ML080660013
| ML080660013 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 03/06/2008 |
| From: | Richard Ennis NRC/NRR/ADRO/DORL/LPLI-2 |
| To: | Levis W Public Service Enterprise Group |
| Ennis R, NRR/DORL, 415-1420 | |
| References | |
| TAC MD8219, TAC MD8220 | |
| Download: ML080660013 (7) | |
Text
March 6, 2008 Mr. William Levis President & Chief Nuclear Officer PSEG Nuclear LLC - N09 Post Office Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038
SUBJECT:
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 - PUBLIC NOTICE OF APPLICATION FOR AMENDMENTS TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES (TAC NOS. MD8219 AND MD8220)
Dear Mr. Levis:
The enclosed announcement was forwarded to the Todays Sunbeam newspaper, located in Salem, New Jersey, for publication. This announcement relates to your application dated March 5, 2008, for amendment to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75.
The proposed amendments would revise the surveillance requirements for Technical Specification 3/4.9.4, Containment Building Penetrations.
Sincerely,
/ra/
Richard B. Ennis, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch I-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311
Enclosure:
Public Notice cc w/encl: See next page
ML080660013 OFFICE LPL1-2/PM LPL1-2/LA OGC LPL1-2/BC NAME REnnis ABaxter BMizuno HChernoff DATE 3/6/08 03/05/08 3/6/08 3/6/08 Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 cc:
Mr. Thomas Joyce Senior Vice President - Operations Mr. Jeffrie J. Keenan, Esquire PSEG Nuclear PSEG Nuclear - N21 P.O. Box 236 P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 Mr. Dennis Winchester Township Clerk Vice President - Nuclear Assessment Lower Alloways Creek Township PSEG Nuclear Municipal Building, P.O. Box 157 P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 Mr. Paul Bauldauf, P.E., Asst. Director Mr. Robert Braun Radiation Protection Programs Site Vice President - Salem NJ Department of Environmental PSEG Nuclear Protection and Energy P.O. Box 236 CN 415 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 Trenton, NJ 08625-0415 Mr. Carl Fricker Mr. Brian Beam Vice President - Operations Support Board of Public Utilities PSEG Nuclear 2 Gateway Center, Tenth Floor P.O. Box 236 Newark, NJ 07102 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 Regional Administrator, Region I Mr. George Gellrich U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Plant Manager - Salem 475 Allendale Road PSEG Nuclear King of Prussia, PA 19406 P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 Senior Resident Inspector Salem Nuclear Generating Station Mr. James Mallon U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Manager - Licensing Drawer 0509 PSEG Nuclear Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 Mr. William Levis President and Chief Nuclear Officer Mr. Steven Mannon PSEG Nuclear, LLC Manager - Salem Regulatory Assurance P.O. Box 236 PSEG Nuclear Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038
PUBLIC NOTICE NRC STAFF PROPOSES TO AMEND OPERATING LICENSES AT THE SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has received an application dated March 5, 2008, from PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG or the licensee), for exigent amendments to the operating licenses for Salem Nuclear Generating Station (Salem), Unit Nos. 1 and 2, located in Salem County, New Jersey.
The proposed amendments would revise the surveillance requirements (SRs) for Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.9.4, Containment Building Penetrations. Specifically, SR 4.9.4.2 would be revised to make this SR applicable to the equipment hatch inside door or an installed equivalent closure device consistent with the current requirements in limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.9.4.a.
As a result of NRC inspection activities associated with the upcoming Salem Unit 2 refueling outage 2R16, it was determined that the current wording in SR 4.9.4.2 does not address the equivalent closure device option permitted by LCO 3.9.4.a. This LCO provides the TS requirements for closure of the containment equipment hatch penetration. The containment equipment hatch penetration provides a means for moving large equipment and components into and out of containment. During movement of irradiated fuel in containment, LCO 3.9.4.a requires that the equipment hatch inside door is capable of being closed and held in place by a minimum of four bolts, or an equivalent closure device is installed and capable of being closed.
SR 4.9.4.2 provides the TS requirements to demonstrate that the containment equipment hatch penetration can be closed using the equipment hatch inside door, but does not address the LCO 3.9.4.a. equivalent closure device option. Currently, the SR reads as follows:
Once per refueling prior to the start of movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within the containment building, verify the capability to install, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, the equipment hatch. Applicable only when the equipment hatch is open during movement of irradiated fuel in the containment building.
The current wording in SR 4.9.4.2 can only be complied with through the use of the equipment hatch inside door and not with an equivalent closure device, which can also be used to close the equipment hatch penetration in accordance with LCO 3.9.4.a. As such, the licensee proposed to revise SR 4.9.4.2 to read as follows:
Once per refueling prior to the start of movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within the containment building, verify the capability to close, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, the equipment hatch inside door or an equivalent closure device. Applicable only when the equipment hatch is open during movement of irradiated fuel in the containment building.
As discussed in the licensees application dated March 5, 2008, PSEG requested that the proposed amendments be processed by the NRC on an exigent basis in accordance with the provisions in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.91(a)(6) based on the recent identification of this issue and the significant impact to the 2R16 outage schedule. PSEG developed the outage schedule for the replacement of the Salem Unit 2 steam generators based on the use of an equivalent closure device to meet the requirements of SR 4.9.4.2. Since SR 4.9.4.2 is only applicable to the equipment hatch inside door, the
equipment hatch inside door would need to be verified capable of being closed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, prior to movement of irradiated fuel inside containment with the containment equipment hatch penetration open. PSEG stated that without the proposed change to SR 4.9.4.2, the outage schedule would need to be revised to maintain the equipment hatch inside door closed, during movement of irradiated fuel inside containment as a result of the, inability to move equipment in support of steam generator replacement from the hatch and close the equipment hatch within one hour. While the inability to move equipment in support of steam generator replacement from the hatch and close the hatch within one hour does not, in and of itself, require the equipment hatch inside door to be installed during movement of irradiated fuel in containment, it would require scheduling movement of the referenced support equipment in series with movement of irradiated fuel in containment. PSEG had planned to conduct these activities in parallel. The licensee stated that the impact of this revision to the current 2R16 outage schedule would be approximately 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> of critical path time; therefore, extending the start-up from the refueling outage by 2-1/2 days. PSEG requested approval of the proposed amendments by March 14, 2008, to support Salem Unit 2 refueling outage 2R16, which is scheduled to commence on March 11, 2008.
The licensee and the NRC staff have evaluated this proposed change with regard to the determination of whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved as discussed below.
Operation of Salem Unit Nos. 1 and 2, in accordance with the proposed amendments, would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
An alternate source term calculation has been performed for Salem Unit Nos. 1 and 2 that demonstrates that offsite and control room dose consequences of a postulated fuel handling accident (FHA) remain within the applicable dose criteria, provided sufficient decay has occurred prior to the movement of irradiated fuel without taking credit for containment closure. Fuel movement is allowed, provided that irradiated fuel has undergone the required decay time. This alternate source term calculation for an FHA inside containment was approved in Amendment Nos. 251 and 232 for Salem Unit Nos. 1 and 2, respectively and, therefore, is already part of the current Salem licensing basis.
The proposed amendments would revise SR 4.9.4.2 to state that this SR is applicable to the equipment hatch inside door or an equivalent closure device allowed by LCO 3.9.4.a.
SR 4.9.4.2 demonstrates the ability to close the equipment hatch penetration within one hour when this penetration remains open during the movement of irradiated fuel within containment.
An equivalent closure device is already specifically allowed by the Salem Unit Nos. 1 and 2 TSs.
That allowance was incorporated into the Salem TSs by Amendment Nos. 217 and 199 for Salem Unit Nos. 1 and 2, respectively and, therefore, is already part of the current Salem licensing basis. This amendment request requires that if an equivalent closure device is installed in lieu of the equipment hatch inside door, the verification requirement of SR 4.9.4.2 must be performed for the equivalent closure device to ensure that closure of the equipment hatch penetration will take place within one hour following an FHA inside containment.
The proposed amendments do not alter the methodology of the FHA or equipment used directly in fuel handling operations. The equipment hatch is not an accident initiator.
Actual fuel handling operations are not affected by the proposed changes. Therefore, the probability of an FHA is not affected with the proposed amendments. No other accident initiator is affected by the proposed changes.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The proposed amendments would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed.
The proposed change does not involve the addition or modification to any plant system, structure, or component. Having the equipment hatch penetration open during movement of irradiated fuel in containment does not create the possibility of a new accident. Closure of the equipment hatch penetration can be accomplished by either the equipment hatch inside door, or an equivalent closure device already specifically allowed by the Salem Unit Nos. 1 and 2 TSs. If an equivalent closure device is installed in lieu of the equipment hatch inside door, the verification requirement of SR 4.9.4.2 must be performed for the equivalent closure device to ensure that closure of the equipment hatch penetration will take place within one hour following an FHA inside containment. Therefore, the proposed amendments do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident than any previously evaluated.
The proposed amendments would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
An alternate source term calculation has been performed for Salem Unit Nos. 1 and 2 that demonstrates that offsite and control room dose consequences of a postulated FHA remain within the applicable dose criteria, provided sufficient decay has occurred prior to the movement of irradiated fuel without taking credit for containment closure. Fuel movement is allowed provided that irradiated fuel has undergone the required decay time. This alternate source term calculation for an FHA inside containment was approved in Amendment Nos. 251 and 232 for Salem Unit Nos. 1 and 2, respectively and, therefore, is already part of the current Salem licensing basis.
The proposed change to SR 4.9.4.2 does not alter the FHA analysis approved by Amendments 251 and 232. This amendment request simply clarifies that that if an equivalent closure device is installed in lieu of the equipment hatch inside door, the verification requirement of SR 4.9.4.2 must be performed for the equivalent closure device to ensure that closure of the equipment hatch penetration will take place within one hour following an FHA inside containment. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Following an initial review of this application, the requested amendments have been evaluated against the standards in 10 CFR 50.92 and the NRC staff has made a proposed (preliminary) determination that the requested amendments involve no significant hazards considerations. The changes do not significantly increase the probability or consequences of any accident previously considered, nor create the possibility of an accident of a different kind, nor significantly decrease any margin of safety.
If the proposed determination that the requested license amendments involve no significant hazards consideration becomes final, the staff will issue the amendments without first offering an opportunity for a public hearing. An opportunity for a hearing will be published in the Federal Register at a later date and any hearing request will not delay the effective date of the amendments.
If the staff decides in its final determination that the amendments do involve a significant hazards consideration, a notice of opportunity for a prior hearing will be published in the Federal Register and, if a hearing is granted, it will be held before the amendments are issued.
Comments on the proposed determination of no significant hazards consideration may be: (1) telephoned to Harold K. Chernoff, Chief, Plant Licensing Branch I-2, by collect call to 301-415-1430, or by facsimile to 301-415-2102; (2) e-mailed to hkc@nrc.gov; or (3) submitted in writing to the Chief, Rulemaking, Directives and Editing Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. All comments received by close of business on March 12, 2008, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays will be considered in reaching a final determination. A copy of the application may be examined electronically through the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room link at the NRC Web site http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the Commission's Public Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public File Area O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Persons who do not have access to ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS should contact the NRC PDR Reference staff by telephone at 1-800-397-4209, or 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov.