 NOlE: TIle local ~arm illdieaOOi1 Tor !ow cl1i~ed water flow and low cl1Uled water temperature wUI Jock in until manuruw reset at the WC-2 control panel.

3. START We Chillier 1A-SA (U~-SB) Ch~1OO water pump P-4 to establisJ'l ci1UIOO water flow"

4. At the local Contn:JiI panel, RESET the low Chfilled Water Flow alarm IJ$mg the CHillED WATER NO FLOW TRIP !NDlCATION RESET push-button.

NOlE: If the lInit cycles off due to low chined water flow or low chilled water temperature, the unit w~1 amomaticaliy restart If all start permissNe amdltioos*

exfst NOlE: An ann-recycle feature prevents more than one normal start within a 30 minute period. This anti-recyde feature is bypassed upon any autornatic start signal from tile ESf sequencer.

NOTE: .Aler going to START on the Chiller Cootroll Switch, the oil pump will start and bring oil pressure up to normal operating pressure pr'ior to chiDer start NOTE: OPT-1512 rotates the Tempernture Control Point potentIDmeterto dean the surfaces. While OPT-1512 restores the potentiometer to i:ts origiMi position, it is possible that due to the surface cleaning the characteris1Jcs of the potentrometer have changed suWu:ienlty to require a manual temperature ad1ustment per Section 8.14 of this procedure. This wfl! be determined by mOnitoong tempen;lture after chi!ierstart in the following Step.

5. START the chinerby performing ooe dtne foNowIng:

(l. At AEP-1, PLACE Water Chflter Compressor WC-2 A-SA (WC-2 8-88) control sIMicn to the* START posmon and release.

OR D. OEPRESSthe START PlJ$l:H;tutton at too local amllroll panelIMth too locaJSeJect switm in the LOCAL position.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 5.,2. Pl.ae:ing Standby Train In Operation NOTE: it is necessary to shffi associated tmins of HVAC units when shjftjng trains of Essential Services ChH!edWatef.

NOTE: This Section js written for sl,lvappingl'rom Tram 13 ESCVV to Train A ESC'l't',

with components for swapping from Train A ESCW to Train B ESGN in parentheses"

t. SePJiil')£!; water is being SUppIi'EH:I to the non-(l[)eratingcnii:ler WC-2 tA..-SA (VVC-2 1B-S13).

2.. One tn,lin of ESCW is already in operation.

3, For non-emergency starts the prestart checKs of Attachment 5 have been perfo ffil ed and an operator shouid be present to observe start of cil:mer..

4. Section 8.12, Mamla! ChIller Reset performed if necessarl fOlr nOll-operating ch:i!ller.

s. The LO" heaters have been in service for Nve!ve hours. (See Precaution and Umilation4.0.3 forapp4icabHity of this initial Condition) 5,2.1. Procedural Steps NOTE: The !ocala]aml inaicatilon for lOW chilledw'ater flow and lOIN chiUedw'ater temperature wHI loc[;: in unt!! mamJaliy res.et at the "NC-2 control: paneL NOTE: If starting th~ chiller cornpressOfis delayed follovJlng tM start of the P-4 Pump jn me next Step, the compressor oil could cool down to the point that the compressor w1H 011 low oil pressure

1. .At AEP-l, STA.RT me l1on-opera!ing Chiller VVC~2 .A-SA (B-SB) Chilled lJ'vater Pump P-4 A,-S,iI, (B-SB) to estabfish chilled water flO'I\! the non-operating train.

2. At the local Control panel, RESET the Low ChHled '~'Vater Flow alarm using the CHILLED '~VATER NO FLO\r'l' TRIP INDICATION RESET push-!)utloo.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 NOTE: OPT-1512 rotates too Temperature Control Pottnt potenliometer to c~n the surfaces. WhiOO! OPT-1512 restores the potentiometer to its ofigirnlli POSU1011, it is PQSsijote that due to the ruiiace c~ni~ the charactelistics of too potentiometer Mve changed ruffh::ien~ to require a matIDai terrlfl'fature adjl.lsmtem: per Section R 14 of this procedure. nus m! be determined by mOMoong temperature after dliiUlrstart in the folklwing Step.

3. START ttle chimer by performttflg ONE of Ule romowm~r

a. At AEP-1, PLACE Water Cllmer Compressor WC-2 A-SA (WC-2 B-3S) control sMtdl to too START position AND RELEASE OR

b. DEPRESS the 8TART pusMIDtton :at the local con~ panel with 100 local se4ect SWitdl in the lOCAL position.

4. PLACE addruona! safety rel:ated air handlers 111 service plior to SWitl:::OOVef of the nonessentlal neader.

NOTE: ESR 99-00142 has evaluated and determined that long-term closure oUoo supply and return valves to the NNS AH units win oot affect operability of the ES5en~1 Services Cruller sY&enl. The next two S!:eps 1Ni1lailign the NNS AH uruts oowever, if it is desired to fl'taintain the NNS isoIatlon valVes shut, then steps 52.2.5 and 5.L.2.6 may be skipped.

5.. ISOLATE the SllfJ1lfy and rerum wives to the NNS AH units from the tram that was already operating by sl1ut~ng Ile foliowmg vaives*:

tCH-196 SB (1CH-125 SB) CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN CLRSISOl 1CH-191 SA (1CH-126 SA) CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN CLRS !SOL 1CH-148 SB (1CH-115 SA) CHILLED WATER TO NESSR FANS ClR ISOL 1CH-149 SA (1CH-116 SB) CHILLED WATER TO NE8SR FAN CLRS ISOL Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 5,2.2 Procedur8il Smps (corrtim.l!ed)

o. AUGN NNS AH units to the main that wiJ! remain operatilng by opening the fo~low[ng V;:Eves:

1CH-125 SB (1CH-196 SB) CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN CLRS !SOL 1CH-126 SA (1CH-197 SA) CHillED WATER FROM NESSR FAN CLRS !SOL 1CH-115 SA {1CH-14B SB} CHILlED WATER TO NESSR FANS CLRISOL 1CH-116 SB (1CH-149 SA) CHILLED WATER TO NESSR FAN ClRSISOL 7_ IF shifting chilllers to support placing the standby safety eqUipment train in service, THEN PERFORM Attachmem: R NOTE: Service water to the chillier c.oodenser wiJl isolate gO secortdis after the ch~lIIer nas stopped, SW FROM WC-2 B-SB (A-SA) CONDENSER 1SW-1200 S8 (1SW-1055 SA) wi!! dose.

B. STOP the chiller by perfom"ril1g one of the following:

a. At AEP-1, PLACE Water Chiler Compressor WC-2 a-SB (A-SA) c.ootrOil switcn to the STOP position OIr1d release.

OR

b. DEPRESS the STOP pusn-button at the local control pane! with the local select. sWitdl in the lOCAL posffion.

9. AtAEP-1, STOP the Crnl!erWC-2 B-SB {A-SA} ChiUed WamrPump P-4 B-SB (A-SA) ifllhe train justsecLH""OO.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 1 FINAL

Scenario 2 Turnover Plant Status

• During the last week Main Turbine vibrations have increased to the point that Plant Management determined a plant shutdown is required. The Reactor will be taken to HSD and the Main Turbine taken off line to perform balance shots.

• The unit is at ~ 39 percent power with a downpower ramp being held through shift turnover. During the ramp down Main Turbine vibrations have returned to normal levels. Plant Management has directed the shutdown to continue.

• The Load Dispatcher requests that the downpower continue at 4 DEH Units/min.

• GP-006 step 15 is in progress with step 16 completed

• Middle of life conditions

• An RCS Boron sample take 30 minutes ago was 1116 ppm

• "A" Train equipment is in service

• Motivating air is isolated per OP-133

(

• Normal Dayshift

• Status Board is updated Equipment Out of Service:

• "B" SG has a 4 Gallon Per Day tube leak

• "B" RHR Pump is under clearance for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> for breaker inspection.

OWP-RH-02 completed; T.S. 3.5.2.a (72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO). "A" RHR Pump is protected.

• "B" Containment Spray pump, under clearance for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for motor replacement; OWP-CT-02 completed; T.S. 3.6.2.1 (72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO).

"A" Containment Spray pump is protected.

Reactivity PlanlBrief:

• Use attached Reactivity Plan to take unit offline at 4 DEH UnitslMin.

Risk Assessment:

• Qualitative YELLOW due to downpower HARRIS 2009A- NRC Simulator Scenario 2 Turnover FINAL.doc

This is the reactivity plan for the Cycle 15 MOL Shutdown at

( 4MWe/minute.

POWERTRAX Operating Strategy Generator Module CyI5MOC/Shtdwnaishtdwnc Date: Today Time: Now Page: 1 Step Date Time Power ppm B Gal Bor Gal Dil R Step AFD AO-XE K Effective 1 000201 060000 100.0 1025 103 0 218 -4.7 1.5 0.99533 2 000201 061000 95.8 1037 94 0 210 -4.0 1.5 0.99535 3 000201 062000 91.7 1048 83 0 205 -3.3 1.5 0.99534 4 000201 063000 87.5 1058 77 0 200 -2.8 1.5 0.99535 5 000201 064000 83.3 1067 64 0 195 -2.4 1.4 0.99535 6 000201 065000 79.2 1074 62 0 190 -2.2 1.3 0.99535 7 000201 070000 75.0 1082 55 0 185 -2.1 1.2 0.99535 8 000201 071000 70.8 1088 48 0 180 -2.1 1.1 0.99534 9 000201 072000 66.7 1093 45 0 175 -2.2 1.0 0.99534 10 000201 073000 62.5 1098 42 0 170 -2.3 0.9 0.99534 11 000201 074000 58..3 1103 39 0 165 -2.3 0.8 0.99534 12 000201 075000 54.0 1108 29 0 160 -2.3 0.7 0.99534 13 000201 080000 50.0 1111 30 0 155 -2.4 0.6 0.99534 14 000201 081000 45.8 1115 25 0 150 -2.3 0.5 0.99533 15 000201 082000 41.7 1117 24" 0 145 -2.2 0.4 0.99534 16 000201 083000 37.5 1120 22 0 140 -2.1 0.4 0.99533

(- 17 18 000201 000201 084000 085000 33.3 29.2 1123 1125 18 58 0

0 135 130

-1.8

-1.4 0.3 0.2 0.99533 0.99533 19 000201 090000 25.0 1131 11 0 130 -0.7 0.1 0.99532 20 000201 091000 21.0 1132 12 0 125 -0.4 -0.0 0.99533 21 000201 092000 17.0 1134 10 0 120 0.0 -0.1 0.99533 22 000201 093000 13.0 1135 15 0 115 0.3 -0.2 0.99533 23 000201 094000 .9.0 1137 20 0 110 0.6 -0.4 0.99533 24 000201 095000 5.0 1139 62 0 105 0.6 -0.5 0.99533

" 25 000201 100000 0.0 1146 100 0.0 -0.6 0.99533 1048 0 HARRIS 2009A- NRC Simulator Scenario 2 Turnover FINALdoc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: 05000400 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

• IC-28, MOL, 39% power

• 'B' RHR Pump Out of Service for inspection

• 'B' Containment Spray Pump out of service to replace its motor

• 4 GPD tube leak on 'B' Steam Generator Turnover:

• Normal shutdown is in progress lAW with GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown, due to elevated vibrations on Main Turbine at 100% power. Vibrations have subsided but Shutdown is to continue to perform inspection on Turbine.

Currently in progress on Step 15 of GP-006 with Step 16 completed.

Critical Task:

• Trip RCPs once RCP Trip Foldout Criteria is met and prior to exiting PATH-1

• Align 'A' Containment Spray System for operation prior to containment pressure exceeding 35 psig Event Malt. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 N/A N - BOP, Lower Power SRO R-RO 2 HVA04 C-BOP, Trip of the running ESCWS Chiller 0NC-2 A-SA)

SRO TS-SRO 3 TT:144, I-RO, Letdown TT-144 fails low and the Letdown Divert Valve, TCV-144, fails to JTB143B SRO operate automatically 4 LT:476 I-BOP, SG 'A' Controlling Level Transmitter fails high SRO TS-SRO 5 RCS14C C-RO, RCP 'C' #1 Seal fails SRO TS-SRO 6 RCS18A M-ALL SBLOCA inside containment (100% severity) 7 RHR01A C-RO, 'A' RHR Pump trips on overcurrent on start SRO 8 ZRPK645A C-RO, Cnmt Spray Pump 'A' Discharge Valve, 1CS-50, and CSAT Additive SRO Valve, 1CS-12, fail to OPEN automatically on a CSAS

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Scenario Event Description Shearon-Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 Scenario Summary:

The plant is at 39% power in middle of life. The crew is lowering power in accordance with GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown, due to elevated vibrations observed on the Main Turbine at 100%

power. Vibrations have subsided since power has been reduced, but shutdown is to continue so that an inspection of the Main Turbine can be performed. Currently the 'B' RHR pump is out of service, the 'B' Containment Spray Pump is out of service, and there is a 4 GPO tube leak on

'B' Steam Generator.

The first event is for the crew to continue lowering power in accordance with their turnover. It is expected that the SRO will conduct a reactivity brief, the RO will borate as necessary to lower power, and the BOP will operate the DEH controls as necessary to reduce turbine load.

The second event, a trip of the running A-SA ESCWS Chiller, can be inserted once the down power has been observed to the extent necessary. The crew will respond to various alarms, diagnose the event, and enter AOP-026, Loss of Essential Chill Water System. This will direct starting the 'B' Train ESCWS Chiller. The SRO should evaluate Tech Spec 3.7.13, Essential Services Chilled Water System. Note that the 'A' Chiller will be inoperable for the remainder of the scenario and this will impact plant response during the Major Event in that this failure will prevent Load Block 9 from energizing.

The third event, a failure of the Letdown Temperature Transmitter, TT-144, can be inserted once the 'B' ESCWS Chiller has been started and ventilation properly aligned. The transmitter fails low which causes the system to attempt to increase temperature by reducing Component Cooling Water flow. As cooling flow reduces, actual temperature will increase. The automatic divert to protect the demineralizers fails to operate. Operators should take action to restore temperature and divert letdown around the demins. From the initiation of the trigger it takes

-2.5 minutes to cause an alarm.

The fourth event is the 'A' Steam Generator Controlling Level Transmitter, LT-476, failing high and can be inserted once the crew has control of letdown temperature. This will require operator action to take manual control of 'A' Main Feedwater Regulating Valve and stabilize level. The SRO should evaluate Tech Specs 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation, and 3.3.2, ESF Instrumentation.

The fifth event, a failure of the 'C' RCP #1 Seal, can be inserted once 'A' Steam Generator Level has stabilized and is under control of the crew. The crew should enter AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions, and evaluate the seal malfunction. The crew should identify the 'C' RCP #1 seal as failed. Since power is less than 49%, they should stop the 'C' RCP and shut 1CS-437, 'C' RCP #1 Seal Water Return valve, between three and five minutes after securing the RCP. Once the RCP is stopped and its seal water return valve is shut, then the major event will be initiated. The SRO should evaluate Tech Spec 3.4.1.1, Reactor Coolant Loops and Coolant Circulation.

The major event is a SBLOCA (100% severity) from the 'A' Loop. The crew should carry out immediate actions of PATH-1. The earlier failure of A-SA ESCWS Chiller will prevent the 'A' Sequencer from reaching Load Block 9. The BOP should manually actuate the MAN PERM switch to enable manual loading on the A-SA bus (due to the earlier trip of the A-SA ESCWS Chiller). Shortly after entering PATH-1, the crew should recognize that the Foldout Criteria for Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Scenario Event Description Shearon-Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 securing all RCPs has been met and carry out that action. Pressure in containment will continue to rise due to the LOCA and a Containment Spray Actuation will be required.

The 'A' Cnmt Spray Pump will start automatically, but 1CS-50, 'A' Cnmt Spray Pump Discharge valve, and 1CS-12, Cnmt Spray Additive valve, will fail to open automatically. The crew should identify this failure and manually open both valves. Since '8' Cnmt Spray Pump is under clearance, there will be no spray flow to containment until the 'A' Cnmt Spray Pump Discharge valve is manually opened.

The 'A' RHR Pump will start automatically from the sequencer and then immediately trip on overcurrent. The RO should identify this failure but the pump cannot be manually started. The loss of RHR will result in the crew exiting PATH-1 and going to EPP-012, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, to address the loss of RHR capability. The '8' RHR Pump is under clearance for routine maintenance and can be made available by the booth operator once the crew has entered EPP-012 (or if FRP-P.1 entry was required prior to EPP-012 entry) and the request has been made to restore '8' RHR Pump to service. Due to the rapid cooldown an Orange conditions will occur for Core Cooling. This will require the crew to implement FRP-P.1.

The crew will progress through FRP-P.1 until they are required to perform a soak for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

Terminate the scenario once the crew determines a soak is required and start to carry out actions of other procedures that do NOT cause an RCS cooldown OR increase pressure.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Scenario Event Description Shearon-Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 SIMULATOR SETUP SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

• Ensure GP-006 is marked up as appropriate for downpower.

• Provide Reactivity Plan for down power

• Go to RUN until annunciator AL8-01 4-4 is ON

• Check RODUP to ensure rod position correct and update if needed INITIAL CONDITIONS:

• IC-28, MOL, 39% power

• '8' RHR pump has a CIT installed, protect 'A' RHR pump switch

• '8' CT pump has a CIT installed, protect 'A' CT pump switch

• Place red bars on annunciators PRE-LOAD:

• irf cns008 RACK_OUT ('8' Cnmt Spray Pump Out Of Service

• imf zrpk645a FAIL_ASIS ('A' Cnmt Spray Pump Discharge and Spray Additive Valves fail to open automatically)

• irf rhr023 RACK_OUT ('8' RHR Pump Out of Service for Oil Replacement due to contaminants)

• imf rhr01a TRUE ('A' RHR Pump trips on overcurrent immediately upon start)

TRIGGERS:

• ET-2: imf hva04 (2 00:00:00 00:00:00) Train_A Trip of the Running Chiller

• ET-3: imf tt:144 (3 00:00:00 00:00:00) 50.000:00:00 imf jtb143b (300:00:0000:00:00) FAIL_ASIS Event 2, Letdown Temp Transmitter fails high, Auto divert fails (takes -2.5 min to show)

• ET-4: imf 1t:476 (400:00:0000:00:00) 100.000:00:00 SG )!\' Controlling Level Transmitter fails High

• ET-5: imf rcs14c (5 00:00:00 00:00:00) 1500:00:000 RCP 'c' Number 1 Seal Failed

• ET-6: imf rcs18a (600) 100 SBLOCA Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Scenario Event Description Shearon-Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 CAEP

!Description of NRC2CAEP IIC-28, MOL, 39% power

!'B' RHR pump is Out of Service

!'C' Containment Spray Pump Out of Service

!4 gpd tube leak on 'B' Steam Generator

!Preloads

'B' Cnmt Spray Pump Out Of Service irf cns008 (n 00:00:0000:00:00) RACK_OUT

'A' Cnmt Spray Pump Discharge and Spray Additive Valves fail to open automatically imf zrpk645a (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS

'B' RHR Pump Out of Service for Oil Replacement due to contaminants irf rhr023 (n 00:00:0000:00:00) RACK_OUT

'A' RHR Pump trips on overcurrent immediately upon start imf rhr01 a (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) TRUE

!Event Triggers

!Event 2, Trip of the Running Chiller

! Note that this failure will prevent Load Block 9 from energizing later in scenario

! Component - BOP

! Tech Spec - SRO imf hva04 (2 00:00:00 00:00:00) Train_A

!Event 3, Letdown Temp Transmitter fails high, Auto divert fails (takes -2.5 min to show)

! Instrument - RO imf tt: 144 (3 00:00:00 00:00:00) 50.0 00:00:00 imf jtb143b (3 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS

!Event 4, SG 'A' Controlling Level Transmitter fails High

! Instrument - BOP imf 1t:476 (400:00:0000:00:00) 100.000:00:00

!Event 5, RCP 'C' Number 1 Seal Failed

! Component - RO imf rcs14c (5 00:00:00 00:00:00) 1500:00:000

!Event 6, SBLOCA

! Major - ALL imf rcs18a (6 0 0) 100

!Event 7, Enter EPP-012 due to loss of RHR capability

! EOP Contingency Procedure Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # --.;..._ _ _ _ Page 6 of _4;.;;,6---j1 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior LEAD EVALUATOR: Cue Event 2 (trip of A-SA ESCWS Chiller) when down power has been observed to the extent necessary.

EVALUATOR NOTE: The crew has been directed to lower power using GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown, due to elevated vibrations on the Main Turbine earlier.

DIRECTS BOP to start power reduction at the specified rate.

SRO May direct initiation of a Boration before the power reduction begins EVALUATOR NOTE: The following steps have already been completed because the shutdown is in progress but the BOP should verify the setup.

BOP DEPRESS the LOAD RATE MW/MIN push-button.

VERIFY the desired rate, NOT to exceed 5 MW/MIN, in the BOP DEMAND display. (4 DEH Units/minute)

BOP DEPRESS the REF push-button.

VERIFY the desired load (120 MW if shutting down) in the BOP DEMAND display.

BOP The HOLD push-button should illuminate.

BOP DEPRESS the GO push-button to start the load reduction.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # .-;.._ _ _ _ Page 7 of _4.;.;.,6---11 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP VERI FY the number in the REFERENCE display decreases.

BOP VERIFY Generator load is decreasing.

RO MONITORS primary systems response.

INITIATES boration, per OP-107.01 Section 5.3 as necessary RO (with SRO concurrence).

1~~~~ff;i~Rl' "}i 1~~:'tS*l.~;~:;~*".'~**8;* ~b~~ 1'(ji. ~:"".' ii'~":~~;;";:~:i' ;,::::;L

.. r:Tjf,. . ' .:.{'. ....

.', ...........:". *C'i::*;\""r¥*'~';'~t~'*3k>*/; ...**,. ,". f.'

, *i:~

DETERMINE the reactor coolant boron concentration from RO chemistry OR the Main Control Room status board.

DETERMINE the magnitude of boron concentration increase RO required.

DETERMINE the volume of boric acid to be added using the RO reactivity plan associated with the IC.

PROCEDURE NOTE: FIS-113, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, has a tenths position.

PROCEDURE CAUTION: If the translucent covers associated with the Boric Acid and Total Makeup Batch counters FIS-113 and FIS-114, located on the MCB, are not closed, the system will not automatically stop at the preset value.

SET FIS-113, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, to obtain the RO desired quantity.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # Page 8 of 46

~-------- ~~

Event

Description:

Lower Power Time ~ Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE NOTE: Boration of the RCS will be dependent on charging and letdown flow rate. Placing additional letdown orifices in service will increase the boric acid delivery rate to the RCS.

RO SET controller 1CS-283, FK-113 BORIC ACID FLOW, for the desired flow rate.

VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in the RO STOP position.

RO VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit.

PLACE control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the BOR RO position.

PROCEDURE NOTE: When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK 444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a PI controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows:

• PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected pressure.

• ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure.

• Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure.

RO OPERATE the pressurizer backup heaters as required to limit the difference between the pressurizer and RCS boron concentration to less than 10 ppm.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # -.;..._ _ _ _ Page 9 of _4;.,;;.6---i1 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO/RO FOR large boron changes, PERFORM the following:

• DIRECT Chemistry to sample the RCS for boron concentration.

• MAKE boron concentration adjustments as dictated from sample results.

PROCEDURE NOTE: Boration may be manually stopped at any time by turning control switch RMW CONTROL to STOP.

RO START the makeup system as follows:

• TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

• VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT.

PROCEDURE CAUTION: The operation should be stopped if an unanticipated reactivity effect is seen. Do not resume the operation until the cause has been corrected.

RO VERIFY Tavg responds as desired.

RO PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1.

RO VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch:

• Is in the STOP position.

• The GREEN light is LIT.

RO PLACE the RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # .-;.._ _ _ _ Page 10 of _4..;.;6~-I Event

Description:

Lower Power Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO START the makeup system as follows:

• TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

• VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT .

LEAD EVALUATOR: Once the power reductions have been observed to the extent necessary, cue Event 2 (trip of A-SA ESCWS Chiller).

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # ...;2;;;.-._ _ _ _ Page 11 of _4;,.;.6----11 Event

Description:

Trip of the running ESCWS Chiller CNC-2 A-SA)

Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: Actuate ET-2 (Trip of the running ESCWS Chiller WC-2 A-SA)

Indications Available: ALB-23-1-18 CHILLER WC2-A TROUBLE BOP RESPONDS to alarm on ALB-23 (1-18).

BOP REPORTS WC-2A-SA tripped.

PROCEDURE NOTE: This procedure contains no immediate actions.

BOP CHECK the in-service chiller RUNNING. (NO)

CREW DISPATCH field operators to determine the cause of the chiller trip.

BOOTH OPERATOR: When contacted, wait 3 minutes and then report that the breaker for the chiller has tripped on overcurrent and that there are no visible problems locally at the chiller.

PERFORM the following using OP-148, Essential Service Chilled Water System: START the Standby chiller (Start P-4B BOP and 'B' Chiller) section 5.1 or 5.2 of OP-148. (Attached at end of guide)

BOOTH OPERATOR: If contacted, report "Pre-start checks on P-4B and 'B' Chiller are complete." No simulator booth operations are required.

EVALUATOR NOTE: Section 5.2 of OP-148 may be used if crew determines that loss will be short term.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # ....;2=--____ Page 12 of _4;,;;.6----l1 Event

Description:

Trip of the running ESCWS Chiller (WC-2 A-SA)

Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: When contacted by the BOP to RESET the Low Chilled Water Flow alarm, wait 15 seconds and then report "The Low Chilled Water Flow Alarm has been reset."

There are NO simulator operations required.

CONTACT Maintenance as necessary for troubleshooting and CREW appropriate corrective actions.

BOP CHECK EITHER chiller STARTED. (YES)

VERI FY the following AH units for the operating train chiller are BOP RUNNING:

• AH-15, Control Room Normal Supply

• AH-17, Fuel Vent FP Pump Room Fan Cooler

• AH-16, Elec Equip Prot Rm Supply BOP VERIFY the following alarm is CLEAR for the running chiller

• ALB-23-1-20, Expansion TK A LO-LO Level

• ALB-23-2-20, Expansion TK B LO-LO Level REFER TO Tech Spec 3.7.13.

At least two independent Essential Services Chilled Water System loops shall be OPERABLE.

SRO

• ACTION: With only one ESCW System loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HSB within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in CSD within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 13 of 46

~-------- ----~I Event

Description:

Trip of the running ESCWS Chiller CNC-2 A-SA)

Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Contacts WCC for Work Request and EIR. Contacts SRO Maintenance to investigate and fills out an Equipment Problem Checklist.

SRO EXIT this procedure.

EVALUATOR NOTE: Initiate Trigger for Event 3 (TT-144 fails low and TCV-144 fails to operate automatically) once ESCWS Chiller is running.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # ...,;3;;...._ _ _ _ Page 14 of _4-.6~1 Event

Description:

Letdown TT-144 fails low and the Letdown Divert Valve, TCV-144, fails to operate automatically Time II Position i Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Actuate ET-3 (TT-144 fails low and TCV-144 fails to operate automatically) on cue from the Lead Evaluator.

Indications Available: ALB-07-3-2, DEMIN FLOW DIVERSION HIGH TEMP.

RO RESPONDS to alarm and ENTERS APP-ALB-07-3-2.

RO CONFIRM alarm using TI-143, LP Letdown Temperature.

RO VERIFY Automatic Functions:

• Manually positions 1CS-50, Letdown to VCT/Demin, to divert flow to the VCT.

RO PERFORM Corrective actions:

• . VERIFY that 1CS-50 diverts flow to the VCT, bypassing the BTRS and Purification Demineralizers.

• PERFORM the following as needed to lower letdown temperature:

• VERI FY proper charging flow is established. (YES)

• LOWER letdown flow. (N/A - CCW Problem)

• IF CCW flow to the Letdown Heat Exchanger appears low, THEN:

• TAKE manual control of TK-144 .

• OPEN 1CC-337, to raise CCW flow .

SRO Contacts Work Control and/or System Engineer for assistance.

BOOTH OPERATOR: If contacted as WCC or System Engineer: "maintain flow bypassing the demineralizers until a resin damage assessment is completed".

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # _4.;...-_ _ _ _ Page 15 of _4.;.;;.6----l1 Event

Description:

SG 'A' Controlling Level Transmitter (LT-476) fails high Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Actuate ET-4 (SG 'A' Controlling Level Transmitter (LT-476) fails high) on cue from the Lead Evaluator.

Indications Available: ALB-14-1-1B SG A NR LVLJSP HIILO DEV and ALB-14-4-3B STEAM GEN A HIGH-HIGH LVL BOP RESPONDS to alarms and ENTERS ALB-014-1-1B and 4-3B.

Evaluator's Note: The APP-ALB-014-1-B and 4-3B actions are similar.

In accordance with OMM-001, the operator may take MANUAL control of a malfunctioning controller before being directed by a procedure.

CONFIRM alarm using LI-474 SA, LI-475 SB, or LI-476 SA, BOP Steam Generator A level indicators. Reports LI-476 reading or failed high.

BOP VERIFY Automatic Functions: NONE BOP PERFORM Corrective Actions:

• CHECK Steam Flow (FI-474, FI-475) AND Feed Flow (FI-476, 477) for deviation. (YES)

• IF FCV-478, SG A auto level controller, is NOT sufficiently correcting level, THEN: (YES)

• SWITCH to MANUAL.

• RESTORE level to normal (57% NR) .

The SRO may enter AOP-010 based on the flow transient.

SRO If so, the outcome will be the same - the associated FRV in MANUAL.

SRO Refer to OWP-RP-05 to remove channel from service.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # _4~_ _ _ _ Page 16 of _4.;.,;;.6---i1 Event

Description:

SG 'A' Controlling Level Transmitter (LT-476) fails high Time i Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Contacts I&C to have channel removed from service.

Evaluator's Note: Channel does NOT have to be removed from service to continue the scenario. Cue Event 5 (RCP 'C' #1 Seal fails) after SG level is under control and the TS has been identified.

Enters Instrumentation TS 3.3.1 Action 6 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1 SRO 3.3.2 Action 19 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up t 0 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # -.;5;;.....-.____ Page 17 of _4.;.,;;.6---11 Event

Description:

RCP 'C' #1 Seal fails Time i Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Actuate ET-5 (RCP 'C' #1 Seal fails).

Indications Available: ALB-08-5-3 RCP-C SEAL #1 LEAKOFF HIGH LOW FLOW RO RESPONDS to alarm on ALB-08-5-3 CREW CONFIRM alarm using ERFIS GO AOP-018 or FR-154A ENTERS AOP-018, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL SRO CONDITIONS PROCEDURE NOTE: Step 1 is an immediate action.

Immediate Action RO CHECK ANY CSIP RUNNING. (YES)

REFER TO PEP-11 0, Emergency Classification And Protective SRO Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Network at entry point x.

PROCEDURE NOTE: Minimum allowable flow for a CSIP is 60 gpm which is provided by normal miniflow during normal operation and alternate miniflow during safety injection.

Maintaining CSIP flow greater than or equal to 60 gpm also satisfies this requirement.

EVALUATE plant conditions AND GO TO the appropriate SRO section:

• Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Malfunction, SECTION 3.3 PAGE 12 CREW CHECK ANY of the following conditions exist:

• ANY RCP #1 Seal FAILS as defined in Attachment 2 (Page 29) (YES)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # ......;.5_ _ _ _ _ Page 18 of _4..;.,;6;"-'-0 Event

Description:

RCP 'C' #1 Seal fails Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO CHECK Rx power greater than P-8 (49%). (NO)

RO CHECK more than ONE RCP affected. (NO)

RO STOP the affected ('C') RCP.

CREW REFER TO Attachment 7, Operation With Two RCPs.

I REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS I Attachment 7 Page 1 of 1 Operation With Two RCPs The following are typical parameter changes that can be expected after tripping one of three running RCPs with Reactor power at 48% at Middle of Core Life:

PARAMETER AFFECTED LOOP OTHER LOOPS PRZ pressure lowers PRZ level starts at 40%, lowers to 33%, recovers to 40%

SG levels starts at 57%, starts at 57%,

lowers to 31 %, swells to 61%,

recovers to 73% lowers to 53%,

recovers to 57%

Loop Tavg lowers rises Median Tavg starts at 570°F, rises to 575°F, recovers to 570°F qelta T lowers rises Reactor power starts at 48%, lowers to 42%, recovers to 48%

Control rods Rods will step in or out as necessary to maintain median Tavg. The magnitude is dependent on time in core life.

The level rise observed in the affected loop SG is that expected to occur with level control left in Automatic. Taking manual control to limit the level rise may be desirable.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 19 of *46

~-------- --~

Event

Description:

RCP 'C' #1 Seal fails Time II Position i Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTE: Crew may trip if RCP is secured prior to Attachment 7 review and anticipation of plant response. If so, insert Event 6 {LOCA Inside Containment} on cue from Lead Evaluator.

SHUT the affected RCP Seal Water Return Valve(s) between RO three and five minutes after securing the RCP:

• 1CS-437, RCP C #1 Seal Water Return RO CHECK all RCPs RUNNING. (NO)

BOP VERIFY SG levels being maintained between 52% and 62%.

MONITOR rod insertion limits (Refer to Section F curve from RO Curve Book).

SRO INITIATE a plant shutdown using ONE of the following:

• GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown from Power Operation to Hot Standby

• AOP-038, Rapid Downpower Evaluator's Note: Crew may elect to continue in AOP-018 or pursue the plant shutdown using the appropriate procedure. The scenario may continue at this time by cueing Event 6 {LOCA inside containment}. Tech Specs for 'C' RCP may be asked as a follow up question.

T.S. 3.4.1.1 All reactor coolant loops shall be in operation {MODES 1 and 2}

ACTION: With less than the above required reactor coolant loops in operation. be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # _6~_ _ _ _ Page 20 of _4;..;.6~1 Event

Description:

LOCA inside containment Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: Actuate ET-6 (LOCA inside containment).

Indications Available: RCS Low Pressure alarms/Rapidly Decreasing RCS Pressure and Pressurizer Level EVALUATOR NOTE: Crew may attempt to enter and implement AOP-016, however the transient in progress will not allow any significant progress in that procedure before an automatic trip occurs. Crew may manually Trip the Reactor and Actuate Safety Injection if a setpoint is approached using guidance contained in OMM-001.

SRO ENTERS AOP'-016, EXCESSIVE PRIMARY PLANT LEAKAGE PROCEDURE NOTE: This procedure contains no immediate actions.

RO CHECK RHR in operation. (NO)

REFER TO PEP-11 0, Emergency Classification And Protective SRO Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Network at entry point X.

PROCEDURE NOTE: This step is a qualitative check for leakage obviously in excess of Make Up capability. Isolation of letdown may be necessary. A formal calculation to determine the leakrate is performed in Step 16.

RO CHECK RCS leakage within VCT makeup capability. (NO)

RO TRI P the Reactor RO MANUALLY INITIATE Safety Injection.

SRO ENTERS* PATH-1 Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page 21 of 46

~-------- ~~I Event

Description:

LOCA inside containment Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE NOTE: Steps 1 through 4 are immediate action steps.

RO VERIFY Reactor Trip:

• AUTO or MANUAL Reactor Trip successful:

• CHECK for any of the following:

• Trip breakers RTA and BYA OPEN (YES)

• Trip breakers RTB and BYB OPEN (YES)

• ROD Bottom lights LIT (YES)

• NEUTRON flux decreasing (YES)

BOP VERIFY Turbine Trip:

• CHECK for any of the following:

• ALL turbine throttle valves - SHUT (YES)

• ALL turbine governor valves - SHUT (YES)

BOP VERI FY power to AC Emergency Buses

• 1A-SA AND 1B-SB Buses energized by off-site power or EOG's. (YES)

RO CHECK SI Actuation:

• CHECK for any of the following - LIT: (YES)

• SI Actuated bypass permissive light

• ALB-11-2-2

• ALB-11-5-1

• ALB-11-5-3

• ALB-12-1-4 Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 . FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # _6~_ _ _ _ Page 22 of _4;.;;,6--11 Event

Description:

LOCA inside containment Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO PERFORM The Following:

• INITIATE monitoring the Critical Safety Function Status Trees.

• EVALUATE EAL Network using entry point X. (Refer to PEP-110)

SRO INFORMS Crew Foldout A applies.

EVALUATOR NOTE: The crew should use Adverse Values when Containment Pressure exceeds 3 PSIG.

EVALUATOR NOTE: The following actions should be taken in accordance with FOLDOUT A criteria during the scenario:

• Verify Alternate Miniflow Isolation Valves or Miniflow Block Valves CLOSE when RCS Pressure lowers to less than 1800 PSIG.

• Trip RCPs when RCS pressure is less than 1400 PSIG with SI flow is greater than 200 GPM.

Critical Task RO SECURES RCPs on RCP Trip Criteria RO VERIFY ALL CSIPs AND RHR pumps - RUNNING.

• REPORTS both CSIPs running but 'A' RHR has tripped and '8' RHR is under clearance BOOTH OPERATOR: 'A' RHR Pump Breaker has overcurrent flags dropped.

Nothing is visibly wrong locally at the pump. WCC will contact maintenance and work toward lifting the clearance on the 'B' RHR Pump.

CREW DISPATCH operators to investigate trip of 'A' RHR SRO CONTACTS WCC to have '8' RHR restored Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # _6;......_ _ _ _ Page 23 of _4.;.,;;.6----1 Event

Description:

LOCA inside containment Time ~ Position II AQQlicant's Actions or Behavior RO CHECK SI Flow:

RO SI flow- GREATER THAN 200 GPM. (YES)

RO RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 230 PSIG. (YES)

ACTUATE manual load permissive switch for 'A' Sequencer BOP (MAN PERM)

BOP CHECK Main Steam Isolation:

Main Steam Isolation - ACTUATED. (YES)

BOP VERIFY all MSIVs and bypass valves - SHUT (YES)

EVALUATOR NOTE: The crew may have manually initiated Containment Spray because Containment Pressure is rising towards the automatic setpoint.

EVALUATOR NOTE: The automatic alignment of 'A' Containment Spray will fail. The 'A' Containment Spray Pump will start automatically but 1CT-50 and 1CT-12 will not open from the signal. 1CT-50 and 1CT-12 and be opened from the MCa switches. Operator action will be required.

CHECK CNMT Pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 RO/BOP PSIG. (NO)

• VERIFY CNMT spray - ACTUATED

• STOP all RCPs. (Previously completed as Foldout Criteria)

Critical Task

• RO OPENS 1CT-50 and 1CT-12 from MCB switches.

(Aligns Cont Spray for Operation)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # _6;;......_ _ _ _ Page 24 of _4.-,6---11 Event

Description:

LOCA inside containment Time II Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUATOB NOTE: Depending on the crews pace, the crew may alternately use FRP-J.1 to address' A' Containment Spray malfunction if FRPs have been directed to be implemented.

BOP CH ECK AFW Status:

AFW flow - AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAILABLE. (YES)

EVALUATOR NOTE: The RO will perform all board actions until the BOP completes Attachment 6. The BOP is permitted to properly align plant equipment in accordance with Attachment 6 without SRO approval. The Scenario Guide still identifies tasks by board position because the time frame for completion of Attachment 6 is not predictable.

VERIFY Alignment of Components From Actuation of ESFAS BOP Signals Using Attachment 6, Safeguards Actuation Verification, While Continuing with this Procedure.

EVALUATOR NOTE: At some pOint during the scenario the crew should recognize that' A' Sequencer has not reached Load Block 9 due to the earlier failure of the A-SA ESCWS Chiller. At the point the BOP should actuate manual load permissive by taking the permissive switch to MAN PERM. This action will only work if performed

>150 seconds after the sequencer initiation signal.

RO CONTROL RCS Temperature:

• CONTROL feed flow and steam dump to stabilize RCS temperature between 555°F AND 559°F using Table 1.

BOP/RO ENERGIZE AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1.

RO CHECK PRZ PORVs - SHUT (YES)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # _6.;......_ _ _ _ Page 25 of _4;.,;;.6---i1 Event

Description:

LOCA inside containment Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior .

CHECK PZR PORV block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN.

RO (YES)

RO PRZ spray valves - SHUT. (YES)

RO/BOP IDENTIFY any faulted SG:

CHECK for any of the following:

• Any SG pressures - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (NO)

• Any SG - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED. (NO)

CREW CHECK Secondary Radiation:

CHECK for all of the following:

• Condenser Vacuum Pump Effluent radiation - NORMAL.

(YES)

• SG Blowdown radiation - NORMAL. (YES)

• Main Steam line radiation - NORMAL. (YES)

BOP/RO Any SG with an uncontrolled level increase (NO)

CREW CHECK RCS Intact:

CHECK for all of the following:

• CNMT pressure - NORMAL. (NO)

Proceeds TO Step 44. (Entry Point C)

CONTINUOUS ACTION: Implement Function Restoration SRO Procedures As Required. (None required) .

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # _6;......_ _ _ _ Page 26 of _4.-,6__u Event

Description:

LOCA inside containment Time II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTE: The crew may review foldout criteria. Foldout A actions should be complete. No Foldout 8 actions apply.

MAINTAIN RCP Seal Injection flow between 8 GPM AND RO 13 GPM.

BOP CHECK Intact SG Levels:

• Any level- GREATER THAN 25% [40%]. (YES)

BOP CONTROL feed flow to maintain all intact levels between 25%

AND 50% [40% AND 50%].

BOP VERIFY AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1 - ENERGIZED. (YES)

RO CHECK PRZ PORVs - SHUT. (YES)

CHECK PZR PORV block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN.

RO (YES)

CONTINUOUS ACTION: IF a PRZ PORV opens on high RO pressure, THEN verify it shuts after pressure decreases to less than opening setpoint.

RO CHECK SI Termination Criteria:

RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN 40°F (NO)

WHEN the SI termination criteria are met, THEN GO TO EPP-SRO 008, "SI TERMINATION", Step 1. (NOT MET)

RO CHECK CNMT Spray Status:

CHECK any CNMT Spray Pump - RUNNING. (YES)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # _6;;.-._ _ _ _ Page 27 of _4;.;;;,6---11 Event

Description:

LOCA inside containment Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior CONSULT plant operations staff to determine if CNMT spray SRO should be placed in standby.

WHEN plant operations staff directs CNMT spray be placed in standby, THEN do Steps 51d, e AND f.

RO CHECK Source Range Detector Status:

Intermediate range flux - LESS THAN 5x10- 11 AMPS.

• Verify source range detectors - ENERGIZED.

• Transfer nuclear recorder to source range scale.

RO CHECK RHR Pump status:

• RCS Pressure greater than 230 PSIG (YES)

• RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING. (YES)

• Stop RHR pumps. (NO RHR Pumps Available)

RO CHECK for both of the following:

BOP/RO

• All SG Pressures - STABLE OR INCREASING. (YES)

RO

• RCS pressure - STABLE OR DECREASING. (YES)

RO ESTABLISH CCW Flow To The RHR Heat Exchangers:

VERIFY both CCW Pumps running (YES)

OPEN the following valves: (CCW Return From RHR HX Trains "A" and "B")

• 1CC-147

• 1CC-167 Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # ....;6;;....._ _ _ _ Page 28 of _4.;.;;.6--11 Event

Description:

LOCA inside containment Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO VERIFY CCW flow to the RHR Heat Exchangers (YES)

PERFORM one of the following to establish two independent CCW systems:

SHUT train A CCW non-essential supply AND return valves:

• 1CC-99

• 1CC-128 OR SHUT train B CCW non-essential supply AND return valves:

• 1CC-113

• 1CC-127 BOP CHECK EDG status:

CH ECK AC emergency buses 1A-SA AND 1B-SB -

ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER (YES)

• CHECK Bus voltages (Normal)

• VERIFY breakers 105 and 125 closed (YES)

RO RESET SI Shutdown any unloaded EDGs using OP-155, Diesel BOP Generator Emergency Power System, Section 7.0.

RHR system - CAPABLE OF COLD LEG RECIRCULATION.

CREW (NO)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # _6~_ _ _ _ Page 29 of _4;..;.6----lJ Event

Description:

LOCA inside containment Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTE: At some point in the scenario it is expected that the crew will receive an ORANGE/RED on Integrity and transition to FRP*P.1. During validations it occurred shortly after entering EPP*012. The actions of FRp*

P.1 are listed on page 32 of this guide.

~~~~~~~~~~~~

• ENTER~;EPpqi12;;LQs*

..... ",*., .***y. . "'RE9tRetJJ6ATJ0~~;K;:: 'E EVALUATOR NOTE: 'B' RHR Pump can be returned to the crew at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator.

• For consistency wait until after several steps of FRP*P.1 have been completed.

BOOTH OPERATOR: Restore the 'B' RHR Pump and inform the crew at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator SRO INFORMS Crew that Foldouts apply SRO RESTORE Emergency Coolant Recirculation Equipment.

. RO RESET SI. (SI previously reset in PATH-1)

PROCEDURE NOTE: Resetting the SI suction auto switchover signal also defeats the automatic open and shut signals to the CSIP alternate miniflow isolation valves.

RO RESET SI Suction Auto Switchover.

Add Makeup To RWST Using OP-107.01, "CVCS BORATION, BOP DILUTION, AND CHEMISTRY CONTROL", Section 8.4.

BOP CHECK Intact SG Levels:

• Any level- GREATER THAN 25% [40%] (YES)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # _6;......_ _ _ _ Page 30 of _4,;,,;;,6---i1 Event

Description:

LOCA inside containment Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• CONTROL feed flow to maintain all intact levels between 25% and 50% [40% and 50%].

PROCEDURE NOTE: After the low steam pressure SI signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

RO CHECK PRZ Pressure:

• Pressure - LESS THAN 2000 PSIG (YES)

• BLOCK low steam pressure SI.

PROCEDURE CAUTION: The RCS cooldown should be performed as quickly as possible to minimize potential offsite releases.

RO/BOP INITIATE RCS Cooldown To Cold Shutdown:

• MAINTAIN RCS cooldown rate less than 100°F/HR.

• CHECK SGs - AT LEAST ONE INTACT SG AVAILABLE (YES)

• CHECK if steam dump to condenser - AVAILABLE:

• CHECK any intact SG MSIV - OPEN (NO)

Dump steam from intact SGs using any of the following (listed BOP in order of preference):

1) SG PORVs (YES)

SRO MONITOR Shutdown Margin While Continuing RCS Cooldown:

VERIFY CNMT Fan Coolers - ONE FAN PER UNIT RUNNING BOP IN SLOW SPEED (YES)

CHECK RWST Level- GREATER THAN 3% (Empty alarm)

RO (YES)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # _6~_ _ _ _ Page 31 of _4~6---l1 Event

Description:

LOCA inside containment Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO DETERMINE CNMT Spray Requirements:

RO

• Spray pump suction - ALIGNED TO RWST (YES)

SRO

• DETERMINE required number of CNMT spray pumps from Table 1: (ZERO)

SRO

• VERIFY spray pumps - REQUIRED NUMBER RUNNING RO

• RESET CNMT spray signal.

• ALIGN CNMT spray pump(s) stopped in Step 12c for standby operation:

• SHUT CNMT spray pump discharge valve(s): 1CT-50 (A CT Pump)

• SHUT chemical addition valve(s): 1CT-12 (A CT Pump)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # _6~_ _ _ _ Page 32 of _4;.;;.,6---i1 Event

Description:

LOCA inside containment Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Foldout Criteria Apply SI REINITIATION CRITERIA

• After SI termination (in Step 18), IF any of the following occurs:

oRCS subcooling - LESS THAN 10°F [40°F] - C, 20°F [50°F] - M o RVLlS indication - LESS THAN REQUIRED BASED ON RCP STATUS

• No RCP Running: Full Range - LESS THAN 63%

• 1 RCPs Running: Dynamic Range - LESS THAN 34%

• 2 RCPs Running: Dynamic Range - LESS THAN 47%

• 3 RCPs Running: Dynamic Range - LESS THAN 80%

THEN perform the following:

a. IF CSIP suction aligned to VCT, THEN realign to RWST.

b. Shut charging line isolation valves AND open BIT valves.

c. Verify normal miniflow isolation valves - SHUT

d. IF necessary to restore conditions, THEN restart standby CSIP.

COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER CRITERIA IF RWST level decreases to less than 23.4% (2/4 Low-Low alarm), THEN GO TO EPP-010, "TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION", Step 1.

EVALUATOR NOTE: The Crew may consider starting the '8' RHR Pump when the breaker is restored. The crew will continue in FRP-P.1 until reaching step 32 for RCS 'soak'. They will then transition to EPP-012. EPP-012 will secure the RHR pump based on the event in progress Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page 33 of 46

~-------- --~I Event

Description:

LOCA inside containment Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Check RCS Pressure:

Check for both of the following:

RO

• RCS pressure - LESS THAN 230 PSIG (NONES)

• Any RHR HX header flow - GREATER THAN 1000 GPM (NO)

SRO Check RCS Cold Leg Temperature Trend:

Check RCS Cold Leg Temperatures - STABLE OR RO INCREASING (NO)

PROCEDURE NOTE: A faulted SG is any SG that is depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner or is completely depressurized.

SRO Stop RCS Cooldown:

BOP Verify SG PORVs - SHUT BOP Verify condenser steam dump valves - SHUT RO Check RHR system -IN SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE (NO)

BOP Any non-faulted SG level - GREATER THAN 25% [40%] (YES)

BOP Control feed flow to non-faulted SG(s) to stop RCS cooldown.

PROCEDURE CAUTION: IF the TDAFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, THEN maintain steam supply to the TDAFW pump from one SG.

SRO Minimize RCS Cooldown From Faulted SG(s):

BOP Check any SG - FAULTED (NO)

SRO Check PRZ PORV Block Valves:

RO Verify power to block valves - AVAILABLE (YES)

RO Check block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # _6~_ _ _ _ Page 34 of _4-.6---l1 Event

Description:

LOCA inside containment Time ~ Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Check PRZ PORVs:

Check all of the following:

RO

• Check LTOPS control switches - IN NORMAL (NOT BLOCKED)

SRO GO TO Step 6.d RO Check PRZ pressure - LESS THAN 2335 PSIG (YES)

RO Verify PRZ PORVs - SHUT (YES)

IF a PRZ PORV opens on high pressure, THEN verify it shuts SRO after pressure decreases to less than opening setpoint.

RO Check SI Flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM (YES)

Check SI Termination Criteria:

Check for both of the following:

RO

1) RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN 60°F [90°F] - C (NO) 70°F [100°F] - M SRO Observe CAUTION prior to Step 9 AND GO TO Step 9.

CAUTION: Following a complete loss of seal cooling, the affected RCP(s) should NOT be started prior to a status evaluation.

SRO Check If An RCP Should Be Started:

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # _6;;......_ _ _ _ Page 35 of _4;..;.6---11 Event

Description:

LOCA inside containment Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN RO 1Q°F [40°F] - C (NO) 20°F [50°F] -M SRO Observe CAUTION prior to Step 32 AND GO TO Step 32.

CAUTION: Following an excessive cooldown, reactor vessel stress must be relieved to enhance and maintain vessel integrity. Do NOT perform any actions that increase pressure OR cause an RCS cooldown until the soak is complete.

Determine RCS Soak Requirements:

RCS cooldown rate - GREATER THAN 100DF IN ANY SIXTY SRO MINUTE PERIOD Perform one hour RCS soak:

RO

• Maintain RCS temperature stable.

• Maintain RCS pressure stable.

• Perform actions of other procedures that do NOT cause an RCS cooldown OR increase pressure.

SRO

• Transition back to EPP-012 Evaluator Note: Terminate the scenario at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Chiller Start 5.0 STARTUP 5.1. Startup Train A-SA (8-S8) from Main Control Room or local Panel 5.1.1. mitial Conditions NOTE: SectIDn 52, Pfadl'g Standby Tmm in Operatfoo, sMuld be used when swapping Trains of ESCWS.

1. No Cruller Train is in seMce.

2. System fined aoo verned per Sectioo 8.1.

3. System lineup Attacn.mel'Ils 1 and 2 are oomp4ete.

4. For non-emerqenq' smrts the prestart cJled(s of Attachment 5 haw been performed and an opemtor sh<ru!d 00 present to observe smno! cruller.

5. Section R 12 Mal'luru Chiflief Reset has been pedormed, if ~IY due to miller mp.

6. The LO. heaters have been in service fori:w'erue Mum. (See Precautjon and Umit<lition 4.Q.3 for appficability of this lomal CoodiOOn)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

OP-14B Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Chiller Start 5.1.1. ProceduriM Steps NOTE: Whenever an "A" Train cmnponent is referred 10 in the body of this procedure it's "B" Train counterpart will immediatefy folrow, em:med by parentheses.

NOTE: ESR 99-00142 has ewluated and detemliined Ilat oog-teml closure' of the supPy am:! return valves 10 the NNS AH I..II'lM will oot affect opembmfty of the Essential Sel'Vices Chiller system. The next two steps wiM align the NNS AH units OOWever, If it is desired 10 maiinmtfl Ile NNS isolation varves shut, then s!:eps5.'1.2.1 and!i 1.:t1 may be skipped.

1. ISOLATE the suppfy and rerum valves to the NNS AH units from the train that will oot be placed in SefVk:e by shutting the fotaowing valves:

1CH-125 SB (1CH-196 SB) CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN CLRSISOL 1CH-126 SA (1CH-191 SA) CHilLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN CLRS ISOL 1CH-115 SA (1CH-148 SB) CHILLED WATER TO NESSR FANS elR

!SOl 1CH-116 SB (1CH-149 SA) CHILLED WATER TO NESSR FAN CLRS

!SOL

2. ALIGN the suppfy aoo rerum valves to the NNS AH units assodated wIth the traiin that wiH 00 placed in servie:e by opening the following wives:

1CH-125 SB (1CH-196 SB) CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN ClRSISOL 1CH-126 SA (1CH-197 SA) CHillED WATER FROM NESSR FAN CLRSISOL 1CH-115 SA (1CH-148 SB) CHillED WATER TO NESSR FANS ClR iSOL 1CH-116 SB {1CH-149 SA) CHILLED WATER TO NESSR FAN CLRS IEOl Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Chiller Start NOTE: The iocalalarm im:!lcatiori for low chilled water flow and lOW chilled ....'ater temperature w;'1I1ockin until mafllJally reset at the V\iC-2 control panel.

3~ START ViJC-2 Chiller lA-S~A (19H38) Ch:illie;{~ water pump P-4 to estal}1ish chilied water flow.~

4.. At the Locat Control panef,RESET the lDW Chmed Water Flow aia:rm using the CHILLED \i'Ii'ATER NO fLOVIl TRIP jNDjCATjm~ RESET push-!JuITcn.

NOTE: if the unit cycles off clue to low chHleclwaffir fJo';'l or low chille.j water temperature, the unit \"Iill aUtomatically restart if aU start permissive conditms exist NOTE: An anti-recycle fe;;jture prevents more than one norma:l start'i'\Iithin3 30 minute perioo. Tn:is anti-reeycle feature IS bypassed UpO!1 any automatic start signal from the ESf sequem::er.

NOTE: After going to STAHl on the Chiller Control S,plitch, the oil Pllmp wHl sta:rt and bring oi~ pressure up 10 norrnai operating pressure prior to cni.ller start.

NOTE: OPT-1512 rotates the Temperature Control Point potentiometer to clean tll1e suFrnces. VVhlle OPT-1512 restores the potentiometer to lis originaJ pOSition, it is po:ssil)ie that due to the surface de.aning the cnaracteristlcs of the potentiometer have dl:anged sufficJent!y to require a manual temperature ad:justment psr Section 8.:4 of fhis pmce(iurs. This v'li!! be detemlined bY' rnonitolring tern perature aiter chiHer start intlJe following Step.

5. START the chlfJer performing one of the folJowin9:

a~ At AEP-1 PLACE 'Water Chllier Compressor WC-2 A-SA

("JVG-2 8-8B) contm! switch to th:s START positilafj and release.

OR t} DEPRESS the START push-!Jutton at the focal oDniro! panel with th:e local Se:lect switch in the LOCAL pnsjtio!1.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Chiller Start 5.2:. Plating Standby Train In Operatioo NOTE: It is necessary to 811m: associated tnliins of HVAC un~ts when shimng Iffiins of Essentiru Services Chiilied Water.

NOTE: This Sedion Is \\\ffltten fOfswapping from Train B ESCW to Train A ESCW, with components for swapping from Train A ESCW to Train 8 ESCW in parentheses.

5.2:.1. mltial Conditions

1. Service water is being su~ied to the l'I!Ofi-operatmg chib WC-2 1A-SA (WC-218-3B).

2. One train at ESCW is already in operation.

3.. For noo-emergency starts the prestart clledl;s of Attachment 5 have been performed and an operator should be present to obsefve* start of chiller.

4. Secnon R 12, M3Irmai ChUier Reset perfom1ed if necessary for noo-operaUng chiiller..

5. The LO. heaters have been in OOfliiC9 for me~\le hours. (See Precaution and Limitation 4,(13 for appltcabifily of this Inm~ Goodmen) 5.2.2:. Pn:K:edUral Ste:ps NOTE: The loc~ alarm indication for lOIN chilied water fkJw and iO"N chWled water temperature will lock in until manuailly fes;eit at the WC-2 control panel.

NOTE: If starting the chiller compressor is delayed following Ule start at the P-4 Pump in the next Step,the compressor oil could cool down to the point that ihe compressor win mp on lO1N o~ pressure:

1. At AEP-1 , START the f1on-oper;;tting Chiller WC-1. A-SA (B-SB) Chilled W;;ttffi" Pump P-4 A-S,A. (B-SB) to establish chUied water flow in the non-operating nino

2. At the local Cootm1 panel, RESET the Low ChiDed Water Flow alarm using the CHILLED WATER NO FlOW TRIP IND!CATION RESET push-button .

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Chiller Start

5. . 2..1 Procedural Steps (contjnued)

NOTE: OPT-1512 rotates the Temperature Control Point potentiometer to dean the surfaces. \,\,'t!i!e OPT-15t2 restores the potentiometer 10 ;its oricginal position, it ;s possiblel11at due to the surface deanfng tM characteristics of the potenUometer have changed sufficiently to require a manual temperature ad]uslfl1ent per Section tL 14 of this procedure. Th:is 'wilf be cetemlined by monitoring temperature :afterchlller start In the fC~!O\lVjl1g Step.

1 START me chil'ler by pertorrnrncg ONE oUhe toUowtng:

L At .AEP-1, PLACE Water Chiller Compressor W'C-2 A-SA CNC-2 S-SB) contra! swgtCh to the START position AND RELEASE OR

b. DEPRESS the START push-button at the local control paneJ vrith tile local select switch: in the LOCAL position

4. PLACE addi:tional safe.r! rela:ted air handlers in Serl/lCe prior to s'.vitcnaver of the nonessential header NOTE: ESR 99-0Q'142 has evaluated am:i determined that long-ternl ciosure of thti SUPPlY and return valves to the NNS ,A;H units will not affect operability of the Essential SelVices ChEhar system Tne next t'lvO steps will allgn t.he NNS AH units nowever, elf it is desired to maintain. the NNS isolation val\r8s sn.ut, then steps 5 ..22.5 and 522.6 may be sk:ipped.

5.. ISOLA TE the SUppl'jf and rerum valves to the NNS AH units from the train that '""as already operating lJ,\{ s,mtting tlie fodlowing valves:

CH-'!96 SB (lCH-t25 SB) CHILLED \NATER FROM NESSR EAN CtRS !SOL

-lCH-H)7 SA (iCH-H6 SP',) CHILLED WATER FRO!\;' NESSR FAN CLRS IS0l 1CH-14B SS (1CH-H5 SA) CHtlLED 'lv'ATER TO NESSH EANS ClR ISOl 1CH-149 SA (1CH-116 SS) CHILLED \iVATER TO NESSR FAN ClRS !SOL Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Chiller Start Ii. ALIGN: NNS AH units to the traIn that 'Nil! remain operating by opening the following valves.:

1CH-125 SEl (1CH-196 SEll' CHILLED 'l~'ATER FROMNESSR F,A.N CLRS ISOL lCH-126 SA (1CH-t91 S,~} CHILLED 'tV,ATER FROM NESSR FAN CLRS !SOL 1CH-t15 SA OCH-148 SEl} CHILLEDW,ATER TO NESSR fANS CLR1S0L 1CH-116 SEl \1CH-1:49 SAl CHILLED WATER TO NESSR FAN CLRS !SOL

7. iF shtfting cMlers to support placing th!8' stamlby safety equipment trailll1 in service, THEN PERFORMA.ttachment R NOTE: ServIce 'Nater to the chiller condenser willisotate 90 second:s after the cihiHer has stopped, S'N FROM WC-2 8-SB (A-SA) CONDENSER1S'lV-1200 BEl (1SVv'-'Hl55 wil! close.

B. STOP tne cflti!er perforrning one of the foUowing:

ct.. At AEP-1, PLACE "/Vater Ch!lfer Compressor "NC-2 8-SEl (A-SA) contrDl sWitch to the STOP position aThd release.

OR

b. DEPRESS the STOP push-button at the locail control palle! with the local seliact :swltch ill thie lOCAL !Josftlon.

9. At AEP-1, STOP the Chmer \NC-2 B-88 (A-8.,A.} Chi!letj ",~later PUf!1'P P-4 B-8El (A-SA) in the train secure{1.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

PATH-1 ATTACHMENT 6 Attachment 6 Sheet 1 of 5 Safeguards Actuation Verification NOTE: General guidance for verification of safeguards equipment is contained in Attachment 8 of this procedure.

1. Verify Two CSIPs - RUNNING

2. Verify Two RHR Pumps - RUNNING

3. Verify Two CCW Pumps - RUNNING

4. Verify All ESW AND ESW Booster Pumps - RUN1UNG

5. Verify SI Valves - PROPERLY ALIGNED (Refer to Attachment 1.)

6. Verify CNMT Phase A Isolation Valves - SHUT (Refer to OMM-004. "POST TRIP/SAFEGUARDS REVIEW". Attachment 4.)

EOP-GUIDE-1 I Rev. 23 I Page 79 of 96 Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

PATH-1 ATTACHMENT 6 Attachment 6 Sheet 2 of 5 Safeguards Actuation Verification

7. Verify SG Blowdown AND SG Sample Isolation Valves In Table 1 -

SHUT Table 1: SG Blowdown And Sample Isolation Valves Process Outside CNMT Inside CNMT Line (MLB-1A-SA) (MLB-IB-SB)

SG A Sample lSP-217 lSP-214/216 SG B Sample lSP-222 lSP-219/nl SG C Sample ISP-227 1SP-224/226 SG A Blowdown IBD-ll IBD-l SG B Blowdown lBD-30 lBD-20 SG C Blowdown lBD-49 IBD-39

8. IF Main Steam Line Isolation Actuated OR Is Required By Any Of The Following. THEN Verify MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves - SHUT o Steam line pressure - LESS THAN 601 PSIG o CNMT pressure - GREATER THAN 3.0 PSIG

9. I I CNMT Spray Actuation Signal Actuated OR Is Required, THEN Verify The Following:

o CNMT spray pumps - RUNNING o CNMT spray valves - PROPERLY ALIGNED o Phase B isolation valves - SHUT o All RCPs - STOPPED (Refer to OMM-004. "POST TRIP/SAFEGUARDS REVIEW". Attachment 9.)

EOP-GUIDE-1 I Rev. 23 Page 80 of 96 Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

PATH-1 ATTACHMENT 6 Attachment 6 Sheet 3 of 5 Safeguards Actuation VerificatiDn

10. Verify Both Main FW Pumps - TRIPPED

11. Verify FW Isolation Valves - SHUT (Refer to OMM-004. "POST TRIP/SAFEGUARDS REVIEW". Attachment 6.)

12. Verify both MDAFW pumps - RUNNING

13. IF any of the following conditions exists. THEN verify the TDAFW pump - RUNNING o Undervoltage on either 6.9 KV emergency bus o Level in two SGs - LESS THAN 25%

o Manual actuation to control SG level

14. Verify AFW Valves - PROPERLY ALIGNED

15. Verify Both EDGs - RUNNING

16. Verify CNMT Fan Coolers - ONE FAN PER UNIT RUNNING IN SLOW SPEED

17. Verify CNMT Ventilation Isolation Valves - SHUT (Refer to OMM -00!1. "POST TRIP /SAFEGUARDS REVIEW". Attachment 7.)

18. Verify Control Room Ventilation - ALIGl\TED FOR EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION (Refer to OMM-004. "POST TRIP/SAFEGUARDS REVIEW". Attachment 5.)

EOP -GUIDE-l I Rev. 23 I Page 81 of 96 Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

PATH-1 ATTACHMENT 6 Attachment 6 Sheet 4 of 5 Safeguards Actuation Verification 19, Verify Essential Service Chilled Water System Operation:

o Verify both WC-2 chillers - RUNNING o Verify both P-4 pumps - RUNNING (Refer to AOP-026. "LOSS OF ESSENTIAL SERVICE CHILLED WATER SYSTEM" for loss of any WC-2 chiller.)

20. Verify CSIP Fan Coolers - RUNNING AH-9 A SA AH-9 B SB AH-10 A SA AH-10 B SB

21. Verify AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1 - ENERGIZED

22. Place air compressor 1A AND IB in the. LOCAL CONTROL Mode.

(Refer to Attachment 5.)

EOP-GUIDE-1 I Rev. 23 I Page 82 of 96 Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

PATH-1 ATTACHMENT 6 Attachment 6 Sheet 5 of 5 Safeguards Actuat~on Verification CAUTION The maximum calculated dose rate in the vicinity of I1CC lA35 - SA and .MCC IB35-SB is between 10. MREM/HR and ISO. MREM/HR.

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ~**************************************

23. Dispatch An Operator To Unlock AND Turn ON The Breakers For The CSIP Suction AND Discharge Cross-Connect Valves:

MCC IA35-SA l'1CC IB3S-SB VATJVE CUBICLE VALVE CUBICLE lCS-17o. 4A lCS-lll 4D ICS-169 4B lCS-168 7D lCS-2IB 14D lCS-220 9D lCS-219 l4E ICS-2l7 12C (Refer to Attachment 11.)

NOTE: IF control room ventilation was previously aligned to an emergency outside air intake for post-accident operati.ons. THEN follow-up actions will be required to restore the alignment.

24. Consult Plant Operations Staff Regarding Alignment Of The Control R.oom Ventilation System:

o Site Emergency Co-ordinator - Control Room a Site Emergency Co-ordinator - Technital Support Center (Refer to PEP-Bo.. "CONTROL ROOI1 OPERATIONS".)

- END -

EOP GUIDE-l I Rev. 23 I Page 83 of 96 Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 2 FINAL

Scenario 4 Turnover Plant Status

• The unit is currently at ~4 percent power and on hold for turnover.

• The previous shift performed a plant startup following a short maintenance outage.

• The turbine is at 1800 rpm

• SG level control is on the Feed Reg Bypass Valves in automatic

• The MSRs are in Cold Start with OP 131.04 Section 5.1.2 step 7 pending

• GP-005, Power Operation, step 94 has been completed

• Return the unit to 100% power in accordance with GP-005

• RCS temperature band set from step 50 (555°F - 561 OF)

• Middle of life conditions

• RCS Boron is 1593 ppm

• "A" Train equipment is in service

• Motivating air is isolated per OP-133

• Normal Dayshift

• Status Board is updated Equipment Out of Service:

• "B" SG has a 4 Gallon Per Day tube leak Reactivity PlanlBrief:

• Use attached Reactivity Plan to return power to 100 percent at 4 DEH UnitslMin.

Risk Assessment:

• Qualitative YELLOW due to power changes HARRIS 2009A- NRC Simulator Scenario 4 Turnover FINAL.doc

MOL Startup Reactivity Plan is for a reactor startup 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> post trip with the reactor critical at 73 hours8.449074e-4 days <br />0.0203 hours <br />1.207011e-4 weeks <br />2.77765e-5 months <br /> and 90 steps on 0 bank. Step 1 below is ready to synchronize to grid. Power Ascension is at 4 MW/min.

POWERTRAX Operating Strategy Generator Module

.Cy15MOC/72hr/PwrAsc Date: Today Time: Now Page: 1 Step Date Time Power ppmB Gal Bor Gal Oil R Step AFO AO-XE K Effective 1 000204 070000 0.0 1599 0 34 90 0.0 -3.5 0.99533 2 000204 071500 1.0 1598 0 86 92 0.1 -3.5 0.99533 3 000204 073000 2.5 1596 0 90 94 0.3 -3.5 0.99533 4 000204 074500 4.0 1593 0 41 96 0.4 -3.2 0.99533 5 000204 080000 5.0 1592 0 49 98 0.5 -2.8 0.99533 6 000204 081500 6.0 1590 0 100 100 0.5 -2.2 0.99533 7 000204 083000 7.5 1587 0 106 102 0.5 -1.4 0.99533 8 000204 084500 9.0 1584 0 61 104 0.4 -0.5 0.99533 9 000204 090000 10.0 1582 0 65 106 0.4 0.5 0.99533 10 000204 091500 11.0 1580 0 88 108 0.3 1.5 0.99533 11 000204 093000 12.5 1577 0 128 111 0.2 2.4 0.99533

( 12 000204 094500 14.0 1573 0 88 113 0.1 3.3 0.99533 13 000204 100000 15.0 1570 115 -0.0 3.9 0.99533 0 938 HARRIS 2009A- NRC Simulator Scenario 4 Turnover FINAL.doc

I

\

POWERTRAX Operating Strategy Generator Module Cy15MOC/72hr/PwrAsc/PwrAsc72d Date: Today Time: Now Page: 2 Step Date Time Power ppmB Gal Bor Gal Oil R Step AFD AO-XE K Effective 1 000204 130000 15.0 1554 0 238 115 -0.2 3.9 0.99636 2 000204 131000 19.0 1546 0 252 120 -0.3 4.1 0.99636 3 000204 132000 23.0 1539 0 269 125 -0.6 4.3 0.99636 4 000204 133000 27.0 1531 0 256 129 -0.9 4.4 0.99636 5 000204 134000 31.0 1523 0 242 134 -1.1 4.5 0.99636 6 000204 135000 35.0 1516 0 294 139 -1.3 4.5 0.99637 7 000204 140000 39.0 1507 0 259 143 -1.4 4.5 0.99637 8 000204 141000 43.0 1500 0 271 148 -1.5 4.5 0.99636 9 000204 142000 47.0 1492 0 298 153 -1.4 4.5 0.99635 10 000204 143000 51.0 1483 0 284 157 -1.3 4.4 0.99635 11 000204 144000 55.0 1475 0 286 162 -1.1 4.3 0.99635 12 000204 145000 59.0 1467 0 332 167 -0.8 4.2 0.99635 13 000204 150000 63.0 1457 0 306 171 -0.6 4.1 0.99635 14 000204 151000 67.0* 1449 0 324 176 -0.3 4.0 0.99635 15 000204 152000 71.0 1439 0 365 181 0.1 4.0 0.99635 16 000204 153000 75.0 1429 0 351 185 0.3 3.9 0.99635 17 000204 154000 79.0 1419 0 370 190 0.6 3.8 0.99635 18 000204 155000 83.0 1409 0 427 195 0.9 3.7 0.99635 19 000204 160000 87.0 1398 0 427 199 0.8 3.7 0.99635 20 000204 161000 91.0 1386 0 465 204 0.8 3.6 0.99634 21 000204 162000 95.0 1373 0 584 209 0.4 3.5 0.99634 22 000204 163000 99.0 1358 0 174 213 -0.9 3.5 0.99636 23 000204 164000 100.0 1353 0 222 218 -0.9 3.5 0.99635 24 000204 170000 100.0 1347 0 1622 218 -0.9 3.4 0.99636 25 000204 190000 100.0 1305 0 1820 218 -1.3 2.7 0.99634 26 000204 210000 100.0 1259 0 1799 218 -1.8 2.4 0.99634 27 000204 230000 100.0 1215 218 -2.4 2.2 0.99636 0 12538 HARRIS 2009A- NRC Simulator Scenario 4 Turnover FINAL.doc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: 05000400 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

• IC-27, MOL, 4% power

• Plant startup to full power in progress lAW GP-005, Power Operation, step 95

• 4 GPD tube leak on '8' Steam Generator Turnover:

• The previous shift continued a plant startup following a short maintenance outage. GP-005 is in progress with Step 94 completed. Continue the startup.

Critical Task:

• Initiate insertion of negative reactivity to bring reactor subcritical (emergency boration or manual rod insertion) prior to exiting FRP-S.1

• Energize at least AC emergency bus prior to commencing SG depressurization of EPP-001 Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 N/A N-BOP, Shift to the Main Feedwater Regulating Valves SRO R-RO Raise Power 2 PT:455 TS-SRO Pressurizer Pressure Channell, PT-455, fails high 3 PRS14A C-RO, Pressurizer Spray Valve fails OPEN (AUTO failure only)

SRO TS-SRO 4 I-RO, LT:459 SRO Controlling Pressurizer Level Channel, LT-459, fails high TS-SRO 5 LT:476 I-BOP, Controlling 'A' Steam Generator Level Transmitter, LT-476, fails low SRO TS-SRO 6 TURMT1 C-BOP, High Vibration on Turbine (increases to trip setpoint over 2 min)

SRO 7-8-9 CRF003A M-ALL 1 Control Rod drops then 2nd Control Rod drops requiring a Reactor Trip CRF003B ATWS RPS01B 10 EPS01A, M-ALL Loss of Offsite Power 11 DG05A, C-BOP, EDG 'A' failure leaves Emergency Bus 1A-SA de-energized DG06B SRO EDG 'B' breaker fails to shut automatically (can eventually be restored by operator)

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Scenario Event Description Shearon-Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 Scenario Summary:

The plant is at 4% power in end of life. There is a 4 GPD tube leak on the 'B' Steam Generator. A plant startup is in progress lAW GP-005, Power Operation. The first priority will be to raise power from 4% to 7% - 9% so that they can transfer control from Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass FCVs to the Main Feedwater Regulating Valves. Once the first Main Feedwater Regulating Valve is placed in service then the scenario will proceed to the next event. They will continue to work at placing FRV's in auto during the scenario.

Once the increase in power has been observed to the extent necessary and 'A' Main FRV is in auto, then event #2 can be inserted. This event is Pressurizer Pressure Channell, PT-455, failing high. This will cause a MCB annunciator to alarm. The RO will report that PT-455 pressure indication is high and the crew will implement OWP-RP-02 to remove the failed channel from service. The SRO should evaluate Tech Specs 3.3.1 (Reactor Trip Instrumentation), 3.3.2 (ESF Instrumentation), and 3.3.3.5.a (Remote Shutdown System), for the failed channel and request assistance from the WCC.

Event #3, Pressurizer Spray Valve PCV-444C failing open, can be initiated once Tech Specs for PT-455 have been evaluated. Pressurizer pressure will decease and all pressurizer heaters will energize.

Annunciators for pressurizer low pressure will alarm. The crew should respond by entering AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control, and place the malfunctioning spray valve in manual per the immediate actions. RCS pressure may drop below the DNB limit depending on how fast the operator responds to the failure. If so, the SRO should evaluate Tech Spec 3.2.5, DNB Parameters.

Event #4 is initiated once RCS pressure has recovered. It is the Controlling Pressurizer Level Instrument, LT -459, failing high. The crew should respond in accordance with alarm response procedure APP-ALB-009. The crew should take Charging FCV-122 to Manual and maintain pressurizer level within the control band and shift level control to an alternate channel. The SRO should evaluate Tech Spec 3.3.3.5.a (Remote Shutdown System), for the failed channel and request assistance from the WCC.

Event #5 is the Controlling Steam Generator Level Channel on SG 'A', LT-476, failing low. The BOP should respond to multiple 'A' Steam Generator alarms on ALB-014 and take manual control of the 'A' FRV in accordance with the alarm response procedures and OMM-001 , Conduct of Operations. The SRO should evaluate Tech Specs 3.3.1 (Reactor Trip Instrumentation), 3.3.2 (ESF Instrumentation), and 3.3.3.6 (Accident Monitoring Instrumentation). The OWP is not required to be implemented in order to continue with the scenario.

Event #6 is High Vibration on the Main Turbine. Vibrations will continue to rise over two minutes to the point that a Turbine Trip is required. Since power is <P-7 the crew trip the turbine only and continue on in AOP-006, Turbine Generator Trouble. Crew should continue on in the procedure to the point that they isolate and break vacuum. Once this action has been performed continue on with Event 7.

Event #7 is the dropping of one control rod. The RO should report the drop of a single control rod. The crew will enter AOP-001 and perform the immediate actions.

(NOTE: a component failure for Event # 7 is NOT credited for the RO during this malfunction due to the rod control system being placed in Manual prior to the failure occurring.)

Event #8 is the dropping of the second control rod. Event 8 will occur 1.5 minutes after the drop of the first control rod. The RO should report the two dropped control rods. The crew will enter AOP-001 and the first immediate action will direct a Reactor Trip.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Scenario Event Description Shearon-Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 Event #9 The crew should recognize that the reactor has failed to trip and enter FRP-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. The Reactor Trip breakers will be opened locally three minutes after a field operator has been dispatched to perform those actions. Once the crew has initiated the emergency boration in FRP-S.1, they should exit FRP-S.1 and return to PATH-1.

Events # 10 and 11 Once the crew has entered PATH-1, the Lead Examiner can cue the loss of off-site power. The 'A' EDG will fail to start and the 'B' EDG Output Breaker will fail to shut automatically. The crew should enter EPP-001, Loss of AC Power to 1A-SA and 1B-SB Buses. Manual operation of the 'B' EDG Output breaker is available and the crew should restore power to the 'B' Safety Bus using the 'B' EDG. Terminate the scenario when the crew transitions out of EPP-001. (Note there is no exit available from EPP-001 without restoring power to at least one of the Safety Buses.)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Scenario Event Description Shearon-Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 SIMULATOR SETUP SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

• Initiate from IC-27. Adjust boron concentration up by 12 ppm over 1 minute to lower power to 4%. Allow -4 minutes for plant to stabilize at new power.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

• From IC-27, adjust to < 5 % power

• No equipment OOS

• GP-005 completed through Step 94

• Reactivity Plan for intended evolution (Raise power for placing Main Turbine on line)

• Turnover Sheet CAEP:

! Description of NRCCAEP4

!Event 1 is to Raise Power

!Event 2, Pressurizer Pressure Channell, PT-455, fails High imf pt:455 (2 00:00:00 00:00:00) 2500.0

!Event 3, Pressurizer Spray Valve, PCV-444C, fails Open (wI Manual Control available) imf prs14a (3 00:00:00 00:00:00) 100

! Event 4, Controlling Pressurizer Level Channel, LT -459, fails high imf 1t:459 (400:00:00 00:00:00) 100.0

!Event 5, Controlling 'A' Steam Generator Level Transmitter, LT-476, fails low imf 1t:476 (5 00:00:00 00:00:00) 0.0

!Event 6, High Vibration on turbine (increases to trip setpoint over 2 minutes) imf tur04a (6 00:00:00 00:00:00) 16 120.0

!Event 7, One control rod drops G-13 requiring AOP-001 actions imf crf03a (7 00:00:00 00:00:00) 2 7

!Event 8, A second rod drops (F-10) with a one minute 30 second delay requiring a manual Reactor Trip imf crf03b (7 00:01 :30 00:00:00) 2 50

!Event 9, ATWS Reactor Trip breakers fail to open auto or manual imf rps01 b (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) 3 3

!Event 10 and 11, Loss of Offsite Power, 'A' EDG trips at 200 rpm, '8' EDG Output breaker fails to shut imf eps01 (1000:00:0000:00:00) W/O_DELAY imf dsg05a (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) true imf dsg06b (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) true Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Scenario Event Description Shearon-Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 CAEP: (Continued)

!Reduce power to -4% (700 gal dilution and 2 rod steps will raise to 9%)

0.5 run 1.0 imf rcs05 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) 1588.5 00:00:60 -

1.0 run .

80.0 dmf rcs05 360.0 frz Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # Page 6 of 36

~-------- ~~I Event

Description:

Shift to the Main Feedwater Regulating Valves / Raise Power Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: Actuate ET-2 (Pressurizer Pressure Channell, PT-455, fails High) on cue from the Lead Evaluator.

EVALUATOR NOTE: Do not proceed to Event 3 (Pressurizer Spray Valve fails OPEN) until the shift of 'A' Feedwater Regulator Valve to AUTO is complete.

SRO GP-005 Step 95 Directs BOP to perform Step 95, PREPARE to place the Main SRO Feedwater Regulating valves in service.

PREPARE to place the Main Feedwater Regulating valves in BOP service as follows:

VERIFY the following Main Feedwater Regulating valves are shut with the flow controllers in manual with zero (0 or minimum) controller output:

• 1FW-133, MAIN FW A REGULATOR (FK-478)

• 1FW-249, MAIN FW B REGULATOR (FK-488)

• 1FW-191, MAIN FW C REGULATOR (FK-498)

VERIFY SHUT the following Main Feed Regulating Block BOP valves:

• 1FW-130, MAIN FW A BLOCK VLV

• 1FW-246, MAl N FW' B BLOCK VLV

• 1FW-188, MAIN FW C BLOCK VLV BOOTH OPERATOR: In the following step, report smooth operation of each FCV.

When requested to verify: report 1 FW-136, 1 FW-252, 1 FW-194 (Main Feed Reg Valve Outlet Isolation Valves) all OPEN. (NOTE: Not modeled on Simulator)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # Page 7 of 36

~-------- ~~

Event

Description:

Shift to the Main Feedwater Regulating Valves / Raise Power Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior CYCLE the following controllers to open then shut the flow BOP control valves, while monitoring locally for smooth operation:

• 1FW-133, MAIN FW A REGULATOR (FK-478)

• 1FW-249, MAIN FW B REGULATOR (FK-488)

• 1FW-191, MAIN FW C REGULATOR (FK-498)

VERIFY OPEN the following Main Feed Regulating Isolation BOP Valves:

• 1FW-130, MAIN FW A BLOCK VLV

• 1FW-246, MAIN FW B BLOCK VLV

• 1FW-188, MAIN FW C BLOCK VLV

• 1FW-136, MAIN FEED REG VALVE A OUTLET ISOL

• 1FW-252, MAIN FEED REG VALVE B OUTLET ISOL

• 1FW-194, MAIN FEED REG VALVE C OUTLET ISOL Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # ....;.._ _ _ _ Page 8 of .....;3;;.;;,6---11 Event

Description:

Shift to the Main Feedwater Regulating Valves / Raise Power Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR'S NOTE: The RO should adjust RCS boron and move rods while maintaining Tavg-Tref within 5 of and power S 10 %.

The RO should request permission and a peer check from the SRO before making a reactivity change.

RO INITIATES dilution, as necessary.

EVALUATOR'S NOTE: OP-107.01 is a "Continuous Use" procedure for the dilution.

OP-107.01, Section5.a, Blender Dilution (Alternate Dilution)

Operation (This is a CONTINUOUS USE procedure.)

DETERMINE the volume of makeup water to be added. This RO may be done by experience or via the reactivity plan associated with the Simulator IC.

SETS FIS-114, TOTAL MAKEUP WTR BATCH COUNTER, to RO obtain the desired quantity.

RO SET total makeup flow as follows:

• IF performing DIL in Step 8, THEN SET controller 1CS-151, FK-114 RWMU FLOW, for less than or equal to 90 gpm.

• IF performing ALT DIL in Step 8, THEN SET controller 1CS-151, FK-114 RWMU FLOW, for the desired flow rate.

VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in the RO STOP position.

RO VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # Page 9 of 36

---

~~I Event

Description:

Shift to the Main Feedwater Regulating Valves / Raise Power Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior PLACE the control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the DIL RO OR the ALT DIL position.

PROCEDURE NOTE: When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK 444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a PI controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows:

• PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected pressure

• ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure

• Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure PROCEDURE NOTE: SRO concurrence should be obtained prior to energizing the BUH in MANUAL.

OPERATE the pressurizer backup heaters as required to limit RO the difference between the pressurizer and RCS boron concentration to less than 10 ppm.

RO START the makeup system as follows:

• TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

• VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT .

PROCEDURE CAUTION: The operation should be stopped if an unanticipated reactivity effect is seen. Do not resume the operation until the cause has been corrected.

RO VERIFY Tavg responds as desired.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # Page 10 of 36

~-------- ~~I Event

Description:

Shift to the Main Feedwater Regulating Valves / Raise Power Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTE: For this plant condition, rod control will be in MANUAL.

IF rod control is in AUTO, THEN VERIFY the control rods are RO stepping out to the desired height.

VERIFY dilution automatically terminates when the desired RO quantity has been added.

RO PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1.

RO VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch:

• Is in the STOP position.

• The GREEN light is LIT.

RO PLACE the RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO.

RO START the makeup system as follows:

• TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

• VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # Page 11 of 36

---

~~I Event

Description:

Shift to the Main Feedwater Regulating Valves / Raise Power Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior WHEN Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valve FCV Controller demand is between 70% and 80%, OR when Reactor Power is BOP between 7 and 9%, THEN TRANSFER SG level control to the Main Feedwater Regulating valves as follows:

PLACE the following Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass FCV Controllers in MAN:

• 1FW-140, MN FW A REG BYP FK-479.1

• 1FW-256, MN FW B REG BYP FK-489.1

• 1FW-198, MN FW C REG BYP FK-499.1 BOP PLACE the Main FW Regulating Valve Controllers in AUTO:

• 1FW-133, MAIN FW A REGULATOR FK-478

• 1FW-249, MAIN FW B REGULATOR FK-488

• 1FW-191, MAIN FW C REGULATOR FK-498 PROCEDURE NOTE: The following Steps verify the Feed Regulating valves will respond prior to fully closing the Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass FCVs.

LOWER the output of the following Feedwater Regulating BOP Valve Bypass FCV Controllers to a position 10% lower than the current output:

• 1FW-140, MN FW A REG BYP FK-479.1

• 1FW-256, MN FW B REG BYP FK-489.1

• 1FW-198, MN FW C REG BYP FK-499.1 PROCEDURE NOTE: If the demand signal reaches a value of 10% with no response from the Feedwater Regulating Valves, it may be necessary to return the FRV controller to MAN to cancel any integrated signal and assess the situation before continuing.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # _______ Page 12 of ....3....

6---11 Event

Description:

Shift to the Main Feedwater Regulating Valves / Raise Power Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior WHEN Feedwater Regulating Valves indicate BOTH of the BOP following responses:

• Controller output increasing

• SG level returning to normal THEN LOWER output of the following Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass FCV Controllers to 0% (Minimum output):

• 1FW-140, MN FW A REG BYP FK-479.1

• 1FW-256, MN FW B REG BYP FK-489.1

• 1FW-198, MN FW C REG BYP FK-499.1 At STATUS LIGHT BOX 1, VERIFY SHUT the following BOP Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass FCVs:

• A BYP FW-140 (Window 4-1)

• B BYP FW-256 (Window 4-2)

• C BYP FW-198 (Window 4-3)

LEAD EVALUATOR: Cue Event 2 when the power increase has been observed to the extent desired.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # .....;2=--_ _ _ _ Page 13 of ..,.;3;,;;.6--11 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Pressure Channell. PT-455, fails high Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTE: Event #2 is Pressurizer Pressure Channell, PT-455, failing high. This will cause a MCB annunciator to alarm. The RO will report that PT-455 pressure indication is high and the crew will implement OWP-RP-02 to remove the failed channel from service. The SRO should evaluate Tech Specs 3.3.1 (Reactor Trip Instrumentation), 3.3.2 (ESF Instrumentation), and 3.3.3.5.a (Remote Shutdown System), for the failed channel and request assistance from the WCC.

BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert ET-2 (Pressurizer Pressure Channel, PT-455, fails high) on cue from the Lead Evaluator.

Indications Available:

• ALB-009-5-2, Pressurizer High Pressure Alert RO IDENTIFIES that PT-455 has failed HIGH IMPLEMENT OWP-RP-02 to remove failed channel from SRO service REFER to the following Tech Specs:

• T.S, 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation Action 6 a, Place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 6 hrs, and b, Channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hrs for surveillance

• T,S, 3.3.2, ESF Instrumentation Functional Unit 1,d Action 19 Ops may proceed provided the following:

SRO

a. Inop channel placed in the tripped condition within 6 hrs, and b. Inop channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hrs for surveillance testing of other channels per Spec 4.3,2,1.

• T.S, 3,3,3.5a, Remote Shutdown System Action b - Restore the inop channels to OPERABLE status within 60 days or submit a Special Report lAW Spec 6.9.2 within 14 additional days, Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # _2=--_ _ _ _ Page 14 of _3.;;;,;6;....~1 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Pressure Channell. PT-455. fails high Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO INITIATE an Equipment Problem Checklist EVALUATOR NOTE: Once the Tech Specs have been evaluated, 'A' FRV is in AUTO, and PT-455 removed from service per the OWP then cue Event 3, Pressurizer Spray Valve PC V-444C fails open.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # _3;......____ Page 15 of ...,;3=6---11 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Spray Valve PCV-444C fails OPEN Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTE: When Pressurizer Spray Valve PCV-444C fails open, Pressurizer pressure will decrease and all Pressurizer heaters will energize. Annunicators for Pressurizer low pressure will alarm. The crew should respond by entering AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control, and placing the malfunctioning spray valve in manual per the immediate actions. RCS pressure may drop below the DNB limit depending on how fast the operator responds to the failure. If so, the SRO should evaluate Tech Spec 3.2.5, DNB Parameters.

BOOTH OPERATOR: Actuate ET-3 (Controlling PZR Pressure Channel, PT-444, fails HIGH).

Indications Available:

• ALB-09-3-3 PRESSURIZER LOW PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL

• ALB-09-5-1 PRESSURIZER HIGH-LOW PRESS RO Responds to ALB-09 alarms.

RO Reports malfunction in the RCS Pressure Control system.

RO Perform AOP-019 Immediate Actions.

Immediate Action RO CHECK that a bubble exists in the PRZ. (YES)

Immediate VERIFY ALL PRZ PORVs AND associated block valves Action RO properly positioned for current PRZ pressure and plant conditions. (YES)

Immediate CHECK Both PRZ spray valves properly positioned for current Action RO PRZ pressure and plant conditions. (NO)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # ...,;3;......_ _ _ _ Page 16 of _3....

6--11 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Spray Valve PCV-444C fails OPEN Time II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTE: The malfunction only affects PCV-444C. It is expected that the operator will recognize that only one spray valve is malfunctioning and operate that controller in MANUAL (option a below).

Immediate CONTROL PRZ spray valves in MANUAL using ONE of the Action following (listed in order of preference):

a) AFFECTED Spray Valve controller in MANUAL (if only one is obviously malfunctioning)

RO OR b) PK-444A, Master Pressure Controller OR c) Both individual spray valve controllers GO TO Section 3.1, Pressure Control Malfunctions While SRO Operating With a Pressurizer Bubble.

Inform SSO to REFER to PEP-110, Emergency Classification SRO and Protective Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Network at entry point X.

MONITOR PRZ pressure by observing other reliable RO indications.

SRO CHECK plant in MODE 1 OR 2. (YES)

RO CHECK PRZ pressure CONTROLLED. (YES)

RO CHECK PRZ pressure 2335 PSIG OR LESS. (YES)

RO CHECK ALL of the following PRZ PORV block valves OPEN:

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # _3;;.....____ Page 17 of ......;3;;.;;.6---i1 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Spray Valve PCV-444C fails OPEN Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• 1RC-117 (for PCV-445A SA) (YES)

• 1RC-115 (for PCV-445B) (YES)

• 1RC-113 (for PCV-44B SB) (YES)

CHECK that a malfunction of one or more of the following has occurred:

• PT-444 (NO)

RO

• PK-444A (NO)

• PRZ heater(s) (NO)

• PRZ spray valve(s) or controller(s) (YES)

RO CHECK PK-444A controlling properly in AUTO. (YES)

RO CONTROL PRZ pressure as follows:

PROCEDURE NOTE: If individual spray valve controllers are already in MAN, do NOT return to AUTO.

CHECK BOTH PRZ spray valve controllers in AUTO AND RO BOTH spray valves operating as desired. (NO)

VERIFY PRZ Spray Valve controllers in ONE of the following alignments:

RO

• AFFECTED Spray Valve controller in MANUAL (if only one is obviously malfunctioning) (YES)

OPERATE Spray Valves as necessary to control PZR RO pressure.

RO CHECK ALL PRZ heaters operating as desired. (YES)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 18 of . 36

~-------- ~~I Event

Description:

Pressurizer Spray Valve PCV-444C fails OPEN Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior CHECK at least one of the following conditions present:

RO

• PRZ pressure is UNCONTROLLED (NO)

• Status of a normal spray valve or a PRZ heater bank is UNCONTROLLED (NO)

REFER TO Tech Spec 3.2.5 (DNB Parameters) AND SRO IMPLEMENT action where appropriate. (Limit is 2185 psig -

restore within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />)

Completes an Equipment Problem Checklist and contacts SRO WCC for assistance. (WR, EIR and Maintenance support)

EVALUATOR NOTE: The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 4 (Controlling Pressurizer Level Channel, LT-459, fails high) once the plant has stabilized back in its normal pressure band.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # _4..;.....-.____ Page 19 of .....;3=6---11 Event

Description:

Controlling Pressurizer Level Channel, LT-459, fails high Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUTATOR NOTE: Event #4 is the controlling Pressurizer Level Instrument, LT-459, failing high. The crew should respond in accordance with alarm response procedure APP-ALB-009. The crew will be required to take Charging FCV-122 to Manual and maintain Pressurizer level within the control band and shift level control to an alternate channel.

BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert ET-4 (ContrOlling Pressurizer Level Instrument, LT-459, fails high), on cue from the Lead Evaluator.

Indications Available:

• ALB-009-2-1, PZR CONT HIGH LEVEL DEV & HTRS ON

• ALB-009-4-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH LEVEL ALERT

• Lowering Pressurizer level RO IDENTIFY a failed Pressurizer Level Channel RO PLACE FCV-122, Charging Flow Control Valve, in manual.

OPERATE FCV-122 as necessary to restore Pressurizer Level RO to the normal band RO SELECT 460/461 on Pressurizer Level Controller Selector Evaluate T,S, 3,3.1 (N/A when < P-7)

SRO TS 3,3,3.5a Remote Shutdown - Restore to Operable wI? days or HSD within next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Restore Charging to Automatic (Requires shifting Master RO Controller to Manual and then back to Auto in order to remove integration Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # _4..:......_ _ _ _ Page 20 of _3;;;,;6;""'-11 Event

Description:

Controlling Pressurizer Level Channel. LT -459, fails high Time II Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior Completes an Equipment Problem Checklist and contacts SRO WCC for assistance, (WR, EIR and Maintenance support)

EVALUATOR NOTE: The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 5 (Controlling Steam Generator Level Channel on SG 'A', LT-476 failing LOW) once the plant has stabilized back in its normal Pressurizer Level band.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # .....;5~_ _ _ _ Page 21 of ......;3=6~1 Event

Description:

Controlling Steam Generator Level Channel on SG 'A', LT-476 failing LOW Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTE: Event 5 is the Controlling Steam Generator Level Channel on SG 'A', LT-476, failing low. The BOP should respond to multiple 'A' Steam Generator alarms on ALB-014 and take manual control of the' A' FRV in accordance with the alarm response procedures and OMM-001, Conduct of Operations.

The SRO should evaluate Tech Specs 3.3.1 (Reactor Trip Instrumentation), 3.3.2 (ESF Instrumentation), and 3.3.3.6 (Accident Monitoring Instrumentation). The failed channel does not have to be removed from service to continue with the scenario.

BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert ET-5 (Controlling Steam Generator Level Channel on SG 'A', LT-476, fails low) on cue from the Lead Evaluator Indications Available:

• ALB-014-1-1 B SG A NR LEVEll SP HII LO DEV

• ALB-014-4-4 SG A LOW LOW LEVEL

• ALB-014-8-5 COMPUTER ALARM SG BOP RESPONDS to multiple 'A' SG alarms EVALUATOR'S NOTE: THE BOP may take MANUAL control of the associated FRV prior to entering the APP.

BOP Enters APP-ALB-014-1-1 Band/or 4-4.

BOP PLACES FRV for SG 'A' in MANUAL and controls flow.

.ii,',/i; *.'* . . . ***'***'~Fl9 ~~~E.Fl~t2iOWp RPto i .*. . . , "'.*,'.',.*'i*'*.'*' .** i.'.*.'. . *,* ,'.'., *....'., ". .

-:"" .* *'.\ ..*. II::lIIJ??)lI::l>I..ifl(::lJ "1~1,1 rtpJ,tr"B'~'\.>I::l:

,;c * *:1;i.."

i ..

i***.' . . . *.,i ,.. . ..,..

SRO CONTACTS work control for assistance.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 22 of 36

~-------- ~~I Event

Description:

Controlling Steam Generator Level Channel on SG 'A'. LT-476 failing LOW Time II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior ENTERS TS:

• 3.3.1.a Reactor Trip Instrumentation, Action 6

• 3.3.2.a ESF Instrumentation, Action 19 SRO Both require tripping the inoperable channel within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

and

• 3.3.3.6.a. Accident Monitoring Instrumentation - restore the inoperable channel within 7 days. (Not applicable but may initiate a tracking EIR related to this TS)

EVALUATOR'S NOTE: After the TS has been evaluated, the Lead Evaluator can cue Event 6 (High Vibration on the Main Turbine).

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # _6;...-._ _ _ _ Page 23 of _3;....;.6~1 Event

Description:

High Vibration on the Main Turbine Time II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTE: Event #6 is High Vibration on the Main Turbine.

BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert ET-6 (Main Turbine Vibration increases from 0 to 16 over 2 minutes) on cue from the Lead Evaluator Indications Available:

• ALB-20-2-3 Turbine Trouble

• ALB-20-5-5 Computer Alarm MSrrURB RO Identify increasing vibrations on the Main Turbine CHECK that an automatic or manual Turbine trip signal has BOP occurred. (NO)

GO TO the applicable section:

SRO

• Section 3.2, Turbine Eccentricity or Vibration (page 12)

PROCEDURE NOTE: Resonant ranges can be found in the Turbine Speed Hold Recommendations chart in the Operations Curve Book.

BOP CHECK Turbine speed 600 RPM OR GREATER. (YES)

COMMENCE an OSI-PI AOP-006 Attachment 1 Group Trend, BOP Turbine Monitoring ERFIS Computer Points.

REFER TO Attachment 6, Turbine Operating Limits AND BOP CHECK that ALL readings applicable to current Turbine speed remain BELOW their trip values. (NO, Vibration exceeds)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # _6;;....._ _ _ _ Page 24 of ....;3=6~

Event

Description:

High Vibration on the Main Turbine Time ~ Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior PERFORM the following:

CONFIRM that a reading is at or above its trip value using at least one of the following:

BOP

• Reading for the alternate vibration monitor from that bearing on Supervisory Panel

• Abnormal Turbine noise or vibration IF a reading AT OR ABOVE its trip value is confirmed, THEN:

(1) IF above P-7, THEN TRIP the Reactor AND GO TO EOP SRO Path-1. (Perform Section 3.1 as time allows.) (NO)

(2) TRIP the Turbine AND GO TO Section 3.1, Turbine Trip.

(YES)

CHECK for ANY of the following:

• ALL turbine governor valves SHUT (4 total) (YES)

BOP OR

• ALL turbine throttle valves SHUT (4 total) (YES)

CHECK ALL of the following SHUT:

BOP

• Reheat Stop valves (4 total) (YES)

• Intercept valves (4 total) (YES)

CHECK ALL Non-Return valves SHUT (8 total) (Status Light BOP Box 3). (YES)

CHECK ALL of the following HP Turbine Drains and Casing BOP Vents OPEN (Status Light Box 2) (YES)

CHECK BOTH of the following AVAILABLE: (YES)

BOP

• Air Side Seal Oil Pump

• Air Side Seal Oil Backup Pump Harris2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # _6;...._ _ _ _ Page 25 of ..,;3;,;;.6----lj Event

Description:

High Vibration on the Main Turbine Time II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE NOTE: Vacuum should be maintained until Turbine speed drops to below 180 rpm except under the conditions listed in the next step. The listed conditions are serious enough that overall damage to the Turbine can be reduced by limiting coastdown time.

CHECK that AT LEAST ONE of the following conditions for breaking condenser vacuum is met:

• ALB-18-2-3, TURBINE TRIP THRUST BEARING WEAR-ALARMED (NO)

• ALB-18-2-4, TURBINE TRIP BEARING OIL LOW PRESS-ALARMED (NO)

SRO

• PI-1842, GLAND STM SEAL HDR PRESS-LESS THAN 20 PSIG (NO)

.

• Loss of Offsite Power (NO)

• Turbine was manually tripped due to sustained vibration of GREATER THAN 14 MILS (YES)

• Audible rubbing noises from the Turbine (NO)

VERIFY that the following breakers are OPEN:

• 52-9, GENERATOR TO NORTH BUS

• 52-7, GENERATOR TO SOUTH BUS BOP

• 102, UNIT AUX XFMR A TO AUX BUS D

• 108, UNIT AUX XFMR A TO AUX BUS A

• 122, UNIT AUX XFMR B TO AUX BUS E

• 128, UNIT AUX XFMR B TO AUX BUS B VERIFY that the following are SHUT:

BOP a. MSIVs

b. MSIV bypass valves BOP STOP BOTH condenser vacuum pumps.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # _6;;;....-._ _ _ _ Page 26 of ...,;3;;.;;,6--11 Event

Description:

High Vibration on the Main Turbine Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior OPEN the following:

BOP - 1CE-447, CONDENSER VACUUM BREAKER

-1CE-475, CONDENSER VACUUM BREAKER REFER TO OP-133, Main Condenser Air Removal System, BOP AND COMPLETE condenser shutdown.

EVALUATOR NOTE: Once the crew has isolated and broken vacuum, then initiate Event 7 (One Dropped Control Rod)

After the crew implements AOP-001 for the dropped rod a second dropped rod will occur (Event 8) requiring a manual Reactor Trip which will result in an ATWS condition.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # _7:....-_ _ _ _ Page 27 of ...,;3;;.;;,6---!1 Event

Description:

One Dropped Control Rod - AOP-001 Time I Position J Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTE: Event #7 is one Dropped Control Rod. The RO should report the event and the crew should recognize that a control rod has dropped.

BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert ET-7 (One Dropped Control Rod) on cue from the evaluator.

Indications Available:

• ALB-013-7-4, ONE ROD AT BOTTOM RO Recognizes indications of Dropped Rod Enters AOP-001, MALFUNCTION OF ROD CONTROL AND SRO INDICATION SYSTEM.

RO Perform AOP-001 Immediate Actions.

Immediate Action RO CHECK that LESS THAN TWO control rods are dropped (YES)

Immediate Action POSITION Rod Bank Selector Switch to MAN.

Immediate Action CHECK Control Bank motion STOPPED.

NOTE - Throughout this procedure, "Westinghouse Rod Control System Troubleshooting Guidelines" refers to Section 6.0 of EPRI document TR-108152, Rod Control System Maintenance - Westinghouse PWRs.

GO TO the appropriate section:

• Section 3.1, Dropped Control Rod 3.1 Dropped Control Rod

• RECORD the time at which the rod dropped: Time Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7 Page 28 of 36

---

~~I Event

Description:

One Dropped Control Rod - AOP-001 Time II Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior ADJUST ONE of the following to equalize Tavg with Tref:

Turbine load Boron concentration CHECK ALL Rod Control Power and Logic Cabinets for normal operation, as follows:

NO blown fuses NO other visible malfunctions DETERMINE if the Westinghouse Rod Control System Troubleshooting Guidelines should be initiated.

(Priority E Work Request is required)

EVALUATOR NOTE: Event 8 (Second Dropped Rod) will occur 1.5 minutes after the first dropped rod (Event 7)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # _8.....,_9_ _ _ _ Page 29 of ....,;3;,,;.6---11 Event

Description:

Two Dropped Control Rods - ATWS Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTE: Event #8 is the drop of the Second Dropped Control Rod. The RO should report the event and the crew should recognize that an ATWS is in progress when the Reactor Trip switches fail to function.

Once the crew has carried the emergency boration of FRP-S.l and transitioned to PATH-l, the Lead Examiner can cue the loss of off-site power. The 'A' EDG will fail to start and the 'B' EDG Output Breaker will fail to shut. The crew should enter EPP-001, Loss of AC Power to 1A-SA and 1B-SB Buses.

Once the 'B' EDG has been restored the scenario can be terminated.

BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert ET-8 (Second Dropped Control Rod) 1.5 minutes after ET-7.

Delete the ATWS malfunction (RPSOl B) and trip the reactor three (3) minutes after a field operator is dispatched by the crew to trip the reactor locally.

Indications Available:

• ALB-013-7-3, TWO OR MORE RODS AT BOTTOM

• ALB-013-7-4, ONE ROD AT BOTTOM RO Recognizes indications of Dropped Rod Enters AOP-001, MALFUNCTION OF ROD CONTROL AND SRO INDICATION SYSTEM.

RO Perform AOP-001 Immediate Actions.

Immediate Action RO CHECK that LESS THAN TWO control rods are dropped (NO)

Immediate Action RO TRIP the Reactor AND GO TO EOP Path-1.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 8,9 Page 30 of 36

~~------ --~I Event

Description:

Two Dropped Control Rods - ATWS Time Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes and reports that the reactor failed to trip ENTER FRP-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power SRO Generation!ATWS PROCEDURE CAUTION: To maximize core cooling, RCPs should NOT be tripped with reactor power GREATER THAN 5%.

(Normal support conditions for running RCPs are NOT required for these circumstances. The RCP TRIP CRITERIA for small break LOCA conditions is NOT applicable to this procedure.)

PROCEDURE NOTE: Steps 1 through 4 are immediate action steps.

RO Verify Reactor Trip:

Check for all of the following:

• Check for any of the following:

o Trip breakers RTA AND BYA - OPEN (NO) o Trip breakers RTB AND BYB - OPEN (NO)

• Rod bottom lights -LIT (NO)

• Neutron flux - DECREASING (NO)

BOP Verify Turbine Trip:

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # _8;,.:.,....;.9_ _ _ _ Page 31 of .....;3;.;;,6---i1 Event

Description:

Two Dropped Control Rods - ATWS Time I Position  ! Applicant's Actions or Behavior Check for any of the following:

• All turbine throttle valves - SHUT (YES)

• All turbine governor valves - SHUT (YES)

BOP Verify All AFW Pumps - RUNNING Check Reactor Trip Status:

RO

a. Check reactor - TRIPPED (NO)

Direct an operator to contact OR report to the main control SRO room (to receive instructions to locally trip the reactor).

SRO Initiate monitoring the Critical Safety Function Status Trees.

SRO Evaluate EAL Network using entry point x.

PROCEDURE NOTE: Actuation of the sequencer inhibits operation of the boric acid pumps. (If the sequencer runs on Program A, the pumps can be started manually after LB-9.

Otherwise, the sequencer must be reset to restore operation of the pumps)

SI flow accomplishes emergency boration.

RO Initiate Emergency Boration of RCS:

Check SI flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM (NO)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # _8;.:.'..;;.9____ Page 32 of ...,;3;;,;;.6----i1 Event

Description:

Two Dropped Control Rods - ATWS Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Check PRZ Pressure - LESS THAN 2335 PSIG (YES)

Isolate CNMT Ventilation:

a. Stop the following fans:

o AH-82 A NORMAL PURGE SUPPLY FAN o AH-82 B NORMAL PURGE SUPPLY FAN BOP o E-5A CNMT PRE-ENTRY PURGE EXHAUST FAN o E-5B CNMT PRE-ENTRY PURGE EXHAUST FAN

b. Verify the valves and dampers listed in the table - SHUT (YES)

RO Check Trip Status:

Check reactor - TRIPPED (YES)

Check turbine - TRIPPED (YES)

Check Reactor Subcritical:

o Power range channels - LESS THAN 5% (YES) o Intermediate range startup rate channels - NEGATIVE (YES)

SRO Observe CAUTION prior to Step 25 AND GO TO Step 25.

PROCEDURE CAUTION: Boration should continue to obtain adequate shutdown margin during subsequent recovery actions.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # _8;.:,*..;;.,9_ _ _ _ Page 33 of _3;;.;6~_U Event

Description:

Two Dropped Control Rods - ATWS Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Implement Function Restoration Procedures As Required.

SRO RETURN TO Procedure and Step in Effect (PATH-1)

EVALUATOR NOTE: Once the crew has transitioned to PATH-1, the Lead Examiner can cue the loss of off-site power. The 'A' EDG will fail to start and the 'B' EDG Output Breaker will fail to shut. The crew should enter EPP-001, Loss of AC Power to 1A-SA and 1B-SB Buses.

Once the 'B' EDG has been restored the scenario can be terminated.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # _1...,0..l..'....

11_____ Page ~ of ...;3=6~1 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power, 'A' EDG fails to start, 'B' EDG Output Breaker fails to shut Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: Initiate ET-10 (Loss of Offsite Power) upon cue from Lead Evaluator.

(After 1st 5 steps of Path-1 are completed)

Identify entry conditions for EPP-001, Loss of AC Power to 1A-CREW SA and 1B-SB Buses and Enters EPP-001 Verify Reactor Trip:

o Check for any of the following:

Immediate Action RO o Trip breakers RTA AND BYA - OPEN (YES) o Trip breakers RTB AND BYB - OPEN (YES) o Neutron flux - DECREASING (YES)

Verify Turbine Trip:

Immediate a. Check for any of the following:

Action BOP o All turbine throttle valves - SHUT o All turbine governor valves - SHUT RO Check If RCS Isolated Check PRZ PORVs - SHUT (YES)

Check letdown isolation valves - SHUT:

• 1CS-1 (LCV-460) (YES)

• 1CS-2 (LCV-459) (YES)

Verify excess letdown valves - SHUT:

RO

• 1CS-460

• 1CS-461 Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # _1.;..;;O;.l..'..;..11;.....-.__ Page ~ of ....;3;.;;,6---11 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power, 'A' EDG fails to start, 'B' EDG Output Breaker fails to shut Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Verify AFW Flow AND Control SG Levels:

II Verify AFW Flow- GREATER THAN 210 KPPH (YES)

BOP (I Any level- GREATER THAN 25% [40%]

(I Control AFW flow to maintain all intact levels between 25% and 50% [40% and 50%]

SRO Evaluate EAL Network Using Entry Point x.

Verify AC Emergency Bus Cross-Ties to Non-Emergency AC BOP Buses - OPEN Verify any cross tie to Bus 1A-SA - OPEN o Breaker 104 o Breaker 105 Verify Any cross tie to Bus 1B-SB - OPEN o Breaker 124 o Breaker 125 BOP Energize AC Emergency Buses using EDGs:

Check EDGs 1A-SA AND 1B-SB - AVAILABLE (NO)

Check any EDG - RUNNING (YES, 'B')

BOP Check any AC emergency bus - ENERGIZED (NO)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # , .;..;11~_ _ Page

_1.;..;0.... ~ of _3_6~~1 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power, 'A' EDG fails to start, 'B' EDG Output Breaker fails to shut Time Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: IF crew does not remember to use sync switch and requests that breaker 126 be closed manually then use Sim Drawing eps02 and close breaker (RF DSG41)

BOP Check any AC emergency bus - ENERGIZED (YES)

SRO Implement function restoration procedures as required.

SRO RETURN TO procedure and step in effect.

Terminate the scenario upon exit from EPP-001.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 4 FINAL

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: 05000400 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

• IC-11, MOL, 89% power

• Restore power to 100%

• '8' RHR Pump is out of service for breaker inspection

• 4 GPO tube leak on '8' Steam Generator Turnover:

• Return to 100% power in accordance with GP-005, Power Operation, step 137.

Critical Task:

• Isolate ruptured '8' Steam Generator from the intact Steam Generators prior to commencin§ the cooldo'Nn

• Isolate AF'N flm... to the ruptured '8' Steam Generator prior to commencin§ the cooldown Event No. Malf. No. Event Event Description Type*

-+ NIA N BGP, Raise f3eweF SRG R-RG 2 PT:308A I-BOP, SG PORV Pressure Instrument fails high SRO TS-SRO 3 GGIA1Q~A G RG, +Fif3 ef Fl:lnnin§ GGW Pl:lFRf3 fA'),

GGWQ47 SRG Standby GGW f3l:lFRf3 fB') fails te Al:lte Start

+S SRG 4 C-BOP, HVAOO9 SRO Trip of running AH-85A fan, standby fails to Auto Start TS-SRO

& ~ l---RG; +l:lFbine FiFst Sta§e PF9SSl:lFe +FansFRitteF Faill:lFe SRG

+S SRG e SGNQliB M Abb '13' SteaFR GeneFateF tl:lbe Fl:lf3tl:lFe (4~Q §f3FR) 7 MSS11 M-ALL Main Steam Header break outside Containment (downstream of MSIVs) 8 MSSQliB G BGP, '13' MSllJ fails te SRl:lt SRG

• (N)ormal, (R )eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Scenario Event Description Shearon-Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 Scenario Summary:

I The plant is at 89% power in middle of life. The 'B' RHR pump is out of service for inl'pection and there is a 4 GPD tube leak on 'B' Steam Generator.

1st Event: The crew has been directed to raise power to 100% using GP-005, Power Operation, following startup. Onoe the power inorease has been observed to the extent desired the next ovent oan be inserted. .

2 nd Event: 'A' Steam Generator PORV Pressure Instrument failing high. This will reqlJire the BOP to take manual control of the PORV to shut it. The SRO should evaluate Teoh Speos 3.3.3.5" Remote Shutdown System, and 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves.

Jffi Event: The running 'A' CO/V Pump viill trip, whioh oan be inserted onoe the plant (las stabilized. The standby 'B' CCVV Pump fails to Auto Start due to a pressure transmitter failure. The '.B' COA' will start manually when operated from the MCB. The Grew should reoognize the loss and enter AOP 014, Loss of Component Cooling "IIJater. AOP 014 ',viII direot the restoration of the CC'lV system. The SRO should also evaluate Teoh Speo 3.7.3, Component Cooling VVater System.

4th Event: The running AH-85A fan will trip, oan be inserted onoe CCW has been restored and AOP 014 S*ited-. This trip will provide alarms at the MCB and the crew will enter the appropriate APP. This trip should auto start the standby AH-85 fan, however the auto start has failed. The stan\::lby fan can be started manually from the MCB. The SRO should evaluate Teoh Speos 3.8.1.1, AC Sou roes Operating, and 3.3.3.5b, Remote Shutdown System.

elR Event: Is a failure of the oontrolling Main Turbine First Stage Pressure Transmitter, PT 446, is inserted onoe the standby AH 85 fan has been plaoed in servioe. PT 446 fails 10'N oausing thE3 Rod Control oirouitry to believe pO'.ver is lowering. Rods will begin to step in to reduoe temperature dovm to no load Tavg. The Grew should reoognize that rod motion is not required and enter AOP 001, Malfunotion of Rod Control and Instrumentation System. The Grew should Garry out the immediate aotions of AOP 001 and plaoe Rod Control in Manual. The SRO should evaluate Teoh Speo 3.3.1, Reaotor Trip System Instrum entation.

61R Event: The first major event is a tube rupture in the 'B' Steam Generator (SGTR) at 420 gpm. The Grew should reoognize the presenoe of a large leak in the primary. After determining that this leak is greater than makeup oapability they should trip the reaotor, manually initiate safety injeotion, and Garry out aotions per PATH 1.

71R Event: Seoond major event, onoe the reaotor is tripped a A main steam line break on the 'B' Steam Generator on the main steam header outside containment will occur. It is expected that the crew trip and Safety Inject and enter transition from PATH-1. to PATH 2 to address the ruptured stoam generator. At some point the faulted steam generator will beoome apparent and the ore'N may use the Seoondary Integrity Foldout Criteria to address the At step 15 on PATH-1 the crew will transition ,to EPP-014 based on 'B' SG pressure decreasing in an uncontrolled manner.

8th Event: 'B' MSIV fails to operate due to the automatically generated Main Steam Line Isolation Signal (MSIS) and will not shut due to a manual MSIS. 'B' MSIV cannot be shut manually from the Main Control Board by the operators. Terminate the scenario once the crew enters EPP 020, SG1,*R with Loss of Reaotor Coolant: Suboooled Reoovery and initiates the RCS Cooldown. exits EPP-014 and transitions to EPP-008, "SI Termination".

NOTE: This event will not count as a component failure during the spare scenario because the operator will not be able to close the valve. There will be no gradable action.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Scenario Event Description Shearon-Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 SIMULATOR SETUP SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

• Ensure reactivity plan is available for return to full power INITIAL CONDITIONS:

• IC-11, MOL, 89% power PRE-LOAD:

• irf rhr023 RACK_OUT ('B' RHR pump out of service for Oil replacement)

• imf mss05b 2 3600 ('B' MSIV fails to shut)

TRIGGERS:

• ET-2: imf pt:308a (200:00:0000:00:00) 1300.000:00:00 SG PORV Pressure Instrument fails HIGH

• ET:3: iFf 00'....047 (:3 00:00:00 00:00:00) 0 imf 00'1101 a (:3 00:00:00 00:00:00) TRUE Trip of fYRRing GGW p./;;/f'fIfJ, StaRf:Jlay GGWp/;;/f'fIfJ fails to Aute Start

• ET-4: irf hva009 (4 00:00:00 00:00:00) BKR_OFF Trip running of AH-85 fan, standby fails to Auto Start

• ET 6: imf pt:44G (/3 00:00:00 00:00:00) 0.0 00:00:10 First stage pressl:Ife traR5FRitter PT:446 faf.!s low

• ET I: imf sgn06b (I 00:00:00 00:00:00) 420

.!J.'1' Steam GeRerater ttlptl:lred

• ET -7: imf mss11 (7 00:00:00 00:05:00) 1500000 On trip, a main steam line rupture occurs; 'B' MSIV fails to shut automatically Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL ReviSion 1

Scenario Event Description Shearon-Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 CAEP:

!Description of NRC3CAEP

!IC-11 , MOL, 89% power

!'B' RHR pump is Out of Service

!4 gpd tube leak on 'B' Steam Generator

!Preloads

'B' RHR pump out of service for Oil replacement irf rhr023 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) RACK_OUT

'B' MSIV fails to shut imf mss05b (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) 2 3600

! Event Triggers

! Event 1: Raise pO'.ver baok to 100% following TV Testing

! Reaotivity RO

!Event 2: SG PORV Pressure Instrument fails HIGH

! Instrument - BOP imf pt:308a (2 00:00:00 00:00:00) 1300.0 00:00:00

!Event:3: Trip of running CCVV Pump, Standby CCIA' pump fails to Auto Start Component RO Teoh Speo SRO irf 00'.'1047 (:3 00:00:00 00:00:00) 0 imf 00'.'101 a (:3 00:00:00 00:00:00) TRUE

!Event 4: Trip running of AH-85 fan, standby fails to Auto Start

! Component - BOP

! Tech Spec - SRO irf hva009 (4 00:00:00 00:00:00) BKR_OFF

!Event 5: First stage pressure transmitter PT:446 fails loy,'

! Instrument RO

! TeGh Speo SRO imf pt:446 (5 00:00:0000:00:00) 0.0 00:00:10

!Event 6: '8' Steam Generator ruptured

! MAJOR ALL imf sgn05b (6 00:00:00 00:00:00) 420

!Event 7: Trip Reactor on a main steam line rupture 'B' MSIV fails to shut

! EOP Contingency Procedure imf mss11 (7 00:00:00 00:05:00) 1500000 Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # L Event # _1_ _ Page Event

Description:

Raise Power Time II Position .~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior E!VAbUATOR NOTE!: The srf!J*," has been dirested te Faise pet,.*"er te ~ 00% using GP 005, Pewer Operatien, fellewing staFtup. Onse the pe'*,.~er insrease has been ebser/ed te the eKtent desired the neKt e'/ent san be inseFted.

PROGE!IJURE! NOTE!:

P~eviles li~estieR J3e~ GP QQ§, SteJ3 ~:37 l. GGNTINldE: witt:! tAe SRG 1.... ,.,..1 . h* ..I,,"' ....."';'"' +h .... f":!f""I '" .",hh, .++"'"

BGP IRfe~ms RGISRG tAat tl:l~SiRe leal iRs~ease is seiR§ iRitiatel.

BGP geJ3~esses GG J3I:1SASl:ltteR.

BGP MeRite~s tl:l~SiRe aRl feelwate~ system ~esJ3eRse.

E!'lAbUATOR'S NOTe: The srew may elest te staFt a dilutien befere the pe'....er shange is initiated.

• * :,; *. ~}.~, ..** ,J(~.;,\;~ !i~~t',~;i~'}:*t**. 0;{ ~~~~Rr~;~;lrl~.

9E:+E:RMI~JE: tAe vell:lme ef makel:lJ3 '.... ate~ te se allel. +Ais may se RG leRe sy eXJ3erieRSe er via tAe reasti'Jity J3laR assesiatel '.... itA tAe Siml:llate~ IG.

SE:+S ~IS ~ ~ 4, +G+Ab MAKE:ldP WTR BA+GI=I GGld~J+E:R, te estaiR RG tAe lesi~el Ell:laRtity.

RG SE:+ tetal makel:lJ3 flew as felle'l.'s:

• I~ J3eRermiR§ 9lb iR SteJ3 8, TI=IE:N SE:+ seRtrelier ~ GS ~ §~, ~K

~~ 4 R}NMld ~bG},t\l, fer less tAaR er eEll:lal te 9Q §J3m.

• I~ J3erfermiR§ Ab+ 9lb iR SteJ3 8, +I=IE:N SE:+ seRtrelier ~ GS ~ §~,

~K ~ ~ 4 R},IVMld ~bGV',!, fe~ tAe lesirel flew rate.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # L Event # _1_ _ Page Q.. of ~

Event

Description:

Raise Power Time II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior VERIFY the RMW CONTROL s'llitsh has been plasod in tho STOP 00 pesitien.

00 VERIFY tho RMVV COflJTROL switsh ~Foon li~ht is lit.

PLACE tho sentFel sl/.!itsh RMl.II,{ MOgE SELECTOR te tho giL OR 00 tho ALT giL pesitien.

PROCEDURE NOTE: )"tthen PRZ baGkup heaters are energii!ed in manual, PI<:

444A1, PRZ Master Pressure C9ntr911er {a PI G9ntr9l1er} ,.'.liII integrate up t9 a greater than n9rmal 9utput, 9pening PRZ Spray Val¥es t9 return and maintain RCS pressure at setp9int. The result is as f9119,.,}s:

• PORV PCV 4448 will9pen at a 19wer than expeGted pressure.

• Ab8 OOg 3 2, PRESSURIZER IoIIGIoi PRESS DEVIATION CONTROb, will aGtit.,late at a 19wer than expeGted pressure.

• InGreased pr9bability f9r eXGeeding TeGh SpeG DN8 limit f9r RCS pressure.

OPERATE tho PFOSSl::IFi;!;OF baskl::lp hOatOFS as FOll::liFOd te IiFflit tho 00 diffoFOnso botwoon tho PFOSSl::IFi;!;OF and tho RCS bemn sensontFatien te loss than ~ 9 ppFfl.

00 START tho Fflakol::lp systoFfl as felle'lls:

• T6JRN sentFel switsh RMW CONTROL te START FfleFflontaFily

• \lERIFY tho Fod indisateF li~ht is lit.

VERIFY dill::ltien al::lteFflatisally tOFFflinatos whon tho dosiFOd Il::1antity 00 has boon addod.

PROCEDURE CAUTION: The 9perati9n Sh9Uld be st9pped if an unantiGipated reaGti',Iity effeGt is seen. D9 n9t resume the 9perati9n until the Gause has been G9rreGted 00 VERIFY Tav~ and Fed Ffletien Fospends as dosiFOd.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # L Event # Page L of 35 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior RG PbAG~ ReasteF Makel,lj3 iR ,A,l,Ite j3eF SeetieR a.~.

RG V~RIF¥ tl=ts RMW GGN+RGb switel=t:

• Is iR tl=ts S+GP j3esitieR.

• +I=ts lFesR lill=tt is lit.

RG PbAG~ tl=ts RMI,lV MG9E S~b~G+GR te A6I+G.

RG S+AR+ tl=ts FRaksl,lj3 systSFR as fellews:

• +61RN eeRtFel switel=t RMIN GGN+RGb te S+AR+ FReFReRtaFily.

• V~RIF¥ tl=te Feel iRElieateF lill=tt is lit.

EVALUATOR NOTE: OnGe the peweF Ghange has been ebseFJJed te the extent desiFed the Lead Evaluator can cue Event 2, SG PORV Pressure Instrument fails high)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # L Event # _2_ _ Page ~ of 35 Event

Description:

SG PORV Pressure Instrument Fails High Time II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTE: This event is a Steam Generator PORV Pressure Instrument failing high. This will require the BOP to take manual control of the PORV to shut it. The SRO should evaluate Tech Specs 3.3.3.5, Remote Shutdown System, and 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves.

BOOTH OPERATOR: On cue from the Lead Evaluator, insert ET-2 (SG PORV Pressure Instrument, PT-308, fails HIGH).

Available Indications:

• ALB-014-8-5, Computer Alarm Steam Generators SRO ENTERS APP-ALB-014-8-S BOP IDENTIFIES 'A' SG PORV is OPEN DEPRESS Manual Pushbutton for PK-308 to take manual control of BOP

'A'SG PORV BOP LOWER output for PK-308 to SHUT 'A' SG PORV Set band for operation with 'A' PORV in manual control (maintain pressure below 1100 psig)

SRO REFER to Tech Specs for failure of 'A' SG PORV

• T.S. 3.3.3.S, Remote Shutdown System

• T.S. 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves bEAg ElJAbYA+OR: Onae the plant has stabilized and leah Speas ha¥e been e>,.'aluated, aue E>~'ent 3, (+Fip 9f Running GG\~( Pump, 'A'}

NOTE: IF the 'A' PORV is not shut within 2-3 minutes Reactor Power level will increase to approximately 91 %

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # L Event # 3 Page ~ of 35 Event

Description:

Trip of Running 'A' CCW Pump Time i Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVAbUATOR NOTE: This e,-~ent is a tFip et the Funning' A' CCW Pump. The standby '8' CC)JJ Pump tails te Aute StaFt due te a pFessuFe tFansmitteF tailuFe. The '8' CCW "'Jill staFt manually when epeFated tFem the MC8. The SFew sheuld Fesegnize the less and enteF AOP 014, bess et Cempenent Ceeling )AtateF.

AOP 014 will diFeGt the FesteFatien et the CCW system. The SRO sheuld alse 6'Jaluate Tesh Spes 3.7.3, Cempenent Ceeling WateF System.

800TH OPERATOR: On sue tFem the bead E'IaluateF inseFt ET 3 (Trip et the Running CCW Pump, 'A'}

k ..ailable Indisatiens:

• Multiple CCW alarms en Ab8 005 SRG eN+eR AGP G14, bess et GeFfl~eRsRt GeeliR§ WatSF PROCEDURE NOTE: This pFeseduFe sentains ne immediate astiens. bess et CC)At may FequiFe implementatien et the SHNPP EmeFgensy P-taR.

Re~eR +G PeP 11 G, eFflSF§SRSY GlassitisatieR ARS PFetsstilJS AstieR SRG RsseFflFflsRsatieRs, AN!;) eN+er;;! tAS eAb Nstl/.!eFk at SRtFY ~eiRt X.

e'lAbUA+e ~laRt GeRsitieRs AND GG +G tAe a~~F9~Fiate sestieR.

SRG (SeGtieR d.d, bess et a GG~fJ,{ PI:lFfl~)

PROCEDURE NOTE: The standby CC)N pump staFts at 52 psig disshaFge pFessuFe.

RG GMeGK tAe staRsey GGV4 ~I:lFfl~ Aas S+Ar;;!+eD. (NG) 800TM OPERATOR: It dispatshed te the tield te in'lestigate FepeFt that 'A' CCW Pump breakeF is tFipped en e,-~eFSUFFent.

RG S+Ar;;!+ tAS staRsey GGW ~I:lFfl~.

RG GMeGK GGlI>,{ AsaseF ~FeSSI:lFS §FeatsF tAaR 92 ~si§. (¥eS)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # L Event # 3 Page 10 of 35 Event

Description:

Trip of Running 'A' CCW Pump Time II Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior VERIFY adequate ESVV sooling water flo'.... to the assosiated CCW 00 heat e*shanger. (YES) 00 CI=IEGK RI=IR ol3erating. (NG)

SRG REFER +G +eshnisal Sl3esifisation d.7.d. (72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> astian)

CGN+.A.C+ Maintenanse to determine the sause of the CCW l3uml3 SRG failure, .A.NQ I~JI+I.A.+E sorresti\'e astian.

CI=IECK '.... ith Gl3erations Staff to determine the desirability of using SRG the swing CGll4 l3uml3.

SRG CI=IEGK CC~A{ flow RES+GREQ to the affested train.

QGCYMEN+ soml3onent manil3ulations l3er GPS NGGC .~dg8, Plant SRG Status Control.

EVALUATOR NOTE: GFew may implemeRt O\ttP GG at this paiRt. This OWP will haJ"te the GFe'*,.{ ¥eFity the ESF Status Light 8c:nEes.

SRG EXI+ this I3rosedure.

LEAD EVALUATOR: Once the plant has stabilized amil TeGh SpeGs ha¥e beeR e¥aluated, cue Event 4, (Trip of Running AH-85A Fan)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # L Event # 4 Page 1L of 35 Event

Description:

Trip of running AH-85A fan, standby fails to Auto Start Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTE: This event is a trip of the running AH-85A fan. This trip will provide alarms at the MCB and the crew will enter the appropriate APP. This trip should auto start the standby AH-85 fan, however the auto start has failed. The standby fan will have to be started manually from the MCB. The SRO should evaluate Tech Specs 3.8.1.1, AC Sources -

Operating, and 3.3.3.5b, Remote Shutdown System BOOTH OPERATOR: On cue from the Lead Evaluator, insert ET-4 (Trip of the Running AH-85A Fan).

BOP ENTERS APP-ALB-027 4 BOP IDENTIFIES the tripped fan, AH-85A REPORTS failure of the AH-85B standby fan to start and dispatches BOP AO to investigate breaker for AH-85 A (1 A23-SA-4A)

BOOTH COMMUNICATOR: Acknowledge request to investigate breaker. After 2 minutes report that breaker for AH-85A is in the trip free position.

BOP STARTS standby AH-85B REFER to Tech Specs (and possibly OWP-HVAC)

SRO

• T.S 3.8.1.1, AC Sources - Operating (Perform OST-1023, Offsite Power Verification within one hour)

• T.S. 3.3.3.5b, Remote Shutdown System be.o.g e¥.o.bU.o.l=gR: gnGe the plant has stabiliii!ed and l=eGh SpeGs ha'Je been e'Jaluated, Gue e\<ent 5, {Pl= 446, FiFst Stage PFessuFe l=FansmitteF, fails bgl.&.9 Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # _5_ _ _ _ _ _ Page 12 of 35 Event

Description:

PT-446, First Stage Pressure Transmitter, fails LOW Time i Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVAlUATOR NOTE: PT 446 fails lew sausing the Red GentFel SiFsuitFY te beli.we pe'IJeF is leweFing. Reds 'I,iil! begin te step in te Feduse tempeFatuFe dewn te ne lead Ta¥g. The SFe'.fJ sheuld Fesegnize that Fed metien is net FeEluiFed and enteF AOP gg~, Malfunstien ef Red GentFel and InstFumentatien System. The SF~I,i sheuld saFFY eut the immediate astiens ef AOP gg~ and plase Red GentFel in Manual. The SRO sheuld e'Jaluate Tesh Spes 3.3.~, ReasteF TFip System InstFumentatien.

BOOTM OPERATOR: On sue fFem the lead E'JaluateF, inseFt ET 5 (PT 446, FiFst Stage PFessuFe TFansmitteF, fails lO)At)

A\iailable Indisatiens:

• Reds begin te step

• Ta\~gtTFef mismatsh aft ssale high RG RE:PGRTS Feels stel3l3iR§ iR GRE:W 19E:N+IFIE:S tl=lat Feel FRetieR is Ell:le te aR iRstFI:lFReRt FRalfl:lRetieR E:N+E:RS AGP gg~, Malfl:lRetieR ef Reel GeRtFel aRElIRstFI:lFReRtatieR SRG SysteFR Immediate Action RG GI=lE:GK tl=lat bE:SS +I=lAfl.l +WG eeRtFel Feels aFe ElFel3l3eEl. (¥E:S)

Immediate Action RG PGSI+IGN Reel BaRk SeleeteF SI.t,!itel=l te MAN.

Immediate Action RG GI=lE:GK GeRtFel BaRk FRetieR S+GPPE:9. (¥E:S)

RG GG +G SeGtieR a.2, GeRtiRl:lel:lS Sl3l:lFiel:ls GeRtFel Reel MetieR GI=lE:GK tl=lat iRstFI:lFReRt el=laRRel faill:lFe l=Ias NG+ GGGURRE:9 by ebseFviR§ tl=le felle'NiR§:

RG

• RGS +av§

• RGS +Fef Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 13 of 35 Event

Description:

PT-446, First Stage Pressure Transmitter, fails LOW Time i Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• Power Range NI ohannels T, ,~h;~~ f;,.~* ~+~~~ ~~~~

RG PE:RFGRM the follol.... ing:

IF a pOl,*.'er supply is lost, TI=IE:N GG TG AGP 024, Loss of Yninterruptiele Power Supply. (NG)

IF an inEli'oliElual instrument faileEl, TI=IE:N MAINTAlfll manual roEl oontrol until oorreoti'.1e aotion is oomplete. (¥E:S)

IF a Power Range NI Channel faileEl, TI=IE:N B¥PASS the faileEl ohannel using G~A{P RP. (NG)

Manually GPE:RATE: aHeoteEl oontrol RG eanl~ to restore the follo'/,ling:

E:Eluilierium power anEl temperature oonElitions RoEls aeove the insertion lim its of Teoh Speo a. ~ .a.e anEl PLP ~ Oe, Teohnioal Speoifioation E:Eluipment List Program anEl Core Gperating Lim its Report.

\lE:RIF¥ proper operation of the follo"t,ting:

CVCS Elemineralizers RG BTRS Reaotor Makeup Control System CI=IE:CK that this section was entereEl Elue to control eanks MGVING RG GYT. (NG)

CI=IE:CK that NE:ITI=IE:R of the foIlQl,\'ing GCCYRRE:D: (¥E:S)

RG YnexplaineEl RCS eoration YnplanneEl RCS Elilution CI=IE:CK that an automatio RoEl Control malfunotion GCCYRRE:D.

RG fNGt RG E:XIT this prooeElure.

EVA.lUATOR NOTE: Cre*.... should implement O'A'P RP 11. This "'Jill plase PT 447 as the seleGted shannel.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # _5~ _ _ _ _ Page 14 of 35 Event

Description:

PT-446, First Stage Pressure Transmitter, fails LOW Time Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior REFER to Teoh Speo 3.3.1, Reaotor Trip System Instrumentation RG

~PJithin one hour oheol~ interlool~~

EVALUATOR NOTE: Once the plant has stabilized then Lead Evaluator may cue Event 67 (Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator, '8' SG at 42Q gpm, fault occurs on trip)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # _6.;..:,....;.7____ Page 1.2..- of _3.;.;5~-t1 Event

Description:

Rl:Jptl::IFOd Faulted Steam Generator ('B' SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs ~)

Time i Position i Applicant's Actions or Behavior E!)JAbUA+QR NQ+E!: +his is the fiFst maj9F e\<ent, a tube FuptuFe in the '8' Steam GeneFat9F {SG+R} at 420 gpm. +he GFeW sh9uld FeG9gniii!!e the pFeSenGe 9f a laFge leak in the pFimaFY. MteF deteFmining that this leak is gFeateF than makeup Gapability they sh9uld tFip the FeaGt9F, manually initiate safety injeGti9n, and GaFFY 9ut aGti9ns peF PA.1'M 1.

QnGe the FeaGt9F is tFipped a main steam line bFeak 9n the main steam headeF 9utside G9ntainment will 9GGUF. It is e*peGted that the GFe',,§ '.... iII tFansiti9n b9m PA+M 1 t9 PA.1'M 2 t9 addFess the FuptuFed steam geneFat9F. At S9me p9int the faulted steam geneFat9F will beG9me appaFent and the GFeW is e*peGted t9 iS91ate the '8' Steam GeneFat9F in PA.1'M 2.

It is p9ssible depending 9n GFeW'S paGe thF9ugh the pF9GeduFe that they may iS91ate the '8' Steam GeneFat9F pFi9F t9 enteFing PA+M 2. +he SGenaFi9 Guide is 'mitten t9 SUpp9R eitheF implementati9n.

8QQ+M QPE!RA+QR: Qn Gue fF9m the bead E!'Jaluat9F, initiate 15+ 6 {SG+R 9n '8' SG at 420 gpm}

AA<ailable IndiGati9ns:

• ChaFging FI9W inGFeasing

• VC+ bevel deGFeasing

• PFessuFiHF bevel deGFeasing

• '8' MSb Rad m9nit9F SRG EN+ERS AGP g~ 6, E*sessi'.'e PFimaFY PlaRt bealiia§9 PRQCE!(;)URE! NQ+E!:

• +his pF9GeduFe G9ntains n9 immediate aGti9ns*

• +hF9ugh9ut this pF9GeduFe, as well as all AtQPs, aGti9ns aFe based 9n 'Jalid alaFms and instFumentati9n. AtGti9ns based 9n in'Jalid indiGati9n aFe n9t appliGable.

• )Afhen p9ssible {e*Gept in the Gases 9f Fapidly pF9pagating leaks and leaks appF9aGhing AGti9n bevel 3}, leakage sh9uld be qualitatively G9nfiFmed pFi9F t9 deGIaFati9n 9f an aGti9n I8'Jel. beakage is qualitatively G9nfiFmed when t'.... 9 diffeFent indiGati9ns {sUGh as gFab samples 9F Fadiati9n m9nit9Fs} tFend in the

~ .......... -" * ..;+10. +10. ... ~ .. _... 1....... +......................~ ............. 1+ ........

RG GFlEGK RFIR iR SP9FatisR. (NG)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # _6.;;.:,...;.7_ _ _ _ Page ..!.2....- of ....;;,.;35;"""-11 Event

Description:

~~pt~red Faulted Steam Generator ('B' SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs aA-t:rip)

Time II Position J Applicant's Actions or Behavior

~U;;;~eR +G PeP ~ ~ g, eFfleF§eRSY Giassifisati9R ARe PF9testi'/e Asti9R SRG ReS9Ff1Ff1eReati9Rs, AN!;) ellol+eR tl=ie eAb IIoletw9Fk at eRtFY J'}9iRt x:.

RG GFleGK RGS leaka§e 'Nitl=iiR VG+ Fflal~eblJ'} saJ'}aeility. (NG)

EVALUATOR NOTE: +he ReaGt9F +Fip will aut9matiGaily insert ET-7, Main Steam Line Break Outside of Containment.

BOOTH OPERATOR: On cue from the Lead Evaluator, insert Trigger 7 (MSLB on

'B' SG Outside Containment)

Indications Available:

• ALB Q28 8 5 COMPUTER ALARM VENTilATION SYSTEM

• Rising pFessuFe in G9ntainment

• Rising tempeFatUFe in G9ntainment

• Reactor Power rising

• Tavg Deceasing

• 1st Stage pressure decreasing CREW Identifies indications of Steam Line Break Enters AOP-038, Rapid Downpovv$(

SRO Provides directions to retire planl< "

BOOTH COMMUNICATOR: AFTER 5 MINUTES OF INSERTION OF EVENT 7 Call 5555 and report that there is a major steam leak at the cross over piping in the Turbine Building.

Directs manual Reactor Trip and MSLI(not to interfere with SRO immediate actions of PATH;-1};'

Enters PATH*t Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # _6;;.,1,...;,7_ _ _ _ Page .!l....- of _3.;.;5~~1 Event

Description:

~l:lptl:lreC:l Faulted Steam Generator ('B' Sed at 420 gpm, fault occurs ~)

Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior PATH-1 NOTE: Steps 1 through 4 are immediate action steps.

RO VERIFY Reactor Trip:

• AUTO or MANUAL Reactor Trip successful:

• CHECK for any of the following:

• Trip breakers RTA and BYA OPEN (YES)

• Trip breakers RTB and BYB OPEN (YES)

• ROD Bottom lights LIT (YES)

• NEUTRON flux decreasing (YES)

BOP VERIFY Turbine Trip:

• CHECK for any of the following:

• ALL turbine throttle valves - SHUT (YES)

• ALL turbine governor valves - SHUT (YES)

BOP VERIFY power to AC Emergency Buses

• 1A-SA AND 1B-SB Buses energized by off-site power or EDG's.

(YES)

RO CHECK SI Actuation:

CHECK for any of the following - LIT

• SI Actuated bypass permissive light (NO)

• ALB-11-2-2 (NO)

• ALB-11-5-1 (NO)

• ALB-11-5-3 (NO)

• ALB-12-1-4 (NO)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 Event

Description:

RI::lj3tl::lred Faulted Steam Generator ('B' Sed at 42Q 9j3m, fault occurs eA-tf$)

Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior CHECK SI Actuation criteria:

• CNMT pressure - GREATER THAN 3.0 PSIG (NO)

RO

• PRZ pressure - LESS THAN 1850 PSIG (NO)

• Steam pressure - LESS THAN 601 PSIG (NO)

SI Actuation - REQUIRED (YES - large steam break in progress that CREW will reach Steam pressure auto SI setpoint, that is rate sensitive, if not addressed)

RO Verifies SI actuation (manual)

SRO Perform the following:

• Initiate monitoring the Critical Safety Function Status Trees .

• Evaluate EAL Network using entry point X .

CREW Foldout A Applies.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # ..;6;;.:.,.;..7_ _ _ _ Page ll..- of _3;;;.;5;""'-l1 Event

Description:

Ruptures Faulted Steam Generator ('B' SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs ~)

Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Verify All CSIPs AND RHR pumps - RUNNING RO (YES, all available - B RHR OOS)

RO Check SI Flow:

• SI flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM (YES)

• RCS pressure - LESS THAN 230 PSIG (NO)

BOP Check Main Steam Isolation:

Main Steam Isolation - ACTUATED (YES - manually)

Check Main Steam Isolation actuation criteria:

• Steam line pressure - LESS THAN 601 PSIG (YES/NO)

• CNMT pressure - GREATER THAN 3.0 PSIG (NO)

• Manual closure of all MSIVs AND bypass valves is desired.

BOP Main Steam Isolation - REQUIRED (YES)

Verify all MSIVs and bypass valves - SHUT ('B' SG MSIV OPEN)

BOP Check CNMT Pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG RO (YES)

BOP Check AFW Status:

• AFW flow - AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAILABLE (YES)

• AFW isolated to 'B' SG (auto isolation on <100 psig AP) (YES)

Verify Alignment Of Components From Actuation of ESFAS Signals BOP Using Attachment 6, Safeguards Actuation Verification, While Continuing With This Procedure.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # _6,;,0,..;.7_ _ _ _ Page ~ of _3.;;,;5;""-11 Event

Description:

~l:Il3tl:lred Faulted Steam Generator ('B' SG at 420 II3FR, fault occurs GR-tfip)

Time ~ Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO/BOP Control RCS Temperature:

• Stabilize AND maintain temperature between 555°F AND 559°F using Table 1.

To evaluate the BOP controlling RCS temperature it may be necessary to have the USCO direct the BOP to suspend PATH-1 Attachment 6 and control RCS temperature.

NOTE: If PRZ pressure is below 2260 PSIG AND increasing, PRZ spray valves may be OPEN due to controller demand. (With the spray valve controllers and master PRZ pressure controller in AUTOMATIC, this response is the result of the PRZ master controller being a proportional-integral controller.)

RO/BOP Check PRZ PORVs AND Spray Valves:

• Verify AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1 - ENERGIZED (YES)

• Check PRZ PORVs - SHUT (YES)

• Check block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES)

• PRZ spray valves - SHUT (YES)

SRO Identify Any Faulted SG: Check for any of the following:

• Any SG pressures - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES 'B' SG)

GO TO EPP-014, "FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION",

SRO Step 1. (PAGE 26 OF THIS GUIDE)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # _6~,_7_ _ _ _ Page ~ of _3_5~~1 Event

Description:

R~pt~reEl Faulted Steam Generator ('B' SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs ~)

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior GRgl\{ PERFGRM tt:le feliewiR~:

+RIP tt:le ReasteF, ANQ GG +G E:GP PA+1=1 ~. (PeFfeFFfI RNG

'" .h"t"' .... " A h " .... rI A,..."" ti ...... '" .... "' ....... it.,.\

PROCEDURE NOTE: If 81 AstuatiGn is FequiFed, Ute ReastGF and TUFlaine shGuld lae J,.~eFified tFipped in PATH 1 laefGFe manually astuating 81.

00 MA~H::lAbb¥ INI+IA+E Safety IRjeGtieR.

E:XI+ tt:lis ~FeseeblFe.

goo E:RteFs PA+1=1 ~

',;~~~\ ;f;'~( . . " I>.>" .\~~~~;.,\\ .*OATUof1k 1

",V".",*'"

." ,,:i,\~~, .*.*. ,'*".;;~~"':)t~il;,;: ">,;L!;y1~,~~~{!,;{j:;~ji)Z;:' \'i\,;'~ .j~~~:;

00 \lERIF¥ ReaGteF +Fi~:

• A6I+G eF MAN blAb ReasteF +Fi~ sblssessfbll:

• GI=1E:GK feF aRY ef tt:le felle'.... iR~:

• +Fi~ 9FeakeFs R+A aRe B¥A GPEN (¥E:S)

• +Fi~ 9FeakeFs R+B aRe B¥B GPE:N (¥E:S)

• RGQ BetteFfi li~t:lts bl+ (¥E:S)

• NE6I+RGN flbl* eesFeasiR~ (¥E:S) oop. \lERIF¥ +blF9iRe +Fi~:

• GI=1EGK feF aRY sf tt:le feliewiR~:

• Abb tblF9iRe tt:lFettle 'o'al'/es SI=161+ (¥E:S)

• Abb tblF9iRe ~e'/eFReF 'Ial'les SI=161+ (¥ES) oop. \lERIF¥ ~eweF te AG E:FfleF~eRsy Bblses Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # _6.;.:,....;.7_ _ _ _ Page ~ of _3_5;"""--11 Event

Description:

~l:Jptl:Jred Faulted Steam Generator ('B' SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs~)

Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• ~ A SA ANQ ~ B SB Bl:Ises eReFgi2:eEl ey sff site flS',t,IeF SF ~QG's.

~

RG GI=l~GK SI Astl:latisR:

GI=l~GK fm aRY sf ths fslI8'.tfiRg LIT

• SI Astl:lateEl eYflass fleFFRissi'/e light (¥~S)

SJID PeFfSFFR the fslIs',t,IiRg:

• IRitiate FRSRitSFiRg the GFitisal Safety pl:IRstisR Statl:lS TFees.

• ~!olall:late ~Ab Net',t,lsFk I:ISiRg eRtFY flsiRt X.

G~~}.IIJ pslElsl:lt A Aflfllies.

RG VeFify All GSIPs ANQ ~I=l~ fll:lFRflS ~YNNING (¥~S)

RG Ghesk SI pISIN:

• SI flsl,t.! G~~AT~~ TI=lAN 2QQ GPM (¥~S)

• ~GS flFessblFe b~SS TI=l.A.N 2dQ PSIG (NG)

BGP Ghesk MaiR SteaFR IsslatisR:

MaiR SteaFR IsslatisR AGTYAT~Q (NG)

Ghesk MaiR SteaFR IsslatioR astblatisR sFiteFia:

• SteaFR liRe flFessl:lFe b~SS TI=lAN 6Q~ PSIG (¥~S/~JG)

• GNMT flFessblFo G~~AT~~ TI=lAN d.Q PSIG (¥~S)

• MaRblal slssblFe sf all MSIVs ANQ eYflass '/al',les is ElesiFeEl .

EVAlUATOR NOTE: It is possible that the GFe'lJ may identify the pFeSenGe of a steam line bFeak, howe!o!eF dUFing ¥alidation the indiGations of the lueak weFe not yet appaFent. If the bFeak is identified at this pOint then a Main Steam Isolation 'Hould be appFopFiate based on OMM 001, ConduGt of OpeFations guidanGe.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 Page ~ of ....;;.,;35;;"'-'-11 Event

Description:

Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator ('B' SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs efI-tI:ip)

Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior OOP- MaiA SteaFA IselatieA ~eQUIFH~Q ~NG)

GReek GtoJM::r: PFess~Fe I=IAS ~eMAINeQ beSS ::r:I=I,A,toJ ~ Q PSIG RG

~

OOP- GReek Ar;.1l4 Stat~s:

• Ar;.I.fJ,l flew A::r: beAS::r: ~~ Q KPPI=I AVAlbABbe ~¥eS)

VeFify AIi§!AFAeAt Gf GeFAl3eAeAts r;.FeFA Aet~atieA ef eSr;.AS Si§!Aals OOP- USiA§! AttaeRFAeAt 6, "Safe§!~aFds Ast~atieA VeFifieatieA", V'lRile GeAtiA~iA§! l,fJ.litR ::r:Ris PFeeed~Fe.

~G,lBGP GeAtFeI ~GS ::r:eFAl3eFat~Fe:

• Stabilize ANQ FAaiAtaiA teFAl3eFat~Fe betweeA 555°r;. Atom 55g°r;.

~SiA§! ::r:able ~.

PROCEDURE NOTE: If PR;l pl'eSSlUe is bela'.... 2260 PSIG AND insl'easing, PR;l spl'ay valves may be OPEN dl:le to sontl'ollel' demand. Pltith the spl'ay 'Jal'Je sontl'ollel's and mastel' PR;l pl'essl:ll'e sontl'ollel' in AUTOMATIC, this I'esponse is the l'esl:Ilt of the PR;l mastel' sontl'ollel' being a Pl'opol'tional integl'al

\

~G,IBGP GReek P~;?; PG~Vs ANQ SI3Fay Vall.les:

• VeFify AG b~ses ~ A~ ANQ ~B~ etoJe~GI;?;eQ

• GReek P~;?; PG~Vs SI=IU::r: ~¥eS)

• GReel~ bleek IJalves A::r: beAS::r: GNe GPetoJ ~¥eS)

• P~;?; sl3Fay valves SI=IU::r: ~¥eS)

EVALUATOR NOTE: Dl:Il'ing '.'alidation it was fOl:lnd that the lOCA, I'eastol' tFip, and safety injestion '.'.'el'e masking the indisations fOF the steam line bl'eak. If the sl'e'.... identifies the fal:llt at this point then they will tl'ansition to EPP 014 now to isolate '8' SG. If not then Foldol:lt Cl'iteFia in PATH 2 '.... iII send them to EPP 014 eventl:lally. Those steps aFe insll:lded on page 21 of this Gl:Iide. Gl:Iide is wl'itten in the oFdeF that they '....eFe implemented by the Validation Cl'e'IJ.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # ~6'...,;7_ _ _ _ Page ~ of _3;;;,;;5;......~1 Event

Description:

~uptured Faulted Steam Generator ('B' SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs Gfl-tfip)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

~G,L8GI2 IgeAtify AAY Fabllteg SG:

Check for aAY of the foliowiAg:

• AAY SG !3ressblres Q~C~~ASlflJG IN AN UNCGflJT~GLL~Q MANN~~ (NG)

• AAY SG CGMI2L~T~L¥ Q~I2~~SSU~I~~Q (NG)

~G,l8GI2 IgeAtify AAY ~bI!3tblreg SG:

• Check for all of the foliowiAg:

• COAgeASer 1.'aCblblm !3b1rA!3 eHibleAt ragiatioA NG~MAL

• SG 13loIN90WA ragiatioA flJG~MAL

• MaiA steam liAe ragiatioA flJG~MAL (NG) sgQ ~bI!3tblreg SG IQ~NTIFI~Q (¥~S, '8')

~Q,l8GI2 ~bI!3tblreg SG level G~~AT~R TI=lAflJ 25% f40%1 (¥~S)

StO!3 feeg flm" 13y ShblttiAg the MQAF'i1J ANQ TQAF'l1J isolatioA valves

~G,L8GI2 to rbl!3tblreg SG. ('8' SG) sgQ GG TG I2ATI=l 2 GUIQ~, Ste!3 ~.

I2,A'+M2 *****.***i. . ....................*....

sgQ FolgOblt C A!3!3lies. (Attacheg to sack of gblige) sgQ ~valblate ~AL flJetwork USiAg ~Atry 120iAt U.

sgQ Im!3lerAeAt FblACtioA ~estoratioA I2rocegblres As ~e~blireg.

NOTe: l=he RGP l=~ip G~ite~ia is in effest until an RGS Gooldo'Jlln is initiated.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # _6.;.:,...;.7_ _ _ _ Page ~ of _3_5;"""-11 Event

Description:

RuptUFOel Faulted Steam Generator ('B' SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs~)

Time II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior 00 GReek RGP +Fif'l GFiteFia:

• AA'I RGP RYNNING (¥eS)

GReek all sf tRe fsllswiA§:

• SI fls'N GReA+eR +MAN 2QQ GPM (¥eS)

• GReek RGS f'lFessblFe beSS +MAN ~4QQ PSIG (NG)

BGP- IdeAtif'l AA'I Rblf'ltblFed SG:

GReek fSF aA'Isf tRe fsllswiA§:

• SG level INGReASING IN AN YNGGN+RGbbeQ MANNeR (¥eS)

• SG asti'.!it'l saFRf'lle MIGM RAQIA+IGN

• MaiA steaFRliAe FadiatisA MIGM RAQIA+IGN (¥eS)

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

• At least one SG must I;)e maintained a\'ailal;)le for RCS sooldown *

• If the TDAF)N pump is the only a\<ailal;)le sourse of feed flotN, one steam supply valve from an intast SG must I;)e maintained open.

OOP Isolate Fls',.,! FFSFR Rblf'ltblFed SG:

Adjblst FUf'ltblFed SG PGRV eSAtFsileF setf'lSiAt ts BB% (~~ 46 PSIG)

ANQ f'llaee iA ablts.

GReek Fblf'ltblFed SG PGRV SMY+ (¥eS)

SRblt Fblf'ltblFed SG steaFR sblf'lf'lI'I valve ts +QAPA' f'lblFRf'I:

• SG 8: ~MS 7Q

• SG G: ~MS 72 VeFif'l slswds'NA isslatisA ¥alves fFSFR Fblf'ltblFed SG SMY+

SRblt Fblf'ltbIFed SG FRaiA steaFR dFaiA isslatisA sefme MSIV:

• SG A: ~MS 2a~

• SG 8: ~MS 266

• SG G: ~MS aQ~

SRblt Fblf'ltblFed SG MSIV ANQ s'lf'lass valve. (NG, '8' MSIV fails ts SMY+)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # ~6,~7_ _ _ _ Page ~ of _3;;,;;5;""'1 Event

Description:

Ruptmod Faulted Steam Generator ('B' SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs ~)

Time II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior EV ALUATOR NOTE: At this point indications of the Main Steamline Break should be identifiable and the crew should transition to EPP-014 using Foldout G, SeCOndaF'IlntegFity GFiteFia. PAl=M 2 continues on page 23 of this guide.

...... i\ I'* SRO . EPP-014,StepJ . . . *.i'*. . * .* . *. i .... i . .............,.

• i .,

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

• At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown .

• Any faulted SG OR secondary break should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS cooldown.

SRO Implement Function Restoration Procedures As Required.

BOP/RO Check MSIVs AND Bypass Valves:

• Verify all MSIVs - SHUT (NO)

Perform the following:

• Locally shut instrument air supply to RAB 261: 11A-814 (north of AH-19 1A-SA)

• Locally remove cap AND open drain valve: 11A-1876 (located in corridor outside VCT valve gallery)

BOOTH COMMUNICATOR: Acknowledge request to perform these actions.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR: DO NOT isolate air or drain air lines during this evaluation.

BOP/RO Verify all MSIV bypass valves - SHUT (YES)

BOP/RO Check Any SG NOT Faulted:

• Any SG pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # _6.;...l,....;.7_ _ _ _ Page ~ of _3.,;",;5;"""'-"'1 Event

Description:

Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator ('B' SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs~)

Time II Position AfJplicant's Actions or Behavior BOP/RO Identify Any Faulted SG:

• Check for any of the following:

• Any SG pressure - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES)

• Any SG - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED (NO)

BOP/RO Isolate Faulted SG(s):

• Verify faulted SG(s) PORV - SHUT (YES)

• Verify main FW isolation valves - SHUT (YES)

• Verify MDAFW AND TDAFW pump isolation valves to faulted SG(s) - SHUT

• Shut faulted SG(s) steam supply valve to TDAFW pump - SHUT

• SG B: 1MS-70 (SHUT)

• SG C: 1MS-72 (SHUT)

• Verify main steam drain isolation(s) before MSIVs - SHUT:

• SG A: 1MS-231 (SHUT)

• SG B: 1MS-266 (SHUT)

• SG C: 1MS-301 (SHUT)

• Verify SG blowdown isolation valves - SHUT

• Verify main steam analyzer isolation valves - SHUT BOP/RO Check CST Level - GREATER THAN 10% (YES)

PROCEDURE CAUTION: A SG may be suspected to be ruptured if it fails to dry out following isolation of feed flow. Local checks for radiation can be used to confirm primary-to-secondary eakage.

BOP/RO Check Secondary Radiation:

Check for all of the following:

• SG blowdown radiation - NORMAL (YES)

• Main steam line radiation - NORMAL (YES)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # _6;.:,...;.7_ _ _ _ Page ~ of _3....,5""'-11 Event

Description:

Rlll'Jb:IFOd Faulted Steam Generator ('B' SG at 42Q 91'JFR, fault occurs aA-tFip)

Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Check SG Levels: Any level - INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED SRO MANNER (NO)

Check If SI Has Been Terminated:

SRO

• SI flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM (YES)

Check SI Termination Criteria:

SRO

• Check Subcooling - GREATER THAN 1Q°F [40°F] - C (YES)

• Check secondary heat sink by observing any of the following:

o Level in at least one intact SG > 25% [40%] (YES) o Total feed flow to SGs > 210 KPPH (YES)

• RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)

• PRZ level- GREATER THAN 10% [30%] (YES)

RO Reset SI Manually Realign Safeguards Equipment Following A Loss Of Offsite SRO Power.

RO Reset Phase A AND Phase B Isolation Signals.

Establish Instrument Air AND Nitrogen To CNMT:

• Open the following valves:

RO o 11A-819 o 1SI-287 RO Stop All But One CSIP.

SRO Check RCS Pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)

Isolate High Head SI Flow:

RO

• Check CSIP suction - ALIGNED TO RWST (YES)

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 Page ~ of _3;;,;5;"""-iI Event

Description:

Rl:Jptl:JFod Faulted Steam Generator ('B' SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs ~)

Time II Position II Al'pJicant's Actions or Behavior Open normal miniflow isolation valves:

• 1CS-182 RO

• 1CS-196

• 1CS-210

• 1CS-214 Shut BIT outlet valves:

RO

• 1SI-3

• 1SI-4 Verify cold leg AND hot leg injection valves - SHUT RO

• 1SI-52

• 1SI-86

• 1SI-107 CAUTION: High head SI flow should be isolated before continuing.

Establish Charging Lineup:

• Shut charging flow control valve:

RO 0 FK-122.1

• Open charging line isolation valves:

0 1CS-235 0 1CS-238 NOTE: RCS temperature must be stabilized to allow evaluation of PRZ level trend.

Monitor RCS Hot Leg Temperature:

RO

• Check RCS hot leg temperature - STABLE (May require action to stabilize)

CAUTION: Charging flow should NOT exceed 150 GPM to prevent damage to the regenerative heat exchanQer.

RO Control Charging Flow To Maintain PRZ Level:

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # _6..;;..:,....;.7_ _ _ _ Page ~ of _3.;;;.;5~-!1 Event

Description:

Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator ('B' 8G at 420 gpm, fault occurs~)

Time II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Control charging using charging flow control valve:

RO

• FK-122.1 RO Maintain charging flow less than 150 GPM.

PRZ Level- CAN BE MAINTAINED STABLE OR INCREASING RO (YES)

SRO GO TO EPP-008, "SI TERMINATION", Step 1.

Terminate the scenario when the transition to EPP-008 is made.

~ GG ::rG PA::rI=l 2, eAtFY !3SiAt d.

• *.* * * . . i** .... ...: PA=I=I=l2,* sAtFyPeiAt J .........  : ... .. .............\. ...*... .* i* *.*. .*. . .........**...**....*

~ ~sIElsl:lt G A!3!3lies. (AttasAeEl ts sask sf jl:liEle)

~ E:lJall:late E:Ab ~Jet',\'sFk 6JSiAj E:AtFY PSiAt 61.

~ IFA!3leFAeAt ~l:lAstisA RestsFatisA PF9SeEll:lFeS ,o.s ReEll:liFeEi.

NQ::rE: +he RGP +I'ip Gl'itel'ia is in effect \;;Intil an RGS caalda'..m is initiated.

00 GI=lE:GK RGP ::rFi!3 GFiteFia:

• AAY RGP R6J~JNING (¥E:S)

GI=lE:GK all sf tAe fsllswiAj:

• SI fls',\' GRE:A::rE:R ::rI=lAN 2GG GPM (¥E:S)

• GI=lE:GK RGS !3FeSSl:lFe bE:SS  ::rI=lA~J ~ 4GG PSIG (~JG)

BGP IgE:~J+I~¥ AAY Rl:l!3tl:lFeEi SG:

GI=lE:GK fSF aAY sf tAe fsllswiAj:

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 Page ~ of _35_-11 Event

Description:

~loJptmod Faulted Steam Generator ('B' SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs~)

Time Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• ~G level ING~~A~ING IN AN 6JI'>JGGI'>J+~Gbb~1:;) MANI'>J~~

f?Sj

• ~G astivity saFA I3le I=IIGI=I ~AI:;)IA+IGN

• MaiA steaFAliAe faEliatioA I=IIGI=I ~AI:;)IA+IGN ~¥~~)

PROCEDURE CA.UTION:

• A.t least one SG must be maintained available for RCS Gooldown .

• If the TDAFW pump is the only a}.'ailable so urGe of feed flo"',,, one steam supply val}.'e from an intaGt SG must be maintained open.

gQP I~GbA+~ Flo"." FfOFA ~tll3ttlfeEl ~G:

/\I:;)J6JS+ ftll3ttlfeEl ~G PG~V sOAtmllef set130iAt to 88% ~1145 PSIG)

ANI:;) I3lase iA atlto.

gQP GI=I~GK Ftll3ttlfeEl ~G PG~V ~1=I6J+ ~¥~~)

S1=I6J+ ftll3ttlfeEl ~G steaFA Stll3l3ly valve to +I:;)/\FW I3tlFAI3:

• ~G 13: 1MS:;ZQ

• ~G G: 1M~ 72 gQP V~~IF¥ 9Io'Nao'NA isolatioA valves ffOFA ftll3ttlfeEl SG S1=I6J+

Shtlt ftll3tmeEl SG FAaiA steaFA ElmiA isolatioA gefom M~IV:

gQP * ~G A: 1M~ ~d1

• ~G 13: 1MS ~66

• ~G G: 1MS dQ1

~htlt wl3ttlmEl ~G M~IV Al'>m 9Y13aSS valve. ~NG, '13' MSIV fails to

~1=I6J+)

Isolate IAtast ~G~s) FFOFA ~tll3ttlfeEl ~G Al'>m MiAiFAi:t:e ~teaFA Flow gQP c.~ D .> .*.. ..J c*r..

• ~htlt all feFAaiAiA§ M~IV ANI:;) 9Y13aSS ..'alves.

• Plase 90th steaFA EltlFAI3 iAtmlosk 9Y13aSS switshes to GFF,I~~~~+.

• 6Jse iAtast SG~s) PG~V fOf all ftlRhef steaFA EltlFAl3iA§.

• Isolate steaFA mlease l3ath fmFA wl3ttlma ~G tlSiA§ AttashFAeAt 1.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 Page ~ of ....;,.;35;;""'--11 Event

Description:

Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator ('B' SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs~)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• AAY iAtaet SG MSIV At>m eYl3ass valve SI=H::l+ ~¥eS~

PROCEDURE CAUTION: IF FuptuFed SG is faulted AND is NOT Reed faF RCS caalda'.... R, THEN feed fla'.... ta that SG shauld FemaiR isalated.

gQP MeAitm Rl:ll3tl:lFeS SG bevel:

• Rl:ll3tl:lFeS SG FAUb+eQ ~¥eS~

• Rl:ll3tl:lFeS SG NeeQ FGR RGS GGGbQGIAlN ~NG~

• belolel GReA+eR +I=lAN 2§% f4G%l (¥eS~

Stel3 fees flew ey shl:lUiAg the MQAPN At>m +QAFVV iselatieA valves te Fl:ll3tl:lFeS SG.

PROCEDURE CAUTION: The steam supply valve fFam the FuptuFed SG ta the TDAF\~.{

pump shauld be shut OR isalated befaFe caRtiRuiRg.

gQP GReek Rl:ll3tl:lFeS SG~s~ PFeSSl:lFe GReA+eR +I=lAN 26G PSIG fa§G PSIGl ~NG,l¥eS~ If t>JG, theA get ePP G2G.

EVAlUATOR NOTE: DepeRdiRg aR the cFe'N's pace thFaugh the pFaceduFes '8' SG pFessuFe may Rat be less thaR 260 psig at this paiRt. If that's the case theR the CFe'.tJ 'IJiII caRtiRue iR PATH 2 URtii step 23 aRd THEN tFaRsitiaR ta EPP 020.

Ii ePP GaG, SG+FPNI+Flb,GSSGj;; ReA~GR GGGbANT I ..... SYBGGGbeQReGG~JeR¥, gte~ ~ *...........................

aRG Felsel:lt al3l3lies ~see attaehes~

00 Reset SI.

gQP MaAl:lally RealigA Safegl:laFss e~l:lil3FF1eAt FellewiAg ,t., bess Gf Gffsite PeweF. ~RefeF te PA+1=l =1 GYIQe, AttaehFFleAt 2.~

00 Reset PRase A At>m PRase B IselatieA SigAals.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # _6....,_7_ _ _ _ Page ~ of _3.;..;5_-11 Event

Description:

Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator ('B' SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs eR-tfip)

Time Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior RG ~sta9lisl=I IAstHlFReAt ,6,iF ANQ NitFe§eA +e GNM+:

OpeA tl=le feliewiA§ valves:

• 11,11. 819

• 1S1 ~87 oop. MeAiteF AG 19b1ses:

Gl=leol< AG eFR9F§eAoy 9b1SeS 1,11. SA ANQ 119 SI9 ~N~RGIZ~Q I9Y OFFSI+~ POVV~R:

• Gl=leok 9b1S velta§es

• Gl=leok 9FeakeFs 1Qa A~m 1~a GbOS~Q oop. Gl=leok all AeA eFReF§eAoy AG 9b1SeS ~N~RGIZ~Q (Y~S)

Gl=leok RblptblF9d SG(s) bevel b~SS +HAN 78% [6Q%] (Hi§1=I Hi§1=I oop.

alaFFR) (Y~S)

PROCEDURE CAUTION: PR:l heaters sheuld NOT be eRergized uRtii PR:l 'IJater le'lel iRdisates greater thaR miRimum resemmeRded by plaRt eperatieRs staff te eRsure heaters are se\'ered.

RG SeoblFe PRZ HeateFS:

• Plaoe 9aokblp l=IeateFs iA tl=le OFF pesitieA.

• VeFify oSAtFeI l=IeateFs OFF

• GeAsbllt plaAt speFatieAs staff feF a JeoeFRFReAded FR iAiFR blFR iAdioated PRZ wateF level tl=lat will eASblFe l=IeateFs aFe oeveFed. (RefeF te 6JS~R'S G6JIQ~, "6JS~R'S G6JIQ~",

I\++"nh""" ... + ') , C" .... I, +; ,,", D.",",,",, or;.,,,. \1\1 .... +". 1 " ,,,I 1... ..1;" .... +;" ... \

RG Gl=leok G~jM+ SpFay Statbls:

• Gl=leok aAY GNM+ spFay pl:lFRp R6J~JNI~jG (NO)

PROCEDURE CAUTION: IF ruptured SG is faulted AND is NOT Reed fer RCS seelde\'m, THEN feed flew te that SG sheuld remaiR iselated.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 Page ~ of _3;..;5~~1 Event

Description:

Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator ('B' Sed at 420 gpm, fault occurs ~)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior oop. MeA iter Fll:lptl:lreE! SG bevel:

• Fll:ll3tl:lFeE! SG ~Al,)b+eg ~¥eS)

• Fll:ll3tl:lreE! SG ~JeH)eg ~GFl FlGS GGGbgGVl,l~j ~~jG)

RG Gl=leel~ FlI=lFl Pl:lFAP Statl:ls:

• FlGS I3ressl:lre GFleA+eFl +I=lA~j ~aQ PSIG ~¥eS)

• FlGS I3ressl:lre S+Agbe GFl l~jGFleASING ~¥eS)

• Gl=leek FlI=lFlpl:lFAp Sl:letieA AblGNeg +G FllNS+

• Step FlI=lFlpl:lFAl3s.

GeerE!iAate l.'Vitl=l PlaAt Gl3eratieAs Staff Mm Gl=leFAistry +e PerferFA SRG +I=le ~ellewiA§ +e GstaiA Primary AAE! SeeeAE!ary SaFAl3les:

Gperate tl=le I3FiFAary ANg seeeAE!ary saFAple l3aAels.

GpeA GG},tJJ te saFAl3le I=lX vallJes:

RG * ~ GG ~ ~ 4

• ~GG na GpeA GG l.o.1 te G~~g IJalves:

RG * ~GG aQ4

• ~GG aQa AIi§A ANg estaiA aetivity, l=lyE!re§eA ANg sereA saFAl3les ef tl=le fellel.... iA§:

RG

• FlGS Ret le§s

• PFlZ liql:liE! sl3aee

• AIISGs SRG IAitiate evall:latieA Gf PlaAt Statl:ls:

Gl=leel~ al:l*iliary sl:lilE!iA§ raE!iatieA ~JGFlMAb PROGEDYRE NO+E: When SG le*.'el deGFeases to 25%, AFV4 aGtuation OGGUFS and the AF\~J flo'll GontFol ¥al'Jes FeGei¥e a full open signal.

oop. GReek IAtaet SG be~lels: AAY bel.lel GFleA+eFl +I=lAN ~a% [4Q%J A~W fle¥.' A+ beAS+ ~~ Q KPPI=l AV,Cl,lbAgbe GeAtrel feeE! flel,\' te FAaiAtaiA iAtaet SG levels setweeA aQ% aAE! aQ%

[4Q% aAE! aQ%J Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 Page ~ of _3;;,;;5~~1 Event

Description:

RUJ3t~Hed Faulted Steam Generator ('B' SG at 420 gJ3m, fault occurs GA--tf+p)

Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior RG GReek PR~ Pressl::Ire:

• Pressl::Ire beSS +I=IAN 2ggg PSIG

• Bleek Ie',\! steaFR f'}ressl::Ire SI.

PROCeDURe CAUTION: If all RCPs aFe stepped, steps te depFessuFize the RCS aRd teFmiRate SI sheuld be peReFmed as quiskly as pessible afteF the seelde'l§R has staFted te miRimize peteRtial pFessuFized theFmal shesk at the FeaGteF J,.~essel.

BQP. IRitiate RGS Geelee',m +e Gele SRl::IteewR:

• MaiRtaiR RGS eeeleeym rate less tRaR ~ ggo~I=IR

• GReek RI=IR systeFR GPeRA+ING IN SI=I61+(;)G},lVN

(--1 III.I~ ur\nc 111.1'-"\

BQP. GReek if steaFR el::lFRf'} te eeReeRser A}JAlbABbe (NG)

BQP. GReek SG Statl::lS ~er GeeleewR:

• GReek SGs A+ beAS+ Gt>le IN+AG+ SG AVAlbABbe (¥eS)

(;)l::IFRf'} steaFR fFeFR iRtaet SGs l::IsiRg aRY ef tRe feliewiRg (listed iR meer sf f'}refereRee):

• GeReeRser steaFR el::lFRf'} (Net Available)

• SG PGRVs TeFmiRate the SGeRaFie eRse the GeeldeWR has beeR ebseF¥ed te the eKteRt desiFed.

Harris 2009A NRC Scenario 3 (Spare) FINAL Revision 1