ML082530378
| ML082530378 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee  |
| Issue date: | 01/20/2003 |
| From: | Fitzpatrick J Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee |
| To: | NRC/SECY/RAS |
| SECY RAS | |
| References | |
| 06-849-03-LR, 50-271-LR, Entergy-Applicant-E4-36-VY, RAS M-349 | |
| Download: ML082530378 (14) | |
Text
/UEAK-NS H A
- USNRIC
..Aufbust 12, 2008 (11:00am)
'OFFICE OF SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND ADJUDICATIONS STAFF VERMONT YANKEE PIPING FLOW ACCELERATED CORROSION INSPECTION PROGRAM (PP 7028) 2002 REFUELING OUTAGE INSPECTION REPORT (RFO 23- Fall 2002)
Prepared by: IIktý le J A C,
~gn . FitT_.attdk- Mechanical /Structural Engineering Reviewed b Thomas M. (tC'nnlr ,
Design Engineedring - Mechanical (StructuraI U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY GOWMI ;SION In the Matter of Syrut I&J V.AUII C Docket No. so £1 Official Exhibit No. *'t-*-*i' OFFERED a Intervenor ....
Page 1 NRC Staff Other_....
IDENTIFIED &? OwNnePanel R2-31 Action Taken: REJECTE WMIhDRAWN Da.nts~nvir-&~ t tx -
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V.Y. PIPING F.A.C. INSPECTION PROGRAM: 2002 REFUELING OUTAGE INSPECTION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS 4.0
SUMMARY
2.0 2002 REFUELING OUTAGE INSPEOTION PLAN 3.0 EVALUATION OF INSPECTION RESULTS 3.1 Large Bore Piping 3.2 Turbine Cross Around Piping 3,3 Small Bore Piping 3.4 Feedwater Heater Shells 3.5 Extraction Steam Reverse Current Valves 4.0 COMPONENTS REQUIRING FUTURE MONITORING 5.0 COMPONENTS REQUIRING POSSIBLE REPAIR OR REPLACEMENT 6.0 INSPECTION DATA RETENTION 7.0 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE FAC INSPECTIONS
8.0 REFERENCES
ATTACHMENT 1:
SUMMARY
OF LARGE BORE PIPING UT INSPECTION RESULTS ATTACHMENT 2:
SUMMARY
OF SMALL BORE PIPING UT INSPECTION RESULTS Page 2
V.Y. PIPING F.A.C. INSPECTION PROGRAM: 2002 REFUELING OUTAGE INSPECTION REPORT 1.0
SUMMARY
External UT measurements were taken on 22 large bore piping components in the Feedwater and Condensate Systems, External UT inspections were performed on 3 sections of small bore piping on the Heater Vents piping and the low point drain for the turbine steam seal header. An internal visual Inspection of the 30 inch B Turbine Cross-Around line was also performed. Planned UT inspections on the No.1 High Pressure feedwater heaters were deleted from the scope due to the decision to replace all 4 HP feedwater heaters in 2004.
Component selection was based on a combination of; previous inspection data, industry events, analyses using the EPRI developed CHEOWORKS computer code, and the consequences of component failure. A detailed selection process was used and was documented in reference (4).
The large bore results were evaluated using a three level screening process defined in plant procedure DP 0072. All components Inspected were found to have a wall thickness greater than the code minimum wall thickness. The predicted thickness at the next refueling outage was greater than the code minimum wall thickness for all components. No piping components required repair or replacement during the refueling outage and there were no immediate operability concerns.
A summary of the large bore piping component screening is contained In Attachment 1. contains a summary of the small bore piping inspection results.
During the 2002 refueling outage, the UT Inspections were performed by the same personnel performing the ASME Section Xl in-Lservice inspections. Panametrics 26DL+
electronic thickness; measurement and data logging equipment was used to collect data.
Component preparation, scaffolding, insulation removal, and surface cleaning were performed by NPS personnel. Due to the small inspection scope, application of grid markings was performed by the UT personnel using guidelines contained In Appendix A of the UT procedure, NE 8053. UT results were directly downloaded from the data loggers into the EPRI CHECWORKS program located on the VY computer network. This reduced both time and effort required to transmit data to engineering personnel and resulted in a faster turn around time for Engineering to evaluate the inspection results and release components for restoration.
Of note, but not directly under the scope of the Piping FAC Inspection Program, was the discovery of erosion of internal components found in the Extraction Steam system reverse current valves, The VY valve maintenance procedures include an internal check for erosion
/corrosion of valve parts. The damage was discovered during planned maintenance. The erosion of the valve covers and disc stem nuts was due to a material deficiency. The design specification required a chrome-moly material, the vendor supplied a carbon steel material.
A contrlbuting cause to the extent of the damage was the lack of maintenance on these valves during the past 30 years of operation.
Page 3
V.Y. PIPING FRA.C, INSPECTION PROGRAM: 2002 REFUELING OUTAGE INSPECTION: REPORT 2.0 2002 REFUELING OUTAGE INSPECTION PLAN The 2002 refueling outage inspection scope was developed to satisfy the following goals:
I Inspect large bore components requiring follow up inspections, based on UT data from previous refueling outages.
- Inspect components Identified by the EPRI CHEOWORKS computer code as being ranked high for susceptibility to wear and/or having the least time remaining to reach code minimum wall thickness.
- Perform repeat inspections on selected large bore components for calibration of the CHECWORKS models.
- Toincorporate industry experience into the program through inspection of components at VY that are similar to those that have either failed or showed significant wall thinning at other plants.
- Perform an internal visual inspection of the 30" B turbine cross around piping. This is the last remaining carbon steel section. The last internal inspection was performed in 1999.
Inspection of selected small bore components contained In the Small Bore Database which have not had an Initial inspection.
- Inspection of selected small bore components based on previous wear or leaks,
- To complete base line UT inspections on the No.1 high pressure (HP) feedwater heaters shells adjacent to the extraction steam inlet nozzles.
Inspections on any large bore and small bore piping components subjected to off normal flow conditions, such as components downstream of normally closed valves with seat leakage are generally performed each refueling outage. These components are typically identified by the cognizant Systems Engineer, using the turbine performance monitoring system, No components were identified during the scoping for RFO 23.
The planned duration for RFO 23 FAG activities was approximately 15 days. Given the shorter duration consideration was given to optimizing the locations and number of components to be inspected, and also to be consistent with previous outage inspection efforts. The detailed reasoning for component selection is contained In the, Inspection Location Worksheets, reference (4). The complete planned scope for RFO 23 is contained in reference (5).
Page 4
VY; PIPING FAGC. INSPECTION PROGRAM: 2002 REFUELING OUTAGE INSPECTION REPORT 3.0. EVALUATION OF INSPECTION RESULTS 3.1 Large Bore Piping The planned large bore piping inspection scope for RFO 23 Included external UT exams on 23 large bore piping components at nine locations on the Feedwater and Heater Drain Systems. Three components adjacent to feedwater heater E-2-IA on the Heater Drain System were removed from the scope due to the decision to replace all 4 high pressure feedwater heaters in 2004. Two additional components on the Feedwater System were Inspected due to availability, A total of 22 large bore components were inspected using external UT.
The UT results were directly downloaded from the data loggers into the EPRI CHECWORKS program located on the VY computer network. The thickness data were evaluated using a three level screening process as defined In procedure, DP 0072. The UT inspection results for each component were reviewed for anomalies and consistency with piping geometry. Wear rates (wear/cycle) were calculated for each component using methods specified in DP 0072, and are consistent with NSAC-202L, reference (8). For component UT results which indicated no wear or minimal wear has occurred, a minimum wear rate of 0.005 incheslcycle was used. Using the calculated wear rates and the 2002 measured thickness, the predicted thickness at the end of the next cycle ( 2004 Tpred ) was calculated using a safety factor of 1.2 on the calculated wear per cycle. Using both the wear rate and 2002 measurement data, the projected number of cycles beyond the Fall 2002 refueling outage (RF023) for each component to wear down to the code minimum wall thickness was also calculated.
Components passing the Level 1 screen have 2004 Tpred greater than .a75Tnom (the manufacturing tolerance of new piping) and require no further evaluation. The Level 2 screen is for components with 2004 Tpred less than .875Tnom but greater than Tmin (the code minimum wall thickness to resist pressure and mechanical loads). These components are acceptable for continued operation but future monitoring Is recommended. The Level 3 screening Is for components with 2004 Tpred less than Tmin. The Level 3 screening is a detailed analytical methodology, It also requires that additional piping components be inspected this outage (sample expansion), and considered for Inspection during future refueling outages.
All components Inspected were found to have wall thickness greater than code minimum wall thickness. All predicted wall thickness (at the 2004 refueling outage) values were above code minimum wall thickness. Of the 22 large bore piping components inspected, 18 (82%)
passed the Level 1 screen, and the remaining 4(18%) passed the Level 2 screen.
No large bore repairs or replacements were required. Only one component was Identified as requiring future monitoring and Is discussed in Section 4.0 of this report. A summary of the large bore piping component screening is contained in Attachment 1.
Page 5
V.Y. PIPING F.A.C. INSPECTION PROGRAM: 2002 REFUELING OUTAGE INSPECTION REPORT 3.2 Turbine Cross Around Pioina Inspections of the turbine cross around piping had been deferred until the 2002 RFO based on an evaluation of the Inspection results from the 1996, 1998, and 1999 refueling outages.
An internal visual inspection was performed on the B 30" diameter Cross Around (CAR) line which runs from the B Moisture Separator to the low pressure turbine. This line is the last remaining carbon steel Cross Around line. The last Inspection of this pipe was performed during the 1999 Refueling Outage.
During the 1995 refueling outage, new moisture separator internals were Installed and extensiveweld repairs were made In this line. The weld repairs performed in 1995 essentially restored the wall thickness of the entire run to a minimum of 0,50Q (nominal wall thickness). The extent of the weld repairs performed in 1995 was greater than previous efforts, The previous repairs were intended to last only one cycle. The 19f95 repairs were originally Intended to last until 1998 with an inspection and minor touch up In 1996 as required.
The 30" B line generally appears essentially the same as observed in 1999. No new areas of red/black oxide were identified. Also, the extent of areas of red/black oxide identified in previous inspections is essentially the same. Markings on the interior of the pipe to identify the 1995 Inspectionfrepair locations, and the 1996 inspection locations are still visible.
These are evidence that there is no significant wall loss occurring. Based on the visual results no supplemental internal ultrasonic (UT) thickness exams were performed, No repairs were required based on the criteria developed in reference(10).
The series of internal visual inspections performed since 1996 along with limited LIT measurements verifies that degradation of the interior surface of the carbon steel 30 inch B Cross Around piping has been minimal as compared to observed damage prior to the internal modifications made in the Moisture Separators. The rate of degradation previously observed and the need for extensive weld repairs has been mitigated by both the repair effort performed in 1995 and the installation of new internals In the moisture separators, If no changes to plant operation that effect the flow regime (iLe. pressure, flow rate, moisture content, etc.) In this line occur, or are planned, then the next scheduled internal visual inspection can be deferred one operating cycle to the Fall of 2005. However, ifthe planned modifications to the high pressure turbine and moisture separators as part of the power uprate project are to be executed during the Spring 2004 refueling outage, the changes in operating pressures and flows will require a reassessment of the current Cross Around piping Inspection and evaluation methodology. Inputs to re(erence(1 0) will change and the current evaluation criteria will be affected, Page 6
V.Y. PIPING F.A.C. INSPECTION PROGRAM; 2002 REFUELING OUTAGE INSPECTION REPORT 3.3 Small Br*ero PIDI*a Three sections of small bore piping were scheduled for external UT Inspection during the 2002 refueling outage. These were new inspections. Two sections of Heater Vent piping from the No. 3 feedwater heaters were Inspected In RFO 23, This piping was installed in 1992 when the No.3 feedwater heaters were replaced. The other section inspected was on the I "-LPDR low point drain off the turbine steam seat header line at the condenser. This location is downstream of the location of a through wall leak at a socket welded elbow fitting that occurred in 2001, reference (12). The damaged elbow and adjacent piping were replaced during the outage.
No significant wear was found in any of the small bore piping inspected. A summary of the small bore piping Inspection results is contained In Attachment 2, 3.4 Feedwater Heater Shells The planned scope for RFO 23 was to complete baseline UT inspections on the No.1 high pressure (HP) feedwater heater shells adjacent to the extraction steam inlet nozzles.
Additional asbestos abatement was planned on these heaters due to planned installation of inspection ports. The extent of the existing grids was to be increased. Also, additional UT measurements on the No, 2 HP heaters shells were to be performed as required to supplement internal visual inspections.
The planned inspections were not performed due to the decision to replace all 4 high pressure feedwater heaters in 2004. Limited internal visual inspections were performed on the No.2 HP feedwater heaters to assess changes since the last RFO, and to confirm cond Itions for one more operating cycle.
-3.5 Extraction Steam Reverse Current Valves Of note, but not directly under the scope of the Piping FAC Inspection Program, was the discovery of erosion of internal components found In the Extraction Steam system reverse current valves, The extraction steam piping routes high pressure and low pressure turbine exhaust steam to the shell sides of the feedwater heaters. The flow rates and steam quality vary in each stage depending on its turbine exhaust point and the line size. The extent of erosion varied in each stage exhaust line, with the most damage found in the 7h stage extraction from the LI turbines.
There are a total of 8 valves located in lines originally constructed using chrome-moly piping. The valve bodies and a majority of the internal parts are cast steel A217-WC6 which Is more resistant to wall loss from wet steam flow than the typical A216-WCB carbon steel used In other plant systems. However, the flat covers which form the pressure boundary and the hex nuts which hold the valve disk to the swing arm are carbon steel.
Page 7
V.Y. PIPING F.A.C. INSPECTION PROGRAM: 2002 REFUELING OUTAGE INSPECTION REPORT The Adverse Trend Investigation Report for ER 2002-2568, reference (11) Identified the root cause of the erosion as a material deficiency. The design specification required a chrome-moly material, the vendor supplied a carbon steel material. The tack of maintenance on these valves during the past 30 years of operation contributed to the extent of the erosion found.
The valve covers and the nuts are located out of the flow stream and partially shielded by the open disc, The severe wear was limited to the covers and the nuts. The chrome-moly internal parts and the valve bodies show no or limited wear considering 30 years of operation. The manufacturers drawing shows blank spaces and then "steel" as the material.
Apparently changes to the drawings were made during procurement and fabdcation- The replacement covers obtained from the vendor are carbon steel A285 Gr, C as specified by the vendor.
External UT inspections of valves, especially check valves, are not typically performed under the Piping FAC Inspection Program at VY. Based on past experience with UT measurement on valves, line items were added to the valve maintenance procedures to Inspect for internal wear/corrosion of the bodies and internal parts. Had we performed UT inspections on these valves, the inspection would have been limited to the flow stream, the covers would not have been included in the inspection since they are located outside the flow stream. This is the first valve cover erosion we have experienced. The erosion was not expected considering the valves bodies are chrome-moly. The carbon steel parts are inconsistent with the chrome-moly bodies with respect to FAG wear resistance. The materials used in the cover and disc nut are incompatible with long term exposure to wet steam flow, The long term solution should include replacement of carbon steel components with FAC resistant materials, and a review of piece parts in other valves with similar flow regimes to insure this situation does not exist in other valves.
4.0 COMPONENTS REQUIRING FUTURE MONITORING Components requiring future monitoring are Identified using the "2004 Predicted Thickness',
the "Screening Level" which the component passed, and the "Approximate Cycles to Trmin" shown in Attachment 1. From the wear rates and cycles to Tmin calculated in Attachment 1, only one component, FD18ELOI was identified with less than 10 cycles to Tmin. However, a conservative wear rate based on a single inspection was used In the time calculation. The conservative time to Tmin is approximately 8 cycles. Inspection of this component should be performed in 4 cycles (2007 RFO) to confirm the calculated wear rates.
The 2002 refueling outage inspection results will be incorporated into the existing CHEOWORKS models of the Feedwater and Heater Drain Systems. The 2002 Inspection data, and data from previous Inspections will be used to refine the wear rate predictions.
The results shown in Attachment I and the updated CHECWORKS analyses will be used to determine the inspection scope for future refueling outages, Page 8
V.Y. PIPING F.A.C. INSPECTION PROGRAM: 2002 REFUELING OUTAGE INSPECTION REPORT 5.0 COMPONENTS REQUIRING POSSIBLE REPAIR OR REPLACEMENT No specific components were identified as requiring repairs or replacements. However, with future operation under GE hydrogen water chemistry, wear rates in the Feedwater and Heater Drain systems are expected to Increase. The Feedwater System piping from the feed pumps past the feed regulator valves has a relatively low margin for wall loss due to flow accelerated corrosion. This is due to the high design pressure and the installed wall thickness. The CHECWORKS models for this piping will be updated with the 2002 (RF023) inspection date, and inspections of specific components on the Feedwater System piping will continue in the future.
e.0 INSPECTION DATA RETENTION UT thickness data has been taken using Vermont Yankee owned Panametrics 2SDL+
digital UT and electronic data logging system. The large bore UT Inspection results were downloaded directly into the CHECWORKS database iocated on the VY computer network.
The measured thickness data for each component Is stored in the CHECWORKS data base. A thickness date sheet (form VYNEFS053,01) including the CHECWORKS thickness matrix printout was created for each inspection. The inspection reports are controlled and put into permanent storage by VY ISI personnel per AP 6807. Component evaluations are documented and transferred to Records Management per the FAC Program Procedure PP 702S.
Page 9
V.Y. PIPING F.A.C. INSPECTION PROGRAM: 2002 REFUELING OUTAGE INSPECTION REPORT 7.0 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE FAC INSPECTIONS Based on results from the RFO 23 inspections no new immediate or near term repairs or replacements are required.
Utilization of ISI inspection personnel to perform FAC inspections, use of the Panametric data logging equipment, and the CHECWORKS code has proven to be effective in performing and evaluating the UT Inspections required under PP 7028. The continued use of this setup Is recommended.
The long term solution for erosion of the carbon steel parts in the Extraction Steam reverse current valves should include replacement of carbon steel components with FAG resistant materials, and a review of the piece parts in other valves with similar flow regimes to Insure this situation does not exist in other valves. These recommendations will evaluated by the FAC Program Coordinator under commitment Item No. ER 2002-2586_03.
The planned power uprate project underway at VY will requIre a complete review of program evaluations, piping modeling, and procedures to account for changes in equipment and flow regimes in plant piping systems. This review should be performed prior to the next refueling outage to Insure all required baseline inspections are performed prior to increased power operations.
The potential for finding significant wear in any piping component exists. Contingency planning as required for either weld repair or replacement of large bore components in the piping systems should be considered. ASME code cases for external weld overlay of eroded piping have been approved in recent years. The applicability and possible use of these code cases at VY should be evaluated. These code cases could provide additional methods for timely and effective repairs during short refueling outages.
Page 10
V.Y. PIPING F.A.C. INSPECTION PROGRAM: 2002 REFUELING OUTAGE INSPECTION REPORT
8.0 REFERENCES
- 1. V.Y. Program Procedure PP 7028, Piping Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) Inspection Program. Original Issue 5110101 with LPC 1 dated 12106/01.
- 2. V.Y. Department Procedure, DP 0072, 'Structural Evaluation of Thinned Wall Piping Components", Original Issue 5117/01, with LPC ¶ dated 10102101.
- 3. V.Y, Nondestructive Examination Procedure, NE 8053, "Ultrasonic Thickness Measurement' Revision 1, dated 9/13102.
- 4. VY Piping FAC Inspection Program - 2002 Refueling Outage: Inspection Location Worksheets ) Methods and Reasons for Component Selection, dated 10131/01.
- 5. Memo J.C.Fitzpatrick to S.D.Goodwin, subject: Piping FAC Inspection Scope for the 2002 Refueling Outage, VYM 20011025, dated 10/31/01.
- 6. ENVY Memo J.C.Fltzpatrick to S.DGoodwin, subject: Summary of RFO 23 Turbine Cross Around Piping Inspections, VYM 2002-009, dated 10113/02.
- 7. ENVY Memo J.C.Fltzpatrlck to S.D.Goodwin, subject: 2002 Refueling Outage Piping Flow Accelerated Corrosion Inspection Summary, VYM 2002-010, dated 10/21102.
- 8. EPRI Report, "Recommendations for an Effective Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Program",
EPRI NSAC-202L-R2, April 1999.
- 9. CHECWORKS - Computer Program User Guide, TR 103496, August 1994 by Altos Engineering Applications Inc, for EPRI.
10.VY Calculation No. WPC 92-004, Rev. 0, 'Turbine Cross Around Piping Wall Thinning Evaluation" 11.VY Event Report No. EFR 2002-2668, Identification of Adverse Trend with reports of erosion on valve parts in the Extraction Steam (ES) system.
12.VY Event Report No. ER 2001-1823, Steam Seal Pressure Regulator Steam Leak Page 11
V.Y. PIPING F.A.C. INSPECTION PROGRAM:"2002 REFUEUNG OUTAGE INSPECTION REPORT ATTACHMENT 1:
SUMMARY
OF LARGE BORE PIPING UT INSPECTION RESULTS Inspw_t Component DIA Tnom .875& Tmin 2002 Wear 2004 Passed Approx. Future Comments No. I.3 Tnomn Min Rats(inJ Tpred. Screen Cycles Inspections Tmeas cycle) Lvel to Tmin Recommended tir_ (in)[ (in) f.*n. jin1, NRote 2 Note 3 Note 4 2002-01 FD01,SP1IUS 24 1.812 1.586 1.447 1.551 0.005 1-545 2 17.3 2002-02 FDQBRD01 24 1.812 1.585 1.447 1.578 0.005 1,572 2 21.8 18 1,375 1.203 1.085 1.263 0.005 1-257 1 29-7 2002-03 FDOSEL01 18 1.375 1.203, 1.085 1.326 0.010 1.314 1 20.1 20D2-03A FDO8SPOlUS 18 1.375 1.203 1.085 1.224 0.0075 1.215 1 15.4 Note 5 2002-04 FD14SP06DS 10 1.219 1.007 0.964 1.126 0.006 1.119 1 22.5 2002-05 FD14EL05 15 1.219 1.067 0.964 1.134 0.005 1.128 1 28.3 2002-06 FD14TEO2 18 1.219 1.087 0.964 1-250 0,005 1.244 1 47.7 Run a? 0.719 0,629 0.520 0.670 0.005 0.664 1 25.0 Branch 2002-06A FD14SP07DS 16 1.219 1.057 0.964 1.155 0.005 1.149 1 31.8 Note 5 2002-07 FD18SPOIDS 1Y 0.844 0,739 0.645 0.705 0.005 0.779 1 23.3 2002-08 FD18ELOI 16 0.844 0,739 0,645 0.797 0.0-16 0.778 1 7 2007 RFO -Note 6 2002-09 FDlSSPO2US 16 0.844 0.739 0.645 0.753 0.00C 0.747 1 18.0 2002-10D HD12SP2DDS 5 0.280 0.245 0.120 0.242 0.007 0.233 2 2C-3 2002-11t HD12EL22 8 0.280 0.245 0.12 0-282 0.005 0276 1 27.0 2002-12 HD12SP21US 18 0.280 0.241 0.120 0-243 0.'005 0.237 2 20.5 2002-16 HDIBELO3 6 0180- 0.245 0.200 0,299 0.007 0.291 1 11i8i "Noe 6 2002-17 HDIBSP05US 6 01280 0.245 0-200 0.257 0.005 0.251 1 12.5 *No*" 6 2002-18 HD3AELOI 10 0.365 0.3191 0.200 0.349 0.005 0.343 1 23-0
.2002-19 HDSASPO3US 10 0.365 0.319 0.154 0.348 0.005 0.342 1 32.3 Page 1 of 2
VdY. PIPING F.A. INSPECTION PROGRAM: 2002 REFUELING OUTAGE INSPECTION REPORT ATTACHMENT 1:
SUMMARY
OF LARGE BORE PIPING UT INSPECTION RESULTS Inspect Component DIA TIou .87T5 Trndn 2002 Wear 2004 Passed Approx. Future Comments No. ID Tnom Min Rate(inJ Tpred. Screen Cycles Inspections Tmeas cycle) Level to Trrmm Recommended 4InL Win I .in. 0niL fin) Note 2 Note 3 Note 4 2002-20 HIDSBTE0I 14 0.375 0-328 0-175 0.57M 0.010 0.559 1 33.6 Run 14 0.375 0.328 0,175 0,525 0-008 0.516 1 35.5 Branch 2002-20A HDSSSP06DS 14 0.375 0.328 0.146 0.336 0-005 0.330 1 31.6 Note ,
2002-21 HD6BSP07US 14 0.375 0.328 0.1411 0.339 O.005i 0.333 1 32.2 2002-22 HD7AEL(J4 16 0,375 0328 0,280 0.447 0.007 0.438 1 19.1 2002-23 HD7ASP04US 16 0.375 0.328 0.140 0.3:Z8 0.005 0.322 2 31.3 NOTES:
I. All thickness values are Inches.
- 2. Wear/Cycle is approximately inchl.s/18 months. The wear per cycle was calculated per DP0072 using 16.9 equivalent 18 month cycles based ow approx.
157,000 operating hours up to 1996 outage, and 12000 _+hrsJcycle. Minimum Wear/Cycle used to calculate Tpred and Cycles to Trin is 0.005 inches per cycle.
- 3. 2004 T predicEed = 2002 T measured - F.S. * (Wear/Cycle), F.S. = Factor of Safety = 1.20.
- 4. Cycles to Tmin is calculated from: (2002Tmeasured-Tmin) (iLe. Cycles from 2002 RFO)
F.S. x Wear/Cycle.
- 5. Component added to scope due to availability. Scaffolding and insulation removal were already performed for adjacent components.
- 6. Conservative of wear rate used. Wear rate based on single inspection using band method (max-mrin).
Page 2 of 2
V.Y. PIPING F.AC. INSPECTION PROGRAM: 2002 REFUELING OUTAGE INSPECTION REPORT ATTACHM ENT 2:
SUMMARY
OF SMALL BORE PIPING UT INSPECTION RESULTS SMALL BORE PIPING S.B. Description I Location Section Size Sch T"nem. .875
- T min. 20112 Min. Apparent Cycles Comments Inspection. Tnnan (inch) Mmo~rmd Wear Rate to Number Thickness Tmin.
e
{Iata BNote (in.) (inch) (inch) 1) (inch) (inrdWtycle) (Note2) 02-SB01 2"-HV-SA Pipe & A 2 80 .216 .191 .073 ,210 <0.005 22.6 Fittings*@ R.O.-3A at (48) FOW healer E-3-1A /
TB Heater Bay (Apprcx-Elev. 236. )
B 2 80 -218 .191 .073 .207 <0.005 22.3 C 2 80 -218 .191 .073 .208 <0.005 22.5 02-5B02 2"-HV-gB Pipe& A 2 80 .218 .191 .073 .203 <0.005 21.7 Fittings @ Condenser (55) Nozzle 23B0 TB Heatr Bay (Approx.
Eev. 236.
B 2 8O .218 .191 .073 ,199 <0.005 21.0 C 2 80 .218 .191 .073 .206 <0.005 222 02-5B603 SSH Low Point Drain 1- A 1 80 .179 -157 .066 .169 <0.005 17.2 LPDR-1' drain off SSH (129) piping & fittings at connection to Condenser A, Nozzle 61, /
TB Heater Bay (Approx.
Elev. 23.. )
1B 1 160 .250 .219 I .066 .216 1<0.005 35.0 1 NOTES;
- 1. Tmin includes a 0.065 inch cprrpsion allowance per ANSI B31.1-1967.