ML053330532

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Draft - Section C Operating Exam (Folder 2)
ML053330532
Person / Time
Site: Hope Creek PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 10/21/2005
From: Suzanne Dennis
Operations Branch I
To: Reid J
Public Service Enterprise Group
Conte R
References
50-354/05-301 50-354/05-301
Download: ML053330532 (59)
v • d • e


Text

HOPE CREEK ELECTRIC GENERAT~NG STATION NRC INITIAL LICENSED EXAIMINATION SCENARIO 1 NOVEMBER 28,2005 SCENARIO TITLE:

Reactor Startup/ Loss of 'B' MB Set/ RCIC Steam Leak SCENARIO NUMBER:

NRC-00 1 EFFECTIVE DATE:

EXPECTED DURATION:

1.O Hours REVISION NUMBER:

1 PROGRAM:

-1 L.O. REQUAL r]

INITIAL LICENSE I

]OTHER REVISION

SUMMARY

New Scenario.

PREPARED BY:

M. L. Brown 9/29/05 NRC Operations Examiner DATE FACILITY REVIEWER:

Nuclear Operations Training Supervisor -

Hope Creek DATE APPROVED BY:

NRC Chief Examiner DATE

1.

OB JECTIVE(S):

NRC-001 REV-0 I Enabling Objectives A.

The crew must demonstrate the ability to operate effectively as a team while completing a series of CREW CRITICAL TASKS, which measure the crews ability to safely operate the plant during normal, abnormal, and emergency plant conditions.

(Crew critical tasks within this examination scenario guide are identified with an CT-X.)

11.

MAJOR A.

B.

C.

D.

A CRD pump trips E.

F.

G.

E SRV fails Open Withdraw Group 7 Control Rods to position 8 PT-N078B, Steam Dome Pressure Transmitter fails LOW Loss of B MG Set and Control Rod 22-35 inadvertently scrams (TS)

Steam Leak from RCIC piping RCIC isolation valves fail to close The scenario begins with a Reactor Startup in progress with IOP-3 completed up to step 5.3.29.

Reactor power is approximately 4%. 1 BP116 EHC pump is tagged out for maintenance and will be out of service until a new pressure compensator arrives tomorrow. After the operators have pulled Group 7 rods to position 8 and placed the Secondary Condensate Pump in service, Pressure Transmitter PT-N078B fails low. After Tech specs are addressed, the B MG Set trips and Control Rod 22-35 inserts, causing a ?h scram and RWCU isolation. The operators will have to restore power to the B RPS from the alternate source. The operators will have to declare the rod inop and comply with Tech Specs. After power has been restored and Tech Specs addressed, the A CRD pump trips requiring the operators to start the B CRD pump to avoid a Reactor Scram. Once the B CRD pump has been started, a steam leak develops on RCIC. The RClC isolation valves fail to close causing RClC room temperature to increase. The Crew should enter EOP-103 based on high room temperature and may place FRVS in service per HC.OP-AB-CONT-0004, South Plant Vent Activity and attempt to shutdown RCIC. The Crew will discover that the RClC isolation valves cant be closed. The Crew should scram the reactor based upon RClC room temperature approaching safe operating limit and enter EOP-101 or AB-0000. When temperature exceeds Max Safe Operation limit in 2 areas, crew should enter EOP-202, Emergency Depressurization. When the crew goes to Emergency Depressurize, E ADS valve will not open, requiring the BOP to open another SRV. Scenario will end after 5 SRVs have been opened.

NRC-001 Page 2 of 22 Rev.: 01

NKC-OO I R E V 4 1

..I

.I t

IV.

INITIALCONDIT~ONS:

~

I Initial I INITIALIZE the simulator to IC-1 1 (4% power, MOL)

RAISE Pressure to 500#

PREWARM B SJAE RESET HPCI High Level Trip PLACE CP161 Chilled Water Circ Pump in MAN

;., PREP FOR &G (i.e., RMI 1 set points, procedure^, bezel covers)

I Initial I Descriotion I

Items required to be set up each time the SG is performed, i.e. tagged equipment, RMl 1 set points, procedures, etc.

COMPLETE Attachment 2 Simulator Ready-for-TraininglExamination Checklist of NC.TQ-DG.ZZ-O002(Z).

Initial EVENT TRIGGER ET #

1 -

2 3

4 5 -

Description EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE:

EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE:

EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE:

EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE rp:kl4a>=l.O && rp:kl4b>=l.O&&lcvposx(lO6)<=0.0 dmf cd062235 Raises EHC Filter Clogging to 100% severity when B EHC pump is started rcvv( 1) <= 0.98 // RCIC steam isolation Trip breaker when valve closure attempted rcvv(4) <= 0.98 // RCIC steam isolation Trip breaker when valve closure is attempted hvtr 4 1 1 O>= 130 // RCIC Room Temperature Set hvtr4l I I = 120 Raises HPCI Room temp as RCIC temp rises hvtr 4 1 1 O>= 140 // RCIC Room Temperature Set hvtr4 1 1 1 = I30 Raises HPCI Room temp as RCIC temp rises NRC-00 1 Page 3 of 22 Rev.: 01

NKC-OO I REV-01 I

EVENT TRIGGER Initial ET 6

7 -

8 -

9 -

10 11 12 -

13 -

14 15 16 -

17 -

Description EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE hvtr 4 1 1 O>= I50 11 RCIC Room Temperature Set hvtr4111 = 140 Raises HPCI Room temp as RCIC temp rises hvtr 4 1 1 O>= 160 11 RCIC Room Temperature Set hvtr4111 = 150 Raises HPCI Room temp as RCIC temp rises hvtr 4 1 1 O>= 170 /I RCIC Room Temperature Set hvtr4111 = 160 Raises HPCI Room temp as RCIC temp rises hvtr 4 1 1 O>= 1 80 // RCIC Room Temperature Set hvtr4111 = 170 Raises HPCI Room temp as RCIC temp rises hvtr 4 1 1 O>= 190 I/ RCIC Room Temperature Set hvtr4111 = 180 Raises HPCl Room temp.as RCIC temp rises hvtr 4 1 10>=200 // RCIC Room Temperature Set hvtr4111 = 190 Raises HPCI Room temp as RCIC temp rises hvtr 4 1 10>=2 10 I/ RCIC Room Temperature Set hvtr4 1 1 1 = 200 Raises HPCI Room temp as RCIC temp rises hvtr 4 1 10>=220 /I RClC Room Temperature Set hvtr4111 = 210 Raises HPCI Room temp as RCIC temp rises hvtr 41 10>=230 // RCIC Room Temperature Set hvtr4 1 1 1 = 220 Raises HPCI Room temp as RCIC temp rises hvtr 4 1 10>=240 // RCIC Room Temperature Set hvtr4111 = 230 Raises HPCl Room temp as RClC temp rises hvtr 4 1 10>=250 // RCIC Room Temperature Set hvtr4111 = 240 Raises HPCl Room temp as RClC temp rises hvtr 41 10>=255 // RCIC Room Temperature Set hvtr4111 = 245 Raises HPCI Room temp as RClC temp rises NRC-001 Page 4 of 22 Rev.: 01

KKC-00 I REV-0 1 EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE EVENT TRIGGER hvtr 41 10>=256 // RCIC Room Temperature Set hvtr4111 = 246 Raises HPCI Room temp as RCIC temp rises hvtr 41 10-257

// RCIC Room Temperature Set hvtr4 1 1 1 = 247 Raises HPCI Room temp as RClC temp rises hvtr 4 1 10>=258 // RCIC Room Temperature Set hvtr4111 = 248 Raises HPCI Room temp as RCIC temp rises hvtr 4 I IO>= 259 // RCIC Room Temperature Set hvtr4111 = 249 Raises HPCI Room temp as RClC temp rises hvtr 4 1 10>=260 // RCIC Room Temperature Set hvtr4111 = 250 Raises HPCI Room temp as RCIC temp rises hvtr 4 1 10>=26 1 // RClC Room Temperature Set hvtr4111 = 251 Raises HPCI Room temp as RCIC temp rises hvtr 4 1 10>=262 // RCIC Room Temperature Set hvtr4 1 1 1 = 252 Raises HPCI Room temp as RCIC temp rises hvtr 4 I 10>=265 // RCIC Room Temperature Set hvtr4111 = 255 Raises HPCI Room temp as RClC temp rises hvtr 41 10>=270 // RCIC Room Temperature Set hvtr4 1 1 1 = 260 Raises HPCI Room temp as RCIC temp rises Initial I:'

NRC-001 Page 5 of 22 Rev.: 01

Initial Description Delay RC 10 - RCIC steam isolation valves F007 & F008 fail to Auto Close RP02B - RPS MG set B failure CD062235 Control Rod 22-35 SCRAM CD 1 OA - CRD Hydraulic Pump A trip RC09 - RCIC Steam Line break inside the RCIC Room 41 10 AN-A2A5 CRYWOLF ANN A2A5 - Fire Prot Panel 0:02 HP09 - HPCI Steam line break inside the HPCI Room 4111 AD02EC - ADS/Relief valve F013E fails to OPEN 1 :oo NONE Description Delay Ramp Trigger Init Val Final Val NONE NRC-OO I REV-0 1 MALFUNCTIO~~

SWY:

I I

I I

I I

I I

Tri er hit Val

++

Final Val Ramp RT-I I 515.205 0

I RP17B - RPS PT-N078B failure I

I RT-2 I RT-2 I RT-3 I 1 :oo RT-4 I O

IO0 1

I REMOTE/FIELD FUNCTION

SUMMARY

I I

I I

Trigger NONE Final Val Init Val

.X61 Description Delay PP05 - OD-3 MFLCPR Fraction Limiting Initial NONE

.723 NONE

,633 ET-2 NOR MAL Valve I

RC05 - GROUP 6A HV-F008 RCIC Steam Supply Valve ET-3 NOR MAL I/O OVERRIDE

SUMMARY

r I

I I

I I

I I

Initial k NRC-00 1 Page 6 of 22 Rev.: 01

V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event / Instructor Activity Crew assumes the watch at step 5.3.29 of l0.Z-0003, and continues plant startup per procedure After 2 minutes NE0 reports back that the Aux Lube Oil Reservoir level for the Secondary Condensate pump to be started is normal Expected Plant/Student Response Comments CRS directs the RO to pull group 7 rods to position 8 to get 1 Turbine Bypass valve to open RO selects Group 7 Control Rod RO pulls Group 7 rod to position 8 observing the following:

Rod only moves 1 notch CRS directs BOP to start the Secondary Condensate Pump BOP reviews P&Ls of SO.AE. 000 1 IAW SO.AE-0001 BOP goes to step 5.1.17 of SO.AE-0001 to start the Secondary Cond. Pump (this will refer him/her back to Step 5.1. I 1)

BOP Ensures at least 2 Cond.

Pumps are running BOP dispatches an NE0 to start the Lube Oil System BOP depresses the SEC CNDS PUMP B AUX LUBE OIL PMP START push-button BOP observes PI-I 669B pressure between 7 to 9 psig.

BOP ensures HV-1651 B, discharge valve is closed BOP Observes SEC CNDS PUMP B START ENABLE is illuminated.

BOP has NE0 ensure FIC-1650B is in AUTO with a setpoint of 5500 gpm NKC-OO 1 REV-01 NRC-00 1 Page 7 of 22 Rev.: 01

NKC-OU I REV-01 V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event / Instructor Activity Expected PlantBtudent Response The NE0 reports FIC-1650B is in AUTO with a setpoint of 5500 gpm BOP Starts Secondary Condensate Pump B and observes:

Min flow valve OPEN light is illuminated Motor Amps are -= 279 amps BOP stops the B Aux Lube Oil pump and returns it to AUTO BOP presses AD-HV-1710 PRI CNDS FLOW PATH MIN FLOW RECIRC CLOSE PB PT-N078B fails Low 0

RO observes several Once the crew has started the Secondary Condensate Pump annunciators illuminate and diagnoses that PT-N078B has failed LOW OR At the discretion of the Lead Examiner TRIGGER - RTI CRS/RO refers to ARP for the illuminated Annunciators OF SVCE OUT OF SVCE CRS determines that PT-N078B is INOP and enters the following LCOS 3.3.1 - Function Unit 3 Action A

- Put in the Trip Condition within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 3.3.2 Trip Function 7B b.l)b. -

Put in the Trip Condition within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 3.3.7.5 - Accident Monitoring System Action 80 - Restore to Operable within 30 days or initiate actions of 6.9.2 CRS contacts I&C to repair instrument C3-B4 - RPS TRIP SYS B OUT C8-A5 - NSSSS INBD ISLN SYS Page 8 of 22 Comments NRC-00 1 Rev.: 01

NKC-OO 1 REV-0 1 V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event / Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

~

0

~

s of g** MG Set and Rod 2235 lnadvertentlv Scrams Set Once the CRS has ssed Tech Specs and contacted I&C OR At the discretion of the Lead Examiner 0

Crew recognizes trip of B MG TRIGGER - RT2 0

RO responds to Annunciators 0

RO recognizes that NO actual scram condition exists and DOES NOT scram the reactor 0

CRS enters AB-IC-0003 Determines Normal CANNOT be restored 0

Directs RO to Transfer power to Alternate power supply 0

RO verifies Alternate Power is available 0

RO Transfers Power to Improper operation of Alternate Power Supply by this will cause a scram Positioning the RPS MG SET TRANSFER SWITCH to the Alternate Position.

0 RO Resets the W Scram by:

o Turning the key for the Affected RPS channel to the RESET position o Turning the key back to the NORMAL position o Verify the scram is reset 0

BOP Observes MSIVs are OPEN NRC-001 Page 9 of 22 Rev.: 01

NKC-001 REV-01 V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event / Instructor Activity Expected PlantBtudent Response Comments CRS directs that the tripped NSSS logic be reset RO presses the NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SHUTOFF SYSTEM TRIP LOGIC B RESET Pb.

RO Verifies MSlV TRIP LOGIC TRIPPED light goes off CRS directs restoration of isolated Equipment (RWCU isolated and Mechanical Vacuum pumps have tripped) equipment IAW applicable SOP Mechanical Vacuum pumps have tripped CRS may elect to restart Mechanical Vacuum pumps here or may wait RO restores RWCU system IAW applicable SOP.

RO Restores isolated Crew observes that RO diagnoses that Rod 22-35 has Scrammed completion of actions This may occur prior to for loss of RPS bus RO references ARP for C6-E3, Rod Drift - Digital Point C078 Determines only 1 Rod has Scrammed Informs CRS to refer to Tech Spec 3.1.3 and 3.2 Checks Reactor Thermal Limits Notifies the On-Call Reactor Engineer IAW RE-AP.ZZ-0101 NRC-001 Page I O of 22 Rev.: 01

NRC-001 REV-01 V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event / Instructor Activity Expected Planthtudent Response Comments Ayy CRD Hvdraulic Pump 0

Trip_

Once the Crew has stabilized the plant and addressed Tech Specs OR At the discretion of the Lead Examiner TRIGGER RT-3 CRS enters AB.IC-0001, Control Rod CRS/RO determines that Multiple Rods are NOT drifting or Scrammed CRS determines that Charging water Header pressure is > 940 psig and DOES NOT have the RO scram the Reactor CRS Enters Section C of AB.IC-0001, Malfunction results in Inadvertent Rod Motion Has RO review ARP for Rod Drift Contacts Rx Engineer for guidance Compares present LPRM reading with previously recorded LPRM readings Checks Thermal Limits CRS determines Control Rod is Fully inserted and cannot be restored and has the Control Rod 22-35 Electrically disarmed CRS refers to Tech Specs 3.1.3.1 and determines the Control Rod is INOP and complies with b. 2. and has the Control Rod disarmed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> RO responds to Annunciator C6-F2, CRD Trouble - Digital Point D2244 RO diagnoses A CRD pump has tripped.

NRC-00 1 Page 1 1 of 22 Rev.: 01

NKC-OO I REV-0 1 V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event / Instructor Activity Expected PlantBtudent Response Comments After 2 minutes have the NE0 in the Aux. Btdg report that the "A" pump motor tripped on overcurrent and the NE0 in the Rx Bldg report that the motor is hot to the touch.

RClC Steam Leak Once the crew has stabilized the plant after the CRD pump trip OR 0

RO/CRS dispatches NEO's to:

0 The Aux Building to look at the CRD Breaker 0

The Reactor Building to look at the pump 0

RO places Drive Water Flow controller in Manual and set to 0 RO starts B CRD pump and restores system flow to 63 gpm 0

RO Adjusts HV-F003 to restore system pressure to normal 0

RO Returns Drive water flow controller to AUTO 0

RO responds to Annunciator A2-A5, Fire Prot Panel 10C671 BOP checks Fire Protection CRT and determines Fire alarm is from the RClC Pump Room At the discretion of the Lead Examiner TRIGGER - RT4 0

Crew dispatches an NE0 to the RClC pump room to investigate 0

BOP responds to annunciator D3-A2, RCIC/RHR B Area Leak Temp Hi 0

BOP attempts to close HV-F007 and HV-F008, RClC Steam Supply Isolation Valves 0

BOP reports Steam Supply isolation valves won't close After 2 minutes have the NE0 report that he sees a lot of steam in the pump room but no fire.

NRC-00 1 Page 12 of 22 Rev.: 01

V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event / Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response e

e m

e e

e CT-I e

Crew INITIATES a manual scram BEFORE RClC Room Temp reaches 250°F e

e NKC-00 I REV-01 Comments Crew requests assistance from NEO/ WCC to close RClC isolation valve CRS Enters EO-0103 based on Room Temp in RClC Room >

Max Normal Op Temp CRS directs RO/BOP to monitor and Control Reactor Building Temps BOP reports RClC pump room temperature > Column 1 - Max Normal Op Temp CRS determines FRVS is NOT in Note - CRS may elect service to put FRVS in service at this time. This action is acceptable CRS directs BOP to verify proper operation of RBVS and Emergency Area Cooling System BOP determines RBVS and Emergency Area Cooling systems are operating properly CRS directs BOP to start all available RBVS fans BOP starts all available RBVS fans BOP reports RClC pump room temperature > Max Safe Op Temp CRS determines RCS is discharging into the Reactor building CRS directs a Recirc Runback and a Reactor Scram before RClC room temperature reaches 250°F CRS enters EO-101 concurrently with this procedure RO Performs the Actions of AB.ZZ-0001, Attachment 1, Reactor Scram Page 13 of 22 NRC-00 1 Rev.: 01

NRC-00 1 REV-OI V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event / Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments RO performs the following:

0 ANNOUNCES Crew - Standby for Scram Report.

0 LOCKS the Mode Switch in Shut down.

0 ANNOUNCES the following:

0 Rod Motion status 0

APRM Downscale status 0

Reactor Shutdown status 0

WHEN the above actions are complete, THEN ANNOUNCE Scram Report Complete.

0 INSERTS the SRM/IRMs.

0 SELECTS IRM chart recorders.

0 WHEN Main Generator output reaches zero Mwe THEN TRIPS the Main Turbine.

0 LOCK OUTS the Main Generator.

0 ENSURES the Reactor Scram has been announced (over PA).

0 REPORTS All Scram Actions Complete.

0 BOP verifies H2 Injection System Tripped 0

RO maintains RPV level between

+ I 2 3 and 54 using Condensate/ Feedwater 0

BOP stabilizes RPV pressure below 1037 psig using the Turbine Bypass valves NRC-00 1 Page 14 of 22 Rev.: 01

NKC-00 I REV-0 1 V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event / Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments 0

CRS determines that all entry conditions have cleared and exits EO-01 01 and enters AB.ZZ-0000 0

Crew stabilizes the plant in 0

BOP reports 2nd area has exceeded its Max Safe Op Limit 0

CRS determines Emergency Depressurization is required and enters EO-0202 AB.ZZ-0000 0

CRS determines the following:

o Reactor is shutdown from all conditions without boron o DW pressure is c 1.68 psig o Supp Pool level > 0 0

CRS orders 5 ADS valves to be Opened hand switches to OPEN CT-2 0

BOP Places all 5 ADS valve Crew Emergency Depressurizes the plant within 5 minutes of when ED conditions are reached.

Note - Failure of E ADS to open was input as an initial condition BOP recognizes PSV-FO13E failed to OPEN CRS directs BOP to open non-ADS SRVs until a total of 5 SRVs are open CT-3 0

BOP opens an additional SRV until a total of 5 SRVs are open Crew opens at least 5 SRVs to comply with ED criteria Termination Requirement:

When 5 SRV are OPEN Put the simulator in Freeze Inform the candidates that the simulator is in freeze and to standby OR for follow questions At Lead Examiner Discretion NRC-00 1 Page 15 of 22 Rev.: 01

N RC-OO I REV-0 I V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event / Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments 0

CRS determines an SAE It is anticipated that the Classification is required based on 4 points for failure of the RCS barrier (3.2.3 B) and 2 points for the failure of the Containment Barrier CRS candidate will be asked to classify this event and the results will be counted as one of his JPMs.

(3.3.4)

NRC-001 Page 16 of 22 Rev.: 01

NKC-00 1 REV-0 I

.. F G VI.

SCENARIOREF'ERENdES:'

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

I.

J.

K.

L.

M.

N.

0.

P.

Q.

R.

S.

T.

U.

V.

W NC.TQ-DG.ZZ-0002 Conduct of Simulator Training.

NUREG 102 1 Examiner Standards JTA Listing Probabilistic Risk Assessment Technical Specifications Emergency Plan (ECG)

Alarm Response Procedures (Various)

SH.OP-AS.ZZ-000 1 Operations Standards SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0 10 1 Post Transient Response Requirements SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0 108 Operability Assessment and Equipment Control Program HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0003 Startup from Cold Shutdown to Rated Power HC.OP-SO.AE-000 1, FEEDWATER SYSTEM OPERATION HC.OP-AB.CONT-0002, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT HC.OP-AB.1C-000 1 Control Rod HC.OP-AB.IC-0003, Reactor Protection System HC.OP-AR.ZZ-0002, Overhead Annunciator Window Box A2 HC.OP-AR.ZZ-00 1 1, Overhead Annunciator Window Box C6 HC.OP-AB.ZZ-000 Reactor Scram HC.OP-AB.ZZ-000 1 Transient Plant Conditions HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0101 RPV Control HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0103 Reactor Building Control HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0202 Emergency RPV Depressurization HC.RE-IO.ZZ-0001 Core Operations Guidelines NRC-00 1 Page 17 of 22 Rev.: 01

NKC-001 REV-01 VII.

NRC CRITICALTASI~RATIONAL NRC-001/ 01

1.

WA 295032 High Secondary Containment Area Temperature EK3.02 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to HIGH SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AREA TEMPERATURE : Reactor SCRAM.........................................

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.6)

RO 3.6/ SRO 3.8 Crew INITIATES a manual scram BEFORE RCIC Room Temp reaches 250°F.

RCIC Room temperature is approaching the Max Safe Operating Temperature. If the temperature in this room approaches its maximum safe operating value, adequate core cooling, containment integrity, safety of personnel, or continued operability of equipment required to perform EOP actions can no longer be assured. EOP-IO1 must be entered to make certain the reactor is scrammed. Scramming the reactor reduces to decay heat levels the energy that the RPV may be discharging to the reactor building.

2.
  • Crew actuatesfive SRVS within two minutes of RCIC room temperature exceeding 250 degrees by Control Room indication (SPDSKRIDS).

WA 295032 High Secondary Containment Area Temperature EK3 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to HIGH SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AREA TEMPERATURE EK3.01 Emergencyhormal depressurization RO 3.5 SRO 3.8 EA2 Ability to determine andor interpret the following as they apply to HIGH SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AREA TEMPERATURE EA2.01 Area temperature RO 3.8 SRO 3.8 The steam leak in the HPCI room is now affecting a second area. The reactor must be depressurized to place it in its lowest energy state due to the potential for multiple inoperable safety systems, to reduce the driving head for the leak, and to reject decay heat to the suppression pool rather than the Reactor Building.

The term Crew actuates five SRVs takes into account the FO 13D failure, which is already inserted. Two minutes is deemed adequate time to recognize the condition and implement EOP-202 and AB.ZZ-0001 Att.

13.
3.

WHEN the PSV-FO13D SRVfails to open, THEN before RPVpressure drops below 50 psig, the Crew ensures afifth SRV is opened to achieve five open SRVs.

WA 239002 ReliefBafety Valves A4 Ability to manually operate andor monitor in the control room:

A4.0 1 SRVs RO 4.4 SRO 4.4 The Minimum Number of SRVs required for Emergency Depressurization (MNSRED) is five. The MNSRED is utilized to assure the RPV will depressurize and remain depressurized when Emergency Depressurization is required. When the PSV-F013D fails to open, the Crew needs to open an additional SRV to achieve MNSRED. This is directed by both EOP-202 and AB.ZZ-0001. SRVs are designed to open with a minimum differential pressure of 50 psid between the reactor vessel and the suppression chamber. Below this d/p, they may not open. If the Crew does not attempt to open the fifth SRV before this minimum d/p is lost, they cannot validate its operation. This would prevent them from detecting the failure and pursuing the use of the Alternate Depressurization Systems in EOP-202.

NRC-00 1 Page 18 of 22 Rev.: 01

NKC-OO I REV-0 1 NRC-001 / 00 HOPE CREEK NRC - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE YM EVENT TRANS1 ENTS :

Turbine Trip Loss of Feedwater MSlV Closure Loss of Condenser Vacuum Inadvertent Open SRV Loss Of Offsite Power Station Black Out y/N EVENT SPECIAL INITIATORS:

Loss of ssw Loss of SACS Loss of RACS Loss of Instrument Air ATWS LOCA COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY YfN COMPONENT. SYSTEM, OR TRAIN YfN COMPONENT, SYSTEM. OR TRAIN HPCl Class IE I20VAC Bus - A Train Y

RCIC Class 1 E I20VAC Bus - D Train Y

One SRV EDG A EDG B TACS One SSW Pump I Loop Circulating Water System - 4 pumps OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE YM OPERATOR ACTION Y

Manual RPV Emergency Depressurization when required Manual RPV Depressurization during ATWS Initiation of RHR for Decay Heat Removal Initiation of Containment Venting Restore Offsite power within 45 minutes SACS I SSW restoration after total loss of both systems Avoiding Loss of Feedwater during transient Recovery of the Main Condenser Complete this evaluation form for each Exam.

NRC-00 1 Page 19 of 22 Rev.: 01

NRC-OO I REV-0 I Rx Power: 4%

Rx Pressure: 480 psig (May vary slightly):

Work Week: Any Risk Color: Green SMD: None River Temp: 65 Activities Completed Last Shift:

Achieved Criticality, raised pressure up to 460 psig.

Major Activities Next 12 Hours:

0 0

0 Continue Reactor Startup currently at step 5.3.29 Pull Group 7 rods to position 8 Place Secondary Condensate Pump in service Protected Equipment:

None Tagged Equipment:

1 BP 1 16 EHC pump is tagged out for maintenance and will be out of service until a new pressure compensator arrives tomorrow.

NRC-00 1 Page 20 of 22 Rev.: 01

IX.

SIMULATOR NRC REVIEWNALIDATION CHECKLIST NRC EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE REVIEW/VALIDATION Note: This form is used as guidance for an examination team to conduct a review for the proposed exam scenario(s). Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed.

SELF-CHECK

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

NRC-001 RE VIEWER:

The scenario has clearly stated objectives in the scenario.

The initial conditions are realistic, equipment andor Instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue crew into expected events.

Each event description consists of:

0 0

0 0

0 The event termination point The point in the scenario when it is to be initiated The malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event The symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew The expected operator actions (by shift position)

The use of non-mechanistic failures (e.g. pipe break) should be limited to one or a credible preceding event has occurred.

The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.

Sequencinghiming of events is reasonable (e.g. the crew has time to respond to the malfunctions in an appropriate time frame and implements procedures and/or corrective actions).

Sequencinghiming of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.

If time compression techniques are used, scenario summary clearly so indicates.

The simulator modeling is not altered.

All crew competencies can be evaluated.

Appropriate reference materials are available (SOERs, LERs, etc.)

If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario.

Proper critical task methodology used IAW NRC procedures.

NRC-00 1 Page 21 of 22 Rev.: 01

NRC EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE VALIDATION (con?)

NRC Examination Validation:

Note: The following criteria list scenario traits that are numerical in nature. A second set of numbers indicates a range to be met for a set of two scenarios. Therefore, to complete this part of the review, the set of scenarios must be available. The section below should be completed once per scenario set.

NRC:

001 SEL F-CHECK

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Total malfunctions inserted: 4-8/10-14 Malhnctions that occur after EOP entry: 1 -4/3-6 Abnormal Events: 1-212-3 Major Transients: I -2/2-3 EOPs used beyond primary scram response EOP: 1 -3/3-5 EOP Contingency Procedures used: 0-3/1-3 Approximate scenario run time: 45-60 minutes (one scenario may approach 90 minutes)

EOP run time: 40-70% of scenario run time Crew Critical Tasks: 2-5/58 Technical Specifications are exercised during the test Events used in the two scenarios are not repeated The scenario sets for the exam week do not contain duplicate scenarios NRC:

Commen ts:

NRC-001 Page 22 of 22 Rev.: 01

  • b p j. i HOPE CREEK ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION NRC INITIAL LICENSED EXAMINATION SCENARIO 2 NOVEMBER 28,2005 SCENARIO TITLE:

Loss of 10B130/ Electrical ATWS/ Small Break LOCA SCENARIO NUMBER:

NRC-002 EFFECTIVE DATE:

EXPECTED DURATION:

1.O Hours REVISION NUMBER:

01 PROGRAM:

0 L.O. REQUAL INITIAL LICENSE OTHER REVISION

SUMMARY

New Scenario.

PREPARED BY:

M. L. Brown 9/29/05 NRC Operations Examiner DATE FACILITY REVIEWER:

Nuclear Operations Training Supervisor -

Hope Creek DATE APPROVED BY:

NRC Chief Examiner DATE

NRC-007 REV-OI I.

OB JECTIVE(S):

Enabling Objectives A.

The crew must demonstrate the ability to operate effectively as a team while completing a series of CREW CRITICAL TASKS, which measure the crews ability to safely operate the plant during normal, abnormal, and emergency plant conditions.

(Crew critical tasks within this examination scenario guide are identified with an CT-X.)

11.

MAJORE A.

Power increase using Recirc Flow B.

Place 3 RFP in service C.

Inadvertent HPCI initiation D.

10B130 trips causing a loss of B Recirc pump E.

EHC pump filters clog, Electrical ATWS F.

Small Break LOCA G.

RHR pump being placed in Drywell Spray trips The plant is operating at 80% power, Middle Of Cycle with SLC Pump AP-208 tagged out for a motor replacement and is expected back within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. The Crew will raise power to -80%

load by raising Recirc Flow. Once load has been increased to -80% the Crew will place the 3rd RFP pump in service IAW SO.AE-0001.

When the 3rd RFP has been placed in service, HPCl will inadvertently initiate. The crew will respond per AB.RPV-0001, Reactor Power, and terminate HPCl operation. A scram on high flux may occur if HPCl is not terminated. HPCI will be declared Inoperable and Tech Specs addressed.

Once Tech Specs have been addressed, power will be lost to 480 VAC Unit Substation 108130.

This results in loss of power to the B Recirc Pump MG Set Lube Oil pump and loss of a Turbine Building Chiller. The Standby Lube Oil pump will fail to start and the B Recirc Pumps MG Set will trip. This places the plant in Region 1 - Immediate Exit region of the power to flow map.

Recirculation flow must be increased or control rods must be inserted to exit Region 1. It is expected that the crew will enter AB.RPV-0003 and take the appropriate actions. In addition, loss of the Turbine Building Chiller will require the crew to either restart the chiller or swap to RACS.

Once the crew has stabilized the plant, the EHC discharge filter will clog. The crew will respond to the annunciator and swap EHC pumps after the 2d pump is started its filter will also clog requiring a manual scram. Manual scram will not work requiring the crew to initiate RRCS.

Shortly after the Rods are inserted, all the turbine bypass valves fail close. As the crew is stabilizing the plant a LOCA occurs causing Drywell pressure to increase. Suppression pool spray will be placed in service, however, Suppression Pool pressure will continue to rise requiring Drywell spray be placed in service. The first RHR pump that is placed in Drywell Spray will trip requiring the operators to swap loops to initiate Drywell spray. The scenario will terminate once Drywell spray has been initiated.

NRC-002 Page 2 of 20 Rev.: 01

02 30 E azed ZOO-3NN P

1 I

r I

1 1

I O - M t l 700-3HN

NKC-002 REV-01

~

RZ03D RRCS Channel B - Logic B Failure to Actuate NONE TCO 1 - 10 All turbine bypass valves fail closes 0 1 :oo ET-2 RR3 1 A2 Recirc loop A Large break [VI 1o:oo RT-4 2

5 1 RZ03A RRCS Channel A - Logic A Failure to Actuate I I

I NONE I I

I PC04 Downcomer break RH04A RHR pump AP202 trip RH04B RHR pump BP202 trip RT-4 ET-3 E T 4 Initial

~ L r i

~ ~ C T I O N s

s

  • ?

RE I

I I

I I

I I

1 Description Delay Ramp Trieger Init Val Final Val ET72 SLC Pump A NONE TAGGED TAGGED PP05 OD-3 MFLCPR Fraction Limiting Critical Power NONE

.861

,801 Ratio lnitial YO OVERRIDE Sh&ARY:

I 1

I I

I I

I 1

Description Delay Ramp Trigger I Init Val Final Val 3A24 C OVLO A2P120 MANUAL - LUBE OIL PUMP NONE I OFF OFF 3,424 D OVLO A2P120 AUTO-LUBE OIL PUMP - A 1A136 C OVLO MANUAL-CH W Circ Pump CP161 NONE OFF ON NONE OFF OFF 1A136 D OVLO AUTO-CH W CIRC Pump CP161 1A136 D OVDI AUTO-CH W CIRC PUMP CP161 NRC-002 NONE OFF ON 00: 15 RT-2 OFF ON Page 4 of 20 Rev.: 01

~

~

V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event / Instructor Activity Raise Power usinn Recirc Flow -

contact crew to raise power Place the 3rd RFP in service After the Crew has reached 80% load they perform HC.OP-SO.AE-0001 section 5.6.1 (Note - Feedpump should be on recirc)

Expected Planthtudent Response

=> CRS - directs RO/BOP to raise power to 80% load using IOP-0006.

RO monitors plant for proper operation RO refers to HC.OP-SO.BB-0002 regarding MG set critical vibration and flow instability points 0

RO - raises reactor power by increasing Recirc Flow per IOP-0006 at a rate not to exceed 1 %/minute RO slowly turns the Recirc pump Master Speed Control potentiometer in the clockwise direction.

RO monitors the following for proper operation Recirc speed increases Recirc loop flow increases Reactor power increases BOP OPENS HV-1769Cl RFP C Discharge Stop Check valve 0

BOP closes HV-1772Cl RFPT C Steam Low Pressure supply stop valve below seat drain NKC-002 REV-OI Comments NRC-002 Page 5 of 20 Rev.: 01

NRC-002 REV-0 1 V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event / Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response INADVERTENT HPCl INITIATION 0

BOP opens HV-I751C, RFPT C Low pressure steam isolation valve 0

BOP depresses the SEL push-button as required to select DEMAND on the in-setvice RFPT(s) whose demand will be matched BOP Presses SEL push-button for the C RFPT to select SPEED CTRLR DMND BOP Presses Increase or decrease buttons as necessary to equalize demand signals while Monitoring:

RFPT Discharge Pressure RFPT DEMAND

BOP matches Flow and speed and transfers RFPT C Speed Control to automatic by depressing the A/M push-button and observing A illuminates BOP reports to CRS that 3rd RFP has been placed in service 0

RO - diagnoses and reports inadvertent HPCI initiation Once the 3d RFP has been placed in service OR At the discretion of the Lead Examiner TRIGGER RT-1 0

CRS directs entry into AB.RPV-000 1 0

RO verifies Reactor level > -38 0

Drywell pressure 1.68#

Comments NRC-002 Page 6 of 20 Rev.: 01

NKC-002 REV-01 V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event / Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments RO presses and holds the HPCl TURB TRIP PB RO observes the following close FD-FV-4880 F D-FV-4879 RO adjusts FIC-R600 HPCl Flow controller to 0 gpm RO place FIC-R600 in MANUAL RO - PRESSES FIC-R600 DECREASE P b for approximately 7 seconds.

0 RO RELEASES the HPCl TURB TRIP PB.

0 RO VERIFIES the FD-FV-4879 remains shut.

0 BOP reduces reactor power with Reactor recirculation flow as necessary to prevent a reactor scram 0

CRS contacts I&C to investigate HPCl failure 0

CRS refers to Tech Spec 3.5.1.

Determines Action D applies (Verify RClC OPERABLE and restore HPCl to Operable within 14 days) 0 CRS refers to ECG and determine reportability requirements (8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> for loss of single train)

NRC-002 Page 7 of 20 Rev.: 01

V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event / Instructor Activity Expected Plantistudent Response 0

0 Crew responds to loss of 1 OBI 30 Observes the following equipment is lost o B Recirc pump 480V Unit Substation 108130 o Turbine Building Chiller 0

RO diagnoses the trip of the B Recirc pump 0

CRS direct entry to AB.RPV-0003 section A - Single Recirc Pump Tripped RO - inserts rods to clear APRM Upscale Alarms 0

RO - ENSURE that the Recirc MG Drive Motor Breaker has TRIPPED for the tripped Pump.

0 RO - CLOSES HV-F031 B for approximately 5 minutes, 0

RO - IMPLEMENT the following:

DL.ZZ-0026 Att. 3n (as required) 0 CRS - DIRECTS the Reactor Engineer to develop a Rod Sequence to achieve an 80%

Rod Line.

Requirements for Single Loop operations.

0 CRS determines region of operation on power/flow map 0

CRS directs actions to exit Region 1 THEN RE-OPENS HV-F031A(B).

DL.ZZ-0026 Att. 3~

CRS - IMPLEMENT 10-6 NKC-002 REV-01 Comments NRC-002 Page 8 of 20 Rev.: 01

NKC-002 REV-01 V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event / Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments 0

RO either Raises Recirc flow with Recirc pump A or inserts control rods to exit Region 1 0

CRS refers to Tech Spec 3.4.1 and COLR for SLO, determine APLHGR limit and APRM setpoints must be modified within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> per IOP-6) 0 CRS contacts I&C to determine cause of failure and to adjust setpoints as required 0

CRS refers to IOP-6 and determines all appropriate actions have been taken in accordance with Section 5.3 BOP diagnoses trip of Turbine Building Chiller 0

CRS directs either the Restart of the Turbine building chiller or swapping Turbine Building cooling to RACS 0 BOP restarts Chiller as directed 0

CRS contacts Electrical to investigate cause of trip of 1 OB1 30 EHC Filter Cloarring Crew responds to Annunciator After CRS has stabilized the D3-F5, TURB HYDR PUMP plant OR At the discretion of the Lead Examiner TRIGGER RT-3 TROUBLE 0

BOP diagnoses problem is high delta P across the EHC pump A filter 0

BOP dispatches an N E 0 to investigate High delta P on pump 0

BOP starts EHC pump BPI 16 NRC-002 Page 9 of 20 Rev.: 01

V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event / Instructor Activity Expected PlantBtudent Response 0

BOP stops EHC pump AP116 0

BOP observes D3F5 clears and then re-annunciates 0

BOP diagnoses problem is now High Delta P on BP116.

0 CRS determines that the plant can no longer be maintained at power and directs that the reactor be manually scrammed 0

CRS directs manual scram and entry into EO.ZZ-0101 0

RO performs scram actions IAW 0

CRS - directs RRCS to be initiated if not already completed by RO 0

CRS enters EO.ZZ-OlOlA if rods are not yet inserted Place RRCS keylock in Trip Place RRCS cs in Trip AB.ZZ-0001 Att. 1.

CT-1 0

RO manually initiates RRCS RRCS is manually actuated within 2 minutes Of reaching an Automatic Scram setpoint.

0 RO reports when all rods are inserted 0

CRS exits EO.ZZ-O101A after control rods are inserted, returns to EO.ZZ-0101 NRC-002 REV-0 1 Comments Note - Shortly after starting BPI 16, this filter will also clog requiring a manual scram Note - Continue to have the filter clog such that the turbine will automatically trip on low EHC pressure within 5 minutes of receiving the High Delta P alarm on the 2nd EHC pump.

NRC-002 Page 10 of 20 Rev.: 01

V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event / Instructor Activity 0

Once Rods are in TRIGGER RT-4 0

Expected PlantBtudent Response RO observes RPV level lowering and Drywell pressure rising.

CRS directs the BOP to start HPCl to control RPV Level BOP starts HPCl to control RPV level CRS enters EO.=-0102 based on high drywell pressure BOP attempts to control drywell pressure 1.68 psig using Drywell ventilation Containment Atmosphere control FRVS CRS directs the BOP to initiate Suppression Chamber Sprays NRC-002 REV-0 1 Comments BOP starts suppression pool Late: Assume i e cooling IAW AB-0001 Attachment Operator places B 3

RHR in Supp Pool Cooling BOP performs the following:

REDUCE B SACS total loop flow so that the following parameters will NOT be exceeded when the EG-HV-2512B is opened in step (2.0)

(establishing flow through the RHR Hx adds z 9000 gpm flow to the SACS loop):

Flow >17,000 with one SACS Pump running.

Flow >30,000 with B SACS supplying TACS.

NRC-002 Page 11 of 20 Rev.: 01

NRC-002 REV-0 1 V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event / Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments 0

ENSURE EG-HV-2512B is OPEN.

ENSURE BP202 RHR PUMP is RUNNING BOP starts the B RHR pump ENSURE the following valves are CLOSED:

A.

HV-F021B.

B.

HV-FOIGB.

Erequired, OVERRIDE THEN CLOSE HV-FO 17B.

0 Erequired, PRESS AUTO CL OVRD PB for HV-F024B.

THROTTLE OPEN HV-F024B UNTIL Loop B Flow indicates = 10,470 gpm.

0 ENSURE HV-F007B closes when flow is,1400 gpm.

CLOSE HV-F048A.

MAINTAIN LOOP B Flow = 10,470 gpm by THROTTLING OPEN/

Suppression Chamber Spray is Note: Suppression CLOSE HV-F024B.

required, Chamber Spray is THEN PERFORM the following:

required.

A.

PRESS HV F027B AUTO CL OVRD PB.

B.

OPEN HV F027B.

0 CRS determines that Supp.

Chamber Press CANNOT be maintained < 9.5 psig and orders initiation of Drywell Spray NRC-002 Page 12 of 20 Rev.: 01

V.

SCENAFUO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event / Instructor Activity Expected PlandStudent Response NRC-002 REV-0 1 Comments RO shuts down Recirc pumps BOP shuts down Drywell Cooling Fans BOP initiates 1 Loop of Drywell Spray IAW AB-0001 Att. 2 BOP performs the following actions in AB.ZZ-0001 Att. 2 ENSURE EG-HV-2512A is OPEN.

ENSURE AP202 RHR PUMP is RUNNING.

will trip after being BOP starts A RHR pump BOP reports A RHR pump tripped and aligns B RHR pump for Drywell BOP removes B RHR pump from Suppression Pool Spray as follows:

0 INITIATE B RHR Drywell Spray as follows:

Note: Assume A Drywell Spray is placed in service Note: A RHR pump started Spray 0

OVERRIDE THEN ENSURE HV-FO17B is CLOSED.

ENSURE HV-F024B is CLOSED ENSURE HV F027B is CLOSED.

OPEN HV-FO16B OPEN HV-F021B 0

VERIFY HV-F007B closes when flow is >I400 gpm.

CLOSE HV-F048B THROTTLE HV-F003B to maintain Loop B flow at = 10,470 gpm.

NRC-002 Page 13 of 20 Rev.: 01

V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event / Instructor Activity Expected PlantEtudent Response CT-2 BOP places Drywell Spray in service before Emergency Depressurization Criteria is reached Crew places Drywell Spray in service before Emergency Depressurization Criteria is reached.

BOP observes that Drywell and Suppression Chamber pressure is lowering CRS determines that Suppression Chamber Pressure can be maintained below the curve SCP-L Put the simulator in Freeze Termination Reauirement:

When the CRS has determined that ED criteria will NOT be reached OR At Lead Examiner Discretion NRC-002 REV-OI Comments Inform the candidates that the simulator is in freeze and to standby for follow questions NRC-002 Page 14 of 20 Rev.: 01

NKC-002 REV-01 VI.

SCENARIO REFEREN A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

1.

J.

K.

L.

M N.

0.

P.

Q.

R.

S.

T.

U.

V.

NC.TQ-DG.ZZ-0002 Conduct of Simulator Training.

NUREG 102 1 Examiner Standards JTA Listing Probabilistic Risk Assessment Technical Specifications Emergency Plan (ECG)

Alarm Response Procedures (Various)

SH.OP-AS.ZZ-0001 Operations Standards SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0101 Post Transient Response Requirements SH.OP-AP.ZZ-01 OX Operability Assessment and Equipment Control Program HC.OP-10.ZZ-0003 Startup from Cold Shutdown to Rated Power HC.OP-AB.IC-0003 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM HC.OP-AB.IC-000 1 Control Rod HC.OP-AB.ZZ-000 Reactor Scram HC.OP-AB.RPV-000 1 Reactor Power HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0 10 1 RPV Control HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0101A ATWS-RPV Control HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0 102 Primary Containment Control HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0202 Emergency RPV Depressurization HC.RE-IO.ZZ-0001 Core Operations Guidelines HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0006, POWER CHANGES DURING OPERATION NRC-002 Page 15 of 20 Rev.: 01

NKC-002 REV-0 1 b!

VlI.

NRCCRITICAL TIONAL NRC-002 / 00

1.

K/A 295037 SCRAM Condition Present and Reactor Power Above APRM Downscale or Unknown EA 1. Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to SCRAM CONDITION PRESENT AND REACTOR POWER ABOVE APRM DOWNSCALE OR UNKNOWN:

EAI.01 Reactor Protection System RO 4.6 SRO 4.6 EA1.03 ARI/RPT/ATWS RO 4.1 SRO 4.1 RRCS is manually actuated within 2 minutes of reaching an Automatic Scram setpoint..

RPS has failed to scram the reactor both manually, and automatically. Any Automatic RPS setpoint was chosen to ensure there is adequate protection for the fuel during transient analyses associated with coolant inventory decrease events. With the Turbine Stop valves closed and the reactor at power, reactor pressure will rapidly rise to the point where the SRVs lift and discharge into the Suppression Pool. The Suppression Pool is NOT designed to handle heat loads > Decay heat loads. This could cause Suppression Chamber pressure to rise until the Suppression Chamber ruptures. Additionlly, ARI is failed and will not automatically scram the reactor at any Automatic Setpoint. Operator action is required to shutdown the reactor. The need to manually initiate ARI within 2 minutes of reaching any Automatic Setpoint was chosen because it represents an acceptable level of performance considering the time needed to diagnose the RPS failure and the time required to implement the scram hard card.

2.

K/A 295024 High Drywell Pressure EA2 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE:

EA2.04 Suppression chamber pressure RO 3.9 SRO 3.9 K/A 223001 Primary Containment Systems and Auxiliaries A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the PRIMARY CONTAINMENT SYSTEM AND AUXILIARIES; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions of operations:

A2.02 Steam bypass of the suppressions pool RO 3.9 SRO 4.1 Crew places Drywell Spray in service before Emergency Depressurization Criteria is reached.

If suppression chamber pressure cannot be maintained below the pressure suppression pressure, EOPs direct actions to emergency depressurize the reactor. Drywell Spray initiation will prevent an unnecessary challenge to the Suppression Chamber and prevent a severe transient to the RPV that emergency depressurization will cause.

NRC-002 Page 16 of 20 Rev.: 01

NRC-002 REV-0 1 NRC-002 / 00 HOPE CREEK NRC - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE Y!N EVENT TRANSIENTS:

Y Turbine Trip Loss of Feedwater MSIV Closure Loss of Condenser Vacuum Inadvertent Open SRV Loss Of Offsite Power Station Black Out YM EVENT SPECIAL INITIATORS:

Loss of ssw Loss of SACS Loss of RACS Loss of Instrument Air Y

ATWS Y

LOCA COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY YM COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN YM COMPONENT. SYSTEM. OR TRAIN HPCI RClC One SRV One SSW Pump / Loop Circulating Water System - 4 pumps Class 1 E IZOVAC Bus - A Train Class 1E I20VAC Bus - D Train EDG A EDG B TACS OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE Y/N OPERATOR ACTION Y

Manual RPV Emergency Depressurization when required Manual RPV Depressurization during ATWS Initiation of RHR for Decay Heat Removal Initiation of Containment Venting Restore Offsite power within 45 minutes SACS / SSW restoration after total loss of both systems Avoiding Loss of Feedwater during transient Y

Recovery of the Main Condenser Complete this evaluation form for each Examination.

NRC-002 Page 17 of 20 Rev.: 01

NRC-002 REV-01 Rx Power: -83%

MWe: (May vary slightly):

Work Week: Any Risk Color: Green SMD: None River Temp: 65 Activities Completed Last Shift:

Lowered Power to 80% and performed a rod sequence change Removed the C RFP from service for a balance shot, completed balance shot and in process of returning C RFP to service (currently running in Recirc)

Major Activities Next 12 Hours:

Raise load to -80% and put the 3rd RFP in service.

Raise power to 100%

Protected Equipment:

None Tagged Equipment:

SLC Pump AP-208 is tagged out for pump rebuild and is expected back within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> No other equipment is Out of Service NRC-002 Page 18 of 20 Rev.: 01

IX.

SIMULATOR NRC mWWNALJDATI0N CHECKLIS~-.

0 1 i-NRC EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE REVIEWNALIDATION Note: This form is used as guidance for an examination team to conduct a review for the proposed exam scenario(s). Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed.

SELF-CHECK

1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

NRC-002 REVIEWER:

The scenario has clearly stated objectives in the scenario.

The initial conditions are realistic, equipment and/or Instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue crew into expected events.

Each event description consists of 0

0 The event termination point The point in the scenario when it is to be initiated The malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event The symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew The expected operator actions (by shift position)

The use of non-mechanistic failures ( e g pipe break) should be limited to one or a credible preceding event has occurred.

The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.

Sequencindtiming of events is reasonable ( e g the crew has time to respond to the malfunctions in an appropriate time frame and implements procedures and/or corrective actions).

Sequencindtiming of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.

If time compression techniques are used, scenario summary clearly so indicates.

The simulator modeling is not altered.

All crew competencies can be evaluated.

Appropriate reference materials are available (SOERs, LERs, etc.)

If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario.

Proper critical task methodology used IAW NRC procedures.

NRC-002 Page 19 of 20 Rev.: 01

NRC EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE VALIDATION (con?)

NRC Examination Validation:

Rev.

Date Comments Note: The following criteria list scenario traits that are numerical in nature. A second set of numbers indicates a range to be met for a set of two scenarios. Therefore, to complete this part of the review, the set of scenarios must be available. The section below should be completed once per scenario set.

NRC:

002 NRC:

SELF-CHECK

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Comments:

Total malfunctions inserted: 4-8/10- 14 Malhnctions that occur after EOP entry: I -4/3-6 Abnormal Events: 1 -2/2-3 Major Transients: 1 -2/2-3 EOPs used beyond primary scram response EOP: 1 -3/3-5 EOP Contingency Procedures used: 0-3/1-3 Approximate scenario run time: 45-60 minutes (one scenario may approach 90 minutes)

EOP run time: 40-70% of scenario run time Crew Critical Tasks: 2-5/58 Technical Specifications are exercised during the test Events used in the two scenarios are not repeated The scenario sets for the exam week do not contain duplicate scenarios NRC-002 Page 20 of 20 Rev.: 01

HOPE &XK ELECTRIC G E N E R A ~ G STATION NRC INITIAL LICENSED EXAMINATION SCENARIO 3 NOVEMBER 28,2005 SCENARIO TITLE:

APRM Failure/ Recirc Pump Hi Vibd LOP SCENARIO NUMBER:

NRC-003 EFFECTIVE DATE:

EXPECTED DURATION:

REVISION NUMBER:

PROGRAM:

REVISION

SUMMARY

New Scenario.

1.O Hours 1

I

~

~

I L.O.REQUAL INITIAL LICENSE

-1 OTHER PREPARED BY:

M. L. Brown NRC Operations Examiner 9/29/05 DATE FACILITY REVIEWER:

Nuclear Operations Training Supervisor -

Hope Creek DATE APPROVED BY:

NRC Chief Examiner DATE

NRC-003 REV-OI I.

OB JECTIVE(S)

Enabling Objectives A.

The crew must demonstrate the ability to operate effectively as a team while completing a series of CREW CRITICAL TASKS, which measure the crews ability to safely operate the plant during normal, abnormal, and emergency plant conditions.

(Crew critical tasks within this examination scenario guide are identified with an CT-x.)

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

Core Spray Pump test Raise Power if desired A APRM Fails Turbine Bldg. Chillers trip B Recirculation Pump High Vibration Loss of Offsite Power A EDG fails to start B RHR pump trips The plant is operating at 80% power, Middle Of Cycle returning to power after a mini-outage.

The Operators are at Step 5.4.29 of IOP-3, with the 3rd RFP having just been started on the previous shift. The OPRM System is INOPERABLE due to an existing 10CFR21 issue. The OPRM System is still functional but is considered INOPERABLE per Technical Specifications.

Core Spray Loop A operability PT will be performed. When the test return valve is opened, the pump will trip. Core Spray A should be declared Inoperable.

After declaring the A Core Spray pump inoperable and addressing tech specs, the Load Dispatcher will call and have the crew raise power. While raising power the A APRM fails causing the crew to enter Abnormal Procedure HC.OP-AB.IC-0004,NEUTRON MONITORING and bypass the APRM.

After the APRM is bypassed, the Turbine Building chillers will trip requiring the operators to swap cooling over to RACS, in addition Drywell pressure will rise to > 0.75 psig. The operators will enter AB.CONT-0001, Drywell Pressure to address the high drywell pressure. When pressure rises to > 0.75 psig, Operators will vent drywell. Once preparations are underway to vent the drywell, B Recirc pump vibrations will increase causing the operators to enter AB.RPV-0003, Recirculation system. Operators will reduce recirc pump speed in an attempt to clear the vibration alarm. Vibration will continue to increase and cause the operators to trip the B Recirc pump on high vibration. After tripping the Recirc pump the operators will have to scram the reactor due to being in Region 1 with OPRMs inop. When the operators have stabilized the plant after the scram a loss of offsite power occurs. The A EDG will fail to start and the B RHR pump will trip. With HPCl running the Operators will forced to start the A EDG to place A RHR in suppression pool cooling. The scenario will end once the operators have restarted the A EDG and place A RHR in Suppression Pool cooling.

NRC-003 Page 2 of 17 Rev.: 01

NRC-003 REV-0 1 Initial INITIALIZE the simulator to IC-5 (-80% power, MOL)

PLACE the 31d RFP in service MAKEUP N2 to the drywell until drywell and Suppression Chamber pressure are 0.53-0.57 psig ENSURE BOTH Steam Tunnel unit coolers are in service C/T CP161 TB Chilled water circ pump as follows ENSURE CP16 1 is not in service 0

0 PLACE CP161 in MAN C/T DKI 11 as follows:

0 ENSURE DKl 1 1 is not in service 0

PRESS DKI 1 1 STOP pushbutton ENSURE HV-9503D is CLOSED ET #

Description EVENT ACTION: Hp:copmp=l.o 1

COMMAND:

Trip HPCI Aux Oil Pump on start PREP FOR N m G @e., RMI 1 set points, procedures, bezel covers).

I I

1

~~

2 3

I Initial I Description I

Items required to be set up each time the SG is performed, i.e. tagged equipment, RMl 1 set points, procedures, etc.

EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE:

EVENT ACTION:

COMMAND:

PURPOSE:

COMPLETE Attachment 2 Simulator Ready-for-TrainingiExamination Checklist of NC.TQ-DG.ZZ-O002(Z).

PLACE Red bezel cover on DKI 1 1 PLACE Red bezel cover on HV-9503D PLACE Red bezel cover on CP 16 1 I

i d

t

... EVENT TRIGGER$

1 NRC-003 Page 3 of 17 Rev.: 01

NRC-003 REV-OI Description HV12 Steam Tunnel unit cooler BVH216 HP08 HPCI Aux Oil Pump Initial Delay Ramp Trigger Init Val Final Val NONE RUN RUN ET-1 UNTAGGED TAGGED Description Delay Ramp Trigger AN-ESFI OHA E5-Fl CHILLED WATER TRBL NONE CSO 1A Core Spray pump A trip RT-1 1A181 El DI DKl 1 1 SAFETY CKT pb 1A181 F LO DKlll STOP light 1A182 E DI HV-9503D OPEN pb 1A182 F LO HV-9503D CLOSE light 1A136 A2 LO CP161 INOP light NM2 1 A APRM Channel A reads high or low CWl8A AP161 Chilled Water Circ pump Trip RT-2 RT-3 NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE CW18B BP161 Chilled Water Circ pump trip 1

5 sec I

I RT-3 1A136 D DI CP161 AUTO pb 1A136 E DI CP161 START pb RR26B2 Recirc Pump BP201 elevated vibration 12:oo RT-4 EG 12 Loss of all off site power RT-5 NONE NONE DG07A Diesel Generator A emergency start I

I I NONE RH04B RHR pump BP202 trip NONE Init Val 0

0 Final Val 7 12 I

ON S I

I I

I I

I I

1 Initial E I

I I

I I

1 1

1 Initial F Description Delay Ramp Tripger 1A181 A2 LO DK111 INOP light NONE I

I 1A181 D D1 DKl11 START pb I

I I NONE I

I 1A136 F LO CP161 STOP light I

I I NONE OFF I

OFF I

OFF I

OFF NRC-003 Page 4 of I7 Rev.: 01

NRC-003 REV-0 1 V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event / Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments watchand C.0P-ST.BE-0002 TRIGGER RT-1 e

e BOP observes proper Core Spray pump A suction pressure BOP Ensures pump suction valve (HV-F001A) is Open BOP Sends an NE0 to pump to check pump out prior to start BOP Starts A Core Spray Pump while monitoring pump discharge pressure and confirms discharge pressure rises to > 300 psig in less than or equal to 5.0 seconds BOP Records time Core Spray pump was started BOP ensures the following:

Core Spray Division 1 Room Cooler fan has started Service Water Outlet valve is Open (NE0 to report)

BOP - Throttles open Core Spray Full Flow Test Byp Valve, HV-FO15A to obtain 2 4625 gpm flow.

BOP observes that A Core Spray pump has tripped BOP sends an NE0 out to determine cause of trip CRS refers to Tech Specs and determines Tech Spec 3.5.1 and determines that Action A (7 day LCO) applies NRC-003 Page 5 of 17 Rev.: 01

~

V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event / Instructor Activity Power Increase contact crew to raise Dower Expected Plant/Student Response Comments 0

e e

A APRM Fails e

After Power has been raised 5%

OR At the discretion of the Lead Examiner TRIGGER RT-2 CRS directs RO/BOP to coordinate Power increase to 90% at l%/minute using IOP-0003 NRC-003 REV-0 1 RO/BOP coordinate raising power RO slowly increases Recirc pump speed BOP monitors RFP speed to ensure proper response RO diagnoses and reports A APRM has failed UPSCALE scram Note: Should get a Half CRS acknowledges report and enters HC.10-AB.IC-0004, Neutron Monitoring RO stops all Control Rod Withdrawals any control rod RO bypasses the A APRM Note: Should not be withdrawals in progress RO ensures all RPS trip conditions are clear NRC-003 Page 6 of 17 Rev.: 01

NRC-003 REV-01 V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event / Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments 0

RO turns the A RPS Trip logic key to reset and returns it to the normal position 0

RO verifies that RPS is reset CRS refers to Tech Specs 3.3.1 Note: Should only be an INFO only LCO -

only required to have 2 OPERABLE TURBINE BLDG CHILLERS TRIP Once the CRS has addressed Tech Specs OR At the discretion of the Lead Examiner BOP diagnoses/ observes that the Turbine Building Chillers have tripped TRIGGER RT-2 0

RO/BOP observe Drywell temperature/ pressure rising 0

CRS directs entry into AB.CONT-0001, Drywell Pressure Section C

BOP performs the following:

ALIGN RACS to the Chill Water System for Drywell Cooling as follows CLOSE HV-9532-1 AND HV-9532-2.

PRESS LOOP A SPLY

/RTN OPEN RACS PB.

PRESS LOOP B SPLYRTN OPEN RACS PB.

NRC-003 Page 7 of 17 Rev.: 01

NKC-003 REV-0 1 V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event / Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments BOP Observes:

0 HV-9530AI/A3 CLOSED 0

HV-9530BI/B3 CLOSED HV-9530A2/A4 OPEN HV-9530B2/B4 OPEN BOP OPENS HV-9532-1 AND HV-9532-2.

Note - Crew may enter this section but it is not necessary for them to start the Drywell vent prior to moving On with 0

IF Drywell Pressure 2 0.75 psig, THEN CRS enters Section D -

Drywell Pressure 3 0.75psig AND No Evidence of Elevated Coolant System Leakage the scenario B Recirc Pump High Vibration Recirc pump vibration Once Drywell vent actions have been initiated OR At the discretion of the Lead Examiner RO diagnoses/ observes rising B TRIGGER RT-3 CRS directs entry into AB.RPV-0003, Recirculation System Section K

RO PRIOR to reducing Recirc Pump Speed, PERFORM the following:

0 ENSURE the following controllers are in MANUAL o SIC-R621A PUMP A SPD CONT CONT o SIC-R621B PUMP B SPD RO RECORD affected pump speed:

o B Recirc Initial Pump Speed NRC-003 Page 8 of 17 Rev.: 01

NRC-003 REV-01 V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event / Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments RO MAINTAIN the affected Pump ALERT limit [REFER to Table 21 clear as follows:

0 INTERMITTENTLY PRESS SPD CONT DECREASE push button on the affected Recirculation Pump.

INSERT Control Rods as required by Reactor Engineering Instructions.

0 RO ALERT limit cannot be maintained clear {REFER to Table 21 AND the affected Recirculation Pump Speed has been lowered by 220%

(below the value logged in Step K.I.B), THEN REMOVE the affected Recirc Pump from service Single Loop Operation.

RO removes pump from service IAW SIC-R621A(B) PUMP A(B)

IAW HC.OP-SO. BB-0002, CT-1 Crew removes Recirc Pump from service within 2 minutes of reaching the Danger Setpoint SO.BB-0002 RO performs the following:

If Danger Limit is Reached on Recirc Pump then 0 TRIP the affected Recirc Pump 0 Enter Condition A CRS - IMPLEMENT 10-6 requirements for Single Loop operations.

on power/flow map CRS determines region of operation NRC-003 Page 9 of 17 Rev.: 01

NRC-003 REV-0 I V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event / Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments Crew determines plant is in Region 1 of Power/Flow map and OPRMs are INOP.

CRS directs a Manual Reactor Scram IAW IOP-6 step 3.1.12 RO manually scrams reactor CT-2 OPRMs INOP RO performs actions of AB.ZZ-0001 Crew stabilizes the plant using RO locks Mode Switch in Shutdown RO verifies the Scram RO inserts SRMs and IRMs AND selects IRMs on the Recorders BOP verifies H2 injection system tripped BOP Trips the Main turbine and verifies Generator lockout is 0 Mwe RO maintains level between + I 2 3 and 54 RO starts RClC AB.ZZ-0000 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER Crew diagnoses Loss of Offsite After Crew has stabilized the plant in AI3.Z-0000 OR At the discretion of the Lead Examiner power TRIGGER RT-4 CRS directs entry into HC.OP-AB-0000 and HC.OP-AB.=-0135 BOP observes failure of A EDG to start and manually starts and closes EDG A output breaker RO observes the failure of B RHR Pump NRC-003 Page 10of 17 Rev.: 01

NRC-003 REV-01 V.

SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Event / Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments CRS directs that HPCl be placed in service for pressure control.

BOP attempts to place HPCl i nse rvice BOP reports that HPCl has tripped.

CRS directs that RPV pressure be maintained using SRVs and RCIC.

CT-3 Crew places Suppression Pool RO places RHR Loop A in Suppression Pool cooling Cooling in service prior to Suppression Pool temp.

exceeding 95°F Termination Requirement:

Put the simulator in Freeze Inform the candidates that the simulator is in freeze and to standby When RO has placed RHR for follow questions train A in Suppression Pool Cooling OR At Lead Examiner Discretion At Lead Examiner Discretion Have the CRS classify the event NRC-003 Page 1 1 of 17 Rev.: 01

NRC-003 REV-0 I SCENARIO A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

I.

J.

K.

L.

M.

N.

0.

P.

Q.

R.

S.

T.

U.

V.

NC.TQ-DG.ZZ-0002 Conduct of Simulator Training.

NUREG 102 1 Examiner Standards JTA Listing Probabilistic Risk Assessment Technical Specifications Emergency Plan (ECG)

Alarm Response Procedures (Various)

SH.OP-AS.ZZ-000 1 Operations Standards SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0 10 1 Post Transient Response Requirements SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0 108 Operability Assessment and Equipment Control Program HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0003 Startup from Cold Shutdown to Rated Power HC.OP-AB.IC-0003 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM HC.OP-AB.IC-0001 Control Rod HC.OP-AB.ZZ-000 Reactor Scram HC.OP-AB.RPV-000 1 Reactor Power HC.OP-EO.=-0 10 1 RPV Control HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0 10 1 A ATWS-RPV Control HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0 102 Primary Containment Control HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0202 Emergency RPV Depressurization HC.RE-IO.ZZ-000 1 Core Operations Guidelines HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0006, POWER CHANGES DURING OPERATION NRC-003 Page 12 of I7 Rev.: 01

NKC-003 REV-01 NRC CRITI kATI NRC-003 IO0

1.
  • CREW secures B Reactor Recirc pump within two minutes of Vibration reaching the DANGER limit IA W guidance in AB.RPV-0003..

WA 202001 Recirculation System A2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the RECIRCULATION SYSTEM ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations:

A2.17 Loss of seal cooling water RO 3.1 SRO 3.2 This action is listed as a Retainment Override in the Abnormal Procedure, a time limit of 2 minutes is deemed adequate for the operator to recognize the condition and take the appropriate action.. The basis of this action is to prevent pump damage and potential piping damage due to vibration. Damage to the pump casing is a degradation of a Reactor Coolant System boundary.

2.
  • Crew Manually Scrams the reactor within 3 minutes of entering Region I with the OPRMs INOP K/A 295006 SCRAM AA 1 Ability to operate andor monitor the following as they apply to SCRAM :

AA I.OS Neutron monitoring system.............................

R04.2 SR04.2 HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0006 precaution 3.1.12 states that IF the OPRMs are INOPERABLE Failure to manually scram the reactor when in the Power instability region results in a significant reduction in the safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

... IF Region 1 is entered, THEN MANUALLY SCRAM the reactor

  • Crew places Suppression Pool Cooling in service prior to Suppression Pool temp.

exceeding 95°F WA 295013 High Suppression Pool Temperature AAl. Ability to operate andlor monitor the following as they apply to HIGH SUPPRESSION POOL TEMPERATURE AAI.01 Suppression pool cooling..............................

RO 3.9 SRO 3.9 AA 1.02 Systems that add heat to the suppression pool......... RO 3.9 SRO 3.9 A Loss of Offsite Power has occurred, the only method of pressure control available to the Crew is to dump heat to the Suppression Pool. Failure to maintain Suppression Pool Temperature will result in a significant reduction in the safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

NRC-003 Page 13 of I7 Rev.: 01

NRC-003 REV-OI NRC-002 / 00 HOPE CREEK NRC - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE YM EVENT TRANSIENTS:

Turbine Trip Loss of Feedwater MSIV Closure Loss of Condenser Vacuum Inadvertent Open SRV Y

Loss Of Offsite Power Station Black Out y/N EVENT SPECIAL INITIATORS:

Loss of ssw Loss of SACS Loss of RACS Loss of Instrument Air ATWS LOCA COMPONENTA'RAINlSYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM. OR TRAIN y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN Y

HPCl RCIC One SRV One SSW Pump I Loop Circulating Water System - 4 pumps Class 1E 120VAC Bus - A Train Class I E I20VAC Bus - D Train Y

EDGA EDG B TACS OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE Y/N OPERATOR ACTION Manual RPV Emergency Depressurization when required Manual RPV Depressurization during ATWS Initiation of RHR for Decay Heat Removal Initiation of Containment Venting Y

Restore Offsite power within 45 minutes SACS I SSW restoration after total loss of both systems Avoiding Loss of Feedwater during transient Recovery of the Main Condenser Complete this evaluation form for each Examination.

NRC-003 Page 14 of 17 Rev.: 01

NRC-003 REV-0 1 Rx Power: 80%

MWe: (May vary slightly):

Work Week: Any Risk Color: Green SMD: None River Temp: 65 Activities Completed Last Shift:

Power lowered to 80% and Control Rod Sequence Exchange performed Major Activities Next 12 Hours:

Maintain power at 80% until contacted by the Load Dispatcher, then return to 100% power Complete HC.OP-ST.BE-0002, Core Spray Pump Loop A Full Flow Test. Currently in progress and completed up to step 5.23 (pump testing).

Protected Equipment:

None Tagged Equipment:

OPRM System is INOPERABLE due to an existing 10CFR21 issue. The OPRM System is still hnctional but is considered INOPERABLE per Technical Specifications.

No other equipment is Out of Service NRC-003 Page 15 of 17 Rev.: 01

SIMULATOR NRC'~EVIEWNALIDATION CHEC NRC EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE REVIEWNALIDATION Note: This form is used as guidance for an examination team to conduct a review for the proposed exam scenario(s). Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed.

SELF-CHECK

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

NRC-002 REVIEWER:

The scenario has clearly stated objectives in the scenario.

The initial conditions are realistic, equipment andor Instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue crew into expected events.

Each event description consists of:

0 0

0 0

The event termination point The point in the scenario when it is to be initiated The malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event The symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew The expected operator actions (by shift position)

The use of non-mechanistic failures ( e g pipe break) should be limited to one or a credible preceding event has occurred.

The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.

Sequencinghming of events is reasonable (e.g. the crew has time to respond to the malfunctions in an appropriate time frame and implements procedures andor corrective actions).

Sequencinghiming of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.

If time compression techniques are used, scenario summary clearly so indicates.

The simulator modeling is not altered.

All crew competencies can be evaluated.

Appropriate reference materials are available (SOERs, LERs, etc.)

If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario.

Proper critical task methodology used IAW NRC procedures.

NRC-003 Page 16 of 17 Rev.: 01

NRC EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE VALIDATION (conk)

NRC Examination Validation:

Rev.

Date Comments Note: The following criteria list scenario traits that are numerical in nature. A second set of numbers indicates a range to be met for a set of two scenarios. Therefore, to complete this part of the review, the set of scenarios must be available. The section below should be completed once per scenario set.

NRC:

002 NRC:

SELF-CHECK

1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Comments:

Total malfunctions inserted: 4-WIO-14 Malfbnctions that occur after EOP entry: 1-413-6 Abnormal Events: 1 -2/2-3 Major Transients: 1-212-3 EOPs used beyond primary scram response EOP: 1-3/3-5 EOP Contingency Procedures used: 0-3/1-3 Approximate scenario run time: 45-60 minutes (one scenario may approach 90 minutes)

EOP run time: 40-70% of scenario run time Crew Critical Tasks: 2-5/54 Technical Specifications are exercised during the test Events used in the two scenarios are not repeated The scenario sets for the exam week do not contain duplicate scenarios NRC-003 Page 170f 17 Rev.: 01

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